

THE GLOBAL PATH OF HUMAN RIGHTS: A QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF
TRAJECTORIES, DEMOCRACY, AND DEVELOPMENT

A DISSERTATION

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS

FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

IN THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF TEXAS

WOMAN'S UNIVERSITY

DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY

COLLEGE OF ARTS AND SCIENCES

BY

HEATHER M. GERLING, M.A.

DENTON, TEXAS

MAY 2020

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This dissertation grew from a reverence for the principles of human rights, and the belief that they represent the very best of humanity. I would first like to thank my committee members, Dr. Jim Williams, Dr. Mahmoud Sadri, and Dr. Philip Yang, for their support. I'm especially grateful to my committee chair, Dr. Celia Lo, who worked tirelessly on my behalf, distilled her wisdom, shared her experience, and selflessly gave of her time. I am convinced there has never been a finer mentor or better advocate. I thank Dr. Williams for his early research guidance, great conversations, and much appreciated attention to detail. I thank Dr. Sadri for his steadfast support of my interest in culture and religion, and for sharing his with me. I thank Dr. Yang for agreeing to come on so late, and for the extra set of eyes on the statistics for this project.

I would like to thank my family who have been a constant source of encouragement—especially my husband, David, for his unwavering belief in me, not only as I pursued this degree, but throughout our lives together. I also thank my amazing daughter, Hunter, whose patient, enduring belief in human dignity inspired this work. I wish to thank my dearest friend, Amy, for graciously walking every mile of this journey with me. Thank you to my co-author, William-Ash-Houchen, for providing such profound friendship along the way. I must thank Michael Thompson, whose outstanding teaching helped plant the seeds for this research. A very special thanks also goes to Karen Allen for her steady guidance. Finally, I want to thank my late father, Daniel Joe Ableman, for paving the way. I will always remember his gift for telling me what mattered.

ABSTRACT

HEATHER M. GERLING

THE GLOBAL PATH OF HUMAN RIGHTS: A QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF TRAJECTORIES, DEMOCRACY, AND DEVELOPMENT

Despite common international acceptance of human rights law, countries and regions vary in their understandings and practices of human rights. This nation-level study sought, first, to develop empirical definitions of human rights; second, to describe the trend of human rights levels across countries and regions of the world; and third, to link development and democracy to country- and region-specific adoption of different generations of human rights.

With data taken from the CIRI Human Rights Data Project, the Social Progress Imperative, the Human Development Report, the Polity IV Project, the World Bank Group, and the Association of Religion Data Archives, indicators were extracted to empirically develop human rights constructs, which were then plotted to determine human rights trends over time. Finally, democracy and economic development were used to explain the human rights constructs globally and across five geographic world regions. Using principal component method with varimax rotation to conduct exploratory factor analysis, results showed that the latent constructs corresponded to the three-generation framework; however, women's rights were found to be empirically separate from general human rights. First-generation human rights (civil and political) were trending downward, while second-generation rights (economic, social, and cultural) were rising. Results also affirmed expectations of higher levels of first-generation human rights in

countries and regions of the Global North. There was no support for the expectation of higher levels of second- and third-generation rights (environmental) among countries and regions of the Global South. Additionally, using generalized least squares (GLS) random-effects modeling for panel data (with robust standard errors) in STATA to analyze the outcome variables did not yield support for the expected positive associations of human rights outcome with democracy and economic development across all three generations. The findings indicate a need for more critical analyses of the causes for the decreases in first-generation rights. Further analyses of countries who have achieved something in the way of gender parity in human rights, and additional work in examining the effects of human rights embedded within a nation's constitution would also be beneficial.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	ii
ABSTRACT.....	iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	v
LIST OF TABLES	vii
LIST OF FIGURES	ix
Chapter	
I. INTRODUCTION	1
Problem Statement	5
Significance of the Study	7
Organization of the Dissertation.....	11
II. THEORETICAL FOUNDATION AND LITERATURE REVIEW	12
The Emergence of Human Rights.....	12
Characterizing Human Rights.....	14
The Case for a Three-Generation Framework	17
The Role of Democracy in Human Rights Trends.....	23
World Polity Theory	23
Waves of Democracy	24
The Role of Economic Development in Human Rights Trends	29
Research Objectives	33
III. DATA AND METHODS	35
Data	35
Sample.....	38
Measures.	39
Human rights indicators	39
Independent variables.....	45
Control variables	45
Data Analysis Strategies.....	46

IV. RESULTS.....	48
The Development of Human Rights Constructs	48
Trends	57
Explanation of Human Rights Constructs.....	76
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION.....	90
Emerging Factors and Their Underlying Constructs	91
World Trends in Human Rights	95
Regional Human Rights Trends.....	100
The Effects of Democracy and Development on Human Rights	102
The Status of Women’s Rights	105
Limitations	107
Future Research	108
Conclusion	109
REFERENCES	112
APPENDICES	
A. Countries used in the Study	134
B. CIRI Variables, Description and Measurements	138
C. Social Progress Index Variables	142
D. Countries Sorted by Region	145
E. List of Acronyms.....	149

LIST OF TABLES

Table	Page
1. Exploratory factor analysis of CIRI data variables from 1981-2011	49
2. Exploratory factor analysis of CIRI data variables from 1981-2011 Rights variable removed	51
3. Exploratory factor analysis of HDR data variables from 2010-2014.....	53
4. Exploratory factor analysis of SPI data variables from 2014-2018.....	56
5. New human rights constructs derived from factor analysis of CIRI, HDR and SPI variable	57
6. Generalized Least Squares Random-Effects Regression Results of Liberties Construct from 1981-2011	80
7. Generalized Least Squares Random-Effects Regression Results of Women's Economic Rights from 1981-2011	81
8. Generalized Least Squares Random-Effects Regression Results of Women's Social Rights from 1981-2004.....	83
9. Generalized Least Squares Random-Effects Regression Results of Women's Political Rights from 1981-2011	84
10. Generalized Least Squares Random-Effects Regression Results of Quality of Life from 2010-2014.....	86
11. Generalized Least Squares Random-Effects Regression Results of Air Quality from 2010-2014.....	87
12. Generalized Least Squares Random-Effects Regression Results of Environmental Integrity from 2010-2014	88

13. Generalized Least Squares Random-Effects Regression Results of Basic Human Needs from 2014-2017.....	89
14. Generalized Least Squares Random-Effects Regression Results of Personal Integrity from 2014-2017	90
15. Human Rights Organized by Generation	94

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure	Page
1. World trend for Liberties construct from CIRI data from 1981-2011.....	58
2. World trend for Women’s Economic Rights construct from CIRI data from 1981-2011	59
3. World trend for Women’s Social Rights construct from CIRI data from 1981-2004	60
4. World trend for Women’s Political Rights construct from CIRI data from 1981-2011	61
5. World trend for Environmental Integrity, Air Quality, and Environmental Integrity constructs from HDR data from 2010-2014	62
6. World trend for Basic Human Needs and Personal Integrity constructs from SPI data from 2010-2014.....	63
7. Regional trends for Women’s Economic Rights construct from CIRI data from 1981-2011	65
8. Regional trends for Women’s Social Rights construct from CIRI data from 1981-2004	67
9. Regional trends for Women’s Political Rights construct from CIRI data from 1981-2011	69
10. Regional trends for Liberties construct from CIRI data from 1981-2011	70
11. Regional trends for Quality of Life construct from HDR data from 2010-2014	71
12. Regional trends for Air Quality construct from HDR data from 2010-2014	72

13. Regional trends for Environmental Integrity construct from HDR data from 2010-2014	73
14. Regional trends for Basic Human Needs construct from SPI data from 2014-2018	74
15. Regional trends for Personal Integrity construct from SPI data from 2014-2018	76

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The term *human rights* is generally associated with ideas of injustice, and with the moral implications associated with the obligation to correct maltreatment (Nash 2015). As such, grievances across the world are often represented as human rights problems (Cmiel 2004). Despite the assumption of many, however, that the human rights canon consists of a set of global norms readily understood and embraced by all people and entities, it is more accurate to say that nation-states, societies, organizations and individuals see human rights in very different ways (Clapham 2015). Simply put, invoking a human rights claim does not mean the argument is won, because human rights protections and entitlements very much depend upon a variety of contextual factors, not the least of which is the human rights culture specific to place and time.

Most commonly, contemporary human rights discussion occurs within the context of global rights. Global human rights include a broad range of rights which are typically understood to be under the purview of the United Nations (UN), and are often presumed fairly universal in nature, if not in practice (Moyn 2010). It is important, however, not to conflate “universal” with “global.” Human rights have not been systematically formulated and agreed upon across ethnicities and cultures (Van Arsdale 2017), and thus, they are certainly not universal as a matter of practice. Yes, human rights are global, but the fact that they represent something of value to all of humanity, and are both tested and

contested across time and space is what qualifies them so. The emergence of human rights as a topic of concern, as well as the path of rights production, rights claims, and their effects both nonlinear, and subject to variation in terms of geography, culture and time (Frezzo 2014). Human rights are, therefore, continually debated and disputed, and our understanding of them evolves as a result of our arguments. In our ongoing negotiation of human rights, we also endlessly renegotiate the architecture of human society.

The subject of human rights and its requisite discourse has traditionally fallen mainly within the purview of philosophy, political science and the law (Freeman 2017; Turner 2011). As early as 1976, however, human rights scholar Richard Claude was advocating for social scientists to study the social forces affecting human rights. Yet, due to sociology's traditionally positivistic nature, and to the seemingly normative character of what constitutes a right, the field of sociology was distinctly absent from the study of human rights until roughly the mid-1990s (Frezzo 2011b; Turner 1993). Since sociology is a discipline that emerged in the service of the study of social inequality and structural violence, it is uniquely suited to offer insight on what is at stake in the human rights debate (Frezzo 2014) in ways that transcend philosophical, legal and political theory.

Because of its interest in all things social, sociology escapes the constraints of the state, and views the citizen as but one small component of the human rights field, considering all people, social constructs and processes within and without the nation-state a part of the "human rights enterprise" (Armaline, Glasberg and Purkayastha 2015:14).

This inclusive approach offers us the ability to scrutinize both the people, and the social forces that may fall outside the bounds of the foundational fields of human rights study. Applying a sociological lens to the study of human rights sets aside the intrinsically moral component of a philosophical approach, the myopic focus on national public policy debates, and the legalities of state legislation. This is particularly important in light of globalization and a world economy, in which the nation-state itself may be part of a larger whole. Thus, the discipline of sociology in recent years has contributed substantially to human rights scholarship, via diverse sociological theory (Sjoberg, Gill and Williams 2001; Turner 1993; Waters 1996) and amidst a growing body of research.

In his “Outline of a Theory of Human Rights,” Turner (1993) argued for a sociology of human rights due to the socio-political rights debates that had become prominent in a globalized, modern society, and stemming, at least in part, from a human rights canon codified through the UN. He based his non-relative, foundational theory on the frailty of humans, the uncertain nature of social institutions and their abilities to protect people, and a collective sympathy for others. Turner reasoned that human beings are, by nature, vulnerable and bound to suffer all manner of natural and human-made predicaments. People, knowing that they are all susceptible to these natural and social ills, therefore, become as sympathetic to others’ plights as they are sorely aware of their own. Since social institutions are quite powerful, yet are only as reliable as the society that creates and hosts them, it behooves people to embrace a universal human rights canon in order to safeguard their security (Turner 1993).

Echoing Turner, Sjoberg et al. (2001), offered that human rights should be subject to sociological inquiry because as social and cultural changes occur on a global level, they have become prominent considerations on the world stage. Citing the institutionalization of human rights and the emergence of a global social order, the authors suggest that organizations have social power, meaning the ability to enable the observance and practice of human rights or to successfully curtail them (Sjoberg et al. 2001). In turn, Waters (1996), rebuts Turner's non-relativized idea of a universal human rights, arguing instead that human rights are inherently relative to time and place, as they emerge within a political landscape (Waters 1996). Waters (1995) asserts that a social constructivist orientation must be adopted, because as a theory, it takes into account the historical and cultural differences in the evolution of human rights, and that any concept of universalization itself is, ironically, also a social construct.

It is not the purpose of this study to fully debate whether sociology has a stake in the human rights discourse, nor whether human rights are either foundational in origin or a social construct. For purposes of this study, it is assumed that human rights are grounded in international law (Anleu 1999; Donnelly 2013; Frezzo 2014), that they are recognized among the international community (Assembly 1966a; Cole 2005), that human rights claims are made and debated in particular human societies, as well as on the global stage, and that sociologists have something meaningful to contribute to the subject (Sjoberg et al. 2001; Turner 1993; Waters 1996).

PROBLEM STATEMENT

Whether public sociology, advocacy, or pure scholarship, a working definition of human rights offers a way to consider human rights conceptually and empirically, and to organize the goals of engagement. As interventions to alleviate human rights abuses have been historically inconsistent, the broad nature of human rights as a topic amid increased scrutiny has led to much confusion about both meaning and the disposition of human rights disputes (Ignatieff 2003). Therefore, the study and research of human rights is vital to private industry professionals, governments across the world, and scholars alike, as the interest in human rights spans the globe, encompassing everything from environmental concerns (Johnston 1995) to political issues involving interstate relations (Armeline et al. 2015), as well as to social problems internal to the nation-state (Joppke 1998). Labelling something as a human right invites public and private consideration of when such a right has been violated (Joppke 1998; Stammers 1999), and thus pushes the boundaries of the social understanding of human rights. Furthermore, a well-defined human rights canon illuminates the far-reaching repercussions of human rights violations, introducing additional areas in need of study and remedy.

For these reasons, it is vital to know not just what is loosely considered a human right, but to define the human rights canon carefully (Goldstein 1986), in order to better understand the origination and ramifications of human rights claims and their scope, as well as the social consequences of human rights abuses. As suggested, the sociological approach is significantly nuanced for the task at hand, and as such, this study will define human rights according to international legal scholar Karel Vasak's (1977) writing in

which he arranged human rights into three generations. Based on the early constitutions of nations that were products of the European Enlightenment, particularly the US and France, Vasak (1977) distinguished different human rights in such a way that allows for more complex comparisons between the level of adoption and observance of human rights across countries and regions. He designated civil and political rights (e.g., the right to vote, or assemble) as first-generation human rights; economic, social, and cultural rights (e.g., the right to adequate food and shelter) as second-generation rights; and the rights of groups to sustainable development, cultural traditions, and a clean environment he expressed as third-generation rights (Blau and Moncada 2015; Frezzo 2014; Vasak 1977).

This dissertation utilizes such a conscientious approach to developing empirical definitions of human rights, and applies them in determining human rights trends across countries and global regions over the last three decades. Finally, human rights constructs are used as outcome measures to examine what effect economic development and democracy have had on the formation and adoption of various rights across nations. Research has also suggested that culture has an impact on human rights practices (Cross 1996; De Soysa and Nordås 2007). As religion has been determined across multiple academic disciplines to be a highly relevant cultural construct associated with social norms and values (Diamond 1994; Hasenclever and Rittberger 2000; Inglehart and Norris 2004; Russett, Oneal and Cox 2000), it is necessary to control for nations' religion in order to better explain the effect of development and democracy on human rights. Furthermore, it is prudent to control for geographic region since they may also reflect

cultural differences, particularly in terms of economic and social development (Frezzo 2014; Kockel 2017; McMichael 2012). This study is intended, first, to develop empirical definitions of human rights; second, to describe the trend of human rights levels across countries and regions of the world; and third, to link development and democracy to the country- and region specific adoption of different generations of human rights.

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

This research contributes to the literature, first, by systematically grouping variables that may represent human rights measures together across three separate data sets in an effort to establish whether and how they empirically reflect latent concepts corresponding to the three-generation human rights framework. As mentioned previously, the totality of the human rights canon is broad, and human rights claims are made against a backdrop of complex histories, and social and political structures (Armaline et al. 2015; Freeman 2017; Frezzo 2014; Nash 2015). As such, some rights overlap, and may even conflict with others, often resulting in incompatible and inconsistent claims and interventions, and increasing the confusion surrounding human rights (Frezzo 2014; Kreide 2016). Although there are many human rights claims coupled with specific rights concepts and variables, such as definitions for genocide (Huttenbach 2002; Manaktala 2012) and personal integrity (Hill Jr 2013), respect for cultural rights (Browne 1993; Renzaho and Mellor 2010), human security (Chen 2004; Martin and Owen 2010), universal healthcare (Abihiro and De Allegri 2015), peace (Anderson 2004), and environmental protection, both broadly and for specific cultures (Berke et al. 2002; Hadden and Seybert 2016), there appear to be few studies that explore conceptual

definitions across the entirety of the human rights canon. This limits the ability to utilize rigorous social scientific methods to comprehensively evaluate the presence and levels of human rights across the world. Using multiple data sets to both enrich and expand the measures of separate aspects of conceptual human rights, and determining whether underlying factors align with specific human rights generations partially addresses this gap. To this author's knowledge, such a comprehensive cross-national, longitudinal study and analysis of human rights concepts across multiple data sets has not been conducted.

Second, this dissertation proposes to examine human rights trends, not just generally, but by looking at latent constructs over time. The human rights canon consists of multiple rights, which are subject to multiple interpretations, and they have been observed to varying degrees and levels by nation-states. In theory, particular time periods are associated with varying degrees of respect for human rights. The Cold War period preceding 1990, which saw less respect for human rights, was followed by the post-Cold War period marking the emergence of what Donnelly (2011:161) has termed an "international human rights regime" between the years 1990-2000. This was then followed by the post-9/11 global war on terror, which is associated with an overall reverse in respect for human rights (Shor et al. 2016). Although the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) (Assembly 1948) has been codified at the international level, the way in which a polity does or does not adopt and practice these laws may vary (Bromley 2014). It is, therefore, not uncommon for a country or region to show human rights progress in terms of some specific rights, while showing little or none in others (Frezzo 2014), and although the vast majority of states subscribe to the international

human rights regime, the number of states who have violated human rights in practice has increased since the 1970s (Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005; Kreide 2016).

Additionally, longitudinal, cross-national research appears to be limited to specific rights violations. Such research includes the relationship between counterterrorist legislation and the repression of physical integrity (Shor et al. 2018; Shor et al. 2016), religious conflict's effect on state repression (Henne and Kloczek 2019), changes in human rights monitoring and state repression (Fariss 2014), human rights institutions and their effects on civil and political rights (Cole and Ramirez 2013), human rights levels and their association with levels of political freedom (Clark 2014), the effect of constitutional provisions on human rights abuses (Keith 2002; Keith, Tate and Poe 2009), the effect of economic sanctions on physical integrity rights (Peksen 2009), and the type of regime associated with personal integrity abuses (Poe, Tate and Keith 1999). This study examines human rights levels significantly more broadly across time, while also assessing whether and how their levels vary with both regime type and economic development factors, which are commonly associated with the presence of human rights (Claude 1976; Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005; Henderson 1991; Mitchell and McCormick 1988; Poe and Tate 1994).

Third, this research examines whether particular countries and regions favor the protection of and respect for certain categories of rights over others. It is commonly understood that both nations and international human rights organizations have tended to give the majority of their attention to first-generation civil and political rights, which is reflected in nation-states' governing practices (Otto 2001). With respect to second-

generation rights, however, it is important to note that a primary challenge to the UDHR has been skepticism about the legitimacy of economic and social rights (Donnelly 2013; Frezzo 2014; Young 2008). Their status as rights has been repeatedly questioned by both scholars and nation-states (Davy 2013). British philosopher Cranston (1963), for example, was highly critical of their designation as human rights, citing their lack of true universality. There are those who have also suggested that economic, social and cultural rights are simply not enforceable, and therefore, it may be most beneficial for organizations and governments to focus on civil and political rights (Ignatieff 2003; Neier 2003). Both Henkin (1981) and Vierdag (1978) supported this line of reasoning, pointing out that although second-generation rights had been codified into international law, there were no legal remedies to their violations.

Alternatively, Langford (2008) has asserted that while economic and social rights have been alleged in the past to be unjusticiable and unenforceable, they have become increasingly accepted, claimed, and adjudicated across the world in the last two decades. In that vein, other nations may have purportedly given more consideration to second-generation economic, social and cultural rights. In general, evidence suggests that wealthy countries reflect an emphasis on first-generation rights, and poorer nations show an emphasis on second-generation rights (Felice 2010; Frezzo 2014; Uvin 2004). Whelan and Donnelly (2007), however, regret this belief that has proliferated among human rights scholars. Refuting a “three generations, three worlds” narrative perpetuated by scholars and activists alike, in which civil and political rights are believed to be paramount in the West, economic, social and cultural rights are predominant in socialist

countries, and solidarity rights are associated with Third World countries (Ishay 2008; Ramcharan 1979), Whelan and Donnelly argue that Western resistance to second-generation human rights is a myth. Citing post-war (WWII) planning and multiple other sources, such as the Universal Declaration of the Covenants, and Human Rights Commission passages, they claim that in addition to European countries' commitment to social and economic rights, both the US and Britain also unreservedly pledged to establish social and economic rights, post-WWII. These authors (2007) further maintain that most Western governments have wholeheartedly supported economic and social rights in both policy and practice, and that stories to the contrary, in addition to being historically inaccurate, only serve to undermine the West's ongoing commitment to guaranteeing second-generation rights. This study should provide empirical evidence to support or undermine these claims.

