

A STUDY IN ARRANGEMENT: A RHETORICAL  
ANALYSIS OF MATTHEW ARNOLD'S  
CULTURE AND ANARCHY

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We hereby recommend that the Thesis prepared under  
our supervision by Geraldine Grace Glasscock  
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Dr. Autrey Nell Wiley was the first to spark my interest and curiosity in the rhetoric taught by the ancient rhetoricians. When I began work on a Master of Arts in English, my first assignment was to make a rhetorical analysis of a portion of Sheridan Baker's The Complete Stylist, a text for freshman English. My next assignment, in a course taught by Dr. Gladys Maddocks, was to compare Sheridan Baker's teaching of the modern essay with the classical oratorical form as taught by Quintilian. Because the knowledge gained from these two research papers revealed to me that the teaching of the modern essay was so closely related to the teaching of ancient oratory, I chose to compare the work of a nineteenth-century English author with the arrangement of the classical oratorical form as taught by Aristotle and Quintilian. For this detailed analysis, I am indebted to Dr. Dean Bishop, who directed my thesis, and Dr. Lavon Fulwiler and Dr. Joyce Palmer, who served on the thesis committee.

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## CHAPTER I

### MATTHEW ARNOLD'S CLASSICAL HERITAGE

With the revival of interest in rhetoric, many writers are beginning to investigate this particular genre of writing, which was taught by the ancient philosopher-teachers about 500 B.C. Rhetoric, which some critics refer to as "the art of persuasion" in both speaking and writing, had its origin in Syracuse, Sicily, after the overthrow of the tyrants of Sicily, and was used as a means of defending the Sicilian's claim to both his rights and his property.<sup>1</sup> Thus began the use of rhetoric. Along with Greek and Roman literature rhetoric was introduced into England in the sixteenth century, and was later seen in the works of English writers. For example, Matthew Arnold's Culture and Anarchy reveals much of the influence of the ancient rhetoricians. This work, published in 1869 and considered to be his greatest

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<sup>1</sup>John F. Wilson and Carroll C. Arnold, Public Speaking as a Liberal Art (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1964), p. 20. History records that subsequent disputes arose over land and citizenship claims after these revolts. This situation, in turn, brought about the first "systematization of the art of speaking, or more specifically, the art of courtroom speaking" (Wilson and Arnold, p. 20).

prose contribution, is a grouping of six essays<sup>2</sup> in which he examines the present conditions of Victorian England and proposes a workable solution that will alleviate the problems brought about by both social and political change. Such a situation, which was primarily caused by the Industrial Revolution and a religious revival, affected the lives of every person in England. As a result Victorian society became divided into three distinct classes: the aristocracy, the middle class, and the working class. It is to these three classes that Matthew Arnold directs his essays with "cultivated intelligence upon the broad issues of his time--in literature, in politics and society, in philosophy and religion--,"<sup>3</sup> with a purpose to investigate each in its true light, and ultimately to persuade his countrymen to return to "first principles and to an idea of progress which [is] intellectual and spiritual rather than material."<sup>4</sup> He hopes that his proposal will bring about a change which will, in turn, transform "each and all of these according to the law

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<sup>2</sup>For the complete history of publications, see The Bibliography of Matthew Arnold, compiled and edited by Thomas Burnett Smart (New York: Burt Franklin Bibliography and Reference Series #159, 1968), p. 44.

<sup>3</sup>George K. Anderson and William E. Buckler, The Literature of England (Glenview, Illinois: Scott, Foresman and Co., 1966, p. 518.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., p. 518.

of perfection."<sup>5</sup>

When Arnold published Culture and Anarchy, England was enduring the throes of change. This change was to make an impact on the educational, religious, scientific, economic, political, ethical, and esthetic views of the Victorian Age (1832-1880). To understand Arnold's concern for his age and the difficulties he encountered in his appeal to the English people, however, one must have a clearer picture of this period in history:

In 1830, illiteracy was the rule rather than the exception among the masses of Englishmen; by 1890, the foundations of free popular education had been firmly laid. In 1830, science was considered, save in the most exclusive coteries, a form of blasphemous speculation and witchcraft; by 1890, the friends of physical science stood in the "meridian radiance" of popular curiosity and approval. In 1830, England was deep in the throes of a fundamentalist religious revival; by 1890, God the Father had been seriously indicted, and God the Son had been dismissed as a myth. In 1830, it was assumed that poverty and plenty followed a pattern of "natural law"; by 1890, the fundamental assumptions of socialism and the welfare state had gained wide acceptance. In 1830, the House of Commons was peopled at the pleasure of the House of Lords; by 1890, England had become a modern democracy. In 1830, morality was a matter of Biblical law; by 1890, morality had become a matter of private judgment. In 1830, Tennyson declared: "The poetic word is mightier than the sword"; in 1890, Oscar Wilde declared: "All art is quite useless."<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>5</sup>Matthew Arnold, Culture and Anarchy and Friendship's Garland (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1911), p. 204. All references for this study will be taken from this particular edition.

<sup>6</sup>Anderson and Buckler, pp. 518-19.

This change, effected over a period of sixty years, caused an upheaval that not only affected the nation as a whole, but also disturbed the life of every individual; yet he had no solution to his problems. Harold Nicholson describes the Englishman's dilemma as a situation that could not be resolved:

The 19th century was one of furious and spasmodic movement. The Victorians did not want to be joggled, but they were joggled all the time. Conscientiously, carefully, they would adjust their minds to some fresh and startling scheme of existence, only to encounter another new and even more eccentric pattern of life. Outwardly they pretended to enjoy it immensely: they talked continuously of "our incomparable civilization," they talked like this very loudly and without ceasing; but in their souls they longed for all this progress, if only for an hour or so, to stop. It did not stop. It went on.<sup>7</sup>

In The Victorian Temper, Professor Jerome Buckley describes the Victorians as

". . . a poor, blind, complacent people"; yet they were torn by doubt, spiritually bewildered, lost in a troubled universe. They were crass materialists, wholly absorbed in the present, quite unconcerned "with abstract verities and eternal values"; but they were also excessively religious, lamentably idealistic, nostalgic for the past, and ready to forego present delights for the vision of a world beyond. Despite their conformity and their purblind respect for convention, they were . . . rugged individualists, given to 'doing as one likes,' heedless of culture, careless of a great tradition; they were iconoclasts who worshipped the idols of authority.<sup>8</sup>

Historians who write about the Victorian Age say that it is

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<sup>7</sup>Harold Nicholson, Tennyson (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1934), pp. 233-35.

<sup>8</sup>Anderson and Buckler, p. 519.

difficult to give an accurate description of what this age really was; however, some record that one thing was certain:

Aristocratic England was on the wane; proletarian England was on the move. Between them stood a middleclass with responsibility in excess of experience, with more eagerness than insight, with an urgent will to reform the world but without any very clear notion of where, exactly to begin. On the one hand, it was an age of "lost causes, and forsaken beliefs, and unpopular names, and impossible loyalties!" On the other hand, it was an age of rapid transformation of ideas and attitudes and values in which the premises of the Renaissance spirit were brought to their logical conclusions and through which the twentieth-century confrontation of life as it in fact is was made imperative.<sup>9</sup>

Arnold was not alone in his concern about Victorian England. Major writers of the period devoted themselves to the problems of man's dilemma in this society. For example, authors of both poetry and prose, including Carlyle, Macaulay, Ruskin, Arnold, Tennyson, Browning, Dickens, Thackeray, and George Eliot, wrote about the Englishman's condition, analyzing the cause and seeking solutions. In fact, Arnold's assessment about his age was voiced several years before he published Culture and Anarchy. In 1863, he wrote:

"Modern times . . . find themselves with an immense system of institutions, established facts, accredited dogmas, customs, rules, which have come to them from times not modern. In this system their life has to be carried forward; yet they have a sense that this system is not of their own creation, that it by no means corresponds exactly with the wants of their actual life, that, for them, it is customary, not rational."<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>9</sup>Ibid., pp. 519-20.

<sup>10</sup>Quoted in Anderson and Buckler, p. 518.

Caught in the press between the dictates of the past and the demands of the present, the Victorians wanted their literature to

. . . transport them from the cankering cares of their daily life, the perplexities and confusion of their philosophies, the weariness of their haunting thoughts, to some entirely new field of existence, to some place of rest, some "clear walled city of the sea," where they can draw a serene air undimmed by the clouds and smoke which infest their ordinary existence.<sup>11</sup>

Arnold was aware of this ever-tightening web not only because he himself was an Englishman, but also because he lived very close to the existing situation in his position as His Majesty's Inspector of Schools:

. . . Arnold was placed in constant contact with people he might otherwise hardly have known the existence of--not merely the middle class, but the lower classes. . . . The consequence was a strong practical concern for the social condition of England, a concern based both on the Oxford ideal and on the practical observation of a man who could see with his own eyes what that condition was. Culture and Anarchy is both the fruit of this observation and the type of this disposition. . . .<sup>12</sup>

Thus, in his effort to fulfill the desire of the age for education and guidance, Arnold responded to the plea. He grouped together six essays, some of which had been given as lectures, and revised articles previously published in

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<sup>11</sup>Nicolson, pp. 233-35.

<sup>12</sup>R. H. Super, Foreword to The Origins of Culture and Anarchy, by Fred G. Walcott (Canada: University of Toronto Press, 1970), p. viii.



The Cornhill Magazine.<sup>13</sup> All these items he then published as Culture and Anarchy, and to convince this age of what it needed, he relied on his training in rhetoric--a training which had long been a part of the man, for the classical tradition was a part of Arnold's life from early childhood. Indeed, Warren Anderson notes that "to be born into the middle or upper classes in England during the earlier decades of the nineteenth century was, in a sense, to be born into the classical tradition."<sup>14</sup> In fact, "all serious education gave the chief place of honor to Latin and Greek."<sup>15</sup> From all evidence, the Arnold house, under the guidance of Thomas Arnold, adhered to this customary approach to education. Although he was "a product of the old school of close textual searching into the poets,"<sup>16</sup> Thomas Arnold began to study Greek philosophy while still an undergraduate at Oxford. Later, he became interested in classical history, but his devotion to the works of Aristotle never lessened. As one

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<sup>13</sup>E. K. Brown, Studies in the Text of Matthew Arnold's Prose Works (New York: Russell & Russell, 1969), p. 16.

<sup>14</sup>Warren D. Anderson, Matthew Arnold and the Classical Tradition (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1965), p. 1.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid.

friend noted,

" . . . his passion . . . was for Aristotle and Thucydides; . . . those who knew him intimately or corresponded with him will bear me witness how deeply he was imbued with the language and ideas of the former; how in earnest conversation, or in writing, his train of thought was affected by the Ethics and Rhetoric; how he cited the maxims of the Stagyrte as oracles, and how his language was quaintly and racily pointed with phrases from him."<sup>17</sup>

Dr. Arnold used this knowledge "of the events of antiquity to illuminate the present, which he saw as a reflection of the past. 'So far as we see and understand the present, . . . we can see and understand the past: so far but no farther.'"<sup>18</sup> As was customary in the early part of the nineteenth century, the Arnold children received their education at home until they were old enough to attend public school. The older Arnold children, Matthew included, studied history, arithmetic, scripture, and geography in addition to five languages--Greek, Latin, French, German, Italian. Teaching began as soon as a child could walk. In fact, when he reached the age of five, he was learning scripture, arithmetic, Latin, and French. Although a governess provided much of this early training, Dr. Arnold supervised the training of his children and personally attended to its continuance, "when on holiday evenings

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<sup>17</sup>Everett Lee Hunt, "Matthew Arnold: The Critic as Rhetorician," Historical Studies of Rhetoric and Rhetoricians, edited by Raymond F. Howes (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1961), note 3, p. 427 (see explanation in footnotes, p. 427).

<sup>18</sup>Anderson, p. 2.

he would read to them his favorite stories from Herodotus."<sup>19</sup> Perhaps Anderson's summation of Dr. Arnold's influence on his son gives a more precise description of the author's early training:

Some importance attaches to the fact that Matthew's earliest years were spent under the influence of such a personality. Quite probably there was no other home in England where a boy could have received so vivid an impression of the classical past viewed comparatively, as paradigm of the present. The lasting tendency to see not deep but wide, an approach that was to vary from mere eclecticism to genuine insight, may have been instilled during these first ten years of childhood.<sup>20</sup>

School records reveal that when Matthew Arnold entered Winchester College in the autumn of 1836, at the age of thirteen, he apparently had reached an advanced stage of study in both Latin and Greek because he entered the school in the class next to the top. To describe college life during this period is to quote from those who received their training in the early nineteenth century: Anderson notes that "one such beginner wrote many years later that as soon as a boy passed within the College walls, he plunged straight into the Middle Ages."<sup>21</sup> Anderson further describes the curriculum:

The English grammar school as it was established in the sixteenth century, and continued for some three centuries after, was essentially the grammar school of the ancient

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<sup>19</sup>Ibid.

<sup>20</sup>Ibid.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid., pp. 4-5.

world, or, to be more precise, a combination of the ancient schools of grammar and of rhetoric, with the former predominating. Its curriculum and methods were not very different from those of the Roman Empire, and an Etonian under Keate would have felt quite at home in the time of Quintilian or Ausonius.<sup>22</sup>

Although no record exists of the Greek and Latin works which Arnold studied, there is evidence that he had done extensive reading in the classics. His immediate predecessor, Arthur Hugh Clough, observed the nature of studies at Oxford:

I had at that time read all Thucydides, except the sixth and seventh books of Herodotus. . . . I had read five plays, I think, of Sophocles, four of Aeschylus . . . four, perhaps or five, of Euripides, considerable portions of Aristophanes; nearly all the "Odyssey"; only about a third of the "Iliad", but that several times over; one or two dialogues of Plato . . . not quite all Virgil; all Horace; a good deal of Livy and Tacitus; a considerable portion of Aristotle's Rhetoric, and two or three books of his Ethics . . . besides of course other things.<sup>23</sup>

After Winchester College, Dr. Arnold was determined to continue to guide his son's education in the classical vein. His decision is revealed in a letter written from Fox How, when he had decided to send his son to Oxford instead of Cambridge: "I could not consent to send my son to an University where . . . his whole studies would be formal merely and not real, either mathematics or philology, with nothing at all like the Aristotle and Thucydides at Oxford."<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>22</sup>Ibid.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid., pp. 9-10.

<sup>24</sup>Ibid., p. 10.

In 1841 Matthew Arnold began his studies at Oxford where he entered three worlds; the University of Oxford, Balliol College, and Honours School of Literae Humaniores. Although he was trained in other subjects in the other "worlds," Arnold's classical training continued in the Honours School. The subject matter included Greek and Roman history, rhetoric, poetry, and moral and political science "in so far as they may be drawn from writers of antiquity, still allowing them occasionally as may seem expedient to be illustrated by the writing of the moderns."<sup>25</sup> In particular, Arnold was expected to familiarize himself with works in moral and political science, history, and poetry. Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics and rhetoric were regarded as essential; the Politics or Poetics might also be read. History required the study of Herodotus and Thucydides, with Xenophon's Hellenica sometimes added. Other "mandatory authors were Vergil, Horace, and Juvenal, with a wide option available from Homer, Pindar, and the bucolic poets (Theocritus, Bion, Moschus) on the Greek side and Plautus, Terence, and Lucretius on the Latin."<sup>26</sup> Frederick W. Robertson, who matriculated in 1837, described the Oxford curriculum as "Four years . . . spent in preparing about fourteen books only for examination. . . . These are made textbooks, read, re-read,

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<sup>25</sup>Ibid.

<sup>26</sup>Ibid., p. 11.

digested, worked, got up, until they become part and parcel of the mind."<sup>27</sup>

It is possible that Arnold's extra-curricular activities also contributed to the molding of the young man who would later debate the issue facing the Victorians: culture versus anarchy. Although England's prolonged religious controversy affected many tutors and undergraduates to the point that they were never able to realize their potential, this situation did not touch Arnold. As an undergraduate in Oxford's Balliol College, he joined a group of young men "whose minds were as lively as his own."<sup>28</sup> He was also invited to join the Decade, a private debating society which included Jowett, Stanley, and Clough among its membership of fewer than twenty. That this society provided the nucleus for the inquiring, analytical mind seen in much of Arnold's works is perhaps best answered in John Duke Coleridge's description of the meetings:

There was a Society called the Decade in those days . . . which I think did a good deal for the mental education of those who belonged to it, of those of us, at least, whom came from public schools. . . . We met in one another's rooms. We discussed all things human and divine. We thought we stripped things to the very bone, we believed we dragged recondite truths into the light of common day and subjected them to the scrutiny of what we were pleased to call our minds.<sup>29</sup>

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<sup>27</sup>Ibid., p. 12.

<sup>28</sup>Ibid., p. 13.

<sup>29</sup>Ibid.

Such was the background of Matthew Arnold's training in the classical tradition, from the time he learned to walk until he completed his studies at Oxford, a place where he appeared "to come as close to perfect happiness as his nature ever permitted. This was a time of intellectual awakening that tempered, however incompletely, a critical mind forged at Thomas Arnold's Rugby."<sup>30</sup>

As would be expected, this classical training is reflected in the early stages of Arnold's literary career. Arnold's ability as a writer first showed itself while he was still an undergraduate at Oxford. In 1843 he was named winner of the Newdigate Prize for his poem "Cromwell." And he placed second for the Hertfordshire Scholarship, a "highly valued classical award"<sup>31</sup> given for unusual ability in Latin. Evidence that Arnold was interested in literary form, even before he launched his career as a writer, is revealed in a letter written to John Duke Coleridge after he completed "Cromwell." Confessing faults in the structure of the poem, Arnold wrote, "I should think . . . that the construction of a Prize Poem ought to be conducted on certain fixed principles."<sup>32</sup> Arnold's first book of poems, The Strayed Reveller, and Other Poems, appeared in 1849 under the pseudonym of "A,"

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<sup>30</sup>Ibid.

