THE WAGES OF FEAR: HOW GENDER, IDEOLOGY, AND SYMBOLIC THREAT
INFLUENCED THE VOTING BEHAVIORS OF WHITE SOUTHERN WOMEN
IN THE 2016 AND 2020 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

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DEDICATION

For my loving wife, Toni, this would never have been possible without you. Thank you for your support over the years, your confidence in me, and the occasional goading. You were always there when I needed you most.

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ABSTRACT

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The purpose of this thesis is to determine whether gender, ideology, and symbolic threat predict the voting behaviors of white southern women; whether these decisions influence political affiliation of partners/spouses/family; and whether threat is weaponized to influence voting behaviors. This study uses three sources of data: the 2016 ANES Time Series Study, the 2020 Time Series study, and a third source consisting of systematic analysis by CPOST in 2021 of those who stormed the U. S. Capitol on January 6, included to further explore the role of symbolic threat. Multinomial logistic regression is used to model the relationship between the independent variables and the nominal dependent variable.

Using models for politics, religiosity, demographics, threat, and all measures combined, the research reveals that white southern women are responsible for the selection of political candidates for their families and symbolic threat controls the selection of political candidates by targeting family values.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

AMERICAN NIGHTMARES

Throughout history, Americans have found many bad things about which to worry. Before many of our 20th-century problems, Americans were concerned about wet winters and dry summers, about illness and injuries in times of primitive medical procedures, and about poor harvests. In our rapidly changing world, people have discovered new concerns, as well as fears about what the future might hold.

The 2016 and 2020 presidential candidates relied heavily on newly emerging threats endangering America, and how other politicians did nothing to mitigate those threats. The fears the Republican Party outlined resonated with its voter base and brought forth the worst of our societal urges to other citizens' concerns: voter worries couched in the form of new technologies in the hands of youth, the impact of popular culture, immigration laws, racial unrest, and the Black Lives Matter movement.

Americans have been having political nightmares for a long time. When they wake from these nightmares, they can dismiss their fears or talk about them using rhetoric resonating with us. It makes even the smallest problems seem to have tremendous implications for what may come (Best 2018). Voter frustrations concerning the strength of the support Trump received from white southern women in 2016 (Stout, Kretschmer, and Ruppanner 2017) are understandable, but history provides perspective and makes this story even more interesting. The 2016 election does not stand alone but shares its roots with events in the earliest history of our country. As we shall see, the presidential election of 2016 was more complicated than many people think, and it also prompts us to question what happened in 2020.

Most white southern women – indeed, most white women – historically vote Republican (Tuchfarber et al., 1995; Jaffe 2017). Nevertheless, the question most people want to ask is, *why* do they vote as they do? That was the question asked that prompted research for my 2019 capstone project, but although there were discoveries about *how* white southern women voted, the question of *why* still lingers.

Feminist theories stress how inequalities between the sexes can differentially affect male and female experiences and behavior (Bolzendahl and Myers 2004). These theories dovetail into thinking of gender as exhibiting a social structure of chronological and cultural variations and being influenced by smaller stressors. It can also be said – unfairly – that in the 2016 presidential election, like all elections, informed voters ought to have voted their consciences or for the person who best represented their interests.

However, one could ask, are American voters indeed informed? Was this an instance of inequalities between the sexes differentially affecting male and female voting behavior? Both candidates were among the most unpopular in American history, so did ideology, distrust, and dislike of the Democratic nominee turn the tide?

Moreover, it is important to note that there has been a downward trend in voter turnout in recent years, except for the 2008 and 2020 elections. Barack Obama won his first term as President in 2008, a strong year for the Democrats after poor reception for the Bush administration's policies, several open-seat elections, and following a period of partisan and ideological polarization (Campbell 2009), not unlike the experiences of the 2020 election season.

If all eligible voters participated, the political map of the United States would look startlingly different. Voter suppression was voiced as chief among the greatest fears in 2020 (as

well as in 2016), and arguably baseless voter fraud was at the root of court filings by the

Republican party in the aftermath of that same election.

Munsey (2008) notes that voting is inconvenient, time-consuming, and often seems

pointless. People's voting reasons are widely varied, including altruism, habit, egocentrism, self-

expression, or fear of social admonition. People who vote are more altruistic, while those who do

not vote are more self-interested (Munsey 2008). Munsey also notes that people generally vote

because they believe that they can make a difference, and there is low regret and high

satisfaction when voting and their choices win (Munsey 2008). In the 2016 election, there

appears to have been an intersection of racial/ethnic tensions, gender, party ideologies and

affiliation, and income. Hillary Clinton won the popular vote, but Donald Trump carried the

Electoral College and became president (Hinton 2019). Those same factors may have

precipitated a reversal in the 2020 presidential election.

Problem Statement

The purpose of this thesis is to determine the influence of gender, ideology, and symbolic

threat on the voting behavior of a sample of white southern women in the 2016 presidential

election and on the voting behavior of a sample of white southern women in the 2020

presidential election, as well as a comparison between the behaviors of those population samples

of white southern women of the two elections. Using data from the American National Election

Study (ANES), the research examines the influence of gender, ideology, and symbolic threat on

white Southern women's voting behaviors in both election cycles. The 2021 study of American

insurrectionists by the Chicago Project on Security and Threats (CPOST) is included to provide

additional support to the findings on the use of threats – symbolic, status, and racial – in United

States elections.

The study will contribute to a greater understanding of the possible effects of party ideology and affiliation, gender, and symbolic threat on white southern women's voting behaviors in the 2016 and 2020 presidential elections. There is a lack of studies addressing the voting behaviors of this traditionally neglected group of voters. Following the events of the 2020 elections, the effects of symbolic threat on voting populations has become prescient of future election strategies.

The structure of the study allows us to address the following limitations in the previous literature, including the factors playing crucial roles in the voting behavior of minority groups (through the lens of race), the alteration of women's gender consciousness and views on gender issues (through the use of gender as a variable), the awareness of voters of the consequences of their decisions (in the exploration of the landscape post-January 6), the roles of class perceptions and religious belief in the selection of leaders (both social class and religiosity are used as variables), and the usefulness of the tactics of subordination of minorities, institutionalized racism, and outgroup fears in the utilization of status threat to influence voting behavior.

In their study on how southern women changed American politics, authors Angie Maxwell and Todd Shields (2019) argued that: "The sacred goddess associated with white Southern womanhood renders white Southern women ill-suited for the rough terrain of political life, or so the story goes…Yet white Southern women who embrace this ideology can rally for 'family values' because those values are patriarchal or traditional or biblical and because those values are all Southern" (Maxwell and Shields 2019:13-14). However, politically active women attract sharp criticism and violence: consider viral images from the January 6 attacks on the U. S. Capitol, showing photos of a man with his feet on the desk of House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, and

another of a man carrying the Speaker's lectern through the rotunda. Speaker Pelosi is, arguably, the most powerful person in American politics.

There is a dearth of research concerning the voting behaviors of white southern women. My capstone undergraduate honors project (Hinton 2019) found that *Linked Fate*, or how one identifies with a group – usually a significant other – and the belief that one's life successes tie into that group's success was crucial to the political behavior of white southern women. The 2019 study suggested a stronger correlation between ideology and party identification for women than for men. The regression results indicated that, while ideology and party identification are significant predictors of white southern women's voting behaviors, those predictors are less robust for white southern men. It was therefore concluded that the voting behavior of white southern women drives that of their male partners (Hinton 2019). While this behavior may explain how white southern women vote, again it does not explain why they vote as they do. Toward the purpose of investigating this more fully, marital status is examined as a variable in this new study.

The thesis poses the following questions: Why do white southern women exhibit the voting behaviors they exhibit? Do these same actions comparatively hold for white college-educated versus white non-college-educated voters, respondents of differently perceived income, black versus white voters, and for men as well as for women? We now know that, according to the Brookings Institution (2019), the 2018 midterm elections were fueled by a turnout of Democratic-voting college-educated women, women of color, and young people. The thesis also examines data about those groups.

STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS

Chapter 3 reviews related literature. A review of literature on voting behavior and the ideology and party identification of voters in Section 1 is followed by reviews of literature on voting behavior and sociodemographic factors, specifically religion, income, and class in Section 2, education in Section 3, gender, race, and marital status in Section 4.

The final two sections, respectively, review literature on the voting behavior of white southern women and symbolic power threat in Section 5 (with a short review of the Trump administration's activity) and identify the research questions in Section 6.

Chapter 4 describes the methodology, including data and data analysis. Chapter 5 presents the findings from the 2016 and 2020 analyses. Chapter 6 summarizes the results and discusses implications, limitations, and future research. Chapter 7 is a postscript providing a view and perspectives of the January 6 protests and assault on the capitol.

CHAPTER II

BACKGROUND

This chapter outlines the background of the study. The first section reviews Symbolic Threat. Section two focuses on Racial Threat. Section three focuses on the 2016 election. Section four outlines the 2020 election. And section five concludes the chapter with an overview of what came before the 2016 and 2020 elections, providing a historical overview of the democratic process and the inequities endemic in that system.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Bourdieu and Symbolic Violence

The 20th-century French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu was opposed to the separation of theory and research. He felt reasoning and adjusting to thought methods were almost all within the context of a concrete evidentiary approach to the study and interpretation of information. He did not merely advocate qualitative research methods but also drew on an amalgamation of quantitative and interpretive data in a mixed-method approach.

Bourdieu's *Theory of Action* revolves around the concept of "habitus," generally defined as the way someone perceives and reacts to the world (Bourdieu 1990). However, Bourdieu described it as a socially constituted ordering system that directs thought, perception, expression, and action. Actions generated by habitus can approximate those specified by *Rational Action Theory*, also known as *Rational Choice Theory*, a framework for understanding social or economic behavior. Aggregate social behavior results in turn from individual actors' behavior, each making personal decisions. The question of what factors influence a particular choice being made shows that an individual has preferences among the available alternatives that allow them the options they like. These preferences are considered complete and transitive – in other words,

the alternatives they prefer alone, in combination, or none-at-all, also the determination that if choice A is larger than B, and B is larger than C, then A is also larger than C (Oxford Languages 2021).

Every person performs a personal cost/benefit analysis to determine if an action is worth pursuing the best possible outcome in every instance. For example, a voter decides which candidate or party they will select, based on who will fulfill their needs the best on essential issues. The belief is that rational choice predicts a pattern of selections and outcomes. Individuals exhibit self-interest, balancing costs against benefits to maximize personal advantages (Oxford Languages 2021).

Symbolic violence is also a term invented by Bourdieu. The term first appears in his work beside concepts like *symbolic power*, which are actions that have discriminatory or injurious meanings, and *cultural capital,* or knowledge and skills that prove social status (Bourdieu 1994). Symbolic violence describes non-physical violence between social groups by imposing a majority group's norms on a subordinate group. Symbolic violence can express itself through nationality, gender, sexual orientation, or ethnic identity.

While not a deliberate action by a hegemony, symbolic violence is an unconscious reinforcement of the accepted "norm" by that social class. Symbolic violence is also expressed through such things as body language, presentation, and adornment (Bourdieu et al. 2013).

The theory might be applied to immigration between the United States and Mexico, wherein United States border protection and laws aimed at cracking down on illegal immigration help perpetuate symbolic violence in the form of the relationship between the indigenous Mexican migrant laborers and their farm supervisors in the United States. There was, for example, the recent report on a migrant farm worker who died in a Seattle hospital.

Brought into the United States under the H-2A visa program as a guest worker, the Mexican farm worker was expected to pick blueberries. A suit filed upon his death charged that his employer caused their migrant workforce to believe they could suffer harm and repercussions unless they submitted to their employer's labor demands, including working 12-hour shifts and minimum quantities of produce picked per hour (Bacon 2018).

There was a growing trend prior to the 2020 election that more blatant forms of hostility toward out-groups were weakening. Nevertheless, western social science developed a heightened interest in the problem at its more institutionalized stage (Makashvili et al. 2018). It should be stressed that threat in theory is concerned with perceived versus actual threats, as perceived threats have real social consequences. Stephan, Ybarra, and Morrison (2009) distinguish two types of perceived threats: realistic, which are threats to the actual well-being of a group, and symbolic, which are threats to cultural values and traits different to those of the out-group. But the clarity of the difference between the two may be problematic, and in the present study the issue is addressed in Pape by experimentally manipulating the threats (Pape 2021). This has been emphasized due to methodological limitations.

Blalock and Racial Threat

As a part of the conflict perspective, racial threat theory says that the majority group, usually identified as whites, perceives an increase in the non-white population's power or size as threatening and takes measures to eliminate the perceived threat. The theory has been extended to include minority populations, specifically ethnic or immigrant populations, and much criminology has tested a perceived threat's effect on criminal justice outcomes. Rather than employing a measure such as the percentage of a given population as black, the standard was expanded to include perceptual measures of threat, such as whether people agree with statements

describing blacks as a threat to public safety and social order (National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine 2018).

According to *Blalock's Racial Threat Theory*, the symbolic threat would occur if there were prejudice due to the presence of an in-group and an out-group. The threat could come from four sources: feelings of group superiority of one group over another, racial differences between the two groups, the dominant group's claim to advantages or privilege, and fear of losing those privileges (Stephan et al. 2009).

For this study, the prediction is that white southern women will modify their voting behaviors in response to the perceived threat if they feel one candidate will better protect their interests: job security, family values, and the sanctity of white southern womanhood. Suppose a symbolic threat becomes a *Dominant Group Status Threat*. In that case, the dominant group will do whatever they feel they have to do to protect their beneficial hierarchy, which leads to voter suppression, threats to economic stability, assaults on peaceful protesters, combined with a shift in voting behavior. Along with marital status and symbolic threat, other variables considered for their singular and combined effect on voting behavior include race, education, and family income.

The GOP's 2016 campaign emphasized nightmare images. The nominee announced his race for the presidency by declaring the American Dream's death, that Mexican immigrants were violent criminals, and that America was no longer great. He continued by arguing that Muslim extremists represented a threat, that government regulations were killing American industry, that attacks on police were threatening our very way of life, and that policy failures were the cause of American carnage. Apocalyptic warnings from supporters and opponents included environmental

collapse, economic ruin, terrible inequities, medical hazards, loss of institutions, out of control technology, and a menace from space (Best 2018).

While racial threat does not only target blacks as the bogeyman, most racial and ethnic populations in the United States are affected by problems in classification due to the arbitrariness of racial/ethnic categories, assimilation, and amalgamation (Perez and Hirschman 2010). This is not true of African Americans, who are the notable exception. The boundaries between whites and blacks – low intermarriage rates and the use of hypodescent – are so unambiguous and rigid, that one is hard put to dispute the relationship between the terms "racial threat" and "African American" (Omi 2001).

For that reason, the terms black or African American are used where other racial or ethnic terms might just as easily suffice. A quick perusal of the internet shows the terms black, Negro, African American, Black African, African Caribbean, Caribbean American, and others used copiously in scholarly and professional writings. While this is true, it should be recalled there is considerable diversity within populations of African descent, and one should exhibit caution as these terms can be both inaccurate and offensive.

The 2016 Election

Edison National Election Poll (Mohdin 2016) and exit poll results (Huang et al. 2016), claim that women overwhelmingly voted for Donald Trump: 54 percent of women voted for Clinton, with black women for the most part driving the gender gap, while most *non-college-educated* white women voted for Trump (64 percent). Giving support to this claim, according to Sarah Jaffe (2018), 53 percent of *all* white women voters chose Trump. "Clinton won women voters overall, but that puzzling number has befuddled commentators or eluded their attention completely" (Jaffe 2018).

Nevertheless, polls only can tell so much of the story. Out of the 73.7 million women who voted in the 2016 election, 53.1 million identified as white and non-Hispanic. The claim that white women mostly voted Republican comes from the 2016 exit polls, an in-person survey taken at polling places and adjusted to match the actual numbers reported by voting authorities. However, Edison Research serves numerous news organizations and is known to have systemic biases. As a result of their structure, these polls over-represent people who are likely to stop and be interviewed by a pollster. Exit polls intend to give a snapshot of the demographic breakdown, and careful analysis has shown that the actual percentage of white women voting for Trump was 47 percent. In comparison, Clinton's votes were 45 percent, nearly a tie (Pew Research Center 2016). Even more people voted in the 2020 election, where reported numbers were as high as 161 million people – 66.8 percent of the United States population.

The common wisdom is that the Republican nominee won the presidency in 2016 due mainly to white, non-college-educated men in the south, an old Republican stronghold since the Southern Strategy. Regardless, there is some speculation that white southern *women* played an essential role in the 2016 election and the 2020 election. Maxwell and Shields (2019) have published excellent research on the Southern Strategy and its effects on southern women's voting behaviors, as mentioned above. To address the actual role of white southern women, this thesis will look at the voting behaviors of white southern women in the 2016 Presidential election. It will also examine voting preferences highlighted in the 2020 Time Series Study of registered voters, using the most currently available data. Lastly, it will explore the influence of symbolic threat on the voting behaviors of these women.

The 2020 Election

It is interesting to note that the 2020 election cycle also exhibited racial, ethnic, and gender tensions, class unrest, poor polling results for the presidency, and heavily contested seats. According to Bargh (2017), the strategy of the Republican party appears to have been to utilize threats to manipulate voting behaviors, particularly among women voters – Bargh studies free will and personal responsibility and is the developer of the "Hot Coffee Study."[1] The Trump Administration has made the appearance of being strong on crime, which results in increased police expenditures, profiling, arrests, heavy sentencing, and policing actions. It equated protests of its policies with riots, and those of its supporters as "peaceful protests." All the while, it was consolidating its power base through the mobilization of law enforcement and various militia and paramilitary groups. With these controversial tactics employed during the election season's preparations and the challenges to the election results' authenticity, what were the effects on the 2020 presidential election? Will the face of American Democracy look the same in the aftermath?

Among the salient studies providing insight into this exploration are Stout, Kretschmer, and Ruppanner's analysis of Linked Fate (2017) and Gentzkow (2016), who provides a close examination of ideology and party identification in his "Polarization in 2016." Tolnay, Beck, and Massey (1989) present one of the first theory-driven efforts to explain Blalock's 1967 *Power Threat Hypothesis*. Author and journalist Isabel Wilkerson (2020) posits a connection between early deaths among middle-aged white people, reported in late 2015, with a *symbolic threat*.

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[1] Intriguingly, recent human research points to the involvement of the insula in the processing of both physical temperature and interpersonal warmth (trust) information. Accordingly, Bargh hypothesized that experiences of physical warmth (or coldness) would increase feelings of interpersonal warmth (or coldness), without the person's awareness of this influence. However, it should be noted that recent research has called these conclusions into question.

Arlie Russell Hochschild (2018) provides a window into the thinking of voters struggling under the burden of failed petroleum companies and broken promises from Republican politicians in rural Louisiana who voted for Donald Trump. Lastly, Robert Pape argues that insurrectionists on January 6, 2021, came from over 40 states, established communications on encrypted channels, and otherwise acted with an almost military precision in their attack. This exemplifies a stark departure from most political rallies (Pape 2021).

