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ALICE'S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND AND THROUGH THE  
LOOKING-GLASS: A MENIPPEAN ASSESSMENT AND  
RHETORICAL ANALYSIS OF CARROLL'S  
ALICE BOOKS

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## DEDICATION

To Motherdear, Daddy, Isiah, and Cressyda without whose love, encouragement, and unlimited support I could never have accomplished this task. Finally, thank you Billie and Martha E., and Juanita A.



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ABSTRACT

Since Lewis Carroll published Alice in Wonderland in 1865 and Through the Looking-Glass in 1872, critics, psychologists, philosophers, and the general audience have sought to isolate and categorize his stylistic form. Called by a critic in 1865 "loose-ended, inconsistent dream stories" that were "stiff and overwrought" (844) and by Hilaire Belloc in 1898 "skin-deep narratives" (310), the two Alice books have defied proper identification and, consequently, appreciation. Although contemporary critics such as Van Wyck Brooks and Northrop Frye have recognized the books' unusual qualities, qualities that transcend children's literature, no one has yet carefully identified the literary expertise underlying the texts. Amid the myriad of analyses that exist, however, that Carroll employs a classical satiric format has eluded many. When one reads these books as Menippean satires rather than as

Juvenalian or Horatian and rather than child's simple nonsense, then, a deep-textured purpose and expertise and control evince themselves slowly, consciously, methodically.

This paper examines in Chapter One many of the prevalent analyses of Carroll's narratives. Representative criticisms ranging from the Alice books as children's literature exclusively to works revealing aspects of Carroll's inner personality are reviewed and assessed.

Chapter Two defines Menippean satire from its earliest origins with Menippus, Varro, and Apulieus. The chapter also includes other contributors such as Rabelais and Swift and delineates what each writer contributes to the genre. The chapter finally proposes that Carroll's works yield themselves to coherent and cohesive comprehension and to deep-structured analysis only when viewed from a Menippean perspective.

Chapters Three and Four provide Menippean analyses rhetorically. Such an approach enables the reader to understand clearly the Menippean intent, motivation, and philosophical stance the two books contain.

Chapter Five, finally, provides an overall summative reiteration of the thesis and arguments. This chapter

also asserts that some technical aspects previously critiqued as weaknesses are in actuality strengths when viewed in the proper context.

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## CHAPTER I

### Introduction: Critics, Critics Everywhere

While not many literary works distinguish themselves as classics by evolving into an immortal polyglot (Newsweek 12 July 1965: 86) as well as by emulating the Bible and Shakespeare in possessing the most quotable sources (Dictionary of Literary Biography 44), Lewis Carroll's two Alice books immediately satisfy these touchstones. Celebrating the centennial publication of Alice's Adventures in Wonderland, Newsweek stated,

[o]utside her native England Alice's legend has long since passed into polyglot (more than 40 languages) immortality. Young Italians lisp 'Guglielmo! tu sei vecchio' as they love Father William just like children in Surrey. Alice remains the same well-mannered girl in France, obediently drinking the sinister little bottle, though it is labeled 'Buvez-moi' and not 'Drink me.' Latinists can meet the Cheshire cat anew as Felis Cestriana in Alicia in Terra Mirabili and Swahili speakers have their own version complete in pictures of a dark-skinned Alice in native dress. (86)

Among these many translations of Alice, interestingly, is even one in "Pitjantjatjara, a dialect of Aborigine" (Dic. Lit. Bio. 44). One question that evinces itself immediately, of course, asks what qualities do the Alice

books contain that would endear them so earnestly to so many diverse cultures, and, further, do these books, then, contain such macrocosmic implications that as Peter Ustinov's daughter, Tammy, stated, "No one would dare grow up without reading it [Alice], would one?" (Newsweek 86).

Since Lewis Carroll published Alice's Adventures in Wonderland in 1865 and Through the Looking-Glass in 1872, critics, psychologists, philosophers, and the general audience have sought to isolate and categorize his stylistic form. Called by one critic in an 1865 review in The Athenaeum "loose-ended, inconsistent dream stories" that were "stiff and overwrought" (844) and by Hilaire Belloc in 1898 "skin-deep narratives" (330), the two Alice books have defied identification. Although contemporary critics such as Van Wyck Brooks and Northrop Frye have recognized the books' unusual qualities that transcend children's literature, no one has yet carefully identified the literary expertise underlying the texts. Indeed, scholars and critics alike agree that the works are not only classics but also seminal; they either disagree or remain in a perpetual quandary, however, when asked why and how they know. Amid this myriad of analyses that exist, though, that Carroll employs a classical satiric--the Menippean satire--has eluded many.

What facets of these works, then, have preoccupied so many scholars and critics alike from 1865 to the present in lieu of its Menippean character? Lewis Carroll and his personal life, Victorian children's literature and Carroll, philosophy and Carroll, psychology and Carroll, the psychedelic and Carroll, and language and satire and Carroll have constituted the canon of Carrollian criticism for the past one hundred and twenty-two years.

Just as Alice observes, and subsequently comments, that Wonderland and its inhabitants become curiousest and curiousest the further she explores, so biographers who have explored the milieu and private life of Charles Ludwig Dodgson have also expressed comparable sentiments. How did such a man, a mild-mannered Oxford Don, create such fanciful works, and why and what did he intend? From among representative biographers such as Lewis Carroll's nephew Stuart Dodgson Collinwood with The Life and Letters of Lewis Carroll (1898), Florence Becker Lennon with Victoria Through the Looking-Glass: The Life of Lewis Carroll (1945), and John Pudney with his Lewis Carroll and His World (1976), one can familiarize oneself with Charles Ludwig Dodgson and establish a rapport with the man, his family, friends, and interests. All of the biographies, for example, begin with Dodgson's birth and



filial bonds. Despite the modes of analyses, particularly twentieth-century deconstruction, the author's life does not form the central consideration for interpretation and criticism, although it does illuminate his work to an extent. According to Austin Warren in "Carroll and his Alice Books" (1980) who relies on E.D. Hirsch's Validity in Interpretation (1967), interpretation examines the work's textual meaning, the author's intended meaning, as he meant it historically--the microcosm; criticism, however, examines the work's macrocosmic implications (351). With Dodgson, however, the antithesis has persevered. Critics have spent too much time with the author's life and not enough with his text. While Collinwood does provide insightful, objective biographical information on Dodgson, as only a family member can, perhaps, he, like Lennon and Pudney, focuses his attention particularly on the Alice books and Dodgson's life juxtaposed to them. Not only does Collinwood establish Dodgson's close filial ties and typical Victorian middle-class views, but he also observes the conflicts his uncle encountered--conflicts, as Collinwood asserts, that would later act as catalysts inspiring the Alice books (76-78). Although Dodgson inherited, for example a religious inclination, and fully as well as joyfully anticipated his initiation into the

Priesthood, Collinwood maintains that his uncle was most unprepared for the extent of asceticism Oxford life demanded, especially the restriction forbidding attendance at the theatre and opera (76-80). As a result of such strictures, Carroll refused to take the Priest's Orders and in lieu of them took the Deacon's. Such restrictions and requirements, for example the celibacy requirement insisted on by Pusey (Pudney 41), metamorphosed into catalysts that later influenced Dodgson. Such influence, according to biographers, evinced itself with Dodgson's creation of a literary persona--Lewis Carroll. To circumvent Oxford's strictures and yet maintain his decorum as an Oxford Don while simultaneously satisfying his expanding interest in secular, non-professional writing, Dodgson as well as his first real editor, Edmund Yates, editor of a periodical entitled The Train, viewed a pseudonym as a necessity if he were going to continue his creative writing; his scholarly works focusing on mathematics and logic such as Symbolic Logic he published under Charles Ludwig Dodgson (Pudney 52-53).

Complementing Carroll's religious and writing pursuits, drawing, photography, epistles, and game/puzzle invention became preoccupations with Lewis Carroll. According to Pudney and Collinwood, Carroll exerted

intense energies into all of his intellectual and religious pursuits to such extents that Carroll distinguished himself among his literary contemporaries, initially by photographing them (Pudney 54-67). Resulting from Carroll's innovative photographing techniques and his eye for composition (Pudney 42,74), lasting friendships with the little girls whom he had photographed occurred:

. . . [P]osterity has gained . . . an arresting portrait gallery of Carroll's friends and relatives, Oxford academics, Pre-Raphaelites, miscellaneous celebrities--and above all, children, the well-nourished children of the well-to-do, from whom came the delectable Alice. (Pudney 67)

To sustain such delicate relationships, Carroll embarked on a letter-writing trek, a trek that was to produce eventually 98,721 letters. According to Carroll in Collinwood's biography, Carroll felt that one-third of his life he devoted to receiving letters while the other two-thirds he spent answering them (Cohen Harper's 65).

Later in 1887 Carroll stated that life itself was in letter-writing and that the definition of "Man" was " . . . an animal that writes letters" (Harper's 65).

Whether his definition is valid or not, what begins to emerge slowly and clearly from these three biographies is indeed a complex portrait, such a complex portrait that contemporary and later critics focus much of the extant

Carrollian criticism on the man's life: family, child-friends, epistles, photography, and sexual life.

Ironically, the majority of these critics disregard the absence of several diaries as well as the attenuation of concrete substantiation found in their conjectures. These critics utilize portions of Carroll's personal biography and merge fact and interpolation and conjecture to explain how Alice's Adventures in Wonderland and Through the Looking-Glass depict their particular theses. One branch of criticism, for example, examines Carroll's personal attachment to Alice Liddell and the role she plays as catalyst and as Carroll's persona for what was to become the first Alice book. Collinwood, as well as Lennon and Pudney, trace the derivation of each book. The first Alice book, according to Collinwood, had many initial titles: Alice's Adventures Under Ground, Alice's Adventures in Elfland, and finally the present title (96). For the companion book written seven years later, in lieu of the original title, Behind the Looking-Glass and What Alice Saw There, an associate, Dr. Liddon, with whom Carroll conferred, suggested Through the Looking-Glass and What Alice Found There (138-39). With this groundwork established, other critics began to observe Alice initially as heroine. W. H. Auden's essay, "Today's 'Wonder-World'"

Needs Alice," examines Alice as heroine and poses the thesis that Alice must have shocked the 'average American' (8) because she fails to comply with the required heroic traits Americans demand:

[t]he American child-hero . . . is a Noble Savage, an anarchist, and even when he reflects, [is] predominantly concerned with movement and action. He may do almost anything except sit still. His heroic virtue--that is to say his superiority to adults--lies in his freedom from conventional ways of thinking and acting; all social habits, from manners to creeds, are regarded as false or hypocritical or both. All emperors are really naked. (8)

While this representative criticism does analyze Alice in light of literary criticism, other criticism juxtaposes Alice with Carroll, using as its touchstone of authority Freudian and Jungian psychology--to be presented later in this chapter. Primarily, then, the representative, essential and factual criticism regarding Carroll's life and works, devoid of overt misinterpretations, appears in Stuart Collinwood's epistolary and journalistic biography, John Pudney's illustrated biography, and Florence Lennon's psychological biography. The remaining body of criticism, depending to an extent on the aforementioned biographies, branches out and examines facets of the Alice books and Carroll's life.

One other rather obvious concern of Carrollian criticism contains examinations of the Alice books as children's literature. Reviews that "Alice" initially garnered reveal how Carroll's contemporaries viewed the work as representative of this genre. The Athenaeum, for example, in 1865 reviewed the work in its section on children's books. This contemporary review evinces unflinchingly its scathing assessment:

. . . who can in cold blood, manufacture a dream, with all its loops and ties, and loose threads, and entanglements, and inconsistencies, and passages which lead to nothing, at the end of which sleep's most diligent pilgrim never arrives?  
 . . . We fancy that any real child might be more puzzled than enchanted by this stiff, overwrought story. (844)

Among critics at large, this review echoes the general tenor of critical reviews. Even when the reviews intended to focus on other Carroll works or the companion narrative, Through the Looking-Glass and What Alice Found There, several years later, they never strayed far from "Alice" and initially negative criticism. The Athenaeum (1876) provides a representative echo:

It may be that the author of Alice's Adventures in Wonderland is still suffering from the attack of Claimnant on the brain, which some time ago numbed or distracted so many intellects. Or it may be that he has merely been inspired by a wild desire to reduce

to idiotcy as many readers, and more especially reviewers, as possible. (495)

That the reviewer intended to "save" the audience from a fate that he had assessed as worse than death evinces itself clearly. What establishes an irony in the review, however, discloses itself in the reviewer's successful circumvention of his primary task, a critical review of the work. As other reviews followed, the works began to receive a melange of reactions. In 1898, for example, Hilaire Belloc in The Cruise of Nona commented: "I am perfectly certain that [Alice's Adventures in Wonderland] will not long survive the easy and unquestioned security of the England in Carroll's day" (Victoria Through the Looking-Glass 330). Not only did the reactions to the books include assessments of utter nonsense, or "idiotcy," but also a lack of universal appeal, according to critics like Belloc. An interesting contradictory observation made by Lennon asks if Carroll's works really lacked universality and child appeal, why did soldiers in the trenches read "Alice"; why did a child read "Alice" to Queen Victoria; why did "Alice" titles and chapter headings adorn contemporary books (330)? Again the critics' conjectures lack the substantive how and why, an oversight

that repeats itself throughout Carrollian criticism, even the favorable criticism.

Did all criticism examining the books in light of children's literature take a negative stance? No. Max Beerbohm, a noted critic, essayist, and caricaturist, in his "Alice Again Awakened" in The Saturday Review (1900), maintained that children not only liked Carroll's "Alice" but also understood and appreciated the work's combination of fantasy and moral edification (Around Theatres I 139). Unlike critics such as Hilaire Belloc who foresaw an abbreviated appeal for the work, Beerbohm contended that because of Carroll's unique creation, the work would remain popular in the nurseries for a long time (139). Critical reviews such as this one initiated a long series of positive reviews for the Alice books. Critics, as a result, began to reassess the Alice books' appeal to children as well as its universal appeal that Belloc had maintained the books failed to achieve. In fact, George Masslich in "A Book Within a Book" in 1921, like Beerbohm, asserts the existence of a deep structure underlying the obvious in "Alice":

[Alice's Adventures in Wonderland] is on the one hand so nonsensical . . . [while] [o]n the other hand it is so deep as to yield results in exegesis almost beyond



belief. Interwoven in a dream fabric of rare verisimilitude is a psychological study of the reaction of the immature mind to academic training . . . . (122-23)

That Masslich perceives the work's attempt to couch a serious text containing universal truths behind a veil of nonsense indicates Carroll's artistic control and focus. Such comments also establish Carroll's concern with the psychological journey of a child. Later paralleling Masslich's perception of Carroll, Jan B. Gordon, in "The Alice Books and the Metaphors of Victorian Childhood (1971)," views "Alice" as a chef-d'oeuvre whose most distinctive trait is its conscious non-reality, a complete distortion of reality. The Wonderland into which Alice finds herself is one of total fantasy (56). Such a world, Gordon maintains, was anticipated by British children, a world where the unusual, improbable, or the unlikely might occur (60). Not only does "Alice" provide these children with their fantasy world, but also "Alice" addresses the problem of anxiety in children, a first in children's books, contends Gordon:

We find a child's anxiety at not growing up fast enough, perhaps never growing up, allied to a refusal to grow up; the traumatic experience of seeing one's own body in strange, incomprehensible metamorphoses that often seems shameful or even monstrous. (61)

Interestingly, these metamorphoses in a mutable system, as

Gordon cites, typify the traits possessed by the Menippean anti-hero or anti-heroine. Gordon, however, does not identify these metamorphoses or the system as Menippean.

Although essayists such as Beerbohm, Masslich, and Gordon form a representative time tunnel of favorable, analytical, objective analyses, unfavorable criticism yet abided. G. K. Chesterton serves as representative of this ever-present fiction that has yet to desist. As a result of an inability to appreciate fully Carroll's innovative approach in "Alice," Chesterton, in his essay "Lewis Carroll" (1932), asserts that Carroll's utilization of nonsense enervates the work because it fails to elicit the pathos that Rabelais elicits, the acrid nonsense Swift exudes, or establish the textured metaphysical concepts Rabelais and Swift champion (117-18). Again, like so many critics before and since, devoid of Menippean background on which to rely for delineation. Chesterton cannot accurately assess whether or not these motifs achieve success. What themes may appear attenuated or which motifs contain sense, subsequently depend wholly upon the Menippean purpose.

The criticism examining Carroll and the books as children's literature, as one can see, runs the complete spectrum from negative to positive, surface to deep

structure. Interestingly, whether affirmative or negative, the critical analyses of the Alice books have continued since the 1865 debut and have associated them with children since that time as well. The primary problem with all of this criticism, although some of it does contain positive assessments such as Beerbohm's, Masslich's, and Gordon's, is its totally precluded view of the work's deep-textured, satiric view and purpose and its reticence to examine other genres as possibilities viably explicating Carroll's purpose and design, possibilities such as Menippean satire.

Moreover, closely associated with Carroll and his works as each relates to children's literature, Lewis Carroll and the Alice books' relationship philosophically has merited critical analyses from Austin Warren's "Carroll and His Alice Books" (1980), to Edmund Wilson's "C. L. Dodgson: The Poet Logician" (1932, 1952), to Allen Tate's "Last Days of Alice" (1948) to Roger Williams Holmes's "The Philosopher's Alice in Wonderland" (1959). That Carroll includes philosophical strands in the Alice books Austin Warren firmly confirms in a recent essay, "Carroll and His Alice Books." According to Warren,

. . . the Alice books of Lewis Carroll . . . are a unique compound of poetry and philosophy, both prime forms which expand the mind and sensibility. (331)

A renowned critic expressing such views solidifies the early conjectures made by other critics. What distinguishes Warren's assessments from the others, however, is that he realizes the extant criticism included too little substantive proof and relied too extensively on Dodgson's life:

Darton's chapter "The Sixties: Alice and After" is profitable to read in the sequence of his highly intelligent, historically, oriented book; for it shows how little an historian can find to say about Carroll and the Alice books . . . . The historian never succeeds in naming the special quality of the Alice books . . . . (340)

Warren, then, provides a breath of fresh air--honesty--that tells the Carrollian scholar that faulty and incomplete Carrollian criticism and interpretation concerning the books' philosophical stances exist.

One such incomplete interpretation of Carroll's works evinces itself in Edmund Wilson's "C. L. Dodgson: The Poet Logician," in which he asserts that while Dodgson functioned daily as the quiet Oxford Don, admired by literary contemporaries such as William Wordsworth, Lewis Carroll functioned as an exacting satirist (199). Carroll, according to Wilson, detested and satirized the "stuffed-shirt side of Wordsworth" as effectively as any before him (200). Such satire occurs, for example, via the White

Knight's song that parodies Wordsworth's "Leech-Gatherer" (200). Philosophically, then, Wilson compares Dodgson to Swift and Donne and refers to him as a logician with poetic tendencies (200). While Wilson does declare a viable thesis, his essay veers from the nucleus of his assertion and proceeds around the perimeters of his proposed purpose. He refers to Lennon's book and its strengths and weaknesses, to Beerbohm's essay, and to others in the same fashion. Wilson never readdresses his thesis, referring to and interpreting and critiquing Carroll's--not Dodgson's--style, intent, or motivation. Wilson, furthermore, never pursues his interpretive and critical analysis that juxtaposes, according to him, Carroll to Swift and Donne.

Like Wilson, Allen Tate also attempts to interpret and critique Carroll's works. What separates Tate's similar textual approach, however, evidences itself with his choice of delivery: a poem, "Last Days of Alice" (1948). Tate, an American poet and proponent of New Criticism, concerns himself primarily with the critical facet of the work:

Alice grown lazy, mammoth but not fat,  
Declines upon her lost and twilight age;  
Above in the dozing leaves the grinning cat  
Quivers forever with his abstract rage:

Whatever light swayed on the perilous gate  
 Forever sways, nor will the arching grass,  
 Caught when the world clattered, undulate  
 In the deep suspension of the looking-glass:

Bright Alice! always pondering to gloze  
 The spoiled cruelty she had meant to say  
 Gazes learnedly down her airy nose  
 At nothing, nothing thinking all the day.

Turned absent-minded by infinity  
 She cannot move unless her double move  
 The All-Alice of the world's entity  
 Smashed in the anger of her hopeless love

Love for herself who, as an earthly twain,  
 Pouted to join two in a sweet one;  
 No more the second lips to kiss in vain  
 The first she broke, plunged through the  
 glass alone--

Alone to the weight of impassivity,  
 Incest of spirit, theorem of desire,  
 Without will as chalky cliffs by the sea,  
 Empty as the bodiless flesh of fire:

All space, that heaven is a dayless night,  
 A nightless day driven by perfect lust  
 For vacancy, in which her bored eyesight  
 Stares at the drowsy cubes of human dust.

--We too back to the world shall never pass  
 Through the shattered door, a dumb-shade  
 harried crowd  
 Being all infinite, function depth and mass  
 Without figure, a mathematical shroud

Hurled at the air-blessed without sin!  
 O God of our flesh, return us to Your wrath,  
 Let us be evil could we enter in  
 Your grace, and falter on the stony  
 path! (207-08)

Sans substantive, authoritative proof, Tate presents a  
 dark and pessimistic criticism of the once-heroine Alice

as an adult who has lost the ability to transport herself to Wonderland, an ever-existing stasis itself. Interestingly, Tate seems to capture a portion of the Menippean satirist's intent. He calls for real, substantive action versus empty pseudo-action via the adult Alice. Nowhere in the poem is this intense angst verbalized better than in the final two stanzas when he enlarges the poem's audience with his first-person plural, nominative pronoun. He further reiterates this yearning by calling for an archetypally negative prayer, a prayer much like Twain's Hadleyburgians' prayer: " . . . return us to Your wrath,/ Let us be evil could we enter in/ Your grace, [the grace of Wonderland] and falter on the stony path" (208). These thoughts Tate evinces parallel the Menippean satirists who also call for action. Although Tate, like Wilson, lightly alludes to Menippean traits, he never fully articulates them coherently and cohesively as belonging to any genre, particularly not as Menippean satire.

In conjunction with Wilson, Warren, and Tate, Roger W. Holmes's essay "The Philosopher's Alice in Wonderland" (1959) completes the gamut of representative criticism and interpretation focusing on Carroll's philosophy:

Have you ever seen nobody? What would your world be like if objects had no names? Can

you remember what will happen week after next? How many impossible things can you believe before breakfast--if you hold your breath and shut your eyes? These questions transport us to the world of Lewis Carroll: to Wonderland, . . . . They transport us to the realm of Philosophy. (159)

Pursuing this thesis, Holmes maintains that the Alice books, though dedicated to children, also dedicate themselves to metaphysics, logic, knowledge, and ethics. These books further examine time and space, names and their functions, and the mind and its external body (160). Although Holmes's thesis has validity, it, too, like other representative criticism, fails to examine wholly the style, intent, or motivation guiding Carroll. With such an exclusion, a full interpretation or criticism cannot occur, even though Holmes cites many provocative passages: the White Rabbit, the White Knight, the Mock Turtle, the pool of tears, the Mad-Tea Party, and the Walrus and the Carpenter, to cite a few. The essay contains, then, a series of assertions without authoritative proof. Holmes, for example, compares the Red King to God as Berkeley perceives God:

. . . the tree in the forest exists when there are no humans to perceive it. To be is to be perceived, ultimately in the mind of God--or the Red King . . . . Here we are at the central problem of philosophy, the problem of the nature of



reality, and confronted as all philosophers are, with the threat of the subjectivity of knowledge . . . . (169-70)

This essay clearly shares the principal flaw that much Carrollian criticism contains, tunnel vision, so narrowed that when the critics encounter a work of art containing a vast magnitude of vistas, they, like Laurence Sterne's Uncle Toby, hop upon their specialized hobby horses and ride off into their preferred sunsets, oblivious to any other considerations, especially to the weaknesses of their own conjectures. They, themselves, become entangled in the mesh and jargon of their own rhetoric.