ORGANIZATION OF THE DISSERTATION

With the relevance of sociology to the subject of human rights established, and the significance of the research and its goals stated, Chapter II provides a brief history of the emergence of modern human rights and reviews the concepts of the three-generation human rights framework. The literature related to human rights in practice is reviewed, as well as the evidence regarding the effects of democracy and level of development on human rights outcomes. Chapter III provides detailed information about the data used, the samples, variable measurements, and data analyses. Chapter IV summarizes the findings. Chapter V provides interpretations of the results, discusses their implications, and identifies study limitations as well as future research.

CHAPTER II

THEORETICAL FOUNDATION AND LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter discusses the intellectual foundation and emergence of contemporary human rights, and makes the case for the three-generation human rights framework. The specific rights designated to each generation are described below, as well as the relevance of political democracy and economic development to human rights in practice. The chapter concludes by listing the research objectives.

THE EMERGENCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS

Although the notion of human rights has traditionally been associated with western political and philosophical thought, similar conventions can be found in eastern Confucian, Buddhist, and Hindu culture (Clapham 2015; Ramcharan 1979). For many scholars, concepts of modern human rights can be traced back as early as the rule of law established in the king of Babylonia's Hammurabi Code in approximately 1754 BC (Messer 1997). The Indian Buddhist king, Ashoka, in the second century BC, not only endorsed religious tolerance, but also made provisions for the health and well-being of his people (Freeman 2017). Additionally, the Bible and the Koran are considered to be representative of humanity's initial attempts to reference human rights, with both books proposing human solidarity and moral duty (Ishay 2008).

A precursor to modern human rights, natural rights are those rights that are said to exist for man in his natural state (Strauss 1979); they are immutable and eternal.

The ancient Greek Stoic philosophers espoused the idea that human beings were born free and equal, and with an ability to reason, a view which was adopted by Enlightenment philosophers Thomas Hobbes and John Locke (Blau and Moncada 2015). Specifically, Hobbes determined that human beings had a natural right to do whatever was required to protect and sustain themselves (Blau and Moncada 2015; Tuck 1979). As a person's natural rights may not align with another's, however, humans were likely to be in a constant state of war with one another, and were so obliged to recognize a sovereign who would balance the competing agendas of his subjects and maintain order (Freeman 2017; Tuck 1979).

The American Declaration of Independence, as a later precedent, was greatly influenced by the work of British philosopher John Locke's theory and the English Bill of Rights (Cranston 1983). Locke theorized that man was innately rational, and had the ability to understand the law of nature. Laws of nature included the right to life, freedom, and property (Blau and Moncada 2015; Locke 1960), and obeying those laws was his responsibility to God (Locke 1960; Strauss 1979). Because man had an obligation to God to safeguard himself, and must serve his own interests (which would invariably conflict with another's), they were compelled to yield to a just government who would respect the rights of all, for the good of all (Locke 1960). Locke's writings proclaiming men's natural rights to life, liberty, and property, also show up in almost identical language the French used in their declaratory documents (Cranston 1983). German philosopher Immanuel Kant as well can be said to have provided a secular antecedent for human rights in his reference to human dignity, in which he argues that all human beings are

equal and deserving of respect from each other because of their unique abilities to reason (Kant 2015; Strauss 1979). For Kant, natural rights were either innate or acquired, and the right to freedom was certainly innate. Since freedom from duress was not assured in a state of nature, people must establish a society that could be governed by constitutional law (Freeman 2017; Malik 2014).

Human rights language as distinct from ethical standards of behavior mentioned throughout history, and across cultures (Sen 2001) finds a modern foundation within the French and American revolutionary documents; however, it can be argued that a human rights revolution of sorts developed in the aftermath of WWII, as a world response to the gruesome revelations of the Holocaust (Morsink 1999; Moyn 2010; Sjoborg et al. 2001; Uvin 2004). Legally defined by the UDHR in 1948 (Assembly 1948), the end of WWII saw a rapid generation of human rights promotion and international institutions to support and protect them (Zhou 2013), as well as organizations tasked with assessing and monitoring the human rights records of state and non-state actors (Bell, Nathan and Peleg 2001; Freeman 2017). Although it has been supposed that human rights may have reached their pinnacle of influence in the 1970s (Moyn 2010), they have become a fundamental tenet of the international community (Cole 2005), and frame a myriad of social problems and debates, from world poverty (Aaronson and Zimmerman 2006) to environmental degradation (Agyeman, Bullard and Evans 2002; Goodhart 2016).

CHARACTERIZING HUMAN RIGHTS.

As mentioned above, an accord and a common language for the legal definitions of human rights was established by the UDHR. Deeply committed to the UDHR as

chairwoman of the United Nations Human Rights Commission, Eleanor Roosevelt advocated for the use of the term “human rights”, as the documents originally included ample recognition of the rights of men, but excluded the rights of women (Glendon 1991; Raphael 1967), as well as slaves and non-whites (Krieger and Crahan 2001). By contemporary law (but certainly independent of practice), human rights are considered universal. They are rights shared by everyone across the world at all times, regardless of race, class, gender, economic background, nationality, or any other defining human characteristic, and they are awarded to all people simply by virtue of being born a human being (Donnelly 2013; Frezzo 2014; Ishay 2008).

The idea of the universal quality of human rights is rooted in the UDHR , in which the term “universal” was included in the final draft, serving as notice that these rights applied to all states, regardless of membership status (Assembly 1948; Krieger and Crahan 2001). For international context, the human rights canon is laid out in three principal UN documents, and they are considered the foundational pillars of human rights (Frezza 2014). The first is the above-mentioned UDHR of 1948, which provides the framework for human rights, and paved the way for succeeding documents. The second is the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of (ICCPR) of 1966, establishing civil and political rights for the individual (Assembly 1966a). Last, is the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) of 1966, which establishes individual economic, social and cultural rights (Assembly 1966b). In addition to the above-mentioned documents, there are three other major documents which have contributed to the human rights canon. They include the Stockholm Declaration of the

United Nations Conference on the Human Environment of 1972 (Handl 2012), the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women of 1979 (CEDAW; Assembly 1979), and the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (DRIP) of 2007 (Assembly 2007).

The civil and political rights as set forth in the ICCPR are considered *negative* rights (Frezzo 2014) or “freedom rights” (Biparva and Zamani 2016), in that they serve as protections of the body from misconduct and offense by others, and preservation from abuse against the individual by interference from the state. They are those rights necessary to sustain personal freedom, civil and political rights, the right to vote one’s conscience in electing political leaders, as well as in matters of thought leading to self-determination, and to the very right to life (Biparva and Zamani 2016; Donnelly 2013; Frezzo 2014). This includes such specific guarantees as the freedom of speech, workers’ rights, freedom to assemble, freedom to travel to, from, and within one’s country, freedom of religion, the right to due process of law, and government representation (Blau and Moncada 2015; Frezzo 2014; Morsink 1999). Also covered under this category are the group of rights labelled “integrity of the person”, which consists of freedom from political repression in the form of torture, political detention, disappearances and political killings (Bollen 1986; Innes de Neufville 1986; Mitchell and McCormick 1988).

In turn, the economic, social, and cultural rights named in the ICESCR are known as *positive* rights (Frezzo 2014) or “participatory rights” (Biparva and Zamani 2016). They are obligations to the individual on the part of the state that determine the health and well-being of an individual, including such social rights as food, shelter, medical

care, sanitation, clean water, uncontaminated air, education, and such economic rights as secure, gainful employment and social security (Biparva and Zamani 2016; Blau and Moncada 2015; Frezzo 2014). These entitlements are due the individual in the form of public utilities and a social safety net most commonly associated with the European welfare state, such as labor rights, public health care, and public pensions (Blau and Moncada 2015; Frezzo 2014; Morsink 1999).

THE CASE FOR A THREE-GENERATION FRAMEWORK

Part of post-WWII reconstruction was the advocacy for and carrying out of decolonization, granting all nations equality within the United Nations, and the right of people everywhere to self-determination (Arrighi 1994; Freeman 2017). In the early 1970s, there was an influx of poor states joining the UN, who brought with them an awareness of the collective, as well as the impact of damage to culture and the environment from the effects of industrialization (Frezza 2014; Rist 2014). The UN's act of declaring the autonomy of all nations served to elevate the perspectives and cultures of the Third World, especially in terms of its influence on human rights formation (Freeman 2017; Frezzo 2014; Sano 2000). This period marked the replacement of Third World developmentalism by "sustainable development", in which non-Western societies rejected the idea of achieving a similar standard of living to Western societies at the expense of their own values and land (Frezza 2014:113).

Although Article 15 of the ICESCR (Assembly 1966b) recognized the rights of people to participate in cultural life, collective human rights violations having to do with vanishing cultures and cultural genocide were actively brought to the attention of the UN

in the 1970s. In response, states added more indigenous representatives to the UN body, bringing increased scrutiny and action to the cause of culture to human rights (Stamatopoulou 2012). Thus, the Third-World perspective that the structural causes of global economic inequality were associated with human rights offenses included the belief in, first, a right to the preservation of culture; second, to development; third, to peace; and finally, to a healthy environment (Blau and Moncada 2015; Frezzo 2014; Udombana 2000). A human right to development prioritizes the right of a people to determine its own brand of not just economic improvement, but social improvement – and to do so in a culturally sensitive way, such that the process takes into account specific cultural norms and values (Alston 1988; Udombana 2000). The collective human right to peace is believed to be a necessary precursor to the achievement of any of the other human rights (Paupp 2014; Roche 2009). Without it, people cannot exercise their civil and political rights, their economic and physical health is disrupted, and their culture cannot be preserved or enjoyed.

A healthy environment for all to enjoy is certainly one aspect of collective rights; however, although environmental resources may be considered collective, they are also finite (Appelbaum and Robinson 2005). It is difficult to determine how to provide sufficient, fair access and distribution of resources to all people, as overuse by one can be to the detriment of another (Blau and Moncada 2015). In 1972, the Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment took place, which provided recognition of environmental issues on a global scale. It invited all nations to advance sustainable development plans and to regulate the protection of natural

resources (Neimark and Mott 1999), and it provided a foundation for the third-generation rights to collective sustainable development (Uvin 2004), and to the preservation of culture and the environment (Frezzo 2014).

While Third-World nations grappled with an erosion of culture due to consumerism, and environmental damage to their countries as a result of colonial resource extraction, tension arose as the importance of the collective to Third-World countries clashed with the predominance of individualism in First-World countries (Elliott 2007). In that context, the balance between the concepts of universalism, and cultural awareness has plagued the human rights discourse (Cowan, Dembour and Wilson 2001; Miranda 2012; Stamatopoulou 2012). For example, because aspects of life that are held sway by religious principles are considerable in their scope, especially in political (Smidt 2003) and economic life (Landes 1999), a significant influence on the shape of a culture is religious tradition. Throughout millennia religious canon has governed life from the mundane activities of daily living to the weightier matters of life and death. Its rules are often applied to perceived status and value, particularly with regard to the social positions of women and children (Witte Jr and Green 2011). As well, religious standards often determine a society's laws, and are used to define and dispense justice (Brown 2002; Cochran 2014; Hecht and Biondo 2010). Because the legal and justice system of a country dictate its behavior toward its citizenry, it may also affect its human rights record.

In 1977, Karel Vasak, then Director of the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization's (UNESCO) Division of Human Rights and Peace, wrote an

article in the *UNESCO Courier* (1977), in which he specified three generations of human rights. He numbered the generations and corresponded them to the French revolution concepts of liberty, equality, and fraternity, in that order (Wellman 2000). Vasak (1977) referred to “first-generation” civil and political rights (liberty), and “second-generation” economic, social and cultural rights (equality). He then remarked that the “international community is now embarking upon a third-generation of human rights which may be called the “rights of solidarity” (Vasak 1977:29). This conception of a new generation of rights (fraternity) consisted of the right to enjoy one’s culture and common heritage, the right to development, the right to peace, and the right to a sustainable environment (Vasak 1977). In his address to the International Institute of Human Rights in 1979, Vasak outlined his theory of a third generation of rights, arguing that such claims as the right to peace and a clean, healthy environment were developing in international law as a reflection of previously colonized nations’ interests.

Furthering the propagation of a three-generation framework has also been the phenomenon of globalization, which has presented the world with such rapidly changing dynamics and conditions that it has compelled social scientists to widen the scope of the canon; in effect, to reimagine human rights (Cushman 2012). Although globalization has been defined sociologically by major globalization theorists (Albrow and King 1990; Giddens 1999; Held et al. 2000; Jones 2010), taken together, globalization can be understood to have set in motion an overwhelming magnitude of social, cultural, economic, and ideological change. It is thus no longer plausible to envision the nation-state as an independent entity, because it cannot solve global problems by acting alone

(Wellman 2000). For example, although the practice of human rights is realized at the level of the state, globalization has put the very salient concept of citizenship under intense pressure, as people are displaced in the world due to armed conflict, climate change, and economic migration (Turner 1993). Subject to the push-pull of outside actors and influences (Anleu 1999; Giddens 1999), human rights claims are being made independent of the nation-state and in appeal to supranational organizations for relief (Boli and Thomas 1997).

In addition, there is the proliferation of a global development-as-consumerism model (McMichael 2012). This model references the differences between what is termed the Global North, understood as the more wealthy countries found in the northern hemisphere, and the Global South, which are the more poor nations typically found in the southern hemisphere (Meyer 1996). World-systems scholar Phillip McMichael (2012) has posited that the development-as-consumerism structure linking consumers in the Global North, and producers in the Global South has resulted in the homogenization of culture, extreme inequality of wealth distribution (Rist 2014) and environmental destruction brought on by mining and factory pollution, specifically in the Global South (Clausen 2011). This twenty-first century awareness of cultural and environmental deterioration follows the concern regarding the erosion of distinct cultures and the environment, which had already emerged as a result of the Third-World development project that had begun in the 1940s, and was abandoned in the 1970s (Rist 2014).

However we choose to define it, there is little doubt that globalization has changed the world rapidly and irrevocably, and accompanying it has been the demise of

the Keynesian welfare state, the socialist state and Third-World developmentalism (Mies and Bennholdt-Thomsen 1999). It was against the backdrop of these declines, along with the cultural and environmental damage to the Third-World due to traditional development economics in which the third-generation of human rights emerged (Burke 2011; Wellman 2000). Since the late 1970s, the three-generation structure has informed scholarship, advocacy, law, and UN projects across the world (Frezzo 2011a). In terms of their historical context, the reference to three generations of human rights connotes a temporal order; however, in contemporary human rights law, these rights were codified at the same time. It is the order in which these rights were declared and then became salient in international law that suggests the generational distinctions. First-generation rights emerged roughly in the eighteenth century, second-generation rights came to the fore in the early twentieth century, and third-generation rights became a focal point in the late twentieth century (Wellman 2000).

First-generation human rights establish the *individual* right to liberty. They consist of civil and political rights, and they include, but are not limited to the freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, freedom of religion, the right to due process of law, the right to fair representation in government, the right to life, bodily integrity and dignity (Blau and Moncada 2015; Frezzo 2014; Ross 2007; Vasak 1977).

Second-generation human rights establish the *individual* right to equality. They consist of social, economic, and cultural rights, and they include, but are not limited to the right to equal conditions provided by the state, the right to have basic needs met in order to prepare for mental, physical, and professional development, a living wage,

protection from vulnerable life stages or natural disaster in the form of healthcare, social security and disability insurance, food, clothing, and housing (Blau and Moncada 2015; Frezzo 2014; Ross 2007; Vasak 1977).

Third-generation human rights establish the *collective* right to solidarity. They consist of the collective rights to culture, a healthy environment, and to sustainable development. They include, but are not limited to the right to the protection of cultural identity and the preservation of cultural traditions (Blau and Frezzo 2011; Frezzo 2014; Turner 1993), the right to protected natural resources, the rights to live in and to be provided with a sustainable environment, along with adequate food production, public hygiene, and infrastructure (Frezza 2014; Van Steenberg 1994).

THE ROLE OF DEMOCRACY IN HUMAN RIGHTS TRENDS

World Polity Theory

The concept of world polity is the view that the world is one integrated social system (Lechner and Boli 2008). World polity scholars argue that globalization is responsible for the diffusion of the dominant culture and social norms, which indicates to states how they are to structure themselves and operate (Boli and Thomas 1997; Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005). Nation-states adopt these norms to reinforce their standing and legitimacy (Bromley 2014; Meyer et al. 1997), and institutionalize them because they assume that they are universally certain (Boli and Thomas 1997). And while there are numerous, seemingly independent nation-states, world polity theory considers that there exists at least broad agreement about what constitutes matters of importance, even if there is disagreement about how to prioritize and achieve those goals (Eriksen 1991). Thus,

nation-states show a significant amount of isomorphism in their political and social structures as they adopt global models (Boli and Thomas 1999; McNeely 1995; Meyer et al. 1997), and they achieve conspicuous levels of similarity, not because of a structure's functional practicality and logic, but because of its place in a dominant world culture (Robertson 1992). Furthermore, the more highly integrated a state is in international society, the more uniform its structures become (Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005)

World polity theory acknowledges the expansion of global standards and norms to the national level. Accordingly, the democratic model has been thus diffused (Clark 2014; Gleditsch and Ward 2006; Torfason and Ingram 2010; Wejnert 2005). Although the number of democracies dropped between WWI and WWII, as well as during the Cold War, the modern Western ideology of democracy has transformed the world in the thirty years since the Cold War's end. It has become the predominantly legitimate form of government, resulting in a trend toward democratization that has spanned the globe (Mansfield and Pevehouse 2008; Torfason and Ingram 2010). According to Huntington (1993b), approximately 5% of countries were considered democracies in 1816, but by the mid-1970s, the democratic wave that had washed over the globe saw some 30 nations transition from an autocratic regime to a democratic one. Their number surpassed the number of autocracies the world over by the 1990s (Gleditsch and Ward 2006).

Waves of Democracy

In his seminal work on democratization, Huntington (1993a), describes its advancement as occurring in three waves, which he characterizes as a greater group of countries who transition to democracy as who transition out of it during a discrete period

of time. He notes that there are also great reverse waves in which many countries revert to nondemocratic regimes. For Huntington (1993a), the first wave occurred between the years 1826 to 1926, and was followed by a reverse wave. The second wave began at the end of WWII (1945), which was followed by another reverse wave in the 1960s and the early 1970s. The third wave occurred at the end of the Carnation Revolution which saw the overthrow of authoritarian rule in Portugal in 1974, and continued to 1990.

Doorenspleet (2000), however, has questioned Huntington's research. While agreeing that there have been democratic waves, he argues that Huntington's findings are problematic due to his vague conceptualization of democracy and his use of percentages in assessing the nation-states that are transitioning, because they show temporal variation. By offering a more precise definition of democracy and by using exact numbering for states who have transitioned, he reports substantially different results. Doorenspleet (2000) concludes that there was a first wave of democratization that occurred between the early 1890s to the mid-1920s. A lesser, reverse wave followed through the early 1940s, before democratic governments' numbers rose slightly again. He finds no second reverse wave, but instead a mild fluctuation period from the late 1950s to the mid-1970s, marked by a new wave beginning in 1976, with a spectacular rise of democratization taking place since 1990.

It has further been theorized that the proliferation of democracies may be because nations tend to emulate their neighbors. Gleditsch (2009) offers a regional approach in order to explain regime style, arguing that countries transition to democracy, or away from democracy depending on others' status in the region. Therefore, a nation in a largely

democratic “neighborhood” will be democratic, indicating that regime change is not solely an internal matter, and may have a relationship with global phenomena. Cederman and Gleditsch (2004) found evidence to support this claim in their study linking regime change and collective security to trajectories of democratization.

What may be most challenging about the term “political democracy” is that, like “human rights”, across the globe there appears to be various interpretations of its meaning (Bollen 1980; Milner, Poe and Leblang 1999). Scholars have conceptually defined political democracy in various ways, and as standard practice have used multidimensional approaches to indicate degrees of democracy (Bollen 1993; Bollen 1980; Dahl 1971; Hartlyn and Valenzuela 1995; Jagers and Gurr 1995; Lasswell 1950; Stepan and Linz 1996). Among social scientists, there are scholars who emphasize free elections and the overall electoral process in their definitions, suggesting among other criteria, multiple opportunities to choose leaders (Lipset 1959), equally weighted votes accorded each individual (Dahl 1956), competition via a multi-party system (Downs 1957), and the right to form opposing parties (Lanski 2013). Alternatively, there are some scholars who have emphasized the construct of a political elite (Bollen 1980). They argue that every nation has a privileged group that holds political power, and that this is actually necessary for a functioning society as these groups have usually managed to develop the knowledge and skills to govern most effectively (Michels 1962; Mills and Wolfe 2000; Mosca, Livingston and Kahn 1970).