<sup>31</sup>Ibid., p. 15.

<sup>32</sup>Ibid.

and "revealed a poet who acknowledged his classical training but was not sure what role it ought to play."<sup>33</sup> Although he had become an inspector in the elementary schools in 1851, Arnold continued with his writing and published a second volume of poetry, Empedocles on Etna, and Other Poems, in 1852 under the same pseudonym. Finally, in 1853 he published a volume of poems under his own name and entitled it Poems by Matthew Arnold. Fred Walcott, in The Origins of Culture and Anarchy, explains that this 1853 edition bore a "substantial Preface, which explains in terms of classical criticism his reasons for substituting 'Sohrab and Rustum' for the 'Empedocles on Etna' in the earlier collection."<sup>34</sup> He adds that this Preface was reprinted in Poems in 1854 and revealed "an admirable acquaintance with ancient literature and ancient critical theory."<sup>35</sup> An analysis of Arnold's Preface reveals that the author not only advocated a disciplined mechanical structure required by the ancient rhetoricians and classical writers, but he also believed that the works of the ancients produced a more lasting effect on the reader. He agreed with Goethe that neither structure nor content could stand alone without the support of the other:

. . . he who neglects the indispensable mechanical part, and thinks he has done enough if he shows spirituality

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<sup>33</sup>Ibid.

<sup>34</sup>Walcott, Introduction, p. xi.

<sup>35</sup>Ibid., p. xi.



and feeling; and he who seeks to arrive at poetry merely by mechanism, in which he can acquire an artisan's readiness, and is without soul and matter . . . the first does most harm to art, and the last to himself.<sup>36</sup>

Indeed, the classical influence had become so deeply ingrained in Arnold's training that he believed that neither characters nor events of his own time could compare with those recorded by the ancient writers:

Achilles, Prometheus, Clytemnestra, Dido--what modern poem presents personages as interesting, even to us moderns, as these personages of an "exhausted past."? . . . Hermann and Dorothea, Childe Harold, Jocelyn, the Excursion, leave the reader cold in comparison with the effect produced upon him by the latter books of the Iliad, by the Oresteia, or by the episode of Dido. And why is this? Simply because in the last three last-named cases the action is greater, the personages nobler, the situations more intense; and this is the true basis of the interest in a poetical work, and this alone.<sup>37</sup>

Undeniably, Arnold admired the tenets of classical tradition and experimented with classical structure in his writing. "Horatian Echo," which is considered among "the very first of all his works to contain marked classical elements,"<sup>38</sup> was written in 1847, though not published until 1890, two years after the author's death. Although this poem is one of Arnold's early works, it reveals that he was interested not only in applying the classical teaching to his work but also in perfecting it.

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<sup>36</sup>Matthew Arnold: Prose and Poetry, edited by Archibald L. Bouton (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1927), p. 20.

<sup>37</sup>Ibid., p. 7.

<sup>38</sup>Anderson, pp. 15-16.

In viewing Arnold's work and its relation to classical rhetorical theory, one observes that the dicta of Aristotle and Quintilian in particular are basic to his method of composition. These classical rhetoricians devoted various commentaries to the components of rhetoric--invention, arrangement, style, audience, delivery, and memory--but it is the classical concept of arrangement that is of paramount interest, for it is in this aspect of rhetoric that Arnold clearly manifests his classical training in Culture and Anarchy.

## CHAPTER II

### THE CLASSICAL FORM

As a result of his early training and education, as well as experimentation in his first literary works, Matthew Arnold had developed a certain pattern of writing as early as 1847, when he wrote "Horatian Echo" and, in particular, when he published his Preface in 1853. This pattern revealed a marked awareness of and a preference for the classical teaching both in structure and content as taught by Aristotle and Quintilian.

Although history has recorded the teachings of many of the ancient rhetoricians, Aristotle (384-322 B.C.) and Marcus Favius Quintilianus (35-100 A.D.), better known as Quintilian, are the only ones who personally wrote complete and comprehensive guidelines for young orators to follow. For both of these rhetoricians, living in eras that were still concerned with establishing appropriate methods for developing art forms, a division of rhetoric that assumed major importance was the arrangement of ideas, preserved either through oratory or through the written word. Even though the teachings of the men are almost identical, Aristotle divides his form into fewer parts. For example, he

says that a speech has two parts: statement and argument. He adds that while statement and argument are the indispensable constituents of the speech, at the most, the parts cannot exceed four: proem, statement, argument, and epilogue. Refutation of the opponent falls under the head of argument, and since a comparison of both sides is an enlargement of the speaker's own case, it too falls under this head. The prologue and the epilogue, he says, function only to aid the memory of the speaker.<sup>1</sup>

On the other hand, Quintilian not only includes these same parts, but he also gives a comprehensive analysis of all the parts included within the major divisions. To accomplish such a breakdown, Quintilian devotes one volume of his four-volume treatise on the training of the young orator in his Institutio Oratoria to the arrangement of form, and presents each part in chronological order: (1) exordium, (2) narratio, (3) confirmatio, (4) refutatio, (5) peroration.

Although the teachings of Aristotle and Quintilian are almost identical, their modes of presentation differ. Quintilian's narrative form was planned and written as a text which the young orator himself could follow without difficulty.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>The Rhetoric of Aristotle, translation by Lane Cooper (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1932), p. 220.

<sup>2</sup>Marcus Favius Quintilianus, Institutio Oratoria, with English trans. by H. E. Butler (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1921), II, 7.

Aristotle's instruction appears to have been planned as a series of lectures; the material contained in them is technical. Because of its clear presentation, then, Quintilian's teaching of arrangement is of special interest. This form, which the twentieth-century author Sheridan Baker says can be detected "almost anywhere you look in the literature and exposition of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance,"<sup>3</sup> and which is seen in Arnold's Culture and Anarchy as well as in the teaching of the modern essay, deserves to be thoroughly examined in its entirety. However, before Quintilian's classical form is examined, perhaps it is advisable to present an example of his teaching of arrangement, which Charles Sears Baldwin presents in outline form:

- the parts of pleading
  - (1) components
    - (a) exordium
    - (b) statement of facts (narratio)
    - (c) excursus, proposition, division
    - (d) proof (confirmatio)
      - (x) evidence
      - (y) argument
      - (z) order
    - (e) refutation (refutatio)
      - (x) destructive enthymeme
    - (f) peroration (peroratio)<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>3</sup>Sheridan Baker, The Complete Stylist (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1966), p. 33.

<sup>4</sup>Charles Sears Baldwin, Ancient Rhetoric and Poetic (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1924), pp. 63-66.

Perhaps Baker gives an even clearer picture of the classical oratorical form in his comparison of the modern essay with the teachings of the ancient rhetoricians:

1. Exordium (or Proem). The introduction.
2. Narratio. General description of subject and background.
3. Propositio. The thesis, the statement of what is to be demonstrated or proved.
4. Partitio. Statement of how the thesis is to be divided and handled.
5. Confirmatio (or Argumentatio, or Explicatio).
6. Reprehensio. The knocking-out of the opposition. Although the ancients, with somewhat more leisure than we, saved their merriment until after their own case was firmly established, the reprehensio contained exactly the refutations that must always accompany an enumeration of the opposition's claims. The structure of the reprehensio was exactly that recommended in our pro's and con's: setting up the opposition only to knock it flat.
7. Digressio. The name speaks for itself. The "digression" was intended to lighten the load. It could come anywhere between exordium and peroratio, with matters related, but not essential, to the subject.
8. Peroratio. The conclusion, summarizing the discussion and urging the thesis with greater eagerness and enthusiasm. Shorter orations sometimes dropped the reprehensio, if no opposition had to be refuted, absorbed the propositio and partitio, the statements of the thesis and method, into the narratio, coming very near to what we have described as our "beginning."<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>5</sup>Baker, pp. 33-34.

When Quintilian began the second volume of Institutio, which sets forth in detail his method of teaching oratorical form, he referred to this portion of his work as being difficult to explain. This difficulty is the subject of a statement to his friend Marcellus Victorius, to whom he dedicated the work:

And this, though the greatest, is not the only motive for this act of religious devotion, but my work is of such a nature that, as it proceeds, I am confronted with greater and more arduous obstacles than have yet faced me. For my next task is to explain the order to be followed in forensic causes, which present the utmost complication and variety. I must set forth the function of the exordium, the method of the statement of facts, the cogency of proofs, whether we are confirming our own assertions or refuting those of our opponents, and the force of the peroration, whether we have to refresh the memory of the judge by a brief recapitulation of the facts, or to do what is far more effective, stir his emotions.<sup>6</sup>

He began his arduous task with these words:

I have ventured to treat them (divisions of the classical form) altogether and foresee such an infinite labour that I feel weary at the very thought of the task I have undertaken. But I have set my hand to the plough and must not look back. My strength may fail me, but my courage must not fail.<sup>7</sup>

First is the introduction, which is styled a proem by the Greeks. Quintilian explains that this is the portion of a speech addressed to the judge or audience before he begins to consider the actual case. The sole purpose of the

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<sup>6</sup>Institutio, II, 5.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid., p. 7.

exordium, then, is to prepare the audience in such a way that it will be disposed to lend a "ready ear" to the rest of the speech. This purpose is effected "by making the audience well-disposed, attentive and ready to receive instruction."<sup>8</sup> Quintilian believed that it was not sufficient merely to explain the nature of the exordium to his students: "We must also indicate the easiest method of composing an exordium."<sup>9</sup>

I would therefore add that he who has a speech to make should consider what he has to say; before whom, in whose defence, against whom, at what time and place, under what circumstances he has to speak; what is the popular opinion on the subject, and what the prepossessions of the judge are likely to be; and finally of what we should express our deprecation or desire.<sup>10</sup>

Answering the question as to what should be said first, Quintilian says that Nature herself will give the orator the knowledge of what he ought to say first, but he more or less rebukes the speakers who tend to think "that anything with which they choose to start is a proem and that whatever occurs to them, especially if it be a reflexion that catches their fancy, is an exordium."<sup>11</sup> The author further explains that "there are, no doubt, many points that can be introduced into an exordium which are common to other parts of a speech,

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<sup>8</sup>Ibid., p. 9.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid., p. 35.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid.



but the best test of appropriateness of a point to any part of a speech is to consider whether it would lose effect by being placed elsewhere."<sup>12</sup>

Continuing with his explanation of the exordium, Quintilian stresses the importance of "a certain simplicity in the thoughts, style, voice and look of the speaker."<sup>13</sup> He adds that "no less care must be taken to avoid exciting any suspicion in this portion of our speech, and we should therefore give no hint of elaboration in the exordium, since any art that the orator may employ at this point seems to be directed solely at the judge."<sup>14</sup> However, Quintilian points out that to avoid all display of art in itself requires "consummate art."

This admirable canon has been insisted on by all writers, though its force has been somewhat impaired by present conditions since in certain trials . . . the judges themselves demand the most finished and elaborate speeches, think themselves insulted, unless the orator shows signs of having exercised the utmost diligence in the preparation of his speech, and desire not merely to be instructed, but to be charmed. It is difficult to preserve the happy mean in carrying this precept in effect: but by a skillful compromise it will be possible to give the impression of speaking with care but without elaborate design.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>12</sup>Ibid., pp. 35-37.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid., p. 37.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid., pp. 37-39.

In addition, Quintilian tells the young orator that "the old rule still holds good that no unusual word, no overbold metaphor, no phrase derived from the lumber-rooms of antiquity or from poetic license should be detected in the exordium."<sup>16</sup> The reason, he says, is that the speaker's position is not yet established, and the attention of the audience is still fresh and imposes restraint upon him. But, he adds, as soon as the speaker has won the goodwill of the audience and "kindled" their interest, they will tolerate such freedom.

On the one hand, Quintilian notes that there are times when the exordium may be dispensed with--in cases where "the judge has been sufficiently prepared for our speech without it or if the case is such as to render such preparation unnecessary."<sup>17</sup> On the other hand, Quintilian points out that it is possible to give the force of the exordium to other portions of the speech. He gives as an example a request which could be made by the speaker in his statement of facts or of his arguments that the judge give him his best attention and good-will. This technique is one which Quintilian recommends as a means of "wakening them when they begin to nod."<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>16</sup>Ibid., p. 39.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid., pp. 45-47.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid., p. 47.

Quintilian concludes his teaching of the exordium by emphasizing that "whether we intend to pass directly to the statement of facts or direct to the proof, our intention should be mentioned at the conclusion of the introduction, with the result that the transition to what follows will be smooth and easy."<sup>19</sup> Further explaining the necessity of good transition, Quintilian says:

. . . the first part of our statement of the facts will be wasted, if the judge does not realise that we have reached that stage. Therefore, although we should not be too abrupt in passing to our statement of facts, it is best to do nothing to conceal our transition.<sup>20</sup>

After the judge or the audience has been adequately prepared in the exordium, Quintilian next passes to the statement of facts, which is sometimes called the narratio. He first explains that the majority regard this point as being indispensable, but that he himself takes this view to be erroneous, pointing out that some cases are so brief as to require only a brief summary rather than a full statement of facts, in particular when the "whole question turns on a point of law. . . ."<sup>21</sup> Quintilian holds that there are two forms of statement of facts in forensic speeches: (1) the one

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<sup>19</sup>Ibid.

<sup>20</sup>Ibid., p. 49.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid., pp. 51-53.

expounding the facts of the case itself, (2) the other setting forth facts which have a bearing on the case.<sup>22</sup>

If the audience already knows the facts, the author says that the orator can pretend to be repeating for the benefit of those who do not know the facts.<sup>23</sup> As to the question whether the statement of facts always follows the exordium, Quintilian maintains that proof cannot be brought forward until the facts of the case are known. However, he does mention that there are exceptions such as a charge having to be rebutted first before the speaker can make his statement of facts.

Quintilian next explains the method to be adopted in making the statement of facts:

The statement of facts consists in the persuasive exposition of that which either has been done or is supposed to have been done, or to quote the definition given by Apollodorus, is the speech instructing the audience as to the nature of the case in dispute.<sup>24</sup>

Most writers, he says, more especially those of the Isocratean school, hold that it should be lucid, brief, and plausible:

We shall achieve lucidity and clearness in our statement of facts, first by setting forth our story in words which are appropriate, significant and free from any taint of

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<sup>22</sup>Ibid., p. 55.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid., p. 47.

<sup>24</sup>Ibid., p. 67.

meanness, but not on the other hand farfetched or unusual, and secondly by giving a distinct account of facts, persons, times, places and causes, while our delivery must be adapted to our matter, so that the judge will take in what we say with the utmost readiness.<sup>25</sup>

Although Quintilian holds that the statement of facts should be brief, he explains the difference between brief and concise:

The former is free from all superfluous matter, while the latter may conceivably omit something that requires to be stated. Consequently, we must aim, perhaps everywhere, but above all in our statement of facts, at striking the happy mean in our language, and the happy mean may be defined as saying just what is necessary and just what is sufficient.<sup>26</sup>

Further explaining the statement of facts, Quintilian says it will be credible "if in the first place we take care to say nothing contrary to nature, secondly if we assign reasons and motives for the facts on which the inquiry turns, and if we make the characters of the actors in keeping with the facts we desire to be believed."<sup>27</sup> The author says it will also be useful at this point to scatter some hints of proofs here and there, but in such a way that the statement of facts is not confused with proof. Emotions should be used, but not to the extent they are used in the peroration: "If you wait for the peroration to stir your hearer's emotions over the

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<sup>25</sup>Ibid., pp. 69-71.

<sup>26</sup>Ibid., p. 73.

<sup>27</sup>Ibid., p. 79.

circumstances which you have recorded unmoved in your statement of facts, your appeal will come too late."<sup>28</sup>

Quintilian holds that the statement of facts more than any other portion of the speech should be adorned with the utmost grace and charm; however, he says that much will depend on the nature of the subject. Emphasizing the importance of the statement of facts, the author concludes:

There is no portion of a speech at which the judge is more attentive, and consequently nothing that is well said is lost. The rhythm should be unobtrusive, but as attractive as possible, while the figures must neither be derived from poetry nor such as are contrary to current usage. . . .<sup>29</sup>

Following the account of statement of facts, Quintilian makes a brief comment at the beginning of his discussion on propositio, noting that in the natural order of things the statement of facts is followed by the verification because it is necessary to prove the points which are stated with the proof in view. He adds, however, that certain rhetoricians are in the habit "of digressing to some pleasant and attractive topic with a view to securing the utmost amount of favour from their audience."<sup>30</sup> Quintilian objects to this habit if the digression transfers "striking thoughts from the places which they should have occupied elsewhere. . . ."<sup>31</sup>

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<sup>28</sup>Ibid., p. 113.

<sup>29</sup>Ibid., pp. 121-123.

<sup>30</sup>Ibid., p. 123.

<sup>31</sup>Ibid.