Certainly, Alice's Adventures in Wonderland and Through the Looking-Glass and What Alice Found There have inspired to even deeper, more tenuous, and assuredly more jargonal interpretations and subsequent erudite criticism--the psychological contributions. Generally bifurcated into the Freudian and Jungian, Carrollian psychological criticism examines Carroll's personal life as Charles Ludwig Dodgson, focusing on filial ties, his photography of little girls, sexual habits, and juxtaposes them with plot events in both books. Among such criticism some representative essays concentrating on the Freudian perspective are William Empson's "Alice in Wonderland: The Child as Swain" (1935), Paul Schilder's

"Psychoanalytic Remarks on Alice in Wonderland and Lewis Carroll" (1938), John Skinner's "Lewis Carroll's Adventures in Wonderland" (1947), Martin Grotjahn's "About the Symbolization of Alice's Adventures in Wonderland" (1947), Phyllis Greenacre's "The Character of Dodgson as Revealed in the Writings of Carroll" in her Swift and Carroll: A Psychoanalytic Study of Two Lives (1955), Kenneth Burke's "The Thinking of the Body" in Language as Symbolic Action (1966), and Derek Hudson's "Lewis Carroll" (1958).

Representing the Jungian perspective are Robert Scott's "From a Letter to Lewis Carroll on 'Jabberwocky'" (1871), Judith Bloomingdale's "Alice as Anima: The Image of Woman in Carroll's Classics" (1971), and Donald Rackin's "Alice's Journey to the End of Night" (1966). Although these perspectives span the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, they all share, ironically, a common focus--a thesis examining Dodgson's sexual tendencies, or lack of them, via Lewis Carroll and the Alice books.

Germinating such an idea even though the thrust of the essay concentrates on the pastoral structure contained in the Alice books, William Empson in "Alice in Wonderland: The Child as Swain" perceives Alice as an exegesis of the Freudian sexuality contained in the books. Empson asserts that Alice's complete character possesses not only

androgynous traits but also matriarchal and patriarchal traits:

She runs the whole gamut; she is father in getting down the hole, a foetus at the bottom, and can only be born by becoming a mother and producing her own amniotic fluid. (269)

Empson draws a distinct parallel here between Carroll and Alice as a result of this earlier conjecture. If Alice functions as Carroll's persona, then Carroll vicariously is Alice with all of her selves (270-71).

Juxtaposing and even fusing Alice and Carroll, and, hence, Dodgson, further preoccupied many critics. Although each psychologist-critic usually prefaces the criticism with a façade of desiring to analyze the books; relationship to children and its psychological effect upon them, the façade's diaphanous texture belies each critic's hobby horse--Dodgson's sexuality. Using Empson as a precursor, then, and other contemporary psychologists as jargonal authority, Paul Schilder writes "Psychoanalytic Remarks on Alice in Wonderland and Lewis Carroll." Schilder innocently and scholarly begins:

Lewis Carroll's Alice in Wonderland and Through the Looking-Glass and What Alice Found There are classics of stories for children. As far as I know nobody has tried so far to find out what is offered to children by these stories. (283)

The reader's immediate assumption, of course, is that finally a critic, a psychologist-critic, is providing the long-awaited style, intent, and motivation that inspired such quintessential works. Schilder, however, does not deliver his proposed thesis. With the next paragraph, in lieu of delving into an interpretation of the works and, consequently, a criticism of them, Schilder prepares to deliver a selective and conjecturally biased biographical sketch of Charles Dodgson (283-84). That the extant biographies, diaries, and letters do not reveal, as Schilder states, " . . . the deeper relations between Charles and his parents . . . brothers and sisters" (284) does not deter him from his improbable conjectures. According to Schilder, these books contain "cruelty, destruction, and annihilation" (289). Alice encounters threatening situations time and again and emerges " . . . bland and smiling" (289). Schilder concludes, subsequently, that Wonderland represents a world devoid of love and that this representation is a metaphor whose tenor is Carroll's loveless milieu with his parents--his parents being the kings and queens (290). Schilder further conjectures that as a result of such a loveless environment (the tenor), Carroll expected one of his sisters to fill this void (290). This synthesis leads Schilder to conclude

that Carroll then desired to be a woman himself, particularly a mother or sister (291). Without any substantiation for any of these conjectures, Schilder makes a quantum leap to ask,

[w]hat was his [Carroll's] relation to his sex organ anyhow? Fenichel [Otto Fenichel and his "Die Symbolische Gleichung: Mädchen=Phallus"--"The Symbolic Equation: Girl=Phallus"] has lately [1936] pointed to the possibility that little girls might become symbols for the phallus. (291)

Made even more tenuous because within the same paragraph Schilder admits that the authoritative texts necessary for such assertions do not exist (291), such a correlation gains impetus, ironically, because Schilder asserts with certainty not only that " . . . little girls substitute for incestuous love objects" (291) but also that Carroll related promiscuously with children; he seduced them (291). Schilder's final conclusions regarding Lewis Carroll/Charles Dodgson reiterate his penchant for conjecturing sans authoritative proof:

I suspect that nonsense literature will originate whenever there are incomplete object relations and a regression to deep layers involving the relation of space and time on the basis of primitive aggressiveness.

Carroll appears to the writer of this study as a particularly destructive writer. I do not mean this in the sense of a literary criticism, which does not increase destructive attitudes

in children beyond the measure which is desirable. There is very little in Alice's Adventures in Wonderland, as in Through the Looking-Glass, which leads from destruction to construction. There is very little love and tenderness and little regard for the existence of others. (292)

With the most verbally ironic statement contained in all of the Carrollian criticism studied here, Schilder says in his last sentence,

[o]ne may be afraid that without the help of the adult, the child may remain bewildered and, alone, may not find his way back to a world in which it can appreciate love relations, space and time and words. (291)

That Schilder "lovingly" refers to a child with a third-person neuter pronoun evidences that despite his initial promise of intent to examine these "classical stories for children" in light of what the books offer to children, his concern--his hobby horse--concentrates on Carroll's sexual behavior. Adding humor to this ruse, Schilder asserts that the words deter children from appreciating words and therefore, needs an adult guide. Schilder would constitute a poor guide, then, for even the adult reader cannot trust him as a viable speaker/authority. Finally, that the Alice books contain no constructive elements and no love relationships, only cruelty and annihilation, Schilder fails to prove unequivocally.

Despite Schilder's inability to prove his thesis, similar psychological criticism abounds. John Skinner's essay, "Lewis Carroll's Adventures in Wonderland," for example, synthesizes Schilder's essay as well as others and asserts that full comprehension of the Alice books depends upon the psychoanalytic study of Dodgson and Carroll (293). Like Empson, Schilder, and Skinner--perhaps the most unusual criticism--Martin Grotjahn writes "About the Symbolization of Alice's Adventures in Wonderland." Synthesizing the previous criticism, including Otto Fenichel's "Die Symbolische Gleichung: Maedchen--Phallus," Grotjahn proposes the same thesis with a unique twist. Grotjahn circumvents the work's theme and purpose and proposes that the Alice books focus on Alice's fulfilling Carroll's " . . . unconscious fantasies and needs" (34). To reify this thesis, Grotjahn utilizes a metaphor of a majorette, specifically, a " . . . Tambour Majorette" (34) who functions as a phallic emblem for the band. The Tambour Majorette behaves as phallus narcissistically not genitally admired and then as a "penis post coitum" (35) in appearance, action, and dress. Relying on Skinner's essay, Schilder's, and Sigmund Freud's Wit and Its Relation to the Unconscious (1938), Grotjahn juxtaposes Alice to the Tambour Majorette and sees

significant, he maintains, comparisons. Alice, then, for Grotjahn assumes such a symbolization; Carroll, too, assumes a parallel role--the devil. Grotjahn and Schilder concur that Carroll was indeed a "particularly destructive writer" whose stories lacked love, compassion, and concern for others (34). Unlike the previously cited psychologist-critics, however, Grotjahn does see one redeeming feature in the works in the refusal to consummate the proposed sexual encounter. Devoid, consequently, of sexual prowess, the pivotal phallic emblem symbolizes, then, the narcissistically admired phallus. That Grotjahn sees Alice's symbolization as the weakest facet because it disintegrates as the novel moves forward and reaches no climax decidedly evidences that Grotjahn read the work artificially. That he conjectures further that the work as a work designed for mental health fails shows, too, that Grotjahn failed to appreciate fully Carroll's purpose (41), not Lewis Carroll. Finally, that Grotjahn maintains that Alice's Adventures in Wonderland completely lacks love and regard for others, contains vehement cruelty, and rebels against rhyme and reason (41) circumvents all of Carroll's motifs, themes, and intent. One might indeed conjecture whether Grotjahn carefully read the work. Another of the representative psychologist-critics who



sees latent sexual aberrations in Carroll, Lionel Morton in his "Memory in the Alice Books" contends that

Carroll's love for his child friends points to a fixation on some unsolved problem in his own early childhood. . . . [T]here is no need to be specific about what it was: the essential point is simply that Carroll's mind and feelings were directed toward some past trauma . . . . According to Greenacre, this female dominance [Carroll's mother and sisters] shows Carroll's fixation on his early relations with his mother at that period when the mother is nearly everything, good and bad, to the children of both sexes; . . . Gattegno [Lewis Carroll: Fragments of a Looking-Glass 1976] points out the paradoxical difference between the picture one gets of Carroll's mother from biographical sources and Carroll's "serious" writing--loving and self-denying--and the picture to be constructed from the Alice books. (300-01)

Again, Carroll evolves as a frustrated, latent pedophile who experiences orgasmic satisfaction via child friendships, photography, and imaginative literature.

The primary problem with the major premise of the aforementioned criticism emerges when one asks for authoritative proof. Quite to the contrary of the anticipated response comes a myriad of substantive rebuttals. Not only does Collinwood's biography not support these theses, as several critics concede, but also Pudney maintains that Carroll's family structure experienced cohesive bonds and that Carroll experienced

these bonds with his mother and father. Their relationships, as a matter of fact, according to Pudney " . . . were strong, widespread, and lasting" (28). Pudney further asserts that Carroll in his letters, diaries, articles, or imaginative literature revealed no perverted or latent psychological aberrations (17). Not even with references to Carroll's preference for little girls does one detect the Lolita syndrome (17). Complementing Collinwood and Pudney, another Carroll biographer, Roger Lancelyn Green, who also edits Carroll's diaries, shows that Carroll's preoccupation with photographing young children, particularly girls, in the nude was a common photographic custom in the nineteenth century. Pudney reiterates Green's observation not just by providing sample photos taken by Carroll but also by other contemporary Victorians, thereby establishing the Victorian public's fascination with photography, photography capturing not just voluptuous adults but children, all nude:

[Such photography was] not only acceptable but fashionable. Carroll's portraits [ ,then, ] sans habilement were neither a novelty nor necessarily an outrage. (107)

As the final and definitive denouement to such criticism, Pudney and Derek Hudson in his "Lewis Carroll" (1958) logically and substantively preclude such tangential

criticism. What better method to address weaknesses of criticism than to utilize the same format? Derek Hudson uses the psychologist-critic approach, but his perspective differs, however, from the majority because he maintains that Carroll's sexual maturity, or immaturity, had little effect, if any, on the Alice books (265). Like Carroll's nephew Collinwood, Hudson alludes to a possible love from afar between Carroll and actress Ellen Terry when she was seventeen (265). Even in this situation, though, Carroll did not vocalize his feelings; Terry was already married. What panacea children performed for Carroll, then, was sexual escape and a Platonic and protective relationship in lieu of pedophilia or other aberrant sexual behavior (265). Within such relationships Carroll could even escape his prevalent tendency to stammer. These other psychoanalytic analyses which do perceive Carroll's aberrant sexual behavior Hudson views as "misguided" criticism that depicts one of the " . . . gayest of books as a nightmare of neurosis" (272). Like Hudson, and realizing that many critics have expended significant amounts of energy paralleling Dodgson's life with that of Lewis Carroll--focusing on sexually deviant behavior--Pudney asks,

[w]here was the orgasm? Was there an orgasm? In his introduction to his [Carroll's] Pillow Problems . . . he wrote of nocturnal "unholy thoughts, which torture with their hateful presence the fancy that would fain be pure." Apart from this unsensational hint there is nothing in his writing, behaviour, or the witness of those who knew him, that his well-cared-for if sometimes underfed body reached any climax of lust. This is not so very odd. Many die virgins. Many live with a love image without sexual desire . . . . He was a singularly happy man who enjoyed good health with a touch of hypochondria. Some have rated him epileptic, others have questioned his mental balance. All fail to prove their theories or to add much to the treasures of Wonderland. (68-69)

What one concludes from such a dearth of substantial information is that although this facet of Freudian psychological analysis provides fascinating reading, the real Carrollian scholar penetrates swiftly the diaphanous veneer to see the fallacious quality. Deceptive criticism evinces itself equally in other facets of Freudian criticism, such as Kenneth Burke's "The Thinking of the Body: Comments on the Imagery of Catharsis in Literature," in which Burke examines the anal/oral tendencies exhibited in the Alice books. The episode "Pig and Pepper," for example, symbolizes potty training (341); and the episode "The Mad-Tea Party" reverses the anal/oral behavior (342-43). Despite all of these analyses, the Alice books and their author emerge unscathed. Why? Phyllis Greenacre

states best why the Alice books succeed despite such derogatory and detrimental criticism--verisimilitude. Contained within each book, the reader of any age may compare and contrast and find solace with many of Alice's episodic adventures, regardless of their apparent madness (331). Greenacre sees, then, like Hudson (331) the same universal plot of mankind and disregards, as Hudson disregards, any latent deviant behavior as catalyst.

Just as the Freudian psychological criticism depicts warped images of Carroll as an individual and manipulates the Alice books to support conjectures or psychological jargon so another branch of psychological criticism also attempts the same feat: Jungian psychology. Though not as prolific as Freudian criticism, Jungian approaches also distort. Robert Scott in "From a Letter to Lewis Carroll on 'Jabberwocky,'" which utilizes the epistolary genre, reels off an ascetic missive to Carroll criticizing the archetypal traits of the Jabberwocky:

Are we to suppose, after all that the Saga of Jabberwocky is one of the universal heirlooms which the Aryan race at its dispersion carried with it from its great cradle of the family? You [Carroll] must consult Max Muller about this. It begins to be probable that the origo originalissima may be discovered in Sanskrit, and that we shall by and by have a "Iabrivokaveda."

The hero will turn out to be the Sun-God in one of his Avatars; and the Tum-Tum tree the great Ash Yggdrasil of the Scandinavian mythology. (377)

Not only are Carroll's works scrutinized in this manner sans analysis of the author's style, intent, or motivation, but also the works are scrutinized from the feminist perspective--Jungian style. Judith Bloomingdale's "Alice as Anima: The Image of Woman in Carroll's Classics," to cite a representative example, focuses, of course, on Alice and asserts that Alice functions as Carroll's anima (379-80), that Carroll satirizes the period's concept of woman as anima (383-84), that Carroll suffers from the mother complex (382), and finally, that Humpty-Dumpty represents the "archetypal image of Platonic man--seen as the union of the white and yolk, yang and yin, enclosed in a thin shell of brittle skin" (381). Like other psychologists, Bloomingdale enervates her thesis via lack of conclusive, substantive evidence. What the Carrollian scholar must conclude here, then, is that these critics care little about Warren's concept of interpretation or criticism. Their interests lie, contrarily, in formulating loosely constructed, unwarranted diagnoses of a man and his works, about which these critics know little.

Rather than improving vastly in quality, Carrollian criticism has remained somewhat static; but to some degree it has become the territory of the psychedelic adherent. Such criticism evidences itself in "White Rabbit" (1966) and "Lewis Carroll--The First Acidhead" (1968). Decidedly, no societal movement has remained silent in its inalienable right to comment upon the Alice books. Grace Slick differs little from other schools of criticism, even though she represents the psychedelic school. In the poem, "White Rabbit," Slick suggests that the drug-induced trip on which Alice embarked will provide a parallel route through which contemporary man may escape to his own panacea in lieu of reality and chaos:

One Pill makes you larger  
 And one pill makes you small.  
 And the ones that mother gives you  
 don't do anything at all.  
 Go ask Alice  
 when she's ten feet tall.

And if you go chasing rabbits  
 And you know you're going to fall.  
 Tell 'em all who got a smokin' caterpillar  
 has given you the call.  
 Call Alice  
 when she was just small.

When men on the chessboard  
 get up and tell you where to go.  
 And you've just had some kind of mushroom,  
 and your mind is moving low,  
 Go ask Alice  
 I think she'll know.

When logic and proportion  
 have fallen sloppy dead,  
 And the White Knight is talking backwards,  
 and the Red Queen's lost her head,  
 Remember what the Dormouse said:  
 Feed your head,  
 Feed your head. (419-20)

Functioning as a companion piece that is more extensive, Thomas Frensch's "Lewis Carroll--The First Acidhead" examines every edible piece of food and drink, such as the drink that Alice tastes with its multi-faceted tastes and affects. He comments, ". . . baby, that's tripping out" (422). Observing further that Carroll was "freaky" (424), Frensch asserts that Wonderland is a "confused, surrealist world--the world of the LSD trip" (424). Such criticism represented by Slick and Frensch clearly depicts the extremes to which Carrollian criticism has gone.

Another interesting observation permeating all strands of the criticism discussed here is the complete lack of any real discussion of the books themselves--no interpretation, no criticism. As Donald Rackin states in his "Alice's Journey to the End of Night" (1966), "[h]ardly a single important critique has been written of 'Alice' as a self-contained fiction" (391). Rackin also observes, as do Austin Warren and Derek Hudson, that proper, objective distance necessary for such analysis has not occurred. Since the critics refuse to achieve the prerequisite



distance before they embark on analysis, they tend to concentrate too much on Charles Ludwig Dodgson and not enough on Lewis Carroll (392). According to Rankin,

[t]he results [of such approaches] are often analyses which fail to explain the total work's undeniable impact on the modern lay reader unschooled in Victorian political and social history, theoretical mathematics, symbolic logic, or Freudian psychology. (392)

Did anyone, or indeed, has anyone ever approached the books from a critical literary perspective? And if a critic has attempted such a task, what are the results?

Indeed, certain Carrollian criticism does attempt to address the critical literary perspective. Concentrating on the language and satire contained in the books, critics such as Florence Milner and her "The Poems in Alice in Wonderland" (1963), John Ciardi and his "A Burble Through Tulgey Wood" (1959), J. B. Priestley and his "A Note on Humpty Dumpty" (1921), and Patricia Meyer Spacks and her "Logic and Language in Through the Looking-Glass" (1961) provide some representative perspectives. Unlike many of the other branches of Carrollian criticism, this branch moves cautiously, deliberately, and methodically. Critics here avoid creating nebulous conjectures for which no substantive proof abounds. While this characteristic certainly provides a welcome respite from the traits of

the others, what evolves from this criticism, however, is abbreviated--a hint here, an allusion there, but never a full synthesis--and, consequently, faulty analyses occur here as well.

This group of critics, for example, particularly the early ones, reticently addresses the work's possible satiric qualities. In Victoria Through the Looking-Glass, Lennon muses that the evident social satire contained in the books is unconscious and that though Carroll wished, probably to control the book's satiric element like a Prospero, he probably was an Ariel instead (7). Later, J. B. Priestley presents a more forceful and less tentative thesis in "A Note on Humpty Dumpty," but it, too, limits its complete synthesis. In this essay Priestley analyzes an aspect of "Alice" that comprises one of the primary characteristics of Menippean satire-caricature (191). As evidenced in the works of antiquity and later identified clearly by Northrop Frye in Anatomy of Criticism, characters represent caricature in lieu of their symbolizing actual people. Narrowing the focus too extremely, Priestley cites Humpty Dumpty as being a caricature of the critics only, critics who speak in circumlocutions and pedantry (192-94). Priestley further reiterates his antipathy for what Menippean satirists call the philosophus

gloriosus--Humpty Dumpty. Referring to Humpty Dumpty as " . . . the very type and symbol of all jargoneers . . . , " Priestley views Humpty Dumpty as prototype for "uncouth" critics who inconvenience the rest of society with their " . . . inappropriate terms" (196-99).

Agreeing with Priestly that satire does permeate the Alice books, George Shelton Hubbell in his "Sanity of Wonderland" (1927) maintains that adults can only see their own foibles and learn from them if they are made to laugh at themselves (392). The subtle method by which Carroll achieves such satire occurs via Alice, the perfect vehicle, since she is a child. Hubbell cites, for example, the episode between the Red Queen and Alice concerning progression from one point to another to show how Carroll satirizes adults:

The strenuously rapid Red Queen boasts that in her country "it takes all the running you can do to stay in the same place." One hardly needs to point out that this is a heightening of the effect which our stupid adult life must make upon a child like Alice. (393)

Clearly, this example shows Carroll's opinion of man's conception of progress via his vehicle, Alice. At best and at worst, the progression which adults seek is a quasi-progression because from Alice's perspective, indeed from children's perspectives, adults never move. Carroll's

satirizing here the adult belief that success depends on an intense pace evinces his contemporary opinion of his society with its harried pace. Conveyed through Alice's "touchstone mind," the adult world finally receives, according to Hubbell, a "sane view of society" represented by the March Hare and the Mad Hatter (398). While Hubbell's essay does extend itself more than those of Lennon and Priestly, the essay yet lacks a total synthesis of Carroll's style, intent, and motivation, however.

Yet other critics vascillate between the reticence Lennon displays and the probing yet narrowed analysis of Hubbell. Florence Milner, for example, lists all of the poems Carroll parodies, reproduces the originals, and provides Carroll's poems. She refrains, though, from interpretation and criticism completely. John Ciardi in his essay follows Milner's method except that he strives to prove that Carroll's poetry evidences traces of the English folk ballad. P. L. Heath, finally, in his "Lewis Carroll," like so many of the critics, cannot wholly see Carroll's coherent and cohesive Menippean view; he does, however, specify Menippean motifs without referring to them as such: massive erudition and ridicule of the philosophus gloriosus:

The characters . . . are all much addicted to argument; and their humor, where it does not rely upon puns, is largely a matter of pursuing logical principles to the point of sophistry or absurdity. The frog who supposes that an unanswered door must have been asking something, is a simple case in point. (36)

Language and satire, of course, are essential and pivotal elements contained in the Alice books. While all of the aforementioned critics allow their awareness of these traits, Virginia Woolf and Patricia Meyer Spacks, like Heath, extend themselves to assert that depth and variety and complexity give coherence to the books, particularly the language and satire. Spacks contends that Carroll's use of language functions as a powerful "weapon of social commentary" (268). Regarding satire, Woolf asserts Carroll's satiric intent as a successful venture, a venture that enables the adult audience to view the world topsy-turvy as a child views it for the purpose of unintimidating instruction (82-83). Such an accomplishment, she further contends, other satirists, "great satirists and moralists" (83) cannot wholly achieve (83). What these other writers achieve, then, is the depiction of a topsy-turvy world, a dedication which compels adults to view it "as grown-up people see it, savagely" (83).