Regretting that proponents of the political elite theory fail to acknowledge cross-national political differences, Bollen (1980) argues that the relative power of the elite

versus non-elite varies with each nation, and that these differences determine the level of political democracy. Thus, he defines “political democracy” as “the extent to which the political power of the elite is minimized and that of the non-elite is maximized” (Bollen 1980:372). This study accepts Bollen’s definition as being highly useful in that the principles and international laws of human rights are, above all, a worldwide response to the savagery of WWII grounded in maximizing equal rights, and minimizing tyranny (Assembly 1948; Blau and Moncada 2015; Donnelly 2013; Frezzo 2014). At its most basic, democracy can be understood to be the polar opposite of an autocracy; however, it has many aspects, which taken together, determine the presence of fuller or lessor democracies (Jagers and Gurr 1995).

The Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action of 1993, Part I, number 8, held that democracy and human rights were “interdependent and mutually reinforcing” (Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action:3). Democracy has been shown to positively influence human rights practices (Clark 2010; Cole and Ramirez 2013; Greenhill 2010; Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005), and has even been hailed as a right on its own (O’loughlin et al. 1998). Empirical studies support this contention, showing that human rights abuses are less likely to occur in democracies (Henderson 1991; Landman 2002; Landman 2005; Poe and Tate 1994), and that compliance with human rights treaties and laws is heavily dependent on regime (Hafner- Burton and Tsutsui 2005). At issue, however, appears to be how democratic is democratic enough to ensure that a state upholds human rights. Fein (1995), for example, found that gross violations of human rights (which include genocide, extrajudicial execution, and torture) are more frequent in countries whose democracies are growing but have not yet been fully realized. Providing

some support for Fein's conclusions, Davenport and Armstrong (2004) found that below a certain threshold, the presence of democracy has no significant effect on human rights at all, but above that threshold, human rights levels showed improvement. Hypothesizing that the more democratic the government, the less likely it would be to employ repressive practices, meaning infringement on the integrity of the person, Henderson (1991) also found support for the expected relationship between democracy and repression by the state. Alternatively, in their sample of 79 countries taken between 1981 and 1996, Cingranelli and Richards (2010) observed that overall, the respect for human rights did not improve after the Cold War; however, they did associate democratization with a decrease in the taking of political prisoners. Also getting mixed results, Gruen and Klasen (2012) found improvements in civil and political human rights across 21 countries that were transitioning from communism between 1988 to 2008, but they found little progress in economic and social rights. In their study comparing OECD and non-OECD countries from 1976-1995, however, Milner et al. (1999) showed not only that social and economic rights improved in more democratic states, but that advances in personal integrity rights were also present. Thus, despite that a large body of research spanning decades has yielded inconsistent results regarding the relationship between political democracy and human rights, what is clear is that democracy matters, and a democratic regime appears to have some relationship to a nation's realization of human rights.

THE ROLE OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN HUMAN RIGHTS TRENDS

It should be noted that development as a project was not considered until the mid-twentieth century, when colonial powers began investing resources in the Third-World in order to spur economic growth (Uvin 2004). As previously mentioned, the mid-twentieth century was also a period of rapid decolonization, and a proliferation of those newly sovereign states joined the UN (McMichael 2012; Strang 1990). Colonizing powers diffused to their former subjects a nation-state model governed by the economic market and consumers (Betts and Betts 2004; Strang 1990), and they distinguished countries who had achieved wealth. In 1945, the UN established the gross national product (GNP), which is the total commercial output of goods and services produced by the citizens of a country, as a measure of economic development (McMichael 2012; Moss and Brennan 2002).

In the years during the Cold War it was commonly understood that human rights and economic development were at odds with one another (Donnelly 2013). Specifically, economic development was the single most important national ambition, outweighing any rights claims (McMichael 2012; Ruffin 1982; Uvin 2004). For Hewlett (1980) and Stewart (1985), robust economic development was not even possible unless civil and political rights, and social equality were suppressed. For example, economists Enke (1963) and Morris (1967) wrote that a nation's spending must be delegated to investment at the expense of funding any basic human needs, and both Boulding (1958) and Johnson (1962) found that social equality must be sacrificed (or at least not be a matter of concern) in order to generate economic growth. In addition, granting and upholding civil

and political liberties could even sabotage economic development. Desirous of reelection, it was argued, politicians may not make the hard economic choices in which people may suffer, and a disgruntled population, if allowed to spread discord, may disrupt the implementation of necessary economic policies (Bayley 1964; Bhagwati 1966; Huntington and Nelson 1976).

The repression of human rights in service to a greater economy has often been deemed more acceptable because it has been seen as a temporary state of affairs. The logic is that by putting economic growth ahead of human rights, it allows those future economic gains to eventually raise everyone up. The more wealth, the bigger the share that will eventually go to everyone, making the achievement of other human rights possible (Bauer and Bell 1999; Uvin 2004). In Dye's and Zeigler's (1988) study comparing socialist and capitalist nations, they found that higher levels of economic development were associated with greater degrees of equality. Duff et al. (1976) made the case that when the level of economic development is high, there is less likelihood of social unrest, and therefore, there will be less reason for the elite class to resort to repression.

Donnelly (2013), however, refutes this logic. He outlines the "tradeoffs" of certain human rights that have been argued are critical for economic development as one, sacrificing citizens' basic needs for the sake of freeing up resources for investment; two, giving up social equality for economic development; and three, curtailing first-generation civil and political rights in order to discourage disruption of economic policy. He argues that tradeoffs are in no way mandatory, and that the acceptance of these tradeoffs are

more a matter of political will (or lack thereof) and interests than a requirement for economic development.

There is evidence to support that when more people are invested and active in a formal, private economy, the national human rights structure becomes more developed. Claude's (1976) comparative historical analysis made the case that capitalism generated the establishment of human rights law because successful economic activity required freedom of expression, which, in turn, made a more equal and stronger country, whose citizens would demand human rights. He and coauthor, Strouse, later distinguished between countries who were undergoing gradual change versus those who were changing and expanding their economies rapidly, however, finding that fast economic growth was associated with the repression of civil and political human rights (Strouse and Claude 1976). Henderson (1991), on the other hand, found an inverse relationship between rapid economic growth and government repression.

In other research on personal integrity rights, Mitchell and McCormick (1988) showed that poorer countries were more likely to take political prisoners and engage in torture, and Banks' (1985) analysis of human rights data taken from 74 countries between 1982 to 1983, found that lower income levels were associated with lower levels of personal freedom. Citing a potential explanation for a regime's suppression of human rights, Gurr (1985) proposes that insurgency may be more common among poorer countries, prompting those governments to censor human rights, a response which Davenport (1995) offers may be due to feeling existentially threatened. In their cross-national study of 153 countries in the 1980s, Poe and Tate (1994) found that lower levels

of economic development were associated with increased abuse of civil and political rights. Conversely, Scully (1988) demonstrated that positive economic development is the result of greater levels of personal civil and political liberty (Scully 1988). There are further studies that suggest an association between a country's GNP and varying national human rights practices (Dasgupta and Weale 1992; Mitchell and McCormick 1988). Along the same vein as Poe and Tate, for example, Moon and Dixon (1985) conducted a cross-national study of 116 nations, finding that a higher per capita GNP is positively associated with the state meeting its citizens' basic human needs.

A nation's domestic productivity may not be the only consideration, however. According to Hymer (1979), while multinational corporate investment (an indicator of foreign investment and economic growth) may be associated with a rise in GNP, it may also result in declines in human rights practices in developing countries. Alternatively, William Meyer (1996) found evidence to support a direct positive relationship between the presence of transnational corporations (an indicator of foreign investment and economic growth), and first and second-generation human rights levels across 50 countries. Smith, Bolyard and Ippolito (1999) oppose Meyer's claim, however, as they failed to replicate Meyer's findings when using alternative measures of human rights practices. Also citing several instances of transnational corporate investment resulting in severe infringements on human rights, Herrmann (1995) suggests that lax environmental regulation, coupled with indifferent employment and labor law, and no requirement for investment in residential infrastructure results in poor human rights outcomes, particularly in the Global South where such development has been highly encouraged.

It has been argued that economic development may be a foundation for political stability, and, in turn, for the promotion of human rights, such that a nation's higher levels of economic development may result in a lesser degree of human rights violations (Mitchell and McCormick 1988). While the national level of economic development has been crucial for predicting many human rights outcome variables (Henderson 1991), such as equality (Dye and Zeigler 1988), levels of human freedom (Banks 1985), government repression (Duff et al. 1976; Mitchell and McCormick 1988), and political violence (Zimmerman 1980), however, some studies have gotten mixed results, and international investment has certainly shown negative effects on human rights outcomes. These disparate findings suggest an ample literature that supports economic development playing some sort of role in a nation's respect for human rights.

Due to the significance and breadth of the topic, the research in human rights is both highly complex and diverse, uses incomparable variables and measures, and turns out inconsistent results. Those studies which examine relationships between the presence of human rights, and political democracy and economic development are no exception. Vasak's (1977) three-generation framework affords researchers the ability to organize rights into somewhat more specific categories, in order to empirically evaluate outcomes.

RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

Utilizing the three-generation framework set forth by Karel Vasak (1977), which he successively based upon the call words of the French Revolution, *Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité*, this study seeks to enrich the sociological approach to human rights by elaborating on their definitions. In order to fully develop human rights concepts, latent

constructs that may correspond to aspects of human rights according to this framework are empirically determined.

Second, empirically derived human rights constructs are used in determining the trends of human rights levels across countries and regions. It is expected that, consistent with the literature, greater levels of first-generation human rights may be present among countries and regions of the Western world or the Global North (Felice 2010; Frezzo 2014; Uvin 2004), and that greater levels of second-generation human rights may be present among countries and regions of the developing world or the Global South. Furthermore, the influence of the Third-World on burgeoning solidarity rights may be reflected in higher levels of third-generation rights in the Global South.

Finally, this dissertation research determines how development and democracy contribute to the adoption of different generations of human rights across the world. When using different constructs of human rights as outcome measures, and examining the effects of economic development and democracy on the presence of various human rights across countries and regions, this study anticipates positive associations of human rights levels with levels of both democracy (Henderson 1991; Landman 2002; Landman 2005; Poe and Tate 1994) and development (Henderson 1991; Mitchell and McCormick 1988).

CHAPTER III

DATA AND METHODS

DATA

This study utilizes data from the following sources: (1) the Cingranelli-Richards Human Rights Data Project (Cingranelli, Richards and Clay 2014), (2) the Social Progress Imperative (Imperative 2013), (3) the Human Development Report (United Nations Development Programme), (4) the Polity IV Project (Center for Systemic Peace), (5) the World Bank Group (The World Bank), and (6) the Association of Religion Data Archives (Brown and James 2018). Data from the Cingranelli-Richards Human Rights Project, the Human Development Report, and the Social Progress Imperative are used to extract indicators to empirically develop human rights constructs. These constructs are then plotted in order to determine trends over time. The Polity IV Project data is used to create the democracy variable to explain human rights outcomes. The World Bank provides data for each nation's Gross National Income, an indicator of economic development, which is also used in determining human rights outcomes. The Association of Religion Data Archives is used to estimate the religious demographics of each country and world region. Geographic world regions are determined by United Nations geographical country groupings, as specified in the United Nations geoscheme (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs), and include a total of five world regions, consisting of the Americas, Asia, Africa, Europe, and Oceania.

The Cingranelli-Richards Human Rights Data Project (CIRI) provides quantitative information on the government observance of 15 human rights featuring six variables for 202 countries. Sourced from the *US State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices*, and Amnesty International's *Annual Report*, the variables are grounded in international law, and cover the years between 1981 and 2011, inclusively.

The Human Development Report (HDR) is used in order to supplement human rights constructs, and to continue the trend analysis covered by CIRI after 2011. The Human Development Report combines social and economic indicators to assess human development from 12 categories and across 3 key dimensions: 1) long and healthy life, 2) knowledge, and 3) a decent standard of living. To obtain the indicators, HDR utilizes shared data from a variety of international data agencies, with many indicators taken directly from the UN and the World Bank. Covering 189 countries, the HDR reports from the years 1990 to 2017, ranking countries from a low human development level to a very high level of human development.

Selected according to their face values, this study identifies 10 variables in the HDR data set that may be associated with human rights, and could provide a more concentrated view of economic and environmental indicators. These variables are taken from the categories of Education, Gender, Environmental Sustainability, Health, Inequality, and Socio-economic Sustainability. Data is not available for all years; however, HDR data successfully covers the years 2010 through 2014.

Because of its more comprehensive variables, the Social Progress Imperative (SPI) is used to expand and enrich human rights constructs and to further extend the trend

analysis across countries and regions. This dataset purposely deemphasizes economic measurements and conceptualizes social progress as composed of three dimensions consisting of basic human needs, foundations of wellbeing, and opportunity. Providing data from the years from 2014 to 2018, and employing sources from the UN, as well as from non-governmental organizations, SPI uses 51 social and environmental indicators to form indexes for each dimension for comparison across 160 countries. Continuing the trend from HDR data, this dissertation utilizes SPI variables from 2014 through 2018.

In order to explain the effect of democracy level on human rights outcomes, Polity IV Project data are used. This quantitative data set provides information on political government regime and authority characteristics for 162 countries, and covers the years from 1800 to 2017. Based on the original work of Ted Robert Gurr, the Polity IV's unit of analysis is the polity, or government organization. Eckstein and Gurr (1975) propose that all governments are a subset of authority patterns, which determine the direction of the state or entity (Marshall et al. 2002). Using national data archives and UN reports, the Polity IV Project conceptualizes institutionalized democracy as a function of, first, the presence of institutions and procedures through which citizens can express preference for and choose government policies and leaders, second, the presence of legal constraints on executive power, and third, the guarantee of civil liberties to that nation's citizens. The data for the Polity IV Project is gathered from multiple, historical open sources of information, and cross-checked with other sources for accuracy and reliability.

As it is the indicator established by the UN in 1945, to assess economic development (McMichael 2012), this dissertation employs the use of nations' Gross

National Income (GNI; formerly known as Gross National Product before the terminology was changed in the System of National Accounts [SNA] in 1993; The World Bank), in order to clarify the effect of economic development on human rights outcomes. This World Bank Indicators data set taken from the World Bank Group uses World Bank National Accounts data and OECD National Accounts data files to produce annual, time series data, covering the years 1961 through 2017. Because 2017 is the last year available for this data, the years covered in answering the third research question are limited from 1981 to 2017.

Last, this research controls for religious demographics of nations using the Religious Characteristics of States Data from the Association of Religion Data Archives (ARDA; Brown and James 2018). With state-year as the unit of analysis, it covers 220 nations across the years from 1800 through 2015, and provides estimates of both percentages and populations of followers of 100 religious denominations. For purposes of this study, it is assumed that religion is a time invariant variable, and it thus uses the religious denomination designated for each country in the year 2000.

Sample

This study uses multiple data sets to develop human rights constructs, and includes countries across the world. There are 202 countries included from CIRI data, 146 countries are included from SPI data, and 195 countries are included from HDR data. See Appendix A for a list of countries included in the study. Because of missing data for different outcome constructs, not all datasets include the same number of countries in the final analyses.

MEASURES

Applying the three-generation framework, variables which may on their face be associated with any of the three generations of human rights are taken from the CIRI, SPI, and HDR datasets. Using the entirety of its data, there are a total of six variables from CIRI that have been compiled for 202 countries from the years 1981 to 2011.

Human rights indicators.

CIRI₁. Physical Integrity Rights Index

This index includes variables indicating Torture, Extrajudicial Killing, Political Imprisonment, and Disappearance, with scores ranging from 0 (no government respect for these rights) to 8 (full government respect for these rights).

CIRI₂. Empowerment Rights Index

This additive index includes variables indicating Foreign Movement, Domestic Movement, Freedom of Speech, Freedom of Assembly & Association, Workers' Rights, Electoral Self-Determination, and Freedom of Religion, with scores ranging from 0 (no government respect for these rights) to 14 (full government respect for these rights).

CIRI₃. Women's Economic Rights

This variable includes several internationally recognized rights, such as the right to equal pay for equal work, the right to work without having to have permission from a male, and the right to a work environment free from sexual harassment. Scores range from 0 to 3, with a score of 0 indicating no social rights for women, and a score of 3 indicating that nearly all of women's rights are guaranteed and supported by the government. See Appendix B for a complete list of these internationally recognized

rights, and greater detail on scoring.

CIRI₄. Women's Political Rights

This variable includes the following internationally recognized rights, such as the right to vote, the right to run for political office, hold elected government positions, the right to petition government officials, and the right to join a political party. Scores range from 0 to 3, with a score of 0 indicating that women's rights are not legally recognized, and a score of 3 indicating that women's rights were supported in practice.

CIRI₅. Women's Social Rights

This index includes several internationally recognized rights, such as the right to equal inheritance, the right to travel internationally, the right to an education, and the right to initiate a divorce. Scores range from 0 to 3 with a score of 0 indicating no social rights for women, and a score of 3 indicates that nearly all of women's rights are guaranteed and supported by the government.

CIRI₆. Independence of the Judiciary

This variable indicates whether the judiciary works independently from other organizations or influences. Scores range from 0 to 2, with a score of 0 indicating not independent, 1 indicating partial independence, and 2 indicating generally independent.

From HDR data, this research uses a total of 10 variables that have been compiled from 189 countries from the years 2010 to 2014.

HDR₁. Mortality Rate Attributed to Household and Ambient Air Pollution

This variable is the number of deaths attributable to the joint effects of household and ambient air pollution in a year per 100,000 population, with age standardized rates.

HDR₂. Rural Population with Access to Electricity

This variable measures the percentage of rural population with access to electricity.

HDR₃. Education Index

This variable is measured by combining average adult years of schooling with expected years of schooling for children, weighting each 50%.

HDR₄. Life Expectancy Index

This variable is a statistical measure of the average time an organism is expected to live.

HDR₅. Gender Inequality Index

This index is a composite measure to quantify the loss of achievement within a country due to gender inequality. It uses three dimensions to measure opportunity cost: reproductive health, empowerment, and labor market participation.

HDR₆. Carbon Dioxide per Capita

Carbon emissions result from burning fossil fuels and cement manufacturing measured in metric tonnes.

HDR₇. Forest Area (% of total land area)

This variable considers land under natural or planted stands of trees at least 5 meters in situ, excluding tree stands in agricultural production.

HDR₈. Fossil Fuel Energy Consumption (% of total energy consumption)

This variable consists of coal, oil, petroleum and natural gas products.

HDR₉. Renewable Energy Consumption (% of total final energy consumption)

This variable is the share of renewable energy of all technologies, including hydro, modern and traditional biomass, wind, and solar, liquid biofuels, geothermal, marine and

waste, in total final energy consumption.

HDR₁₀. Coefficient of Human Inequality

This is a simple average of inequalities in health, education, and income, and is calculated by an unweighted mean of estimated inequalities of those dimensions.

Details for the calculation and a complete list of contributing international data agencies to HDR data can be found at <http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/understanding/sources>. For example, one source is the European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions that collects cross-sectional, longitudinal data on income, poverty, and living conditions.

Using the entirety of SPI data, there are a total of 12 variables across the dimensions of Basic Human Needs, Foundations of Wellbeing, and Opportunity. These variables have been compiled for 146 countries from the years 2014 to 2018, and gives countries a score from 0 to 100, inclusive, to indicate their overall social progress. The Basic Human Needs dimension consists of the following variables:

SPI₁. Nutrition and Basic Medical Care

This variable is constructed from indicators including undernourishment, maternal mortality rate, child mortality rate, child stunting, and deaths from infectious diseases.

SPI₂. Water and Sanitation

This variable is constructed from indicators including access to at least basic drinking water, access to piped water, access to at least basic sanitation facilities, and rural open defecation (% of population).

SPI₃. Shelter

This variable is constructed from indicators including access to electricity, quality of electricity supply, and household air pollution attributable deaths.

SPI₄. Personal Safety

This variable is constructed from indicators including property crime rate, political killings and torture, perceived criminality, and traffic deaths.

The Foundations of Wellbeing dimension consists of the following variables:

SPI₅. Access to Basic Knowledge

This variable is constructed from indicators including adult literacy rate, primary school enrollment, secondary school enrollment, gender parity in secondary enrollment, and access to quality education.

SPI₆. Access to Information and Communications

This variable is constructed from indicators including mobile telephone subscriptions, internet users, access to online governance, and access to independent media.

SPI₇. Health and Wellness

This variable is constructed from indicators including life expectancy at 60, premature deaths from non-communicable diseases, access to essential services, and access to quality healthcare.