Some teachers of rhetoric, says Quintilian, place the proposition after the statement of facts, but he sees the necessity of having a proposition at the beginning of every proof if one is necessary. However, if the nature of the main question is sufficiently clear without the proposition, especially if the statement of facts ends exactly where the question begins, then it is permissible to exclude it. For example, "The affair took place, as I have described, gentlemen: he that laid ambush was defeated, violence was conquered by violence, or rather, I should say audacity was crushed by valour."<sup>32</sup> This kind of remark, according to Quintilian, would serve as transition from one paragraph to another.

Another way of handling the propositio is to produce a proposition, even though it is not in itself a proposition. This is effected by adding after the statement of facts some phrase such as the following: "These are the points on which you will give your decision."<sup>33</sup> Such a comment reminds the judge to give special attention to the question and emphasizes the point that the student has finished the statement of facts and is beginning the proof. Realizing this transition, the judge will begin to listen with renewed attention.

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<sup>32</sup>Ibid., p. 133.

<sup>33</sup>Ibid., p. 137.

Stressing the need in expressing every proposition with clarity and lucidity, Quintilian reiterates, in part, what he has already said in the statement of facts:

. . . For what could be more discreditable than that a portion of the speech, whose sole purpose is to prevent obscurity elsewhere, should itself be obscure? Secondly it must be brief and must not be burdened with a single superfluous word. But the worst fault of all is to treat your points in an order different from that which was assigned them in your proposition.<sup>34</sup>

Of the five parts into which he divides forensic cases, Quintilian teaches that any single one other than the proof may on occasion be dispensed with. But there can be no suit in which this part is not absolutely essential. To begin his treatise on the importance of the proof to the case, the author notes that the division laid down by Aristotle has met almost universal approval: "It is to the effect that there are some proofs adopted by the orator which lie outside the art of speaking, and others which he himself deduced or, if I may use the term, begets out of his case."<sup>35</sup> He refers to the former as inartificial proofs, the latter as artificial proofs.<sup>36</sup> Inartificial proofs are those which belong to decisions of previous courts, rumors, evidence extracted by torture, documents, oaths, and witnesses. Artificial proofs are wholly the work of art, which are matters specially adapted to produce belief.

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<sup>34</sup>Ibid., p. 151.

<sup>35</sup>Ibid., p. 157.

<sup>36</sup>Aristotle refers to proofs as Non-artistic and Artistic (The Rhetoric of Aristotle, p. 8).



Before he proceeds with his classification of the various species of artificial proof, Quintilian points out that there are certain features common to all kinds of proofs:

For there is no question which is not concerned either with things or persons, nor can there be any ground for arguments save in connexion with matters concerning things or persons, which may be considered either by themselves or with reference to something else; while there can be no proof except such as is derived from things consequent or things opposite, which must be sought for either in the time preceding, contemporaneous with or subsequent to the alleged fact, nor can any single thing be proved save by reference to something else which must be greater, less than or equal to it.<sup>37</sup>

Arguments, says Quintilian, may be found either in the questions raised by the case, "which may be considered by themselves quite apart from any connection with individual things or persons, or in the case itself, when anything is discovered in it which cannot be arrived at by the light of common reason, but is peculiar to the subjects on which the judgment has to be given."<sup>38</sup> He further explains that all proofs fall into three classes: necessary, credible, and not impossible. Finally, Quintilian reiterates that there are four forms of proof and gives examples of each:

First, we may argue that, because one thing is, another thing is not; as It is day and therefore not night. Secondly, we may argue that, because one thing is another thing is: as The sun is risen, therefore it is day. Thirdly, it may be argued that because one thing is not

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<sup>37</sup>Institutio, II, 191.

<sup>38</sup>Ibid., p. 193.

another thing is; as It is not night, therefore it is day. Finally, it may be argued that, because one thing is not, another thing is not; as He is not a reasoning man, therefore he is not a man.<sup>39</sup>

That Quintilian considers artificial proofs as one of the most important parts of his oratorical form is revealed by the amount of space he devotes to it--over 150 pages. Because of his detailed account of every aspect, it is not practical to do more than to give a limited view and to point out the different kinds of proofs which are in this particular category.

First, the author explains that every artificial proof consists either of indications, arguments, or examples. He clarifies his statement by admitting that he is well aware that many rhetoricians consider indication a part of the arguments, but he goes on to give his reasons for distinguishing between them:

In the first place indications as a rule come under the head of inartificial proofs: for a bloodstained garment, a shriek, a dark blotch and the like are all evidence analogous to documentary or oral evidence and rumours; they are not discovered by the orator, but are given him with the case itself. My second reason was that indications, if indubitable, are not arguments, since they leave no room for question, while arguments are only possible in controversial matters. If on the other hand they are doubtful, they are not arguments, but require arguments to support them.<sup>40</sup>

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<sup>39</sup>Ibid., p. 195.

<sup>40</sup>Ibid.

Quintilian contends that argument, which he calls the enthymeme, has three meanings: it means anything conceived in the mind; it signifies a proposition with a reason, and it gives a conclusion of an argument drawn from denial of consequents or from incompatibles. He adds, however, that there is some controversy on this point:

For there are some who style a conclusion from consequents an epicheireme, while it will be found that the majority hold the view that an enthymeme is a conclusion from incompatibles: wherefore Cornificius styles it a contrarium or argument from contraries. Some again call it a rhetorical sylogism, others an incomplete syllogism, because its parts are not so clearly defined or of the same number as those of the regular syllogism, since such precision is not specially required by the orator.<sup>41</sup>

Finally, Quintilian teaches that if an argument is to be effective, it must be based on certainty. For he says it is obviously impossible to prove what is doubtful by what is less doubtful. Maintaining that some things which are adduced as proof require proof themselves, he gives an example: "If a woman is accused of killing her husband because she is an adulteress, adultery must first be proved."<sup>42</sup> Further, the strongest arguments should be presented singly, whereas the weaker arguments should be massed together. The author also contends that it is undesirable for our strong arguments to have their force obscured by the surrounding matter since it

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<sup>41</sup>Ibid., pp. 203-205.

<sup>42</sup>Ibid., p. 299.

is important to show their true nature. On the other hand, arguments which are naturally weak will receive mutual support if they are grouped together.

Quintilian explains that refutation may be understood in two senses because the duty of the defense consists wholly in refutation, while whatever is said by the opponents must be rebutted, whether the orator is speaking for the defense or the prosecution. Consequently, he adds, it is in this sense that refutation is assigned the fourth place in pleadings, but "the methods required in either case are identical. For the principles of argument in refutation can only be drawn from the same sources as those used in proof, while topics and thoughts, words and figures will all be on the same lines."<sup>43</sup> Quintilian also teaches that as a rule no strong appeal to the emotions is made in the refutation.

A serious fault into which pleaders fall is the over-elaboration of points. Such a procedure makes his case suspect to the judges. On the other hand, "arguments, which if stated without more ado, would have removed all doubt, lose their force owing to the delay caused by the elaborate preparations made for their introduction, due to the fact that the advocate thinks that they require additional support."<sup>44</sup>

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<sup>43</sup>Ibid., p. 311.

<sup>44</sup>Ibid., p. 343.

The order in which arguments are offered depends on the case. Quintilian says "if we are prosecuting, our first duty will be to prove our own case, our second to refute the arguments brought against it. If on the other hand, we are defending, we must begin by refutation."<sup>45</sup> In addition, both proof and refutation should be "embellished and supported by the powers of the speaker. For although our arguments may be admirably adapted to express what we desire, they will none the less be slight and weak unless the orator makes a special effort to give them life."<sup>46</sup>

Quintilian begins the last of the five main divisions of his oratorical form with an explanation that some rhetoricians call the peroration the completion; others refer to it as the conclusion. He also says that there are two kinds of peroration: one type deals with facts, while the other makes use of the emotional aspect of the case. The first type, the repetition and grouping of the facts, serves both to refresh the memory of the judge and to place the whole of the case before his eyes. Even though the facts may have made little impression on the judge when they were given in detail earlier in the case, their cumulative effect is considerable:

This final recapitulation must be as brief as possible, and we must summarize the facts under the appropriate heads. For if we devote too much time thereto, the

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<sup>45</sup>Ibid., p. 345.

<sup>46</sup>Ibid.

peroration will cease to be an enumeration and will constitute something very like a second speech. On the other hand the points selected for enumeration must be treated with weight and dignity, enlivened by apt reflection and diversified by suitable figures; for there is nothing more tiresome than a dry repetition of facts, which merely suggests a lack of confidence in the judges' memory.<sup>47</sup>

Quintilian teaches that as a general rule both the prosecution and the defense "may likewise employ the appeal to the emotions, but they will appeal to different emotions."<sup>48</sup> The defender, then, will employ these appeals with greater frequency and fulness, since the accuser has to rouse the judge, while the defender has to soften him.

While Quintilian teaches the orator that the peroration is the most important part of forensic pleading, he adds that "in the main," it consists of appeals to the emotions:

There is scope for an appeal to the emotions in every portion of a speech. . . . But few indeed are those orators who can sweep the judge with them, lead him to adopt that attitude of mind which they desire, and compel him to weep with them or share their anger. And yet it is this emotional power that dominates the court, it is this form of eloquence that is the queen of all. Proofs, it is true, may induce the judges to regard our case as superior to that of our opponent, but the appeal to the emotions will do more, for it will make them wish our case to be the better. And what they wish, they will also believe.<sup>49</sup>

Quintilian adds that "the prime essential for stirring the emotions of others is first to feel those emotions oneself,

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<sup>47</sup>Ibid., p. 383.

<sup>48</sup>Ibid., p. 387.

<sup>49</sup>Ibid., pp. 417-19.

. . . and our eloquence must spring from the same feeling that we desire to produce in the mind of the judge."<sup>50</sup>

Knowing that the young orator does not have the power to generate emotion at his own will, Quintilian explains how it can be effected:

There are certain experiences which the Romans call visions, whereby things absent are presented to our imagination with such extreme vividness that they seem actually to be before our very eyes. It is the man who is really sensitive to such impressions who will have the greatest power over the emotions.

From such impressions arises that . . . which Cicero calls illumination and actuality, which makes us seem not so much to narrate as to exhibit the actual scene, while our emotions will be no less actively stirred than if we were present at the actual occurrence.<sup>51</sup>

Quintilian explains that emotions fall into two classes:

The one is called pathos by the Greeks and is rightly and correctly expressed in Latin by adfectus (emotion); the other is called ethos, a word for which in my opinion Latin has no equivalent; it is however rendered by mores (morals) and consequently the branch of philosophy known as ethics is styled moral philosophy by us. . . . The more cautious writers . . . explain pathos as describing the more violent emotions and ethos as designating those which are calm and gentle. . . . For as ethos denotes moral character, our speech must necessarily be based on ethos when it is engaged in portraying such a character. . . . Finally ethos in all its forms requires the speaker to be a man of good character and courtesy.<sup>52</sup>

He further distinguishes between the two by explaining that ethos rather resembles comedy and pathos tragedy. Thus,

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<sup>50</sup>Ibid., pp. 431-33.

<sup>51</sup>Ibid., pp. 435-37.

<sup>52</sup>Ibid., pp. 421-27.

"ethos is generally employed to calm the storm aroused by pathos."<sup>53</sup> In particular, Quintilian stresses the importance of ethos in oratory:

The ethos which I have in my mind and which I desiderate in the orator is commended to our approval by goodness more than aught else and is not merely calm and mild, but in most cases ingratiating and courteous and such as to excite pleasure and affection in our hearers, while the chief merit in its expression lies in making it seem that all that we say derives directly from the nature of the facts and persons concerned and in the revelation of the character of the orator in such a way that all may recognise it. This kind of ethos should be especially displayed in cases where the persons concerned are intimately connected. . . .<sup>54</sup>

Such a summary of the classical form is preliminary to a rhetorical analysis of arrangement in Culture and Anarchy, for it is this that Arnold advised and adopted to give structure and meaning to his own work.

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<sup>53</sup>Ibid., p. 423.

<sup>54</sup>Institutio, III, 183.



### CHAPTER III

#### ARRANGEMENT IN CULTURE AND ANARCHY:

#### EXORDIUM, NARRATIO, DIGRESSIO

A rhetorical analysis of Culture and Anarchy requires first an examination of Arnold's subject to determine the kind of writing evident in the work, for ancient rhetoricians trained their young orators in three kinds of rhetorical speeches: (1) deliberative (political, advisory); (2) forensic (legal); epideictic, or panegyric (ceremonial). Aristotle's definitions of the different kinds of rhetoric are perhaps more clearly stated than those of any other rhetorician:

The kinds of rhetoric are three in number, corresponding to the three kinds of hearers to which speeches are addressed; for a speech being the joint result of three things--the speaker, his subject, and the person addressed--the end or object has reference to this last, namely the hearer; and the hearer must be either (1) a mere observer [critic], or (2 and 3) a judge [decider], and, if the latter, then either (2) a judge of things past or (3) a judge of things to come. . . . It follows that there must be three kinds of speeches in rhetoric, (1) deliberative, (2) forensic, and (3) epideictic.<sup>1</sup>

Aristotle then distinguishes the three kinds of rhetoric by their (a) elements, (b) time, (c) ends or aims.

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<sup>1</sup>The Rhetoric of Aristotle, p. 16.

(1) The elements of deliberation[counsel] are (a) exhortation [encouragement], (b) dissuasion; for, as advice given in private always has one or the other aspect, so it is with those who discuss matters of State in public--they either exhort or dissuade. (2) The elements of forensic speaking are (a) accusation, (b) defence, since the parties to a legal action will necessarily be engaged in either one or the other. (3) The elements of an epideictic speech are (a) praise and (b) blame. As for the divisions of time which severally belong to these several kinds of speakers, to the deliberative speaker belongs the future, for he gives advice about things to come, exhorting or dissuading; to the judicial pleader belongs the past, for it is always with regard to things already done that the one party accuses and the other defends; and to the epideictic speaker, above all, belongs the present, for every one praises or blames with regard to existing conditions [qualities], though a speaker often adds to his resources with reminiscences from the past and conjectures about the future.<sup>2</sup>

Explaining the ends or aims of these different kinds of rhetoric, Aristotle says:

. . . (1) The aim of the deliberative speaker concerns advantage and injury; for the one who exhorts recommends a course of action as better, and the one who dissuades deters us from it as worse; other considerations--of justice and injustice, of honor and dishonor--he makes subsidiary to this end [of the expedient]. (2) The aim of judicial pleaders concerns justice and injustice, and they in like manner make the other considerations subsidiary to these. (3) The aim of those who praise and blame concerns honor and dishonor, and such speakers likewise subordinate the other considerations to these.<sup>3</sup>

On the basis of this information, Arnold's essays in Culture and Anarchy deal with certain aspects found in all of the rhetorical speeches. They encourage, accuse, defend, praise, and blame. They deal with the past, present, and future. And

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<sup>2</sup>Ibid., pp. 17-18.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 18.

they aim for a course of action that is better, they concern justice and injustice, and they concern honor and dishonor. However, it is logical to conclude that as a whole these essays follow the forensic type of speech because Arnold has chosen a subject in which he must serve as both prosecutor and defense.

To carry out this two-fold duty in the six essays comprising Culture and Anarchy, Arnold has adhered to classical form with the exception of the third essay, which he uses as a rhetorical device to give background information about his subject. Thus Arnold uses his first essay, "Sweetness and Light," as an exordium. Again, following Quintilian's form, he presents his narratio in his second essay, "Doing As One Likes." At this point, Arnold uses a rhetorical device, referred to as *digressio*<sup>4</sup> by the ancient rhetoricians, and devotes his third essay, "Barbarians, Philistines, Populace," to background information about the English society. Next, he considers his confirmatio and refutatio in the fourth, fifth, and sixth essays—"Hebraism and Hellenism," "Porro Unum Est Necessarium," and "Our Liberal Practitioners." Finally, Arnold concludes the collection with his own "Conclusion," which he uses as a peroration, thereby following the classical form throughout the presentation. Whether or not this arrangement was intentional, there is a definite relation to

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<sup>4</sup>Ibid.

the classical structure advocated by Aristotle and Quintilian.

To test the theory that there is a similarity between Arnold's Culture and Anarchy and classical form, one must next examine Arnold's essays to see if he follows the teachings of the classical form in presenting his argument to his audience. As previously stated, references to ancient rhetoricians are limited, in particular, to Aristotle and Quintilian's teachings. Using the latter's form as a guideline, an examination and comparison of the essays proceeds in chronological order. Although this examination is based primarily on the major divisions of the classical form, certain rhetorical devices, which these rhetoricians used for the purpose of persuading their judges or audiences, are also presented.

In applying the classical form to the overall arrangement of each essay in Culture and Anarchy, one finds that Arnold devotes a two-page introduction and the first essay, "Sweetness and Light," to his exordium. First, he follows Quintilian's teaching of composing an exordium and considers beforehand "what he has to say; before whom; in whose defence, against whom, at what time and place, . . . what is the popular opinion on the subject. . . ." <sup>5</sup> Thus Arnold will discuss culture, which perhaps he summarizes best in his preface: "The whole scope of the essay is to recommend culture as the

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<sup>5</sup>Institutio, II, 35.

great help out of our present difficulties."<sup>6</sup> And he is speaking to an audience, which includes the entire Victorian society. The defendant in this case is culture, and Arnold is acting as defense. However, at the same time he is also acting as prosecutor of those who misinterpret the true meaning of culture. The popular opinion on the subject appears to be an interpretation voiced by well-known Liberals, who define culture as "a smattering of the two dead languages of Greek and Latin."<sup>7</sup> As prosecutor, Arnold begins his "Introduction" with a rebuttal of this seemingly popular opinion and thereby introduces his own interpretation of culture. Employing a rhetorical device, referred to as an apostrophe, which Quintilian advocates when the orator wishes to speak to someone other than the judge,<sup>8</sup> Arnold first speaks indirectly to Mr. Bright and Mr. Frederick Harrison, both of whom have abused culture. While Mr. Bright has referred to culture as "a smattering of two dead languages,"<sup>9</sup> Mr. Harrison has referred to it as "the silliest cant of the day."<sup>10</sup> Further expounding

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<sup>6</sup>Culture and Anarchy, p. xi.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid., p. 1.