These critics, who have ardently endeavored to interpret and critique the Alice books, have innately

sensed their greatness. These critics have even seen aspects of what makes the Alice books great, but not even Woolf or Spacks wholly synthesizes the macrocosmic implication or literary expertise underlying these works. And yet, never very far from their conscious state, the elusive answer flutters just beyond their grasp. G. K. Chesterton, too, intuitively this unuttered elucidation:

Nobody indeed would have been more shocked than Mr. Dodgson at being classed with the anarchial artists who talked about l'art pour l'art. But in spite of himself, he was much more original artist than they. He had realised that certain images and arguments could sustain themselves in the void by a sort of defiant folly; an incongruous incongruity; the very aptitude of ineptitude. It was not only very new but very national. We may even say that for some time it was the secret of the English. (112)

In reality, Chesterton does not realize the complete impact of his critique. His insight that deduces Carroll's "Alice" possesses innovation further reiterates the conjecture that even though critics could see and appreciate facets of Carroll's accomplishments, whole comprehension and appreciation are precluded if the critic lacks a Menippean background.

Like a Menippean carousel plot, we have journeyed full circle, but to what extent and for what purpose? If the representative criticism here is inclusive, then, Lewis

Carroll's Alice books have remained interpreted and critiqued only limitedly. To circumvent the obvious conclusion, one might conjecture that critics have been attempting to find depth, structure, intent, and motivation where none existed other than to create a pleasant story and subsequent sequel, inaugurated by a pleasant little girl acquaintance on an indolent Independence Day afternoon. But is this assertion accurate and insightful into Lewis Carroll, even though it is a convenient one? If this conjecture in conjunction with the ones examined in this chapter is invalid, faulty, or not completely accurate, and if the Carrollian scholar truly seeks to probe the depths of the Alice books, then, the scholar must seek another system or heuristic that will allow the Alice books to yield their apparent and yet concealed fruits while not compromising the texts. The one system these critics have failed even to mention is Menippean satire. When one reexamines the texts in light of the Menippean intent, style, and motivation, what results is a complex, textured satire permeated with a deep structure that successfully conveys itself subtly through a fantasy surface structure.

## CHAPTER II

### What is Menippean Satire?

To substantiate that the Alice books rely on Menippean satire to achieve complete coherence and cohesion and to avoid the same shortcomings thus far shared by many Carrollian scholars--substantive proof and authority--one must consider the definition of the genre in conjunction with its historical lineage. What, then, is Menippean satire? Incubated and introduced by the Greek cynic Menippus, amplified, modified, and tailored by such men as Varro, Lucian, Petronius, Rabelais, and Swift, Menippean satire mocks Platonic universals, decries artificiality via its material conventions, belittles ornate and verbose religious rhetoric that hampers man's individuality, and finally exposes pedants and braggarts who rely on empty and bombastic and loquacious rhetoric to intimidate, baffle, and deceptively persuade their companion(s). In lieu of these undesirable traits, Menippean satire advocates simplicity of mind and spirit devoid of the tendency to be influenced by society's artificial signs of success such as wealth and fame. According to Juanita Williams who writes Toward a Definition of Menippean Satire, the



Menippean satirist advocates "the mean and sure estate"

(2). Originator of Menippean satire, Menippus reifies his philosophical satire via a clothes metaphor in which he contends that " . . . fortune equips men with the costumes of beauty and social position; after death [,however,] the costumes are removed and men are equal" (2). Further refining Menippean satire's definition, Williams states that this genre of satire is a

. . . serio-comic dramatic presentation, often allegorical and ultimately Cynical, involving the twofold error of attempting, on the one hand, to enclose the mutable world by means of the irrevelant and static abstract, and, on the other, of submitting to chaos itself through tangible indulgence and appeal to arms; and offering in place of either, the solution of the mean and sure estate, the simple and useful life. (1)

Unlike Juvenalian satire that utilizes a dignified style in a direct attack on evil and error to evoke anger and, subsequently, action from the audience (Handbook to Literature 240) and unlike Horatian satire that utilizes a tolerant, whimsical style in a ridicule of life's absurdities to persuade the reader gently to laugh at himself and subsequently act (Handbook to Literature 217), the Menippean satire utilizes a dynamic style which creates in the reader uncertainty concerning the work's surface-versus-depth and seriousness-versus-nonsense.

Such a stylistically avant-garde approach invites the reader to plunge into the work's depth, without knowing exactly where such a plunge may lead, and embark on a new reading experience. Menippean satire seeks to examine and expose mental attitudes, using a single intellectual pattern. To accomplish such a purpose in a seemingly enigmatic style, the Menippean satire relies on specific devices incorporated by the Menippean satirist such as carousel plot, episodes, variety of action, metaphor of madness, multiple points of view, mixture of bawdy and philosophical ideas, caricature versus characterization, medley of prose and verse, metamorphosis, mutability, metaphor of the fantastic, parody, dialogue, ridicule of the philosophus gloriosus and the pedant. Although these now archetypal traits characterize later Menippean satires such as Rabelais' Gargantua and Pantagruel, Swift's Gulliver's Travels, and Twain's The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn, these devices have not always populated the genre. The earlier Menippean satirists experimented with the genre and innovated these devices and others as the genre progressed. Not only does the Menippean satire contain an organic plot, then, but also the genre itself possesses an organic nature, a protean quality. Menippus, the genre's progenitor, focused on the philosophus

gloriosus and the mixture of prose and verse. Varro amplified what Menippus had done by adding dramatic dialogue, emphasizing mutability, metamorphosis, the metaphor of madness, and parody. Lucian added the travelogue and countries with absurd or grotesque customs. Petronius and Apulieus later enhanced what Lucian had innovated, amplifying the travelogue to an actual journey motif in which the serio-comic hero spiralled upward toward a useful and pure ideal. Rabelais later amplified this ideal and useful place to which the serio-comic hero aspired and identified it as a Thèlémé. Later, Cervantes and Swift, influenced by Rabelais, would also incorporate into their works the themes of mutability and metamorphosis of the serio-comic hero questing for truth and a Thèlémé. Although this abbreviated historical synopsis does answer basically what Menippean satire is and who developed the genre and why, a closer, more delineated examination is essential before one can assert any correlations between this ancient genre and Lewis Carroll.

To examine this genre's literary heritage, one logically begins with the genre's progenitor, Menippus. Since all of Menippus of Gadara's writings are lost, however, the Menippean scholar must rely on Diogenes

Laertius' Lives of Eminent Philosophers and on Marcus Terentius Varro's Varro's Menippean Satires for information about the man and his works. According to Diogenes Laertius, Menippus, a third-century Phoenician and a slave, later became a Theban and wrote "books" that abounded with humor, thirteen in all: "Necromancy," "Wills," "Epistles artificially composed as if by the gods," "Replies to the physicists and mathematicians and grammarians," "A book about the birth of Epicurus," and "The school's reverence for the twentieth day," to cite a few (Laertius 105). Relying on this information Diogenes Laertius provides, one can establish, then, the Menippean intent via its parodies and its attacks (replies) against pedants. Varro provides further indirect information about Menippus and his works. Varro indirectly described Menippus in his "Tomb of Menippus" when he juxtaposed the old culture's simplicity against the new culture's luxury and needless complexity (87-88). Just as Menippus had focused on such incongruities in his writings, Varro, imitating Menippus, juxtaposed the pragmatically simple and the ridiculously complex so that he could establish the Menippean solution: to reach behind the societal façade for the truth and behind the clothes for the body (Williams 10).

That Varro consciously imitated Menippus and his followers evinces itself in several instances. Varro, first of all, employed many of the stylistic traits Menippus used such as the prose-verse format and parody and themes of high to low. Varro also christened this "new" genre Satirae Menippae, according to Ulrich Knoche (Die Romanische Satirae 34-45). Since Menippus antedated Varro (116-27 BC), Knoche uses Diogenes Laertius' references to Menippus' works and his imitators to establish the necessary linkage between Menippus and Varro; men such as Gellius, Probus, and Cicero provide that linkage. Varro, influenced by these imitators, entitled a book Satirae Menippae, according to Knoche to establish his purpose in a familiar form associated with a group of crusaders crusading toward significant values in life and the basic foundations of them (34-45). Varro's amplification and innovation of the Menippean style displays itself immediately. Varro's works include such traits as the high to low themes, the dramatic dialogue, the anti-hero, the metaphor of madness, parody, and metamorphosis (Williams 11).

In Varro's Bimarcus, for example, the action focuses on the Menippean logomachy, or battle of words--philosophical

ideas--in which the old-order Marcus verbally battles with the new-order Marcus, Varro included here dramatic dialogue which contains debates on suicide and on the value of music. In another Varronian work Sexagesis, the rudimentary strains of metamorphosis occur in that the anti-hero falls asleep only to awaken fifty years later, changed into an animal-like individual. Williams calls the metamorphosed boy "a ludicrous Cynic dog" (12). These two devices under Varro's controlling pen enable the audience to see excessive luxury contrasted with natural restraint. To illustrate further this Menippean theme, Varro introduced the metaphor of madness, an innovation that has remained as a Menippean trademark because it allows "the antithesis of theory and practice: he who appears to be mad is not; he who appears to be sane is culpable. Reason is madness, and madness is reason" (Williams 13-14). In Varro's Eumenides, for example, when the townspeople accuse the narrator of being mad and bring him to trial, he is declared sane, instead, because he uses truth as his defense. The townspeople, on the other hand, who view themselves as sane the narrator--who utters only truth--identifies as insane due to their insatiable greed, selfishness, and fanaticism. What the metaphor of madness accomplishes, then, under Varro, is

to strip off the societal veneer so that the audience can peer directly into a reality which the audience itself formulates because it has contrasted the good with the bad.

In conjunction with these other devices, Varro also initiated the anti-hero's traveling from one ideological system to another ideological system in order to discover concrete reality, according to Williams (15). Williams compares the hero of Varro's Sesculixes to Rabelais' Panurge, Swift's Gulliver, and Voltaire's Candide. This idea of mutability also foreshadows the Menippean journey motif, or travelogue. With this and other previously examined traits, the declaration that Varro indirectly inherited Menippus' style and intent as well as Menippus' imitators emerges as an assertion one cannot deny. That Varro included their stylistic traits, amplified them, and innovated others is another reasonable assertion. Finally, that Varro christened this new genre for the progenitor whom he regarded as such provides further conclusive evidence of this genre's existence. Although Varro carried the genre forward and retained its Cynic intent, another source who progressed the genre even further emerges, Lucian.

Lucian, a Syrian taken to Greece as a slave, lived 125-200 AD and wrote of Menippus, too. In Lucian's work

Dialogues of the Dead, there are not only references to Menippus but also Menippean stylistic traits such as medley of prose and verse, parody, ridicule of pedants, and preference for the mean and sure estate, a preference that Menippus had championed earlier. In Lucian's "Menippus or the Descent into Hades" from Dialogues of the Dead, for example, Menippus finds himself unable to delineate between a peasant and a king because they are now on an equal level--as Williams states, "all are bones" (29). Lucian allowed Menippus here to express his perspective regarding the human predicament:

So as I looked at them it seemed to me that human life is like a long pageant, and that all its trappings are supplied and distributed by Fortune, who arrays the participants in various costumes of many colours. Taking one person, it may be, she attires him royally, placing a tiara upon his head, giving him body guards, and encircling his brow with the diadem; but upon another she puts the costume of a slave. Again she makes up one person so that he is handsome, but causes another to be ugly and ridiculous. I suppose that the show must needs to be diversified. And often, in the very middle of the pageant, she exchanges the costumes of several players; instead of allowing them to finish the pageant in the parts that had been assigned to them, she reapparels them, forcing Croesus to assume the dress of a slave and a captive, and shifting Meandrius, who formerly paraded among the servants, into the imperial habit of Polycrates. For a brief space she lets them



use their costumes, but when the time of the pageant is over, each gives back the properties and lays off the costume along with his body, becoming what he was before his birth, no different from his neighbor.  
(IV 99)

Lucian further reiterates Menippus' perspective of life when he allows Tiresias to respond to Menippus' inquiry of what kind of life is best. Tiresias says:

'The life of the common sort is best, and you will act more wisely if you stop speculating about heavenly bodies and discussing final causes and first causes, spit your scorn at those clever syllogisms, and counting all that sort of thing nonsense, make it always your goal object to put the present good to use and to hasten on your way, laughing a great deal and taking nothing seriously.'  
(IV 107-09)

The Menippean intent and weltanschauung evidence themselves here indubitably in that Tiresias, the Menippean persona, loathes the societal pretenses and customs with their superfluous complexities. Tiresias further focuses on the importance of the individual and that individual's concern with his own life. According to Tiresias, then, this individual should not concern himself, therefore, with pedants and societal clothing that easily and persuasively mislead.

In addition to the Menippean intent, the other Menippean traits that function as archetypes in Lucian's "Menippus" are dialogue and the mixture of prose and verse.

Lucian displayed throughout this work Menippus' humor and exasperation with superfluous rhetoric. Nowhere does such intent more humorously evince itself than with the dialogue between Menippus and Hermes concerning the societal facade of beauty:

'Where are the beauties, Hermes?'

'I am truly busy, Menippus. But look over there to your right, and you will see Hyacinth, Narcissus, Nireus, Achilles, Tyro, Helen, Leda,--all the beauties of old.'

'I can only see bones, and bare skulls; most of them look exactly alike.'

'Those bones, of which you seem to think so lightly, have been the theme of admiring poets.'

'Well but show me Helen: I shall never be able to make her out by myself.'

'This skull is Helen.'

'And for this a thousand ships carried warriors from every part of Greece; Greeks and barbarians were slain, and cities made desolate.'

'Ah Menippus, you never saw the living Helen or you would have said with Homer

Well might they suffer grievous years of toil

Who strove for such a prize.

We look at withered flowers, whose dye is gone from them, and what can we call them but unlovely things? Yet in the hour of their bloom these unlovely things were the things of beauty.'

'Strange that the Greeks could not realize what it was for which they laboured; how short-lived, how soon to fade.' (IV 288)

Quite clearly Menippus asserts via this medley of prose and poetry that prose transcends and establishes intrinsic value because of its pragmatic, utilitarian use. Poetry, on the other hand, views the world metaphorically to circumvent reality (Williams 32). By incorporating the poetic genre into the Menippean, then, the Menippean satirist can more effectively parody it.

After reading Lucian's "Menippus or the Descent into Hades," what Menippean traits can one discern within this seminal work? Lucian expertly utilizes many Menippean motifs such as parody, mixture of poetry and prose, the travelogue, and the Menippean intent of pragmatism and truth. Not only do these traits emerge, but also Lucian utilizes the Menippean philosophy of reversal, here reversal of one's typical moral values (Williams 34). Hades, consequently, is a Menippean paradise. Unlike Ulysses who sees dead kings such as Agamemnon maintaining their regal bearing, Menippus sees Kings and Queens atypically selling fish and teaching. This kind of Menippean reversal also reveals the Menippean delight in metamorphosis. Ultimately, then, as Tiresias tells Menippus, and reiterates the Menippean code--the facade of pomp and metaphysics is at

best humorous; simplicity transcends everything (Williams 34).

Menippus' journey is now complete. In a variety of episodes, Menippus encounters the established societal system and parodies its cultured, chaotic, and illogical nature. Like a true Menippean serio-comic hero, he searches for an ideal system and witnesses the unnecessarily complex system metamorphose and reverse into a pragmatic, utilitarian one devoid of the Menippean anathemas. Not only does the system metamorphose but also the people, people like Tiresias who now share the Menippean weltanschauung. Such a metamorphosis under Lucian becomes transmogrification of the great to effect the establishment of Menippean justice (Williams 34). This type of reversal effects the Menippean satirist's laughter as well as his audience's because it explains just how useless the ' . . . trappings of thought and unnecessary adornments of human behavior' are for each age and how useful are the mean and sure estate (Williams 40). According to Williams, who also cites from Lucian's "Menippus or the Descent into Hades, "

[s]implicity is plain speaking and laughter, and complexity is antithesis and balanced clauses. Beauty, wealth, vanity, pride, power, insolence[,] and temper are hopelessly

intricate pitfalls for anyone who desires to be a Menippean hero. The clue to human existence is to be quietly useful, to be 'content and satisfied with one's lot and to think no part of it intolerable/ (VII 45), as Menippus says in "Menippus and Charon," and to "Know thyself" (VII 19), as he says in "Shades to Pluto against Menippus." (42)

Lucian, then, distinctly echoed the Menippean creed repeatedly in his work. Expression of such an intent in Menippean style demands indirection and suggestion, however, rather than a direct approach. The Menippean devices, subsequently, enable the Menippean satirist to accomplish this enigmatic goal. The most prominent devices in Lucian's work, enabling attainment of such a goal, evidence themselves to be dialogue and journey. The dialogue advances the Menippean theory and practice in dramatic logomachies. The journey depicts the Menippean philosopher allegorically, however. Traveling from ideological system to system questing for the ultimate, universal truth, the traveller sees vignettes of man's pettiness, systems paralleling his own. Viewing a foreign world that so closely parallels his own enables the anti-hero to question whether the system from which he emanates possesses the same absurdities, excessive complexities, and grotesque customs and conventions (Williams 44-45). The anti-hero continues the journey until he completes the quest and

sees the ideal system in lieu of the previously inadequate one. Popular during the Greek Renaissance, Lucian does indeed amplify and innovate the Menippean genre for the later satirists among whom is Lewis Carroll.

So far, in the development of the genre, the Menippean ideal looms as the obvious focal point of each extant piece. This focus shifts, however, with Gaius Petronius Arbiter and his The Satyricon, written during Nero's reign; The Satyricon focuses, then, on Menippean failure (Williams 59). With characters such as Trimalchio, Encolpius, and Eumolpus, though possessing one positive Menippean trait of earthiness (Williams 61), their finding the ideal system in the actual gaining of material wealth and gratification enjoins them to the philosophus glorious (Williams 61). The harder Trimalchio strives to locate his system of truth, organic unity, and stasis, the constant metamorphosis of objects subjects him to the Menippean anathema--unnecessarily excessive societal systems (Williams 61). What is thoroughly Menippean here reveals itself as a completely cohesive, coherent reversal. Relying primarily on parody of epic conventions such as the epic hero and the epic structure, The Satyricon is a parade of comic, burlesque, serious, and philosophic episodes, all comprised

of stock ideas which are also original. Happiness, joy, and wealth cannot be attained permanently, but Trimalchio's efforts create humor. That Encolpius, too, does not qualify as an epic hero but as a mock-hero also provides this sense of humor because he triumphs through Luck/Fortune and absurdity.

This kind of Menippean hero garners even more humor, for, as Williams asserts, Encolpius is the parodic anti-thesis of Odysseus (50). Unlike Ulysses whose episodic travels lead him to his ideal stasis and truth, Encolpius' episodic travels lead him nowhere. Whereas Ulysses confronts the gods and Fate and subsequently conquers, Encolpius succumbs to Fate.

Petronius, in addition to including this innovation and the other standard ones, includes other Menippean innovations such as a symposium of food. This innovation, though utilized to an extent in Lucian, solidifies under Petronius. Trimalchio's feast asserts the ideology of the "nouveaux riches," the lust for money gained via work and the subsequent pretentious loquacity, tasteless and inane (Williams 53). Foreshadowing Lewis Carroll and Alice's banquet, Trimalchio's banquet includes rich pastries that appear to be eggs, thrushes flying out of sow's flanks, and in general, massive metamorphoses; everything edible

continues to change to such a degree that a symposium, a bad dinner results, and consequently, bad taste.

Trimalchio's philosophic ideal becomes "Fat Profit" and "Large Income" in lieu of the mean and perfect estate.

Like the Menippean satirists before him, Petronius modifies and amplifies the genre to convey his message, a message humorously asserting that in life permanence does not exist. Knowing such truth subliminally, Petronius' caricatures disregard it and yet strive to locate some system of permanence. Continuing to make errors in such a situation, they view putting on more societal garb--more superfluity--as the panacea to this problem of excessive mutability instead of reversing their actions totally to embrace the mean and sure estate. Here one really begins to comprehend why the Menippean hero, the serio-comic hero, assumes the designation anti-hero, according to William Arrowsmith, who translated The Satyricon (x). Arrowsmith rightly designates the hero because amidst apparent success is defeat. The Menippean hero, then, does not qualify at all for hero because what makes him heroic is not based on any cherished idea; he is an innocent anticipating much but realizing little of what he anticipated, the utilitarian--pragmatic--though nonetheless secure life. His triumph, then, is impotent;



Encolpius, in the final analysis, is impotent, for he does not triumph. The Menippean message, however, clearly conveys itself: in his quest for material or physical gain such as money or sex, man cannibalizes himself. In what later typifies the Menippean carousel plot, the work concludes where it began, but with no note of resolution (Williams 61).

Another contributor and imitator of this genre, the African Lucius Apuleius (b. 125 AD?) wrote the Metamorphosis --or The Golden Ass, an episodic but organic work whose anti-hero embarks on a journey after rubbing himself with a magic lotion and metamorphosing into an ass. To remetamorphose into a human once more, he must eat of certain roses. Immediately one notices familiar traits: parody, the journey, reversal and metamorphosis, and the Menippean creed of simplicity. "Cupid and Psyche," for example, contains all of these Menippean traits in microcosm.

The Golden Ass as a total, organic work parodies the Milesian Tales, a collection of short Greek tales involving love and adventure, written by Aristides of Miletus (2 BC) (Oxford Companion to English Literature 649). According to Robert Graves, who translated The Golden Ass, these tales utilize highly stylized and ornate rhetoric; the

Milesian school revelled in words for words' sake (vii-viii). Apuleius, in the now archetypal Menippean style, parodies the Milesian school by fusing it into the very structure of the work itself. Graves further conjectures about additional motivations for Apuleius' incorporation of such parody:

Why did Apuleius choose to write in this eccentric style? For the same reason that Rabelais did. The parellel is close. Both were priests--pious, lively, exceptionally learned, provincial priests--who found that the popular tale gave them a wider field for their descriptions of contemporary morals and manners, punctuated by philosophical asides, than any more respectable literary form. (vii-viii)

This germ begins with Menippus and realizes itself more fully with Apuleius. Only with Lewis Carroll does comparable expertise evidence itself once more. Interestingly, when this motif associates itself with the Menippean satire, it becomes an eccentric style that displays effective parody. When this same motif is devoid of its Menippean heritage, however, it becomes utter nonsense that even children refuse to appreciate, according to some Carrollian critics.

Complementing the parody of empty rhetoric, the journey further substantiates Menippean ties. Although all of the Menippean satires since Lucian share some version of the

travelogue or journey motif, the cycle of these journeys and their settings is peculiar to the author. In The Golden Ass Lucius the ass journeys from bestiality to spirituality. Williams asserts that

Apuleius thus uses the Menippean methods of metamorphosis, naive traveller[, ] and voyage literature in order to produce an antithesis of magical theory and its impractical results and to achieve a purpose which, therefore, is distinctly Menippean both in tone and technique. (69)

The journey, then, not only provides this episodic, organic narrative cohesion but also provides a means by which the Menippean satirist can convey his Menippean intent.