SPI₈. Environmental Quality

This variable is constructed from indicators including outdoor air pollution attributable to deaths, wastewater treatment, greenhouse gas emissions, and biome protection.

The Opportunity dimension consists of the following variables:

SPI₉. Personal Rights

This variable is constructed from indicators including political rights, freedom of expression, access to justice, freedom of religion, and property rights for women.

SPI₁₀. Personal Freedom and Choice

This variable is constructed from indicators including vulnerable employment, early marriage, satisfied demand for contraception, and corruption.

SPI₁₁. Inclusiveness

This variable is constructed from indicators including acceptance of gays and lesbians, discrimination and violence against minorities, equality of political power by gender, equality of political power by socioeconomic position, and equality of political power by social group.

SPI₁₂. Access to Advanced Education

This variable is constructed from indicators including years of tertiary schooling, women's average years in school, globally ranked universities, and percent of tertiary students enrolled in globally ranked universities.

For a complete list of indicators included in each SPI variable, see Appendix C. Details for the calculation and source of each indicator can be found at <https://www.socialprogress.org/index/global>. For example, for “access to at least basic drinking water,” one of the indicators of Water and Sanitation, is calculated as the percentage of population with access to drinking water from an improved water source where collection time is not more than 30 minutes for a roundtrip including queuing. This

data is collected from the WHO/UNICEF Joint Monitoring Programme for Water and Supply and Sanitation.

Independent variables.

1. Institutional Democracy

The Polity IV Project utilizes an additive 11 point scale (0 to 10) to arrive at the democracy indicator. It is composed of the variables of competitiveness of political participation, openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment, and constraints on the chief executive.

2. Economic Development

This measure of GNI used by the World Bank is an estimate of the size of a nation's economy in terms of GNI per capita. Aggregates are based on constant 2010 U.S. dollars. GNI per capita is gross national income divided by midyear population, and is the sum of a nation's gross domestic product plus any product taxes (less subsidies) not included in the valuation of output, plus net receipts of income it receives from abroad.

Control variables.

1. Religion

This study separates countries according to their religious demographics, discerning between Muslim, Christian, and Other categories. From the ARDA, for the years 1950 through 2010, total population numbers are taken from the United Nations Statistics Division.

2. Region

This research separates countries into five geographic regions for regional analysis. The regions are Africa, the Americas, Asia, Europe, and Oceania. See Appendix D for a list of country by region.

Data Analysis Strategies

The first objective of this research is to empirically define human rights; therefore, it is necessary to support the literary definitions of human rights by conducting an exploratory factor analysis, separately, of the data provided in CIRI, SPI, and HDR, in order to show how the variables chosen for the study cluster. Using principal component method with varimax rotation, exploratory factor analysis is run for the included variables from each dataset for each year (CIRI 1981-2011, HDR 2010-2014, and SPI 2014-2018).

To answer question (2), the CIRI longitudinal data is used to analyze the trend of first- and second-generation rights. The available data cover the years from 1981 to 2011. Additional data are taken from HDR to get a fuller picture of second-generation trends. A shorter trend of third-generation human rights is determined from SPI and HDR data. The available data covers the years from 1981 to 2018.

To answer question (3), generalized least squares (GLS) random-effects modeling for panel data (with robust standard errors) in STATA was used, as it provided a more efficient means of estimating coefficients than GLS fixed-effects modeling (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2008). A longitudinal record linking each country in the study was created which was then divided into country-waves as the unit of analysis. Country waves

were subsequently used to evaluate the associations between the explanatory variables (democracy level and GNI per capita) and levels of the various human rights constructs. GNI per capita, and democracy level (explanatory variables), as well as all outcome variables, were treated as continuous variables. Religion and region were controlled for, and dichotomous variables were created for both. Geographic-based region variables were Asia, the Americas, Europe and Oceania. Africa provided the reference. Religion variables were Muslim and other religion, with Christian as the reference.

CHAPTER IV

RESULTS

This chapter describes the results of the study according to each objective. This dissertation aimed to empirically develop human rights constructs, and use them to plot the global and regional trends of specific rights. These new constructs also served as outcomes to explain whether and how democracy and economic development are related to the presence of human rights levels across countries and regions.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS CONSTRUCTS

To address the first research objective, which is to expand and elaborate on human rights definitions, exploratory factor analysis was conducted. Compiling data taken from three data sets, there are 31 years of results for CIRI, 5 years for HDR, and 5 years for SPI. The exploratory factor analysis revealed up to two factors from CIRI variables, three factors from HDR variables, and two factors from SPI variables. From CIRI, from the years 1981 through 1989, 2004 through 2006, and 2010 through 2011, the six variables loaded on two factors. Table 1 shows that one factor includes women's economic rights, women's political rights, and women's social rights, each of which is a construct of overall women's rights. A second factor is comprised of physical integrity, empowerment rights, and independence of the judiciary. This constellation of indicators is labeled as the 'Liberties' factor.

Table 1: Factor Analyses of 6 Human Rights Variables Taken from CIRI from 1981-2011 (varimax rotation)

Year	Physical Integrity	Empowerment Rights	Women's Economic Rights	Women's Political Rights	Women's Social Rights	Independence of Judiciary	N=	Variance %
1981	<u>0.822</u>	<u>0.852</u>	0.302	-0.044	0.370	<u>0.851</u>	116	39.25
	0.124	0.275	<u>0.854</u>	<u>0.838</u>	<u>0.839</u>	0.108		37.31
1982	<u>0.778</u>	<u>0.839</u>	0.259	-0.062	0.304	<u>0.876</u>	120	37.31
	0.163	0.273	<u>0.853</u>	<u>0.797</u>	<u>0.856</u>	-0.001		36.64
1983	<u>0.725</u>	<u>0.839</u>	0.341	-0.110	0.314	<u>0.867</u>	124	36.82
	0.176	0.260	<u>0.812</u>	<u>0.795</u>	<u>0.836</u>	-0.016		34.81
1984	<u>0.782</u>	<u>0.812</u>	0.273	-0.009	0.439	<u>0.825</u>	129	36.97
	0.051	0.315	<u>0.847</u>	<u>0.834</u>	<u>0.781</u>	0.193		36.06
1985	0.095	0.356	<u>0.812</u>	<u>0.812</u>	<u>0.812</u>	0.045	129	35.36
	<u>0.755</u>	<u>0.762</u>	0.317	-0.095	0.321	<u>0.855</u>		70.27
1986	<u>0.749</u>	<u>0.813</u>	0.313	-0.100	0.285	<u>0.881</u>	129	36.44
	0.191	0.234	<u>0.805</u>	<u>0.769</u>	<u>0.845</u>	-0.029		34.10
1987	<u>0.801</u>	<u>0.746</u>	0.391	-0.013	0.410	<u>0.862</u>	129	37.72
	0.158	0.374	<u>0.731</u>	<u>0.830</u>	<u>0.765</u>	0.116		33.10
1988	0.245	0.308	<u>0.827</u>	<u>0.772</u>	<u>0.859</u>	-0.036	133	36.23
	<u>0.685</u>	<u>0.797</u>	0.325	-0.021	0.279	<u>0.891</u>		34.71
1989	0.255	0.393	<u>0.788</u>	<u>0.811</u>	<u>0.861</u>	0.010	128	37.36
	<u>0.735</u>	<u>0.719</u>	0.374	0.027	0.268	<u>0.886</u>		34.27
1990	0.739	0.842	0.814	0.626	0.804	0.732	129	58.16
1991	0.717	0.820	0.848	0.704	0.797	0.703	118	58.85
1992	0.688	0.830	0.811	0.646	0.839	0.728	131	57.86
1993	0.697	0.794	0.790	0.588	0.817	0.653	148	52.98
1994	0.707	0.823	0.807	0.589	0.843	0.722	141	56.80
1995	0.708	0.788	0.803	0.552	0.853	0.735	145	55.67
1996	0.725	0.799	0.766	0.569	0.821	0.753	151	55.25
1997	0.741	0.805	0.774	0.599	0.819	0.785	151	57.37
1998	0.758	0.805	0.817	0.587	0.835	0.818	148	60.02
1999	0.742	0.824	0.778	0.617	0.821	0.804	151	58.94
2000	0.760	0.821	0.750	0.638	0.827	0.802	150	59.14
2001	0.752	0.852	0.709	0.446	0.789	0.839	187	55.34
2002	0.704	0.817	0.739	0.619	0.828	0.811	156	57.30
2003	0.747	0.842	0.725	0.464	0.753	0.810	168	53.86
2004	<u>0.843</u>	<u>0.810</u>	0.311	-0.076	0.389	<u>0.868</u>	173	39.58
	0.049	0.317	<u>0.645</u>	<u>0.813</u>	<u>0.663</u>	0.179		27.51
2005	<u>0.859</u>	<u>0.843</u>	0.536	0.015		<u>0.860</u>	191	49.51
	-0.021	0.059	<u>0.568</u>	<u>0.946</u>		0.149		26.14

2006	<u>0.843</u>	<u>0.809</u>	0.522	0.013	<u>0.856</u>	191	47.41
	0.031	0.277	<u>0.526</u>	<u>0.951</u>	0.058		25.23
2007	<u>0.828</u>	<u>0.880</u>	<u>0.692</u>	0.319	<u>0.832</u>	192	54.64
2008	<u>0.827</u>	<u>0.866</u>	<u>0.665</u>	0.348	<u>0.852</u>	190	54.80
2009	<u>0.824</u>	<u>0.859</u>	<u>0.810</u>	0.287	<u>0.861</u>	191	57.91
2010	<u>0.883</u>	<u>0.835</u>	<u>0.689</u>	0.065	<u>0.883</u>	193	54.73
	-0.039	0.204	0.368	<u>0.974</u>	0.003		22.55
2011	<u>0.882</u>	<u>0.846</u>	<u>0.687</u>	0.064	<u>0.870</u>	194	54.55
	0.045	0.165	0.391	<u>0.975</u>	-0.036		22.69

From 1990 through 2003, and again from 2007 through 2009, all variables loaded on one factor only, suggesting that the distinction of women's rights was lost and the indicators began to come together as various dimensions of the Liberties factor. In 2005, however, CIRI opted to discontinue the data for the women's social rights variable; thus, this variable showed no values from 2005 through 2011. Furthermore, although it landed with the remaining variables on one factor from 2007 through 2009, the factor loading for women's political rights was extremely low, with values of .319, .348 and .287, respectively. The acceptable factor loading value for constituting a construct was .4. Last, of the five remaining variables in 2010 and 2011, women's political rights was the sole variable loading on factor two. As the three women's rights variables did not behave consistently over time in terms of their relationships with physical integrity, empowerment rights, and independence of the judiciary, they were removed and the factor analysis was rerun for each of the 31 years. Each women's rights variable thus became a separate outcome measure of human rights. Table 2 shows the results of the factor analysis with the three Women's Rights variables removed.

Table 2: Factor Analyses with Women's Rights Variables Removed from CIRI from 1981-2011 (varimax rotation)

Year	Physical Integrity	Empowerment Rights	Independence of Judiciary	N=	Variance%
1981	0.830	0.901	0.860	127	74.66
1982	0.801	0.883	0.855	133	71.75
1983	0.759	0.889	0.851	132	69.69
1984	0.746	0.880	0.851	134	68.48
1985	0.747	0.849	0.847	133	66.55
1986	0.766	0.863	0.859	133	69.01
1987	0.752	0.873	0.854	134	68.56
1988	0.749	0.861	0.852	136	67.57
1989	0.787	0.839	0.845	135	67.90
1990	0.789	0.889	0.861	134	71.81
1991	0.792	0.860	0.834	131	68.76
1992	0.802	0.848	0.881	146	71.25
1993	0.812	0.828	0.832	150	67.92
1994	0.809	0.846	0.859	150	70.29
1995	0.792	0.843	0.846	152	68.48
1996	0.813	0.844	0.869	155	70.95
1997	0.827	0.863	0.878	154	73.32
1998	0.839	0.863	0.900	152	75.32
1999	0.828	0.884	0.885	154	75.04
2000	0.837	0.872	0.893	154	75.32
2001	0.835	0.908	0.891	190	77.16
2002	0.806	0.871	0.893	158	73.58
2003	0.832	0.895	0.905	187	77.08
2004	0.844	0.901	0.893	188	77.32
2005	0.842	0.904	0.874	191	76.32
2006	0.841	0.880	0.848	191	73.38
2007	0.872	0.894	0.862	192	76.79
2008	0.885	0.896	0.869	192	78.10
2009	0.869	0.889	0.873	192	76.10
2010	0.892	0.882	0.878	193	78.15
2011	0.893	0.896	0.858	194	77.89

CIRI finally yields four factors: 1) Women's Economic Rights, 2) Women's Political Rights, 3) Women's Social Rights, and 4) Liberties, consisting of the physical

integrity, empowerment rights, and independence of the judiciary indicators. Because of differing scales used to measure the Independence of the Judiciary, the Physical Integrity Rights Index, and Empowerment Rights Index variables taken from CIRI, each item was standardized, and the three items were summed to develop the Liberties index. The Liberties factor explained from 67% to 78% of the variance, as referenced in Table 2.

From the years 2010 through 2014, the ten variables taken from HDR landed on three distinct factors consistently over time. In Table 3, one factor, entitled ‘Air Quality’ includes mortality rate attributed to household and ambient air pollution, and carbon dioxide per capita. A second factor, named ‘Quality of Life’ includes access to electricity, education index, life expectancy index, gender inequality index, and the coefficient of human inequality. The third factor, named ‘Environmental Integrity’ is comprised of forest area, fossil fuel energy consumption, and renewable energy consumption. The gender inequality index, forest area, renewable energy consumption, and coefficient of human inequality were reverse coded to make them consistent with higher level of human rights. The Air Quality factor explained from 20% to almost 23% of the variance of all variables included for the HDR dataset. The Quality of Life factor explained from 46% to 48% of the variance. The Environmental Integrity factor explain from 13% to 16% of the variance.

Table 3: Factor Analysis of 10 Human Rights Variables from HDI Data from 2010 2014 (varimax rotation)

Variable	2010			2011			2012			2013			2014		
	I	II	III	I	II	III	I	II	III	I	II	III	I	II	III
Mortality Rate Attributed to Household and Ambient Air Pollution	-0.031	<u>0.930</u>	-0.073	-0.008	<u>0.935</u>	-0.031	-0.004	<u>0.930</u>	-0.091	-0.045	<u>0.922</u>	-0.152	-0.084	<u>0.932</u>	-0.105
Rural Population with Access to Electricity (%)	<u>0.830</u>	0.203	-0.271	<u>0.846</u>	0.216	-0.248	<u>0.832</u>	0.232	-0.313	<u>0.825</u>	0.163	-0.362	<u>0.817</u>	0.233	-0.273
Education Index	<u>0.898</u>	0.253	0.018	<u>0.911</u>	0.239	0.054	<u>0.915</u>	0.228	0.032	<u>0.911</u>	0.225	0.010	<u>0.905</u>	0.254	0.029
Life Expectancy Index	<u>0.916</u>	-0.002	-0.140	<u>0.922</u>	0.059	-0.136	<u>0.926</u>	0.061	-0.156	<u>0.929</u>	0.007	-0.146	<u>0.929</u>	0.005	-0.082
Gender Inequality Index	<u>-0.924</u>	-0.172	-0.028	<u>-0.929</u>	-0.159	-0.064	<u>-0.932</u>	-0.157	-0.061	<u>-0.932</u>	-0.141	-0.069	<u>-0.934</u>	-0.136	-0.065
Carbon Dioxide per Capita (tonnes)	0.468	<u>0.743</u>	0.132	0.462	<u>0.728</u>	0.165	0.479	<u>0.724</u>	0.137	0.455	<u>0.771</u>	0.075	0.411	<u>0.788</u>	0.163
Forest Area (% of total land area)	0.056	0.060	<u>0.823</u>	0.073	0.051	<u>0.834</u>	0.068	0.041	<u>0.833</u>	0.136	0.083	<u>0.768</u>	0.094	0.046	<u>0.823</u>
Fossil Fuel Energy Consumption (% of total energy consumption)	0.371	0.562	<u>-0.594</u>	0.436	0.580	<u>-0.531</u>	0.422	0.552	<u>-0.578</u>	0.396	0.458	<u>-0.674</u>	0.397	0.551	<u>-0.578</u>
Renewable Energy Consumption (% of total final energy consumption)	-0.496	-0.564	<u>0.539</u>	-0.557	-0.577	<u>0.470</u>	-0.545	-0.550	<u>0.522</u>	-0.516	-0.474	<u>0.613</u>	-0.533	-0.572	<u>0.500</u>

Coefficient of Human Inequality	<u>-0.909</u>	-0.205	0.030	<u>-0.891</u>	-0.235	-0.042	<u>-0.910</u>	-0.210	0.022	<u>-0.903</u>	-0.205	0.015	<u>-0.912</u>	-0.133	-0.006
N=		102			106			105			108			104	
% Variance	46.22	22.29	14.38	47.73	22.65	13.17	47.93	21.76	14.56	47.10	20.25	16.06	46.79	22.78	13.85

From the year 2014 through 2018, based on the factor analysis results, the 12 variables taken from SPI landed on two distinct factors consistently over time. In Table 4, the factor entitled ‘Basic Human Needs’ is composed of nutrition and basic medical care, water and sanitation, shelter, access to basic knowledge, access to information and communications, health and wellness, environmental quality, personal freedom and choice, and access to advanced education. The factor labeled ‘Personal Integrity’ includes personal safety, personal rights, and inclusiveness. The Basic Human Needs factor explains from 56% to almost 58% of the variance of all variables included for the SPI dataset. The Personal Integrity factors explained between 28% and 29% of the variance, as referenced in Table 4.

Table 4: Factor Analyses of 12 Human Rights Variables from SPI Data from 2014-2018
(varimax rotation)

Variable	2014		2015		2016		2017		2018	
	Factor									
	I	II	I	II	I	II	I	II	I	II
Nutrition and Basic Medical Care	<u>0.914</u>	0.281	<u>0.916</u>	0.277	<u>0.920</u>	0.261	<u>0.917</u>	0.267	<u>0.916</u>	0.263
Water and Sanitation	<u>0.936</u>	0.207	<u>0.936</u>	0.202	<u>0.938</u>	0.190	<u>0.937</u>	0.183	<u>0.934</u>	0.184
Shelter	<u>0.943</u>	0.231	<u>0.943</u>	0.230	<u>0.946</u>	0.223	<u>0.946</u>	0.214	<u>0.948</u>	0.205
Personal Safety	0.441	<u>0.735</u>	0.444	<u>0.734</u>	0.440	<u>0.743</u>	0.447	<u>0.752</u>	0.444	<u>0.748</u>
Access to Basic Knowledge	<u>0.866</u>	0.329	<u>0.874</u>	0.318	<u>0.873</u>	0.317	<u>0.879</u>	0.313	<u>0.879</u>	0.317
Access to Information and Communications	<u>0.800</u>	0.476	<u>0.804</u>	0.475	<u>0.800</u>	0.483	<u>0.800</u>	0.497	<u>0.814</u>	0.474
Health and Wellness	<u>0.770</u>	0.485	<u>0.776</u>	0.477	<u>0.779</u>	0.473	<u>0.795</u>	0.456	<u>0.799</u>	0.447
Environmental Quality	<u>0.709</u>	0.534	<u>0.708</u>	0.535	<u>0.714</u>	0.527	<u>0.755</u>	0.477	<u>0.766</u>	0.454
Personal Rights	0.225	<u>0.901</u>	0.215	<u>0.906</u>	0.207	<u>0.901</u>	0.216	<u>0.904</u>	0.214	<u>0.905</u>
Personal Freedom and Choice	<u>0.832</u>	0.407	<u>0.832</u>	0.405	<u>0.827</u>	0.413	<u>0.827</u>	0.411	<u>0.833</u>	0.298
Inclusiveness	0.275	<u>0.889</u>	0.276	<u>0.891</u>	0.270	<u>0.893</u>	0.266	<u>0.897</u>	0.269	<u>0.899</u>
Access to Advanced Education	<u>0.786</u>	0.414	<u>0.790</u>	0.410	<u>0.782</u>	<u>0.440</u>	<u>0.795</u>	0.417	<u>0.806</u>	0.392
N=	146		146		146		146		146	
% Variance	55.95	29.24	56.27	29.14	56.21	29.28	57.17	28.84	57.73	28.13


Table 5 presents the nine new constructs derived from factor analyses across the CIRI, HDR, and SPI datasets. They are: Liberties, Women’s Social Rights, Women’s Political Rights, Women’s Economic Rights, Air Quality, Quality of Life, Environmental Integrity, Basic Human Needs, and Personal Integrity.

