Choi, WonseokChung, Chune YoungPark, Jongchan2023-03-232023-03-232021This is a post-print version of an article that is available at https://doi.org/10.1111/ajfs.12331. Recommended citation: Choi, W., Chung, C. Y., & Park, J. (2021). Pension fund monitoring and corporate debt policy: Evidence from the Korean market*. Asia-Pacific Journal of Financial Studies, 50(2), 210–237. This item has been deposited in accordance with publisher copyright and licensing terms and with the author’s permission.https://hdl.handle.net/11274/14719https://doi.org/10.1111/ajfs.12331Article originally published in Asia-Pacific Journal of Financial Studies, 50(2), 210–237. English. Published online 2021. https://doi.org/10.1111/ajfs.12331Post-print under embargo until April 2023We investigate whether the Korean National Pension Service, a corporate watchdog and major long-term investor in South Korea, positively affects corporate financial policy. The Korean National Pension Service is less likely to influence corporate financial policy even among firms with high uncertainty and information opacity, which increases the importance of large shareholders’ monitoring role. Additionally, ownership by the Korean National Pension Service has statistically insignificant effects on firms’ performance and financial soundness.en-USBlockholdingInstitutional monitoringKorean marketKorean National Pension ServiceTarget capital structurePost-Print