Apuleius' "Cupid and Psyche" provides a microcosmic depiction of The Golden Ass's Menippean nature. Fickle Fortune toys with the lovers while Providence delivers them, and the Menippean intent regarding simplicity and the obliteration of society's unnecessary complexities emerges as the pivotal point that finally joins the two lovers. The ideal system which they seek the lovers finally realize when they transcend life's petty complexities and Fickle Fortune's random Wheel. What results, then, is a psychological and spiritual journey, a journey which culminates in "the simple union with Intellectual Love" (Williams 75). What Apuleius amplifies here reveals

itself with the anti-hero's participatory trait. Unlike Lucian's Menippus or Petronius' Encolpius, or any of Varro's heroes who observe or only question the systems they encounter, Apuleius introduces an anti-heroine who physically and emotionally and spiritually participates in identifying and locating and obtaining her ideal system. Like Hercules, Psyche must perform physically arduous and mentally debilitating tasks, tasks which she performs, looking forward toward the ultimate truth and good.

With Menippean satire represented by the Greeks, Romans, and Africans, a French, Spanish, and British heritage seems apropos. Since the genre had established itself and stabilized by the sixteenth century, Rabelais, who writes Pantagruel (1532/1533) and Gargantua (1534), adds only a few enhancing motifs to the genre; the overall structure and style previously introduced, however, continue to permeate all comparable works. Similar to Rabelais' works and amplifications, Miguel Cervantes' Don Quixote de La Mancha appears during the seventeenth century and Swift's Gulliver's Travels during the eighteenth.

At this time the term Thelémé, the carousel plot, the serio-comic metamorphosis, semantic satire, the

apparent digression, and the satire of names represent the gamut of amplifications consciously made by these men to achieve an even more effective Menippean genre.

François Rabelais, first of all, introduces a newer, more Menippeanesque ideal system for which Gargantua searches, the Thèlémé. Like the standard ideal system, the Thèlémé is not a coherent ideal or image; it is a negative post. Gargantua takes, for example, an institution he dislikes, such as education, and negates all of the negatives; what evolves, subsequently, is a positive environment since two negatives constitute a positive. In such a Thèlémé one does as one wishes, devoid of such societal custom or clothing. In a way Rabelais' Thèlémé is the monastic world turned topsy-turvy (Gargantua 150-52). The positive side contains the library with books--classical and modern--with six floors and a different language on each floor. Rules that exist in society with its complexities and artificiality do not exist here because the inhabitants are virtually inclined to do good:

. . .  
 Enter not here, lawyers insatiable,  
 Ushers, lawyer's clerks, devourers of the people,  
 Holders of office, scribes and pharisees,  
 Ancient judges who tie up good citizens  
 Like stray dogs with cords on their necks,  
 Your reward is earned now, and it is the gibbet.  
 So go and brag there. Here is done no violence  
 Such as in your courts sets men fighting lawsuits

. . .  
 Enter in here, and you shall be most welcome,  
 And having come, stay noble gentleman!  
 Here is the place where income comes in well,  
 And having come affords good entertainment  
 For great and small, though thousands of them come.  
 Be then my cronies, my especial favourite,  
 Merry and nimble, jolly, gay, and sprightly,  
 And, in a word, the best of good companions.  
 All worthy gentlemen,  
 Keen witted and serene,  
 From every coarseness free,  
 Here find civility,  
 Among your hosts will reign,  
 All worthy gentlemen. (153-55)

This system, then, is the ideal one, but it is also one that is unreal, non-existent. That the anti-hero attains this system in a Menippean satire is not the primary focus, however. The focus, rather, resides on the anti-hero's attempts to attain the ideal system, or Thèlémé.

In addition to this device Rabelais also uses the grotesque, the enumerative, the travesty, institutional satire, and satire of names, according to Ruth Cave Flowers who writes Voltaire's Stylistic Transformation of Rabelaisian Satirical Devices (93). What Rabelais accomplishes via such Menippean devices--all of which Carroll later incorporates--is to present the Menippen creed. Panurge like Gargantua advises the interlocutors, the readers, to drink, participate and use, practice moderation and dispense with words (Williams 130). If a Thèlémé does exist, Panurge and Gargantua understand now

that mutability is inevitable and that attainment of the Menippean mean and sure estate does not occur via empty sophistry which lawyers provide in the books. This Thèlémé occurs, rather, if one is participatory and honest in the quest and if one embraces mankind.

Like Rabelais, Swift employs the same Menippean traits so that he can advance the Menippean creed, or intent. Just as Rabelais utilizes ornate words to describe Gargantua's costume and uses Panurge's semantic tricks to reveal, ironically, the truth of participatory Friar John and the Oracle of the Bottle, Swift utilizes the Menippean devices to achieve the same purpose. Such a technique uses the traits being satirized to reveal truth. In Gulliver's Travels, for example, Swift contains the mutable world through which Gulliver journeys, systems through which Williams calls "the glorious abstractions of Lilliput and Laputa" (270) until he, like the Menippean anti-hero, realizes the truth, the Thèlémé, the land of the Houyhnhnms.

In addition to the complexity of society--versus--truth and simplicity inherent in Rabelais and Swift, these Menippean satirists also emphasize the world's mutability. Because of society's disagreeable and negative complexities in an ever-changing environment, man strives

to assert some coherence and cohesion to his environment. Unfortunately, this assertion usually relies for foundation upon faulty philosophical stances that the individual feels are static. The Menippean satirist depicts the anti-hero's attempts to circumvent society's mutability and burdens--Trimalchio with verbose epitaphs, for example,--and then depicts the hero's acceptance of life's mutability and reliance upon simplicity and truth for survival.

Closely associated with these aforementioned traits, themes of war and corrupt jurisprudence also occur throughout these satires. Compounding life's complexities, man also uses false semantics to imitate war. Such futile wars occur often in Rabelais, Swift, and even in Lucian; such war all of these authors considered most vile and corruptive to the human spirit. Equally corruptive to the human spirit is corrupt jurisprudence, which abounds everywhere in the guises of lawyers, man's "legal protectors."

Like Menippean satire's carousel plot, we have come full circle: what, then is a Menippean satire:

Menippean satire has a particular ideology which transcends satire of a more personal and specific nature; it possesses at times a tone of tragedy, which lends it an expansive and universal significance. Always there appears the spirit of Menippus,



who having seen the horrors of Hades, sneers at men hiding in the pompous cloaks of luxury and words. To Menippus the Cynic, life is a multi-customed drama and a dissonant chorus; the confusion is to be accepted; one must be quietly content and not dispute. The greatest Menippean satirist of all, Jonathan Swift, indulges his comic genius in the multiform fancies of the Tale ["Tale of a Tub"]; and in Gulliver's Travels the tragedy of man-engendered chaos looms large. Menippean medley, then, is not mere verse and prose, but rather the clutter of worldly events that cannot be controlled with irrelevant philosophies. The trimmings of wrong words must be cut away; simplicity must be restored. (Williams 274)

Yes, one must adapt to the dissonance, the chaos; but one must in the true Menippean sense find a type of solace and activity and productivity for oneself; one should tend one's own garden.

Lewis Carroll's name does indeed belong to the distinguished list of Menippean satirists. Alice's Adventures in Wonderland and Through the Looking-Glass and What Alice Found There do comply with the definitive definition and characteristics and intent of past Menippean satirists in structure, characterization, and intent.

## CHAPTER III

### Who Are You?

That Carroll possessed an expansive and Continental reading background biographers Pudney, Green, Collinwood, Greenacre, and Lennon have documented well unanimously. That ancient Greek, Latin, and French writers represented a portion of Carroll's reading repertoire these biographers have also documented. That he emulated a particular strain of writers no one has asserted, however. The following two chapters will attempt to address this facet of Carrollian study by establishing a cohesive parallel between Carroll and the Menippean school. As heretofore stated, Carroll's Alice's Adventures in Wonderland and Through the Looking-Glass and What Alice Found There prominently exhibit Menippean characteristics in structure, characterization, and intent. Close analysis of each work, as a matter of fact, dispels many of the previous analyses discussed in Chapter One because the Menippean style so pervades the two books that no one can critically deny the Menippean existence.

Structurally, the carousel plot most distinguishes itself as a Menippean feature. Resembling a ferris wheel rather than the usually linear plot line, this 360° format

allows the anti-hero to begin and end in the same place. This plot format also moves not progressively but pseudo-progressively in that although the anti-hero seemingly detects forward movement, this character at the work's conclusion finds that in reality the movement has returned him to the point of origin physically. If the character experiences no progression physically, then, does any kind of progression occur? For the Menippean intent to evolve within this character, mental progression occurs, a progression that spirals upward while yet moving in a circular motion. Alice, subsequently, does end the narrative where she began, on the bank with her sister; and, as a result, the physical carousel has completed itself. Although all appears as it was initially, however, the implications Alice's journey has had spiral upward because Alice's sister, Lorina, recapitulates exactly Alice's journey and completes her carousel via a dream frame, or an ecphrasis--a work within a work (162-64). After recounting every episode, Alice's sister verbalizes for herself and the reader just how much Alice has spiralled upward on the carousel;

Lastly, she pictured to herself how this same little sister of hers would, in the after-time, be herself a grown woman; and how she would keep, through all her riper years,

the simple and loving heart of her childhood; and how she would gather about her other little children, and make their eyes bright and eager with many a strange tale, perhaps even with the dream of Wonderland of long ago; and how she would feel with all their simple sorrows, and find pleasure in all their simple joys, remembering her own child-life, and the happy summer days. (164)

That Alice and her sister share the same and yet a different journey indicates the Menippean intent because each journey concludes with a goal of reaching an ideal place: Alice--home and her sister--the recapture of a child's acute awareness. That the journeys share no exact sequential parallel matters little because the focus of the journey's carousel nature lies with the necessity of one's having to experience all of the episodes to reach the desired goal. Not only Alice but also the story concludes, then, the way it began in that Carroll emphasizes the importance of the story on memory; the audience readily ascertains that this Alice book is about telling tales, consequently. Alice's Adventures in Wonderland is a special activity of a man with the ability to pass on the story from his memory to another individual, and she to another, and eventually to others:

Alice! A childish story take,  
And with a gentle hand  
Lay it where Childhood dreams are twined

In Memory's mystic band,  
 Like pilgrim's withered wreath of flowers  
 Pluck'd in a far-off land. (lines 37-42)

So, like Lewis Carroll, Alice, once grown up, will tell the tale; and the plot, then, will continue. With such a structural vehicle as the carousel plot, the first setting can transcend its original location on the banks of the Thames, can transcend time, can transcend space so that the "far-off land" evinces itself to be a better state of mind, a mind that can recapture for future reference the feeling of a " . . . dream-child moving through a land/ Of wonders wild and new,/ . . . And half believe it true (21-22). The carousel plot's motion actually begins then not with Alice seeing the rabbit and falling down the hole, but with Lewis Carroll, an older person like Alice's sister, embarking on the possibility of mental and emotional transcendence.

If Lewis Carroll and Lorina Charlotte Liddell initiate and conclude Alice's Adventures in Wonderland, thereby completing the physical formation of the carousel plot, then who and what constitute the components of the carousel--its integral parts--and to what extent do these components function in concert with the characters and episodes to effect the Menippean intent? Upon closer inspection of the basic Menippean plot structure, the

audience begins to see a mutable world presented and experienced episodically, a mutable world where the action is multifaceted to complement its milieu and a world where the carousel plot's structural balance, too, evidences this same mutability. Carroll, like Rabelais and Swift before him, attains this mutable and internal structure with effective and cohesive metaphors: the metaphor of madness and the metaphor of the fantastic.

For the carousel plot to begin its gyration, a journey must begin with some sort of catalyst:

. . . Alice started to her feet, for it flashed across her mind that she had never before seen a rabbit with either a waistcoat-pocket, or a watch to take out of it, and burning with curiosity, she ran across the field after it, and was just in time to see it pop down a large rabbit-hole under the hedge . . . . Alice had not a moment to think about stopping herself before she found herself falling down what seemed to be a very deep well. (26)

On a rather drowsy afternoon the enigmatic White Rabbit functions as Alice's catalyst along with her ennui and child-like curiosity.

Just as a carousel moves slowly and then gains momentum, Alice moves, or rather journeys throughout Wonderland slowly then faster but yet not so fast that she fears for her life. This kind of peculiar structural appearance versus reality, or rather the metaphor of

madness, evinces itself here and subsequently permeates and coheres the entire book. Nothing is as it seems, logically. Remembering that the Menippean satirist consciously attacks pedants who function only on logic--ill-formed logic especially--enables the audience to accept Alice's atypical fall and analysis of it, for example. Already, then Carroll projects the reader with Alice into a freefall that logically should culminate with Alice's death and the reader's vicarious death. Instead of such an end, however, the fall is slow enough that she can observe her new, mutable environment. Even when she tries to sort out where she is journeying, using the logical deductions and facts her outer world has taught her, she finds only frustration and inconsistencies:

'I must be getting somewhere near the centre of the earth. Let me see: that would be four thousand miles down, I think--' (for you see, Alice had learnt several things of this sort in her lessons in the schoolroom, and though this was not a very good opportunity for showing off her knowledge, as there was no one to listen to her, still it was good practice to say it over)--'yes, that's about the right distance--but then I wonder what Latitude or Longitude I've got to?' (Alice had not the slightest idea what Latitude was, or Longitude either, but she thought they were grand words to say.) (27)

This structural mixture of humor with serious undertones achieves a balance that reiterates the Menippean metaphor

of madness, for though Alice can appear to deduce where she is and is going on her journey, in reality she employs empty, ineffectual jargon that has little use in this new, curious world, a world where outer-world logic has already evinced itself as a poor support system.

To reiterate the uselessness of society's artificial and static systems and customs as well as logic, Carroll provides a *mélange* of episodic adventures through which Alice progresses. Each episodic encounter relies upon the metaphor of madness in that though each appears to be a nonsense recapitulation of the other, in reality each differs and adds another facet to the Menippean Wonderland. Alice does indeed, then, find herself in a state of wonderment as she wanders on her journey, searching for initially a typical, outerworld logical explanation for what she sees and experiences and then a Menippean Theleme, a workable system within which she, alone, can operate and synthesize--the Garden. Each episode, then, with its peculiar multiplicity of action and structural balance enables Alice to comprehend that the outerworld's systems, customs, and logic are not only not consistent there but also are not universally true. Such episodic adventures include most notably "Pig and Pepper," "A Mad Tea-Party," and "The Mock Turtle's Story."



In the "Pig and Pepper" episode, Carroll achieves the structural balance via humor-versus-seriousness as well as appearance-versus-reality. Set within an apparently nonsensical frame, then, Alice encounters grotesque Wonderland inhabitants who mirror and contrast their outerworld counterparts. Complementing successfully the Menippean structure, logomachies further progress and reify the action while reiterating the Menippean intent. Completing this structural balance and action, the metaphors of the grotesque and fantastic continue emphasizing the Menippean intent via seeming nonsensical vehicles.

Alice encounters her first real grotesque figures in the guise of footmen. Posing her conclusions on artificial clothing dictated by societal conventions of the outerworld, Alice deduces the two figures to be footmen because of their livery--their outer clothing:

For a minute or two she stood looking at the house, and wondering what to do next, when suddenly a footman in livery came running out of the wood--(she considered him to be a footman because he was in livery: otherwise, judging by his face only, she would have called him a fish) . . . . It [the door] was opened by another footman in livery, with a round face, and large eyes like a frog; and both footmen, Alice noticed, had powdered hair that curled all over their heads. (79)

Carroll here utilizes animal figures garbed in human apparel to depict humorously the effects such artificial

habillements can have not only upon non-humans but also more importantly upon humans. Carroll also successfully satirizes humans' perceptions of others via Alice's superficial and artificial recognition. Since the frog and fish wear the costumes of liveries, that they "appear to be" fish and frog become secondary. They are, then, liveries, performing and looking like liveries. Societal dictums and clothing supersede Alice's common sense; complexity usurps simplicity. What the reader notes here and in other comparable instances as well is that each time Alice relies on complex, societal rules and logic in lieu of common, simple, and pragmatic reason, she encounters more complexity without substance and, consequently, frustration. Carroll achieves this satiric statement concerning society's mental attitudes toward artificial roles repeatedly via the same structural motifs, the metaphor of the grotesque and metaphor of madness. While Alice strives to comprehend each situation and while the audience humorously assesses it, Carroll achieves his statement with deep structure--his Menippean statement concerning society's unnecessarily complex and artificial rules, labels, and clothing.

This same statement Carroll reiterates when he allows Alice to overhear and/or participate in verbal battles--or

logomachies--among Wonderland inhabitants. Again in this pivotal episode, Alice overhears and eventually participates in a typical Carrollian logomachy when the Queen's Fish-Footman delivers an invitation to the Duchess' Frog-Footman, for example:

. . . in a solemn tone, 'For the Duchess. An invitation from the Queen to play 'croquet.' The Frog-Footman repeated in the same solemn tone, only changing the order of the words a little, 'From the Queen. An invitation for the Duchess to play croquet.' (80)

Though the battle here circumvents overt violence, a battle such as Swift's "Battle of the Books," tension does, however, exist in that each livery docorously and meticulously addresses the other, adhering to all the artificial rules of protocol. Carroll's burlesque here of social decorum among the servant class reaches Menippean comic height through Alice's eyes because the participants behave ludicrously--physically and verbally. Carroll even uses their artificially curled hair to represent one united entanglement to depict the humorous pitfalls of artificial decorum.

This burlesquing via logomachy continues to progress the action in this episode especially when Alice engages in an encyclopedic anatomy examining how one gains entry into the Duchess' house (79-82). What Carroll depicts here

evidences unequivocally the Menippean satirist's distrust and subsequent abhorrence of unnecessarily complex and chaotic societal systems whose justifications lie couched in empty, complex, and cacophonous rhetoric:

'There's no sort of use in knocking,' said the Footman, 'and that for two reasons. First because I'm on the same side of the door as you are; secondly, because they're making such a noise inside, no one could possibly hear you.' . . .

'Please, then,' said Alice, 'how am I to get in?'

'There might be some sense in your knocking, . . . if we had the door between us. For instance, if you were inside, you might knock, and I could let you out, you know.' . . .

'I shall sit here,' said the Footman, 'till to-morrow--' . . . '--or the next day, maybe,' . . . .

'How am I to get in?' asked Alice again, in a louder tone.

'Are you to get in at all?' said the Footman. 'That's the first question, you know.'

It was no doubt: only Alice did not like to be told so. 'It's really dreadful,' . . . the way all the creatures argue. It's enough to drive one crazy!'

The Footman seemed to think this a good opportunity for repeating his remark, with variations. 'I shall sit here,' he said, 'on and off, for days and days.'

'But what am I to do?' said Alice.

'Anything you like,' said the Footman,  
and began whistling.

'Oh there's no use in talking to him,'  
said Alice desperately: 'he's perfectly idiotic!'  
And she opened the door and went in. (81-82)

As before when Alice tried to use outerworld logic, decorum, and verbage to assess her situation, she engages here in polite yet tensional verbal discussion on an insignificant topic--how to gain entry into a home. Again as before, Alice learns that a complex outerworld decorum, logic, and verbage provide poor support. She also learns that simplicity and direct action gain positive response; so she can simply open the door and enter since entrance is her desire. This logomachy does indeed evidence Carroll's satiric intent while also progressing Alice along the carousel.

Another even more graphic utilization of the metaphors of the grotesque and madness designed to progress in action and enhance the work's structure evince themselves with the baby and the Cheshire cat in the same episode, "Pig and Pepper." When Alice first enters the Duchess' house, she immediately observes the chaotic, topsy-turvy atmosphere. Not only do the Duchess and the cook not resemble Alice's outerworld conception of royalty and the servants' class (82-85), but also the house pet and the Duchess' child

do not resemble anything with which this logical anti-heroine is familiar:

'Please would you tell me,' said Alice, a little timidly, for she was not quite sure whether it was good manners for her to speak first, 'why your cat grins like that?'

'It's a Cheshire cat,' said the Duchess, 'and that's why . . . ' . . .

'I didn't know that Cheshire cats could grin.'

'They all can,' said the Duchess; 'and most of 'em do.'

'I don't know of any that do,' Alice said very politely, feeling quite pleased to have got in the conversation.

'You don't know much,' said the Duchess; 'and that's a fact.' (83)

That Carroll adds the Cheshire cat later in the 1865 version rather than in Alice's Adventures Underground evidences clearly that Carroll had in mind a further satiric amplification of this episode. This amplification intensifies and sustains the structural balance in that Carroll via the metaphors teaches Alice that where clarification and explication would appear to be--with the grotesque Duchess--they are not; rather, logic and clarification lie with the Cheshire cat. The Menippean metaphor of madness allows the viability of this creative twist and provides for Alice her first tangible and yet

intangible guide, her light, toward simple and positive comprehension of Wonderland and subsequently the outerworld as well. The Cheshire cat explains not only the nature of madness but also the nature of Alice's journey (88-90), functions that eventually enable Alice to progress more smoothly from system to system. This gradual assimilation and synthesis Alice undergoes evince themselves to the audience initially when the narrator remarks that the Cheshire cat's disappearing before Alice's eyes proved unsurprising to her since " . . . she was getting so well used to queer things happening" (90). Even the mutability of Wonderland's inhabitants, such as the baby who metamorphoses into a pig (86-87), eventually ceases to affect Alice in an outerworld perspective. Alice, instead, begins to observe and participate rather than spouting preconceived notions so that when the Cheshire cat after having disappeared and now reappearing inquires about the baby, Alice replies, "'It turned into a pig,' Alice answered very quietly, just as if the cat had come back in a natural way" (90). The structural balance Carroll achieves in this episode he completes via the metaphors of the grotesque and madness along with metaphors of the fantastic, for Alice's encounter with the Cheshire cat not only continues her journey but also exposes her further to

the Wonderland inhabitants' mutability:

' . . . I [Alice] wish you wouldn't keep appearing and vanishing so suddenly: you make one quite giddy!'

'All right,' said the Cat; and this time it vanished quite slowly, beginning with the end of the tail, and ending with the grin, which remained some time after the rest of it had gone.

'Well! I've often seen a cat without a grin,' thought Alice; 'but a grin without a cat! It's the most curious thing I ever saw in all my life.' (90-91)

Alice's response, then, sharply evidences this unique fusion of metaphors and structural balance that Carroll achieves episode after episode. That Carroll further achieves cohesion, coherence, and intensity in this episode and subsequently in others via these Menippean motifs evinces itself vividly, too.