Table 5: New Constructs Derived from Factor Analysis of Variables from CIRI, HDR, and SPI

CIRI Constructs	HDR Constructs	SPI Constructs
Liberties	Air Quality	Basic Human Needs
Women's Political Rights	Quality of Life	Personal Integrity
Women's Social Rights	Environmental Integrity	
<u>Women's Economic Rights</u>		

TRENDS

To address the second research objective, which is to develop human rights trends across countries and regions, the nine constructs that emerged by conducting the factor analysis were graphed. These new constructs were plotted over time for all countries together in the study, as well as for five world regions. In Figure 1, beginning in 1981, the Liberties construct fluctuated somewhat, but fell overall considerably until 2000. Levels rose sharply to nearly 1981 levels, only to fall drastically in 2002. With some slight fluctuation, Liberties settled at approximately the same levels by 2011, as shown in 1981.



In Figure 2, Women's Economic Rights levels showed an overall slight upward trend with small fluctuations, including a more significant fall in 2006. Levels were at their highest in 2007, and sank below their 2006 levels by 2008, finishing 2011 overall slightly higher than their 1981 levels.




Figure 3 shows Women's Social Rights. With slight fluctuations, Women's Social Rights fell to their lowest levels in 1984, but trended upward fairly steadily, and finished 2004 at higher levels than 1981.







Figure 4 shows Women's Political Rights, which boasted much smaller fluctuations than the other women's rights constructs. They trended relatively steadily upward from 1981 through 2011, reaching their highest levels by approximately 2008. They finished 2011 down from 2008 levels, but still significantly higher than they began in 1981.



In Figure 5, the Quality of Life construct from HDI showed some fluctuation, but levels rose moderately above original 2010 levels by 2014. Air Quality showed practically no change from 2010 to 2014. Environmental Integrity demonstrated the greatest fluctuation of the three HDI constructs, but finished 2014 just slightly above 2010 levels.



In Figure 6, SPI's Basic Human Needs construct showed a consistent trend upward from 2014 through 2018. The Personal Integrity construct showed a very shallow decline in levels between 2014 and 2018.



In terms of regional trends, Figure 7 shows the Women's Economic Rights construct from CIRI across the years 1981 through 2011. Europe's trend line was largely stable with mild fluctuations from 1981 through about 2006, before spiking in 2007. It finished 2011 with significantly higher levels than it began with in 1981. Oceania's Women's Economic Rights levels started lower than Europe's, but mimicked Europe's trend, remaining largely stagnant with slight fluctuations. Oceania's levels ending 2011 were significantly below Europe's, but still above their starting point in 1981. Women's Economic Rights levels in the Americas began just below Oceania's in 1981, but with slight fluctuations, were relatively stable across the years between 1981 and 2007. They rose sharply in 2007, and the Americas finished 2011 below Oceania's levels, but with

somewhat higher levels than they began in 1981. Africa's and Asia's Women's Economic Rights trends were quite similar across the years. Although Africa's levels were slightly higher than Asia's in 1981, Africa's levels of Women's Economic Rights fell below Asia's by about 1986, and remained below them, albeit just slightly until 2011 when they met. Africa's and Asia's trends were largely stable with slight up and down fluctuations, and both Africa and Asia finish 2011 at levels slightly lower than where they began in 1981.




Figure 8 shows the regional trends for the Women's Social Rights construct from CIRI across the years 1981 through 2004. Of the five world regions designated in this study, the Americas, Africa, Asia, Europe, and Oceania, Europe's regional trend for Women's Social Rights was the highest. Despite two notable upward spikes between 1990 and 1991, and 2002 and 2003, however, levels steeply declined in 2003, and ended

somewhat lower in 2004 than when the measurement began in 1981. Oceania's Women's Social Rights measure began at the same level as Europe in 1981, but then fell below it except in the late 1990s when it surpassed Europe briefly. Levels in Oceania declined beginning roughly in 2002 and finished significantly lower than they began in 1981. The Americas' Women's Social Rights trend began 1981 much lower than either Europe's or Oceania's, and levels fluctuated only slightly up and down before rising significantly in 2003, finishing above Oceania levels, but just slightly lower than Europe in 2004. At substantially lower levels than the Americas, both Asia's and Africa's Women's Social Rights trends nearly overlapped, and were the most stable and similar across the years, with very slight fluctuations until approximately 2002. At this point, Asia trended sharply higher in 2003, and finished at somewhat higher levels in 2004 than they started in 1981. Around the same time as Asia's levels were going up, Africa's trended sharply down, finishing at slightly lower levels in 2004 than they began in 1981.




Figure 9 shows the regional trends for the Women's Political Rights construct from CIRI across the years 1981 through 2011. Europe exhibited the highest levels of Women's Political Rights overall, but its rising trend was also the most shallow, and had the least fluctuations. Europe finished 2011 overall with higher levels than those in 1981. The Americas' levels began significantly lower than Europe's, but rose steadily upward with slight fluctuations. The Americas finished below Europe's levels in 2011. Africa's

levels began much lower than the Americas' levels, but also trended fairly steadily upward with somewhat more pronounced fluctuations. Africa finished at levels significantly higher than those they began with in 1981, and slightly lower than the Americas'. The Asia region's Women's Political Rights levels trended very similarly to Africa, but with a slightly shallower upward trend and slightly smoother fluctuations. It finished at levels lower than Africa's, but they were still quite a bit higher than they began in 1981. Oceania's Women's Political Rights trend was the most volatile of the regions. It began 1981 with levels very slightly below the Americas'. Oceania reached its highest levels of women's political rights from about 1993 to 1999, before fluctuating markedly. It finished with lower overall levels than those it began with in 1981, and placed the lowest of all the regions.




Figure 10 shows the regional trends for the Liberties construct from CIRI from the years 1981 through 2011. Oceania had the highest overall levels of Liberties; however, it showed a shallow downward trend with some modest fluctuations, and levels ended 2011 somewhat lower than they began in 1981. Europe's levels began substantially lower than Oceania's, but remained fairly stable, finishing 2011 at about the same levels as 1981. The Americas' Liberties levels began significantly below Europe's in 1981, but demonstrated a slightly fluctuating, very shallow trend line. Americas' Liberties levels finished 2011 significantly higher than they began, but far below Europe's. Although Asia's Liberties levels started the lowest of all the regions, they were very close to Africa's beginning levels. They showed a steady decline; however, and finished 2011

significantly lower than they began in 1981, and with the lowest levels of the five regions. Africa's Liberties levels showed an extremely shallow fall with only very mild fluctuations, and ended 2011 with somewhat lower levels of Liberties than they began with in 1981.




Figure 11 shows the regional trends for the Quality of Life construct from HDR from 2010 through 2014. Oceania started at the highest overall levels until they began a moderately steep decline in 2013, and ended 2014 at significantly lower levels than 2010. Europe's Quality of Life levels began somewhat lower than Oceania in 2010, but remained constant, finishing 2014 at about the same levels as in 2010. The Americas' and Asia's Quality of Life levels exhibited overall very slight declines. They remained very

near constant and overlapped almost entirely across the years; however, the America's levels began 2010 just slightly higher than Asia's, and ended just barely above Asia's in 2014. Africa's Quality of Life levels began at the lowest levels of all the regions, and substantially lower than the Americas' and Asia's. Africa's levels remained largely unchanged until 2013 when they began a shallow rise, ending at slightly higher levels than those in 2010. Although very modest, Africa's levels showed the only real increase overall.




Figure 12 shows the regional trends for the Air Quality construct from HDR from 2010 through 2014. Asia's Air Quality levels were the highest of all the regions overall, and exhibited a marked increase, finishing 2014 somewhat higher than 2010. Europe's

starting levels were just under Asia's, and began a shallow, but steady decline, finishing 2014 significantly lower than 2010 levels. Oceania's Air Quality levels started somewhat below Europe's levels in 2010, and then fluctuated very slightly, ending 2014 at roughly the same levels as 2010's and just above Europe's. The Americas' Air Quality levels started significantly below Oceania's, and remained constant, finishing 2014 at about the same levels as 2010. Africa's Air Quality levels were the lowest of all the regions. They showed an overall very modest rise, finishing 2014 with slightly higher levels of Air Quality than those in 2010.




Figure 13 shows the regional trends for the Environmental Integrity construct from HDR from 2010 through 2014. Oceania had the highest levels of all the regions;

however, its levels remained largely constant and ended 2014 about the same as they began in 2010. Asia began 2014 with Environmental Integrity levels somewhat lower than Oceania's. Levels rose modestly and finished 2014 slightly higher than 2010's levels. Europe's Environmental Integrity levels began 2010 somewhat below Asia's and declined very gradually, finishing 2014 as slightly lower levels than 2010's. The Americas' trend was largely static with 2010 through 2014 levels about the same. Africa demonstrated the lowest levels of all the regions, but saw an extremely shallow rise, finishing 2014 with slightly higher levels of Environmental Integrity than those in 2010.




Figure 14 shows the regional trends for the Basic Human Needs construct from SPI from 2014 through 2018. Europe's levels were the highest overall, and exhibited a

very shallow increase, ending 2018 just slightly higher than they began in 2014. The Americas region had the second highest Basic Human Needs levels overall. Its trend line showed an increase more shallow than Europe's, and it ended 2018 with barely higher levels than 2014's. Asia's Basic Human Needs levels were well below the Americas', but did show a shallow, but steady increase, ending 2018 with slightly higher levels than those in 2014. Oceania began 2014 with somewhat lower Basic Human Needs levels than Asia's, and was the only region that showed an overall downward trend. Africa's levels remained the lowest of all the regions by a significant margin, but their Basic Human Needs levels demonstrated a steady, shallow rise through 2018.





Figure 15 shows the regional trends for the Personal Integrity construct from SPI from 2014 through 2018. Europe exhibited the highest levels of Personal Integrity of all the regions. Its levels declined very slightly, and finished 2018 just under the beginning 2014 levels. Starting at levels well below Europe's, Oceania showed the only real increase. With beginning levels lower than Oceania's, the America's Personal Integrity trend was much like Europe's, ending 2018 slightly below their 2014 levels. Africa and Asia's levels were highly similar. Asia began 2014 with just slightly higher Personal Integrity levels than Africa's, then very gradually declined and overlapped with Africa from 2015 through 2016. Asia's Personal Integrity levels then dipped just below Africa's, and remained there to finish 2018 slightly lower than they began in 2014, and at the lowest levels of all the regions.



EXPLANATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS CONSTRUCTS

To address the third research question, which is to determine how democracy and economic development contribute to human rights around the globe, the nine empirically derived human rights constructs were used as outcomes in order to evaluate human rights' associations with economic development and political democracy, controlling for religion and region. Prior to conducting multivariate data analyses, tolerance levels were checked for any complications with collinearity. All tolerance levels were above .44, except for Europe in reference to Africa, which was slightly below .4. This indicates that

multicollinearity was not a serious problem. Tables 6-9 present the findings for the GLS random-effects regression results for the four constructs derived from CIRI.

In Table 6, the results suggest that Liberties is positively associated with democracy. Asia has lower levels of Liberties, while Europe and Oceania have higher levels, when compared to Africa. The years 1981 through 2002 were positive and significant, indicating that Liberties levels were greater across the years from 1981 through 2002, than were those in 2011.

Table 7 shows that Women's Economic Rights was positively associated with GNI per capita. Countries with Christian religion were shown to have higher levels of Women's Economic Rights than Muslim countries. The Americas, Europe, and Oceania regions had higher levels of Women's Economic Rights when compared to Africa. The years 1985, 1988, 2002, 2004, 2007, and 2010 had significantly higher levels of Women's Economic Rights when compared to 2011.

Table 8 shows that Women's Social Rights was positively associated with GNI per capita. Muslim countries had lower Women's Social Rights levels than Christian countries. The Americas, Europe, and Oceania regions were found to have higher levels of Women's Social Rights than the Africa region. Women's Social Rights was not found to be significantly different between year 2004 and any year between 1981 and 2003.

Table 9 demonstrated that Women's Political Rights was found to be significantly lower among Muslim countries as compared to Christian countries. Significantly lower levels of Women's Political Rights were found in the years 1981 through 2003, as well as

2006 and 2007, when compared to 2011. The Wald Chi-Square results show that the model significantly improves the explanation of each of the CIRI data human rights outcomes. Indeed, 61% of Liberties, 29% of Women's Economic Rights, 29% of Women's Political Rights, and 43% of Women's Social Rights can be explained by the model.

Table 6: Generalized Least Squares Random-Effects Regression Results of Liberties Construct from 1981-2011

Liberties	Coef.
Democracy level	0.084178**
LN (GNI)	0.021445
Religion (ref:Christian)	
Muslim	-0.05313
Other religion	0.117239
Region (ref:Africa)	
Asia	-0.26237**
Americas	0.077479
Europe	0.42027**
Oceania	0.819989**
Year (ref:2011)	
1981	0.472704**
1982	0.485912**
1983	0.450792**
1984	0.421408**
1985	0.443847**
1986	0.418079**
1987	0.428065**
1988	0.420128**
1989	0.374629**
1990	0.269802**
1991	0.257808**
1992	0.185894**
1993	0.220045**
1994	0.175666**
1995	0.193201**
1996	0.234974**
1997	0.231692**

1998	0.236217**
1999	0.226084**
2000	0.212718**
2001	0.11112**
2002	0.196116**
2003	0.068287
2004	0.049724
2005	0.03434
2006	0.032322
2007	0.0129
2008	-0.0106
2009	-0.01154
2010	-0.0262
Constant	-1.19024
Wald χ^2	808.29
Overall R2	0.6086
Between-Subjects Standard Deviation ($\sqrt{\psi}$)	0.330392
Within-Subjects Standard Deviation ($\sqrt{\theta}$)	0.327133
Intraclass Correlation (ρ)	0.504956
** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$	

Table 7: Generalized Least Squares Random-Effects Regression Results of Women's Economic Rights from 1981-2011

Women's Economic Rights	Coef.
Democracy level	-0.01322
LN (GNI)	3.86E-02*
Religion ref:Christian)	
Muslim	-0.21928*
Other religion	0.022259
Region ref:Africa)	
Asia	0.058026
Americas	0.319745**
Europe	0.713119**
Oceania	0.584141*
Year (ref:2011)	
1981	-0.07017
1982	0.066382
1983	0.093198

1984	-0.04947
1985	0.188919*
1986	0.162782
1987	-0.00753
1988	0.139641
1989	0.154709*
1990	0.01561
1991	0.048462
1992	0.075523
1993	0.050823
1994	0.037972
1995	0.071893
1996	0.024423
1997	0.087658
1998	0.180673**
1999	0.104748
2000	0.125188
2001	0.124862
2002	0.142878*
2003	0.118604
2004	0.152526*
2005	0.082456
2006	-0.04556
2007	0.259366**
2008	-0.07915
2009	0.017251
2010	0.100547*
Constant	0.183764
Wald χ^2	312.69
Overall R ²	0.288
Between-Subjects Standard Deviation ($\sqrt{\psi}$)	0.34483
Within-Subjects Standard Deviation ($\sqrt{\theta}$)	0.446124
Intraclass Correlation (ρ)	0.374001

** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$

Table 8: Generalized Least Squares Random-Effects Regression Results of Women's Social Rights from 1981-2004

Women's Social Rights	Coef.
Democracy level	-9.72E-03
LN (GNI)	0.056547*
Religion (ref:Christian)	
Muslim	-0.33889**
Other religion	-0.02727
Region (ref:Africa)	
Asia	0.061545
Americas	0.397181**
Europe	1.019541**
Oceania	0.94742**
Year (ref:2004)	
1981	-0.11271
1982	-0.09571
1983	-0.07225
1984	-0.11202
1985	-0.07642
1986	-0.07997
1987	-0.14823
1988	-0.12049
1989	-0.12009
1990	-0.15133
1991	-0.06278
1992	-0.08442
1993	-0.10201
1994	-0.03546
1995	-0.0364
1996	-0.11184
1997	-0.10471
1998	-0.02102
1999	-0.05331
2000	-0.06359
2001	-0.00732
2002	-0.00432
2003	0.057249

Constant	1.060265
Wald χ^2	223.1
Overall R2	0.43
Between-Subjects Standard Deviation ($\sqrt{\psi}$)	0.453105
Within-Subjects Standard Deviation ($\sqrt{\theta}$)	0.43407
Intraclass Correlation (ρ)	0.521445
** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$	

Table 9: Generalized Least Squares Random-Effects Regression Results of Women's Political Rights from 1981-2011

Women's Political Rights	Coef.
Democracy Level	-0.00369
LN (GNI)	1.84E-02
Religion (ref:Christian)	
Muslim	-0.42872**
Other religion	-0.04075
Region (ref:Africa)	
Asia	-0.18351
Americas	0.04305
Europe	0.132666
Oceania	-0.36745
Year (ref:2011)	
1981	-0.69963**
1982	-0.66856**
1983	-0.61616**
1984	-0.63943**
1985	-0.48648**
1986	-0.48622**
1987	-0.47647**
1988	-0.43993**
1989	-0.43979**
1990	-0.46656**
1991	-0.49125**
1992	-0.42841**
1993	-0.37278**
1994	-0.39493**
1995	-0.36966**
1996	-0.28434**

1997	-0.24995**
1998	-0.25147**
1999	-0.18411**
2000	-0.20189**
2001	-0.14387**
2002	-0.11164*
2003	-0.11796*
2004	-0.05979
2005	-0.06644
2006	-0.10052**
2007	-0.07472*
2008	0.054179
2009	-0.04044
2010	-0.032
Constant	1.789445**
Wald χ^2	247.69
Overall R ²	0.2948
Between-Subjects Standard Deviation ($\sqrt{\psi}$)	0.343463
Within-Subjects Standard Deviation ($\sqrt{\theta}$)	0.378742
Intraclass Correlation (ρ)	0.451268
** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$	

Tables 10-12 present the findings for the GLS random-effects regression results for the constructs derived from HDR variables from 2010 through 2014. Table 10 shows that the Quality of Life construct was positively associated with GNI per capita. Africa was found to have lower Quality of Life than Asia, the Americas, Europe, and Oceania. The year 2010 was significant and positive, but 2013 was significant and negative, when compared to 2014. This finding indicated that Quality of Life was greater in 2010 than in 2014, and worse in 2013 than in 2014. Table 11 displays the results of the Air Quality construct. It shows a positive association with GNI per capita. Air Quality was also higher among Muslim than Christian countries. When compared to Africa, Air Quality

was at higher levels in the Asia, Europe, and Oceania regions. The year 2010 is the only significant wave compared to 2014, and it was positive. Table 12 shows the Environmental Integrity construct results, which was positively associated with GNI per capita. The higher the Gross National Income, the higher the levels of Environmental Integrity. Muslim countries were found to have higher Environmental Integrity than Christian countries. All regions (Asia, the Americas, Europe, and Oceania) had higher levels of Environmental Integrity than Africa. The years 2010, 2011, and 2012 had higher levels of Environmental Integrity than the year 2014. The Wald Chi-Square results show that the model significantly improves the explanation of each of the HDR data human rights outcomes, with 80% of Quality of Life, 22% of Air Quality, and 39% of Environmental Integrity explained by the model.

Table 10: Generalized Least Squares Random-Effects Regression Results of Quality of Life from 2010-2014

Quality of Life	Coef.
Democracy level	0.004236
LN (GNI)	9.40E-02**
Religion (ref:Christian)	
Muslim	-0.20088
Other religion	-0.08002
Region (ref:Africa)	
Asia	1.081978**
Americas	1.023383**
Europe	1.823902**
Oceania	1.687638**
Year (ref:2014)	
2010	0.016928*
2011	-0.00204
2012	-0.00492
2013	-0.01422**
Constant	-1.067**

Wald χ^2	756.79
Overall R ²	0.8033
Between-Subjects Standard Deviation ($\sqrt{\psi}$)	0.430044
Within-Subjects Standard Deviation ($\sqrt{\theta}$)	0.036707
Intraclass Correlation (ρ)	0.992767
** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$	

Table 11: Generalized Least Squares Random-Effects Regression Results of Air Quality from 2010-2014

Air Quality	Coef.
Democracy level	4.37E-03
LN (GNI)	0.131417**
Religion (ref:Christian)	
Muslim	0.531509**
Other religion	0.168285
Region (ref:Africa)	
Asia	0.529846**
Americas	0.525098
Europe	0.570844**
Oceania	0.659199**
Year (ref:2014)	
2010	0.041969**
2011	0.018059
2012	0.017935
2013	0.014079
Constant	-0.76629**
Wald χ^2	79.27
Overall R ²	0.2179
Between-Subjects Standard Deviation ($\sqrt{\psi}$)	0.816033
Within-Subjects Standard Deviation ($\sqrt{\theta}$)	0.118002
Intraclass Correlation (ρ)	0.979518
** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$	

Table 12: Generalized Least Squares Random-Effects Regression Results of Environmental Integrity from 2010-2014

Environmental Integrity	Coef.
Democracy level	0.001262
LN (GNI)	0.117412**
Religion (ref:Christian)	
Muslim	0.899942**
Other religion	-0.02561
Region (ref:Africa)	
Asia	0.559013**
Americas	0.544745*
Europe	0.648177*
Oceania	0.722333*
Year (ref:2014)	
2010	0.036561**
2011	0.019161*
2012	0.019891**
2013	-0.0009
Constant	-3.5916**
Wald χ^2	109.96
Overall R ²	0.3857
Between-Subjects Standard Deviation ($\sqrt{\psi}$)	0.609051
Within-Subjects Standard Deviation ($\sqrt{\theta}$)	0.044565
Intraclass Correlation (ρ)	0.994675
** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$	

Finally, Tables 13 and 14 present the findings for the GLS random-effects regression results for the constructs derived from SPI variables for the years 2014 through 2017. In Table 13, higher levels of Basic Human Needs were found to be in regions whose countries had higher gross national income. The Asia, Americas, and Europe regions had higher levels of Basic Human Needs than Africa. The years 2014 through 2016 had lower levels of Basic Human Needs than 2017. Countries with higher levels of democracy and GNI per capita were also found to have higher levels of Personal

Integrity. In Table 14, Muslim countries were found to have lower levels of Personal Integrity than their Christian Counterparts. Higher levels of Personal Integrity were associated with the Europe and Oceania regions as compared to Africa. The year 2016 had significantly higher Personal Integrity than the year 2017. The Wald Chi-Square results show that the model significantly improves the explanation of each of the SPI data human rights outcomes, indicating that 64% of Basic Human Needs, and 56% of Personal Integrity can be explained by the model.

