Independent directors’ dissensions and firm value
Date
2021
Authors
Choi, Wonseok
Rabarison, Monika K.
Wang, Bin
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
Elsevier
Abstract
Using a novel dataset of independent directors’ voting activities on items proposed by managers of Korean firms, we investigate whether independent directors’ dissension in board meetings plays an effective role in enhancing firm value through improved corporate governance. Our results indicate that dissension improves firm value. This finding is robust to different measures of firm value and alternative model specifications including subsample, propensity score matching, and instrumental variable analyses. Overall, we contribute to the understanding of the relation between corporate governance and firm value. Specifically, we provide new evidence that the monitoring by independent directors enhances firm value.
Description
Article originally published in The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 80, 258–271. English. Published online 2021. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.qref.2021.02.003
Post-print under embargo until May 2023
Post-print under embargo until May 2023
Keywords
Corporate governance, Independent, Board of directors, Dissension, Firm value
Citation
This is a post-print version of an article that is available at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.qref.2021.02.003. Recommended citation: Choi, W., Rabarison, M. K., & Wang, B. (2021). Independent directors’ dissensions and firm value. The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 80, 258–271. This item has been deposited in accordance with publisher copyright and licensing terms and with the author’s permission.