Subsequent episodes such as "A Mad Tea-Party" and "The Mock Turtle's Story" enhance and enlarge the scope of Carroll's carousel structure. With these two subsequent episodes, the audience readily recognizes archetypal Menippean motifs, particularly the metaphor of madness in "A Mad Tea-Party" and the metaphor of the grotesque in "The Mock Turtle's Story." In "A Mad Tea-Party" Alice ultimately realizes via a series of logomachies that progress the action that madness is indeed a relative



term, a term whose definition adjusts itself to the speaker. She further realizes that madness divests itself of its perimeters to encompass space, time, and things as well as individuals. Only when Alice allows herself to experience and participate actively in Wonderland and only when Alice begins to divest herself of her outerworld clothes does she begin to assert control over her journey, a journey in which she seeks entrance previously denied her because of artificial societal conventions:

Once more she found herself in the long hall, and close to the little glass table. "Now I'll manage better this time," . . . and began by taking the little golden key, and unlocking the door that led into the garden. Then she set to work nibbling at the mushroom (she had kept a piece of it in her pocket) till she was about a foot high: then she walked down the passage: and then--she found herself at last in the beautiful garden, among the bright flowerbeds and the cool fountains. (104)

The audience readily recognizes that Alice, herself, has accepted the Menippean philosophical concept of madness. Alice's having retained a piece of mushroom, her utilizing that piece to control her size, and her determination to enter into the garden just as she entered the Duchess' house depict the Menippean metaphor of madness. Nothing is as it appears.

As with the two previous episodes, "The Mock Turtle's Story" functions as another mutable system along Alice's

episodic, carousel journey. Relying primarily on the metaphor of the grotesque to add another facet to Alice's character, "The Mock Turtle's Story" burlesques Carroll's contemporary educational system and exposes Alice to Wonderland counterparts even more fantastic and grotesque than the Fish-Footman and Frog-Footman or their outer-world counterparts (124-25). What the audience has recognized slowly, of course, is Alice's lack of commenting on the physical differences and rare qualities each animal possesses. One can further ascertain, then, a shift, or a spiralling upward of Alice's mental stance as her body physically travels from system to system. Carroll achieves such a Menippean synthesis via the coherence and cohesion of these Menippean motifs.

This Menippean coherence and cohesion Carroll further achieves via this satire's encyclopedic nature. Within the work's complex carousel structure, this motif evidences itself through Carroll's utilization of massive erudition and parody. To convey the concern that man preoccupied himself with excessive and misdirected formal learning--educational or societal--in artificial environments and to depict the consequences of such exposure, the Menippean satirists targeted not only the format of such faulty educational systems but also the very individuals

responsible for producing such progeny. To assert, however, that Menippean satirists sought condemnation of all teachers and scholars would be a faulty assertion. To assert, instead, that Menippean satirists condemned useless and empty logic, illogical rules and formulas that sought to steal away man's uniqueness, his individuality, and consequently, his independent thought would focus directly on a primary facet of Menippean philosophy. True to Menippus and Varro, Carroll chooses to depict this dilemma in a pseudo-direct manner. The Menippean satirist believed the only way to condemn a system was to include that system in the skeletal structure and content of the work itself. Next, the satirist would parody this system now inseparably fused into the satire. Throughout the carousel journey, then, the anti-hero encounters and experiences many systems, systems which reveal to the anti-hero their inconsistency and inefficacy and jargonal dispositions. Parody and massive erudition accomplish this monumental objective under the compositional expertise of the Menippean satirist.

Like a true Menippean satirist, Carroll takes Alice through an encyclopedic journey of systems, systems which Carroll satirizes via interpolated tales, ecphrasis, and a medley of prose and verse. Carroll further develops the

Menippean satiric focus with his parodying pedants and philosophus gloriosus from other systems. What results is an effective satiric comment against massive erudition, and who better to make such comment than an unbiased, curious, and precocious seven-year-old, Alice. Since neither Dodgson nor Carroll could openly condemn society's social, judicial, or educational systems, just as his Menippean predecessors could not, the author allows Alice to voice the universal truths which evidence themselves as she journeys on the carousel, just as Encolpius, Gargantua, and Gulliver do. "A Caucus-Race and a Long Tale," "The Mock Turtle's Story," "The Lobster Quadrille," and "Who Stole the Tarts?" best evidence Carroll's mastery of the Menippean satire's encyclopedic attack on massive erudition.

Alice first encounters in "A Caucus-Race and a Long Tale" the Menippean distrust of artificial erudition when she strives to comprehend Wonderland and its inhabitants via societal rules and regulations. What Alice begins to see but not fully understand, however, is the incongruity that exists between outerworld decorum and Wonderland decorum as well as ambiguity in outerworld language and Wonderland language. In most cases Alice finds that the rules of decorum and ambiguity of language "go hand in

hand." One such sample occurs when she engages in a short but terse logomachy with the mouse while it is trying to tell its tale:

'You are not attending!' said the Mouse to Alice severely. 'What are you thinking of?'

'I beg your pardon,' said Alice very humbly: 'you had got to the fifth bend, I think?'

'I had not!' cried the Mouse, sharply and very angrily.

'A knot!' said Alice, already to make herself useful, and looking anxiously about her. 'Oh, do let me help undo it!'

'I shall do nothing of the sort,' said the Mouse, getting up and walking away. 'You insult me by talking such nonsense!'

'I didn't mean it!' pleaded poor Alice. 'But you're so easily offended, you know!' . . . And an old Crab took the opportunity of saying to her daughter, 'Ah, my dear! Let this be a lesson to you never to lose your temper!'

'Hold your tongue, Ma!' said the young Crab, a little snappishly. 'You're enough to try the patience of an oyster!' (51-52)

Quite clearly here one sees how ambiguity of language and incomprehension create misunderstanding, even anger.

Alice breaks the rules of decorum--listening, or rather not listening, to a story--and further complicates the situation with her misinterpretation of knot for not.

Even Alice's logical progression here becomes questionable,

for logically, had she attended attentively to the Mouse's tale, she could not have deduced knot for not.

Complementing Alice's faux pas, the old Crab's maxim on acceptable social behavior and the young Crab's reply evince Carroll's underlying satiric commentary in that society's illogical rules and ambiguities do try the endurance of an oyster. Such a condensed metaphor exhibits its tenor: society's systems exasperate even the most steadfast.

In another part of this episode, Carroll satirizes again ambiguities in language when the Mouse tries to relate British history to the group. This interpolation ends in a fiasco because it fails to communicate. Employing the metaphor of madness here, Carroll allows the Mouse to appear as if he is relating essential, factual, and substantive information. The satiric commentary emerges, however, when the Mouse fails via ambiguous language not only to communicate but also to deliver his promise--to dry off his wet listeners:

'William the Conqueror, whose cause was favoured by the pope, was soon submitted to the English, who wanted leaders, and had been of late much accustomed to usurpation and conquest. Edwin and Morcar, the earls of Mercia and Northumbria--' . . . 'Declared for him; and even Stigand, the patriotic archbishop of Canterbury, found it advisable--'

'Found what?' said the Duck.

'Found it,' the Mouse replied rather crossly: 'of course you know what "it" means.'

'I know what "it" means well enough, when I find a thing,' said the Duck: 'it's generally a frog or a worm. The question is, what did the archbishop find?'

The Mouse did not notice this question, . . . . 'How are you getting on now, my dear?' it continued, turning to Alice as it spoke.

'As wet as ever,' said Alice in a mealancholy tone: 'it doesn't seem to dry me at all.' (46-47)

Not only does Carroll clearly evince here the ambiguity of language, but also Carroll depicts the Mouse as an empty pedant who possesses much erudite knowledge, knowledge which when imparted yet leaves its audience wet and unresponsive. Such parody expertly reifies concretely the Menippean satirist's abhorrence of empty rhetoric and knowledge for knowledge's sake; Carroll, therefore, does address once more the true Menippean intent.

In two companion episodes--"The Mock Turtle's Story" and "The Lobster Quadrille," Carroll amplifies his parodic attack on massive erudition and the pedant in that by allowing the Turtle to recount anatomically to Alice his educational history, Carroll achieves the subtle satire sought by the Menippean satirist. Like the Mouse in "The

Caucus-Race and a Long Tale," the Turtle and his revelations best serve to ridicule the very system he praises. For example, when the Mock Turtle explains to Alice a typical day in the life of a Turtle at school, the Mock Turtle exhibits the ambiguity of his account due to ambiguous language that is foreign to Alice's ear and brain:

' . . . we went to school in the sea. The master was an old Turtle--we used to call him Tortise--'

'Why did you call him Tortise, if he wasn't one?' Alice asked.

'We called him Tortise because he taught us,' said the Mock Turtle angrily. 'Really you are very dull!'

'We had the very best of educations--in fact we went to school every-day--'

'I've been to day-school, too,' said Alice. 'You needn't be so proud as all that.'

'With extras?' asked the Mock Turtle, a little anxiously.

'Yes,' said Alice: 'we learned French and music.'

'And washing?' said the Mock Turtle.

'Certainly not!' said Alice indignantly.

'Ah, then yours wasn't really a good school, . . . .' 'Now at ours, they had, at the end of the bill, French, music, and washing--extra.'

'You couldn't have wanted it much,' said Alice; 'living at the bottom of the sea.'



'I couldn't afford to learn it,' said the Mock Turtle with a sigh. 'I only took the regular course.' (127-29)

That Carroll parodies here the educational system readily evinces itself. That Alice feels herself compelled to compete with the Mock Turtle's description of his "quality" education versus her "quality" education also evinces itself quickly. The deep-structured implications of these actions do not evidence themselves so readily, however. Education's regimentation and ambiguity and needless complexity, these traits are the ones Carroll lambasts via the Mock Turtle. Of such a satiric view the reader no longer doubts when Carroll allows the Turtle to continue the parody in his discussion of mathematics: " . . . Ambition, Distraction, Uglification, and Derision" (129). With such parodic puns Carroll subtly satirizes this system in only a way a satirist who possesses the Menippean perspective can.

Carroll completes his attack on the ambiguity of massive erudition with its ill-effects in "The Lobster Quadrille" primarily via a medley of prose and verse. This typical Menippean motif enables the satirist not only to utilize more than one genre at a time but also to satirize a variety of literary styles. Like Swift and like Carroll's contemporary, Mark Twain, Carroll disliked excessively sentimental poetry and ambiguous language.

With the Menippean motif of the medley, Carroll subsequently satirizes such well-known poems of his day as "Star of the Evening" by James M. Sayles and "The Sluggard" by Isaac Watts. Using Alice as an objective persona, Carroll allows her to recite "The Sluggard" upon the request of the Gryphon when it is Alice's time to display her learning. As with the Mock Turtle, Carroll satirizes the pointless complexity of memorization only for the sake of memorization, for when Alice endeavors to recite from memory her learned lessons, she experiences an atypical reversal of what she desires to produce. Just as she began to realize earlier while falling down the hole and while journeying through other systems that outerworld logic fails in Wonderland, she now comprehends that all of the lessons learned so well in the outerworld and deemed essential facets of knowledge have no pervasive import in Wonderland or on its inhabitants:

' . . . and the works came very queer indeed: --  
'Tis the voice of the Lobster: I heard  
declare'

'You have baked me too brown, I must  
sugar my hair.'

'As a duck with eyelids, so he with his nose  
Trims his belt and his buttons, and turns out  
his toes.

When the sands are all dry, he is gay as a lark,  
And will talk in contemptuous tones of the Shark;  
But, when the tide rises and sharks are around,  
His voice has a timid and tremulous sound.'

. . .

Alice said nothing: she had sat down with her face in her hands, wondering if anything would ever happen in a natural way again. (139)

What she learns here is that natural becomes a relative term, a term which when asked to explain her version of "The Sluggard," she cannot, for education, according to Carroll's perception, does not always allow the individual to synthesize information usefully; rather, it allows the individual to collect information without ever really appreciating a need for it.

Each system Alice experiences, then, provides her with a parody on the unnecessarily complex systems so popular in society. The Mouse in the Caucus-race typifies the pedant who capitalizes on knowledge for knowledge's sake; the Mock Turtle typifies the regimentation and ambiguity of the educational system. The massive judicial erudition in "Who Stole the Tarts?" provides the matter by which Carroll burlesques once more the artificial and complex systems sustained by society. That the participants are a pack of playing cards strikes the reader initially as the beginning of the burlesque. Relying on the Menippean metaphor of the fantastic here, Carroll then relies on Alice to determine more specifically the roles. Basing her recognition on artificial and societally dictated clothing and accoutrements, Alice reprises her method of

delineation from "Pig and Pepper":

Alice had never been in a court of justice before, but she had read about them in books, and she was quite pleased to find that she knew the name of nearly everything there. 'That's the judge,' she said to herself, 'because of his great wig.' . . . 'And that's the jury-box,' thought Alice, 'and those twelve creatures,' (she was obliged to say "creatures," you see because some of them were animals, and some were birds), 'I suppose they are the jurors.'  
(144)

Just as Alice determines the frog and fish to be Foot-men, so to speak, she determines here who the judge and jurors are, based not on their physical features or their actions in a court of law, or on their expertise with judicial rhetoric. Alice determines what each role is by the artificial clothing, placement in the courtroom, and collective number--all being external facets established by the outerworld. Carroll's burlesquing of the unnecessary complexity of the judicial system begins here; the animals and cards provide amenable vehicles for such a delicate tenor, consequently.

Thus begins, then, Alice's humorous expedition of this system. Her observation, for example, of the jurors' rapidly writing on their slates before the trial even begins satirizes the intellectual quality of the jurors when the Gryphon tells her that they are writing their names

" . . . for fear they should forget them before the end of the trial" (144). To burlesque further the needlessly complex role of the judiciary via roles such as the judiciary stenographer, Carroll utilizes not one but twelve--the jurors--and depicts them in varying acts of absurdity:

One of the jurors had a pencil that squeaked. This, of course, Alice could not stand, and she went round the court and got behind him, and very soon found an opportunity of taking it away. She did it so quickly that the poor little juror (it was Bill, the lizard) could not make out at all what had become of it; so, after hunting all about for it, he was obliged to write with one finger for the rest of the day; and this was of very little use, as it left no mark on the slate. (145)

That the jurors write constantly provides satiric humor, but also that the jurors will continue the act even when the act is devoid of substance, as Bill's predicament indicates, provides the Menippean satiric humor. The Menippean satirist, after all, decries not all actions of society but only the ones that involve complexity and rules when none need apply. Instance after instance Alice observes this theme first depicted by the jurors when the jurors reduce dates of the Hatter's tea-time to shillings and pence (146), when the king asks the Hatter to stand down and the Hatter replies he can stand no lower (150),

and when Alice sees another juror literally suppressed by the court:

Here one of the guinea-pigs cheered, and was immediately suppressed by the officers of the court. (As that is rather a hard word, I will just explain to you how it was done. They had a large canvas bag, which tied up at the mouth with strings: into this they slipped the guinea-pig, head first, and then sat upon it.)

'I'm glad I've seen that done,' thought Alice. 'I've so often read in the newspapers, at the end of trials, "There was some attempt at applause, which was immediately suppressed by the officers of the court," and I never knew what it meant till now.' (149-50)

Indeed, Carroll does invoke humor here via animals and a seven-year-old in such a Menippean way that the adult audience can see itself, its foibles, and subsequently, laugh and learn. Just as the carousel journey circles, goes up, and goes down, it can also spiral upward toward total comprehension, cognizance. Each system, then, like this judicial system, enables the adult audience to experience and learn vicariously through a completely objective anti-heroine, Alice. What the audience sees here through all of Carroll's pathetic fallacies and metaphors of madness and the fantastic is that massive erudition without discipline, without a focus, without clarity and simplicity equals an utter cacophony of ideas and language, a cacophony that is anything but natural

and simple. Such ideas and language, consequently, promote useless and needless complexity as well as frustration.

If the systems through which Alice journeys affect her as well as the audience, what about the Wonderland inhabitants? According to Juanita Williams and Northrup Frye, the Menippean satire targets in addition to insufficient systems the pedant and philosophus gloriosus. In order to perform such a task, the Menippean satire, then, focuses on the mental attitudes formulating and sustaining these systems; its characters are not characters at all, as a result, but caricatures:

Pedants, bigots, cranks, parvenus, virtuosi, enthusiasts, rapacious and incompetent professional men of all kinds, are handled in terms of their occupational approach to life as distinct from their social behavior. The Menippean satire thus resembles the confession in its ability to handle abstract ideas and theories, and differs from the novel in its characterization, which is stylized rather than naturalistic, and presents people as mouthpieces of the ideas they represent. (Frye 309)

These types do not, however, perceive themselves as such, but through the anti-heroine's perspective these types appear as excessive caricatures of the problems abhorred by the Menippean satirist. According to Frye, the Menippean satire relies on

. . . the free play of intellectual fancy and the kind of humorous observation that produces caricature . . . . At its most concentrated the Menippean satire presents us with a vision of the world in terms of a single intellectual pattern. The intellectual structure built up from the story makes for violent dislocations in the customary logic of narrative, though the appearance of carelessness that results reflects only the carelessness of the reader or his tendency to judge by a novel-centered conception of fiction. (309-10)

What Frye understands here about character and the Menippean satire and with what Juanita Williams fully concurs evidences itself vividly in Alice's Adventures in Wonderland. Alice's intellectual pattern provides the vehicle which transports the reader and the mental mindset on which the reader must depend. Through this unbiased, objective, precocious seven-year-old, then, the audience becomes aware of pedants such as the Mouse and a menagerie of societal attitudes. In addition to these Menippean caricatures, the audience also sees an excellent caricature of the philosophus gloriosus in the Duchess and of the Menippean anti-heroine in Alice.

Along her carousel journey, Alice initially encounters the Duchess in "Pig and Pepper" and subsequently in "The Mock Turtle's Story." Carroll immediately establishes the fact that the Duchess is a caricature of her station, her sex, and her stereotypical gender function via John



Tenniel's illustration. According to Martin Gardner, who annotates the definitive versions of the Alice books,

[a] glance at the portrait of the Ugly Duchess, by the sixteenth-century Flemish painter Quintin Matsys (it is reproduced in Langford Reed's book on Carroll) leaves little doubt that it served as the model for Tenniel's duchess. Matsys's duchess is popularly supposed to be Margaretha Maultasch, a fourteenth-century duchess of Carinthia and Tyrol.

'Maultasch,' meaning 'pocket-mouth,' was a name given to her because of the shape of her mouth. The unhappy life of poor Margaret, who had the reputation of being the ugliest woman in history is told by Lion Feuchtwanger in his novel The Ugly Duchess. (82)

Upon first glance, then, Alice already realizes that what society dictates as a necessary norm for positive, physical attributes, especially for royalty, does not apply in Wonderland.

After shocking Alice with her physical appearance, the Duchess then proceeds to shock Alice with her reversal of what one would expect from a mother figure. Addressing her baby as "Pig" (83), the Duchess simultaneously participates in a logomachy with Alice, a logomachy in which the Duchess breeches decorum by asserting that Alice lacks wit (83). With the Duchess' not behaving as a Duchess, her not behaving as a mother--even when, for example, the cook begins throwing dishes, the baby begins

"howling" (84), and her being insensitive to it all, Alice reflects on such "dislocations" with understandable confusion. The Duchess as mother figure finally exasperates Alice when she, nursing her child, sings to it a lullaby:

'Speak roughly to your little boy,  
And beat him when he sneezes:  
He only does it to annoy,  
Because he knows it teases.'

CHORUS

'Wow! wow! wow!'

While the Duchess sang the second verse of the song, she kept tossing the baby violently up and down, and the poor little things howled so, that Alice could hardly hear the words:--

'I speak severely to my boy,  
And beat him when he sneezes:  
For he can thoroughly enjoy  
The pepper when he pleases!'

CHORUS

'Wow! wow! wow!'

'Here! You may nurse it a bit, if you like!' the Duchess said to Alice, flinging the baby at her as she spoke. 'I must go and get ready to play croquet with the Queen,' . . . . (85)

Not only does the Duchess here represent the mental attitudes, as Carroll depicts them, of some nobility or even priveleged class toward child-rearing, but also of the same class toward its social responsibility to the Crown. That the Duchess fails to function simply, directly, and truly to her sex, maternal role, and

station typifies the Menippean motif of the transmogrification of the great. Such a motif enables Menippean satirists to effect a subliminal reversal while seemingly allowing the individual to appear to remain at stasis.

Carroll further reiterates his position on the needlessly complex and empty rhetoric and rules via the Duchess in "The Mock Turtle's Story." In this episode the Duchess appears as the precursor to Carroll's greatest philosophus gloriosus--Humpty Dumpty--in the second book. Espousing one moral after the other, the Duchess caricatures the Victorian-adult world's penchant for moralizing; despite the previous statement or the circumstance, the Duchess has a moral. That she understands its import or that Alice sees its relationship to the conversation at hand is moot:

'You're thinging about something my dear, and that makes you forget to talk, I can't tell you just now what the moral of that is, but I shall remember it in a bit.'

'Perhaps it hasn't one,' Alice ventured to remark.

'Tut, tut, child!' said the Duchess. 'Everything's got a moral, if only you can find it.' (120)

As the Duchess expresses here, she will provide Alice with a moral regardless. What the reader must note here,

however, is that neither Carroll nor Alice disputes the existence of morals; what each does dispute, rather, evinces itself with the moral whose nucleus contains nebulous, fallacious criteria. When the Duchess and Alice, for example, discuss Alice's flamingo and whether or not it will bite, the Duchess says,

'[v]lery true, ' . . . : 'flamingoes and mustard both bite. And the moral of that is--'Birds of a feather flock together.'

'Only the mustard isn't a bird,' Alice remarked.

'Right, as usual,' said the Duchess: 'what a clear way you have of putting things!'

'It's a mineral, I think,' said Alice.

'Of course it is,' said the Duchess, who seemed ready to agree to anything that Alice said: 'there's a large mustard-mine near here. And the moral of that is--'The more there is of mine, the less there is of yours.'

'Oh, I know,' exclaimed Alice, who had not attended to this last remark, 'it's a vegetable. It doesn't look like one, but it is.'

'I quite agree with you,' said the Duchess; 'and the moral of that is--'Be what you would seem to be'--or, if you'd like it put more simply--'Never imagine yourself to be otherwise than what it might appear to others that what you were or might have been was not otherwise than what you had been would have appeared to them otherwise.'

'I think I should understand that better,  
 . . . if I had written it down: But I can't  
 quite follow it as you say it.' (121-22)

Not even does Humpty-Dumpty have a speech that transcends this one the Duchess makes, even though he comprehensively typifies the philosophus gloriosus that the Menippean satirist detests. Alice truly performs here as the Menippean mouthpiece when she infers that the Duchess' speech lacks simplicity, clarity, and substance. Paralleling an earlier motif, Carroll subliminally asserts, too, that adults often spout euphemisms which contain no substance whatsoever.

Throughout Alice's Adventures in Wonderland, Carroll includes such caricatures heretofore mentioned as junctures along Alice's carousel journey within the variety of systems. Without Alice's reacting and interacting with these caricatures, then, the fact that they are caricatures in the Menippean sense would never evince itself. The pivotal facet of the Menippean satire, as a result, is this Menippean anti-heroine who engages the carousel, who embarks on the spiralling journey, and who experiences a variety of mutable systems, always looking forward toward a Theleme. Although each episode suffices as another system explored, experienced along the carousel, such episodes as "Advice From a Caterpillar," "Pig and Pepper,"

and "Alice's Evidence" provide the cruxes that depict Alice as a Menippean anti-heroine.