Table 13: Generalized Least Squares Random-Effects Regression Results of Basic Human Needs from 2014-2017

Basic Human Needs	Coef.
Democracy level	1.27E-01
LN (GNI)	1.45E+00**
Religion (ref:Christian)	
Muslim	0.273809
Other religion	-1.06541
Region (ref:Africa)	
Asia	17.52829**
Americas	22.10734**
Europe	32.01259**
Oceania	15.29841
Year (ref:2017)	
2014	-2.18668**
2015	-1.57982**
2016	-1.04075**
Constant	13.558
Wald χ^2	863.92
Overall R ²	0.6427
Between-Subjects Standard Deviation ($\sqrt{\psi}$)	10.45986
Within-Subjects Standard Deviation ($\sqrt{\theta}$)	0.568543
Intraclass Correlation (ρ)	0.997054
** p < .01; * p < .05	

Table 14: Generalized Least Squares Random-Effects Regression Results of Personal Integrity from 2014-2017

Personal Integrity	Coef.
Democracy level	0.699128**
LN (GNI)	8.69E-01*
Religion (ref:Christian)	
Muslim	-5.80644*
Other religion	8.54E-02
Region (ref:Africa)	
Asia	-0.46141
Americas	4.89225
Europe	16.37318**
Oceania	10.47724*
Year (ref:2017)	
2014	0.17601
2015	0.151615
2016	0.112159*
Constant	9.936438**
Wald χ^2	218.89
Overall R ²	0.5608
Between-Subjects Standard Deviation ($\sqrt{\psi}$)	9.113758
Within-Subjects Standard Deviation ($\sqrt{\theta}$)	1.108774
Intraclass Correlation (ρ)	0.985415
** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$	

To briefly summarize the results, there were nine new constructs created from the CIRI, HDR and SPI datasets, which were then graphed to show global and regional trends. Overall, Liberties, Personal Integrity and Air Quality were trending slightly down; Basic Human Needs, Quality of Life and Environmental Integrity were trending slightly up. All women's rights trends were rising.

Although they showed varying degrees of fluctuation, most of the regional trends remained relatively unchanged overall. There were some differences, however. Women's Political Rights showed the most movement with marked improvement across all regions, except for Oceania. For the Liberties trend, Oceania, Asia, and Africa were trending down, and the Americas region was trending up while Europe was fairly stable. Oceania was notable for its declines in both Quality of Life and Basic Human Needs, while Europe was conspicuous in its decline in Air Quality. Last, Africa and Asia both showed clearly rising trends in Environmental Integrity.

The GLS random-effects regression results revealed that Liberties and Personal Integrity were positively related to democracy. Basic Human Needs, Air Quality, Quality of Life, and Environmental Integrity were positively associated with GNI per capita. Both Women's Social Rights and Women's Economic Rights were also positively related to GNI per capita. Finally, all the women's rights constructs were significantly lower in Muslim than in Christian countries

CHAPTER V

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

The contemporary human rights field has given rise to substantial human rights debates, plagued by vague concepts, numerous claims, and inconsistent interventions (Donnelly 2013; Frezzo 2014; Ignatieff 2003). Amidst these challenges, considerable human rights literature has developed that suggests multiple human rights definitions and indicators (Çalı 2007), correlations (Park 1987), and predictors (Lupu 2016). That an internationally agreed upon law of human rights does not promise international agreement on their adoptions in practice is also clear, as evidenced by occurrences across the globe of government sanctioned genocide (Madley 2016; Tatum 2010), world poverty (Pogge 2007), and environmental damage (Anton and Shelton 2011).

In the interest of contributing to empirical research on the presence of human rights across the world, the first objective of this dissertation was to determine whether and how variables across multiple datasets were structured analytically. To that end, human rights constructs were derived from variables taken from three separate data sets by conducting a factor analysis on those, which at face value, reflected one of the three generations of human rights. Second, this study was designed to use these newly created constructs to chart human rights trends across countries and geographic regions. Last, the

relationships between countries' economic development, and levels of democracy and human rights outcomes were examined.

EMERGING FACTORS AND THEIR UNDERLYING CONSTRUCTS

Interpretations of the results of this study are considered in the order of the dissertation's stated objectives. First, the constructs resulting from the factor analysis tend to reflect underlying human rights generations concepts, as specified by Karel Vasak (1977). For the sake of discussion, a brief summary of human rights sorted by generational distinction is provided in Table 15 below. Note that this table is not exhaustive. For a complete breakdown of articles of the ICCPR and ICESCR covenants, and the Stockholm Declaration, see <https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/ProfessionalInterest/ccpr.pdf>, <https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/cescr.aspx>, and https://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/CONF.48/14/REV.1, respectively.

Table 15: Human Rights Organized by Generation

First Generation (ICCPR 1966)
Individual -Level
Right to self-determination
Right to recognition without such distinction as race, color, sex, language, religion, political opinion, national or social origin, property, birth
Equal rights of men and women to the rights of the covenant
Equality before the law
Right to a fair trial
Right to effective legal remedy when rights are violated/enforcement of legal remedy
Right to life
Right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion
Right to liberty and security of person
Judicious use of death penalty within the state
Freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention
Freedom from torture and slavery
Liberty of movement and freedom
Freedom to assemble
Freedom to associate with others
Right to enter into marriage freely
Right to take part in public affairs, access to a legal representative
Second Generation (ICESCR, 1966)
Individual-Level
Right to self-determination
Right to recognition without such distinction as race, color, sex, language, religion, political opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or social origin, property, birth
Equal rights of men and women to the rights of the covenant
Right to work and to freely choose work

Right to fair wages
Equal pay for equal work
Right to a decent living
Right to safe working conditions
Right to social security and insurance
Social protections for women before, during and after childbirth
Right to adequate food, clothing and housing
Right to highest attainable physical and mental health
Right to education
Right to take part in cultural life
Third Generation (Stockholm Declaration, 1972)
Collective-Level
Natural resources must be safeguarded
Renewable resources must be maintained, improved or restored
Nature conservation should be considered in economic development
Non-renewable resources should be shared by all
Pollution in excess of environmental capacity to mitigate its effects should cease
States should prevent pollution
Economic and social development is necessary to improve quality of life
Financial and technological assistance may be required for developing countries
Environmental policies of countries should not adversely affect the development of other countries
Development planning must be done with a view toward protecting and improving the environment
All countries have an equal role when managing international environmental matters
Nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction should be eliminated

Of the nine factors, the Liberties, Women's Political Rights, and Personal Integrity factors were comprised of items that match first-generation human rights concepts, as outlined in the ICCPR. The Quality of Life, Air Quality, Basic Human Needs, and Women's Economic Rights factors are representative of second-generation human rights concepts outlined in the ICESCR. The Women's Social Rights variable may be said to cut across both first- and second-generation rights, as it was comprised of elements in both the ICCPR and the ICESCR. For example, it includes such items as the right to obtain a passport (indicative of liberty of movement) in the ICCPR, but also the right to an education, as seen in the ICESCR. Finally, Environmental Integrity is an underlying construct of third-generation rights, as evidenced by the concern for natural and non-renewable resources referenced in the Stockholm Declaration.

A word should be said regarding the women's rights constructs. As mentioned in the results section, the inconstant behavior of these constructs required that the women's rights variables be separated, which may be indicative of the ephemeral nature of women's rights across the globe. If women achieve something close to parity with men, then it is natural that women's rights would lose their independent characteristics and consistently load onto the same factors as the remaining variables. The fact that this phenomenon waxes and wanes may be indicative of the ambivalence toward women's position in societies across the world. A thorough treatment of women's rights within the context of human rights is outside the scope of this study; however, it is appropriate to say that at least up until 2011, women, just as many racial and ethnic designations, have

not lost their separateness when it comes to recognizing the rights accorded their male, majority counterparts. Due to their unique nature, the women's political, economic and social rights trends will be considered separately.

WORLD TRENDS IN HUMAN RIGHTS

Each of the three generations of human rights global and regional trends will be discussed below. In regard to first-generation human rights (indicated by Liberties and Personal Integrity), the worldwide trend ending 2018, is just slightly down overall, as seen across Figures 1 and 6. As evidence suggests that peaceful conditions are associated with the enjoyment of human rights (Landman 2005; Paupp 2014; Roche 2009), this trend may be explained, at least in part, by a lack of peace around the world.

First, the conspicuous downturn in the trend between 1981 and 2000, coincides with the 57 major armed conflicts which took place across the world between the years 1981 and 2001. The inordinate number of violent struggles during roughly two decades of warfare resulted in substantial human rights violations across the world (Freeman 2017). Whether driven by politics, because of an ethnic divide, or to secure resources, violent conflict produces such human rights violations as civilian displacement and imprisonment, as well as other violations of personal integrity rights (Martin-Ortega, Herman and Sriram 2010). Foreign military intervention exacerbates state repression of personal integrity rights, such as disappearances, torture, and genocide, regardless of who is intervening in the affairs of the target country (Peksen 2012). As well, militias within a country's own borders have been linked to decreases in the observance of physical integrity rights outcomes (Alvarez 2006; Kirschke 2000), because not only do

governments struggle to control informal militias, their presence enables governments to avoid accountability by shifting the blame for human rights violations onto those agents operating outside it (Dreher, Gassebner and Siemers 2010). This makes a militia a handy scapegoat when a regime's record is taken to task.

Second, whether international or domestic, violence as a result of terrorism is anathema to peace and security, and there have been over 38,000 terror attacks around the world between 1969 and 2009 (Muhlhausen and McNeill 2011). Government responses to terrorist acts can have a deleterious effect on the practice of human rights. Numerous studies have established links between the suppression of first-generation human rights and terrorism during the years between the early 1980s and the early 2000s, particularly in instances of violations of physical integrity (Dreher et al. 2010; Piazza and Walsh 2009; Robison 2009). Such widespread terrorist activity has, therefore, given regimes ample opportunity to curb first-generation human rights when threatened by violence.

Third, an additional drag on the first-generation rights trend may also be the world response in the aftermath of 9/11, particularly in regard to global security measures and their impact on first-generation rights. The advent of 9/11, and the subsequent global war on terror brought with it counter-terrorism measures that resulted in profound human rights violations both in wealthy and poor nations alike (Freeman 2017), especially with regard to civil liberties (Howell 2006). Counter-terrorist legislation has been linked to broad repression of first-generation rights among countries with prior intermediate scores of repression (Shor et al. 2018; Shor et al. 2016). Unfortunately, countries who carry an intermediate repression score make up the majority of nations around the world, such as

most of Central and South America, Eastern Europe, and numerous countries in Asia and Africa (Shor et al. 2018). It makes sense that their sheer numbers would allow for increased opportunities for the enforcement of harsh counterterrorist measures that would, in turn, pull global levels of first-generation rights down.

Interestingly, the slight downward trend of first-generation rights has been accompanied by a slight overall rise in the trajectory of the global second-generation human rights trends as seen the Quality of Life, Air Quality, and Basic Human Needs constructs in Figures 5 and 6. Prior to speculating why, it is necessary to reiterate that the legitimacy of economic and social rights has been beset by challenges on all sides (Davy 2013; Donnelly 2013; Frezzo 2014; Young 2008), including doubt as to their universal quality (Cranston 1963). The difficulties are surely evident. For example, it is nearly impossible to determine, let alone legislate what may constitute the right to a decent living across nations, and how could one imagine legal recourse when such a right is violated? That being said, the evolving focus of the UN and the development of an international human rights regime, i.e., those laws, treaties and institutions that make up international human rights practices, must be considered as possible explanations for this trend.

First, the International Conference on Human Rights in Teheran in 1968, in which the UN aimed at evaluating human rights progress and priorities may be foundational to the increased commitment to economic and social rights evident in the global trend. Out of this conference came the Proclamation of Teheran, in which paragraph 13 conceded that civil and political rights may be unrealizable without the presence of economic and

human rights (United Nations 1968). A subsequent study conducted by Manoucher Ganji, and finalized in 1975, examined economic and social rights in nations of varying degrees of development, but he ultimately proposed, among other recommendations, that Third-World countries had unique needs and challenges, and that those challenges (poverty, lack of sovereignty, and the endurance of discrimination among them) were related to the development process (Donnelly 1981). Whereas historically, the UN had paid little attention to economic and social rights in the 1950s and 1960s, the work undertaken by the UN after Ganji's research was overwhelmingly centered on second-generation rights (Donnelly 1981). This renewed focus by the UN, the preeminent human rights authority, may have resulted in first-generation rights taking a back seat to second-generation rights world-wide.

Second, the increased observance of second-generation human rights may also be credited to the development of the global civil society, and the presence of international non-government organizations (INGOs). While the UN encourages countries' human rights practices via a series of treaties or laws (the ICESCR, for example), a country's signature on a human rights treaty seemingly has little to do with whether it will respect human rights in practice (Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005; Hathaway 2002; Landman 2005). NGOs, however, serve as a bridge between a civil society and the presence of human rights, by uniting activists, institutions, and organizations (Murdie 2009). As human rights law has been globally institutionalized and accepted as the norm, the global civil society has been able to leverage those norms to persuade states to honor human

rights treaties, and improve human rights performance (Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005; Murdie 2009; Neumayer 2005).

It has been suggested that while economic and social rights have in the past been alleged to be unjusticiable and unenforceable, they have become increasingly accepted, claimed, and adjudicated across the world in the last two decades (Langford 2008). There is also evidence that the majority of countries across the world are most concerned with economic and social rights due to their increasing relevance to the UN since the 1970s (Donnelly 1981). The findings of this dissertation indicate that, at least globally, there may be some merit to these claims, and they cast doubt on the contention that civil and political rights have monopolized the interests of nations and human rights organizations to the exclusion of economic and social rights (Otto 2001), or that first-generation rights are a western imperialist concern which has eclipsed the importance of second-generation rights across the world.

Last, although the global third-generation human rights trend is quite short, it bears remarking on its slight rise as shown in the Environmental Integrity construct in Figure 5. This dissertation has supposed that the influence of world polity has played a role in the establishment of global norms and values. The third-generation trend may offer support for this contention when the path of the emergence of nations' respect for the environment is considered. As mentioned previously, the Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in 1972, put the world on notice that the well-being of the environment was both a global concern, as well as a pressing one. It also laid the groundwork for environmental issues to be linked to human

rights. That link has allowed activists to mobilize the global civil society, and to utilize human rights organizations and institutions, such as INGOs, in pushing an environmentalist agenda (Nickel 1993). Thus, nations are increasingly accepting responsibility for the environment, and they have responded by creating policies and enacting laws which support environmental integrity (Frank, Hironaka and Schofer 2000; Hironaka 2002). As well, a number of countries are adopting environmental rights within their constitutions by associating them with human rights (Gellers 2015). This is an even stronger indication of a state's commitment to the environment, as a constitutional guarantee has the added benefit of making it harder for incoming administrations to scrap the environmental protections put in place by their predecessors. The number of years in the trend is limited; however, the results do offer support for the argument that a world culture has developed in which third-generation human rights are both generally acknowledged and practiced.

REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS TRENDS

Examining human rights progression by region allows for a more detailed explanation of geographic trends. Altogether, regional human rights trends are notable for two reasons, and both concern the performance of Asia and Africa. First, while all of the five regions shown in Figures 10 and 15, have largely flat, slightly decreased trends in first-generation rights, Africa and Asia have highly similar positioning, with the lowest levels of civil and political rights among the regions. Second, both Asia and Africa are the only two regions which show any overall improvement in second- and third-generation rights. These findings warrant some interpretation.

In terms of first-generation rights, both Asia and Africa faced early obstacles to their realization. With regard to Asia, the history of civil and political human rights observance in the region can be traced back to the Cold War, in which Asia was caught between equally powerful communist and anticommunist movements. Specifically, both communist and non-communist states were willing to sacrifice Asian nations' civil and political rights. Communist regimes wanted to keep Asia's anticommunist citizens from undermining their authoritarian rule; on the other hand, the West sought to keep procommunist Asian citizenry from undermining their attempts to challenge communism (Kingsbury and Avonius 2008). After the Cold War, it simply was not worthwhile to encourage first-generation rights, particularly among the Asian Tigers (Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan), who realized the benefits of economic planning and growth unhindered by broad political participation (Kingsbury and Avonius 2008).

In the case of Africa, the decolonization that began in the 1970s, was also accompanied by a rejection of the multiparty political systems put in place by their colonizers. For many African states, they were replaced by either one-party systems or military dictatorships, which has resulted in dismal civil and political human rights records (Ojo and Sesay 1986). This was followed by the push in the 1990s, of Western donors linking economic aid to democratic reforms; however, there have been multiple instances of Western states supporting repressive African regimes when their political choices go against Western economic interests (Barya 1993). Thus, in reality, aid becomes dependent on whether the receiving state can control a population who may show political resistance to donor countries' demands. These events have done little to

improve first-generation rights in the region in practice, and may well have contributed to their low levels.

Interestingly, Asia and Africa are standouts in their relatively higher second- and third-generation rights achievements as seen in Figures 11-14. Improvements in these rights may be due, first, to the view that social and economic rights are more important than civil and political rights. Leaders in both the Asian and African regions have asked roughly the same question: What good is it for a starving person to have secured a political voice? (Howard 1983; Li 2003). This question is reflective of language expressed in the Proclamation of Tehran, and the subsequent work of the UN in the diffusion of economic and social rights (Donnelly 1981). Second, there is a foundation in both Asian (Barr 2000) and African cultures (Cobbah 1987) for a collectivist mentality, in which the community is more important than the individual. A mindset such as this promotes third-generation rights, such as a sustainable environment, lending support for the argument that developing countries tend to embrace third-generation rights more often than the West (Ishay 2008; Ramcharan 1979).

THE EFFECTS OF DEMOCRACY AND DEVOLVEMENT ON HUMAN RIGHTS

Although human rights have become the dominant, legitimate norm across the international community, the pursuit of economic development and democracy can have different effects on the practice of human rights. In this study, democracy matters for the presence of first-generation rights, as shown in Tables 6 and 14, but is not relevant for second- and third-generation rights (Tables 10-13). In turn, the level of economic

development is not important for first-generation rights, save for the physical integrity sub-section, but is necessary for the realization of second- and third-generation rights.

With regard to democracy, justification for these outcomes may come down, first, to the fact that first-generation civil and political rights, and democratic ideals are in some ways so indistinguishable from each other that democracy has been argued to be a human right in itself (Beitz 2011). Basic rights such as the guaranteed freedom of movement, the right to self-determination, and a freely elected government, have, by definition, seemingly little to do with autocracy. Second, the UN was created largely due to the efforts and support of Western democratic governments. It is natural that their commitment to civil and political rights would not only inform UN human rights documents, but would also command an emphasis (Frezzo 2014). These findings lend support to the contention that democracy is accompanied by improvements in civil and political rights (Clark 2014; Gruen and Klasen 2012; Henderson 1991; Poe and Tate 1994), but not human rights across generations.

It can certainly be argued, in this case, that economic progress does not predict a nation's advancement of first-generation human rights; however, many in the West believe that the growth of an economy translates into greater social welfare for all citizens, making the need for the right to a second-generation social safety net unnecessary (Trubek 1984). This may explain a lack of political will to establish government programs that would support greater levels of second-generation rights in democratic countries. Furthermore, fairly elected governments have often sought neo-liberal economic policies, which can be inimical to social and economic protections for

their citizenry. The rise of democracy since the Cold War is evident in the transition of 21 countries to democracy from 1988 to 2008. Those countries saw inequality rise, and well-being decrease in terms of life expectancy, and education, but many also saw increases in civil and political rights (Gruen and Klasen 2012). Thus, in many post-communist countries civil and political rights were more respected than economic and social rights.