<sup>8</sup>Institutio, II, 41.

<sup>9</sup>Culture and Anarchy, p. 1.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid., p. 2.

his opinion on culture, Mr. Harrison has said:

Culture is a desirable quality in a critic of new books, and sits well on a possessor of belles-lettres; but as applied to politics, it means simply a turn for small fault-finding, love of selfish ease, and indecision in action. The man of culture is in politics one of the poorest mortals alive. . . . Perhaps they are the only class of responsible beings in the community who cannot with safety be entrusted with power.<sup>11</sup>

Next, Arnold begins his rebuttal which, according to Quintilian, is acceptable in the exordium if it is more appropriate here than elsewhere.<sup>12</sup> And he replies to Mr. Harrison's opinion by first conceding a point in that he himself does not "wish to see men of culture asking to be entrusted with power,"<sup>13</sup> and supports this statement by reiterating what he has already declared in public: ". . . in my opinion the speech most proper, at present, for a man of culture to make to a body of his fellow-countrymen who get him into a committee-room, is Socrates': Know thyself! and this is not a speech to be made by men wanting to be entrusted with power."<sup>14</sup> Then he gives his conclusion and says that he takes culture to be a great deal more than his opponents judge it to be. In addition, while he agrees with Mr. Harrison's opinion that "men of culture . . . cannot properly, at present, be entrusted with power,"<sup>15</sup> he thinks that the problem is "the

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<sup>11</sup>Ibid.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid.

<sup>12</sup>Institutio, II, 35.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid., p. 3.

<sup>13</sup>Culture and Anarchy, p. 2.

fault of the community rather than of the men of culture."<sup>16</sup> Finally, Arnold takes a stand on the issue and declares that although he, too, is a Liberal, yet he is "a Liberal tempered by experience, reflection, and renouncement, and I am, above all, a believer in culture,"<sup>17</sup> and makes his proposal to his audience:

Therefore I propose now to try and inquire, in the simple unsystematic way which best suits both my taste and my powers, what culture really is, what good it can do, what is our own special need of it; and I shall seek to find some plain grounds on which a faith in culture,-- both my own faith in it and the faith of others,--may rest securely.<sup>18</sup>

Once he has informed his audience of his plan, Arnold continues with "what he has to say" about the kind of culture that he himself believes in, and begins to lay the ground work for his argument in defense of it as a rallying instrument which can reunite the English people. Again following the classical teaching, "to do all that is possible to show our opponent's case is not deserving of them,"<sup>19</sup> Arnold gives background information for the purpose of preparing his audience "to receive instruction,"<sup>20</sup> explaining in detail not only his interpretation of the culture that he defends and advocates, but also how the lack of it has contributed to the

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<sup>16</sup>Ibid.

<sup>19</sup>Institutio, II, 21.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid.

<sup>20</sup>Ibid., p. 9.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid., p. 4.

present dilemma seen in present-day England. Then he explains how this culture can fill the void, which exists in the lives of the British people. Using Aristotle's technique that "men pay attention to things of importance, to their own interests, to anything wonderful, to anything pleasant,"<sup>21</sup> Arnold continues his presentation, sometimes directing his thoughts to the individual classes<sup>22</sup> of Victorian society, while at other times directing his thoughts to the English people as a whole.

First, Arnold informs his audience that ". . . what distinguishes culture is, that it is possessed by the scientific passion as well as by the notions of reason and the will of God, and does not readily suffer its own crude conceptions to substitute for them."<sup>23</sup> Next, he explains what culture believes in:

. . . culture which believes in making reason and the will of God prevail, believes in perfection, is the study and pursuit of perfection, and is no longer debarred, by a rigid invincible exclusion of whatever is new, from getting acceptance for its ideas, simply because they are new.<sup>24</sup>

Also aware that England is in the throes of religious controversy,<sup>25</sup> Arnold compares culture with religion:

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<sup>21</sup>The Rhetoric of Aristotle, p. 224.

<sup>22</sup>Anderson and Buckler, pp. 519-20.

<sup>23</sup>Culture and Anarchy, p. 8.

<sup>24</sup>Ibid., p. 9.

<sup>25</sup>Anderson and Buckler, pp. 518-19.



And religion, the greatest and most important of the efforts by which the human race has manifested its impulse to perfect itself,--religion, that voice of the deepest human experience,--does not only enjoin and sanction the aim which is the great aim of culture, the aim of setting ourselves to ascertain what perfect is and to make it prevail; but also, in determining generally in what human perfection consists, religion comes to a conclusion identical with that which culture . . . likewise reaches.<sup>26</sup>

Arnold next points out that because men "are all members of one great whole," man cannot isolate himself or be indifferent to the rest of humanity if he wishes to strive for the perfection which culture forms. "Perfection," he notes, "as culture conceives it, is not possible while the individual remains isolated."<sup>27</sup> Being very careful to define every facet of culture, Arnold next describes perfection, which culture believes in, as "a harmonious expansion of all the powers which make the beauty and worth of human nature, and is not consistent with the over-development of any one power at the expense of the rest," again refuting Mr. Bright's and Mr. Harrison's accusations that culture is a "frivolous and useless thing. . . ."<sup>28</sup>

At this point in his exordium, Arnold shifts his presentation to the function of culture as well as the obstacles that it will encounter in Victorian England.<sup>29</sup> The function

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<sup>26</sup>Culture and Anarchy, p. 10.

<sup>27</sup>Ibid., p. 11.

<sup>28</sup>Ibid., p. 12.

<sup>29</sup>Ibid., pp. 12-18.

of culture, as mentioned earlier, "is to recommend culture as the great help out of our present difficulties."<sup>30</sup> Once more applying Aristotle's teaching that "men pay attention to things . . . to their own interests," Arnold now begins to remind the Victorians about the emptiness which exists in their lives. Being an Englishman himself and having worked for His Majesty in the role of Inspector of Schools, as well as having lived and worked among the middle-class and working-class, Arnold is able to give firsthand information. He also knows that his countrymen are concerned and that they are searching for answers, but they have found no solutions to their problems.<sup>31</sup> If, then, culture is to contribute toward the restoration of England from its present dilemma, Arnold must explain the causes which brought about the emptiness in the Victorian's life. Acting as prosecutor, he follows Quintilian's teaching:

If the case affords us the means of winning the favour of the judge, it is important that the points which seem most likely to serve to our purpose should be selected for introduction into the exordium. . . . the judge should be prepared for the most important of the questions that are to be raised.<sup>32</sup>

Arnold now introduces for the first time the major problems which are causing discontent among the people. The Industrial Revolution and the upheaval in religion, as mentioned

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<sup>30</sup>Ibid., p. xi.

<sup>31</sup>Anderson and Buckler, pp. 518-35.

<sup>32</sup>Institutio, II, 17-19.

earlier, have caused the people of England to place their faith in machinery: freedom, population, national wealth, personal wealth, and religious organizations.<sup>33</sup> This machinery, in turn, has caused the people to feel that it is their right to do as they like, has increased the population to the point of overflowing in and around the big cities, has brought about a worship of national material gain, as well as individual gain, and has led to the formation of certain religious organizations which are advocating reform. Such are the obstacles which culture must overcome. Being very careful to recognize the enormity of the problem, Arnold informs his audience that he is aware of the responsibility that he has placed on his defense of culture:

But above all in our own country has culture a weighty part to perform, because here that mechanical character, which civilisation tends to take everywhere, is shown in the most eminent degree. Indeed nearly all the characters of perfection, as culture teaches us to fix them, meet in this country with some powerful tendency which thwarts them and sets them at defiance.<sup>34</sup>

Again following Quintilian's rules that "We shall then occasionally introduce certain points from the main questions into the exordium to exercise a valuable influence in winning the judge to regard us with favour,"<sup>35</sup> Arnold explains

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<sup>33</sup>Culture and Anarchy, pp. 12-25.

<sup>34</sup>Ibid., pp. 12-13.

<sup>35</sup>Institutio, II, 19.

to his audience how each part of the English "machinery" has gained control over the lives of the Englishmen. But, at the same time, he is careful to remind them how culture has the power to alleviate this condition:

If it were not for this purging effect wrought upon our minds by culture, the whole world, the future as well as the present, would inevitably belong to the Philistines. The people who believe most that our greatness and our welfare are proved by our being very rich, and who most give their lives and thoughts to becoming rich, are just the very people whom we call Philistines.<sup>36</sup>

This purging effect can also bring about the pursuit of culture instead of the pursuit of "machinery." To replace this desire for personal material gain, Arnold agrees with Epictetus that "the formation of the spirit and character must be our real concern."<sup>37</sup> Such a "finely tempered nature," then, would cause the Victorians to conceive of it as a nature of "harmonious perfection, a perfection in which the characters of beauty and intelligence are both present,"<sup>38</sup> and which Swift says "unites" "two noblest of things, sweetness and light."<sup>39</sup>

Acutely aware of the social and political unrest in England, as well as the division of the society into three distinct classes--the aristocracy, the middle-class, and the working class--Arnold now informs his audience in the light

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<sup>36</sup>Culture and Anarchy, p. 16.

<sup>38</sup>Ibid.

<sup>37</sup>Ibid., p. 18.

<sup>39</sup>Ibid.

of each individual and explains that culture has the overall power to help them join forces and work toward a democracy:

It does not try to teach down to the level of inferior classes; it does not try to win them for this or that sect of its own, with ready-made judgments and watch-words. It seeks to do away with classes; to make the best that has been thought and known in the world current everywhere; to make all men live in an atmosphere of sweetness and light, where they may use ideas as it uses them itself, freely,--nourished, and not bound by them.<sup>40</sup>

Next, he points out why culture is necessary in man's life:

It is of use because, like religion,--that other effort after perfection,--it testifies that, where bitter envying and strife are, there is confusion in every evil work.<sup>41</sup>

Then, Arnold follows another of Quintilian's rules and informs his audience that he is reaching the end of his exordium. Reiterating what he has already said in his defense of culture and his prosecution of the advocates of machinery, Arnold says:

The pursuit of perfection, then, is the pursuit of sweetness and light. He who works for sweetness and light, works to make reason and the will of God prevail. He who works for machinery, he who works for hatred, works only for confusion. Culture looks beyond machinery, culture hates hatred; culture has one great passion, the passion for sweetness and light. It has one even yet greater!--the passion for making them prevail. It is not satisfied till we all come to a perfect man, it knows that the sweetness and light of the few must be imperfect until the raw and unkindled masses of humanity are touched with sweetness and light.<sup>42</sup>

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<sup>40</sup>Ibid., p. 38.

<sup>41</sup>Ibid., p. 37.

<sup>42</sup>Culture and Anarchy, p. 37.

Having defended culture and informed his countrymen about its power to revolutionize their lives, Arnold concludes his exordium, using Quintilian's teaching to "excite the feelings"<sup>43</sup> of the Victorians as he challenges them to pursue the culture which he himself advocates:

The great men of culture are those who have had a passion for diffusing, for making prevail, for carrying from one end of society to the other, the best knowledge, the best ideas of their time; who have laboured to divest knowledge of all that was harsh, uncouth, difficult, abstract, professional, exclusive; to humanise it, to make it efficient outside the clique of the cultivated and learned, yet still remaining the best knowledge and thought of the time, and a true source, therefore of sweetness and light.<sup>44</sup>

To assume that Matthew Arnold had the classical form in mind when he began to organize his Culture and Anarchy is perhaps presumptuous at this point; however, Arnold has complied with most of the rules which Aristotle and Quintilian taught for preparing the exordium. It is also evident from the very beginning of the essay that the preparation of the subject matter to be discussed follows the rules which apply to the preparation of the classical forensic speech, to which Quintilian devotes one volume in his Institutio Oratoria.

Both Aristotle and Quintilian teach that after the audience has been adequately prepared by the exordium, the

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<sup>43</sup>Institutio, II, 15.

<sup>44</sup>Culture and Anarchy, p. 38.

speaker next passes to the statement of facts (or narratio),<sup>45</sup> Similarly Arnold's second essay "Doing As One Likes" adheres to Quintilian's rules for the statement of facts in forensic speeches:

For my part I follow the very highest authorities in holding that there are two forms of statement of facts in forensic speeches, the one expounding the facts of the case itself, the other setting forth facts which have a bearing on the case.<sup>46</sup>

Actually, Arnold begins the statement of facts in the exordium, and in accordance with Quintilian's technique of repeating facts already mentioned in the exordium "for the benefit of some new member of the jury,"<sup>47</sup> Arnold begins his second essay by informing his audience that he has been trying to show

. . . that culture is, or ought to be, the study and pursuit of perfection; and that perfection as pursued by culture, beauty and intelligence, or in other words, sweetness and light, are the main characters.<sup>48</sup>

Then he interrupts his statement of facts, a procedure which Quintilian says

. . . may be done with advantage whenever we have not merely to rebut the charge, but to turn the tables on

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<sup>45</sup>Since Quintilian's classical oratorical form is used as a primary source for making an analysis of Culture and Anarchy, reference to the remaining divisions follow the terms which he used, with the Latin and/or Greek terms being designated in parenthesis.

<sup>46</sup>Institutio, II, 55.

<sup>47</sup>Ibid., p. 61.

<sup>48</sup>Culture and Anarchy, p. 40.

our opponents; thus after first rebutting the charge, we make our statement of facts the opening of an incrimination of the other party. . . .<sup>49</sup>

Arnold follows this plan in order to rebut an allegation made against the "religion of culture" that he is "supposed to be promulgating."<sup>50</sup> Not only are his own countrymen objecting to his ideas, but also certain people in the United States are taunting him and calling the culture he advocates

. . . a religion proposing parmaceti, or some scented salve or other, as a cure for human miseries; a religion breathing a spirit of cultivated inaction, making its believer refuse to lend a hand at uprooting the definite evils on all side of us, and filling him with antipathy against the reforms and reformers which try to extirpate them.<sup>51</sup>

Then, using a rhetorical device, which the rhetoricians call ethos, and which Quintilian says can be used in the statement of facts to "move" the judge at the same time that the orator is instructing him,<sup>52</sup> Arnold makes his first emotional appeal to his audience:

It is impossible that all these remonstrances and reproofs should not affect me, and I shall try my very best, in completing my design and in speaking of light as one of the characters of perfection, and of culture as giving us light, to profit by the objections I have heard and read, and to drive at practice as much as I can, by showing the communications and passages into practical life from the doctrine which I am inculcating.<sup>53</sup>

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<sup>49</sup>Institutio, II, 40.

<sup>50</sup>Culture and Anarchy, p. 40.

<sup>51</sup>Ibid.

<sup>52</sup>Institutio, II, 111.

<sup>53</sup>Culture and Anarchy, p. 41.



At the same, Arnold begins to introduce his proof, which is in accordance with Quintilian's teaching: "We may touch on everything that we propose to produce in our proof while making our statement of facts, as for instance points connected with persons, cause, place, time, the instrument and occasion employed."<sup>54</sup> Noting, again, his opponent's charges that "a man with my theories of sweetness and light is full of antipathy against the rougher or coarser movements going on around him, and that therefore the believers in action grow impatient with him,"<sup>55</sup> Arnold rebuts the allegation by responding with two questions:

But what if rough and coarse action, ill-calculated action, action with insufficient light, is, and has for a long time been our bane? What if our urgent want now is not to act at any price, but rather to lay in a stock of light for our difficulties?<sup>56</sup>

Then he justifies his statement by explaining to the audience that this course "is surely the best and in real truth the most practical line our endeavours can take."<sup>57</sup> Finally, Arnold proposes that he will attempt to produce his proof through the means of light:

So that if I can show what my opponents call rough and coarse action, but what I would rather call random and ill-regulated action, action with insufficient light, action pursued because we like to be going something and doing it as we please, and do not like the trouble of thinking and the severe constraint of any kind of rule, --if I can show this to be, at the present moment, a

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<sup>54</sup>Institutio, II, 81.

<sup>56</sup>Ibid.

<sup>55</sup>Culture and Anarchy, p. 42.

<sup>57</sup>Ibid.

practical mischief and dangerous to us, then I have found a practical use for light in correcting this state of things, and have only to exemplify how, in cases, which fall under everybody's observation, it may deal with it.<sup>58</sup>

Once more taking the stand as prosecutor, Arnold now begins to list his statement of facts--facts, which he says are the representative cause of the Victorian dilemma. First the overall problem, as Arnold mentioned in the exordium, is "our bondage to machinery, on our proneness to value machinery as an end in itself, without looking beyond it to the end for which alone, in truth it is valuable."<sup>59</sup> Continuing to adhere to Quintilian's teaching that the orator may touch on everything he proposes to produce in the proof, Arnold next begins to expound on the effects of this machinery on the lives of his countrymen. Freedom, which is one of the fringe benefits of this machinery, has caused men to believe "that it is a most happy and important thing for a man merely to be able to do as he likes."<sup>60</sup> Further, his misinterpretation of the British Constitution as a "system of checks, . . . stops and paralyses any power interfering with free action of individuals."<sup>61</sup> Consequently, such belief is causing the people of England to drift toward anarchy. In addition, the people have no notion, "so familiar on the Continent and to antiquity, of the State, --the nation in its collective and corporate character, entrusted with stringent powers for the

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<sup>58</sup>Ibid.