Like Gargantua in Rabelais' work and like Gulliver, Alice appears to be a typical Menippean anti-heroine who, as Williams asserts, is "naive and bumbling, yet able to outwit" the inhabitants of each system encountered (93). Initially experiencing free-fall, then uncontrollable physical metamorphosis and mental shock, Alice slowly begins to realize that the outerworld's artificiality and complexity and incomprehensibility Wonderland magnifies to the excessive. She further realizes eventually that since such caricatures exist, her outerworld logic, decorum, and rules fail to explicate or solve the dilemmas or encounters in which she finds herself. Throughout almost the entire first half of the first book, Alice bumbles and excuses her way along her journey. Not until Book V, "Advice From a Caterpillar," does she evidence that she is beginning to metamorphose intellectually. Interestingly, once Alice achieves some control over her own mental attitudes and perspectives toward Wonderland inhabitants and once she begins to listen, synthesize, and enact self-reliance, she achieves total control over her bodily metamorphosis so that she can reduce or enlarge parts of her body at will.

Such an important metamorphosis occurs via the Caterpillar. The Caterpillar asks Alice a pivotal question, "Who are You?" (67). Prior to this time Alice always endeavored to explain when unasked that she was experiencing a rather perplexing day and that perhaps she really was a different person from the one she was earlier. Her reply to the Caterpillar, however, is a typically Menippean one that reflects the metamorphic motif: " . . . at least I knew who I was when I got up this morning, but I think I must have been changed several times since then" (67). Realizing further that her statement contains ambiguity--another Menippean motif--Alice and the Caterpillar seek a simpler, less complex answer to his question. Interestingly, Alice provides an effective and simple analogy to explain her plight to the Caterpillar (68); what makes this analogy even more provocative is that the Caterpillar asserts metamorphosis--growth and change--as natural and not unique.

To complicate matters even more for Alice, her memory has metamorphosed as well. This memory that heretofore has reflected outerworld decorum, rules, complexity, and, to her, stability has forsaken her in this enigmatic, mutable world. She tells the Caterpillar, "I can't remember things as I used--and I don't keep the same size

for ten minutes together!" (69). Again, as in previous and subsequent episodes Carroll utilizes this anti-heroine's bafflement to act as a façade for his subliminal parody. To prove to the Caterpillar her predicament, Alice tries to recite Robert Southey's "The Old Man's Comforts and How He Gained Them," a moralistic and didactic poem well-known during Carroll's day. Alice's version metamorphoses into "You are old, Father William," an anti-moralistic, anti-restraint parody:

'You are old, father William,' the  
young man said,  
    'And your hair has become very white;  
And yet you incessantly stand on your head--  
    Do you think, at your age, it is right?'

'In my youth,' father William replied  
to his son, 'I feared it might injure the  
brain;  
But now that I am perfectly sure I have none,  
    Why, I do it again and again.' (70)

Although on first glance Southey's poem touts that restraint and moderation reap one old age and a sedate existence, Carroll's parody from Alice's befuddled brain proves to be the more desirous one, for it exudes vigor, simplicity, and above all, humor.

Alice, however, yet seeks some sort of stasis, or at least a semblance of one. When the Caterpillar requests of her, then, what size she would prefer to be, she replies "a little larger" (72). The Caterpillar, before



providing her with the essential information, reiterates the positive aspects of metamorphosis as well as its inevitability (72). Then, the Caterpillar provides Alice with the specific, simple means by which she can control her own metamorphosis: "One side will make you grow taller, and the other side will make you grow shorter" (73). After much empirical experimentation and after her logomachy with the Pigeon who first perceives her as a serpent (74-75), she finally reaches a controlled physical balance through empirical logic. Alice, also, at this time begins to think less of herself and more of the Wonderland inhabitants because she desires now to appear as "normal" to them as she possibly can.

By the time Alice reaches the journey's mid-point, "Pig and Pepper," she has not only achieved control of her size by nibbling both sides of the mushroom, but also she has achieved a Wonderland approach to logic. As Northrop Frye asserts of the Menippean anti-hero, Alice innocently participates in intellectual play of the fancy, and in so doing, she hypothesizes why situations are as they are, and why she is as she is, and more importantly, why adults behave as they do--individuals representing the artificial outerworld. Alice initially evidences this new trait when she assumes responsibility for the Duchess'

child:

'If I don't take this child away with me,' thought Alice, 'they're sure to kill it in a day or two. Wouldn't it be murder to leave it behind?' (86)

The issues with which Alice concerns herself are always of significant import rather than any trivial, stereotypical child-like nonsense. Alice re-emphasizes this same suspicion related to the Duchess when she strives to deduce the nature of such treatment--the Duchess and her child:

'Maybe it's always pepper that makes people hot-tempered,' she went on, very much pleased at having found a new kind of rule, 'and vinegar that makes them sour--and camomile that makes them bitter--and--and barley-sugar and such things that make children sweet-tempered.' (119-20)

In this portion of "The Mock Turtle's Story," Alice surmises a parallel theorem to the four humors and their causes. That her theorem combines three-fourths of what makes adults ill-tempered and one-fourth of what makes children sweet reveals to the reader her perception of adults' basic and most pervasive natures. One must note here, too, that Alice's adeptness at employing an empirical logic has refined itself and, for her in this world, has become more useful and less complex.

Alice finally displays her maturation in this book in the final episode, "Alice's Evidence." Structurally,

Alice completes her carousel journey, and as an "at large" intellectual fancy who experiences Wonderland, she also reaches maturation. While her surface goal has been to adjust her size so that she could enter into the garden, her deep-structured goal has been to comprehend the systems through which she has journeyed and to establish some sort of individual control. Here, in this episode, then, Alice achieves the final link in the circular chain. Beginning slowly and gaining momentum, Alice first displays her evolving control and simple comprehension when she engages in a short logomachy with the King, regarding the age of a rule. Alice's deductive response to a rule which she believes to have been recently created rather than "the oldest rule in the book" (156) as the King contends is to assert, "Then it ought to be Number One" (156). To such a response, the King, of course, says nothing.

Alice again asserts herself with her logic and experience when she questions the validity of key evidence, verses allegedly written by the Knave, the accused. Even when the White Rabbit reads the verses in court to establish the Knave's guilt, Alice remarks that the ambiguity of the language makes detection impossible. She even asserts that the "distinguished" jury and judge do

not possess the intellectual prowess to comprehend the verses:

'That's the most important piece of evidence we've heard yet,' said the King; . . . 'So now let the jury--'

'If any one of them can explain it,' said Alice, . . . 'I'll give him sixpence. I don't believe there's an atom of meaning in it.' (159)

Alice does possess the intellectual capacity to understand, however, because she has removed the outerworld veneer and complexities and replaced them with simplicity and directness.

Alice's newly achieved simplicity and directness conclude the trial in that she confidently confronts the Queen, the one caricature she feared confronting heretofore. The Queen, representing the highest reification of rules, regulation, artificiality, and complexity, always modifies these already complex rules to suit her own preference. At this point during the trial, the Queen decides to sentence the Knave prior to pronouncing a verdict (160-61), disregarding the new result Alice's perspective has contributed to the Knave's case. In the brief and last logomachy that ensues, Alice displays her full development as a Menippean anti-heroine:

'Hold your tongue!' said the Queen,  
turning purple.

'I won't!' said Alice.

'Off with her head!' the Queen shouted  
at the top of her voice. Nobody moved.

'Who cares for you?' said Alice (she had  
grown to her full size by this time). 'You're  
nothing but a pack of cards!' (161)

Alice's physical growth, begun during the penultimate episode, reaches its culmination here. That she reaches full height signifies that she has transcended the Wonderland systems, physically and mentally. The chaotic confusion that was catalyst for the carousel journey has satiated itself and stasis, relatively, of course, has returned. Physically, Alice is as she was before. Mentally, Alice nor the reader nor her sister can remain at stasis. Subliminally, Alice's creative fancy has expanded, questioned, explored, and experienced. Subliminally and unconsciously, the vicarious reader can never return wholly to the chaotic, artificial system where he has comfortably existed.

## CHAPTER IV

### Through the Looking-Glass and What Alice Found There:

#### Is Life Really a Dream?

Lewis Carroll repeats his Menippean performance with the sequel to the first Alice book--Through the Looking-Glass and What Alice Found There (1871). Although this sequel does exhibit some familiar, cohesive Menippean threads that relate it to the first Alice book, such as the journey, carousel plot, ridicule of the pedant, and mutability, this work also possesses many unique inventions, inventions peculiar to this work alone. What the reader quickly ascertains is that Carroll's style, temperament, and focus have matured, darkened, and consistently reiterate the darker, inevitable antithesis to childhood--growth and separation and death. This second book, therefore, assumes a pronounced, philosophical stance and poses in lieu of acquiescing to life's inevitability the physical and metaphysical conjecture, "Life, what is it but a dream?" (345). Indeed, one finds here, especially that Carroll is searching for the most direct and unnecessarily complex reality he can find, his Theleme. What he realizes ultimately, however, parallels what Alice realizes at the conclusion of her dream,

uncertainty. Both, then, must adjust and create their own reality as each perceives it.

While Carroll's first Alice book achieves its distinction via the Menippean intent and traits, the second book displays Carroll's mastery of those techniques particularly in cohesive structure. Rather than the episode's relying, for example, on Alice's journey to system after system with only her search for the White Rabbit and the Garden providing structural cohesion, Looking-Glass possesses a tighter transitional cohesion between episodes to such a degree that the reader perceives only slightly that movement from one system to another occurs. In addition to Carroll's amplified and strengthened structure, the work's attack on the artificial and unnecessarily complex societal systems darkly and universally evidences itself through its encyclopedic motif and characterization.

The reader recognizes almost immediately Carroll's layering of Alice's carousel journey. The actual dream-journey from the outerworld into the Looking-Glass world provides a cohesive, coherent frame that contains and indeed allows the other journeys to evolve: the chess journey toward the Thèlémé--Queenship; the railway journey, the forest journey, the boat journey, the Knight journey,

and finally the coronation journey. Within this complex series of journeys, Carroll entwines separate and yet unified episodes, episodes representing parodies of various outerworld systems. Sustaining and connecting all of these facets of *Through the Looking-Glass*, the bifurcated dream frame operates as the subliminal, deep-structured focal point, or underlying theme, of the work. That this complex, multifaceted structure exceeds the structural complexity of *Alice in Wonderland* is quite evident. Carroll reaches a height artistically in his experimentation and manipulation of the Menippean satire that can only be compared to such artistry and expertise as Swift exhibited in Gulliver's Travels.

Like Alice in Wonderland, Through the Looking-Glass and What Alice Found There begins and ends in the same place; thus Carroll relies again upon the Menippean carousel plot. As in "Alice," this essential trait Carroll also layers so that while Alice, the anti-heroine, begins and completes the physical journey in the same place with the same companions, the narrator also begins and completes the book with the same yet modified mental mindset and with the same genre, a lyric poem. One thought-provoking difference, however, does pervade not only the poems but more importantly also Alice's carousel journey, that difference being Alice's mental alacrity. While the first



Alice book concludes with only the adults--Lorina Liddell and Carroll--articulating the underlying theme of the work, Through the Looking-Glass concludes with the now seven-and-one-half-year-old Alice and Carroll echoing the theme with the same dark, shadowy fears and the same bright, elusive hopes. The carousel, then, has completed itself thoroughly, even more totally than before, since Alice, too, can articulate the same message.

The initial carousel, then, begins with Carroll's prefatory poem, "Child of the Pure Unclouded Brow" (173-74). Even the title foreshadows the book's ominous and yet hopeful theme. The first stanza, too, contains this same ominous theme:

Child of the pure unclouded brow  
And dreaming eyes of wonder!  
Though time be fleet, and I and thou  
Are half a life asunder,  
Thy loving smile will surely hail  
The love-gift of a fairy tale.

This stanza manifestly acknowledges disparity between age and youth and the rapidity with which time passes and age advances, a societally recognized negative, universal truth. Yet the stanza also retains an element of hope in that the narrator realizes that this universal truth need not occur totally so long as one remains cognizant of and adaptable to the positive influences of innocent youth.

As long as one possesses the ability to view the world with the eyes of wonderment, as long as one possesses the ability to suspend belief and allow oneself to see life via the fairy-tale, that dark, universal, inevitable truth need not apply. That Carroll refuses here to identify specifically that truth is important because his intent is to show gradually, as Menippus showed, that in inevitable death and separation all are equal, bereft of society's artificial clothing. He also strives to show death's relativity in that one can be dead, being enmeshed in society's complex systems. The abstract tenor emerges, then, to be one of live life to the fullest sans artificiality; and the vehicle is the only one it could possibly be--a youthful, imaginative child.

Sustaining this metaphor and progressing further, Carroll allows the following stanzas to ponder what happens when the aging adult no longer has direct access to his child and must, therefore, rely on past memories:

I have not seen thy sunny face,  
Nor heard thy silver laughter;  
No thought of me shall find a place  
In thy young life's hereafter--  
Enough that now thou wilt not fail  
To listen to my fairy tale.

A tale begun in other days,  
 When summer suns were glowing--  
 A simple chime, that served to time  
 The rhythm of our rowing--  
 Whose echoes live in memory yet,  
 Though envious years would say 'forget.'

Come, harken then, ere the voice of dread,  
 With bitter tiding laden,  
 Shall summon to unwelcome bed--  
 A melancholy maiden!  
 We are but older children, dear,  
 Who fret to find our bedtime near.

Without, the frost, the blinding snow,  
 The storm-wind's moody madness--  
 Within, the firelight's ruddy glow,  
 And childhood's nest of gladness.  
 The magic words shall hold thee fast:  
 Thou shall not heed the raving blast. (173-74)

The first two stanzas here recognize that the fairy-tale will act as cohesive for this unique relationship, since a physical relationship is impossible. The narrator also rather sadly acknowledges the universal truth that society demands substitution of such relationships and tales of fancy for complex realities and separation. He depends then upon the child's memory, a memory innocent of complex, artificial realities. Though he does rely on such an appealing plea based on "[a] tale begun in other days," he can never completely escape the outerworld reality, a reality he concretely depicts in the next two stanzas as " . . . the voice of dread," laden with " . . . bitter tidings," "bedtime," and a winter's storm.

Interestingly, Carroll's vehicles, though concrete, yet retain enough Menippean ambiguity that the tenor reveals its multi-layered meaning. "The voice of dread," for example, a voice heavily containing woeful news, creates in the reader's mind a voice of impending, inevitable age, of marital maturity, of death. Each of these realities for a nineteenth-century girl-child certainly existed, and each of them certainly demanded a forfeiture of fancy and separation from childhood friends, beliefs, and pastimes. Carroll sustains this tenor further when he says that this inevitable news will lead this "melancholy maiden" to her "unwelcome bed"; again, via the Menippean ambiguity Carroll's concrete vehicle contains more than one abstract meaning, meanings such as marital bed or death bed. Each bed here, of course, denotes an ending of innocence: virginal and emotional and societal. Carroll finally concludes this fourth stanza affirming that not only the child but also all individuals who can retain that vestige of child-like perspective experience anxiety when "bedtime" approaches. As before, "bedtime" possesses an ambiguous tenor, for the maiden on her honeymoon night certainly experiences feelings of anxiety as does the adult who approaches life's inevitable bedtimes--separation and death.

The last two stanzas further portray, physically, the focal point Carroll strives to convey. Shifting from the process of maturation to convey the tenor, Carroll utilizes the setting to reify, finally, this concept. Contrasting the archetypally positive, fertile, youthful, and anticipatory summer setting beginning Alice in Wonderland with the archetypally negative, infertile, old, static, and dying winter setting beginning this book, Carroll creates a contrastive, fanciful, and Menippean environment within Alice's home:

And though the shadow of a sigh  
 May tremble through the story,  
 For 'happy summer days' gone by,  
 And vanish'd summer glory--  
 It shall not touch, with the breath of bale,  
 The pleasance of our fairy-tale.

While the winter storm howls outside, the crackling fire warms and enlivens inside. Although six months have elapsed and the time of year no longer makes nature conducive for the flight of fancy experienced July 4, 1865, Carroll creates an atmosphere conducive for recapturing that sense of youth, innocence, and wonderment--of simplicity and naturalness for which the Menippean satirist seeks--the only real Thèlémé worth questing and regaining over and over again. That Carroll asserts here the transient nature of such a Thèlémé reiterates the

Menippean view that though the anti-hero sees the Thèléme' and actively seeks it, he seeks it knowing consciously or subconsciously that total acquisition transcends his grasp. With such awareness, the anti-hero continues on the carousel-journey, satisfied to spiral upward toward an increased awareness of the greater universal truth, knowing that he has bettered himself simply by sincerely embarking on the quest.

This very sentiment of such an acknowledgement Carroll expresses as the book returns to its point of origin on the carousel in the concluding poem, stanzas three through seven:

Long has paled that summer sky:  
Echoes fade and memories die:  
Autumn frosts have slain July.

Still she haunts me, phantomwise,  
Alice moving under skies  
Never seen by waking eyes.

Children yet, the tale to hear  
Eager eye and willing ear,  
Lovingly shall nestle near.

In a Wonderland they lie,  
Dreaming as the days go by,  
Dreaming as the Summer's die:

Ever drifting down the stream--  
Lingering in the golden gleam--  
Life, what is it but a dream? (345)

After remembering the July 4 boatripe down the Thames with the three sisters eager and happy to hear a "simple

tale," Carroll acknowledges that the ideal respite which he joyfully experienced has faded due to the reality of maturation. He further acknowledges a dark, pessimistic result of this maturation and reifies this result with the pathetic fallacy of autumn frost's slaying the life of July (line 9). This idea of death and dying constitutes a pervasive and protean quality from the commencement of Through the Looking-Glass, first subtly and finally overtly. This preoccupation with death Carroll continues and even refers to Alice as one who "has died" and, consequently, haunts him as a phantom haunts the living; she metamorphoses, then, like the Caterpillar, from a concrete vehicle to an abstract tenor, or Theleme for Carroll, the quintessence of innocence devoid of societal artificiality and complexity.

This Thèlémaic Alice does not, however, penetrate Carroll's waking world, for the waking world of the adult--as Through the Looking-Glass depicts--is one of the ruled perimeters, obligations, semantic manipulations, and illogic designed to confuse the issue. Alice, then, must haunt Carroll's unfettered conscious, his sleeping subconscious that awakens and earnestly lives during his dream state. In such a state, time becomes atemporal, and as he says, they continue forever, "Dreaming as days

go by, /Dreaming as the summer's die" (lines 17-18). He even poses the Menippean preference that perhaps his day to day adult existence is his dream state and the Alice-state is reality, the real reality for which man should quest: "Ever drifting down the stream--/Lingering in the golden gleam--/Life, what is it but a dream?" (19-21). So ends this structural facet of the carousel-journey in Through the Looking-Glass and What Alice Found There.

Although Carroll's journey begins mentally desirous of a return or recapturing of a philosophical mindset, a mindset already comprehending the greater, or universal truth, Alice begins her journey, much as she did before, curiously wondering what kind of world lies beyond her own and what kind of people abide there (180-82). Prior to Alice's actually discussing the Looking-Glass world, however, she establishes the central figures involved in her fanciful afternoon with Dinah and her kittens:

'Let's pretend you're the Red Queen, Kitty! Do you know I think if you sat up and folded your arms, you'd look exactly like her.' . . . And Alice got the Red Queen off the table. (180)

Since Alice had already suggested the game of kings and queens to her sister who refused to play, she chooses to use the felines. She specifically delineates later her characters after she has entered the Looking-Glass



(186-87, 190). Just as the White Rabbit, ennui, and curiosity established the catalysts for Alice's first journey, then, the Queen, King, pawn, and Knight chess pieces functioning in concert with Alice's ennui, curiosity, and mirror, fancifully create another other-world--Looking-Glass world. Talking to her Kitty, her kitten, Alice allows her fancy to describe this otherworld to which she will eventually journey:

' . . . First there's the room you see through the glass--that's just the same as our drawing room, only the things go the other way. I can see all of it when I get upon a chair--all but the bit just behind the fireplace. Oh! I do wish I could see that bit! I want so much to know whether they've a fire in the winter: you never can tell, you know, unless our fire smokes, and then smoke comes up in that room too--but that may be only pretence, just to make it look as if they had a fire. Well, then, the books are something like our books, only the words go the wrong way: I know that because I've held up one of our books to the glass, and then they hold up one in the other room. (181)

This mutable world Alice describes certainly displays Looking-Glass world's tangible quality. What evinces itself so realistically here is Alice's synthesis explaining why specific facets of Looking-Glass House function as they do, facets such as the fire and the books. Interestingly, this early Thèléme is a more

cohesive and coherent one for Alice than was Wonderland because she has previously observed this one room--"the door" to Looking-Glass world. From Alice's reconnaissance, how Looking-Glass world operates antithetically comprises much of her inductive assessment and conclusions for Kitty such as fire on one side of the mirror automatically means fire on the other.

With the setting firmly embedded and with the primary catalyst--curiosity--engaged fully, Alice embarks on her carousel-journey:

Oh Kitty, how nice it would be if we could  
only get through into Looking-Glass House!  
I'm sure it's got, oh! such beautiful things  
in it! Let's pretend there's a way of getting  
through into it, somehow, Kitty. Let's  
pretend the glass has got all soft like gauze,  
so that we can get through. Why, it's  
turning into a sort of mist now, I declare!  
. . . And the glass was beginning to melt  
way, just a bright silvery mist . . . .  
In another moment Alice was through the  
glass, and had jumped lightly down into  
the Looking-Glass room. (183-84)

Not only does one denote here Alice's conscious and deliberate entrance into this foreign system, a decisive act, but also Alice's complete control of the act and of the pretense. Unlike the first Alice book that relies on Carroll and Lorina Liddell to begin the fantasy, this book relies primarily on Alice who repeats the desire to pretend. So begins the second phase, then, of Carroll's

layered journey. Once Alice enters into Looking-Glass House via Carroll's initial desire, she begins a seemingly parallel carousel journey that is also episodic. The different, innovative approach Carroll assumes in this second book, however, exhibits a matured expertise, a cohesive quality that fuses the episodes to such an extent that each literally "melts" into the other. How does Carroll achieve such structural cohesion with so many filtered journeys? Having already established that Alice uses chess pieces to act as model characters for Kitty, he structures another layer to the overall journey--a frame involving a chess game. With such subtle, structural amplifications, the second book's *Thèlémé* establishes itself unequivocally--Queenship. Even though Alice does not begin this physical journey until Chapter II, "The Garden of Live Flowers," Carroll designs transitional amplification between the first two chapters.

Structurally, from the moment Alice begins the carousel-journey into Looking Glass world and then begins her next journey toward Queenship, Carroll, employing the Menippean motif of mutability, allows each move on the chessboard to signify Alice's movement from societal system to societal system. This approach also represents Alice's episodic adventure in which she will encounter a

variety of fantastic and grotesque and ambiguous characters and vehicles. Carroll's Red Queen functions as the modus operandi foreshadowing a capsulized version of this adventure--Alice's chess journey--in "The Garden of Live Flowers":

'A pawn goes two squares in its first move, you know. So you'll go very quickly through the Third Square--by railway, I should think--and you'll find yourself in the Fourth Square in no time. Well, that square belongs to Tweedledum and Tweedledee--the Fifth is mostly water--the sixth belongs to Humpty-Dumpty--But you make no remark?'  
 . . . the Seventh Square is all forest--however, one of the Knights will show you the way--and in the Eighth Square we shall be Queens together, and it's all feating and fun!' (212)

Unlike the first book's unanticipated episodic trek, this trek the Queen outlines for Alice. Again, Alice can exert a modicum of control, since she is now cognizant of what should happen next. With such logic being employed as one would employ it in a chess game, one might conjecture that the Menippean motif involving multifaceted structural balance to progress the action would be forfeit--such motif as the metaphor of madness, metaphor of the fantastic, and transmogrification of the great, all permeated with the Menippean balance of the serious-versus-ambiguous.