To better understand what will be put forth in this thesis, it would be best to examine what came before 2016. In that, there is a story to tell. It can be said that history can familiarize, as much as it can warn. What it cautiously instructs, then, is for us to pay attention to the south.

Bourdieu said that the logic of the social world can only be grasped if one closely examines the historically located and dated empirical reality, constructing from that a specific example or case in all the world of finite possible configurations (Bourdieu 1994). The approach is to apply what is known about our logical models to the periods of the elections of 2016 and 2020, in the hope to find structure that has been overlooked.

What Came Before

In 1787, the specter of slavery stalked the Constitutional Convention just after the end of the Revolutionary War. As author Ron Chernow observes, "The states were divided into different interests not by their difference of size, but principally from their having or not having slaves…" (Chernow 2004:238). In other words, not between large and small states, but between northern and southern. Slavery shaped the racial relations in America's early history in a range of ways. Nevius (2021) tells us that "varying social and political contexts shaped the discussions held by the fifty-five white male delegates to the Philadelphia convention of 1787."

The Virginia Plan, drafted by James Madison, proposed a three-branched government and a bicameral legislature where the states would be represented based on their population. Asking whether wealth should not be counted as well as people and states resulted in the three-fifths clause, counting three-fifths of the slave population in the overall population count – counting only humans as property as an indication of wealth. For many southerners, the slavery issue allowed no room for concessions, and they supported the Virginia Plan in exchange for protecting their peculiar institution. Charles Cotesworth Pinckney of South Carolina stated: "South Carolina and Georgia cannot do without slaves" (Nevius 2021:238). The other side of the coin was the belief that, if allowed to expand into the new western states, slavery would slowly die out.

"Slavery, an historical human condition, was central to the development of race relations throughout eighteenth century British colonies of which the United States was born" (Nevius 2021). Meanwhile, Republicanism (the "faction" that formed around Thomas Jefferson) was centered in compromise "informed by the politics of racial hatred, borne of the significant demographic shifts caused by the Revolutionary War" (Nevius 2021). Here I will note that political parties act on principle, while James Madison described factions as citizens "adverse to the rights of other citizens or the permanent and aggregate interests of the community" (Carey and McClellan 2001:42-49).

Alexander Hamilton's *Report on Public Credit* (1790) set fiscal and economic policy and proposed reorganization of the national debt and public credit establishment. It put forth the concept that state debts from the Revolutionary War be assumed by the federal government, better to settle with creditors. However, it did further crystalize the divisions between north and south. "There was a popular conception … that the original holders of government paper were

disproportionately from the south and that the current owners who had 'swindled' them were from the north" (Chernow 2004:303). Despite attempts to educate politicians on economics, "the impression persisted that crooked Northern merchants (sic) were hoodwinking virtuous Southern farmers" (Chernow 2004:303).

The Civil War, fought between 1861 and 1865, resulted after a decade of failed attempts to reach a compromise following the admission of California into the Union as a free state and the endorsement of popular sovereignty in the western territories (Nevius 2021). While the most simplistic answer for the cause of the bloodiest conflict in America's history was fighting over the moral issues of slavery, the *economics* of slavery and the wish to have political control over that system was central to the conflict.

Fighting presumably over states' rights, the southern states wanted to assert their interests over the Federal Government to abolish federal laws interfering with keeping slaves and taking them across the country as they wished. These rights included transporting slaves into the western territories as the nation expanded, while the north wanted to maintain the new domains open only to white labor. The newly minted Republican Party – distinctly different from today's – was opposed to the expansion of slavery into newly forming states.

That party nominated an astute politician by the name of Abraham Lincoln as its presidential nominee in 1860. Lincoln's election without a single southern electoral college vote signaled the end of the southern states' influence. These states turned to the only option they felt they still had, secession from the Union, which immediately led to war.

Following the Civil War period (1865-1877), attempts to redress the inequities of slavery, economic problems, and readmission of the Confederate States into the Union had mixed results. Reconstruction was a laudable experiment in interracial democracy and restructuring both the

federal system and the definition of citizenship. Unfortunately, Reconstruction suffered from several flaws, ranging from loyalty oaths to limitations on blacks' right to vote to the "very intelligent" and those who served in the Union Army.

After Lincoln's assassination, Johnson initiated a different Reconstruction view, limiting requirements for readmission of Confederate states to the Union and granting them mostly a free hand for managing their affairs. The former Confederate States responded by enacting Black Codes limiting former slaves' economic options and reestablishing plantation discipline (Forner 2020).

The events marking the division between classical and contemporary sociology occurred in the mid-twentieth century: The Great War (1914) and Fascism (1922), the Great Depression (1929), World War II (1939), and the Cold War (1947). Beginning about 1930, these factors influenced the thinking of social theorists about what shaped some societies into democratic institutions while others became dictatorships. Barrington Moore argued that this was due to the paths to modernization and historical conditions – whether the pre-modernized agriculture of a country involved the use of serfs tied to the land like slavery or was based on peasant workers who were free (Calhoun, Gerteis, Moody, Pfaff, and Virk 2012).

There came a tipping point between the Civil War and the New Deal, where the Democrats used big government to gain political power, and the Republicans rhetorically opposed the expansion of big government for federal power. The New Deal (1933) opened many opportunities to form broad political alliances based on the opposition to federal policies that threatened reconfiguration of southern race relations or made the federal government more present in state schools. The New Deal also threatened the educational agendas of segregationist women. Depression-era budgets made it impossible for advocates to counter attempts in schools

of telling only a white history of the south. Feeling that gross inequalities would bring federal interference to the south, southern Governors pushed for free textbooks – mostly from southern writers – and segregationist monitoring of curriculums. Most of these southern textbooks created a narrative where only white Americans were worthy of acknowledgment and a place in history (McRae 2018).

The Deep South was home to the most authoritarian, undemocratic, partisan political systems in the nation. Only 10 to 20 percent of the voting-age population voted in the presidential elections between 1920 and 1940. In South Carolina and Mississippi, over 90 percent of votes cast were for the Democratic candidate from 1900 to 1944 (Mickey 2015).

Most voters supported Roosevelt's New Deal, some into his third term, but not all. By 1937, a combination of Social Security, the Works Project Administration, the anti-lynching bill, and the court-packing plan was too much for southern conservatism. Differentiating themselves into the "New Deal Democrats" (who fully supported Roosevelt) and the "Jeffersonian Democrats" (who were mostly white), most opposed the court expansion (McRae 2018). In a prescient move, white southern women targeted First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt for undermining segregation when she dined with African Americans. "In blaming Eleanor, white southern women diminished the validity of black protest, took away black initiated violence as a political strategy, and elevated the role white women played in a segregated nation" (McRae 2018:117).

World War II was a significant turning point in the Jim Crow south. Many white soldiers fighting alongside black soldiers felt their attitudes change, for perhaps the first time in their lives seeing blacks as human beings. World War II left the legacy that all humans should expect democracy and freedom and that white supremacy and totalitarianism should perish. Still, those with changed attitudes only made up for a small percentage of the white southern servicemen.

About two-thirds felt that blacks should have the same rights as before the war upon their return, and those who had stayed at home felt even more strongly about segregation (Sokol 2006).

However, many whites disagreed (Sokol 2006). Southern women had come to identify themselves as three classes of voters: Jeffersonian Democrats, Dixiecrats (Democrats who left the party in 1948 in opposition to civil rights), and lapsed Democrats who had joined the Republican party. The southern Democrats continued to hemorrhage members into the next decade.

White southern women left the Democratic party in 1952 to vote Republican: 59 percent of white southern women voters cast their ballot for Eisenhower in that year. White southern women's support for Eisenhower *outdistanced white southern men's by 18 percent*" (McRae 2018; emphasis my own). Given this, for white women, this was but the first step in partisan realignment. For those who voted for the Republican ticket, the days of the Solid South had come to an end.

Senator Lyndon Johnson pushed through the Civil Rights Act of 1957, creating a Civil Rights Division and establishing a committee on voter suppression, and Eisenhower signed it into law. In September of the same year, Central High School in Little Rock became desegregated. Anti-communism also formed an integral part of white southerner's views on civil rights – how else could the changes in race relations better be explained? Into the 1960s, "communist" came to be a catchphrase for anything associated with social change (Sokol 2006), just as is true of "socialist" today.

As the 1968 Presidential election drew near, Nixon embarked on his "Southern Strategy," tailored to white concerns: people who were more receptive to law and order instead of opposing civil rights (Sokol 2006). By 1968, just half of southern voters defined themselves as Democrats.

CHAPTER III

LITERATURE REVIEW

The first section of this chapter reviews literature on voting behavior and the ideology and party identification of voters. The second section reviews literature on voting behavior and religion, income, and class of voters. The third section reviews literature on voting behavior and the education achieved by voters. The fourth section reviews literature on voting behavior and the gender, race, and marital status of voters. The fifth section reviews the literature on voting behavior of white southern women and symbolic power threat. The sixth section lists the theoretical framework. And the last section poses research questions.

VOTING BEHAVIOR AND IDEOLOGY/PARTY IDENTIFICATION

The popular media attempted to explain the 2016 presidential election results in terms of ideological polarization and how it fractured the political process. One way to look at evidence of polarization in the American population is self-identification, or how Americans look at themselves. This view's gold standard is the American National Election Study (ANES), a nationally representative survey conducted before and after each election, going back to 1948 (Gentzkow 2016). In Gentzkow's study of the election in 2016, he looked at how the responses to party identification evolved over time and found no evidence of growing polarization. The second variable he examined was party ideology, and again there was no evidence of increasing polarization (Gentzkow 2016:7).

While Gentzkow's 2016 study argues for no evidence of increasing polarization, some data suggests otherwise. For example, for Republicans, Gentzkow contrarily claims the correlation with the frequency of holding pro-immigration views has *decreased*. He then holds that most voters hold either liberal or conservative opinions across the board (Gentzkow 2016). If true, this is a serious issue in that what divides people has become increasingly personal. More and more

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Americans describe themselves as strongly conservative or strongly liberal, while fewer describe themselves as moderate (Gentzkow 2016:5).

VOTING BEHAVIOR AND RELIGIOSITY/INCOME/CLASS

Following the 2016 election, many sociologists attempted to explain the American electorate's decisions (Kreiss 2017; Mast 2017; Norton 2017). One theory is that support for the Republican party was a defense of America's supposed Christian heritage in the eyes of many supporters (Whitehead et al. 2018). Based on a random sample of adults after the 2016 election, Whitehead found substantial evidence that indicates that Christian Nationalism played an essential role in which Americans voted for Donald Trump. Christian Nationalism is a pervasive set of beliefs that views a Republican presidency as essential to restore a Christian future, and Whitehead found it was the only significant religious predictor of voting for the GOP candidate (Whitehead 2018).

It is important to consider why the relationship between income and partisanship varies across United States regions. Yet the larger question is what relationship is there between income and partisanship in the first place. There have been various explanations posited for the 2016 presidential election outcome, including *economic dissatisfaction*, sexism, racism, or several phobias (Whitehead, Perry, and Baker 2018).

Polls leading up to the election indicated that white *working-class men* (and women), particularly in Ohio, Michigan, Wisconsin, and Pennsylvania (the Rust Belt), were the strongest supporters as the Republican nominee appealed to voters' distrust of immigrants as a threat to the economy and to job security. Besides popular class-based explanations, studies have shown that other cultural commitments played an even larger role (Whitehead 2018). However, scholars have identified a commitment to a vision of the nation's religious heritage and identity with a

Protestant work ethic (Whitehead 2018). With working-class Americans paying the price for mass immigration, it was claimed, the immigrants had to come into the country legally, were more likely to gain an education and become citizens and were accepting of the classic American values.

Recent work in behavioral science seeks to explain income-based voting and its deviations in states and counties (Hersh and Nall 2016). There are two schools of thought about the relationship between income and partisanship. First, it is weaker in more affluent states than in less affluent states, where race has consequences for redistribution. Second, differences in the support for reworking social welfare policies and income redistribution are related to racial heterogeneity, and support for public goods is impeded by ethnic and racial fractionalization (Hersh and Nall 2016).

Because nationally representative surveys such as the ANES have insufficient samples for analysis within regions as low as state house districts, scholars have developed new approaches such as employing a combination of data from multiple surveys (Hersh and Nall 2016). Income-based voting is looked at in terms of region, with the south an outlier. The differences between southern and non-southern states are pronounced only in districts with high proportions of African Americans (Hersh and Hall 2016). The Black Belt states are most notable – these encompass the region from central Alabama and Mississippi into North Carolina. Racial segregation and polarized politics in this region (more affluent whites voting Republican and more impoverished blacks voting Democrat) ensure a high coefficient of black Democrat voters (Hersh and Nall 2016). The myth of southern exceptionalism has been disproven, as southern voting behaviors remain much the same as they have for decades.

The results of the 2016 ANES shows some interesting and significant information about white southern women who voted: 28 percent have a Bachelor's degree or more, they have an average age of 48 years, they self-identify slightly more as conservative (37.2 percent) than liberal (31 percent), they self-identify more as Democrat (43.7 percent) than Republican (35.9 percent) or Independent (20.5 percent), and distribute toward the more racist end of the racial resentment scale (an average of 9.84 on a 0 to 16 scale) (Tien 2017).

There is a persistent ideal that formal education is the primary mechanism behind citizenship. Education consistently increases political participation, voter turnout, civic engagement, political knowledge, and democratic ideals and principles (Hillygus 2005). Understanding how the educational process has such a profound effect on democratic behaviors may explain how it affects voter choice.

Education is the strongest predictor of political participation, even when other socioeconomic factors are considered (Shields and Goidel 1997). There are thousands of analyses that demonstrate a strong relationship between formal education and democratic behavior, though a definitive answer is missing as to why education influences this behavior (Miller and Shanks 1996).

The most prominent and likely explanation is the *Civic Education Theory*, which stipulates that education provides both skills needed for political engagement and understanding politics. Education provides the skills necessary for navigating the political world. Meanwhile, it is puzzling that there has been a dramatic increase in education but a decline in political engagement since the 1960s (Brody 1998).

The *Social Network Hypothesis* argues that education determines political engagement, not so much due to its skill-building, but because education breeds a position in social networks (Nie, Junn, and Stehlik-Barry 1996). Closer ties with the center of politically influential social networks affect the level of participation.

A third theory states that intelligence begets educational attainment. *Political Meritocracy Theory* suggests that traditional schools separate those with higher intelligence from less proficient students (Herrnstein and Murray 1994). Education might be a predictor of cognitive ability, thereby predicting political participation. Conversely, it would only be fair to argue that separation of those perceived to be more intelligent provides them with a more fertile atmosphere, wherein cognitive ability flourishes.

Of the three competing theories, there is the strongest support for the Civic Education Theory, although it appears that a more elaborate explanation is still needed. It also seems clear that the impact of higher education on engagement is not a function of the school's size or quality. The research does indicate that curriculums geared toward verbal skills and civics better prepare students for the political world (Brody 1998).

In his study of politics and the life cycle, Kinder (2006) suggests that children express strong attachments to the nation and think of themselves as partisans because their parents are partisan. The origins of such beliefs center on Social Learning Theory that children will imitate and internalize their parents' beliefs (Bandura 1969). Studies seem to bear out the concept of high-school seniors copying their parents' party ideology (Kinder 2006). On most other matters of belief, however, the connection is weak.

Analysis indicates that political development occurs mainly in the impressionable years of late adolescence to early adulthood, but it does not stop there. Neighbors can affect political

thought, as can family. Individuals, however, do not seem to grow more conservative as they age (Kinder 2006:1906).

Persistent inequalities such as income, professional development, and education attained have always characterized participation in politics. Well-educated parents tend to produce better-educated children. Kinder notes that inversely, while these inequalities have increased over the last 30 years, participation in civic and political life has decreased (Kinder 2006). Since my research is focused on white southern women, a very specific sample of this much larger group, I refer again to the 2016 ANES and its findings concerning this thesis' targeted group.

VOTING BEHAVIOR AND GENDER/RACE/MARITAL STATUS

Linked Fate is how one identifies with a group and the belief that one's life successes tie into that group's success (Dawson 1994). While there is robust literature from studies showing that Linked Fate plays a crucial role in the political behaviors of blacks, Latinos, and Asian Americans (Dawson 1994; Stout, Kretschmer, and Ruppanner 2017), it has only recently been connected to the role of gender (Stout et al. 2017).

Much of the research identifies a gender gap wherein married women have lower levels of gendered consciousness than their unmarried counterparts. Marriage alters women's perception of their interests by institutionalizing their partnerships with men. Scholars hypothesize that married women will have fewer connections with other women while accepting more conservative views on gender issues (Stout et al. 2017). Marital status is essential because public opinion polls have captured differences between married and unmarried women. Married women are less invested in the concerns and issues of unmarried women.

In exploring the effects of marital status on Gender-Linked Fate for black women, there were no statistically significant differences between black single and black married women.

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Marriage does not shift black women's gender attitudes, possibly due to different matrimonial unions they form than do whites (Stout et al. 2017).

The study by Stout and his colleagues suggests that Gender-Linked Fate has severe implications in American politics (Stout et al. 2017). Research has shown that Gender-Linked Fate is not a good predictor of political ideology (Gay, Hoschschild, and White 2016). All the same, this study connects lower levels of Gender-Linked Fate to less self-identification as Liberals and Democrats (Stout et al. 2017). While nothing can completely explain how the marriage gap is linked to partisanship and ideology, Gender-Linked Fate performs as well as or better than other variables.

VOTING BEHAVIOR AND SYMBOLIC POWER THREAT

Between 1889 and 1931, nearly 3000 blacks were lynched in the south. There is some argument that whites lynched blacks to retain political hegemony (Tolnay, Beck, and Massey 1989). While southern whites have used an impressive collection of tactics in the subordination of minorities, lynching was perhaps the most brutal. Blalock (1967) hypothesized two types of perceived threats that could motivate a group to discriminate against a minority: competition over economic resources and competition for political power. Further, he identified three types of discrimination related to control: restriction of political rights, symbolic forms of segregation, and ideological systems based on threat. A fourth possible type is symbolic violence, such as lynching.

In June of 1934, a committee of Nazi bureaucrats met to debate the options for a framework for an Aryan nation, turning ideology into law. They met to present their research findings into how other countries had come to protect racial purity and sat down to closed-door sessions. As they worked out what would eventually become the Nuremberg Laws, their plan

included learning from how the United States managed marginalized groups and protected its ruling white citizens. As Pulitzer Prize-winning author and journalist Isabel Wilkerson (2020) notes, they began debating how to institutionalize racism in the Third Reich by asking how the Americans did it.

Wilkerson further posited a connection between early deaths among middle-aged white people, which was reported in late 2015, and symbolic threat. She asked what could account for this group's worsening prospects, which were unique to the western world and a singular trend in the United States. The trail leads to a shift in demographics, erosion of labor unions, perceived status loss, fears concerning their place in the world, and resentment of waning security, and it has a name: *Dominant Group Status Threat*, the sense that an outgroup is doing better than one's dominant group (Wilkerson 2020).