<sup>59</sup>Ibid., pp. 42-43.

<sup>60</sup>Ibid., p. 43.

<sup>61</sup>Ibid.

general advantage, and controlling individual wills in the name of an interest wider than that of individuals."<sup>62</sup> In fact, these people interpret the State as being made up of individuals who believe that they are the best judge of their own interests. To substantiate this fact, Arnold gives the reasons each of the three classes in English society is opposed to a state-ruled government:

Our leading class is an aristocracy, and no aristocracy likes the notion of a State-authority greater than itself,. . . . Our middle class, the great representative of trade and Dissent, with its maxims of every man for himself in business, every man for himself in religion, dreads a powerful administration which might somehow interfere with it. . . . Then as to our working class. This class, pressed constantly by the hard daily compulsion of material wants, is naturally the very centre and stronghold of our national idea, that it is man's ideal right and felicity to do as he likes.<sup>63</sup>

Machinery has brought about an "anarchical tendency of our worship of freedom in and for itself."<sup>64</sup> Indeed, men everywhere "are beginning to assert and put in practice an Englishman's right to do what he likes; . . . march where he likes, meet where he likes, enter where he likes, hoot as he likes, threaten as he likes, smash as he likes."<sup>65</sup> Liberals view these actions as "trifles," while the "educated and the intelligent remain in their majestic repose."<sup>66</sup> Consequently,

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<sup>62</sup>Ibid., pp. 43-44.

<sup>65</sup>Ibid., pp. 45-46.

<sup>63</sup>Ibid., p. 44.

<sup>66</sup>Ibid., p. 46.

<sup>64</sup>Ibid., p. 45.

the Victorians continue to pursue their own kind of personal liberty, refusing to listen to any voice that would ask them to subordinate this freedom to right reason.

The English view their kind of rowdyism as their privileged right to personal liberty, which they claim is guaranteed by the British Constitution, for Englishmen only. Such an attitude discriminates not only against the Irish, but also against anyone who is not an Englishman:

In the first place, it never was any part of our creed that the great right and blessedness of an Irishman, or, indeed, of anybody on earth except an Englishman, is to do as he likes.<sup>67</sup>

Consequently, the Victorians feel no danger from the Irish Fenian, "for against this our conscience is free enough to let us act resolutely and put forth our overwhelming strength the moment there is any real need for it."<sup>68</sup> Further, the Victorians see an "immense" difference between the Irish Fenian and the English rough:

He [the Irish Fenian] is so evidently desperate and dangerous, a man of a conquered race, a Papist, with centuries of ill-usage to inflame him against us, with an alien religion established in his country by us at his expense, with no admiration of our institutions, no love of our virtues, no talents for our business, no turn for our comfort! Show him our symbolical Truss Manufactory on the finest site in Europe, and tell him British industrialism and individualism can bring a man to that, and he remains cold!

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<sup>67</sup>Ibid., p. 49.

<sup>68</sup>Ibid.

But the Hyde Park rioter how different! He is our own flesh and blood; he is a Protestant; he is framed by nature to do as we do, hate what we hate, love what we love; he is capable of feeling the symbolical force of the Truss Manufactory; the question of questions, for him, is a wages question.<sup>69</sup>

To present additional factual information about the rowdyism of the Victorians, Arnold now concentrates on a certain type of individual found in the working class. The Industrial Revolution has caused the "Hyde Park rough" to change his old way of thinking; he now aspires to seek the privileges afforded the aristocracy and the middle class, but he "has not yet quite found his groove and settled down to his work, and so he is just asserting his personal liberty"<sup>70</sup> to do what he likes:

He sees the rich, the aristocratic class, in occupation of the executive government, and so if he is stopped from making Hyde Park a bear-garden or the streets impassable, he says he is being butchered by the aristocracy. . . . while the aristocratic and middle classes have long been doing as they like with great vigour, he has been too underdeveloped and submissive hitherto to join in the game; and now, when he does come, he comes in immense numbers, and is rather raw and rough.<sup>71</sup>

This Hyde Park rough, like the country squires in the aristocratic class and the political dissenters in the middle class, has no idea of a State. Because the present form of Government "must neither have any discretionary power nor act resolutely on its own interpretation of the law if any one disputes

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<sup>69</sup>Ibid., pp. 49-50.

<sup>70</sup>Ibid., p. 50.

<sup>71</sup>Ibid., p. 51.

it, it is evident our laws give our playful giant, in doing as he likes, considerable advantage."<sup>72</sup> Such freedom to do as one likes, under the guise of individual interpretation of the British Constitution, "tends to cause distress, and so to increase the sort of anarchy and social disintegration which had previously commenced."<sup>73</sup>

Having completed statement about certain actions and beliefs, which have contributed to the existing condition in England, Arnold now assumes the role of defense and gives facts about culture which, he says, can successfully combat this anarchical tendency. In his exordium Arnold not only rebutted accusations against what he claimed was a misinterpretation of culture, but he also explained in detail its function, its necessity in man's life, and its overall purpose. Now, he, as defendant, presents facts about the power of culture to correct the unsatisfactory conditions seen in Victorian society.

Again following Quintilian's advice that "It will also be useful to scatter some hints of our proofs here and there,"<sup>74</sup> Arnold presents his overall proof of culture as a deterrent against anarchy, which he sees gaining control of his countrymen. However, to establish this proof, Arnold

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<sup>72</sup>Ibid.

<sup>73</sup>Ibid., p. 52.

<sup>74</sup>Institutio, II, 79.

uses enthymeme to present this proof and at the same time prosecute his opponents:

Now, if culture, which simply means trying to perfect oneself, and one's mind as part of oneself, brings us light, and if light shows us that there is nothing so very blessed in merely doing as one likes, that the worship of the mere freedom to do as one likes is worship of machinery, that the really blessed thing is to like what right reason ordains, and to follow her authority, then we have got a practical benefit out of culture. We have got a much wanted principle, a principle of authority, to counteract the tendency to anarchy which seems to be threatening us.<sup>75</sup>

Once he has established his proof that culture can be "a principle of authority" to counteract anarchy, Arnold reverses his role and again becomes the prosecutor in his statement of facts as he reveals the inadequacies of each class to become the principle of authority for the State. First, Arnold discusses the aristocracy and notes that this class, according to Mr. Carlyle, is most qualified as "the power representing the right reason of the nation, and most worthy, therefore of ruling."<sup>76</sup> For Mr. Lowe, "it is the middle class with its incomparable Parliament."<sup>77</sup> For the Reform League, it is the working class, the class with "the brightest powers of sympathy and the readiest powers of action."<sup>78</sup> Next, Arnold rebuts the claims of each class, and offers facts that will discredit their claims:

Allowing, therefore, with Mr. Carlyle, the aristocratic class possess sweetness, culture insists on the necessity

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<sup>75</sup>Culture and Anarchy, p. 52.

<sup>77</sup>Ibid.

<sup>76</sup>Ibid., p. 53.

<sup>78</sup>Ibid.

of light also, and shows us that aristocracies, being by the very nature of things inaccessible to ideas, unapt to see how the world is going, must be somewhat wanting in light, and must therefore be, at a moment when light is our great requisite, inadequate to our needs.<sup>79</sup>

In addition, the ordinary young Englishman has neither the ideas nor the seriousness of the middle class. Moreover, this young Englishman, "sensing the weakness of the aristocracy to deal with the multitudes at home, applauds the absolute rulers of the Continent," completely missing "the grounds of reason and intelligence which alone can give any colour of justification, any possibility of existence, to those rulers. . . ." <sup>80</sup>

Following the same procedure to test the middle class as a principle of authority, Arnold finds that Englishmen in this class are the epitome of that which machinery has bred:

. . . the advocacy of free trade, of Parliamentary reform, of abolition of church-rates, of voluntarism in religion and education, of non-interference of the State between employers and employed, and of marriage with one's deceased wife's sister.<sup>81</sup>

The people, however, deny this accusation and insist that their class "always meant more by these things than meets the eye; that it has had that within which passes show, and that we are soon going to see, in a Free Church and all manner of

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<sup>79</sup>Ibid., pp. 53-54.

<sup>80</sup>Ibid., p. 55.

<sup>81</sup>Ibid., p. 59.



good things, what it was."<sup>82</sup> Further, this misinterpretation of the Victorians that their involvement with machinery brings about a cultural enlightenment has influenced a certain American supporter to defend the actions of these British Liberals:

. . . their Dissidence of Dissent has been a mere instrument of the political Dissenters for making reason and the will of God prevail (and no doubt he would say the same of the marriage with one's sister); and that the abolition of a State Church is merely the Dissenter's means to this end, just as culture is mine. Another American defender . . . says just the same of their industrialism and free trade; . . . this gentleman . . . proposes that we should for the future call industrialism culture, and the industrialists the men of culture.<sup>83</sup>

At this point in his statement of facts, Arnold again assumes the role of defense to clarify his own interpretation of "the will of God," which he has mentioned earlier in his definition of culture:

All this is undoubtedly specious, but I must remark that the culture of which I talked was an endeavor to come at reason and the will of God by means of reading, observing, and thinking; and that whoever calls anything else culture may, indeed, call it so if he likes, but then he talks of something quite different from what I talked of.<sup>84</sup>

Next, Arnold tests each class for the mean and the excess. Here, for the first time, occurs positive evidence that Arnold was exposed to at least part of the rhetoric of Aristotle: ". . . my head is still full of a number of phrases we learnt at Oxford from Aristotle, about virtue being

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<sup>82</sup>Ibid.

<sup>83</sup>Ibid., p. 60.

<sup>84</sup>Ibid., pp. 60-61.

in a mean, and about excess and defect, and so on."<sup>85</sup> Even this test fails and he finds, through his examination of representatives from each class, that all fall short of the virtuous mean. Thus no one is yet capable of being the principle of authority of the State. In the aristocracy, "there seemed evidently some insufficiency of light," as well as a tendency toward the excess. The middle class "is to be conceived as a body swaying between the qualities of its means and its excess," but more inclined "towards the excess than the mena." The working class also has an "insufficiency of light," and leans toward the excess.<sup>86</sup> Finally, Arnold makes one conclusive statement of facts in his testing of the individual classes to be a source of authority:

I conclude, therefore . . . that we can as little find in the working class as in the aristocratic or in the middle class our much-wanted source of authority, as culture suggests it to us.<sup>87</sup>

Using the teaching of Aristotle "that no aspect of the case may escape us,"<sup>88</sup> Arnold makes one last test to see if a "centre of light and authority" can be found in the Victorians as a "whole community." This, too, under present

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<sup>85</sup>Ibid., p. 57.

<sup>86</sup>Ibid., pp. 57, 63, 67.

<sup>87</sup>Ibid., p. 67.

<sup>88</sup>The Rhetoric of Aristotle, p. 6.

conditions, fails. And Arnold presents his last statement of facts as the prosecutor:

Every one of us has the idea of country, as a sentiment; hardly any one of us has the idea of the State, as a working power. And why? Because we habitually live in our ordinary selves, which do not carry us beyond the ideas and wishes of the class to which we happen to belong. And we are afraid of giving the State too much power, because we only conceive of the State as something equivalent to the class in occupation of the executive government, and are afraid of that class abusing power to its own purposes. If we strengthen the State with the aristocratic class in occupation of the executive government, we imagine we are delivering ourselves up captive to the ideas and wishes of our fierce aristocratical baronet; if with the middle class in occupation of the executive government, to those of our truculent middle-class Dissenting minister; if with the working class, to those of its notorious tribune. . . .<sup>89</sup>

Moreover, people in each of the classes "want to affirm their ordinary selves, their likings and dislikings."<sup>90</sup> Consequently, this attitude causes them to remain "separate, personal, at war." Further, the Victorians are safe from one another's tyranny only when no one has any power. Finally, the author concludes that this so-called safety cannot save the Victorians from anarchy. Therefore, when anarchy presents itself as a danger to them, they know not where to turn.

Once more assuming the role of the defense, Arnold presents facts about a "best self" through his comparison of this self with the Victorian "ordinary self." First, the

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<sup>89</sup>Culture and Anarchy, p. 68.

<sup>90</sup>Ibid.

author explains to his audience that "our best self . . . is the very self which culture, or the study of perfection, seeks to develop in us."<sup>91</sup> This culture,

. . . which is flouted as so unpractical, leads us to the very ideas capable of meeting the great want of our present embarrassed times! We want an authority, and we find nothing but jealous classes, checks, and a deadlock; culture suggests the ideas of the State. We find no basis for a firm State-power in our ordinary selves; culture suggests one to us in our best self.<sup>92</sup>

In comparison with the ordinary self, "our best self inspires faith, and is capable of affording a serious principle of authority."<sup>93</sup> While the Victorians continue to blindly interpret and accept their ordinary selves as being their best selves, they do not give much care to Bishop Wilson's second rule for a man's guidance: ". . . take care that your light be not darkness."<sup>94</sup> Instead, they conscientiously believe that the light they are following "was, indeed, perhaps, only an inferior self, only darkness; and that it would not do to impose this seriously on all the world."<sup>95</sup> To cope successfully with the conditions which a revolution imposes on its people, order and law must prevail if changes are to be accomplished. Yet, because of this ordinary self, which possesses the Victorians, lawlessness and disorder run rampant,

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<sup>91</sup>Ibid.

<sup>94</sup>Ibid., p. 69.

<sup>92</sup>Ibid., pp. 68-69.

<sup>95</sup>Ibid., p. 70.

<sup>93</sup>Ibid., p. 70.

whereas "our best self, or right reason, plainly enjoins us to set our faces against"<sup>96</sup> such actions. In addition, our best self "enjoins us to encourage and uphold the occupants of the executive power, whoever they may be, in firmly prohibiting them."<sup>97</sup> Finally, our best self becomes a principle of authority,

because it does it with a free conscience; because in thus provisionally strengthening the executive power, it is not doing this merely to enable our aristocratical baronet to affirm himself as against our working-men's tribune, or our middle-class Dissenter to affirm himself as against both. It knows that it is establishing the State, or organ of our collective best self, of our national right reason.<sup>98</sup>

Thus Arnold concludes the statement of facts.

At this point in the presentation, Arnold does not pass directly to the confirmatio, the next major division of classical form. Instead, he follows a procedure which Quintilian describes as having "originated in the display of schools of declamation and thence . . . to the courts as soon as causes came to be pleaded, not for the benefit of the parties concerned, but to enable the advocates to flaunt their talents."<sup>99</sup> This procedure, which Quintilian refers to as digression, was later modified and accepted as an essential part of the classical form. Its purpose was to allow the orator to digress from his major topic if he thought such a

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<sup>96</sup>Ibid.

<sup>98</sup>Ibid., pp. 70-71.

<sup>97</sup>Ibid.

<sup>99</sup>Institutio, II, 123.

digression would lend support to his pleading. In fact, some teachers of rhetoric even designated a certain place in the case where they believed a digression would be most effective:

Most of them are in the habit, as soon as they have completed the statement of facts, of digressing to some pleasant and attractive topic with a view of securing the utmost amount of favour from their audience.<sup>100</sup>

Sheridan Baker, who is an advocate of the classical form, explains this part of the pleading as giving information to "matters related, but not essential to the subject,"<sup>101</sup> while Quintilian gives more specific information:

For whatever we say that falls outside the five divisions of the speech already laid down is a digression, whether it express indignation, pity, hatred, rebuke, excuse, conciliation or be designed to rebut invective. Other similar occasions for digression on points not involved by the question at issue arise when we amplify or abridge a topic, make any kind of emotional appeal or introduce any of those topics which add such charm and elegance to oratory. . . .<sup>102</sup>

Quintilian also says that the digression may be used as a second exordium:

But, though such digressions are not always necessary at the end of the statement, they may form a very useful preparation for the examination of the main question, more especially if at first sight it presents an aspect unfavourable to our case. . . . For this is the place for inserting what may be regarded as a second exordium with a view to exciting or mollifying the judge or disposing him to lend a favouring ear to our proofs.<sup>103</sup>

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<sup>100</sup>Ibid., p. 123.

<sup>101</sup>Baker, pp. 33-34.

<sup>102</sup>Institutio, II, 129.

<sup>103</sup>Ibid., p. 127.

Quintilian further explains that the digression can be a most useful device in forensic pleading:

I admit however that this form of digression can be advantageously appended, not merely to the statement of facts, but to each of the different questions or to the questions as a whole, so long as the case demand, or at any rate permit it. . . . For there is no part of a speech so closely connected with any other as the statement with the proof, though of course such a digression may be intended as the conclusion of the statement and the beginning of the proof.<sup>104</sup>

On the basis of these comments "Barbarians, Philistines, and Populace" shows a similarity to the classical digression. The first few lines of the beginning paragraph even indicate that it is intended as a digression:

I have omitted, I find, to complete the old-fashioned analysis which I had the fancy of applying, and have not shown in these classes, as well as the virtuous mean and the excess, the defect also.<sup>105</sup>

When Arnold adds "I do not know that the omission very much matters," it becomes clear that he intended the essay to amplify or abridge a topic, or insert what may be regarded as a second exordium.

Undoubtedly, Arnold believes he could give greater clarity to his pleading if he presented the defects of each class in Victorian society. He has already tested his countrymen for the virtuous mean and the excess and found each class

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<sup>104</sup>Ibid., pp. 123-25.