Practically speaking, the positive relationship between economic development and second- and third-generation human rights may have something to do with wealthier nations having the resources to provide greater entitlements to their citizens, and to meet their basic human needs (Moon and Dixon 1985), as well as to invest in environmentally sustainable technology and practices. Furthermore, economic development may contribute to a greater number of people rising out of poverty, as in China, for example, and in effect, making more equal conditions among the people (Dye and Zeigler 1988). The findings of this study call into question Donnelly's (2013) position that the basic needs of a nation's population are often sacrificed to the use of public funds for financial investment, resulting in decreasing entitlements and social programs. The more money in the coffers equals greater provision of public entitlements line of reasoning, however, may also be too simple (and altruistic) of an assumption.

An alternative explanation, or an additional reason for the link between economic development and second-generation rights, is that when a person's basic needs are met, they are less likely to challenge the status quo, lending stability to a nation's leadership. It therefore behooves a nation's regime who wants to survive to provide some means of support for their citizenry. There are many economically successful countries who do not

provide overly generous civil and political rights, but who do offer a means for people to live with material dignity, e.g. some Arab Gulf states, and the Asian Tigers.

THE STATUS OF WOMEN'S RIGHTS

Although the need to disaggregate women's rights from general human rights demonstrates the work that remains in securing women's equality, women's global and regional political rights trends in Figures 4 and 9 offer some measure of encouragement. Indeed, however small the improvement, women's political progress seems to be a bright spot in the otherwise lackluster overall picture of human rights. One potential explanation for the rising women's political rights trend is the ratification of CEDAW, because it elevated the conversation about women's issues across the globe, creating openings for dialog and activism which were not present before (Englehart and Miller 2014; Hill Jr 2010). In such an environment, NGOs and INGOs can become a force for change. If CEDAW is indeed the catalyst, however, the question remains why political rights show the most improvement, while women's social rights (see Figures 3 and 8) show much less improvement, and women's economic rights (see Figures 2 and 7) show almost none. This question is particularly relevant because CEDAW made such comprehensive recommendations aimed at improving every aspect of women's lives. It is conceivable that women's political rights are simply the easiest rights to offer, due to the already existing presence of political rights in many states' laws (Englehart and Miller 2014). With a legal framework already in place, the passage of new laws is not necessary, making much less work on the front end. Furthermore, there becomes an established legal argument for the implementation of policies supporting women's rights.

Women's social and economic rights, on the other hand, may be more difficult to influence, because there are both practical economic realities involved as well as a difficult conversation about culture. For example, it is much less complicated for a nation to allow women to vote than it is to promote women's rights to an education. Voting is an occasional activity; however, mandating and enforcing a girl's right to an education may mean not only a drain on government funds, but the absence of girls and women from home while they attend school, and perhaps later seek a job in the formal economy. Women and girls perform the lion's share of societies' unpaid labor, from childrearing and caring for elderly and sick family members, to total household management (Iversen and Rosenbluth 2010). Economically speaking, even implementing something as seemingly simple as equal access to education would necessitate massive social restructuring in many countries of the world. In addition, cultural values profoundly affect behaviors, and many societies are deeply opposed to women participating in the public sphere. Seen in this light, extending women their political rights simply does not have the same immediate 'risks' to social structure as the implementation of women's social and economic rights.

In terms of the effects of economic development, the 'cheap' cost of women's political rights is demonstrated in Table 9. Improvements in these rights for women have occurred no matter the level of economic development across all regions. Yet, a higher level of economic development appears to be necessary for women to have greater social (see Table 8) and economic rights (see Table 7). In general, it may be that those nations with more financial resources are able to provide women with a social safety net, and

simultaneously bear the economic and social costs associated with more women in the formal labor market (e.g., government subsidized day care, and senior living facilities).

In the end, it seems that the will of religious culture prevails over political regime, however. Predominantly Muslim countries have lower levels of women's rights across the board, a powerful reminder that cultural attitudes are remarkably resilient when women are involved (Gerling, Ash-Houchen and Lo 2019; Inglehart and Norris 2003). This is evident again in the similarity of the Africa and Asia regions, where the majority of Muslim societies are located. Simply put, women's rights are viewed as much less important, and even harmful in many African and Asian societies that are dominated by a traditional patriarchy (Derichs and Fennert 2014; Ndulo 2011). This study reiterates the profound pull of culture, and calls into question political democracy's promise of an equal voice. Democracy or not, at least in the case of women's rights, national culture trumps the reach of an international human rights regime.

LIMITATIONS

This study features three limitations. First, it should be noted that by employing all the data sets used in this study, and by using country as the unit of analysis, valuable information about substantial populations who may be vulnerable within their own countries, or who may not enjoy citizenship status may be excluded. The escalation and expansion of human rights production and discourse, and the human rights scholarship generated in response may be due in part to the effects of globalization, a phenomenon that is also associated with more permeable national borders and diffuse cultures. As

mentioned previously, human rights formation transcends both geography and time, and national borders may fail to contain all populations. Furthermore, the political and social dynamics of nation-states may preclude an accurate representation of human rights in practice, especially in the case of more marginalized groups (Goldstein 1986; Turner 1993).

Second, it was not possible to find a dataset that reflected all three generations of human rights on their face. In addition, the reliance on secondary data precluded getting as many constructs for third-generation rights as was necessary for a strong analysis. The third-generation construct that did emerge also covered a very limited number of years, making a valid determination of third-generation trends problematic.

Last, the regional classifications presented a further challenge. Because there were too few countries in North America, Latin American and Caribbean countries were included in the Americas region. The stark differences in economic development and levels of democracy between North American countries and nations of South America may particularly skew the trends, and hinders a more refined analysis.

FUTURE RESEARCH

There are many opportunities and points of entry for future research on human rights. In the interests of human rights implementation and practice, first, more attention needs to be paid to researching women's rights. The codification of women's rights at the international level has been tentative and weak. Although the ratification of CEDAW has been cited as a catalyst for positive change in women's political rights (Englehart and

Miller 2014), it would be useful to conduct research specifically in second- and third-generation rights for women. Further exploration could include identifying those countries who have implemented specific social and economic changes for women, and thoroughly examining their outcomes.

Second, international human rights treaty ratification has not always been positively associated with a nation's practice of human rights. Identifying countries that have ratified specific covenants, versus those who have rights built into their constitutions, and comparing their outcomes may contribute substantially to the literature. Research in this area has been conducted in regard to environmental rights embedded in state constitutions (Gellers 2015), but studies spanning the three generations may offer some idea of whether and how constitutional rights improve the likelihood that states will implement human rights more broadly.

Last, the number of people displaced by armed conflict, natural disasters, and poverty is growing. These phenomena essentially leave people stateless, and without recourse as the practice of human rights is carried out at the national level. Research at the intersection of mass immigration, human rights law, and implementation would be a timely addition to the field.

CONCLUSION

Evident from the results of this study is that while it can be argued that a world polity of sorts has developed which diffuses social norms and culture across the globe, human rights, although internationally recognized, are not universally or uniformly

practiced among countries and regions of the world. Alarming, this research has demonstrated that human rights have largely stagnated around the world, with a slight decrease in first-generation rights trends, and only a minimal increase in second- and third-generation rights. Furthermore, despite the proliferation of democratic regimes since the end of the Cold War, liberal democracy did not have the positive effect on human rights overall that is suggested in the literature, nor does economic development appear to be necessary for the realization of first-generation rights. Last, despite gains in women's political rights, women's rights in general seem to be informed at least partially by religion, a phenomenon which is proving remarkably slow to change. Regardless of any endorsement for human rights or any rational suggestions for their implementation, it is clear that human rights in practice are at the mercy of a number of political and social forces, and chief among them is culture. Culture can both inform and be informed by human rights, and international laws can delimit a right; yet, culture can limit the law, or at the very least, limit how and whether a law is carried out or vigorously enforced.

Human rights levels across the world vary drastically; this is undisputed (Donnelly 1984; Frezzo 2014). For those seeking to elucidate those differences, the complexity of human rights as a topic of study is exacerbated by disparate legal instruments, capricious political practices, and distinctive cultural perceptions. Additionally, researchers are burdened by multiple conceptual definitions of human rights, and a vast and highly contradictory extant literature. In a large-scale attempt to cut through the confusion, this dissertation created more definitive and expansive empirical definitions of human rights by uncovering their latent constructs across multiple datasets.

It also took a longitudinal, cross-national approach to clarify the presence of human rights broadly and across time in order to get the fullest picture possible of worldwide human rights trends, while accounting for the effects of the global proliferation of democracy and liberal economics. Last, it helped shed light on the dispute regarding the ‘three-generations, three worlds’ narrative which has infused the literature. In light of the broad, international support for human rights, such efforts should be continued. Around the world, people are naming and claiming human rights; their struggles may be best supported by providing careful definitions and a common understanding for what is being named. By being ever more precise, we do not subscribe to the false dichotomy of designating countries or regions as simply either observers of human rights or not. Rather, we can better investigate the contextual factors associated with records of highly specific human rights practices.

REFERENCES

- Aaronson, Susan Ariel, and Jamie M Zimmerman. 2006. "Fair trade?: How Oxfam presented a systemic approach to poverty, development, human rights, and trade." *Human Rights Quarterly* 28(4):998-1030.
- Abihiro, Gilbert Abotisem, and Manuela De Allegri. 2015. "Universal Health Coverage from Multiple Perspectives: A synthesis of conceptual literature and global debates." *BMC international health and human rights* 15(1):17.
- Agyeman, Julian, Robert D Bullard, and Bob Evans. 2002. "Exploring the Nexus: Bringing together sustainability, environmental justice and equity." *Space and polity* 6(1):77-90.
- Albrow, Martin, and Elizabeth King. 1990. *Globalization, Knowledge and Society: Readings from international sociology*. London, UK: Sage.
- Alston, Philip. 1988. "Making Space for New Human Rights: The Case of the Right to Development [in] Harvard Human Rights Yearbook." *Harvard Human Rights Yearbook* 1:3-40.
- Alvarez, Alexander. 2006. "Militias and Genocide. War Crimes, Genocide & Crimes Against Humanity, An International Journal." *War Crimes, Genocide, and Crimes Against Humanity* 2:1-33.
- Anderson, Royce. 2004. "A Definition of Peace." *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology* 10(2):101.

- Anleu, Sharyn Roach. 1999. "Sociologists Confront Human Rights: The problem of universalism." *Journal of Sociology* 35(2):198-212.
- Anton, Donald K, and Dinah L Shelton. 2011. *Environmental Protection and Human Rights*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Appelbaum, Richard P, and William I Robinson. 2005. *Critical Globalization Studies*. New York, NY: Routledge.
- Armaline, William T, Davita S Glasberg, and Bandana Purkayastha. 2015. *The Human Rights Enterprise: Political sociology, state power, and social movements*. Cambridge, UK: John Wiley & Sons.
- Arrighi, Giovanni. 1994. *The Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power, and the Origins of Our Times*. New York, NY: verso.
- Assembly, UN General. 1948. "Universal Declaration of Human Rights." *UN General Assembly* 302(2).
- . 1966a. "International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights." *United Nations, Treaty Series* 999:171.
- . 1966b. "International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights " *United Nations, Treaty Series* 993:3.
- . 1979. "Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women." *Retrieved April 20:2006*.
- . 2007. "United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples." *UN Wash* 12:1-18.
- Banks, David L. 1985. "Patterns of Oppression: A statistical analysis of human rights." *American Statistical Association: Proceedings of the Social Statistics Section* 62:154-63.
- Barr, Michael D. 2000. "Lee Kuan Yew and the "Asian Values" Debate." *Asian Studies Review* 24(3):309-34.

- Barya, John-Jean B. 1993. "The New Political Conditionalities of Aid: an independent view from Africa." *ids bulletin* 24(1):16-23.
- Bauer, Joanne R, and Daniel A Bell. 1999. *The East Asian Challenge for Human Rights*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Bayley, David H. 1964. *Public Liberties in the New States*. Chicago, IL: Rand McNally.
- Beitz, Charles R. 2011. *The Idea of Human Rights*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Bell, Lynda Schaefer, Andrew James Nathan, and Ilan Peleg. 2001. *Negotiating Culture and Human Rights*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Berke, Philip R, Neil Ericksen, Jan Crawford, and Jenny Dixon. 2002. "Planning and Indigenous People: Human rights and environmental protection in New Zealand." *Journal of Planning Education and Research* 22(2):115-34.
- Betts, Raymond, and Raymond F Betts. 2004. *Decolonization*. New York, NY: Routledge.
- Bhagwati, Jagdish. 1966. *The Economics of Underdeveloped Countries*. New York, NY: World University Library.
- Biparva, Amir, and Sayed Qasem Zamani. 2016. "The Convergence of Human and Citizenship Rights in the Globalization Era." *Modern Applied Science* 10(9):94.
- Blau, Judith, and Mark Frezzo. 2011. *Sociology and Human Rights: A bill of rights for the twenty-first century*. Los Angeles, CA: Sage Publications.
- Blau, Judith, and Alberto Moncada. 2015. *Human Rights: A primer*. New York, NY: Routledge.
- Boli, John, and George M Thomas. 1997. "World Culture in the World Polity: A century of international non-governmental organization." *American Sociological Review*:171-90.
- . 1999. *Constructing world culture: International nongovernmental organizations since 1875*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

- Bollen, Kenneth. 1993. "Liberal Democracy: Validity and method factors in cross-national measures." *American Journal of Political Science* 37(4):1207-30.
- Bollen, Kenneth A. 1980. "Issues in the Comparative Measurement of Political Democracy." *American Sociological Review*:370-90.
- . 1986. "Political Rights and Political Liberties in Nations: An evaluation of human rights measures, 1950 to 1984." *Human Rights Quarterly* 8:567.
- Boulding, Kenneth E. 1958. *Principles of Economic Policy*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall
- Bromley, Patricia. 2014. "Legitimacy and the Contingent Diffusion of World Culture: Diversity and human rights in social science textbooks, divergent cross-national patterns (1970–2008)." *Canadian Journal of Sociology* 39(1):1-44.
- Brown, Davis, and Patrick James. 2018. "Religious Characteristics of State Dataset: Demographics, version 2.0."
- Brown, Steven P. 2002. *Trumping religion: The new Christian right, the Free Speech Clause, and the courts*. Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press.
- Browne, Annette. 1993. "A Conceptual Clarification of Respect." *Journal of Advanced Nursing* 18(2):211-17.
- Burke, Roland. 2011. *Decolonization and the Evolution of International Human Rights*. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Çalı, Başak. 2007. "Balancing Human Rights? Methodological problems with weights, scales and proportions." *Human Rights Quarterly*:251-70.
- Cederman, Lars-Erik, and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch. 2004. "Conquest and Regime Change: An evolutionary model of the spread of democracy and peace." *International Studies Quarterly* 48(3):603-29.

- Center for Systemic Peace. "Polity IV: Regime Authority Characteristics and Transition Datasets." Retrieved on Sept. 1, 2018 (<http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html>).
- Chen, Lincoln C. 2004. "Health as a Human Security Priority for the 21st Century." in *Paper for human security track III*. Helsinki, FI: Helsinki Process.
- Cingranelli, David L, and David L Richards. 2010. "The Cingranelli and Richards (CIRI) human rights data project." *Human Rights Quarterly* 32(2):401-24.
- Cingranelli, David L, David L Richards, and K Chad Clay. 2014. "The CIRI human rights dataset."
- Clapham, Andrew. 2015. *Human Rights: A very short introduction*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Clark, Rob. 2010. "Technical and Institutional States: Loose coupling in the human rights sector of the world polity." *The Sociological Quarterly* 51(1):65-95.
- . 2014. "A Tale of Two Trends: Democracy and Human Rights, 1981–2010." *Journal of Human Rights* 13(4):395-413.
- Claude, Richard P. 1976. "The Classical Model of Human Rights Development." *Comparative human rights*:6-50.
- Clausen, Rebecca. 2011. "Cooperating Around Environmental Rights." *Sociology and Human Rights: A Bill of Rights for the Twenty-First Century*:103.
- Cmiel, Kenneth. 2004. "The Recent History of Human Rights." *The American Historical Review* 109(1):117-35.
- Cobbah, Josiah AM. 1987. "African Values and the Human Rights Debate: An African perspective." *Human Rights Quarterly* 9:309.
- Cochran, Clarke E. 2014. *Religion in Public and Private Life* New York, NY Routledge.
- Cole, Wade M, and Francisco O Ramirez. 2013. "Conditional Decoupling: Assessing the impact of national human rights institutions, 1981 to 2004." *American Sociological Review* 78(4):702-25.

- Cole, Wade M. 2005. "Sovereignty Relinquished? Explaining Commitment to the International Human Rights Covenants, 1966-1999." *American Sociological Review* 70(3):472-95.
- Cowan, Jane K, Marie-Bénédicte Dembour, and Richard A Wilson. 2001. *Culture and Rights: Anthropological perspectives*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Cranston, Maurice. 1963. *What are human rights?* New York, NY: New York : Basic Books.
- . 1983. "Are there any human rights?" *Daedalus* 112(4):1-17.
- Cross, Frank B. 1996. "International Determinants of Human Rights and Welfare: Law, Wealth or Culture." *International & Comparative Law Review* 7:265.
- Cushman, Thomas. 2012. *Handbook of Human Rights*. London, UK: Routledge.
- Dahl, Robert A. 1956. *A Preface to Democratic Theory*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- . 1971. *Polyarchy: Participation and opposition*. New Haven, CT Yale University Press.
- Dasgupta, Partha, and Martin Weale. 1992. "On Measuring the Quality of Life." *World Development* 20(1):119-31.
- Davenport, Christian. 1995. "Multi-Dimensional Threat Perception and State Repression: An inquiry into why states apply negative sanctions." *American Journal of Political Science* 39(3):683-713.
- Davenport, Christian, and David A Armstrong. 2004. "Democracy and the Violation of Human Rights: A statistical analysis from 1976 to 1996." *American Journal of Political Science* 48(3):538-54.
- Davy, Ulrike. 2013. "Social Citizenship Going International: Changes in the reading of UN - sponsored economic and social rights." *International Journal of Social Welfare* 22:S15-S31.

- De Soysa, Indra, and Ragnhild Nordås. 2007. "Islam's Bloody Innards? Religion and political terror, 1980–2000." *International Studies Quarterly* 51(4):927-43.
- Derichs, Claudia, and Dana Fennert. 2014. *Women's Movements and Countermovements: The Quest for Gender Equality in Southeast Asia and the Middle East*. Newcastle upon Tyne, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
- Diamond, Larry. 1994. *Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries: Textbook edition*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Donnelly, Jack. 1981. "Recent Trends in UN Human Rights Activity: Description and polemic." *Int Org* 35(4):633-55.
- . 1984. "Cultural Relativism and Universal Human Rights." *Human Rights Quarterly* 6(4):400-19.
- . 2011. "The Social Construction of International Human Rights." *Relaciones Internacionales-Madrid* (17):153-84.
- . 2013. *Universal human rights in theory and practice*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Doorenspleet, Renske. 2000. "Reassessing the Three Waves of Democratization." *World Politics* 52(3):384-406.
- Downs, Anthony. 1957. *An Economic Theory of Democracy*. New York, NY: Harper & Brothers.
- Dreher, Axel, Martin Gassebner, and Lars-H Siemers. 2010. "Does terrorism threaten human rights? Evidence from panel data." *The Journal of Law and Economics* 53(1):65-93.
- Duff, Ernest A, John F McCamant, John F McCamant, and Waltraud Q Morales. 1976. *Violence and Repression in Latin America: A quantitative and historical analysis*. New York, NY: Free Press.
- Dye, Thomas R, and Harmon Zeigler. 1988. "Socialism and Equality in Cross-National Perspective." *PS: Political Science & Politics* 21(1):45-56.

- Eckstein, Harry, and Ted Robert Gurr. 1975. *Patterns of Authority: A structural basis for political inquiry*. New York, NY: Wiley
- Elliott, Michael A. 2007. "Human Rights and the Triumph of the Individual in World Culture." *Cultural Sociology* 1(3):343-63.
- Englehart, Neil A, and Melissa K Miller. 2014. "The CEDAW Effect: International law's impact on women's rights." *Journal of Human Rights* 13(1):22-47.
- Enke, Stephen. 1963. *Economics for development*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
- Eriksen, Thomas. 1991. "Book Notes -- Global Culture. Nationalism, Globalization and Modernity edited by Mike Featherstone." Pp. 334. Oslo, NO: Sage Publications Ltd.
- Fariss, Christopher J. 2014. "Respect for Human Rights has Improved over Time: Modeling the changing standard of accountability." *American Political Science Review* 108(2):297-318.
- Fein, Helen. 1995. "More Murder in the Middle: Life-integrity violations and democracy in the world, 1987." *Human Rights Quarterly* 17:170.
- Felice, William F. 2010. *The Global New Deal: Economic and social human rights in world politics*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
- Frank, David John, Ann Hironaka, and Evan Schofer. 2000. "The Nation-State and the Natural Environment over the Twentieth Century." *American Sociological Review*:96-116.
- Freeman, Michael. 2017. *Human rights*. Malden, MA: Polity Press.
- Frezzo, Mark. 2011a. "Sociology and Human Rights Education: Beyond the Three Generations?" *Societies Without Borders* 6(2):3-22.
- . 2011b. "Sociology and Human Rights in the Post-Development Era." *Sociology Compass* 5(3):203-14.
- . 2014. *The Sociology of Human Rights*. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.