In further support of symbolic threat other than racial in nature, Todd Frankel writes in *The Washington Post* on February 10, 2021, that most of the arrests for trespass as part of the riot at the Capitol were of people who, despite their outward signs of success, experienced lengthy financial struggles. "…what you're finding is more than just economic insecurity," he quotes Dr. Cynthia Miller-Idriss, a political science professor at American University, "but a deep-seated feeling of precarity about their personal situation" (Frankel 2021). That precarity, along with a sense of betrayal about someone taking things away, may have mobilized a substantial number of people to march on the Capitol, riot, and breach the seat of American liberty.

In 2021, Dr. Robert Pape, a political scientist at the University of Chicago, announced the results of research by the Chicago Project on Security and Threats (CPOST). Analyzing 377 people arrested in the wake of the insurrection of January 6, he and his colleagues found that – unlike previous protests supporting Trump – these people were older and more professional, had

no ties to right-wing groups, and were 95 percent white and 85 percent male (Pierce 2021). What brought them to support the GOP candidate?

Weber (1991) recognized four types of social actions: rational, instrumental, traditional, and affectual (emotional). He further acknowledged two types of affectual actions: uncontrolled reactions and emotional tension. In an uncontrolled reaction, there is a lack of restraint and absence of discretion. There is an argument to be made that participating in the insurrection or the act of voting for a candidate who epitomizes worst traits in the voter might be described as an uncontrolled affectual reaction.

The Former President

While women of color are responsible for the gender gap in elections, white women have voted Republican for over six decades (Sokol 2006). Four possibilities present themselves: that these sixty years were the early stages of a political realignment of women attempting to fix perceived systemic inequality, that white women all too often align their political interests to those of white men as they have since before the Civil War, that more significant numbers of white women are organizing politically in ways that build racial solidarity, or, lastly, that white women were targeted for threats to family, job security, or economic prosperity and responded to those threats in kind. These may become the framework for further investigation on the subject in a later study.

HYPOTHESES

The following three hypotheses will be explored in the thesis. These have been broken down so that they might be better addressed individually.

Hypothesis 1 states that marital status impacts white southern women's voting behaviors – voting as do their husbands in the 2016 and 2020 elections as would be predicted by Linked

Fate Theory. My own research in a 2019 capstone supported a contrary view, that husbands could follow the lead of their wives. This thesis study takes a fresh look at that data.

Hypothesis 2 posits that most white southern women vote for Republican candidates. Particularly in the aftermath of January 6 – which occurred at the very end of writing the results of the research on this thesis – into the months that followed, it begs the question of why women would support a political ideology set on attacking their constitutional rights. There certainly must be superb reasons for that support, and the research suggests what those might be.

Lastly, Hypothesis 3 posits there was greater perceived threat among white southern female respondents in 2020 as opposed to 2016. Threat is a new variable for the 2020 election data, and it was not available for 2016. This study examines that data as well.

At this point, it is crucial to note that voting behavior is a part of the behavior of electors – by which I mean a person who has the right to vote in an election (nominated to a slate at the party convention, a relic of Article II, Section 1, Clause 2 from the records of the Federal Convention of 1787). By the study of this behavior, we can begin to understand how decisions are made by voters. This study in its simplest form can be said to be an attempt to understand how variables influence voters' decision-making processes, or how they select their candidates. It goes a long way toward understanding how those voters think. But it does not completely explain every action of those voters.

The first hypothesis posits that marital status impacts white southern women's voting behaviors – voting as do their husbands in the 2016 and 2020 elections as would be predicted by Linked Fate Theory. The research does show predictors for southern women in ideology, party identification, religiosity, race and ethnicity, and marital status, just as other studies have also

shown. The 2016 and 2020 analyses show a slightly stronger correlation in ideology and party identification for southern women, which is surprising.

As was discussed, there is robust literature from studies that show gender linked fate as having an impact on women and their male partners in the form of a gender gap. Nonetheless, while being female has a significant effect on preference for Trump versus Clinton, when all measures are combined, there is a much less significant effect on preference for Trump versus Biden. Political ideology and party identification were both significant in the elections. The effect of party identification for men appears to be stronger than the effect for ideology in terms of voting for Trump versus Clinton, albeit gender does not appear to have a significant effect on the likelihood of voting for Trump.

More simply, does marital status impact white southern women's voting behaviors – voting as do their husbands in the 2016 and 2020 elections? The results of prior studies would imply that southern women follow the lead of the most important male in their household – be it husband, father, or male relative – in their political choices. Instead, multinomial logistic regression results show ideology and party identification to be very strong and significant predictors of voting behaviors of the target population of white southern women, although those same predictors are less strong in southern men.

In fact, when all other predictors are taken into consideration in my fourth model, party identification remains a strong predictor of voting behavior for white southern women, while party identification's regression coefficient is greater than for male southerners in the same model. We may tentatively conclude that it is not the male southerners who are driving southern women to vote as they do (Hinton 2019), but the political ideology. This supports Gender-

Linked Fate theory, and the hypothesis that the variables can play a role in predicting voting behavior.

The second hypothesis posits that most white southern women vote for Republican candidates. Regarding this statement, while most white women vote Republican, why do they do so? This study indicates that gender-linked fate theory may indeed have serious implications in American politics. Again, while no one variable can completely explain the link between the marriage gap and partisanship, perhaps gender-linked fate performs well, although not as expected. It suggests that factors such as party identification may be so strong that they are outweighing gender in terms of their influence, and that seems to be an interesting result, as well.

A second possible answer lies in the racial tensions remaining post-Reformation. The south remained segregationist into the mid-twentieth century, and the New Deal under Roosevelt threatened the segregationist agenda. The shift from the Democratic party to the Republican party began in the early twentieth century and reached a critical point with the early Southern Strategy when Truman introduced the pro-civil rights platform in 1948, switching the parties, and Goldwater and Nixon developed the strategy to politically realign the south (Sokol 2006).

Lastly, the third hypothesis states that there was greater perceived threat among white southern female respondents in 2020 as opposed to 2016. This is an important consideration leading into other questions. When hearing Republicans' dire warnings about riots, looting, racial unrest, and the threats concerning immigrants, did women, and especially white southern women, react differently? And it returns us to the story told at the beginning of this thesis about what came before the 2016 and 2020 elections, questioning whether an attempt was made to use symbolic threat to influence voter behavior in elections.

Symbolic threat in the study was measured using questions inclusive of fair voter counts and the use of violence to overturn legal elections. These are measured specifically in both the Pape study and the 2020 ANES by the questions of whether the voter felt the 2020 election had been stolen, and whether they felt that violent means might be justified as a response to the stolen election.

There is abundant evidence that symbolic threat was used and at least as effective as economic hardship, affective action, and the so-called "left behind" thesis in affecting voting behaviors, and there are strong indications that symbolic threats were a consideration in the minds of a non-insignificant representation of voters in the General Election in November of 2020 (Pape 2017; Mutz 2018). The Left-Behind Thesis states that those who lost jobs or experienced wage hardship from job loss choose to punish the incumbent party for their perceived economic hardship (Mutz 2018). But this does not seem to be supported by the data, which shows that voting behaviors preferring the Republican candidates are embraced largely by wealthy white voters.

Furthermore, early on in 2020 Trump made it clear to his audiences that the election would not be fair, and that anything but his re-election would be fake or rigged, claiming the votes would be stolen by the Democrats and their allies. When the COVID-19 pandemic erupted in the most intense pre-election season, Trump intensified his focus against mail-in voting, inciting outcries against non-existent voter fraud.

In the next chapter, I will outline in detail the methodology used in the study, the three sources of data used, the variables used and the logic of their selection, and how that data was analyzed.

CHAPTER IV

METHODOLOGY

This chapter details the methodology for the study. The first section examines the data

and sample selected for the study. The second section details the variables used in the study and

the reasons for their selection. The third section details the analysis of the data obtained.

DATA AND SAMPLE

This study uses three sources of data. Data from both the 2016 ANES Time Series Study

and the 2020 Time Series Study are used, with the third source of data consisting of a systematic

analysis of the Capitol Hill Insurrectionists conducted by CPOST in 2021 of those who stormed

the U. S. Capitol on January 6. This is included to further the examination of the role of symbolic

threat. This CPOST analysis utilizes official court documents and media sources of the primary

demographics, socio-economic characteristics, and militant group affiliations – over 1500

documents – of 444 (as of May 14, 2021) individuals arrested by the FBI and the Washington

DC police for offenses related to those riots (Pape 2021).

The 444 individuals charged with either being inside the Capitol or on the Capitol

grounds were analyzed by CPOST and were compared to the demographic profile of 108

individuals arrested by the FBI or local police for deadly violence connected with right wing

causes from 2015-2020 and other data on right-wing extremists. This analysis is comparable to

Pape et al. 2017, "American Face of Isis," and is drawn upon to inform the discussion of

insurrectionists to be covered later in the thesis.

The sample from the 2016 presidential election is from data obtained from the American

National Election Study (ANES), an academic survey of U. S. voters typically conducted before

and after every presidential election since 1948. The 2016 sample contains 3647 respondents from the post-election sample. A total of 204 southern women and 147 southern men are used for the analysis. All respondents in the 2020 sample group completed the 2020 survey online. By "southern," the sample is taken from the 11 former Confederate States: North Carolina, South Carolina, Mississippi, Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Texas, Virginia, Arkansas, and Tennessee.

The 2020 respondents are pooled from three separate opt-in non-probability panels conducted in April 2020 including a total of 7453 post-election interviews: 1473 were male respondents, and 1607 were female. Some variables have been removed from the 2020 Preliminary Release dataset to protect respondent confidentiality. Examples of restricted variables include, but are not limited to detailed geography, detailed religious denomination, birth date, detailed education, detailed business/industry, detailed occupation, detailed race/ethnicity, nationality, and detailed income. [2]

The ANES 2020 Exploratory Testing Survey was conducted to test new questions and carry out methodological research to inform the design of the ANES 2020 Time Series study. Distinct from many ANES pilot surveys, the primary aim of the ANES 2020 Exploratory Testing Survey was to allow for more targeted experimentation and testing of longer batteries of questions, with less concern for estimation of population characteristics. In line with these goals, the study relies on non-probability samples, and no sampling weights are provided. I would caution readers about the use of these data in making inferences about the distribution of opinions in the American electorate. However, it has been included to inform the discussion.

The survey content was significantly shaped by ideas offered by the ANES user community through public solicitations and by members of the ANES national advisory board. Additional questions were included to capture changes in the political environment and recent developments in social science research. The questionnaire includes questions about voting behavior, candidate traits, political engagement, ideological orientations, racial identity and stereotyping, and many topical issues including #MeToo, immigration, impeachment, and the coronavirus pandemic (ANES 2021).

The ANES Combined Pre- and Post-Election Survey, which concluded on November 3, 2020, included new content about voting experiences, attitudes toward public health officials and organizations, anti-elitism, faith in experts/science, climate change, gun control, opioids, rural-urban identity, international trade, the MeToo movement, transgender military service, perception of foreign countries, group empathy, social media usage, misinformation, personal experiences, health insurance, identity politics, immigration, media trust and misinformation, institutional legitimacy, campaigns, party images, trade tariffs and tax policy. The partial release date was July 19, 2021, and a full release was completed August 2021. The same two questions were included as a measure of threat in both the Pape study and the ANES (ANES 2021).

Data Collection

The ANES 2016 collection was from early September 2016 through January 2017. Pre-election interviews were conducted two months before the 2016 presidential election, followed by post-election interviews beginning in November 2016. Face-to-face interviewing complemented data collection via the Internet. The two methods were conducted using separate samples, although the questionnaires were substantially identical, the sampling administered over

the Web was a representative sample separate from the face-to-face sample (ANES 2016).

The 2020 survey was conducted between August 2020 and November 3, 2020. The final post-election sample includes responses from 7453 adult citizens from across the United States.[3] At the time of this writing, data for the ANES 2020 post-election survey was only just released on the ANES website at https://electionstudies.org/. For purposes of this thesis, the 2020 post-election dataset and questionnaire is used (ANES 2021).

The ANES reports that the interviewing mode in 2016 was face-to-face (N=1181), using the variable V160501 as a filter variable to select only the Web cases; the interviewing mode for the 2020 sample was provided by three separate opt-in internet panel vendors, with the variable set to V200002 selecting only web cases. The weight variable for 2016 was set to V160102 post-election weight – full sample, while the weight variable for 2020 was set to V200010b post-election weight, full sample. Stratum and cluster variables for complex standard errors were set to the stratum variable for the full sample.

The data examined as a determinant of symbolic threat were collected from all individuals arrested by FBI, Capitol Hill Police, and DC Police for entering the US Capitol or breaking into the Capitol grounds on January 6, 2021, collecting primary demographics such as age, gender, race, geography of residence, socio-economic factors like occupation or prior military/police service, affiliation in militias, organizations, or groups existing prior to 2021. Furthermore. a comparison was made to 108 right-wing extremists arrested by FBI for deadly violence from 2015 to 2020 and other data on past right-wing extremists based on information from Official US Court Documents and open-source media reporting (Pape 2021). The method

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[3] These study highlights are taken from the *2020 Exploratory Testing Survey,* as outlined at the website https://electionstudies.org/data-center/2020-exploratory-testing-survey/.

was comparable to Pape et al., "American Face of ISIS" (January 2017).

Variables

  As race is a variable in both the 2016 and 2020 ANES datasets, it is important to note that the race categories are used for civil rights legislation by the Office of Management and Budget. They are an arbitrary classification scheme and may vary from year to year. The variables for the 2016 analysis are enumerated, followed by the variables for the 2020 analysis.

VARIABLES FOR 2016 ANALYSIS

Dependent Variable

  The Dependent Variable for the 2016 dataset is "For whom did you vote in the 2016 Presidential election?" It is measured by responses to item V162034a and renamed Trump2016. The response options were recoded such that 1 = Hillary Clinton, 2 = Donald Trump, 3 = Other candidates, and 0 = None.

Independent Variables

  The Independent Variables are Ideology, Party Identification, Religiosity, Family Income, Race/Ethnicity, Social Class, Education, and Marital Status. Symbolic Threat was not measured in 2016. Political Ideology is measured by responses to item V162171, which included response options coded as 1 = Liberal, 2 = Moderate, 3 = Conservative, and 0 = None. Party Identification is measured by responses to V161158x, recoded as 1 = Democratic, 2 = Independent, 3 = Republican, 0 = None.

  Religiosity is measured by item V161245, Church Attendance, recoded as 1 = Never, 2 = A few times a year, 3 = Once or twice a month, 4 = Almost every week, 5 = Every week, or 0 = None, and Religious Importance, item V161241, recoded to 1 = Important, 2 = Not Important.

Family Income is measured by V161225x, or 1 = Under $5000, 2 = $5000-25,000, 3 = $25,000-60,000, 4 = $60,000-100,000, 5 = $100,000+, 0 = None. Race/Ethnicity is measured by Race, which is coded as 1 = White, 2 = Black, 3 = Asian, 4 = Hispanic, 0 = None. Social Class is measured by V161307, or recoded as 1 = Lower class, 2 = Working class, 3 = Middle class, 4 = Upper class, 0 = None. Education is measured by edu_lvl, recoded to 1 = HS or less, 2 = Some college, 3 = College Undergrad, 4 = Graduate degree, 0 = None. Marital Status is measured by V161268, recoded as 1 = Married, 2 = Never married, 3 = Divorced, 4 = Widowed, 0 = None.

Gender is measured by responses to item V161342, which were recoded as Gender Male, 1 = Male, 0 = None, and Gender Female, 2 = Female, 0 = None. Region is measured by responses to V161010d, South, with options coded as Southern states = 1 and 0 = None.

While symbolic threat will not be measured for 2016, this is not to say that racial threat was not present in the 2016 Presidential election. This is evidenced by Republican candidate's use of the "strong on crime" argument in response to the "southern border crisis," immigrants taking jobs from American workers, and immigration laws.

VARIABLES FOR 2020 ANALYSIS

Dependent Variable

For the 2020 Post-Election Questionnaire, the Dependent Variable was V201021 renamed Trump2020, "For which candidate did you vote in the Presidential primary?" These were recoded as 1 = Joe Biden, 2 = Donald Trump, 3 = Other Candidates, and 0 = None.

Independent Variables

The Independent Variables are Ideology, Party Identification, Religiosity, Family Income, Race and Ethnicity, Social Class, Education, Marital Status, and Symbolic Threat. Ideology is measured by responses to item V201201, or Political Ideology, which includes

response options recoded as Liberal, Moderate, Conservative, or None. Party Identification is measured by responses to V201639, coded as 1 = Democratic, 2 = Independent, 3 = Republican, and 0 = None.

Religiosity is measured by Religious Importance, coded as 1 = Very Important, 2 = Important, and Church Attendance (V201453), coded as 1 = Every week, 2 = Almost every week, 3 = Once or twice a month, 4 = A few times a year, 5 = Never, or 0 = None. Family Income is measured by item V201617x, which is coded as 1 = Under $25,000, 2 = 25,000-50,000, 3 = 50,000-75,000, 4 = 75,000-100,000, 5 = 100,000+, and 0 = None. Race/Ethnicity is measured by V201549x, coded as 1 = White, 2 = Black, 3 = Hispanic, 4 = Asian, 0 = None. Social Class is measured by V202352, divided into Lower = 1, Working = 2, Middle = 3, Upper Class = 4, and 0 = None. Education is measured by V201639, coded as 1 = High School or less, 2 = Some College, 3 = Undergrad, 4 = Graduate degree. Marital Status is measured by V201508, recoded as 1 = Married, 2 = Never married, 3 = Divorced, 4 = Widowed, 0 = None.

Gender is measured by responses to item V202637, which was recoded as Gender Male, 1 = Male, 0 = None, and Gender Female, 2 = Female, 0 = None. Region is measured by responses to the item V203000, South. Options are recoded to Southern states (the former Confederate States) = 1 and Northern states = 0.

Lastly, symbolic threat is measured with data consisting of the answers to the following items: V201351, Votes, "How accurately do you think votes will be counted?" recoded as 1 = Not at all, 2 = A little, 3 = Moderately, 4 = Very, 5 = Completely, 0 = None; and item V201602, Violence, "Do you feel it is justified for people to use violence to pursue their political goals in this country?" recoded as Not at all = 1, A little = 2, Moderately = 3, A lot = 4, A great deal = 5, None = 0.

DATA ANALYSIS

The project uses data drawn from the ANES. The data are hosted by the Inter-university Consortium for Political Science Research (ICPSR) in Ann Arbor, MI, and are available for online analysis. Although the ANES utilizes the Survey Documentation and Analysis (SDA) statistical web-based package for the analysis of survey data, the data for the thesis was analyzed with the SPSS 27 software package. As the dependent variable is a categorical variable with more than two possible outcomes, *multinomial logistic regression* was used. The betas reported in the tables in the following chapter on results of the study are *unstandardized*: an unstandardized coefficient represents the amount of change in a dependent variable Y due to a change of 1 unit of independent variable X.