<sup>105</sup>Culture and Anarchy, p. 72.

to be lacking. Now, he plans to go a bit further with his analysis of these three classes and try to "see their distinctive qualities in the defect, as well as in the excess and in the mean."<sup>106</sup> First, Arnold employs enthymeme and deductive reasoning to establish the cause of this defect:

It is manifest, if the perfect and virtuous mean of that fine spirit which is the distinctive quality of aristocracies, is to be found in a high chivalrous style, and its excess in a fierce turn for resistance, that its defect must lie in a spirit not bold and high enough, and in an excessive and susillanymous unaptness for resistance. If, again, the perfect and virtuous mean of that force by which our middle class has done its great works, and of that self-reliance with which it contemplates itself and them, is to be seen in the performances and speeches of our commercial member of Parliament, and the excess of that force and of that self-reliance in the performances and speeches of our fanatical Dissenting minister, then it is manifest that their defect must lie in a helpless inaptitude for the great works of the middle class, and in a poor and despicable lack of its self-satisfaction.<sup>107</sup>

Continuing with his digression for the purpose of clarity, Arnold explains that even though he had no hesitation in choosing certain "personages" to represent the mean and the excess of the aristocratic and middle-class qualities, he prefers not to use any representative man to illustrate the defects of the aristocracy. Further, he will use himself as a representative to illustrate the defect "in those forces and qualities which make our middle class what it is":

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<sup>106</sup>Ibid.

<sup>107</sup>Culture and Anarchy, pp. 72-73.



The too well-founded reproaches of my opponents declare how little I have lent a hand to the great works of the middle class; for it is evidently these works, and my slackness at them, which are meant, when I am said to "refuse to lend a hand to the humble operation of uprooting certain definite evils" (such as church-rates and others), and that therefore "the believers in action grow impatient" with me. The line, again, of a still unsatisfied seeker which I have followed, the idea of self-transformation, of growing towards some measure of sweetness and light not yet reached, is evidently at clean variance with the perfect self-satisfaction current in my class,. . . and may serve to indicate in me, therefore, the extreme defect of this feeling.<sup>108</sup>

The defect of the working class can be considered what Mr. Frederic Harrison refers to as those "bright powers of sympathy and ready powers of action,"<sup>109</sup> which Arnold has previously mentioned in his statement of facts. In addition, "the working class is so fast growing and rising at the present time, that instances of this defect cannot well be now very common."<sup>110</sup>

Informing his audience that further amplification is needed for the purpose of designating each class to its proper category, Arnold explains his next digression:

The same desire for clearness, which has led me thus to extend a little my first analysis of the three great classes of English society, prompts me also to improve my nomenclature for them a little, with a view to making it thereby more manageable.<sup>111</sup>

Then he gives his reason: "It is awkward and tiresome to be always saying the aristocratic class, the middle class, the

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<sup>108</sup>Ibid., p. 74.

<sup>110</sup>Ibid.

<sup>109</sup>Ibid.

<sup>111</sup>Ibid., p. 75.

working class."<sup>112</sup> Beginning with the middle class, Arnold notes that this class has already been given a name, which is well known:

For the middle class, for that great body which, as we know, 'has done all the great things that have been done in all departments,' and which is to be conceived as moving between two cardinal points of our commercial member of Parliament and our fanatical Protestant Dissenter,--for this class we have a designation which now has become pretty well known, and which we may as well still keep for them, the designation of Philistines.<sup>113</sup>

Next, Arnold explains why this name has been given the middle class:

For Philistine gives the notion of something particularly stiff-necked and perverse in the resistance to light and its children; and therein it specially suits our middle class, who not only do not pursue sweetness and light, but who even prefer to them that sort of machinery of business, chapels, tea-meetings, and addresses from Mr. Murphy, which make up the dismal and illiberal life on which I have so often touched.<sup>114</sup>

Arnold designates to the aristocratic class the name Barbarians; however, he justifies this particular nomenclature by first pointing out that the actions of the aristocracy are similar to those of the Barbarians:

But the aristocratic class has actually, as we have seen, in its well-known politeness, a kind of image or a shadow of sweetness; and as for light, if it does not pursue light, it is not that it perversely cherishes some dismal and illiberal existence in preference to light, but it is lured off from following light by those mighty and eternal

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<sup>112</sup>Ibid.

<sup>113</sup>Ibid.

<sup>114</sup>Ibid., p. 76.

seducers of our race which weave for this class their most irresistible charms,--by worldly splendour, security, power and pleasure. These seducers are exterior goods, but in a way they are goods; and he who is hindered by them from caring for light and ideas, is not much doing what is perverse as what is too natural.

The Barbarians, to whom we all owe so much, and who re-invigorated and renewed our worn-out Europe, had, as is well known, eminent merits; and in this country, where we are for the most part sprung from the Barbarians, we have never had the prejudice against them which prevails among the races of Latin origin. The Barbarians brought with them that staunch individualism, as the modern phrase is, and that passion for doing as one likes, for the assertion of personal liberty, which appears to Mr. Bright the central idea of English life. . . . The stronghold and natural seat of this passion was in the nobles of whom our aristocratic class are the inheritors; and this class, accordingly, have signally manifested it, and have done much by their example to recommend it to the body of the nation, who already, indeed, had it in their blood.<sup>115</sup>

Further comparing the aristocracy with the Barbarians, Arnold points to their passion for field-sports, which they also handed to the aristocratic class: "The chivalry of the Barbarians, with its characteristics of high spirit, choice manners, and distinguished bearing,--what is this but the commencement of the politeness of our aristocratic class?"<sup>116</sup> The culture of the Barbarians, then, was an exterior culture mainly. And if one makes "allowances for the difference of the times, surely we can observe precisely the same thing now in our aristocratic class."<sup>117</sup> Such characteristics of this

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<sup>115</sup>Ibid., pp. 76-78.

<sup>116</sup>Ibid., p. 78.

<sup>117</sup>Ibid.

class prevent the aristocracy from exerting "any deep power upon its spirit," thereby revealing, "an insufficiency of light."<sup>118</sup>

Finally, Arnold designates to the working class the name Populace:

But that vast portion, lastly, of the working class which, raw and half-developed, has long lain half-hidden amidst its poverty and squalor, and is now issuing from its hiding-place to assert an Englishman's heaven-born privilege of doing as he likes, and is beginning to perplex us by marching where it likes, meeting where it likes, bawling what it likes, breaking what it likes--to this vast residuum we may with great propriety give the name of Populace.<sup>119</sup>

Once he has established the three distinct terms to denote the three classes in Victorian society, Arnold assumes the role of the defense as he continues with his digression. At this point in his presentation, however, the purpose of the digression changes from that of amplification to that of a second exordium, as well as an emotional appeal to his audience. Using ethos to mollify his audience, Arnold begins to discuss the common basis of human nature, which exists among all three classes: ". . . there exists, sometimes only in germ and potentially, sometimes more or less developed, the same tendencies and passions which have made our fellow-citizens of other classes what they are."<sup>120</sup> In the role of

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<sup>118</sup>Ibid.

<sup>119</sup>Ibid., pp. 80-81.

<sup>120</sup>Ibid., p. 81.

the defense for culture, Arnold further explains that consideration of these same tendencies and passions is "very important, because it has great influence in begetting that spirit of indulgence which is a necessary part of sweetness, and which, indeed, when our culture is complete, is, as I have said, inexhaustible."<sup>121</sup>

Secondly, all three classes imagine happiness to consist in doing what one's ordinary self likes; however, these likes differ according to each class. Again, using ethos, Arnold makes another emotional appeal to the Victorians as a whole:

But in each class there are born a certain number of natures with a curiosity about their best self, with a bent for seeing things as they are, for disentangling themselves from machinery, for simply concerning themselves with reason and the will of God, and doing their best to make these prevail;--for the pursuit, in a word, of perfection. . . . culture being the true nurse of the pursuing love, and sweetness and light the true character of the pursued perfection.<sup>122</sup>

Being very careful not to mislead his audience to believe that the followers of culture suffer no ills in life, Arnold points out some of the obstacles they will encounter, but at the same time lists the rewards they will receive:

. . . this bent always tends to take them out of their class, and to make their distinguishing characteristic not their Barbarianism, or their Philistinism, but their humanity. They have, in general, a rough time of it in

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<sup>121</sup>Ibid., pp. 81-82.

<sup>122</sup>Ibid., p. 84.

their lives; but they are sown more abundantly than one might think, they appear where and when one least expects it, they set up a fire which enfilades, so to speak, the class with which they are ranked; and, in general, by the extrication of their best self as the self to develop, and by the simplicity of the ends fixed by them as paramount they hinder the unchecked predominance of that class-life which is the affirmation of our ordinary self, and seasonalby disconcert mankind in their worship of machinery.<sup>123</sup>

Now, Arnold digresses to topics discussed in his statement of facts and begins to amplify his previous plan to test each of the three classes as a principle of authority only to find that the Victorians' "ordinary self" maintains power over each individual:

But it is evident also, that it is not easy, with our style of proceeding, to get beyond the notion of our ordinary self at all, or to get the paramount authority of a commanding best self, or right reason, recognised.<sup>124</sup>

This absence of an overall authority encourages the Victorians to keep their "natural taste for the bathos unimpaired."<sup>125</sup> In addition, each class has no guide by which to judge its literature or its religion. Politicians comfort each class, telling each one what it wants to hear; "Thus everything in our political life tends to hide from us that there is anything wiser than our ordinary selves, and to prevent our getting the notion of a paramount right reason."<sup>126</sup> Newspapers promote certain philosophical theories advocated by Parliamentary representatives. These doctrines, preached by

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<sup>123</sup>Ibid., p. 85.

<sup>125</sup>Ibid., p. 87.

<sup>124</sup>Ibid., p. 86.

<sup>126</sup>Ibid., p. 96.

respectable authorities, advocate a "peculiarly British form of Atheism," as well as a "peculiarly British form of Quietism," which give

. . . no suggestions of right reason, and no rebukes of our ordinary self, from our governors, but a kind of philosophical theory . . . widely spread among us to the effect that there is no such thing at all as a best self and a right reason having claim to paramount authority, or, at any rate, no such thing ascertainable and capable of being made use of; and that there is nothing but an infinite number of ideas and works of our ordinary selves, and suggestions of our natural taste for the bathos. . . .<sup>127</sup>

At this point, adhering to Quintilian's teaching of the digression, Arnold concludes the essay with an "emotional appeal" to his audience:

We see, then how indispensable to that human perfection which we seek is, in the opinion of good judges, some public recognition and establishment of our best self, or right reason. We see how our habits and practice oppose themselves to such a recognition, and the many inconveniences which we therefore suffer. But not let us try to go a little deeper, and to find, beneath our actual habits and practice, the very ground and cause out of which they spring.<sup>128</sup>

After this appeal to the audience Arnold concludes the digression. He is now ready to present his proof, which is the next major division after the statement of facts.

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<sup>127</sup>Ibid., p. 99.

<sup>128</sup>Ibid., p. 108.

## CHAPTER IV

### ARRANGEMENT IN CULTURE AND ANARCHY:

#### CONFIRMATIO, REFUTATIO, PERORATIO

Since Arnold's Culture and Anarchy has thus far adhered to two of Quintilian's five major divisions as well as a rhetorical device used in forensic pleading, it is therefore logical to assume that the remaining three essays are devoted to confirmatio, refutatio, and peroratio. In fact, Arnold begins the fourth essay, "Hebraism and Hellenism," with a rhetorical device referred to as an artificial proof--that which the orator himself deduces--in the opening sentence of the first paragraph: "This fundamental ground is our preference of doing to thinking."<sup>1</sup> Although this sentence in itself is not altogether clear insofar as proof is concerned if it is taken at face value, it is a valid in the light of Quintilian's rule-- "if the nature of the main question is sufficiently clear without the proposition, especially if the statement of facts ends exactly where the question begins then it is permissible to exclude it."<sup>2</sup> Therefore, the

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<sup>1</sup>Culture and Anarchy, p. 109.

<sup>2</sup>Institutio, II, 131.



conclusion of Arnold's third essay serves as the proposition, or propositio: "But now let us try to go a little deeper, and to find, beneath our actual habits and practice, the very ground out of which they spring."<sup>3</sup>

As he continues to clarify his first statement of proof, Arnold concedes a point by acknowledging that perhaps the Victorians interpret the light of which he speaks in a different manner, but quickly refutes any preconceived belief which they may have:

We show, as a nation, laudable energy and persistence in walking according to the best light we have, but are not quite careful enough, perhaps, to see that our light be not darkness. This is only another version of the old story that energy is our strong point and favourable characteristic, rather than intelligence.<sup>4</sup>

Next, Arnold uses another rhetorical device, the Example, which Aristotle says is one of the two means of persuasion common to all branches of speaking.<sup>5</sup> Employing the means of the historical parallel, Arnold compares the Victorians "version of the story that energy is our strong point and favourable characteristic, rather than intelligence"<sup>6</sup> to prove that these two forces actually work against man. While the Victorians may regard the obligation of duty, self control and work as one force, and intelligence driving at those ideas

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<sup>3</sup>Culture and Anarchy, p. 108.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., p. 109.

<sup>5</sup>The Rhetoric of Aristotle, p. 147.

<sup>6</sup>Culture and Anarchy, p. 109.

which are the basis of right practice as another force, these two forces, although not necessarily rivals in their own nature, become rivals when they are exhibited in man and his history. As a result these forces divide "the empire of the world between."<sup>7</sup> Arnold then substantiates his argument by presenting a historical parallel: "And to give these forces names from the two races of men who have supplied the signal and splendid manifestations of them, we may call them respectively the forces of Hebraism and Hellenism."<sup>8</sup> Establishing proof that an imbalance of Hebraism and Hellenism prevents the English people from seeking the sweetness and light which can change their whole concept of society, Arnold begins his argument by conceding that the "final aim of both Hellenism and Hebraism, as of all great spiritual disciplines, is no doubt the same: man's perfection or salvation,"<sup>9</sup> before he passes on to his next proof. Using both artistic and in-artistic proofs, Arnold argues from established truths (facts) as well as from those which he himself deduces to prove that each force pursues the final aim of salvation in a different light:

The uppermost idea with Hellenism is to see things as they really are; the uppermost idea with Hebraism is conduct

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<sup>7</sup>Ibid., p. 110.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid.

and obedience. . . . The governing idea of Hellenism is spontaneity of consciousness; that of Hebraism, strictness of conscience.<sup>10</sup>

At this point in his argument, Arnold expounds his proof and first explains what a man believes if he is ruled by Hellenism:

To get rid of one's ignorance, to see things as they are, and by seeing them as they are to see them in their beauty, is the simple and attractive ideal which Hellenism holds out before human nature; and from the simplicity and charm of this ideal, Hellenism, and human life in the hands of Hellenism, is invested with a kind of aerial ease, clearness, and radiancy; they are full of what we call sweetness and light. Difficulties are kept out of view, and the beauty and rationalness of the ideal have all our thoughts.<sup>11</sup>

Then he gives credence to his argument by again using the historical parallel and quotes Socrates: "The best man is he who tries to perfect himself, and the happiest man is he who most feels that he is perfecting himself."<sup>12</sup> Continuing with his historical example, Arnold gives credit to Socrates as he describes Hebraism through the eyes of this ancient philosopher and explains why some of the English people are unable to seek perfection:

"Socrates," as this saying goes, "is terribly at ease in Zion." Hebraism,--and here is the source of its wonderful strength,--has always been severely pre-occupied with an awful sense of the impossibility of being at ease in Zion; of the difficulties which oppose themselves to a man's pursuit or attainment of that perfection of which Socrates talks so hopefully. . . .<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>10</sup>Ibid., pp. 111-113.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid., p. 116.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid., pp. 115-116.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid.

Thus, through the Example, which the ancient rhetoricians used as the inductive method of arguing,<sup>14</sup> Arnold establishes proof as to why Hebraism in Victorian society thwarts perfection:

"This something is sin; and the space which sin fills in Hebraism, as compared with Hellenism, is indeed prodigious."<sup>15</sup> Then he explains that because of a consciousness of sin, man has difficulty in knowing and conquering himself. This block impedes man's pursuit of perfection and thus Hebraism becomes a force hostile to man:

As Hellenism speaks of thinking clearly, seeing things in their essence and beauty, as a grand and precious feat for man to achieve, so Hebraism speaks of becoming conscious of sin, of awakening to a sense of sin, as a feat of this kind.<sup>16</sup>

With this proof established, Arnold passes to his next argument in his attempt to establish proof as to why both Hebraism and Hellenism fail as a single ruling force. Using another rhetorical device, referred to as "cause and effect" and listed under Aristotle's Topics,<sup>17</sup> Arnold draws his conclusion from his examination of historical data. First examining the "cause" of the failure of each of these two major forces to become a single ruling force, Arnold presents his next argument through inartistic proofs. Giving detailed

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<sup>14</sup>The Rhetoric of Aristotle, p. 147.

<sup>15</sup>Culture and Anarchy, p. 117.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid., p. 117.