Such forfeiture, however, does not occur in this book. Carroll, rather than reducing these motifs,

amplifies and enhances them to such an extent that without them the basic carousel-journey structure with its mutable traits would lose the intensity and vivacity that distinguish this work. The metaphor of madness here, for example, displays vividly how exactly Carroll has matured stylistically and, subsequently, thematically. Once Alice crosses over into Looking-Glass world, she begins to encounter totally new systems that challenge her sense of appearance versus reality. Having learned from the first Alice that not all cultures and societal rules abide by one universal truth, Alice proceeds into each new system, exhibiting less shock and more mental malleability than before. The audience, consequently, observes the absence, or rather more aptly a suspension, of rigid, outerworld dogmas and complexities by which she had previously experienced Wonderland. In lieu of such inhibition, Alice in Looking-Glass world accepts the fantastic on its own terms, in its own environment and strives to comprehend each system's internal cause and motivation. Such systems, then, as the Garden of Live Flowers, Looking-Glass Insects, and the Sheep in "Wool and Water," typify the Menippean intent via the metaphor of madness--divestment of society's unnecessarily complex and illogical and false clothing, rules, and language. With seven-and-one-half-year-old

Alice as an anti-heroine persona, Carroll can address an outerworld adult audience, attack its ludicrous systems, and invoke that audience to laugh at its own foibles sans intimidation with such serious-versus-ambiguous structural balances as the metaphor of madness.

Alice engages in her initial metaphoric system of madness with The Garden of Live Flowers (199-213). Searching for the path that would progress the carousel-journey to the house on the distant hill, an exasperated Alice encounters instead a garden of flowers. Approaching the flowers as one would in the outerworld, as inanimate vegetation, Alice poses a seemingly simple rhetorical question:

'O Tiger-lily!' said Alice, addressing herself to one that was waving gracefully about the wind, 'I wish you could talk!'

'We can talk,' said the Tiger-lily, 'when there's anyone worth talking to.'

Alice was so astonished that she couldn't speak for a minute: it quite seemed to take her breath away. At length, as the Tiger-lily only went on waving about, she spoke again, in a timid voice--almost in a whisper. 'And can all flowers talk?'

'As well as you can,' said the Tiger-lily. 'And a great deal louder.'  
(200-01)

Via pathetic fallacy Carroll enables appearance to deceive reality and thereby teaches Alice that one can never assume an outerworld universal truth to remain so infinitely. Such an encounter also reminds Alice that a flexible and curious imagination gains more insight and knowledge than an inflexible, unimaginative mindset. With this cognizance, then, rather than externally or internally complaining about or denying this system based only on its difference as happens in the first book, Alice uses this encounter not only to learn about a variety of flowers and the system by which they function but also to progress along her carousel-journey, a journey which she fears will end unless she finds the path:

'I'm not going in again yet. I know  
I should have to get through the Looking-  
glass again--back into the old room--and  
there'd be an end of all my adventures!'  
(200)

Determined to circumvent the inevitable result of the carousel, at least for a while, Alice, once she realizes the flowers can talk, seizes the opportunity to inquire not only about the flowers' personalities but also about the existence of others like herself (203-05). Among the many personalities of flowers Alice encounters--the Rose, the Daisy, the Violet, and the Tiger-lily--the most interesting "flowers" distinguish themselves vocally.

Just as Alice makes the assumption that flowers cannot talk, echoing the Menippean trait appearance-versus-reality, the flowers parallel Alice's outerworld assumption concerning her; they assume Alice and those like her to be flowers too:

'There's one other flower in the garden that can move about like you,' said the Rose. 'I wonder how you do it--. . . .'

'Is she like me?' Alice asked eagerly; for the thought crossed her mind. 'There's another little girl in the garden somewhere!'

'Well, she has the same awkward shape as you,' the Rose said, 'but she's redder--and her petals are shorter, I think.' (204)

Via this metaphor of madness, Carroll establishes the first in a series of mutable episodes in which the audience can see at once a more flexible anti-heroine within more clearly aligned systems to the outerworld. Unlike this Alice who can now accept new and unusual environments with a greater degree of curiosity and excitement rather than with distrust and skepticism, the Flowers do not even entertain the idea that Alice might not qualify as a flower at all. Based on artificial clothing--the garden setting itself--the Flowers classify Alice and the Red Queen as the ones of their own who possess peculiar traits such as mobility.



While this facet of the metaphor of madness provides important structural and content balance, part of why this book is so innovative lies in Carroll's utilization of texture. To achieve and sustain such a complex layering of journeys, Carroll adds more texture and possibility to every Menippean motif, here the metaphor of madness. What evolves, then, in this instance, is Alice's exposure to a new culture that functions differently and yet similarly to her own, while possessing the answer to an essential component of her quest:

'I [the Rose] should advise you to walk the other way' [backwards].

This sounded nonsense to Alice, so she said nothing, but set off at once towards the Red Queen. To her surprise she lost sight of her in a moment, and found herself walking in at the front door again.

A little provoked, she drew back, and after looking everywhere for the Queen (whom she spied out at last, a long way off), she thought she would try the plan, this time, of walking in the opposite direction.

It succeeded beautifully. (205

Echoing the Menippean trait appearance-versus-reality once more, what seems to be a universal according to society, then, does not necessarily make it so, as Alice realizes. A universal truth to a Menippean satirist would

have to possess a pragmatic, simple, effective approach. What better way to reiterate this intent than structurally. Alice continues her initial carousel-journey, then, not by progressing forward but by progressing backward. This oxymoronic structural approach via the metaphor of madness Martin Gardner views as an effective reification of the catalyst for the entire journey--the mirror--since, as he says, "forward and backward are reversed by a mirror" (205). So, moving backward to progress the journey, Alice moves to the next structural episode that amplifies the metaphor of madness--"Looking-Glass Insects."

In this metaphoric appearance-versus-reality episode, Alice again progresses mentally and physically. As in the garden, Alice here experiences an entirely mutable system of insects, insects that at once she recognizes based on her outerworld experience, yet she fails to recognize them fully. Alice displays, once more, a thoroughly Menippean curiosity and excitement in this new system:

' . . . why what are those creatures, making honey down there? They can't be bees--nobody ever saw bees a mile off, you know--' and for some time she stood silent, watching one of them that was bustling about among the flowers, poking its proboscis into them, 'just as if it was a regular bee,' thought Alice.

However, this was anything but a regular bee: in fact, it was an elephant--as Alice soon found out, though the idea quite took her breath away at first. 'And what enormous flowers they must be!' (215-16)

This seven-and-one-half-year-old Alice assesses the situation, analyzes it, and adapts, to an extent, since the appearance is indeed incongruous with reality. In this part of her carousel-journey, she finds that continued progression includes unavoidably encountering a menagerie of creatures like the bee-elephants: the Beetle, Gnat, Rocking-Horsefly, Snap-dragonfly, and Bread-and-Butter-fly.

Although such metaphoric oddities as the bee-elephant tantalize Alice's curiosity, being a true pragmatic Menippean anti-heroine like Gulliver, precaution with oddities of this type checks her from consciously seeking any more contact. Interestingly, however, Carroll refuses to permit the audience to forget the outerworld's influence on Alice, traits such as feigned courage, inflated egotism, and misguided pride. Because Alice yet possesses these unnecessarily complex characteristics, then, she does not really shock the audience when she "says" that she will visit the unusual bee-elephants at another time or when she pleads the desire to move on to the next square as her raison d'etre (216). Structurally, then, Alice runs down the hill and jumps over the first

six brooks to the Third Square. Thinking only of her surface Thèlémé--Queenship, Alice never stops to think that perhaps this square might inhabit Looking-Glass insects as well; it does. Via the foreshadowed move by rail, Alice finds herself in this square on a train filled to capacity with Looking-Glass insects bound for the Fourth Square where she will engage in an anatomy of these creatures (221-24).

What strikes the reader once more about this work, particularly, is Carroll's textured structure. The multiple strands of the journey--such as the railway journey--though separate, depend wholly upon Carroll's sustaining the others coherently and cohesively. Unlike the structural framework in the first Alice book, this book's structure winds, interwinds, and progresses itself inextricably with Alice's physical movement, interactions, and emotional desires. Unlike any of the Menippean satirists before him--even Swift--Carroll paradoxically achieves the quintessence of Menippean structure. The metaphor of madness in one way enables him to achieve this kind of structure.

Working in concert with the metaphor of madness for structural coherence, the metaphor of the fantastic enables Carroll to unfetter completely his fancy.

Unleashing creative prowess like Carroll displays in this book not only acknowledges the examples, heretofore mentioned, that further aid the Menippean coherence and cohesion but also examples such as fantastic and instantaneous metamorphoses: Queens who metamorphose before Alice's eyes into sheep, knitting needles that metamorphose into boats (252-58). In no other manner could Carroll more expertly convey the subtle, Menippean tenor of protean movement, continuous progress with no possibility of a stagnating stasis. As Alice, the Menippean philosophical mouthpiece states, "[t]hings flow about so here!" (253). Once more observing how expertly Carroll weaves this tapestry-like structure, the reader hears Alice while simultaneously seeing a seemingly insignificant example of the kind of progression he is striving to convey: " . . . a large bright thing, that looked sometimes like a work-box and was always in the shelf next above the one she was looking at" (253). Just as the Menippean philosophical stance champions forward, spiralling progression and just as it seeks simplicity and truth, these visual and audible effects evoke the same desires in the audience. As if this metaphor were insufficient or needed a failsafe, Carroll has Alice verbalize and visualize the Menippean intent once more:

'Can you row?' the Sheep asked,  
handing her a pair of knitting needles--'  
Alice was beginning to say, when suddenly  
the needles turned into oars in her hands,  
and she found they were in a little boat,  
gliding along between banks: so there was  
nothing for it but to do her best. (254)

Here Alice's metaphor of madness, metaphor of the fantastic, and mutability structurally fuse to advance her journey and her experiences: such fusion itself, however, exposes her to the basic Menippean ideal of an organic, protean reality. No stasis--societal or personal or educational--can Alice really attain, then, for one must adapt oneself to inevitable and unalterable change. She must, for example, grow older and larger despite any desires she or anyone else--Dodgson--may have to sustain her at stasis. Surface and deep structure here are quite interwoven, consequently, and are dependent on each other for structural coherence and cohesion.

An interesting Menippean by-product of such structural devices reveals with caricature development, particularly, transmogrification of the great. Used by Menippean satirists since Varro, this character motif enables the Menippean satirist to strip all artificial clothing from or to heap excessive amounts on those caricatures who represent the array of pedants, philosophus gloriosus, parvenus, bigots, queens, and kings to whom Northrop Frye

alludes. Carroll amplifies this motif when he reifies these caricatures via their societal institutions such as royalty, education, and societal decorums. Whereas the first book separates the work's structure, encyclopedic nature, and characterization so that one can examine each in relative isolation, this second book thoroughly fuses all these perspectives, particularly the satire's encyclopedic nature and its characters that defy exact delineation. Amplification and fusion of this nature allow Carroll to anatomize more fully than ever done before all unnecessarily complex and illogical systems which Alice encounters. Those amplifications and fusions also enable Carroll to infuse the very people with their language and milieu into the texture of the work itself--an authentic Menippean approach. These amplifications and fusions finally enable Carroll to convey consistently throughout the work from beginning to conclusion this work's darker, more psychological theme--death. Although all of the episodes possess these encyclopedic and characteristic amplifications and fusions in varying degrees, "Tweedledum and Tweedledee," "Humpty Dumpty," "It's My Own Invention," and "Aueen Alice" best typify these motifs.

After Alice watches the Gnat disappear in "Looking-Glass Insects," she progresses to the Fourth Square on her carousel-journey to the Eighth Square. This Fourth Square includes the wood with no names, an episodic adventure foreshadowing Alice's more specific encounter with Tweedledum and Tweedledee. Typical of this "new" Alice, the anti-heroine hypothesizes not only about the nature of the wood itself but also about herself and people in general:

'I wonder what'll become of my name when I go in? I shouldn't like to lose it at all--because they'd have to give me another, and it would be almost certain to be an ugly one. But then the fun would be, trying to find the creature that had got my old name! That's just like the advertisements, you know, when people lose dogs--"answers to the name of 'Dash': had on a brass collar"--just fancy calling everything you met "Alice," till one of them answered. Only they wouldn't answer at all, if they were wise.' (225)

In this brief though comprehensive example of massive erudition, the audience immediately sees a different Menippean anti-heroine from the one in Wonderland. This Alice muses on the possibility of losing one's own personality, a personality reified in a name. According to Gardner in his annotation, Carroll intended the wood to represent a microcosmic Thélémé devoid of artificial clothing and complex systems, a Thélémé, then, whose rules



involve simplicity--undesignated, undivided, unanalyzed simplicity:

The wood in which things have no name is in fact the universe itself, as it is apart from symbol-manipulating creatures who label portions of it because--as Alice earlier remarked with pragmatic wisdom--'it's useful to the people that name them.' The realization that the world by itself contains no signs . . . is by no means a trivial philosophic insight. (227)

This stripping away of societal veneer enables Alice and a Faun to traverse through the forest together harmoniously (226-27). To reiterate this necessity, the Menippean philosophic view, Carroll juxtaposes this encounter with an antithetical one. This juxtaposing antithesis occurs not when Alice and the Faun exit the wood but when Alice enters the proximity of the twins, Tweedledum and Tweedledee.

Popularized by Rabelais, the Menippean metaphor of names typifies the unnecessarily complex societal systems just as does the Menippean metaphor of madness. Two such caricatures as Tweedledum and Tweedledee paradoxically teach Alice that names and relationships, like the curio shop with the Sheep, are at best mutable. Even language and logic are mutable, and all possess the capability of metamorphosing into unnecessarily complex, empty, illogical systems. These two caricatures exhibit this

Menippean philosophical stance, for example, when they define logic:

'I know what you're thinking about,'  
said Tweedledum; 'but it isn't so nohow.'

'Contariwise,' continued Tweedledee,  
'if it was so, it might be; and if it were  
so, it would be; but as it isn't, it ain't.'  
That's logic. (230-31)

Relying on subjunctive semantics and syntactical circumlocutions, this "couple of great schoolboys" (231) constantly cancel each other's discussions. Even when they engage in their famous logomachy regarding the rattle (240-46), the twins typify Menippean societal anathemas. Society's unnecessarily complex and illogical rules of decorum, for example, provide a perfect subject for parody when the twins engage in their logomachy and pseudo-fight, a "fight" occurring between the societally acceptable hours of 4:30 and 6:30 p.m.

Not only do the caricatures represent contradiction and massive erudition gone rampant, they also expose Alice to further semantic meaninglessness and death in "The Walrus and the Carpenter," a Menippean medley of prose and verse. Lured by false blandishment, young oysters follow the Walrus for a "pleasant walk, a pleasant talk" (234). Promising the fat oyster a story, the Walrus ironically says,

'The time has come,' . . .  
 'To talk of many things:  
 'Of shoes--and ships--and sealing wax--  
     Of cabbages--and kings--  
 And why the sea is boiling hot--  
     And whether pigs have wings.'

'A loaf of bread,' the Walrus said,  
     'Is what we chiefly need:  
 Pepper and vinegar besides  
     Are very good indeed--  
 Now, if you're ready, Oysters dear,  
     We can begin to feed.'

. . .  
 'The night is fine,' the Walrus said,  
 'Do you admire the view?'

'It was so nice of you to come!  
     And you are very nice!'  
 The Carpenter said nothing but  
     'Cut us another slice.  
 I wish you were not quite so deaf--  
     I've had to ask you twice!'

'It seems a shame,' the Walrus said:  
     'To play them such a trick.  
 After we've brought them out so far,  
     And made them trot so quick!'  
 The Carpenter said nothing but  
     'The butter's spread too thick!'

'I weep for you,' the Walrus said:  
     'I deeply sympathize.'  
 With sobs and tears he sorted out  
     those of the largest size,  
 Holding his pocket-handkerchief  
     Before his streaming eyes.

'O oysters,' said the Carpenter,  
     'You've had a pleasant run!  
 Shall we be trotting home again?'  
     But answer came there none--  
 And this was scarcely odd, because  
     They'd eaten every one. (235-36)

This poem displays clearly how susceptible individuals can be when one employs empty, complex rhetoric; unlike the eldest Oyster who shows restraint and right reason at the call of the Walrus and Carpenter, the Youngest Oysters yielding to empty rhetorical cajolery excitedly and unthinkingly follow the sycophants to their deaths. With a true Menippean style Carroll utilizes several motifs such as the medley of prose and verse, the metaphor of madness, pathetic fallacy, semantic ambiguity, and logomachy to reveal societal inadequacies and inequities to Alice, the innocent, curious anti-heroine:

'I like the Walrus best,' said Alice: because he was a little sorry for the poor oysters.'

'He ate more than the Carpenter, though,' said Tweedledee. 'You see he held his handkerchief in front so that the Carpenter couldn't count how many he took: contrariwise.'

'That was mean!' Alice said indignantly. 'Then I like the Carpenter best--if he didn't eat so many as the Walrus.'

'But he ate as many as he could get,' said Tweedledum. (237)

This prose logomachy among Tweedledum, Tweedledee, and Alice enables Alice to comprehend that when one couches deceit and needless complexity in rhetoric, the results can completely baffle the listener. Once more society's

mutability and contrariness reifies itself via the paradoxical twins.

One other, even more pivotal character and structural revelation occurring via the twins is Alice's introduction to the last phase of her carousel-journey--the dream motif. This most abstract and complex innovation Carroll sustains throughout the remainder of the book as the underlying current as well as the underlying focal question--what is reality? The twins' introducing Alice to the paradox of her own existence versus nonexistence lends structural and characteristic veracity to the work, since they, too, are paradoxes:

'He's dreaming now,' said Tweedledee,  
'and what do you think he's dreaming about?'

Alice said, 'Nobody can guess that.'

'Why about you!' Tweedledee exclaimed,  
clapping his hands triumphantly. 'And if  
he left off dreaming about you, where do you  
suppose you'd be?'

'Where I am now, of course,' said Alice.

'Not you!' Tweedledee retorted contemptuously. 'You'd be nowhere. Why, you're  
only a sort of thing in his dream!'

'If that there King was to wake,' added  
Tweedledum, 'you'd go out--bang just like a  
candle!'

'I shouldn't!' shouted Alice indignantly.  
'Besides, if I'm only a sort of thing in his  
dream, what are you, I should like to know?'

'Ditto.' said Tweedledum.  
. . . 'when you're only one of the things  
in his dream[,] [y]ou know very well you're  
not real.' (238-39)

Although Alice relegates this discursive logomachy to the ranks of nonsense (240), the idea itself has begun to germinate and will continue to increase in intensity until it culminates in the final sections of the book. Structurally, here, Carroll displays his innovative ability of layering carousel journeys with such textural depth as to probe the psyche, that subconscious mind which entertains the less-than-desirable realities, the simple truths that the conscious mind refuses. Realizing, too, that the Menippean approach strives to maintain an imbalance in the serious-versus-humorous approach with the reader so that learning can occur, Carroll allows his two paradoxical caricatures to sustain this important trait so that Alice can learn. To expose Alice to such contraries and to such extreme manipulation of ideas and language, Carroll could not have incorporated better caricatures, then, of society's needless complexities than the twins.

Just as the twins represent Alice's introduction to the final phase of her carousel-journey--the abstract,

psychological one--and her exposure to societal excesses of unnecessarily complex decorums and language, Alice's encounter with Humpty Dumpty continues this same unique fusion. The fusion that distinguishes this book from the first--the interweaving of structure and character--works continually to progress Alice along her journey toward her Theleme. With this episode Alice sees the literal transmogrification of the great in this philosophus gloriosus. With this episode Alice also sees the negative effects of educational rhetoric used for the sake of itself rather than for edification. With this episode, too, Alice again confronts the dark issue of death.

Like a true Menippean anti-heroine, Alice first encounters the appearance-versus-reality motif when she says that Humpty Dumpty looks like an egg (262). As Alice has done so many times previously, she does not allow her physical eyes to assess a situation; instead, she allows her knowledge of societal decorums and rules to dictate her responses. She engages, as a result, in a series of discursive logomachies in which Humpty Dumpty reveals his true nature. Among these logomachies two of the most interesting center on the poem "Jabberwocky" and the discussion about Alice's age.

In Alice and Humpty Dumpty's logomachy about language, Humpty Dumpty introduces language's mutable qualities, qualities apparent especially when utilized by a philosophus gloriosus like himself:

'When I use a word,' . . . 'it means just what I choose it to mean--neither more or less.'

'The question is,' said Alice, 'whether you can make words mean so many different things.'

'The question is,' said Humpty Dumpty, 'which is to be master--that's all.' . . . 'They've a temper, some of them--particularly verbs: they're the proudest--adjectives you can do anything with, but not verbs--however, I can manage a whole lot of them! Impenetrability! That's what I say!' (267)

In quite a Menippean style Carroll allows Humpty Dumpty to propose the Medieval view that societal terms refer not to objective existences but "are nothing more than flatus vocis, verbal utterances" (Gardner 268). Such mutability, then, introduces also the antithetical idea that words actually possess limited meanings sans any peripheral ones (Gardner 268). Humpty Dumpty's contention, however, that words can mean whatever he chooses for them to mean reifies the mutable theme in the work as well as the idea of man as manipulator of meaning.

Nowhere in the work does man as manipulator of words evince itself so clearly as with Humpty Dumpty and Alice



in his explication of "Jabberwocky" (270-73). Never being one to show his modesty, Humpty Dumpty confidently says, "I can explain all the poems that ever were invented-- and a good many that haven't been invented just yet" (270). After such a declamation, Humpty Dumpty proceeds to show himself as a true philosophus gloriosus with his "definitions" of terms utilized in the poem's first stanza. Whether he is familiar with the accurate definitions or not matters little to him, for as he says, a word can mean whatever he chooses it to mean. Although Humpty Dumpty defines some words somewhat accurately, others he defines totally inaccurately but with authority:

'Brillig means four o'clock in the afternoon--the time when you begin boiling things for dinner.' . . . 'Well, slithy means lithe and slimy. Lithe is the same as active. You see it's like a portmanteau--there are two meanings packed into one word.' . . . 'Well, a rath is a sort of green pig: but mome I'm not certain about. I think it's short for from home--meaning that they'd lost their way, you know.' (271-72)

The majority of the words Humpty Dumpty defines, consequently, have different meanings from the one he authoritatively espouses to Alice. According to Gardner's annotations, Carroll defines the same words quite differently in an 1855 issue of MischMasch--a type of periodical that Dodgson penned, illustrated, and "hand

lettered" for the pleasure of his siblings:

Bryllyq (derived from the verb Bryl or broil),  
the time of broiling dinner, i.e. the close  
of the afternoon.

Slythy (compounded of Slimy and Lithe),  
smooth and active.