Furthermore, since data for both the 2016 and 2020 surveys were collected using a complex sampling procedure, the full-sample post-election weight was chosen. Separate analyses were run for both the 2016 and 2020 data, and the research questions were addressed with multinomial logistic regression analyses. Descriptive statistics were used to present the characteristics of respondents for each election year. Regression analyses, one for men and one for women, were also run for each year for voting behavior. As SPSS takes the highest numbered category as the reference category for the outcome variable unless otherwise specified, the reference category was set to the candidate in category 1 (Clinton in 2016, Biden in 2020).

Finally, an index was created combining responses to two selected variables to make a measure of symbolic threat, however the addition of the two variables could not create a reliable Cronbach's alpha. More specifically, the Cronbach's alpha was .057. Hence, the two measures of symbolic threat were treated separately.

Separate analyses were computed for female and male southerners for the years 2016 and 2020. Four models were calculated for the female southerners' sample, and four were calculated for the male southerners' sample for each of the target years.

Specifically, Model 1 examines the effect of political measures, Model 2 examines the effect of religious measures, and Model 3 examines demographic measures. Model 4 examines symbolic threat, which is only used in the 2020 analysis, while Model 5 is a combined model that includes all predictors.

CHAPTER V

RESULTS

The first section of results describes the characteristics of the participants and the

analysis for the 2016 American National Election Survey data. The second section describes the

characteristics of participants and the analysis for the 2020 American National Election Survey

data.

CHARACTERISTICS OF PARTICIPANTS AND ANALYSIS 2016

2016 Participants

Table 1 indicates that an average of 45.5 percent of participants were female, while 54.5

percent were male. Out of the 4271 cases in the sample, 1409 cases were excluded due to invalid

codes in variables in the analysis, by fillers and weights, and due to other variables. By weighted

results, 63.7 percent of study participants were white, 6.9 percent were black, 2.1 were Asian,

13.7 percent were Hispanic, and the remaining 13.6 percent were classed as Other.

Most participants were politically moderate (56.6 percent of men and 52.5 percent of

women); most men identified as Republican (43.1 percent) while most women identified as

Democrat (50.9 percent); most men identified as Protestant (35.8 percent), and most women

(38.8 percent) identified as Other. Female participants were more likely than men to attend

church regularly (34.0 percent versus 28.0 percent), make less money than men (21.5 percent

versus 29.3 percent making less than $100K), and were more likely to be white (66.8 percent

versus 58.8 percent). Men were less likely to identify as middle class (46.7 percent versus 51.2

percent). Both men and women were likely to have a high school education or less. Most of the

individuals in the study were between 33 and 55 years of age. Most men were married (54.8

percent), while most women were not (49.9 percent).

Table 1. Characteristics of Participants 2016

Characteristic	Male		Female	
	N	%	N	%
Ideology				
Liberal	214.2	15.8	327.5	23.9
Moderate	764.4	56.6	718.6	52.5
Conservative	372.9	27.6	322.5	23.6
Party Identification				
Democrat	715.1	42.0	946.3	50.9
Moderate	255.5	14.8	240.5	12.9
Republican	743.9	43.1	674.0	36.2
Attends Church				
Protestant	345.5	35.8	387.6	34.6
Catholic	264.2	27.4	272.3	24.3
Jewish	14.5	1.5	26.2	2.3
Other	341.3	35.3	434.9	38.8
Frequency Attendance				
Every Week	278.0	28.0	388.7	34.0
Almost Weekly	202.3	20.4	227.0	19.9
1-2 Monthly	172.9	17.4	215.3	18.8
A Few Times Yearly	313.9	31.7	293.0	25.6
Never	24.6	2.5	19.5	1.7
Family Income				
Less Than 30K	378.4	22.5	548.6	30.2
30K-59,999	409.2	24.3	431.7	23.8
60K-99,999	402.7	23.9	445.2	24.5
100K+	494.3	29.3	389.9	21.5
Race/Ethnicity				
White	546.7	58.8	563.1	66.8
Black	180.3	19.4	109.5	13.0
Asian	15.6	1.7	21.1	2.5
Hispanic	129.4	13.9	110.3	13.1
Other	27.7	6.2	38.9	4.6
Social Class				
Lower Class	130.1	11.8	141.4	12.4
Working Class	413.6	37.5	374.8	32.5
Middle Class	514.8	46.7	51.2	51.2
Upper Class	43.0	3.9	3.9	3.9
Education				
High School or Less	815.0	40.4	779.9	35.8
Some College	587.9	29.2	713.4	32.8
College Grad	377.0	18.7	390.4	17.9
Post Grad	236.4	11.7	293.2	13.5
Married/Other				
Married	947.1	54.8	932.9	49.9
Not Married	782.5	45.2	936.3	50.1

Female Southerners

The sample observations, with Hillary Clinton as the reference category exhibiting 34 percent of the votes, have a total dataset of 3647 respondents (N = 3647). Table 2 (None versus Clinton), Table 3 (Trump versus Clinton), and Table 4 (Other Candidates versus Clinton), presents results for the three voter groups.

For Model 1, the Chi-Square test is a significant improvement in fit over the null model with $X^2(12) = 2029.4$ and $p < .001$. Goodness-of-Fit results test indicates the model fits substantially better than the intercept only model. For Model 2, the Chi-Square test is a significant improvement in fit over the null model with $X^2(12) = 213.7$ and $p < .001$. Goodness-of-Fit results test indicates the model fits substantially better than the intercept only model. For Model 3, the Chi-Square test is a significant improvement in fit over the null model with $X^2(12) = 676.7$ and $p < .001$. Goodness-of-Fit results test indicates the model fits substantially better than the intercept only model. And for Model 4, the Chi-Square test is a significant improvement in fit over the null model with $X^2(12) = 2409.1$ and $p < .001$. Goodness-of-Fit results test indicates the model fits substantially better than the intercept only model.

Southern Women Voting for None versus Voting for Clinton

Group 1 includes voters who self-reported they are likely to abstain from voting for various reasons. Model 1 (Political Measures) indicates that party identification represented by the unstandardized coefficient (B = 1.307) and political ideology (B = - .178) are statistically significant and discriminate between voting for no one and voting for Hillary Clinton. The coefficient for party identification is positive, indicating that respondents scoring higher on party identification are more likely to vote for None than for Clinton. The coefficient for political

ideology is negative, indicating that respondents scoring lower are less likely to vote for None and more likely to vote for Clinton.

For every one unit increase in political ideology, there is a change in the odds of a person voting for no one by a factor of .837. For every one unit increase in party identification there is a factor of 3.694 increase in the likelihood of voting for None versus voting for Clinton. The multinomial logit for females relative to males is .093 units lower for not voting rather than voting for Clinton. Therefore, females would overall be less likely to vote for Clinton in the current model.

Model 2 (Religiosity Measures) indicates that the only statistically significant coefficients discriminating between voting for no one and voting for Hillary Clinton were religious importance (B = - .407) and church attendance (B = - .062). These are both negative coefficients, and gender is statistically significant, overall indicating that the female respondents scoring lower are less likely to vote for Clinton than for None.

For every one unit increase in religious importance, there is a change in the odds of a person voting for None by a factor of .666, while for every one-unit increase in church attendance, there is a change in the odds of a person voting for no one by a factor of .939. The multinomial logit for females relative to males is .170 units lower for voting for None than voting for Clinton, a strongly negative significance, thereby indicating women were more likely to vote for Clinton versus voting for None.

Model 3 (Demographic Measures) indicates the most statistically significant predictors of women's voting behavior are education (B = - .531), income (B = .781), and marital status (B = - .119), discriminating between the options of not voting and voting for Clinton. The coefficient for family income is positive, indicating that persons scoring higher in the variable for family

income is more likely to vote for no one versus voting for Clinton. For every one-unit increase in education, there is a change in the odds of a person voting for no one by a factor of .588, the odds are decreasing. Taken as a whole, this indicates a person scoring lower in education is more likely to vote for Clinton.

For every one-unit increase in income, there is a change in the odds by a factor of 2.183, an increase in the likelihood of voting None versus voting for Clinton. And for every one-unit increase in marital status, there is a change in the odds by a factor of .888, decreasing the likelihood of not voting versus voting for Clinton.

The multinomial logit for females relative to males is .112 units lower for voting for no one than voting for Clinton. Women who typically did not vote had more education, higher incomes, were less likely to be married, and were more likely vote for Clinton. Taken as a whole, however, there were greater odds of voting for None than for Clinton.

Model 4 (All Measures) finds that the significant predictors of women's voting behavior are party identification (B = 1.288) and income (B = .534), both positive coefficients, indicating that respondents scoring higher in the variables for party identification and family income are more likely to not vote than to vote for Clinton in this model. And with education (B = - .537), and marital status (B = - .135) having negative coefficients, it is deduced that respondents scoring lower on these categories are less likely to vote for no one versus voting for Clinton.

For every one-unit increase in party identification, there is a change in the odds by a factor of 3.627 and increasing the likelihood of voting for no one. For every one-unit increase in family income, there is a change in the odds by a factor of 1.706, an increase in the likelihood of voting for None versus voting for Clinton. For every one-unit increase in education, there is a change in the odds by a factor of .585, which indicates a decrease in the likelihood of not voting.

And for every increase of one unit in marital status, there is a decrease in the odds by a factor of .874, decreasing the likelihood of not voting versus voting for Clinton. In this model, the multinomial logit for females relative to males is .038 units lower for not voting than for voting for Clinton. Gender is statistically significant in this model.

Model 4 suggests that women with strong party identification, lower levels of education, and higher incomes were less likely to vote for Clinton and more likely to choose Trump. Conversely, this model suggests that those who voted for Clinton identified with a party less, had higher levels of education, and lower incomes, all factors which lean toward liberal candidates. Those women who voted for Clinton were also more likely to be unmarried.

Table 2. Multinomial Logistic Regression of Voting Behaviors of White Southern Women
2016 - None versus Clinton

Variable	Political	Religiosity	Demographics	All Measures
For whom did you vote?	None	None	None	None
South Region	- .172	- .145	- .136	- .153
	(.111)	(.103)	(.108)	(.118)
Gender Identification	- .093 *	- .170 ***	- .112 **	- .038 ***
	(.045)	(.041)	(.043)	(.048)
Political Ideology	- .178 ***			- .123 *
	(.048)			(.050)
Party Identification	1.307 ***			1.288 ***
	(.068)			(.071)
Religious Importance		- .407 ***		- .231 *
		(.092)		(.107)
Church Attendance		- .062 **		- .067 **
		(.023)		(.026)
Level of Education			- .531 ***	- .537 ***
			(.041)	(.045)
Race/Ethnicity			- .184 **	- .141 *
			(.063)	(.064)
Family Income			.781 ***	.534 ***
			(.081)	(.090)
Social Class			- .070 *	- .108 **
			(.033)	(.037)
Marital Status			- .119 ***	- .135 ***
			(.035)	(.037)
Chi Square	2029.4	213.7	676.7	2409.1
Significance	0	< .001	< .001	0
N	3647	3647	3647	3647

Standard errors are represented in parenthesis.

Note: $p < .05$ * $p < .01$ ** $p < .001$ ***

Southern Women Voting for Trump versus Voting for Clinton

Group 2 includes voters who were more likely to vote for Donald Trump than for Hillary Clinton. In Model 1 (Political Measures), both political ideology (B = .311) and party identification (B = 2.368) are statistically significant and discriminate between voting for Trump and voting for Clinton. Since they are both positive coefficients, they indicate that respondents scoring higher are more likely to vote for Trump than to vote for Clinton.

For every one unit increase in party ideology, there is a change in the odds by a factor of 1.365, increasing the likelihood of voting for Trump versus Clinton. For every 1 unit increase in party identification, there is a change in the odds by a factor of 10.680, increasing the likelihood of voting for Trump as opposed to Clinton.

The multinomial logit for females relative to males is .06 higher for voting for Trump versus voting for Clinton. However, being female was not a significant coefficient (B = .059) on the preference for Trump versus Clinton. The effect of party identification is especially very strongly significant in this model, indicating that women with a strong connection to political ideology are more likely to support Trump.

In Model 2 (Religiosity Measures), there is a statistically significant predictor for religious importance (B = .293) which discriminates between voting for Trump and voting for Clinton. The coefficient is negative, indicating that respondents scoring lower are less likely to vote for Trump and more likely to vote for Clinton.

For every one-unit increase in religious importance, there is a change in the odds by a factor of .293 decrease in voting for Trump versus voting for Clinton. There is also a moderately significant predictor for church attendance (B = .968). For every one-unit increase in church attendance, there is a change of a factor of .968 decrease in voting for Trump. The multinomial

logit for females relative to males is .173 units lower for voting for Trump versus voting for

Clinton. This indicates that women overall are more likely to vote for Clinton due to measures of

religiosity.

For Model 3 (Demographics Measures), family income is a very strongly statistically

significant positive predictor of voting behavior (B = 1.802), indicating that respondents scoring

higher are more likely to vote Trump than Clinton. Level of education (B = - .221) is a weak

statistically significant influence in voting behavior, indicating that respondents scoring lower

are less likely to vote for Trump than vote for Clinton. Race/ethnicity (B = - .306), and marital

status (B = .089) are statistically significant influences. All these coefficients discriminate

between voting for Trump versus voting for Clinton.

For every one-unit increase in family income, there is 6.060 increase in the likelihood of

Southern women voting for Trump. For every one-unit increase in marital status, there is a

change in the odds by a factor of 1.093, increasing the likelihood of voting for Trump. For every

one-unit increase in level of education, there is a change in the odds by a factor of .802 of a

decreasing likelihood of voting for Trump versus voting for Clinton. And, for every one-unit

increase in race/ethnicity, there is a change in the odds by a factor of .737, decreasing the

likelihood of voting for Trump versus voting for Clinton. Being female has a negative effect on

voting preference for Trump (B = - .113, $p < .01$).

Women with higher family income and being married increase the likelihood of voting

for Trump, while being better educated and aware of racial differences (although still most likely

white) increase the likelihood of voting for Clinton.

For Model 4 (All Measures), there are indicators for effects of statistically significant

predictors for political ideology (B = .301), party identification (B = 2.298), and family income

(B = 1.020) that discriminate between voting for Trump and voting for Clinton. The coefficients for political ideology, party identification, and family income are positive, and indicate that respondents scoring higher are more likely to vote for Trump.

For every one-unit increase in political ideology, there is a change in the odds by a factor of 1.352, increasing the likelihood of voting for Trump. For every one-unit increase in party identification, there is a change in the odds by a factor of 9.954, increasing the likelihood of voting for Trump. And for every one-unit increase in family income, there is a change in the odds by a factor of 2.773, increasing the likelihood of voting for Trump.

The coefficients for religious importance (B = - .792) and level of education (B = - .408) are negative, indicating that respondents scoring lower are more likely to vote for Clinton. For every one-unit of increase in religious importance, there is a change in the odds by a factor of .453 and decreasing, which implies less likelihood for Trump versus Clinton. For every one unit increase in education, there is a .665 decrease in the odds of voting for Trump.

Model 4 suggests that income and party affiliation were more important predictors for the women who voted Trump as opposed to Clinton. The results imply that education would make Southern women less likely to vote for Trump. In this model, gender is not a significant predictor of preference for Trump over Clinton, however, these effects are miniscule and likely due to ideology, whereas the respondents are more likely to identify with party affiliation. More wealthy Republicans voted for Trump.

Table 3. Multinomial Logistic Regression of Voting Behaviors of White Southern Women
2016 – Trump versus Clinton

Variable	Political	Religiosity	Demographics	All Measures
For whom did you vote?	Trump	Trump	Trump	Trump
South Region	- .243	.869	- .143	- .153
	(.141)	(.704)	(.111)	(.148)
Gender Identification	.059	.841 ***	- .113 **	.040 ***
	(.056)	(.774)	(.040)	(.059)
Political Ideology	.311 ***			.301 ***
	(.058)			(.060)
Party Identification	2.368 ***			2.298 ***
	(.083)			(.086)
Religious Importance		.293 ***		- .792 ***
		(.240)		(.138)
Church Attendance		.968		- .074
		(.923)		(.033)
Level of Education			- .221 ***	- .408 ***
			(.041)	(.056)
Race/Ethnicity			- .306 ***	- .195 *
			(.068)	(.089)
Family Income			1.802 ***	1.020 ***
			(.105)	(.129)
Social Class			.010	- .052
			(.033)	(.045)
Marital Status			.089 **	.087
			(.034)	(.046)
Chi Square	2029.4	213.7	676.7	2409.1
Significance	0	< .001	< .001	0
N	3647	3647	3647	3647

Standard errors are represented in parenthesis.
Note: $p < .05$ * $p < .01$ ** $p < .001$***

Southern Women Voting for Other Candidates versus Voting for Clinton

Group 3 includes voters who self-reported voting for Other Candidates versus voting for Clinton. In Model 1 (Political Measures) , there are indications that party identification (B = 1.429) is statistically significant and clearly discriminates between voting for Other Candidates and voting for Clinton. The coefficient is positive and indicates the respondents scoring higher are more likely to vote for Other Candidates than to vote for Clinton.

For every one-unit increase in party identification, there is a change in the odds by a factor of 4.174 units, increasing the likelihood of voting for the Other Candidates. For every one-unit increase in political ideology, there is a change in the odds by a factor of 1.041 units for increasing the likelihood of voting for Other Candidates. Gender (B = .018) is no influence on voting behaviors. In this model, there is a greater likelihood for voting for the Other Candidates than voting for Clinton.

For Model 2 (Religiosity Measures) indicate that religious importance (B = .286) and church attendance (B = .067) are of no statistical significance. Church attendance has a weak effect. Gender (B = - .064) has a very weak statistical significance on the model, with the multinomial logit for females relative to males is less for voting for Other Candidates. In Model 2, the more the respondent feels that religion is significant, the less likely she was to vote for Clinton.

For Model 3 (Demographics Measures) indicate that family income (B = 1.369) shows a very strong statistical significance and discriminates between voting for Other Candidates and voting for Clinton. The coefficient is positive, indicating that respondents scoring higher are more likely to vote for other candidates than vote for Clinton.

For every one-unit increase in family income, there is a change in the odds increasing the likelihood of voting for Other Candidate versus Hillary Clinton by a factor of 3.932. The multinomial logit for females (B = - .063) relative to males is less for voting for Other Candidates. Women in this model would more likely vote for Other Candidates than for Clinton.

In Model 4 (All Measures), significant predictors include party identification (B = 1.345) and family income (B = 1.057), which suggest that wealthy white southern women voted for Trump. Political ideology (B = .007) is having no effect for women voting for Other Candidates. Gender (B = .076) has no effect in this model.

Interpretation for Southern Women 2016

In every model tested, the Chi-Square test is a significant improvement in fit over the null model. Goodness-of-Fit results test indicate the study models fit substantially better than the intercept only model.

Interpretation of data for the 2016 Presidential election, taken as a whole, indicates that women who identified with their political party and party ideology were more likely to vote for Donald Trump than vote for Hillary Clinton – in fact, feeling so strongly that they would rather vote for any other candidate than vote for Clinton. Party identification is statistically significant in the political models, and there was an increased likelihood of voting for Trump.