<sup>17</sup>The Rhetoric of Aristotle, p. 179.

factual evidence, Arnold explains to his audience that Hellenism originally failed because its conception of human nature was unsound and premature at that particular moment in man's development:

Therefore the bright promise of Hellenism faded, and Hebraism ruled the world. Then was seen that astonishing spectacle, so well marked by the often-quoted words of the prophet Zechariah, when men of all languages and nations took hold of the skirt of him that was a Jew, saying: "We will go with you, for we have heard that God is with you." And the Hebraism which thus received and ruled a world all gone out of the way and altogether become unprofitable, was, and could not but be, the later, the more spiritual, the more attractive development of Hebraism. It was Christianity; that is to say, Hebraism aiming at self-conquest and rescue from the thrall of vile affections, not by obedience to the letter of a law, but by conformity to the image of a self-sacrificing example. . . . Through age after age and generation after generation, our race, or all that part of our race which was most living and progressive, was baptized into a death; and endeavoured, by suffering in the flesh, to cease from sin.<sup>18</sup>

As Arnold continues with his argument, he takes advantage of the rhetorical digressio to give his audience a more detailed and vivid account of historical evidence from the early civilization of Greece prior to Christianity, through the Reformation, the Renaissance, and Puritanism, to show how man's interpretation of both Hebraism and Hellenism during these different periods in history effected changes in both forces:

For more than two hundred years the main stream of man's advance has moved towards knowing himself and the world,

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<sup>18</sup>Culture and Anarchy, p. 118.

seeing things as they are, spontaneity of consciousness; the main impulse of a great part, and that the strongest part, of our nation has been towards the strictness of conscience.<sup>19</sup>

Using all of the conclusions drawn from evidence established in his pleading, Arnold is able to substantiate his defense of culture by presenting the fallacies of both Hebraism and Hellenism:

They have made the secondary the principal at the wrong moment, and the principal they have at the wrong moment treated as secondary. This contravention of natural order has produced, as such contravention always must produce, a certain confusion and false movement, of which we are now beginning to feel, in almost every direction, the inconvenience. . . . Everywhere we see the beginnings of confusion, and we want a clue to some sound order and authority. This we can only get by going back upon the actual instincts and forces which rule our life, seeing them as they really are, connecting them with our other instincts and forces, and enlarging our whole view and rule of life.<sup>20</sup>

From this point, Arnold proceeds to "Porro Unum Necessarium."

"Porro Unum Est Necessarium," is a continuation of the ideas in "Hebraism and Hellenism." In this essay Arnold uses both confirmatio and refutatio; however, he is primarily interested in refuting the Victorians' accepted belief that Hebraism can fulfill the needs in their lives. Again, Arnold follows the teaching of the ancient rhetoricians. First, he restates his statement of facts:

We have found that at the bottom of our present unsettled state . . . lies the notion of its being the prime right

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<sup>19</sup>Ibid., pp. 126-27.

<sup>20</sup>Ibid., p. 127.

and happiness for each of us, to affirm himself, and his ordinary self; to be doing, and to be doing freely as he likes. We have found at the bottom of it the disbelief in right reason as a lawful authority.<sup>21</sup>

Then he presents his propositio: he will test the validity of the present ruling force, Hebraism, to see if it is the one thing needful in the lives of the English people. Beginning with proofs previously deduced when he used historical parallels to relate the current beliefs of the Victorians to misguided conceptions about religious interpretations, Arnold reiterates his proof that such a belief causes them to think

. . . their real and only important homage was owed to a power concerned with obedience rather than with their intelligence, a power interested in the moral side of their nature almost exclusively.<sup>22</sup>

Consequently,

. . . they have been led to regard in themselves as the one thing needful, strictness of conscience, the staunch adherence to some fixed law of doing we have got already, instead of spontaneity of consciousness, which tends continually to enlarge our whole law of doing.<sup>23</sup>

Arnold then refutes this belief by concluding that what the Victorians really have "is a law of conduct, a law of unexampled power for enabling them to war against the law of sin in their members and not to serve it in the lusts thereof."<sup>24</sup>

Although Arnold is primarily interested in proving that Hebraism cannot fulfill the needs of the people of England,

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<sup>21</sup>Ibid., p. 128.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid.

<sup>22</sup>Ibid., p. 129.

<sup>24</sup>Ibid.

he also refutes any idea that Hellenism alone can serve man's intellectual and moral needs:

But sooner or later it becomes manifest that when the two sides of humanity proceed in this fashion of alternate preponderance, and not of mutual understanding and balance, the side which is uppermost does not really provide in a satisfactory manner for the needs of the side which is undermost, and a state of confusion is, sooner or later, the result.<sup>25</sup>

Lending further support to a refutation of the current belief that Hebraism is the one thing needful is Arnold's condemnation of Victorian society. While he has previously used the work Puritanism only to point out that the basic beliefs of the Puritans and the English are almost identical--strictness of conscience rather than the spontaneity of consciousness found in Hellenism--he becomes more explicit and refers to Hebraism as Puritanism. Using a historical parallel to adduce his next premise, Arnold refutes the Victorians' ability to interpret correctly the meaning of the force which they so blatantly avow is the teaching of the apostles:

And therefore, while we willingly admit with the Christian apostle that the world by wisdom,--that is, by the isolated preponderance of its intellectual impulses,--knew not God, or the true order of things, it is yet necessary, also, to set a sort of converse to this proposition, and to say likewise (what is equally true) that the world by Puritanism knew not God.<sup>26</sup>

As Arnold continues to defend culture through his refutation of Hebraism, he presents another artistic proof deduced by

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<sup>25</sup>Ibid., p. 130.

<sup>26</sup>Ibid., pp. 130-31.



his own association with society:

The Puritan's great danger is that he imagines himself in possession of a rule telling him the unum necessarium, or one thing needful, and that he then remains satisfied with a very crude conception of what this rule really is and what it tells him, thinks he has now knowledge and henceforth needs only to act, and, in this dangerous state of assurance and self-satisfaction, proceeds to give full swing to a number of the instincts of his ordinary self.<sup>27</sup>

Finally, Arnold draws a conclusion about the value of Hebraism by first pointing out to his audience what the Puritan of whom he speaks really wants, then immediately refutes this want:

And what he wants is a larger conception of human nature, showing him the number of other points at which his nature must come to its best, besides the points which he himself knows and thinks of.

There is no unum necessarium, or one thing needful, which can free human nature from the obligation of trying to come to its best at all these points. The real unum necessarium for us is to come to our best at all points.<sup>28</sup>

He presents another proof in defense of culture when he informs Victorians that the force which dictates to the Englishman that the "one thing needful justifying in us vulgarity, hideousness, ignorance, and violence." is presently being challenged by a power which "encourages us to go back upon this rule, and try the very ground on which we appear to stand."<sup>29</sup> Again using the historical parallel, Arnold indirectly defends culture:

Sweetness and light evidently have to do with the bent or side in humanity which we call Hellenic. Greek intelligence

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<sup>27</sup>Ibid., p. 134.

<sup>28</sup>Ibid., pp. 134-35.

<sup>29</sup>Ibid., p. 135.

has obviously for its essence the instinct for what Plato calls the true, firm, intelligible law of things; the law of light, of seeing things as they are. . . . To say we work for sweetness and light, then, is only another way of saying that we work for Hellenism.<sup>30</sup>

To refute those who say that sweetness and light are not enough, Arnold writes:

But whether at this or that time, and to this or that set of persons, one ought to insist most on the praises of fire and strength, or on the praises of sweetness and light, must depend, one would think, on the circumstances and needs of that particular time and those particular persons.<sup>31</sup>

Finally, Arnold confirms his stance:

. . . the more we go into the matter, the currents seem to converge, and together to bear us along towards culture. If we look at the world outside us we find a disquieting absence of sure authority. We discover that only in right reason can we get a source of sure authority; and culture brings us towards right reason.<sup>32</sup>

In the sixth and last essay, "Our Liberal Practitioners," Arnold concludes his proof in the defense of culture. Although his concept of culture remains unchanged, he now shifts altogether to another rhetorical device, one of Aristotle's methods of refuting by counter-arguments. Having argued through two essays to prove what the majority of the Victorians believe in and how they often have been influenced through the misinterpretation of historical events to establish such beliefs, Arnold is now able to use the Aristotelian method to adduce premises contrary to those of his opponents

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<sup>30</sup>Ibid., p. 131.

<sup>32</sup>Ibid., p. 149.

<sup>31</sup>Ibid., p. 133.

and thereby establish his own premises to prove that culture is needed in the lives of the English people.

Using the rhetorical propositio, Arnold informs his audience that he will examine the "practical operations" in which his friends and countrymen are presently engaged "for the removal of certain definite evils." Specifically, he will use examples

. . . to try to see whether this conspicuous operation is one of those round which we need to let our consciousness play freely and reveal what manner of spirit we are of in doing it; or whether it is one which by no means admits the application of this doctrine of ours, and one to which we ought to lend a hand immediately.<sup>33</sup>

In this particular part of the argument, Arnold first establishes the premise "that the present Church establishment in Ireland is contrary to reason and justice in so far as the Church of a very small minority of the people there takes for itself all the Church-property of the Irish people."<sup>34</sup> To prove that this action is contrary to reason and justice, Arnold presents evidence through his application of the topos of "incentives and deterrents"<sup>35</sup> to establish proof. He notes that while "our statesmen of both parties were inclined . . . to follow the natural line of the State's duty . . . to make in Ireland some fair apportionment of Church-property,"<sup>36</sup>

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<sup>33</sup>Ibid., pp. 152-53.

<sup>34</sup>Ibid., p. 153.

<sup>35</sup>The Rhetoric of Aristotle, p. 168.

<sup>36</sup>Culture and Anarchy, p. 154.

they have been deterred in their inclinations because of the English and Scotch Nonconformists' great horror of establishments and endowments for religion. Consequently, as an incentive to get the support of the Nonconformists, who comprise the strength of the Liberal Majority in the House of Commons, these Liberal statesmen support the Nonconformists' actions.

Arnold next refutes the so-called superficial reasons for the disestablishment of the Irish Church. Using a premise contrary to his opponent, he says:

The actual power, in short, by virtue of which the Liberal party in the House of Commons is now trying to disestablish the Irish Church, is not the power of reason and justice, it is the power of the Nonconformists' antipathy to Church establishments.<sup>37</sup>

Then he presents an underlying motive for this action:

Mr. Spurgeon, in his eloquent and memorable letter, expressly avowed that he would sooner leave things as they are in Ireland, that is, he would sooner let the injustice and irrationality of the present appropriation continue, than do anything to set up the Roman image.<sup>38</sup>

Finally, Arnold refutes the belief of the Nonconformists' claim that they are supported by Jesus Christ in their actions:

. . . by these words, Christ meant that his religion was to work on the soul. And of the two parts of the soul on which religion works,--the thinking and speculative part, and the feeling and imaginative part,--Nonconformity satisfies the first no better than the Established Churches,

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<sup>37</sup>Ibid., p. 155.

<sup>38</sup>Ibid., p. 156.

which Christ by these words is supposed to have condemned, satisfy it; and the second part it satisfies even worse than the Established Churches.<sup>39</sup>

Thus Arnold draws his conclusion and defends his advocacy of culture by asking his audience to make its own decision between the premise presently accepted as the basis for disestablishing the Irish Church, which he refers to as Hebraising, "--that is, in this case, taking an uncritical interpretation of certain Bible words as our absolute rule of conduct. . . ,"<sup>40</sup> and his own premise, which he refers to as Hellenising:

. . . surely it may not be unreasonable to Hellenise a little, to let our thought and consciousness play freely about our proposed operation and its motives, dissolve these motives if they are unsound,--which certainly they have some appearance, at any rate, of being,--and create in their stead, if they are, a set of sounder and more persuasive motives conducting to a more solid operation.<sup>41</sup>

The next example of the Liberals' "practical operations," which Arnold examines is the Real Estate Intestacy Bill, proposed by the Liberals "to prevent the land of a man who dies intestate from going, as it goes now, to his eldest son."<sup>42</sup> To test the validity of this particular operation, Arnold deviates from his previous method of arguing and combines several rhetorical devices to establish his proof. First, he uses Aristotle's procedure of adducing a premise

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<sup>39</sup>Ibid., pp. 161-62.

<sup>41</sup>Ibid., pp. 162-63.

<sup>40</sup>Ibid., p. 162.

<sup>42</sup>Ibid., p. 164.

contrary to the present premise favored by Victorian would-be reformers. Next, he uses a method of Socrates, which Quintilian also advocates:

The method of argument chiefly used by Socrates was of this nature: when he had asked a number of questions to which his adversary could only agree, he finally inferred the conclusion of the problem under discussion from its resemblance to the points already conceded. This method is known as induction, and though it cannot be used in a set speech, it is usual in a speech to assume that which takes the form of a question in dialogue.<sup>43</sup>

Arnold, too, presents the opposing premises in the form of questions; then through the method of induction, he infers a conclusion. Placing the two propositions side by side, he opposes the Liberals' premise to his own, which, as always, he derives from his defense of culture:

If the almost exclusive possession of the land of this country by the Barbarians is a bad thing, is this practical operation of the Liberals, and the stock notion, on which it seems to rest, about the natural right of children to share equally in the enjoyment of their father's property after his death, the best and most effective means of dealing with it. Or is it best dealt with by letting one's thought and consciousness play freely and naturally upon the Barbarians, this Liberal operation, and the stock notion at the bottom of it, and trying to get as near as we can to the intelligible law of things as to each of them?<sup>44</sup>

Thus, following Quintilian's process of defending by refuting first,<sup>45</sup> Arnold begins to defend his premise by refuting the

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<sup>43</sup>Institutio, II, 273.

<sup>44</sup>Culture and Anarchy, pp. 164-65.

<sup>45</sup>Institutio, II, 345.

Liberals' belief that it is their inherent right to take the law into their own hands and propose whatever they wish without due consideration of those to whom it is aimed. Then applying Socrates' technique, Arnold begins his plea with questions to the audience:

Now does any one, if he simply and naturally reads his consciousness, discover that he has any rights at all? . . . men get this notion of rights from a process of abstract reasoning, inferring that the obligations they are conscious of towards others, others must be conscious of towards them, and not from any direct witness of consciousness at all.<sup>46</sup>

He reiterates: "So it is unsafe and misleading to say that our children have rights against us; what is true and safe to say is, that we have duties towards our children."<sup>47</sup> Next, Arnold questions the feasibility of the equal sharing of property among a man's children, for such a practice seems not in the best interest of their welfare:

With this equal sharing, society could not, for example, have organised itself afresh out of the chaos left by the fall of the Roman Empire; and to have an organized society to live in is more for a child's welfare than to have an equal share of his father's property.<sup>48</sup>

Finally, he concludes the refutation by telling the audience that Liberals have used the wrong approach in their proposal against the Barbarians, or landowners. Subtly he introduces

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<sup>46</sup>Culture and Anarchy, p. 165.

<sup>47</sup>Ibid.

<sup>48</sup>Ibid., p. 166.



Hellenism as a better solution to the Liberals' proposal:

It seems to me quite easy to show that a free disinterested play of thought on the Barbarians and their landholding is a thousand times more really practical, a thousand times more likely to lead to some effective result, than an operation such as that of which we have been now speaking.<sup>49</sup>

Again following Quintilian's practice, Arnold next elaborates on the facts which he has established in his refutation. As Quintilian notes, such facts

. . . require to be embellished and supported by the powers of the speaker. For although our arguments may be admirably adapted to express what we desire, they will none the less be slight and weak unless the orator makes a special effort to give them life.<sup>50</sup>

By pointing out the fallacies not only of the Liberals' actions, but also those of the Barbarians, Arnold now exposes Hebraism through the actions of Victorian society:

So that, perhaps, of the actual vulgarity of our Philistines and brutality of our Populace, the Barbarians and their feudal habits of succession, enduring out of their due time and place, are involuntarily the cause in a great degree; and they hurt the welfare of the rest of the community at the same time that as we have seen, they hurt their own.<sup>51</sup>

Finally, he offers culture as a solution, but again presents his conclusion in the form of a question:

But must not, now, the working in our minds of considerations like these, to which culture, that is, the disinterested and active use of reading, reflection, and

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<sup>49</sup>Ibid., p. 167.

<sup>50</sup>Institutio, II, 345.

<sup>51</sup>Culture and Anarchy, p. 169.



observation, in the endeavour to know the best that can be shown, carries us, be really much more effectual to the dissolution of feudal habits and rules of succession in land than an operation like the Real Estate Intestacy Bill; . . . since we have seen that this mechanical maxim is unsound, and that if it is unsound, the operation relying upon it cannot possibly be effective?<sup>52</sup>

Arnold's third example of Liberal policies is the bill brought forward in the House of Commons, a bill which permits a man to marry his deceased wife's sister. To examine this proposal, Arnold again follows the procedure that he used in the previous example. First, he refutes the Liberals' view "that God's law,--the name [Mr. Chambers] always gave to the Book of Leviticus,--did not really forbid a man to marry his deceased wife's sister,"<sup>53</sup> as being a misinterpretation used to justify undue appetites:

. . . having never before read anything else but their Bible, they now read their Bible over again, and make all manner of great discoveries there. All . . . are favourable to liberty, and in this way is satisfied that double craving so characteristic of our Philistine, and so eminently exemplified in that crowned Philistine, Henry the Eighth,--the craving for forbidden fruit and the craving for legality.<sup>54</sup>

Again attacking such a proposal as representative of the Hebraistic side of man, which causes him to feel that it is his right to do as he pleases when he pleases, Arnold condemns such action as "a kind of first instalment or public and

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<sup>52</sup>Ibid., p. 170.

<sup>53</sup>Ibid., p. 171.

