In, out or what? How globalization affects high or low corruption: A qualitative-comparative analysis of 90 developing countries
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In this dissertation, I analyze the combinations of globalization and social structural internal conditions linked to corruption at the national level. Using Fuzzy Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis, I address two general questions: First, under what conditions can we consider globalization linked to corruption, both on high and low levels? Second, what are the similarities and differences of research cases in terms of their configurations of casual conditions? I have approached globalization in its political, economic and social dimensions as external condition, as well as nine internal conditions including, wealth, inequality, property rights, judicial independence, efficient legal system, political stability, democracy, elite fractionalization and ethno-linguistic-religious fractionalization. The results reveal that while low elite fractionalization and strong property rights are two necessary but not sufficient conditions for low corruption, there are no necessary conditions for high corruption in developing countries. In addition, I found very high consistency scores between three other conditions, globalization, political stability and wealth with the set of low corruption. With regards to the combinational effects of these conditions, by applying the analyses of sufficiency for both low and high corruption, I argue that neither globalization nor internal conditions are sufficient for high or low corruption. Rather, these conditions combine in four distinct ways to be sufficient for low corruption and in three other ways to be sufficient for high corruption. From among all of the above-mentioned conditions, while high globalization, high political stability, low elite fractionalization and high wealth are repeated in the most of the pathways to low corruption, it seems that the combinations of low legal efficiency, low judicial independence, low property rights and low political stability are more important in earning high fuzzy membership scores in the set of "high corrupt" countries. Also I have discussed the similarities and differences of cases based on their support for distinct pathways. I conclude that although globalization is seen as an important condition especially for low corruption, this condition needs to combine with strong political, legal and economic structures such as wealth, political stability and low elite fractionalization to be sufficient for low corruption. On the other hand, I found that three legal conditions, low property rights, low judicial independence and low legal efficiency along with low political stability are more conducive to high corruption.