Surprisingly, there was a greater likelihood of voting for Clinton when looking at religious measures. The data shows a greater likelihood for voting Clinton versus Trump, as well as Clinton versus None. For women who believe religion to be important in their lives, and those who attend church regularly, there was a greater likelihood of voting for Clinton.

As income increased, there was as much as a 600 percent increase in the likelihood of voting for Donald Trump. Female Trump voters were more likely to be married. More educated

women gravitated to Clinton, as did women who were more aware of racial and ethnic issues. In most cases, gender was statistically significant.

In summary, women who were more educated, lower incomes, and who were less likely married voted Clinton. Women who were less educated, had higher incomes, and were married tended to vote for Trump.

Table 4. Multinomial Logistic Regression of Voting Behaviors of White Southern Women
2016 – Other Candidates versus Clinton

Variable	Political	Religiosity	Demographics	All Measures
For whom did you vote?	Other	Other	Other	Other
South Region	- .212	- .219	- .171	- .243
	(.268)	(.264)	(.265)	(.272)
Gender Identification	.018	- .064	- .063	.076
	(.105)	(.103)	(.103)	(.108)
Political Ideology	.040			.007
	(.106)			(.112)
Party Identification	1.429 ***			1.345 ***
	(.134)			(.139)
Religious Importance		.286		.524 *
		(.221)		(.231)
Church Attendance		.067		.033
		(.053)		(.056)
Level of Education			.005	- .040
			(.096)	(.099)
Race/Ethnicity			- .193	- .125
			(.160)	(.160)
Family Income			1.369 ***	1.057 ***
			(.255)	(.264)
Social Class			.022	- .011
			(.077)	(.080)
Marital Status			- .052	- .069
			(.088)	(.087)
Chi Square	2029.4	213.7	676.7	2409.1
Significance	0	< .001	< .001	0
N	3647	3647	3647	3647

Standard errors are represented in parenthesis.
Note: $p < .05$ * $p < .01$ ** $p < .001$***

Male Southerners

The sample of observations, with Hillary Clinton as the baseline exhibiting 34 percent of the votes, is 3647 respondents (N = 3647). Table 5 (None versus Clinton), Table 6 (Trump Versus Clinton), and Table 7 (Other Candidates versus Other Clinton), present results for the three voter groups.

For Model 1, the Chi-Square test is a significant improvement in fit over the null model with $X^2(12) = 2028.8$ and $p < .001$. Goodness-of-Fit results test indicates the model fits substantially better than the intercept only model. For Model 2, the Chi-Square test is a significant improvement in fit over the null model with $X^2(12) = 215.0$ and $p < .001$. Goodness-of-Fit results test indicates the model fits substantially better than the intercept only model. For Model 3, the Chi-Square test is a significant improvement in fit over the null model with $X^2(12) = 677.5$ and $p < .001$. Goodness-of-Fit results test indicates the model fits substantially better than the intercept only model. And for Model 4, the Chi-Square test is a significant improvement in fit over the null model with $X^2(12) = 2408.2$ and $p < .001$. Goodness-of-Fit results test indicates the model fits substantially better than the intercept only model.

Southern Men Voting for None versus Voting for Clinton

Group 1 presents the regression results for the four models used for male Southerners who self-reported not voting versus voting for Hillary Clinton. Model 1 (Political Measures) indicates that party identification (B = 1.306) and political ideology (B = - .177) are statistically significant and discriminate between voting for no one versus voting for Clinton. The coefficient for party identification is positive, indicating that respondents scoring higher on party identification are more likely to vote None rather than voting for Clinton. The coefficient for

political ideology is negative, indicating that respondents scoring lower on that coefficient are less likely to not vote versus vote for Clinton.

For every one-unit increase in political ideology, there was a change in the odds of a respondent voting for no one by a factor of .837, the odds are decreasing, and the respondents are more likely to vote for Clinton. For every one-unit increase in party identification, there was change in odds of a person voting for no one versus Clinton by a factor of 3.693, an increasing likelihood of not voting.

Gender is only having a small statistically significant effect. The multinomial logit relative males to females is .184 ($p < .05$) unit higher for not voting than for voting for Clinton. Men were less likely to vote for Clinton versus not voting.

For Model 2 (Religiosity Measures), religious importance is indicated as a statistically significant predictor (B = - .409) and discriminates between voting for no one and voting for Clinton. The coefficient for religious importance is negative, indicating that respondents scoring lower were less likely to vote None than vote for Clinton.

For every one unit increase in religious importance, there is a change in the odds of a person voting for no one by a factor of .664 decrease in the likelihood of voting for no one than voting for Clinton. Gender indicates the multinomial logit for males relative to females is .342, a very strong statistical significance indicating males would prefer to not vote than vote for Clinton.

Model 3 (Demographics Measures) indicates that education (B = - .531), marital status (B = - .119), and family income (B = .780) are statistically significant and discriminate between voting for None and voting for Clinton. The coefficients for education and marital status are

negative, indicating that respondents scoring lower in education and marital status were more likely to vote for Clinton. The coefficient for family income is positive and indicates that respondents scoring higher were more likely to not vote. Gender (B = .229) has a moderately strong influence. Men were more likely to vote for None than to vote for Clinton.

For every one-unit increase in education, there is a change in the odds of a person voting for Clinton by a factor of .588. For every one-unit increase in marital status, there is a change in the odds of voting for Clinton by a factor of .888. But, for every increase in family income, there is a change in the odds for voting for None by a factor of 6.062. The higher one perceives their social status, the less likely they are to vote for Clinton.

For Model 4 (All Measures), the strongest measure when all predictors are taken into consideration is party identification (B = 1.288), followed by family income (B = .534), marital status (B = - .135), and education (B = - .537). All are statistically significant and discriminate between voting for None versus voting for Clinton. The coefficients for party identification and family income are positive and indicate that respondents scoring higher were more likely to not vote rather than vote for Clinton. The coefficients for marital status and education are negative and indicate that respondents scoring lower were more likely to vote for Clinton versus not to vote. Gender (B = .074) is not statistically significant in this model.

For every unit increase in party identification, there is a change in the odds of a person voting for None by a factor of 3.626, with the odds increasing. Likewise, for every unit increase in family income, there is a change in the odds of voting for no one versus voting for Clinton by a factor of 1.706. As men identified more with a political party and see more income, they were more likely to vote for None than to vote for Clinton.

For every one-unit increase in marital status, there was a change in the odds of a person voting for Clinton versus None by a factor of .874. Again, for every one-unit increase in education, there was a change in the odds of a person voting for Clinton versus none by a factor of .585. Men who are single and men who are more educated are more likely to have voted for Clinton.

Table 5. Multinomial Logistic Regression of Voting Behaviors of White Southern Men
2016 – None versus Clinton

Variable	Political	Religiosity	Demographics	All Measures
For whom did you vote?	None	None	None	None
South Region	- .177	- .145	- .136	- .156
	(.048)	(.103)	(.108)	(.118)
Gender Identification	.184 *	.342 ***	.229 **	.074 ***
	(.089)	(.083)	.086	(.096)
Political Ideology	- .177 ***			- .123 *
	(.048)			(.050)
Party Identification	1.306 ***			1.288 ***
	(.068)			(.071)
Religious Importance		- .409 ***		- .232 *
		(.092)		(.107)
Church Attendance		- .063 **		- .067 **
		(.023)		(.026)
Level of Education			- .531 ***	- .537 ***
			(.041)	(.045)
Race/Ethnicity			- .185 **	- .141 *
			(.063)	(.064)
Family Income			.780 ***	.534 ***
			(.081)	(.090)
Social Class			- .070 *	- .108 **
			(.033)	(.037)
Marital Status			- .119 ***	- .135 ***
			(.035)	(.037)
Chi Square	2029.1	215.0	678.0	2408.2
Significance	0	< .001	< .001	0
N	3647	3647	3647	3647

Standard errors are represented in parenthesis.
Note: $p < .05$ * $p < .01$ ** $p < .001$ ***

Southern Men Voting for Trump versus Voting for Clinton

Group 2 includes white southern men self-identifying as voting for Donald Trump versus voting for Hillary Clinton. Model 1 focuses on Political Measures. Party identification (B = 2.368) and political ideology (B = .311) have the most statistical significance on voting behaviors and discriminate between voting for Trump and voting for Clinton. The coefficients for party identification and political ideology are positive, indicating that respondents scoring higher on those coefficients were more likely to vote for Trump than vote for Clinton.

For every one-unit increase in party identification, there is a change in the odds of a person voting for Trump versus Clinton by a factor of 10.680, an increasing likelihood of men voting for Trump versus voting for Clinton. For every one-unit increase in political ideology, there is a change in the odds of a person voting for Trump vice Clinton by a factor of 1.364. Meanwhile, gender (B = - .111) has a minimal statistical significance.

For Model 2 (Religiosity Measures), religious importance (B = - 1.231) has a statistically significant effect on voting behaviors and discriminates between voting for Trump and voting for Clinton. The coefficient is negative, indicating that respondents scoring lower on the coefficient are more likely to vote for Clinton than to vote for Trump.

For every one-unit increase in religious importance, there is a change in the odds by a factor of .292, a decrease in the likelihood of voting for Trump versus voting for Clinton. Gender (B = .367) has a very strong effect.

Model 3 (Demographics Measures) indicates that family income (B = 1.802) is the only statistically significant non-negative predictor and discriminates between voting for Trump and voting for Clinton. The coefficient for family income is positive, indicating that respondents scoring higher are more likely to vote Trump versus vote Clinton. The coefficients for education

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(B = - .221) and race/ethnicity (B = - .307) are both negative, indicating that respondents scoring lower in education and are more racially and culturally aware are more likely to vote for Clinton. The multinomial logit for men relative to women is .241 higher for voting for Trump than for voting for Clinton, implying men are more likely to vote for Trump based on gender (B = .241).

For every one-unit increase in family income, there is a change in the odds of a person voting for Clinton by a factor of 6.062, increasing the likelihood of men voting for Trump versus voting for Clinton. For every one-unit increase in education, there is a change in the odds of a person voting for Trump versus voting for Clinton by a factor of .802 and decreasing, thereby decreasing the likelihood of men voting for Trump. And for every one-unit increase in race/ethnicity, there is a change in the odds by a factor of .736, decreasing in the likelihood of men voting for Trump.

For Model 4 (All Measures) indicates party identification (B = 2.297), family income (B = 1.019), educational level (B = - .407), and marital status (B = .088) are statistically significant and discriminate between voting for Trump and voting for Clinton. The coefficient for party identification, family income, and marital status are positive, indicating that respondents scoring higher are more likely to vote for Trump than to vote for Clinton. The coefficient for educational level is negative, indicating that respondents scoring lower are less likely to vote for Trump. Wealthy white southern Republican men are more likely to vote for the GOP candidates.

For every one-unit increase in party identification, there is a change in the odds of a person voting for Trump by a factor of 9.948, increasing in the likelihood of voting for Trump versus voting for Clinton. For every one-unit increase in family income there is a change in the odds of a person voting for Trump by a factor of 2.772. For every increase in marital status, there

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is a change in the odds of a person voting for Trump by a factor of 1.092. For every increase in educational level, there is a change in the odds of a person voting for Trump by a factor of .824.

The multinomial logit for men relative to women is a - .060 decrease in the likelihood of voting for Trump versus voting for Clinton, a weak relationship. This would imply that men are less likely to vote for Trump than are women, but the influence of gender is negligible due to the influences of party identification and income.

Table 6. Multinomial Logistic Regression of Voting Behaviors of White Southern Men
2016 – Trump versus Clinton

Variable	Political	Religiosity	Demographics	All Measures
For whom did you vote?	Trump	Trump	Trump	Trump
South Region	- .243	- .140	- .142	- .152
	(.141)	(.107)	(.111)	(.148)
Gender Identification	- .111 *	.367 ***	.241 **	- .060
	(.112)	(.085)	(.088)	(.118)
Political Ideology	.311 ***			.300 *
	(.058)			(.060)
Party Identification	2.368 ***			2.297 ***
	(.083)			0.086
Religious Importance		- 1.231 ***		- .794 *
		(.102)		(.138)
Church Attendance		- .033 **		- .074 **
		(.024)		(.033)
Level of Education			- .221 ***	- .407 ***
			(.041)	(.056)
Race/Ethnicity			- .307 ***	- .194 *
			(.068)	(.089)
Family Income			1.802 ***	1.019 ***
			(.105)	(.129)
Social Class			.010	- .053 **
			(.033)	(.045)
Marital Status			.089 **	.088 ***
			(.034)	(.046)
Chi Square	2029.1	215.0	676.7	2408.2
Significance	0	< .001	< .001	0
N	3647	3647	3647	3647

Standard errors are represented in parenthesis.
Note: $p < .05$ * $p < .01$ ** $p < .001$ ***

Southern Men Voting for Other Candidates versus Voting for Clinton

Group 3 includes the voters who self-reported voting for other candidates than Donald Trump or Hillary Clinton. For Model 1 (Political Measures), party identification (B = 1.427) is statistically significant and discriminates between voting for other candidates and voting for Clinton. The coefficient is positive, indicating that respondents scoring higher are more likely to vote for the other candidates than to vote for Clinton.

For every one-unit increase in party identification, there is a change in the odds by a factor of 4.168 and an increase in the likelihood of voting for another candidate rather than voting for Donald Trump. Gender (B = .012) is not statistically significant and is having no effect.

The multinomial logit for men relative to women is a .012 increase in the likelihood of voting for other candidates rather than voting for Clinton. This result supports the supposition advanced in the model.

Model 2 (Religiosity Measures), neither religious importance (B = .279) nor church attendance (B = .067) has a statistically significant effect on voting behaviors in this model. The religiosity model is thereby implied to not influence the voting behaviors of white southern men.

Model 3 (Demographics Measure), only family income (B = 1.369) is statistically significant and discriminates between voting for the other candidates and voting for Clinton. The coefficient is positive, indicating that respondents scoring higher on family income are more likely to vote for the other candidates than to vote for Clinton.

For each one-unit increase in family income there is a factor of 3.932 increase in the likelihood of voting for the other candidates than for voting for Clinton. The multinomial logit for males relative to females is .180 units higher for voting for other candidates than voting for

Clinton. Males in this model are more likely to vote for the other candidates than to vote for Clinton.

Model 4 (All Measures), Both party identification (B = 1.343) and family income (B = 1.057) are statistically significant and discriminate between voting for the other candidates and voting for Clinton. The coefficients are positive and indicate that respondents scoring higher are more likely to vote for the other candidates than for Clinton.

For every one-unit increase in party identification, there is a change in the odds by a factor of 3.831 increase in the likelihood of voting for other candidates. And for every one-unit increase in family income, there is a change in the odds by a factor of 2.879 in the likelihood of voting for another candidate than for voting for Clinton. The multinomial logit for males relative to females is - .104 units lower for voting for another candidate. Male respondents were slightly more likely to have voted for Clinton, but voters overall were more likely to have voted for another candidate than voted for Clinton.

Interpretation for Southern Men 2016

Taken as a whole, the data for 2016 indicates that political ideology and party identification have the greatest effect on the voting behaviors of southern men and have a statistically significant effect on the likelihood of voting for Trump as opposed to voting for Clinton (just as it does for southern women) and the effect of party identification for southern men indicates a stronger effect than the effect for political ideology in voting for Trump versus Clinton – men feel that party should be more important than ideals – while southern women show a greater effect for both political ideology and party identification than do men.

Southern men were more likely to not vote than vote for Clinton in all models for the first group (voting for None versus voting for Clinton). Family income is a statistically significant

measure, indicating respondents who score higher in this coefficient are less likely to vote for Clinton. Gender does not appear to have a strong effect on the voting behaviors of southern men on the likelihood of voting for Trump versus Clinton.

However, the negative effect indicates southern women are more likely to be influenced by gender. Male voters, for whom religion is important, are then less likely to vote Trump. The 2016 data is interpretable, in that party ideology and identification have a significant effect for women on the likelihood of voting for Trump as opposed to Clinton. Southern men are more influenced by party identification than by political ideology, as is true of southern women. Southern women are more influenced by party identification than men.

Table 7. Multinomial Logistic Regression of Voting Behaviors of White Southern Men
2016 – Other Candidates versus Clinton

Variable	Political	Religiosity	Demographics	All Measures
For whom did you vote?	Other	Other	Other	Other
South Region	- .210	- .217	- .168	- .240
	(.268)	(.264)	(.265)	(.272)
Gender Identification	.012	.176	.180	- .104
	(.210)	(.206)	(.206)	(.215)
Political Ideology	.038			.005
	(.106)			(.112)
Party Identification	1.427 ***			1.343 ***
	(.135)			(.139)
Religious Importance		.279		.518 *
		(.221)		(.231)
Church Attendance		.067		.032
		(.053)		(.056)
Level of Education			.006	- .039
			(096)	(.099)
Race/Ethnicity			- .193	- .124
			(.160)	(.159)
Family Income			1.369 ***	1.057 ***
			(.255)	(.264)
Social Class			- .021	- .012
			(.077)	(.080)
Marital Status			- .050	- .067
			(.088)	(.087)
Chi Square	2029.1	215.0	676.7	2408.2
Significance	0	< .001	< .001	0
N	3647	3647	3647	3647

Standard errors are represented in parenthesis.
Note: $p < .05$ * $p < .01$ ** $p < .001$ ***

CHARACTERISTICS OF PARTICIPANTS AND ANALYSIS 2020

2020 Participants

Table 8 indicates 53.7 percent of participants were female in 2020, while 45.4 percent were male. Out of the 8280 cases in the sample, cases were excluded due to invalid codes in variables in the analysis, and by fillers and weights. By weighted results, 72.0 percent of participants identified as white, 8.8 percent were black, 3.4 percent were Asian, 9.2 percent were Hispanic, 2.1 percent were Native American, and the remaining 3.3 percent were classed as Other.

Most participants were, interestingly, conservative (23.5 percent of men and 29.6 percent of women); most men identified as Republican (35.3 percent) while most women identified as Democrat (41.2 percent). Women were more likely than men to attend church regularly, make less money than men, and more likely to be white. Men were more likely to make more than $250,000 yearly, and least likely to identify as conservative. Both men and women were likely to have a bachelor's degree or less. Most were aged 33-55 years. Most men were married, while more women were not with a significant number having never been married.

An examination of Tables 1 and 8 suggest that, taken as a whole, the 2020 participants are broadly like the 2016 participants. There were 3467 participants in 2016 and 7453 participants in 2020. A key difference in the 2020 data is the role played by threat in the election.

