Choi, WonseokRabarison, Monika K.Wang, Bin2023-03-232023-03-232021This is a post-print version of an article that is available at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.qref.2021.02.003. Recommended citation: Choi, W., Rabarison, M. K., & Wang, B. (2021). Independent directors’ dissensions and firm value. The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 80, 258–271. This item has been deposited in accordance with publisher copyright and licensing terms and with the author’s permission.https://hdl.handle.net/11274/14718https://doi.org/10.1016/j.qref.2021.02.003Article originally published in The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 80, 258–271. English. Published online 2021. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.qref.2021.02.003Post-print under embargo until May 2023Using a novel dataset of independent directors’ voting activities on items proposed by managers of Korean firms, we investigate whether independent directors’ dissension in board meetings plays an effective role in enhancing firm value through improved corporate governance. Our results indicate that dissension improves firm value. This finding is robust to different measures of firm value and alternative model specifications including subsample, propensity score matching, and instrumental variable analyses. Overall, we contribute to the understanding of the relation between corporate governance and firm value. Specifically, we provide new evidence that the monitoring by independent directors enhances firm value.en-USCorporate governanceIndependentBoard of directorsDissensionFirm valuePost-Print