<sup>54</sup>Ibid., pp. 172-73.

parliamentary pledge, of the great sexual insurrection of our Anglo-Teutonic race."<sup>55</sup> He establishes his own premise:

"What we seek is the Philistine's perfection, the development of his best self, not mere liberty for his ordinary self";<sup>56</sup> then he offers support:

For we know that the only perfect freedom is, as our religion says, a service; not a service to any stock maxim, but an elevation of our best self, and a harmonising in subordination to this, and to the idea of a perfected humanity, all the multitudinous, turbulent, and blind impulses of our ordinary selves.<sup>57</sup>

Using the rhetorical example to lend further support in his argument in the defense of culture, Arnold quotes from the Book of Leviticus:

Christian duties are founded on reason, not on the sovereign authority of God commanding what He pleases; God cannot command us what is not fit to be believed or done, all his commands being founded in the necessities of our nature.<sup>58</sup>

Finally, Arnold presents his conclusion in the form of a question, which each man must examine for individual meaning:

Who, I say, will believe, when he really considers the matter, that where the feminine nature, the feminine ideal, and our relations to them, are brought into question, the delicate and apprehensive genius of the Indo-European race, the race which invented the Muses, and chivalry, and the Madonna, is to find its last word on this question in the institutions of a Semitic people, whose wisest king had seven hundred wives and three hundred concubines?<sup>59</sup>

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<sup>55</sup>Ibid., p. 173.

<sup>58</sup>Ibid., p. 175.

<sup>56</sup>Ibid.

<sup>59</sup>Ibid., pp. 175-76.

<sup>57</sup>Ibid., pp. 173-74.

The fourth and last example of the Liberals' operations that Arnold examines is their free-trade policy. The pattern of confirmation seen in this presentation is almost identical to the argument in the Real Estate Intestacy Bill. First he adduces a premise contrary to the present premise favored by the Liberals. Again, he places these two premises side by side, opposing the Liberals' stance to his own, which he derives from his defense of culture:

Let us see whether . . . our Liberal friends do not pursue their operations in a mechanical way, without reference to any firm intelligible law of things, to human life as a whole, and human happiness; and whether it is not more for our good, at this particular moment at any rate, if instead of worshipping free-trade with them Hebraistically, as a kind of fetish, and helping them to pursue it as an end in and for itself, we turn the free stream of our thought upon their treatment of it, and see how this is related to the intelligible law of human life, and to national well-being and happiness.<sup>60</sup>

To test the validity of this particular operation, Arnold proposes to "see whether what our reprovers beautifully call ministering to the diseased spirit of our time is best done by the Hellenising method of proceeding or by the other [Hebraism]."<sup>61</sup> Once again following Quintilian's art of defense through refutation, Arnold points out the fallacies of such an operation administered by leaders whose natures are controlled by Hebraism. To Arnold, Hebraism entertains a superficial view of the policy; it sees free-trade only as

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<sup>60</sup>Ibid., p. 177.

<sup>61</sup>Ibid.

"having enabled the poor man to eat untaxed bread, and as having wonderfully augmented trade."<sup>62</sup> In reality, he argues, such a policy is aimed as a stimulant to the production of wealth, increase of trade, business, and population of the country, all of which are mechanically pursued by ends precious in themselves and are worshipped as what Arnold refers to as fetishes, with no sincere consideration of the individual's personal desire to have more in his life than untaxed bread. Consequently, this act of the Liberals has been used "not so much to make the existing poor man's bread cheaper or more abundant, but rather to create more poor men to eat it."<sup>63</sup> While some people may be troubled over the multitude of poor men, the majority of the Victorians, whose lives are ruled by Hebraism, overlook the individual's plight and think only of the overall progress. The Liberals maintain that (1) "other things being equal, the more population increases, the more does production increase to keep pace with it," and that (2) "although population always tends to equal the means of subsistence, yet people's notions of what subsistence is enlarge as civilization advances, and takes in a number of things beyond the bare necessities of life."<sup>64</sup> Arnold refutes this philosophy as only axioms which the Liberals apply, with

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<sup>62</sup>Ibid., p. 176.

<sup>63</sup>Ibid., p. 178.

<sup>64</sup>Ibid., p. 180.

the belief that such are "self-acting laws which put themselves into operation without trouble or planning on our part, if we will only pursue free-trade, business, and population zealously and staunchly." He concludes:

Whereas the real truth is, that, however, the case might be under other circumstances, yet in fact, as we now manage the matter, the enlarged conception of what is included in subsistence does not operate to prevent the bringing into the world of numbers of people who but just attain to the barest necessities of life or who even fail to attain them; while, again, though production may increase as population increases, yet it seems that the production may be of such a kind, and so related, or rather non-related, to population, that the population may be little the better for it.<sup>65</sup>

To substantiate this conclusion, Arnold again follows Quintilian and elaborates on the facts thus far established in his refutation. Using the rhetorical example, Arnold presents additional proof: the cost of bread and bacon has changed very little since Queen Elizabeth's time, even though the Liberals argue that with an increase in population, prices are cheaper and procurement of these goods is more easily available.

Finally, Arnold deduces a conclusion from the proofs, which, in turn, he has drawn from evidence presented:

In short, it turns out that our pursuit of free-trade as of so many other things, has been too mechanical. We fix upon some object, which in this case is the production of wealth, and the increase of manufactures, population, and commerce through free-trade as a kind of one

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<sup>65</sup>Ibid.

thing needful, or end in itself; and then we pursue it staunchly and mechanically, not to see how it is related to the whole intelligible law of things and to full human perfection, or to treat it as the piece of machinery, of varying value as its relations to the intelligible law of things vary, which it really is.<sup>66</sup>

Having followed Quintilian's procedure thus far and refuted the opponents' premise, Arnold now begins defense of his own premise. First, he informs the audience of the need to prevent the Philistine Liberals' operations from being pursued mechanically; what then follows is a restatement of his notion of culture:

. . . the notion that culture, or the study of perfection, leads us to conceive of no perfection as being real which is not a general perfection, embracing all our fellow-men with whom we have to do. Such is the sympathy which binds humanity together, that we are, indeed, as our religion says, members of one body, and if one member suffer, all the members suffers with it. Individual perfection is impossible so long as the rest of mankind are not perfected along with us.<sup>67</sup>

Consequently, if the English people are to rise above their present situation, then all people must be included in the progress toward perfection, and "we must not let the worship of any fetish, any machinery, such as manufactures or population . . . create for us such a multitude of miserable, sunken, and ignorant human beings."<sup>68</sup> Further, Arnold argues that although some of the Philistines have begun to make

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<sup>66</sup>Ibid., pp. 181-82.

<sup>67</sup>Ibid., p. 184.

<sup>68</sup>Ibid., p. 186.

progress toward perfection, they cannot succeed as long as "an unintelligent Hebraism of one sort keeps repeating"<sup>69</sup> such interpretations, which the Victorians accept as being infallible. Then he concludes his argument in the defense of culture:

Hellenism, surely, or the habit of fixing our mind upon the intelligible law of things, is most salutary if it makes us see that the only absolute good, the only absolute and eternal object prescribed to us by God's law, or the divine order of things, is the progress towards perfection,--our own progress towards it and the progress of humanity.<sup>70</sup>

Having now refuted four policies urged by Liberal practitioners, Arnold adds a three-page conclusion, or peroration. This procedure in argument has its precedent in Quintilian:

When we are pleading a complicated case which is really made up of several cases, it will be necessary to introduce a number of passages resembling perorations, as Cicero does in the Verrines, where he laments over Philodamus, the ships' captains, the crucifixion of the Roman citizen, and a number of other tragic incidents. . . . Some call these . . . a peroration distributed among different portions of a speech. I should regard them rather as species than as parts of the peroration, since the terms epilogue and peroration both clearly indicate that they form the conclusion of a speech.<sup>71</sup>

Quintilian teaches that this last division of his five-part arrangement is considered the most important one in forensic

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<sup>69</sup>Ibid., p. 190.

<sup>70</sup>Ibid., p. 191.

<sup>71</sup>Institutio, II, 415-17.

pleading.<sup>72</sup> Further, he says that there are two kinds of peroration: ". . . it may deal either with facts, or with the emotional aspect of the case."<sup>73</sup> Quintilian also points out that while the majority of Athenians and almost all philosophers who have left anything in writing on the art of oratory have held that the recapitulation is the sole form of the peroration,<sup>74</sup> he himself teaches that the peroration consists primarily of appeals to the emotions, which fall into two classes: (1) ethos - to establish the speaker's character as being completely trustworthy, and (2) pathos - to arouse feeling in his audience.<sup>75</sup>

Arnold's peroration, however, deals more with facts than with the emotional aspects of the case. In all of his arguments, he has presented evidence through both artistic and non-artistic proofs to establish facts which prove that the lack of culture has caused a chaotic condition which, in turn, is fostering anarchism within Victorian society. In addition Arnold's peroration is purposefully not forceful. This subdued manner is another rhetorical procedure sanctioned by Quintilian in particular situations:

There are also milder kinds of peroration in which, if our opponent is of such a character that he deserves to be treated with respect, we strive to ingratiate ourselves with him or give him some friendly warning or urge him to regard us as his friends.<sup>76</sup>

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<sup>72</sup>Ibid., p. 417.

<sup>73</sup>Ibid., p. 383.

<sup>74</sup>Ibid., p. 385.

<sup>75</sup>Ibid., pp. 417-29.

<sup>76</sup>Ibid., p. 413.



Certainly, Arnold's situation demands that he ingratiate himself with his opponents. First, throughout his essays, he has included himself among those whom he has prosecuted in his defense of culture. Secondly, he is not only appealing to the Victorians to decide in his favor, but he is also appealing to them to lend support to a different kind of life--a life that requires a new philosophy, which will alter their present way of life as well as their religious dogmas.

As Arnold begins the peroration, he follows Quintilian's teaching of "recapitulation of the proofs,"<sup>77</sup> and reiterates what he has said in the conclusion of each essay:

. . . the practical operations of our Liberal friends . . . do not seem to us so practical for real good as they think; and our Liberal friends seem to us themselves to need to Hellenise . . . a little, to examine into the nature of real good, and to listen to what their consciousness tells them about it. . . .

It is mere Hebraising, we stop short, and refuse to let our consciousness play freely, whenever we or our friends do not happen to like what it discovers to us. This is to make the Liberal party, or the Conservative party, our one thing needful, instead of human perfection.

Everything, in short, confirms us in the doctrine, so unpalatable to the believers in action, that our main business at the present moment is not so much to work away at certain crude reforms, . . . as to create, through the help of that culture which at the very outset we began by praising and recommending.

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<sup>77</sup>Ibid., p. 405.

In the meanwhile, since our Liberal friends keep loudly and resolutely assuring us that their actual operations at present are fruitful and solid, let us in each case keep testing these operations in the simple way we have indicated, by letting the natural stream of consciousness flow over them freely; and if they stand this test successfully, then let us give them our interest, but not else.<sup>78</sup>

Afterwards, Arnold begins an emotional appeal. Using pathos to arouse feeling in the audience, he enumerates his major facts, and at the same time pleads with the Victorians to support his plan by explaining to them that each can contribute to the perfecting of English society if he will refuse "to lend a hand to the imperfect operation of our Liberal friends"<sup>79</sup> and disregard their actions in preference to seeking in the "intelligible laws of things a firmer and sounder basis for future practice than any which we have at present."<sup>80</sup> And he further pleads that they may also succeed in making the society in which they live more solid "than all which our bustling politicians can do."<sup>81</sup>

Next, Arnold presents another established fact to refresh the memory of his audience and to give support to the challenge he has just offered his opponents:

For we have seen how much of our disorders and perplexities is due to the disbelief, among the classes and combinations of men, Barbarian or Philistine, which have hitherto goverened our society, in right reason, in a

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<sup>78</sup>Culture and Anarchy, pp. 192-94.

<sup>79</sup>Ibid., p. 195.

<sup>80</sup>Ibid.

<sup>81</sup>Ibid.

paramount best self; to the inevitable decay and break-up of the organisations by which, asserting and expressing in these organisations their ordinary self only, they have so long ruled us; and to their irresolution, when the society, which their conscience tells them they have made and still manage not with right reason but with their ordinary self, is rudely shaken, in offering resistance to its subverters.<sup>82</sup>

Lending further support to his challenge, Arnold gives factual evidence about the anarchial tendencies prevalent among the Liberals because of their insistence that it is an Englishman's right to do as he likes when he likes, with no repression from government. Again, Arnold uses pathos to arouse the feelings of his audience by reminding them that "the very framework and exterior order of the State, whoever may administer the State, is sacred,"<sup>83</sup> and adds that culture is a resolute enemy of anarchy, "because of the great hopes and designs for the State which culture teaches us to nourish."<sup>84</sup> And he further pleads with the Victorians and says that if they will believe in right reason, and have faith in the progress of humanity towards perfection, and labor for this end, they will grow "to have a clearer sight of the ideas of right reason, and of the elements and helps of perfection. . . ."<sup>85</sup>

Once he has recapitulated factual proofs established in his arguments, Arnold devotes the remainder of the "Conclusion" not only to appeal to his audience to become a vanguard

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<sup>82</sup>Ibid., pp. 195-96.

<sup>84</sup>Ibid.

<sup>83</sup>Ibid., p. 197.

<sup>85</sup>Ibid.

in a non-violent revolution against the Liberals and Nonconformists but also to give them guidelines, which will effectively reveal fallacies. Those who become a part of Arnold's vanguard will thus become lovers of culture, individuals who "are unswervingly and with a good conscience the opposers of anarchy."<sup>86</sup> And it will be their duty to dissipate the false notions prevalent among the Victorians. Indeed, the friends of culture must "spread the belief in right reason and in a firm intelligible law of things, and get men to try, in preference to staunchly acting with imperfect knowledge, to obtain some sounder basis of knowledge on which to act."<sup>87</sup>

Arnold goes on to explain that the believers in culture must not be hasty in trying to reform England. Although England has long been ruled by the discipline of Hebraism,<sup>88</sup> is it the best light that England knows? And is it not possible that

. . . when in the fulness of time it has reason and beauty offered to it, and the law of things as they really are, it should at last walk by this true light with the same staunchness and zeal with which it formerly walked by its imperfect light? And thus man's two great natural forces, Hebraism and Hellenism, will no longer be dissociated and rival, but will be a joint force of right thinking and strong doing to carry him on towards perfection.<sup>89</sup>

Finally, Arnold makes one last appeal to his audience. Directing his words to each individual in English society, he urges

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<sup>86</sup>Ibid., p. 198.

<sup>88</sup>Ibid., p. 200.

<sup>87</sup>Ibid., p. 199.

<sup>89</sup>Ibid.

that everyone subdue selfish interests and actively engage himself in the battle for humanity:

We . . . are for giving the heritage neither to the Barbarians nor to the Philistines, nor yet to the Populace; but we are for the transformation of each and all of these according to the law of perfection.<sup>90</sup>

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<sup>90</sup>Ibid., p. 204.

## CONCLUSION

A rhetorical analysis of Matthew Arnold's Culture and Anarchy reveals that there is a definite similarity to the classical form. Although there is no conclusive historical evidence that Arnold used this form as a guideline, the classical pattern emerges as he progresses from essay to essay in an effort to prove his argument in the defense of culture. Certainly, records reveal that studies in the classics were regarded as the epitome of intellectual training in the universities of England during the time that Arnold received his academic training. Even though the classical form per se is not mentioned as one of the subjects that Arnold studied, there is evidence that it was included in his training, since accounts of training at Oxford show that studies there included Aristotle and Quintilian. Indeed, Arnold's predilection for classical structure and his perserverance in perfecting the classical style in his works are evident from the beginning of his literary career.

Moreover, an analysis of Culture and Anarchy reveals that each essay corresponds to the divisions as well as to the rhetorical devices of arrangement particularly as

taught by Aristotle and Quintilian. Arnold begins his treatise with the classical exordium, or introduction, and introduces his subject, culture. Then he explains the purpose of his essay: to recommend culture as the great help out of the present difficulties. Finally, he informs his audience that he will defend culture and, at the same time, prosecute those who misinterpret it as merely "a smattering of the two dead languages of Greek and Latin." In "Doing As One Likes," which corresponds to Quintilian's statement of facts, Arnold expounds the facts of the case. He also sets forth facts that will have a bearing on the case. In presenting these facts, he follows the classical teaching that it is necessary first to rebut charges in order to incriminate the opponent. Arnold uses his third essay, "Barbarians, Philistines, Populace," as a classical digressio, a rhetorical device, which is allowed if digression will lend support to the pleading, to give information related to the subject. Next, Arnold proceeds to the classical confirmatio, or proof, in his fourth essay, "Hebraism and Hellenism." Here he presents proof of the prosecution of the Victorians in order to establish his defense of culture. His practice follows the teaching of both Aristotle and Quintilian, for he uses rhetorical devices such as artistic and inartistic proofs. Arnold's fifth essay, "Porro Unum Est Necessarium," is a continuation of the previous essay. To further establish his proof, he employs refutatio,

or refutation, the fourth division of the classical form, to refute pre-conceived ideas that the Hebraic way of life can fulfill the Victorians' need in their lives. Again, Arnold uses the classical digression to lend support to his argument. In his sixth and last essay, "Our Liberal Practitioners," Arnold continues his refutation through the use of the example, another rhetorical device. Finally, in the "Conclusion," which corresponds to the classical peroration, Arnold recapitulates factual evidence presented and appeals to his audience to become a vanguard in a non-violent revolution in the defense of culture against the Liberals and Non-Nonconformists, whose actions reveal a tendency toward anarchy. With this rhetorical structure, Arnold and Culture and Anarchy present a persuasive argument through the artful employment of arrangement.



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