Table 8. Characteristics of Participants 2020

Characteristic	Male		Female	
	N	%	N	%
Ideology				
Liberal	875.0	24.6	1098.0	28.6
Moderate	823.4	23.2	872.1	22.7
Conservative	1308.3	36.8	1078.4	28.1
Party Identification				
Democrat	1015.1	28.6	1465.3	38.3
Independent	1186.6	33.5	1112.3	29.1
Republican	1203.8	34.0	1134.5	29.6
Attends Church				
Protestant	763.9	21.7	899.9	23.5
Catholic	735.3	20.8	769.0	20.1
Jewish	78.6	2.2	72.9	1.9
Other	612.2	17.4	490.5	12.7
Frequency Attendance				
Every Week	465.5	28.9	577.9	30.3
Almost Weekly	344.3	21.4	446.0	23.4
1-2 Monthly	287.6	17.8	314.4	16.5
A Few Times Yearly	462.7	28.7	525.1	27.6
Never	51.1	3.2	41.9	2.2
Family Income				
Less Than 30K	474.5	13.6	646.1	17.2
30K-59,999	686.5	19.8	839.7	22.4
60K-99,999	742.1	21.3	852.9	22.7
100K +	1580.1	45.4	1400.1	37.4
Race/Ethnicity				
White	2356.5	66.6	2480.2	64.8
Black	349.1	9.9	483.1	12.6
Hispanic	153.6	4.3	137.0	3.6
Asian	471.3	13.3	507.7	13.3
Social Class				
Lower Class	188.9	5.4	319.4	8.5
Working Class	1363.8	38.8	1458.6	38.6
Middle Class	1784.3	50.7	1846.6	48.9
Upper Class	180.4	5.1	154.2	4.1
Education				
High School or Less	1356.2	38.1	297.6	8.5
Some College	609.8	17.2	701.5	18.3
College Grad	1435.0	40.3	1701.7	44.3
Post Grad	154.0	4.3	185.2	4.8
Married/Other				
Married	1942.5	54.7	1926.5	50.2
Not Married	1611.0	45.3	1910.9	49.8

Female Southerners

The sample observations, with Joseph Biden as the baseline exhibiting 38 percent of the votes, consists of 7453 participants (N = 7453). Table 9 (Biden versus None), Table 10 (Biden Versus Trump), and Table 11 (Biden versus Other Candidate), presents results for the three voter groups. A new model has been created for the 2020 data, labeled *threat*.

For Model 1, the Chi-Square test is a significant improvement in fit over the null model with $X^2(12)$ = 492.9 and $p < .001$. Goodness-of-Fit results test indicates the model fits substantially better than the intercept only model. For Model 2, the Chi-Square test is a significant improvement in fit over the null model with $X^2(12)$ = 316.3 and $p < .001$. Goodness-of-Fit results test indicates the model fits substantially better than the intercept only model. For Model 3, the Chi-Square test is a significant improvement in fit over the null model with $X^2(12)$ = 1176.5 and $p < .001$. Goodness-of-Fit results test indicates the model fits substantially better than the intercept only model. For Model 4, the Chi-Square test is a significant improvement in fit over the null model with $X^2(12)$ = 760.6 and $p < .001$. Goodness-of-Fit results test indicates the model fits substantially better than the intercept only model. And for Model 5, the Chi-Square test is a significant improvement in fit over the null model with $X^2(12)$ = 2048.3 and $p < .001$. Goodness-of-Fit results test indicates the model fits substantially better than the intercept only model.

Southern Women Voting for None versus Voting for Biden

Group 1 is made up of respondents who self-reported as not voting for None versus voting for Joseph Biden in the 2020 presidential election. For Model 1 (Political Measures),the indication is that political ideology (B = .321) and party identification (B = .201) are both statistically significant and discriminate well between voting for no one and voting for Joseph

Biden. The coefficient for political ideology and party identification are positive, indicating that respondents scoring higher are more likely not to vote than to vote for Biden.

For every one-unit increase in political ideology, there is a change in the odds by a factor of 1.378, increasing the likelihood of not voting versus voting for Biden. For every one-unit increase in party identification, there is a change in the odds increasing the likelihood of not voting by a factor of 1.222. Gender (B = - .287) has low statistical significance ($p < .05$), while region (B = .503) is statistically significant. Southern women in 2020 were more likely to not vote than vote for Biden.

In Model 2 (Religiosity Measure), the importance of religion has a negative effect on voting behavior in not voting versus voting for Biden. The model indicates that religious importance (B = .134) is statistically significant and discriminates between not voting and voting for Biden. The coefficient for religious importance is positive, indicating that respondents scoring higher are more likely to not vote.

For every increase of one-unit increase in religious importance, there is a factor of 1.144 increase in the likelihood of not voting as a preferred option to voting for Biden. Attending religious services is not statistically significant. Gender (B = - .307) is only moderately significant. Religion influences southern women's decision-making process in the selection of elected officials. Women who embrace the importance of religion were less likely to vote for Biden.

For Model 3 (Demographics Measure), there is an indication that educational level (B = - .710), family income (B = .154), and social class (B = - .561) are all statistically significant and discriminate between not voting and voting for Biden. The coefficient for family income is positive, indicating that respondents scoring higher were more likely to not vote than they were

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to vote for Biden. The coefficient for educational level and social class are negative, indicating that respondents scoring lower were more likely to vote for Biden than not vote, seeing Trump as an almost religious figure.

For every one-unit increase in family income, there is a change in the odds of not voting by a factor of 1.166. For every one-unit increase in education, there is a change in odds of voting for Biden by a factor of .492, and for every one-unit increase in social class, there is a change in the odds of voting by a factor of .571, an increase in the likelihood of voting for Biden versus not voting. The multinomial logit for females relative to males is statistically insignificant.

Model 4 (Threat Measures) indicates that the variables vote count (B = - .364) and use of violence (B = .246) are statistically significant and clearly discriminate between not voting and voting for Biden. The coefficient for vote count is negative, indicating that respondents scoring lower on vote count are less likely to vote for no one that to vote for Biden. The coefficient for use of violence is positive, indicating that respondents scoring higher in use of violence are more likely to vote for no one than to vote for Biden.

This supports the supposition that respondents who thought the votes were counted accurately were more likely to have felt that Biden won the election fairly, and that respondents who felt that the election was stolen were more likely to support the use of violence to overthrow the election results and more likely to not vote than cast a vote for Biden.

For every one-unit increase in vote count, there is a change in the odds a factor of .695 in the likelihood of not voting, and for every one-unit increase in the use of violence, there is a change in the odds by a factor of 1.279 in the likelihood of not voting versus voting for Biden. While neither result is strong, it appears that those who protested the 2020 vote as stolen and see

violence as an option to "take back the vote," were likely to vote for no one versus vote for Biden, but this interpretation of the influence of threat is far from proven.

For Model 5 (All Measures), there is indication that political ideology (B = .226), family income (B = .137), use of violence (B = .216), education (B = - .592), social class (B = - .464), and vote count (B = - .333) are all significantly significant and discriminate between not voting and voting for Biden. The coefficients for political ideology, family income, and use of violence are positive, indicating that respondents scoring higher on these coefficients are more likely to not vote than to vote for Biden. The coefficients for education, social class, and vote count are negative, indicating that respondents scoring lower on these coefficients are more likely to vote for Biden than to not vote.

For every one-unit increase in political ideology, there is a change in the odds by a factor of 1.253, an increase in the likelihood of not voting versus voting for Biden. For every one-unit increase in family income, there is a change in the odds by a factor of 1.147, an increase in the likelihood of not voting. For every increase in use of violence, there is a change in the odds by a factor of 1.241 in the likelihood of voting for None.

For every one-unit increase in education, there is a change in the odds by a factor of .553 in the likelihood of not voting versus voting for Biden. For every one-unit increase in social class, there is a change in the odds by a factor of .629 in the likelihood of voting for None. For every one-unit increase in vote count, there is a change in the odds by a factor of .716 in the likelihood of voting None.

Gender (B = - .212) is not statistically significant on voting for None versus voting for Biden. The southern region (B = .407) is statistically significant in voting for None (not voting).

Table 9. Multinomial Logistic Regression of Voting Behaviors of White Southern Women
2020 – None versus Biden

Variable	Political	Religiosity	Demographics	Threat	All Measures
For whom did you vote?	None	None	None	None	None
South Region	.503 ***	.506 ***	.436 ***	.502 ***	.407 ***
	(.063)	(.062)	(.064)	(.063)	(.066)
Gender Identification	- .287 *	- .307 *	- .229	- .279 *	- .212
	(.128)	(.127)	(.130)	(.128)	(.132)
Political Ideology	.321 ***				.226 ***
	(.035)				(.037)
Party Identification	.201 ***				.047
	(.023)				(.028)
Religious Importance		.134 ***			.079
		(.040)			(.042)
Church Attendance		.001			- .006
		(.020)			(.021)
Level of Education			- .710 ***		- .592 ***
			(.049)		(.057)
Race/Ethnicity			- .033		- .087 **
			(.030)		(.031)
Family Income			.154 ***		.137 ***
			(.026)		(.027)
Social Class			- .561 ***		- .464 ***
			(.041)		(.042)
Marital Status			.008		- .005
			(.034)		(.035)
Vote				- .364 ***	- .333 ***
				(.027)	(.028)
Violence				.246 ***	.216 ***
				(.033)	(.036)
Chi Square	492.9	316.3	1176.5	760.6	2048.3
Significance	< .001	< .001	< .001	< .001	0
N	7453	7453	7453	7453	7453

Standard errors are represented in parenthesis.
Note: $p < .05$ * $p < .01$ ** $p < .001$ ***

Southern Women Voting for Trump versus Voting for Biden

Group 2 includes voters who self-reported voting for Donald Trump. Model 1 (Political Measures) indicates that political ideology (B = - .198) is statistically significant and discriminates between voting for Donald Trump and voting for Joseph Biden. Party identification (B = .295) is also statistically significant and discriminates between voting for Trump and voting for Biden. The coefficient for political ideology is negative, indicating the respondents scoring lower are more likely to vote for Biden than to vote for Trump. Meanwhile, the coefficient for party identification is positive, indicating that respondents scoring higher are more likely to vote for Trump.

For every one-unit increase in political ideology, there is a change in the odds of voting for Trump by a factor of .820. For every one-unit increase in party identification, there is a change in the odds by a factor of 1.343 in the likelihood of voting for Trump versus voting for Biden. For purely political reasons (identification with a political party), southern women are more likely to vote for the Republican candidate. The multinomial logit is for women relative to men is not statistically significant.

For Model 2 (Religiosity Measures), there is indication that both religious importance (B= .455) and church attendance (B = .095) are statistically significant and discriminate between voting for Trump and voting for Biden. The coefficient for both is positive, indicating that respondents scoring higher for religious importance and church attendance are more likely to vote for Trump than for Biden.

For every one-unit increase in religious importance, there is a change in the odds by a factor of 1.576 in the likelihood of voting for Trump. For every one-unit increase in church attendance, there is a change in the odds by a factor of 1.099 in the likelihood of voting for

Trump versus voting for Biden. Gender (B = - .270) has only a weak statistical significance (p <

.05).

Model 3 (Demographics Measures) indicates that level of education (B = - .798),

race/ethnicity (B = - .543), social class (B = - .214), and marital status (B = - .265) are

statistically significant and discriminate between voting for Trump and voting for Biden. The

coefficients for education, race/ethnicity, and class are negative, indicating that respondents

scoring lower are more likely to have voted for Biden. The coefficient for marital status is also

negative, and indicates that respondents scoring lower were less likely to have voted for Trump

For every one-unit increase in education, there is a change in the odds by a factor of .450,

decreasing the likelihood of southern women voting for Trump versus voting for Biden. For

every one-unit increase in race/ethnicity, there is a change in the odds by a factor of .581,

decreasing the likelihood of voting for Trump. For every one-unit increase in social class, there

is a change in the odds by a factor of .807, decreasing the likelihood of voting for Trump. And

for every one-unit increase in marital status, there is a change in the odds by a factor of .767,

decreasing the likelihood of voting for Trump versus voting for Biden. The multinomial logit for

women relating to men is - .185, indicating a decrease in the likelihood of voting for Trump in

the current model. The indications are that, in the demographics model, more educated, socially

mobile, southern women of color were more likely to vote for Biden.

Model 4 (Threat Measure) indicates in votes counted accurately (B = - .535) and use of

violence (B = - .335) that the coefficients are statistically significant and discriminate between

voting for Trump and voting for Biden. The coefficients are negative, indicating that respondents

scoring lower on party identification or use of violence are less likely to vote for Trump than

vote for Biden.

For every one-unit increase in vote count, there is a change in the odds by a factor of .586 decrease in the likelihood of voting for Trump versus voting for Biden. For every one-unit increase in use of violence, there is a change in the odds by a factor of .716 decrease in the likelihood for voting for Trump versus voting for Biden. The multinomial logit is not statistically significant in this model. While the use of threat motivated white southern women to vote for the "law and order" candidate in 2016, negative news media coverage concerning the Republican candidate in 2020 might have had the opposite effect on voting behaviors. Vote not counted accurately alone appears to not substantially have motivated white women to vote for Donald Trump.

For Model 5 (All Measures), political ideology (B = - .144), party identification (B = .147), religious importance (B = .438), church attendance (B= .104), race/ethnicity (B = - .087), educational level (B = - .592), marital status (B = - .241), votes counted accurately (B = - .538), and use of violence (B = - .205) indicate that all coefficients are statistically significant and discriminate between voting for Trump and voting for Biden. The coefficients for party identification, religious importance, and church attendance are positive, indicating that respondents scoring higher are more likely to vote for Trump versus vote for Biden. The coefficients for political ideology, race/ethnicity, educational level, marital status, votes counted accurately, and use of violence are negative, and indicate that respondents scoring lower are less likely to vote for Trump.

For every one-unit increase in party identification, there was a change in the odds by a factor of 1.158, increasing the likelihood of voting for Trump versus voting for Biden. For every one-unit increase in religious importance, there was a change in the odds by a factor of 1.550, increasing the likelihood of voting Trump versus voting Biden. For every one-unit increase in

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church attendance, there was a change in the odds by a factor of 1.110 in the likelihood of voting for Trump rather than voting for Biden.

For every one-unit increase in political ideology, there was a change in the odds by a factor of .866 in the likelihood of voting Trump versus voting Biden. For every one-unit increase in race/ethnicity, there was a change in the odds by a factor of .571 in the likelihood of voting for Trump. For every one-unit increase in educational level, there was a change in the odds by a factor of .547 in the likelihood of voting for Trump. For every one-unit increase in marital status, there was a change in the odds of voting for Trump by a factor of .786. For every one-unit increase in votes counted, there was a change in the odds of voting Trump versus voting Biden by a factor of .584. And for every one-unit increase in use of violence, there was a change in the odds of voting Trump by a factor of .814. There is no statistical significance from gender.

Table 10. Multinomial Logistic Regression of Voting Behaviors of White Southern Women
2020 – Trump versus Biden

Variable	Political	Religiosity	Demographics	Threat	All Measures
For whom did you vote?	Trump	Trump	Trump	Trump	Trump
South Region	.349 ***	.273 ***	.378 ***	.334***	.273 ***
	(.063)	(.063)	(.065)	(.064)	(.068)
Gender Identification	- .232 *	- .270 *	- .185	-.215	- .193
	(.122)	(.123)	(.127)	(.126)	(.134)
Political Ideology	- .198 ***				- .144 ***
	(.037)				(.040)
Party Identification	.295 ***				.147 ***
	(.023)				(.029)
Religious Importance		.455 ***			.438 ***
		(.038)			(.041)
Church Attendance		.095 ***			.104 ***
		(.019)			(.021)
Level of Education			- .798 ***		- .592 ***
			(.049)		(.057)
Race/Ethnicity			- .543 ***		- .087 ***
			(.036)		(.031)
Family Income			- .038		- .037
			(.032)		(.034)
Social Class			- .214 ***		- .117 **
			(.042)		(.045)
Marital Status			- .265 ***		- .241 ***
			(.036)		(.037)
Vote				- .535 ***	- .538 ***
				(.026)	(.028)
Violence				- .335 ***	- .205 ***
				(.047)	(.048)
Chi Square	492.9	316.3	1176.5	760.6	2048.3
Significance	< .001	< .001	< .001	< .001	0
N	7453	7453	7453	7453	7453

Standard errors are represented in parenthesis.

Note: $p < .05$ * $p < .01$ ** $p < .001$ ***

Southern Women Voting for Other Candidates versus Voting for Biden

Table 11 below presents the results for the four models for Group 3, which represents respondents who self-reported voting for other candidates. Model 1 (Political Measures) indicates that political ideology (B = .401) is statistically significant and discriminates between voting for other candidates and voting for Biden. The coefficient for political ideology is positive, indicating that respondents scoring higher are more likely to vote for the other candidates versus voting for Biden.

For every one-unit increase in political ideology, there is a change in the odds by a factor of 1.493 in the likelihood of voting for other candidates versus voting for Biden. The multinomial logic for females relative to males is not statistically significant in this model.

Model 2 (Religiosity Measures) indicates that religious importance (B = .286) is statistically moderately significant and discriminates between voting for other candidates and voting for Biden. The coefficient for religious importance is positive, indicating that respondents scoring higher on religious importance are more likely to vote for other candidates than to vote for Biden.

For every one-unit increase in religious importance, there is a change in the odds in the likelihood of voting for other candidates versus voting for Biden by a factor of 1.332. Religious importance is not very statistically significant in this model, and gender has no statistical significance.

Model 3 (Demographics Measures) indicates that level of education (B = - .391), race/ethnicity (B= - .267) and social class (B = - .358) are all statistically significant and discriminate between voting for other candidates and voting for Biden. The coefficients for educational level, race/ethnicity, and social class are negative, indicating that respondents

scoring lower on these coefficients are less likely to vote for the other candidates than vote for Biden.

For every one-unit increase in educational level, there is a change in the odds by a factor of .676, decreasing the likelihood of voting for the other candidates versus voting for Biden. For every one-unit increase in race/ethnicity, there is a change in the odds of voting for other candidates by a factor of .766. For every one-unit increase in social class, there is a change in the odds of voting for other candidates by a factor of .699. Gender in this model is not significant. Region has no significance.

Model 4 (Threat Measures) indicates that counting votes (B = - .317) is statistically significant and discriminates between voting for other candidates and voting for Biden. The coefficient for counting votes is negative, indicating that respondents scoring lower on counting votes are less likely to vote for other candidates than vote for Biden. In this model, use of violence has no significance.

For every one-unit increase in counting votes, there is a change in the odds of voting for other candidates by a factor of .728, decreasing the likelihood of voting for other candidates versus voting for Biden. White southern women who were less likely to trust that the votes were properly counted were more likely to have voted for Biden in this model.

For Model 5 (all Measures), the indication is that political ideology (B = .369), religious importance (B = .269), and use of violence (B = .195) are statistically significant and discriminate between voting for other candidates and voting for Biden. The coefficients are positive, indicating that respondents scoring higher on political ideology, religious importance, and use of violence are more likely to vote for other candidates than vote for Biden. The indications are that level of education (B = - .429), race/ethnicity (B = - .327), social class (B = -

.237), and votes counted (B = - .303) are all statistically significant and discriminate between voting for other candidates and voting for Biden. The coefficients are negative, indicating that respondents scoring lower are less likely to vote for other candidates than for Biden.

For every one-unit increase in political ideology, there is a change in the odds by a factor of 1.446, increasing the likelihood of voting for the other candidates versus voting for Biden. For every increase of one unit in religious importance, there is a change in the odds of voting for other candidates by a factor of 1.309. For every one-unit increase in the use of violence, there is a change in the odds of voting for other candidates by a factor of 1.215.