Mome (hence Solemome, solemane, and solemn).  
Grave.

Rath. A species of land turtle. Head  
erect: mouth like a shark: forelegs curved  
out so that the animal walked on its knees:  
smooth green body: lived on swallows and  
oysters. (191)

Quite obviously, Humpty Dumpty represents those individuals who would rather concoct an answer to an inquiry in lieu of honestly expressing ignorance. He is one of the very types Menippus and his imitators sought to expose.

Not only does Humpty Dumpty represent the pedant and philosophus gloriosus combined, showing the negative effects of massive erudition, but also because he possesses such traits, he feels no compunction toward Alice when he deliberately alludes to the subject of death and tries to persuade her that seven rather than seven-and-one-half represents a desirable age:

'So here's a question for you. How  
old did you say you were?'

Alice made a short calculation, and  
said, 'Seven years and six months.'

'Wrong!' Humpty Dumpty exclaimed triumphantly. 'You never said a word like it!'

'I thought you meant 'How old are you?' Alice explained.

'If i'd meant that, I'd have said it,' said Humpty Dumpty . . . . 'Seven years and six months!' Humpty Dumpty repeated thoughtfully. 'An uncomofrtable sort of age. Now if you'd asked my advice, I'd have said "leave off at seven"--but it's too late now.'

'I never ask advice about growing,' Alice said indignantly . . . . 'I mean,' . . . 'that one can't help growing older.'

'One can't perhaps,' said Humpty Dumpty: 'but two can. With proper assistance, you might have left off at seven.' (265-66)

This very specific yet ever so subtle allusion to death continues this darker thread that permeates the second book. That Alice, too, perceives the implications of Humpty Dumpty's statement evidences itself when she consciously and deliberately changes the subject rather abruptly (266).

Even though Alice changes the subject concerning her own possible demise, Humpty Dumpty yet retains the last statement that is also an everlasting one. Alice foreshadows this statement at the beginning of this episode when she recounts the Humpty Dumpty nursery rhyme (262). That Humpty Dumpty, too, "resembles" one of nature's most fragile creations--the egg--reifies this

pervasive theme microcosmically. When Alice hears, therefore, " . . . a heavy crash [that] shook the forest from end to end" (276) and then she sees crowds of soldiers--" . . . four thousand and two hundred and seven . . . " (278), she, as does the audience, recognizes the tragic implications. As a Menippean audience, too, the readers recognize the transmogrification of the great, for as Menippus intimates to Hermes in Varro's work, all men are alike when dead.

Having experienced a variety of Menippean undesirables, Alice finally encounters on her carousel-journey a parallel antithesis to the pedants, bigots, and philosophus gloriosus--the White Knight. Structurally, the White Knight enables Alice to complete the last phases of her carousel journey toward Queenship:

'I don't want to be anybody's prisoner.  
I want to be a Queen.'

'So you will, when you've crossed  
the next brook,' said the White Knight.  
'I'll see you safe to the end of the wood--  
and then I must go back, you know. That's  
the end of my move.' (296)

The Knight's episode also exposes Alice to a positive force, a force typifying society's ideal definition of a Knight spiritually while transmogrifying society's physical depiction. When the Red Knight approaches and asserts that she is his prisoner, the White Knight

approaches in an effort to rescue the "damsel in distress." Parodying society's unnecessarily complex rules once more, Carroll shows the Red and White Knight preparing to engage in a joust:

'She's my prisoner, you know!' the Red Knight said at last.

'Yes, but then I came to rescue her!' the White Knight replied.

'Well, we must fight for her, then,' said the Red Knight, as he took up his helmet . . . and put it on.

'You will observe the Rules of Battle, of course?' the White Knight remarked, putting on his helmet too. (294)

Even the joust itself Carroll parodies and shows, as a result, the ludicrous extent of rules. One rule, for example, says that if a knight hits a knight and misses, the knight falls off anyway (295). Just as with other comparable episodes in this book, Carroll uses parody to effect the Menippean philosophical stance.

Carroll further develops this caricature of the Knight as Alice and he progress down the path toward the Eighth Square. Along the way Alice finds him not only typical of the ideal societal stereotype but also atypical in a Menippean way in that this Knight strives to invent contraptions which would be "helpful" to him in his diurnal affairs. Interestingly, however, Alice

and, subsequently, the reader realize almost immediately the impotence of the Knight's inventions, inventions such as his deal-box,

. . . fastened across his shoulders,  
upside-down, and with the lid hanging  
open . . . .  
'I see you're admiring my little  
box,' . . . 'It's my own invention--to  
keep clothes and sandwiches in. You see  
I carry it upside-down, so that the  
rain can't get in.' (297)

Although the idea itself appears sound, it lacks substance because the deal-box fails to work. As Alice observes, " . . . things can get out" (297) because of the box's open lid. Invention after invention, then, the Knight presents, but Alice peers beneath the surface to the depth of its impotence: the ineffective bee-hive, a useless mousetrap, the shark-repellent horse anklets--all totally impotent. Once more in a true pragmatic Menippean mode, Carroll via the Knight and Alice poses what use is a useless invention. Although the Knight serves as source of Menippean parody, he also provides the one unique and positive Menippean philosophical stance--affection. A real sense of friendship and care develops between the Knight and Alice, a friendship that exudes simplicity, emotion, unrestraint. No scene depicts this relationship better than the concluding scene where the Knight's protection of Alice comes to a conclusion:

'You've only a few yards to go,' he said, 'down the hill and over that little brook, and then you'll be a Queen--But you'll stay and see me off first?' . . . 'I shan't be long. You'll wait and wave your handkerchief when I get to that turn in the road! I think it'll encourage me, you see.'

'Of course, I'll wait,' . . . . (314)

Alice does wait and does see him off even to the extent of delaying her final move, the move toward Queenship. Like the Cheshire cat in the first Alice book and yet with more intensity, the White Knight, then, typifies a friend for Alice, a protector and guide in addition to being the kind of protector and guide necessary for her successful movement on the carousel journey.

While the previously discussed and pivotal episodes structurally progress Alice along her physical journey and expose her to the psychological journey, the most important episode--"Queen Alice"--not only provides Alice's structural Theleme but also brings into focus the psychological appeal and satiric message, both of which emanate from a Menippean view on Alice. Although the book utilizes Alice as Menippean anti-heroine throughout much of the first book, one significant difference emerges. While this Alice is indeed a coherent and cohesive factor, she is not the coherent and cohesive focus; Alice, rather,

functions here as Menippean observer/participant. She first observes the Looking-Glass world and its inhabitants, then engages in discursive sessions that sometimes metamorphose into logomachal discussions, and then moves on toward the Eighth Square. This Alice, unlike the Alice of the first book, the audience readily observes, possesses more of the Menippean philosophy of wonder and curiosity than the previous Alice, who assessed and judged first by societal rules and dogmas and universal truths.

The Alice of the second book initially differs in functioning as source: Carroll replaces Alice Liddell with another Alice--Alice Theodora Raikes. Carroll meets this eight-year-old Alice when he visits his Uncle Skeffington in Onslow Square, London. This Alice, like the other, does function as catalyst--the catalyst being the idea of mirror reversal: when given an orange and told to stand in front of a mirror to ascertain which hand the image seen "has got" the orange in it, the new Alice replied the left. Carroll, accordingly asked her how she knew this fact, and her reply was the beginning of the second book: "If I was on the otherside of the glass, wouldn't the orange still be in my right hand?" "Well done, little Alice," he said. "The best answer I've had yet" (Pudney 80-81). This new Alice can and does



bring a maturer, analytical facet to the persona.

Because this new Alice differs in such respects, Carroll utilizes his innovative ability with the Menippean anti-heroine as well. What evolves, then, is an anti-heroine who travels along the carousel journey and who experiences many mutable systems but does not play an overtly emphatic role until the final episodes. Only that she desires to be Queen evinces itself continuously until the pivotal episode, "Queen Alice." Here the Menippean anti-heroine begins to exhibit the Menippean philosophical stance that champions simplicity, truth, and existence devoid of artificial clothing. As a Menippean anti-heroine, she also confronts abstract, universal truths pragmatically and confronts, too, life's darker, inevitable truths such as reality and death. Fusing the Menippean structure with the Menippean stylistic motifs with the primary intellectual pattern of the anti-heroine enables Carroll, then to maintain this uniquely textured depth he has so earnestly maintained throughout the book thus far with his systems and caricatures primarily. The Eighth Square, then, the physical Thèlémé, represents the climactic crux of this book, the crux where all of these threads converge and where, consequently, this seven-and-one-half-year-old

must articulate to herself, the unseen narrator, and the audience what the true Thèléme really is.

Structurally, Alice transitionally moves into the Eighth Square at the conclusion of her episode with the White Knight in "It's My Invention" (315). Archetypally, Carroll, utilizing the Menippean mutability motif and the metaphor of madness, places Alice in a spring-like setting with green grass and flowers, and via the metaphor of the fantastic allows the golden crown to appear on her head (315). At this juncture two facets of her carousel-journey have apparently reached conclusion: the Queenship and the chess game. Carroll adjusts the structure at this point in that he allows Menippean structural motifs to progress Alice further along her journey. Among these structural motifs the metaphor of the fantastic and the assembly of food prominently evince themselves as stylistic, structural techniques Carroll utilizes to suspend all facets of the journey. In other words, what apparently has reached a conclusion has not; for, in a very real way, Alice just begins her metamorphosis as Menippean anti-heroine.

Even though Alice crosses into the Eighth Square and receives a golden crown, she cannot really become Queen until she experiences the coronation dinner-party.

Already another facet of her carousel-journey begins to evolve. Structurally, this dinner-party, relying on the metaphor of the fantastic and the assembly of food, provides one of the most riveting moments in the second book's entire composition. Until this episode, and most particularly, this very moment, Alice has anxiously been expectant of what was going to happen to her. Even though a particular move may have had its uniquely mutable personality or element of madness, she commanded each experience well and functioned primarily as observer/synthesizer with the attainment of Queenship as her participating motivation. With this dinner-party, however, not only has a new, important episode occurred, but also an episode that evolves into its own system occurs, too. This assembly of food via personification reintroduces Alice to the extremes of decorum and unnecessarily complex societal rules:

'You look a little sky: let me introduce you to that leg of mutton,' said the Red Queen. 'Alice--Mutton: Mutton--Alice.' The leg of mutton got up in the dish and made a little bow, to Alice; and Alice returned the bow, not knowing whether to be frightened or amused.

'May I give you a slice?' [Alice] said . . . .

'Certainly not,' the Red Queen said,

very decidedly: 'it isn't etiquette  
to cut anyone you've been introduced to.'  
(331)

This personified assembly continues even when Alice meets the Pudding, and operating on the outerworld's rule that one eats food rather than talking to it, Alice once more suggests that she cut a slice for everyone. The Pudding, however, replies at such a suggestion,

'What impertinence!' . . . 'I wonder  
how'd you'd like it, if I were to cut a  
slice out of you, you creature!' (332)

This structural amplification continues to develop to such an excussive extent that the entire assemblage metamorphoses into food, and Alice's royal Thèlémé turns topsy-turvey right before her eyes:

And then . . . all sorts of things happened  
in a moment . . . . As to bottles, they each  
took a pair of plates, which they hastily  
fitted on as wings, and so with forks for  
legs, went fluttering about in all  
directions: . . . . . instead of the  
[White] Queen, there was the leg of mutton  
sitting in the chair. 'Here I am!' cried  
the voice from the soup tureen, and Alice  
turned again, just in time to see the  
Queen's broad good natured face grinning at  
her for a moment over the edge of the tureen,  
before she disappeared into the soup. (335)

At this moment Alice wholly perceives that she has not, after all, completed her carousel-journey, nor has she reached her Thèlémé.

As the scene continues to metamorphose, the metaphor of madness that has been working consistently and subtly throughout the entire book as well as this episode, evidences itself most clearly here for Alice in that the realities now are simply appearances. To convey verbally as well as visually and reify this abstract idea structurally, Carroll extends the final metamorphosis over this episode, the tenth episode, "Shaking," and the eleventh episode, "Waking." Carroll also dwindles and slows the actual size and movement of these episodes as Alice experiences them. At the conclusion of "Queen Alice," then, the participants shrink in physical size while retaining their features (336). In "Shaking" the participants begin to metamorphose into their physical appearances (337), and by "Waking" Carroll carries over and concludes an unfinished sentence from "Shaking":  
"--and it really was a kitten after all" (339). The cycle of metamorphosis has completed itself. The journey has now really concluded, and Alice returns where she began.

Such a complex interweaving of structure could have only occurred via the multifaceted Menippean motifs Carroll employs here. Also, for Carroll to effect such a satirical probing and anatomical analysis into the psyche without intimidating or alienating his audience,

this type of structural approach offers the only avenue available to him.

Complementing this Menippean structure and profiting by it, Alice, the Menippean anti-heroine, emerges here in this episode, particularly, as the physical convergence point of all threads begun earlier in episode one. Typifying the Menippean anti-heroine who adapts well to a variety of systems, always questing toward the ideal one, Alice initially begins "Queen Alice" with the exuberance anticipated by the audience as well as with the reticence regarding the situation's reality foreshadowed by the Tweedle twins: " . . . if I really am Queen," she said as she sat down again, "I shall be able to manage it [crown] quite well in time" (317). Throughout the second book Alice has encountered Looking-Glass inhabitants who have either misconstrued who and/or what she is or like Humpty Dumpty inhabitants who have cared little for who she is at all. Alice even forgets her own identity during her walk through the wood. That one system, then, begins to emerge as identity--who am I and who are you--appears clearly and subtly. Alice loses only once who she literally is, but she never actually grasps the essential, darker, more psychological question of identity: does she herself exist at all.

Alice really grapples with this possibility of existence versus nonexistence when she inquires of the Red Queen whether she [Alice] really is a Queen. In the logomachy that ensues among Alice, the Red Queen, and the White Queen, Alice begins to realize that existence first depends upon words and their meanings--a message reminiscent of Humpty Dumpty in that the Queens see meaning itself as mutable and dependent upon complex rules:

'What do you mean by "If you really are a Queen?" What right have you to call yourself so? You can't be a Queen, . . . , till you've passed the proper examination . . . '.

'I only said "if"!' poor Alice pleaded in a piteous tone.

. . . 'She says she only said "if"--'

'But she said a great deal more than that!' the White Queen moaned, . . . , 'Oh ever so much more than that!'

'So you did, you know,' the Red Queen said to Alice. 'Always speak the truth--think before you speak--and write it down afterwards.' . . .

'I'm sure I didn't mean'--Alice was beginning, . . . .

'That's just what I complain of! You should have meant! What do you suppose is the use of a child without any meaning.'

(318-19)

Quite confusedly, Alice perseveres and finds only more

confusion and unnecessarily complex rules as she progresses toward her confirming dinner-party.

Her next encounter involving this carousel-journey toward identification occurs when Alice approaches an arch doorway. This doorway will enable Alice to be identified finally as Queen Alice, but a problem occurs in that she cannot even enter into it because she can find no door designation pertaining to her. On each side of the arch she sees a bell for visitors and for servants:

I'll ring the--the--which bell must I ring?  
 She went on, very much puzzled by the names.  
 I'm not a visitor, and I'm not a servant.  
 There ought to be one marked 'Queen,' you  
 know--' (327)

Interestingly, when the audience remembers the observer-Alice earlier in the book, it does not remember an anti-heroine confined by complex rules and designations. Now, however, that Alice has reached the Eighth Square and has become Queen, Alice-the-participant relies on those standard rules and designations as she does here. What finally enables Alice to begin to reach for the ideal Menippean balance is the old Frog whom she meets at the arch.

That Carroll chooses such a caricature as a vehicle which assists Alice in reacquiring directness, simplicity, and truth devoid of artificiality effectively evidences



itself with this Frog, his stature, and his language. Not looking for titles or formality, the old Frog tells Alice,

'Shouldn't do that [knocking at it]-- shouldn't do that--' 'Wexes it, you know,' Then he went up and gave the door a kick with one of his great feet. 'You let it alone,' . . . 'and it'll let you alone, you know.'

At this moment the door was flung open . . . (329). This portion of her episode represents its own system, since the Frog exposes Alice to the effects of direct, uncomplicated action. Whether she wholly comprehends and adjusts her perspective reveals itself at the dinner-party.

After Alice has tried to behave according to the rules of decorum and semantics during the dinner-party with the results being a personified assemblage of food, she does evidence her awareness of direct, simple action:

'I can't stand this any longer!' she cried, as she jumped up and seized the tablecloth with both hands: one good pull, and plates, dishes, guests, and candles came crashing down together in a heap on the floor. (336)

Alice chooses to conclude this event, an event whose reality she has yet to determine. Paralleling all effective Menippean anti-heroines, Alice determines to assert control, and the control she asserts finally is

the one that lacks the superfluity of the outerworld's complexities--rules and people. With her own identity, her real, outerworld identity finally re-established by the end of "Waking," Alice has yet one more consideration before her, the one consideration that has permeated subtly and subliminally the entire work with Alice and Carroll and man in general as its primary focus.

This consideration Carroll saves for the final episode of the book, "Which Dreamed It?" That the Tweedle twins introduce the Red King's sleeping and his dreaming of Alice and thereafter any specific reference to him does not really occur is by purpose from Carroll. From the moment Alice does, however, entertain this idea from the twins that she will cease to exist if the Red King awakens, she encounters varying references to separation and to death and to non-existence that she or the Looking-Glass inhabitants make. Looking-Glass's extremely mutable nature itself reiterates the universal idea of change and death. The dinner-party, too, reifies this same idea when the major reversal occurs: inanimate objects become animate and animate objects die. Alice's encounter with the White Kinght, too, represents separation, age, and alludes to eventual death, which the speaker refers to in the poem the White Knight recites (313).

When all the episodes have ended, then, and when Alice has experienced all of the systems, she assesses how far she has succeeded in her quest to reach comprehension in the final chapter. What Alice realizes is indeed truly Menippean in that Alice understand that total comprehension escapes all:

'Now Kitty, let's consider who it was that dream it all. This is a serious question, my dear, . . . . You see, Kitty, it must have been either me or the Red King. He was part of my dream, of course-- but then I was part of his dream, too. Was it the Red King, Kitty? You were his wife, my dear, so you ought to know-- Oh Kitty, do help to settle it!' (344)

Alice never receives a definitive response to her query, and as a true Menippean anti-heroine, the lack of a definitive response allows the central question of existence-versus-nonexistence, dream-versus-reality, to continue.

Such a continuance to the question must occur not only for Alice but also for Carroll who himself questioned this same consideration. In his diary Carroll says,

Query: when we are dreaming and, as so often happens, have a dim consciousness of the fact and try to wake, do we not say and do things which in the waking life would be insane? May we not then sometimes define insanity as an inability to distinguish which is the waking and which the sleeping life? We often dream without

the least suspicion of unreality"  
 'Sleep hath its own world,' and it  
 is often as lifelike as the other. (10)

Just as Alice returns to the outerworld parlor, her point of origin, understanding more now than before, even the darker aspects life holds, so, too, does Carroll. Carroll begins and ends this second book with a poem, the first foreshadowing the central consideration of reality-versus-unreality and mutability-versus-immutability. Paralleling Alice's assertion/question, the second poem accepts mutability as an inevitable truth, a truth which contains separation and eventual death: "Long has paled that sunny sky:/ Echoes fade and memories die:/ Autumn frosts have slain July" (345). In juxtaposition, however, with this realization, Carroll asserts, just as Alice asserts her existence, that the central question that has permeated the second book does not matter in the final analysis after all, for Alice's quest for her Theleme and Carroll's quest for his--that Wonderland--will forever continue, since what is life but a dream? (345)

## CHAPTER V

### Final Analysis: The Golden Dream

Even though Lewis Carroll produced other works than Alice's Adventures in Wonderland and Through the Looking-Glass and What Alice Found There, these two innovative works by far have assured him a niche among the world's foremost authors. Somewhere along the way, unfortunately, critics began to regard the man's life as more interesting and noteworthy than the man's work. Critics, psychologists, feminists, and the simply curious have examined every facet of Charles Ludwig Dodgson's life and, consequently, have relegated the Alice books to the realm of polite children's literature with little or not substantive worth or to the realm of Freudian psychoanalysis in which pedophilistic Dodgson experienced a pseudo-coital concupiscence with a seven-year-old or to the realm of Jungian psychoanalysis in which Dodgson is studying Alice as anima or to the realm of the psychedelic in which Carroll's intent is to send Alice and her readers on a drug-induced trip.

Lewis Carroll's works should be relegated to none of these realms. Based upon the assumption that the macrocosmic worth of the Alice books lies in their appeal

to child and adult alike, W. H. Auden poses two pivotal questions, questions that he contends one asks when assessing the books' value:

. . . first, what insight do they provide as to how the world really appears to a child?; and second, to what extent is the world really like that? (11)

Carroll does indeed allow the microcosmic Alice to experience the variety of societal systems all children experience: rules, decorums, adults, behaviors, beliefs, and contradictions, for example. Carroll adds more verisimilitude to Alice's journeys when he allows her to articulate and synthesize these systems in her own way. By allowing the books to pivot on a child heroine and her perspective, Carroll effectively removes the adult audience to such a safe distance that when Carroll via Alice parodies or satirizes societal excesses and complexities, the adult audience laughs at itself and yet sees itself simultaneously.

In no genre, then, other than the Menippean satire could Carroll effect such goals. In no other genre than the Menippean would Carroll have at his disposal such an array of innovative motifs to be used in concert for the attainment of his goals. Motifs such as the carousel journey, the variety of metaphors, logomachies, caricatures, and the anti-heroine are Menippean motifs that distinguish

the Alice books as works that contain in their surface-structure a child appeal and in their deep-structure an adult, psychological appeal. Carroll tackles Victorian themes of rigid manners and morals, massive erudition, royalty versus the common, and the universal themes of complexity versus simplicity and unreality versus reality. Being truly Menippean, each work contains no panacea, but each concludes on the positive note revolving on the greatness of the quest itself, the magnitude of continually spiralling upward toward the ideal, toward a Theleme. Virginia Woolf best assesses the result of an adult's having read the Alice books in her essay "Lewis Carroll" in that she recognizes he is calling for a new method of reading, a method calling for adults to be children again (82). Such an audience, according to Woolf, finds the world turned topsy-turvy, inside out:

In order to make us into children, [Lewis Carroll] first makes us asleep. 'Down, down, down, would the fall never come to an end?' Down, down, down, we fall into that terrifying, wildly inconsequent, yet perfectly logical world where time races then stands still; where space stretches, then contracts. It is the world of sleep; it is also the world of dreams . . . . It is for this reason that the two Alices are not books for children; they are the only books in which we become children. President Wilson, Queen Victoria, The Times lead writer, the late Lord Salisbury--it

does not matter how old, how important, or how insignificant you are . . . . To become a child . . . ; to find everything so strange that nothing is surprising; to be heartless, to be ruthless, yet to be so passionate that a snub or a shadow drapes the world in gloom. It is to be Alice in Wonderland. (82-83)

It is to experience, experience, and experience some more. It is to peer curiously into the Menippean mirror and consciously, excitedly, and fearfully walk through to the other side so that we can understand our other selves better. It is to become Lewis Carroll and Alice on a golden summer afternoon.



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