For every one-unit increase in level of education, there is a change in the odds of the likelihood of voting for other candidates versus voting for Biden by a factor of .651. For every one-unit increase in race/ethnicity, there is a change in the odds of voting for other candidates by a factor of .721, a decreasing likelihood. For every one-unit increase in social class, there is a change in the odds by a factor of .789, decreasing the likelihood of voting for the other candidates. For every one-unit increase in votes counted, there is a change in the odds by a factor of .738 decreasing the likelihood of voting for other candidates.

Interpretation for Southern Women 2020

Taken as a whole, gender and region are insignificant in Model 4. There is a change in the odds in the likelihood of voting for other candidates versus voting for Biden. Religious importance is not very statistically significant in this model, and gender has no statistical significance.

Political ideology and party identification have a significant effect on the likelihood of white southern women voting for Trump as opposed to voting for Biden. As it does for southern

women, the effect of party identification for men appears to be stronger than the effect for ideology in voting for Trump versus Biden.

Gender does not appear to have a strong effect for southern women on likelihood of voting for Trump versus Biden; however, the negative effect indicates southern women are more likely to be influenced by family values. Male voters for whom religion is important are less likely to vote for Trump. The 2020 data is interpretable to the effect that party ideology and identification have a significant effect for women on the likelihood of voting for Trump as opposed to Biden.

Table 11. Multinomial Logistic Regression of Voting Behaviors of White Southern Women
2020 – Other Candidate versus Biden

Variable	Political	Religiosity	Demographics	Threat	All Measures
For whom did you vote?	Other	Other	Other	Other	Other
South Region	- .148	- .168	- .150	- .145	- .208
	(.208)	(.209)	(.209)	(.208)	(.211)
Gender Identification	- .613	- .617	- .556	- .593	- .558
	(.601)	(.600)	(.601)	(.600)	(.602)
Political Ideology	.401 ***				.369 ***
	(.102)				(.104)
Party Identification	- .027				- .149
	(.070)				(.079)
Religious Importance		.286 *			.269 *
		(.116)			(.116)
Church Attendance		- .030			- .030
		(.062)			(.062)
Level of Education			- .391 **		- .429 **
			(.144)		(.142)
Race/Ethnicity			- .267 **		- .327 **
			(.102)		(.103)
Family Income			.076		.047
			(.079)		(.081)
Social Class			- .358 **		- .237 *
			(.120)		(.121)
Marital Status			- .029		.041
			(.102)		(.103)
Vote				- .317 ***	- .303 ***
				(.078)	(.078)
Violence				- .174	.195 *
				(.097)	(.098)
Chi Square	492.9	316.3	1176.5	760.6	2048.3
Significance	< .001	< .001	< .001	< .001	0
N	7453	7453	7453	7453	7453

Standard errors are represented in parenthesis.

Note: $p < .05$ * $p < .01$ ** $p < .001$ ***

Male Southerners

The sample observations, with Joseph Biden as the baseline exhibiting 38 percent of the votes, consists of 7453 participants (N = 3647). Table 5 (Biden versus None), Table 6 (Biden versus Trump), and Table 7 (Biden versus Other Candidate), presents results for the three voter groups.

For Model 1, the Chi-Square test is a significant improvement in fit over the null model with $X^2(12) = 500.4$ and $p < .001$. Goodness-of-Fit results test indicates the model fits substantially better than the intercept only model. For Model 2, the Chi-Square test is a significant improvement in fit over the null model with $X^2(12) = 321.6$ and $p < .001$. The Goodness-of-Fit results test indicates the model fits substantially better than the intercept only model. For Model 3, the Chi-Square test is a significant improvement in fit over the null model with $X^2(12) = 1183.8$ and $p < .001$. Goodness-of-Fit results test indicates the model fits substantially better than the intercept only model. For Model 4, the Chi-Square test is a significant improvement in fit over the null model with $X^2(12) = 764.2$ and $p < .001$. Goodness-of-Fit results test indicates the model fits substantially better than the intercept only model. And for Model 5, the Chi-Square test is a significant improvement in fit over the null model with $X^2(12) = 2053.0$ and $p < .001$. Goodness-of-Fit results test indicates the model fits substantially better than the intercept only model.

Southern Men Voting for None versus Voting for Biden

Group 1 includes southern men who self-reported not voting. In the 2020 Presidential election, the south region is significant for voting behaviors. Furthermore, gender has a very strong negative significance.

In Model 1 (Political Measures) political ideology (B = .323) and party identification (B = .201) indicate statistical significance and discriminate between voting none and voting for Joseph Biden. The coefficients for political ideology and party identification are positive, indicating that respondents scoring higher are more likely to not vote versus voting for Biden.

For every one-unit increase in political ideology, there is a change in the odds by a factor of 1.381, increasing the likelihood of voting for no one versus voting for Biden. For every one-unit increase in party identification, there is a change in the odds of not voting by a factor of 1.223. Gender is not statistically significant. White southern men would rather not vote than vote for Biden.

Model 2 (Religiosity Measures) indicates religious importance (B = .132) is statistically significant and discriminates between voting for None and voting for Biden. The coefficient for religious importance is positive, indicating that respondents scoring higher for religious importance are more likely to not vote rather than vote for Biden. For every one-unit increase in religious importance, there is a change in the odds by a factor of 1.141 in the likelihood of white Southern men not voting versus voting for Biden.

Model 3 (Demographics Measures) indicates level of education (B = - .710), social class (B = - .559), and family income (B = .156) are statistically significant and discriminate between voting for none and voting for Biden. The coefficients for level of education and social class are negative, indicating that respondents who score lower for these coefficients are less likely to vote for no one. The coefficient for family income is positive, indicating that respondents who score higher for this coefficient are more likely to not vote versus vote for Biden.

For every one-unit increase in education, there is a change in the odds by a factor of .491 in the likelihood of voting for None rather than voting for Biden. For every one-unit increase in

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social class, there is a change in the odds by a factor of .572 in the likelihood of not voting versus voting for Biden. For every one-unit increase in family income, there is a change in the odds by a factor of 1.168 in the likelihood of voting None versus voting for Biden.

Model 4 (Threat) indicates that counting votes (B = - .363) and use of violence (B = .243) are both statistically significant, as well as discriminating between not voting and voting for Biden. The coefficient for counting votes is negative, indicating that respondents who score lower are less likely to not vote than to vote for Biden. The coefficient for use of violence is positive, indicating that respondents who score higher are more likely to not vote than to vote for Biden.

For every one-unit increase in counting votes, there is a change in odds by a factor of .696 in the likelihood of voting for None vice voting for Biden. For every one-unit increase in use of violence, there is a change in odds by a factor of 1.275 in the likelihood of not voting versus voting for Biden. The multinomial logit for males relative to females is .979 ($p < .01$) units lower for not voting versus voting for Biden. Not surprisingly, people who advocate the use of violence to overthrow election results are more likely not to vote for the Democratic candidate.

For Model 5 (All Measures), the indication is that political ideology (B = .226), family income (B = .139), social class (B = - .463), educational level (B = - .592), votes counted (B = - .332), and use of violence (B = .212) are statistically significant and discriminate between voting for None and voting for Biden. The coefficient for political ideology and family income are positive, indicating that respondents scoring higher are more likely to not vote than to vote for Biden. The coefficients for social class, educational level, votes counted, and use of violence are negative, indicating that respondents scoring lower are less likely to not vote.

For every increase of one unit of political ideology, there is a change in the odds by a factor of 1.254 in the likelihood of voting for no candidate rather than voting for Biden. For every one-unit increase in family income, there is a change in the odds by a factor of 1.149 in the likelihood of not voting versus voting for Biden.

For every one-unit increase in social class, there is a change in the odds by a factor of .629 in the likelihood of voting None versus voting for Biden. For every one-unit increase in educational level, there is a change in the odds by a factor of .553 in the likelihood of voting None versus voting Biden. For every one-unit increase in votes counted, there is a change in the odds by a factor of .717 in the likelihood of voting for no one versus voting for Biden. For every one-unit increase in use of violence, there is a change in the odds by a factor of 1.236 in the likelihood of not voting versus voting for Biden.

Table 12. Multinomial Logistic Regression of Voting Behaviors of White Southern Men
2020 – None versus Biden

Variable	Political	Religiosity	Demographics	Threat	All Measures
For whom did you vote?	None	None	None	None	None
South Region	.497 ***	.501 ***	.431 ***	.497***	.401 ***
	(.063)	(.062)	(.064)	(.063)	(.066)
Gender Identification	- 1.163 ***	-1.127 ***	- 1.085 ***	-.979**	- .964 **
	(.334)	(.331)	(.341)	(.334)	(.349)
Political Ideology	.323 ***				.226 ***
	(.035)				(.037)
Party Identification	.201 ***				.048
	(.023)				(.028)
Religious Importance		.132 ***			.077
		(.040)			(.042)
Church Attendance		.000			-.007
		(.020)			(.021)
Level of Education			- .710 ***		- .592 ***
			(.049)		(.057)
Race/Ethnicity			- .031		- .086 **
			(.030)		(.031)
Family Income			.156 ***		.139 ***
			(.026)		(.027)
Social Class			- .559 ***		- .463 ***
			(.041)		(.042)
Marital Status			.009		-.005
			(.034)		(.035)
Vote				- .363 ***	- .332 ***
				(.027)	(.028)
Violence				.243 ***	.212 ***
				(.033)	(.036)
Chi Square	500.4	321.3	1183.8	764.2	2052.9
Significance	< .001	< .001	< .001	< .001	0
N	7453	7453	7453	7453	7453

Standard errors are represented in parenthesis.
Note: $p < .05$ * $p < .01$ ** $p < .001$ ***

Southern Men Voting for Trump versus Voting for Biden

Group 2 includes men who self-reported voting for Donald Trump. Model 1 (Political Measures) indicates that political ideology (B = - .197) and party identification (B = .295). are statistically significant and discriminate between voting for Donald Trump and voting for Joseph Biden. The coefficient for political ideology is negative, indicating that respondents scoring lower on political ideology are less likely to vote for Trump. The coefficient for party identification is positive, indicating that respondents scoring higher on party identification are more likely to vote for Trump versus vote for Biden.

For every one-unit increase in political ideology, there is a change in the odds by a factor of .822 in the likelihood of voting Trump versus voting Biden. For every one-unit increase in party identification, there is a change in the odds by a factor of 1.344 in the likelihood of voting for Trump versus voting for Biden. Gender is not statistically significant. Men, who identify with the Republican party more strongly are likely to have voted for Trump in 2020.

Model 2 (Religiosity Measures) indicates that religious importance (B = .453) is statistically significant and discriminates between voting for Donald Trump and voting for Joseph Biden. The coefficient for political ideology is positive, indicating that respondents scoring higher on political ideology are more likely to vote for Trump.

For every one-unit increase in religious importance, there is a change in the odds by a factor of 1.574 in the likelihood of voting for Trump rather than voting for Biden. Gender (B = - .424) is statistically significant. In fact, it is only significant in this model of this group. Church attendance is not significant.

Model 3 (Demographics Measures) indicates that level of education (B = - .799), race/ethnicity (B = - .543), social class (B = - .213), and marital status (B = - .264) are

statistically significant and discriminate between voting for Trump and voting for Biden. The

coefficients are negative, indicating that respondents scoring lower are less likely to vote for

Trump versus vote for Biden. Gender is not statistically significant.

For every one-unit increase in education, there is a change of odds by a factor of .450 in

the likelihood of voting for Trump versus voting for Biden. For every one-unit increase in

race/ethnicity, there is a change in the odds by a factor of .581 in the likelihood of voting for

Trump. For every one-unit increase in social class, there is a change in the odds by a factor of

.808 in the likelihood of voting for Trump. For every one-unit increase in marital status, there is

a change in the odds by a factor of .768 in the likelihood of voting for Trump versus voting for

Biden.

In Model 4 (Threat), there is indication that votes counted is statistically significant (B = -

.535), as is use of violence (B = - .337). These coefficients discriminate between voting for

Trump and voting for Biden. The coefficients are negative, indicating that respondents scoring

lower are less likely to vote for Trump.

For every one-unit increase in votes counted, there is a change in the odds of the

likelihood of voting for Trump by a factor of .586. For every one-unit increase in use of

violence, there is a change in the odds by a factor of .714 in the likelihood of voting for Trump.

Gender (B = - .370) is not statistically significant. However, region is statistically significant (B

= .329).

For Model 5 (All Measures), the indications are that political ideology (B = - .143), party

identification (B = .147), religious importance (B = .437), attend services (B = .104),

race/ethnicity (B = - .561), educational level (B = - .602), marital status (B = - .241), social class

(B = - .116), and votes counted (B = - .538) are all statistically significant. Gender is not

statistically significant. The coefficients for party identification, religious importance, and attend services are positive, indicating that respondents scoring higher are more likely to vote for Trump than for Biden. The coefficients for political ideology, race/ethnicity, educational level, marital status, votes counted, and social class are negative, indicating that respondents scoring lower are less likely to vote for Trump.

For every one-unit of increase in party identification, there is a change in the odds by a factor of 1.159 in the likelihood of voting for Trump versus voting for Biden. For every one-unit increase in religious importance, there is a change in the odds by a factor of 1.548 in the likelihood of voting for Trump. For every one-unit increase in attend services, there is a change in the odds by a factor of 1.110 in the likelihood of voting for Trump.

For every one-unit increase in political ideology, there is a change in the odds by a factor of .866 in the likelihood of voting for Trump. For every one-unit increase in race/ethnicity, there is a change in the odds by a factor of .571 in the likelihood of voting for Trump. For every one-unit increase in educational level, there is a change in the odds for the likelihood of voting for Trump by a factor of .548. For every one-unit increase in marital status, there is a change in the odds for the likelihood of voting Trump by a factor of .786. For every one-unit increase in votes counted, there is a change in the odds for the likelihood of voting for Trump by a factor of .584. For every one-unit increase in use of violence, there is a change in the odds for the likelihood of voting for Trump versus voting for Biden by a factor of .813. For every one-unit increase in social class, there is a change in the odds by a factor of .890 in the likelihood of voting for Trump. Gender is not statistically significant. Region is statistically significant.

Table 13. Multinomial Logistic Regression of Voting Behaviors of White Southern Men
2020 – Trump versus Biden

Variable	Political	Religiosity	Demographics	Threat	All Measures
For whom did you vote?	Trump	Trump	Trump	Trump	Trump
South Region	.345 ***	.267 ***	.374 ***	.329 ***	.268 ***
	(.063)	(.063)	(.065)	(.064)	(.068)
Gender Identification	- .472	- .424 ***	- .352	- .370	- .223
	(.260)	(.260)	(.269)	(.265)	(.285)
Political Ideology	- .197 ***				- .143 ***
	(.037)				(.040)
Party Identification	.295 ***				.147 ***
	(.023)				(.029)
Religious Importance		.453 ***			.437 ***
		(.038)			(.041)
Church Attendance		.094			.104 ***
		(.019)			(.021)
Level of Education			- .799 ***		- .602 ***
			(.049)		(.060)
Race/Ethnicity			- .543 ***		- .561 ***
			(.036)		(.038)
Family Income			- .037		- .036
			(.032)		(.081)
Social Class			- .213 ***		- .116 **
			(.042)		(.045)
Marital Status			- .264 ***		- .241 ***
			(.036)		(.037)
Vote				- .535 ***	- .538 ***
				(.026)	(.028)
Violence				- .337 ***	- .207
				(.047)	(.048)
Chi Square	500.4	321.3	1183.8	764.2	2052.9
Significance	< .001	< .001	< .001	< .001	0
N	7453	7453	7453	7453	7453

Standard errors are represented in parenthesis.

Note: $p < .05$ * $p < .01$ ** $p < .001$ ***

Southern Men Voting for Other Candidates versus Voting for Biden

In Group 3, southern men self-report having voted for other candidates than Donald Trump or Joseph Biden. Table 14 presents multinomial logistic regression results for the four models used for male southerners.

For Model 1 (Political Measures) political ideology (B = .401) is a statistically significant variable in the model and discriminates between voting for other candidates and voting for Biden. The coefficient for political ideology is positive, indicating that respondents who score higher in political ideology are more likely to vote for other candidates than to vote for Biden.

For every one-unit increase in political ideology, there is a change in the odds by a factor of 1.494 increase in the likelihood of voting for another candidate versus voting for Biden. The multinomial logit is not statistically significant.

For Model 2 (Religiosity Measures) there is indication that religious importance (B = .285) is statistically significant and discriminates between voting for another candidate and voting for Biden. With a significance of $p < .05$ (.014). It indicates strong evidence against the null hypothesis, and thus there is only a small probability that the results are random. The coefficient for religious importance is positive, indicating the respondents scoring higher are more likely to vote for other candidates than to vote for Biden.

For every one-unit increase in religious importance, there is a change in the odds of the likelihood of voting for other candidates versus voting for Biden by a factor of 1.329. Gender is not statistically significant.

Model 3 (Demographics Measures) indicates that level of education (B = - .392), race/ethnicity (B = - .268), and social class (B = - .359) are statistically significant and discriminate between voting for other candidates and voting for Biden. The coefficients for level

of education, race/ethnicity, and social class are positive, indicating that respondents scoring higher are more likely to vote for other candidates than to vote for Biden.

For every one-unit increase in level of education, there is a change in the odds of the likelihood of voting for other candidates versus voting for Biden by a factor of .676. For every one-unit increase in race/ethnicity, there is a change in the odds by a factor of .765 of the likelihood of voting for other candidates instead of voting for Biden. For every one-unit increase in social class, there is a change in the odds of voting for other candidates by a factor of .698. Gender is not statistically significant.

Model 4 (Threat Measures) indicates the variable votes counted (B = - .317) is statistically significant and discriminates between voting for other candidates versus voting for Biden. The coefficient is negative, indicating that respondents scoring lower on votes counted are less likely to vote for Other Candidates than to vote for Biden.

For every one-unit increase in vote, there is a change in the odds of the likelihood of voting for Other Candidates by a factor of .728. The multinomial logit is not statistically significant. Under the influence of the narrative that votes were not counted accurately, respondents who self-reported they were voting for other candidates than Biden, in fact voted for Biden.

For Model 5 (All Measures), the indications are that political ideology (B = .368), votes counted (B = - .304), and race/ethnicity (B = - .329) are statistically significant and discriminate between voting for other candidates and voting for Biden. The coefficient for political ideology is positive and indicates that respondents scoring higher are more likely to vote for other candidates versus voting for Biden. The coefficient for race/ethnicity is negative and indicates

that respondents scoring lower are less likely to vote for other candidates and more likely to vote

for Biden.

For every one-unit increase in political ideology, there is a change in the odds for the

likelihood of voting for other candidates by a factor of 1.445. For every one-unit increase in

votes counted, there is a change in the odds of voting for other candidates by a factor of .738. For

every one-unit increase in race/ethnicity, there is a change in the odds by a factor of .720 for the

likelihood of voting for other candidates versus voting for Biden. Gender is not statistically

significant.

Interpretation for Southern Men 2020

Taken as a whole, gender has no effect. The region has no effect. Political ideology has a

significant effect on the likelihood of voting for Trump as opposed to voting for Biden, as it does

for Southern women, and the effect of political ideology for men is stronger than the effect of

party identification in voting for Trump versus Biden, while party identification has a lesser

effect. Male voters for whom religion is important were more likely to vote for Trump in 2020.

The data is interpretable such that party ideology has a significant effect in men on the likelihood

of voting for Trump as opposed to Biden. Counting votes has a negative effect, while political

violence seems to have no effect on voting behaviors in voting other for other candidates. This is

untrue of choosing not to vote rather than vote for Biden, or, rather, indicating a decrease of the

likelihood of voting for no candidate.

Summary of Interpretations

In every model, the Chi-Square test proved to be a significant improvement in fit over the

null model, where the null model represents circumstances where all the variables of interest

have no effect. In other words, the model accurately predicts the response. The Goodness-of-Fit results test indicates the study models fit substantially better than the intercept-only model.

Taken as a whole, the interpretation of data for both presidential elections indicates that both men and women who identified with their political party and party ideology were more likely to vote for Donald Trump and would rather vote for any other candidate than vote for the Democratic candidate. Southern men were slightly more strongly influenced by party identification – party was more important than ideals. Party identification was statistically significant in the political models. Southern women were influenced by political ideology and party identification, more so than were men. Both were likely to vote for Trump. Women and men who believe religion is important, and those who attend church regularly were likely to vote against Trump in the religiosity models.

As income increased, there was as much as a 600 percent increase in the likelihood of voting for Trump in some models. Trump voters were more likely to be married, but less educated or aware of social issues. Southern women were more influenced by family values.

In both elections, political ideology and party identification were statistically significant. The results show men having a greater statistical significance for party identification, while women exhibit statistical significance for both party identification and political ideology. The results are support the view that southern women influence the voting choices of southern men but is inconclusive in their support of Gender-Linked Fate. However, research has shown that gender-linked Fate is not a good predictor of political ideology (Gay, Hoschschild, and White 2016).

All the same, this study connects lower levels of gender-linked Fate to less self-identification as Liberals and Democrats (Stout et al. 2017). The coefficients are very close in all

models, suggesting that factors such as party identification may be so strong that they outweigh gender in terms of their influence.

The following section discusses threat and its significance to the 2020 election.

Table 14. Multinomial Logistic Regression of Voting Behaviors of White Southern Men
2020 – Other Candidates versus Biden

Variable	Political	Religiosity	Demographics	Threat	All Measures
For whom did you vote?	Other	Other	Other	Other	Other
South Region	- .159	- .177	- .158	-.154	- .218
	(.208)	(.209)	(.209)	(.208)	(.211)
Gender Identification	- .497	- .416	- .354	-.313	- .269
	(.855)	(.854)	(.855)	(.855)	(.890)
Political Ideology	.401 ***				.368 ***
	(.102)				(.104)
Party Identification	- .026				- .148
	(.070)				(.079)
Religious Importance		.285 *			.268 *
		(.116)			(.116)
Church Attendance		- .032			- .031
		(.062)			(.062)
Level of Education			- .392 **		- .430 **
			(.144)		(.142)
Race/Ethnicity			- .268 **		- .329 **
			(.102)		(.103)
Family Income			.077		.048
			(.079)		(.081)
Social Class			- .359 **		- .238 *
			(.120)		(.121)
Marital Status			- .030		.042
			(.102)		(.103)
Vote				- .317 ***	- .304 ***
				(.078)	(.078)
Violence				- .172	.192 *
				(.097)	(.098)
Chi Square	500.4	321.3	1183.8	764.2	2052.9
Significance	< .001	< .001	< .001	< .001	0
N	7453	7453	7453	7453	7453

Standard errors are represented in parenthesis.

Note: $p < .05$ * $p < .01$ ** $p < .001$

THREAT MEASUREMENT

While a great deal of data has been gathered concerning the voting behaviors of white southern women, scholars have a much better understanding of how they vote than why they vote the way they do. One may speak of the voting history of white southern women, and how they mobilized during the Civil War from homemakers and sewing circles to become the administrators of large plantations and financial planners while their husbands were away, for example. Their influence or the chief male of their households in voting behaviors becomes increasingly clear, while their motivations for choosing a particular candidate do not.

Politicians Behaving Badly

In 2021, a political scientist at the University of Chicago, announced the result of research by the CPOST. CPOST was founded in 2004 by Dr. Robert A. Pape to support his research into the causes, conduct, and consequences of suicide terrorism campaigns and to establish, maintain, and update the first-of-its-kind Suicide Attack Database, that remains the most comprehensive database of suicide attacks and attackers available (Pape 2021).

His 2021 study assessed all individuals arrested by the Federal Bureau of Investigations, Capitol Hill Police, or the DC Police for unlawfully entering the Capitol or breaking into the Capitol grounds on 6 January 2021 to determine primary demographics, socio-economic factors, or affiliation with militias, organizations, or groups existing prior to 2021. A comparison was made to 108 right-wing extremists arrested by the FBI for deadly violence between 2015 and 2020, and with data collected on past right-wing extremists. This was based on information from official court documents and open-source media reporting.

Two specific questions Pape's team asked during interviews to establish complicity of government officials as well as of supporters in social media and right-wing news organizations

were "How accurately do you thinks votes were be counted?" and "Do you feel it is justified for people to use violence to pursue their political goals in this country?" These two questions were crafted to provide proof of the formation of a violent mass movement, based on fear of an existential threat. The same two questions were used in the ANES 2020 Time Series survey and were included to measure threat in the 2020 election for this study. The results were interesting.

In models using threat alone or threat in a model with all other variables included, beta (B) is negative, indicating that for every one-unit increase in the variables for threat, there is a change in the odds by a factor in the likelihood of voting for Trump versus voting for Biden. The coefficients are negative, indicating that respondents scoring lower are *less* likely to vote for Trump.

It has the appearance that neither counting votes inaccurately nor use of violent protest were enough to influence voting behaviors of white southern women. What would the influence of an insurrection look like? Again, the results of the other variables might blur the results from votes counted and use of violence.

As was earlier noted, these results speak to the question of how a person voted, not necessarily how they would act in a specified situation. However, as the regressions stand, the results are not clear.

CHAPTER VI

IMPLICATIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND CONCLUSIONS

This chapter summarizes the key findings of the study, discusses the results considering the theoretical framework, discusses implications, and concludes with suggestions for future research.

SUMMARY OF STUDY

Hypotheses

In the study, threat was measured by whether votes were counted accurately and whether violence was considered justified if the election were claimed to be stolen (although the assertion still circulates, investigations have discredited the claims by Trump). Vote count and use of violence both have a strong negative effect on voting behaviors. The use of violence has a stronger overall effect.

For southern women, there is a decrease in likelihood voting for Trump versus voting for Biden because of threat measures. When taken with all measures for southern men, political violence still has a less significant net negative effect. Also, as was mentioned earlier, there is an argument to be made that participating in the insurrection or the act of voting for a candidate who epitomizes worst traits in the voter might be described as an uncontrolled affectual reaction, as was theorized by Weber (1991), and this is certainly worthwhile considering. Recall that affectual actions are like something one would say or do as an emotional reaction, regardless of the consequences (Weber 1978). And while the use of threat motivated white southern women to vote for the "law and order" candidate in 2016, negative information concerning the Republican candidate in 2020 might likely have had the opposite effect on voting behaviors.

Was voting altered by the presumption of racial, ethnic, and political threats as espoused by the Republican candidate? To some degree, yes, it appears so, and the evidence is mounting (Pape 2017; Mutz 2018; Ball 2021). Efforts had been made to minimize incidents of voter intimidation and calm hysteria over an expected refusal of concession by Trump. But the key was making certain people voted in the first place.

One might consider why white southern women voted for Donald Trump in two elections. The conclusion has been drawn that women feel more strongly about party identification in the south, certainly more strongly than southern men, and they felt that Donald Trump mirrored their concerns.

To some degree, it is possible that women – at least some women – followed the lead of their male heads of household, but it is just as likely that gender-linked fate works with men following the lead of women, with whom they identify their success. Perhaps marriage, in which men are more invested in our study, alters the perception of their interests – men will have stronger connections with their families and accept more conservative views on gender. This conservatism appears to carry over into the daily lives of southern women, who are more religious – or, at least, more church-going – than are southern men.

Theories and Implications

The reason women, specifically the white southern women in this study, vote Republican seems buried in the political past as much in current theories. Several such explanations have been examined in this thesis: growing ideological polarization, the defense of America's Christian heritage, racial heterogeneity and fractionalization, the relationship between educational level and partisanship, persistent inequalities in politics, linked fate, and response to threat.

One point does need to be made: as journalist Charles M. Blow (2021), author of *The Devil You Know: A Black Power Manifesto,* tells us, racism is more evenly distributed across the country than many people will admit. While true that people in the north express their support of fewer racial biases than people in the south, surveys reveal only conscious biases, not those that are subconscious. Blow asked Project Implicit, an "international collaboration of researchers who…measure the racial prejudice of its participants, to run an analysis…to see if there were regional differences in pro-white or anti-black bias" (Blow 2021:47). There was almost no difference between people in the south and the northeast or midwest. It seems that white people outside the south say the right things but are still bigots. Although the focus of this thesis was on the white southern women who formed the sample population, the results may be applied to the population of the United States as a whole.

The use of White Fear for non-whites, immigrants, and women, as well as for anyone not sharing one's political views – but particularly for blacks – would not have been possible without entrenched, systemic racism any more than the fear of blacks and immigrants for white voters. The links between racial purity, the specter of slavery, and white southern women's voting behaviors are substantial, and its effects on voting behaviors on white voters through the medium of symbolic threat are a force to be reckoned with. Furthermore, the influence of gender-linked fate ensures that voting will remain a family matter for the foreseeable future.

As Hochschild (2016:15) noted, "…while the far right is strongest in the south, most of its members make up a demographic – white, middle to low-income, older, married, Christian – that spans the whole nation."

But it should be noted that all non-whites are potential targets. There are credible claims by Democratic lawmakers and civil rights groups that the government has vastly undercounted

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hate crimes, a problem that has grown more acute in the middle of rising white nationalism and a deepening racial strife. In his article for *The Washington Post,* journalist David Nakamura makes the accusation that,

> …the attacks — including several in Northern California over the past month that attracted national attention — followed months of warnings from advocates that anti-China rhetoric from former president Donald Trump over the pandemic was contributing to a surge in anti-Asian slurs and violence. (Nakamura 2020)

Limitations

As of 4 July 2021, the American National Election Survey website reported that in the processing of the 2020 Time Series post-election data, a potential issue was detected involving the variables V202498x – V202504. For that reason, most of the variables from the submodule (IDENT) were coded to -2 with the intent being to research the issue and include those variables in the full release of the 2020 Time Series data. However, it was pointed out that the variable V202504 ("How important is being American to your identity?") was not included in that set of recodes and contains valid data. The data, somewhat predictably, look off. They are in the process of trying to fully resolve the issues with all the variables from this submodule and will re-release them as soon as possible (ANES 2021).

Furthermore, on July 16, 2021, an email was sent on behalf of the ANES Restricted-Use Data Program. The 2020 Time Series study design required last-minute changes due to limitations on in-person interviewing: their restricted-use data agreement did not allow working from home.

To address these issues, the ANES arranged with the ICPSR to administer the ANES Restricted-Use Data Program, effective immediately. ICPSR is a high-volume

processor of data use agreements and has an efficient, streamlined procedure that meets or exceeds the standards for customer service and the protection of survey respondents (ANES 2021).

Due to the relatively small numbers of minorities represented in the ANES, this study is unable to explore differences in Latinas of different national origins and other underrepresented minority groups. Future research may find that subgroups of Asian Americans drive the voting behavior of southern women, and better-constructed questions might include the addition of membership in other ethnic groups.

Finally, ANES does not collect information on individual income. Perhaps future studies may consider individual income as a variable for southern women in voting behaviors.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

This study advances our understanding of the implications of education, religiosity, class, race/ethnicity, marital status, and symbolic threat and their roles in the voter behavior of white southern women. It is expected that it also adds to the existing literature on voting behaviors of this traditionally neglected group of voters.

A further study on the effects of equal rights suppression from institutional racism, racial threat, and police may prove fruitful. A review of the literature shows no lack of interest in the subject.

Again, due to the relatively small numbers of minorities represented in the 2016 ANES, we are unable to explore differences in Latinas of different national origins, as well as other underrepresented minority groups. Better constructed questions might include the addition of membership in other ethnic groups.

Finally, a detailed analysis of the data from the 2020 election has yet to be conducted, and in fact much of the data has not been processed. It will be interesting to compare the two elections fully to determine if the conclusions of this study are fully supported.

CHAPTER VII

POSTSCRIPT

While typing the final words of this thesis, a recording dating to the news coverage of the

Congressional certification of the votes from the 2020 Presidential election streamed over

YouTube. This year, the typically ceremonial event was marred by baseless claims of voter fraud

and disputed ballots. The outgoing president held news conferences and rallies claiming he won

the election by a landslide, a patently untrue claim, but it stoked the fires of discontent in his

base.

The stream was interrupted by reports that rioting broke out in Washington. Inflamed by

allegations of a stolen election, a mob had stormed the Capitol. In its wake, it left five dead and

triggered the impeachment of a president. The pro-Trump mob breached the U. S. Capitol,

causing Congress to be evacuated and 1100 members of the DC National Guard mobilized to

help control the crowd. One protester was fatally shot during the incident and one Capitol Police

officer was beaten to death. It was noted by a senator that the president bore direct responsibility

for the violence that disrupted the counting of electoral votes by Congress. In its original form,

the adage goes: "Curses are like chickens, they always come home to roost" (Anon).

The reign of King Louis Philippe, the last king of France, came to an abrupt and ignominious

end on Feb. 24, 1848, after days of increasingly violent demonstrations in Paris and months of

mounting agitation with the government's policies.

     The protesters surging through the city at first were fairly orderly: students

     chanting, well-dressed men and women strolling, troublemakers breaking

     windows and looting. But late in the evening of Feb. 23, the tide turned dark.

     Soldiers had fired on the crowd near the Hôtel des Capucines, leaving scores of

men and women gravely wounded. Some blocks away, a journalist was "startled by the aspect of a gentleman who, without his hat, ran madly into the middle of the street, and began to harangue the passers-by. 'To arms!' he cried. 'We are betrayed.'" (Carey 2021)

It is difficult for many people to believe that the events that unfolded at the Capitol could have occurred without the foreknowledge and assistance of persons in the Senate and Congress, as well as with the aid of some members of Capitol Police. Evidence is mounting that there were plans to not only stop the counting of the votes, or overthrow the government of the United States, but to kidnap and execute lawmakers including a vice-president who had dared to place his oath of office before loyalty to the president.

One cannot help but draw similarities between the actions of some House and Senate members in 2021 with events on and around May of 1794. Although repression in France during its revolution gained ferocity and violence, Republicans could not shed their commitment to the French revolutionists. Horrifying deeds were committed in the name of Liberty, but Thomas Jefferson still looked at these as triumphal victories. He "blamed the excesses not on the French but on 'invading tyrants' who had dared 'to embroil them in such wickedness'" (Chernow 2004:463).

Also, in 1794, whiskey producers in Pennsylvania protested the excise tax on domestic spirits which affected homebrewers in that state. One writer couched the armed protest in terms of a pretext for tearing down the constitution. "There is no road to despotism more sure (sic) or more to be dreaded than that which begins at anarchy" (Chernow 2004:473), said Alexander Hamilton. Sending in armed troops, the Whisky Rebellion was put down with minimal violence.

As Molly Ball reported in her *Time* magazine piece on February 4, 2021:

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...Trump and his allies were running their own campaign to spoil the election. The President spent months insisting that mail ballots were a Democratic plot and the election would be "rigged." His henchmen at the state level sought to block their use, while his lawyers brought dozens of spurious suits to make it more difficult to vote–an intensification of the GOP's legacy of suppressive tactics. Before the election, Trump plotted to block a legitimate vote count. And he spent the months following Nov. 3 trying to steal the election he'd lost with lawsuits and conspiracy theories, pressure on state and local officials, and finally summoning his army of supporters to the Jan. 6 rally that ended in deadly violence at the Capitol. (Ball 2020)

This was an example of the "Big Lie." The intent was to stage the second American Revolution, in which the "patriots" would be remembered in history as heroes. Toward that end, audio, video, and print records of participants and actions were immortalized. And the Internet does not forget.

Robert A. Pape (2021), professor of political science at the University of Chicago and Director of the CPOST, worked with court records to analyze the demographics and home county characteristics of 377 Americans, from 250 counties in 44 states, arrested or charged in connection with the Capitol insurrection. The analysis revealed that counties that had the largest reduction in white population had an 18 percent chance of sending insurrectionists to Washington, D.C., while counties that seeing the least decline had only a 3 percent chance (Pape et al. 2021).

In its aftermath, families treated loved ones as if they were cult members. It is possible this might be considered truth, as they were sucked into a vortex of social media and the rhetoric

of politicians whose self-serving agendas warped their constituents' views of reality. It seemed these supporters were gripped by an outlandish epidemic of insanity.

And it was not only black Americans who were targeted. Blaming the pandemic on China, Asian Americans became the focus of violence and racist rhetoric. Immigrants waiting to enter our country through its southern borders were expected to endure interviews by hostile government officials. And, not to be forgotten, the GOP rolled out 253 restrictive voting bills in 43 states to tighten the noose around voting rights, a result of the "Big Lie" (Ball 2020).

What was observed on January 6 was a resurrection of politics based on hatred and rooted in our nation's original sin of slavery. The seeds were planted when the first people of color arrived on American soil, they sprouted in the First Continental Congress, and lifted their leaves to the sun on the fields of battle during the Civil War. Perhaps, one day, the rancor and hostilities engendered by the Trump presidency may fade. But its roots, embedded deeply in the bedrock of our republic, may never be removed.

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APPENDIX A

HOT COFFEE STUDY

1. The **Hot Coffee Study** was reported in a paper co-authored by a professor of psychology

   at Yale University, John A. Bargh, and Lawrence E. Williams, Ph.D., of the University

   of Colorado.

   In the 24 October 2008 issue of the journal *Science*, the researchers showed that people

   believed others to have more generous and caring dispositions if they held a warm cup of

   coffee, but less so if they held an iced coffee. A second study indicated people are likely

   to give something to others if they previously held something warm and likely take

   something for themselves if they had just held something cold. The study builds on

   earlier work showing the physical distance between individuals influences their social

   judgments about others (Hathaway 2008).

   However, I note that a research team in 2008 attempted to replicate two of the findings

   with participant samples triple the size of the original study. It found no effects of drink

   temperature (Singal 2019).

APPENDIX B

FOOTNOTES LISTING

1. https://electionstudies.org/data-center/2020-exploratory-testing-survey/. Location of the

    ANES announcement of the survey.

2. These study highlights are taken from the *2020 Exploratory Testing Survey,* as outlined at

    the website https://electionstudies.org/data-center/2020-exploratory- testing-survey/.