- Ganji, Manouchehr. 1975. "The Realization of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Problems, policies, progress." New York, NY: United Nations.
- Gellers, Joshua C. 2015. "Explaining the Emergence of Constitutional Environmental Rights: A global quantitative analysis." *Journal of Human Rights and the Environment* 6:75.
- Gerling, Heather M, William Ash-Houchen, and Celia C Lo. 2019. "Fractured Modernization: Cultural and structural predictors of attitudes on gender equality." *International Review of Sociology*:1-19.
- Giddens, Anthony. 1999. *Runaway World: How Globalisation is Reshaping our Lives*. New York, NY: Routledge.
- Gleditsch, Kristian Skrede. 2009. *All International Politics is Local: The Diffusion of Conflict, Integration, and Democratization*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
- Gleditsch, Kristian Skrede, and Michael D Ward. 2006. "Diffusion and the International Context of Democratization." *International Organization* 60(4):911-33.
- Glendon, Mary Ann. 1991. *Rights Talk: The impoverishment of political discourse*. New York, NY: The Free Press.
- Goldstein, Robert Justin. 1986. "The Limitations of Using Quantitative Data in Studying Human Rights Abuses." *Human Rights Quarterly* 8:607.
- Goodhart, Michael. 2016. *Human Rights: politics and practice*. Oxford, UK: Oxford university press.
- Greenhill, Brian. 2010. "The Company You Keep: International socialization and the diffusion of human rights norms." *International Studies Quarterly* 54(1):127-45.
- Gruen, Carola, and Stephan Klasen. 2012. "Has transition improved well-being?" *Economic Systems* 36(1):11-30.

- Gurr, Ted Robert. 1985. "On the Political Consequences of Scarcity and Economic Decline." *International Studies Quarterly* 29(1):51-75.
- Hadden, Jennifer, and Lucia A Seybert. 2016. "What's in a Norm: Mapping the Norm Definition Process in the Debate on Sustainable Development." *Global Governance* 22:249.
- Hafner-Burton, Emilie M, and Kiyoteru Tsutsui. 2005. "Human Rights in a Globalizing World: The paradox of empty promises." *American Journal of Sociology* 110(5):1373-411.
- Handl, Günther. 2012. "Declaration of the United Nations conference on the human environment (Stockholm Declaration), 1972 and the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, 1992." *United Nations Audiovisual Library of International Law* 11.
- Hartlyn, Jonathan, and Arturo Valenzuela. 1995. "Democracy in Latin America since 1930." Pp. 97-162 in *The Cambridge History of Latin America: Volume 6: 1930 to the Present*, edited by Leslie Bethell. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Hasenclever, Andreas, and Volker Rittberger. 2000. "Does religion make a difference? Theoretical approaches to the impact of faith on political conflict." *Millennium* 29(3):641-74.
- Hathaway, Oona A. 2002. "Do human rights treaties make a difference?" *The Yale Law Journal* 111(8):1935-2042.
- Hecht, Richard D. and Vincent F. Biondo, eds. 2010. *Religion and Everyday Life and Culture*. Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger.
- Held, David, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt, and Jonathan Perraton. 2000. "Global Transformations: Politics, economics and culture." Pp. 14-28 in *Politics at the Edge*. London, UK: MacMillan Press.
- Henderson, Conway W. 1991. "Conditions Affecting the Use of Political Repression." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 35(1):120-42.

- Henkin, Louis. 1981. "International Human Rights as "Rights"." *Nomos* 23:257-80.
- Henne, Peter S, and Jason Klocek. 2019. "Taming the Gods: How Religious Conflict Shapes State Repression." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 63(1):112-38.
- Herrmann, Pauline. 1995. "Human Environmental Crisis and the Transnational Corporation: The question of culpability." *Human Ecology* 23(2):285-89.
- Hewlett, Sylvia Ann. 1980. *The Cruel Dilemmas of Development: Twentieth-century Brazil*. New York, NY: Basic Books
- Hill Jr, Daniel W. 2010. "Estimating the Effects of Human Rights Treaties on State Behavior." *The Journal of Politics* 72(4):1161-74.
- . 2013. "The Concept of Personal Integrity Rights in Empirical Research." *IPSA Committee on Concepts and Methods Working Paper Series on Political Concepts* (59).
- Hironaka, Ann. 2002. "The Globalization of Environmental Protection: The case of environmental impact assessment." *International Journal of Comparative Sociology* 43(1):65-78.
- Howard, Rhoda. 1983. "The Full-Belly Thesis: Should Economic Rights Take Priority over Civil and Political Rights? Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa." *Human Rights Quarterly* 5(4):467-90.
- Howell, Jude. 2006. "The Global War on Terror, Development and Civil Society." *Journal of International Development: The Journal of the Development Studies Association* 18(1):121-35.
- Huntington, Samuel P. 1993a. *The Third Wave: Democratization in the late twentieth century*. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Huntington, Samuel P, and Joan M Nelson. 1976. *No Easy Choice: Political participation in developing countries*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

- Huntington, Samuel P. 1993b. "The Clash of Civilizations." *Foreign Affairs* 72(3):22-49.
- Huttenbach, Henry R. 2002. "From the Editor: Towards a Conceptual Definition of Genocide." *Journal of Genocide Research* 4(2):167-75.
- Hymer, Stephen. 1979. "The Multinational Corporation and the Law of Uneven Development." Pp. 113-40 in *Economic and World Order*: New York, NY: Academic Press, Inc.
- Ignatieff, Michael. 2003. *Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Imperative, Social Progress. 2013. "Social progress index." 2016. <http://www.socialprogressimperative.org/global-index>.
- Inglehart, R., and P. Norris. 2003. *Rising Tide: Gender equality and cultural change around the world*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- . 2004. *Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Innes de Neufville, Judith. 1986. "Human Rights Reporting as a Policy Tool: An examination of the State Department Country Reports." *Human Rights Quarterly* 8:681.
- Ishay, Micheline. 2008. *The History of Human Rights: From ancient times to the globalization era*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Iversen, Torben, and Frances McCall Rosenbluth. 2010. *Women, Work, and Politics: The political economy of gender inequality*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Jagers, Keith, and Ted Robert Gurr. 1995. "Tracking Democracy's Third Wave with the Polity III Data." *Journal of Peace Research* 32(4):469-82.
- Johnson, Harry Gordon. 1962. *Money, Trade and Economic Growth: Survey lectures in economic theory*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

- Johnston, Barbara Rose. 1995. "Human Rights and the Environment." *Human Ecology* 23(2):111-23.
- Jones, Andrew. 2010. *Globalization: key thinkers*. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
- Joppke, Christian. 1998. *Challenge to the Nation-State: Immigration in Western Europe and the United States*. New York: Oxford University Press
- Kant, Immanuel. 2015. *The Moral Law: Groundwork of the metaphysics of morals*. New York, NY: Routledge.
- Keith, Linda Camp. 2002. "Constitutional Provisions for Individual Human Rights (1977-1996): Are they more than mere "window dressing?"." *Political Research Quarterly* 55(1):111-43.
- Keith, Linda Camp, C Neal Tate, and Steven C Poe. 2009. "Is the law a mere parchment barrier to human rights abuse?" *The Journal of Politics* 71(2):644-60.
- Kingsbury, Damien, and Leena Avonius. 2008. *Human Rights in Asia: A Reassessment of the Asian Values Debate*. New York, NY: Palgrave MacMillan.
- Kirschke, Linda. 2000. "Informal Repression, Zero-Sum Politics and Late Third Wave Transitions." *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 38(3):383-405.
- Kockel, Ullrich. 2017. *Regional Culture and Economic Development: Explorations in European ethnology*. London, UK: Routledge.
- Kreide, Regina. 2016. "Between Morality and Law: In defense of a political conception of human rights." *Journal of International Political Theory* 12(1):10-25.
- Krieger, Joel, and Margaret E Crahan. 2001. *The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Landes, David S. 1999. *The Wealth and Poverty of Nations : why some are so rich and some so poor*. New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company.

- Landman, Todd. 2002. "Comparative Politics and Human Rights." *Human Rights Quarterly* 24:890.
- . 2005. *Protecting Human Rights: A comparative study*. Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press.
- Langford, Malcolm. 2008. "The Justiciability of Social Rights: From practice to theory." *Social rights jurisprudence: emerging trends in international and comparative law* 3:43-45.
- Lasswell, Harold. 1950. "Politics: Who Gets What, When, How, New York." New York, NY: Whittlesey House.
- Lechner, Frank J, and John Boli. 2008. *World Culture: Origins and consequences*. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing.
- Lenski, Gerhard E. 2013. *Power and Privilege: A theory of social stratification*. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press.
- Li, Xiaorong. 2003. "Asian Values and the Universality of Human Rights." *Philosophical dimensions of public policy* 13:171.
- Lipset, S. M. 1959. "Some social requisites of democracy: Economic development and political legitimacy." *American Political Science Review* 53(1):69-105.
- Locke, John. 1960. *Two Treatises of Government*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Lupu, Yonatan. 2016. "Explaining Human Rights Abuses: Comparing Contemporary Factors and Historical Factors." *Virginia Journal of International Law* 56:481.
- Madley, Benjamin. 2016. *An American Genocide: The United States and the California Indian Catastrophe, 1846-1873*. London, UK: Yale University Press.
- Maliks, Reidar. 2014. *Kant's Politics in Context*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Manaktala, Meghna. 2012. "Defining Genocide." *Peace Review* 24(2):179-86.

- Mansfield, Edward D, and Jon C Pevehouse. 2008. "Democratization and the Varieties of International Organizations." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 52(2):269-94.
- Marshall, Monty G., Ted Robert Gurr, Christian Davenport, and Keith Jagers. 2002. "Polity IV, 1800-1999: Comments on Munck and Verkuilen." *Comparative Political Studies* 35(1):40-45.
- Martin-Ortega, Olga, Johanna Herman, and Chandra Lekha Sriram. 2010. "War, Conflict, and Human Rights." in *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International Studies*. Oxford, UK: Routledge.
- Martin, Mary, and Taylor Owen. 2010. "The Second Generation of Human Security: Lessons from the UN and EU experience." *International Affairs* 86(1):211-24.
- McMichael, Philip. 2012. *Development and Social Change: A global perspective*. London, UK: Sage.
- McNeely, Connie L. 1995. *Constructing the Nation-State: International organization and prescriptive action*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group.
- Messer, Ellen. 1997. "Pluralist Approaches to Human Rights." *Journal of Anthropological Research* 53(3):293-317.
- Meyer, John W, John Boli, George M Thomas, and Francisco O Ramirez. 1997. "World Society and the Nation-State." *American Journal of Sociology* 103(1):144-81.
- Meyer, William H. 1996. "Human rights and MNCs: Theory versus quantitative analysis." *Hum. Rts. Q.* 18:368.
- Michels, R. 1962. *Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy*. New York, NY: Free Press.
- Mies, Maria, and Veronika Bennholdt-Thomsen. 1999. *The Subsistence Perspective: Beyond the globalised economy*. London, UK: Zed Books Ltd.

- Mills, C Wright, and Alan Wolfe. 2000. *The Power Elite*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
- Milner, Wesley T, Steven C Poe, and David Leblang. 1999. "Security Rights, Subsistence Rights, and Liberties: A theoretical survey of the empirical landscape." *Human Rights Quarterly* 21:403.
- Miranda, Lillian Aponte. 2012. "The Role of International Law in Intrastate Natural Resource Allocation: Sovereignty, human rights, and peoples-based development." *Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law* 45:785.
- Mitchell, Neil J, and James M McCormick. 1988. "Economic and Political Explanations of Human Rights Violations." *World Politics* 40(4):476-98.
- Moon, Bruce E, and William J Dixon. 1985. "Politics, the State, and Basic Human Needs: A cross-national study." *American Journal of Political Science* 661-94.
- Morris, Bruce Robert. 1967. *Economic Growth and Development*. New York: Pitman Pub. Corp.
- Morsink, Johannes. 1999. *The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Origins, drafting, and intent*. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Mosca, Gaetano, Arthur Livingston, and Hannah D Kahn. 1970. *The Ruling Class*. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill
- Moss, David A, and Sarah A Brennan. 2002. "National Economic Accounting: Past, Present, and Future."
- Moyn, Samuel. 2010. *The Last Utopia*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Muhlhausen, David B, and Jena Baker McNeill. 2011. "Terror Trends: 40 years' data on international and domestic terrorism." Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation.
- Murdie, Amanda. 2009. "The Impact of Human Rights NGO Activity on Human Right Practices." *International NGO Journal* 4(10):421-40.

- Nash, Kate. 2015. *The Political Sociology of Human Rights*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Ndulo, Muna. 2011. "African Customary Law, Customs, and Women's Rights." *Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies* 18(1):87-120.
- Neier, Aryeh. 2003. *Taking Liberties: Four Decades in the Struggle for Rights*. New York, NY: PublicAffairs.
- Neimark, Penninah, and Peter Rhoades Mott. 1999. *The Environmental Debate: A documentary history* Amenia: Grey House Publishing.
- Neumayer, Eric. 2005. "Do international human rights treaties improve respect for human rights?" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49(6):925-53.
- Nickel, James W. 1993. "The Human Right to a Safe Environment: Philosophical perspectives on its scope and justification." *Yale Journal International* 18:281.
- O'loughlin, John, Michael D Ward, Corey L Lofdahl, Jordin S Cohen, David S Brown, David Reilly, Kristian S Gleditsch, and Michael Shin. 1998. "The Diffusion of Democracy, 1946–1994." *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 88(4):545-74.
- Ojo, Olusola, and Amadu Sesay. 1986. "The OAU and Human Rights: Prospects for the 1980s and beyond." *Human Rights Quarterly* 8:89.
- Otto, Dianne. 2001. "Defending Women's Economic and Social Rights: Some Thoughts on Indivisibility and a New Standard of Equality'." *Giving Meaning to Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights* 52:55.
- Park, Han S. 1987. "Correlates of Human Rights: Global tendencies." *Human Rights Quarterly* 9:405.
- Paupp, Terrence E. 2014. *Redefining Human Rights in the Struggle for Peace and Development*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

- Peksen, Dursun. 2009. "Better or worse? The effect of economic sanctions on human rights." *Journal of Peace Research* 46(1):59-77.
- . 2012. "Does foreign military intervention help human rights?" *Political Research Quarterly* 65(3):558-71.
- Piazza, James A, and James Igoe Walsh. 2009. "Transnational Terror and Human Rights." *International Studies Quarterly* 53(1):125-48.
- Poe, Steven C, and C Neal Tate. 1994. "Repression of Human Rights to Personal Integrity in the 1980s: A global analysis." *American Political Science Review* 88(4):853-72.
- Poe, Steven C, C Neal Tate, and Linda Camp Keith. 1999. "Repression of the Human Right to Personal Integrity Revisited: A global cross-national study covering the years 1976–1993." *International Studies Quarterly* 43(2):291-313.
- Pogge, Thomas. 2007. *Freedom From Poverty as a Human Right: Who owes what to the very poor?* Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Rabe-Hesketh, Sophia, and Anders Skrondal. 2008. *Multilevel and Longitudinal Modeling using Stata*. College Station, TX: Stata Press.
- Ramcharan, B. G., ed. 1979. *Human-Rights-30 Years After The Universal Declaration*. Hingham, MA: Kluwer Boston, Inc.
- Raphael, David Daiches. 1967. *Political Theory and the Rights of Man*. Blommington, IN: Indiana University Press.
- Renzaho, Andre MN, and David Mellor. 2010. "Food Security Measurement in Cultural Pluralism: Missing the point or conceptual misunderstanding?" *Nutrition* 26(1):1-9.
- Rist, Gilbert. 2014. *The History of Development: From Western Origins to Global Faith*. London, UK: Zed Books Ltd.

- Robertson, Roland. 1992. *Globalization: Social theory and global culture*. London, UK: Sage Publications.
- Robison, Kristopher K. 2009. "Terror's true nightmare? Reevaluating the consequences of terrorism on democratic governance." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 22(1):62-86.
- Roche, Douglas. 2009. "The Human Right to Peace." *Journal of the Institute for the Humanities* 3:68.
- Ross, Alistair. 2007. "Multiple Identities and Education for Active Citizenship." *British Journal of Educational Studies* 55(3):286-303.
- Ruffin, Patricia. 1982. "Socialist Development and Human Rights in Cuba." in *Towards a Human Rights Framework*, edited by P. Schwab and A. Pollis. New York, NY: Praeger.
- Russett, Bruce M, John R Oneal, and Michaelene Cox. 2000. "Clash of civilizations, or realism and liberalism déjà vu? Some evidence." *Journal of Peace Research* 37(5):583-608.
- Sano, Hans-Otto. 2000. "Development and Human Rights: The necessary, but partial integration of human rights and development." *Human Rights Quarterly* 22:734.
- Scully, Gerald W. 1988. "The Institutional Framework and Economic Development." *Journal of Political Economy* 96(3):652-62.
- Sen, Amartya. 2001. *Development as Freedom*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Shor, Eran, Leonardo Baccini, Chi-Ting Tsai, Tai-Ho Lin, and Titus C Chen. 2018. "Counterterrorist Legislation and Respect for Civil Liberties: An Inevitable Collision?" *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 41(5):339-64.
- Shor, Eran, Ina Filkobski, Pazit Ben-Nun Bloom, Hayder Alkilabi, and William Su. 2016. "Does counterterrorist legislation hurt human rights practices? A longitudinal cross-national analysis." *Social Science Research* 58:104-21.

- Sjoberg, Gideon, Elizabeth A Gill, and Norma Williams. 2001. "A Sociology of Human Rights." *Social Problems* 48(1):11-47.
- Smidt, Corwin E. 2003. *Religion as Social Capital: Producing the Common Good*. Waco, TX: Baylor University Press.
- Smith, Jackie, Melissa Bolyard, and Anna Ippolito. 1999. "Human Rights and the Global Economy: A response to Meyer." *Human Rights Quarterly* 21(1):207-19.
- Stamatopoulou, Elsa. 2012. "Monitoring Cultural Human Rights: The claims of culture on human rights and the response of cultural rights." *Hum. Rts. Q.* 34:1170.
- Stammers, Neil. 1999. "Social Movements and the Social Construction of Human Rights." *Human Rights Quarterly* 21(4):980-1008.
- Stepan, Alfred, and Juan Linz. 1996. *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press
- Stewart, Frances. 1985. *The Basic Needs in Developing Countries*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Strang, David. 1990. "From Dependency to Sovereignty: An event history analysis of decolonization 1870-1987." *American Sociological Review*:846-60.
- Strauss, Leo. 1979. *Natural Right and History* Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Strouse, James C, and Richard P Claude. 1976. "Empirical Comparative Rights Research: Some preliminary tests of development hypotheses." *Comparative human rights* 51:52.
- Tatum, Dale. 2010. *Genocide at the Dawn of the Twenty-First Century: Rwanda, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Darfur*. New York, NY: Palgrave MacMillan.
- The World Bank. "Data and Methodologies." Retrieved June 1, 2018 (<https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906531-methodologies>).

- . "World Bank National Accounts Data (1962- 2018)." Retrieved Sept. 1, 2018
(<https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.ATLS.CD>).
- Torfason, Magnus Thor, and Paul Ingram. 2010. "The Global Rise of Democracy: A network account." *American Sociological Review* 75(3):355-77.
- Trubek, David. 1984. "Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the Third World: Human rights law and human needs programs." *Human Rights in International Law: Legal and Policy Issues* 1:205-71.
- Tuck, Richard. 1979. *Natural Rights Theories: Their origin and development*. Cambridge, UK: Press Syndicate of University of Cambridge.
- Turner, Bryan S. 1993. "Outline of a Theory of Human Rights." *Sociology* 27(3):489-512.
- . 2011. "The Short History of Human Rights." *Contemporary Sociology* 40(6):678-80.
- Udombana, N. J. 2000. "The Third World and the Right to Development: Agenda for the Next Millennium." *Human Rights Quarterly* 22(3):753-87.
- The United Nations. 1968. "Proclamation of Tehran." Retrieved on Sept. 1, 2018.
(https://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ha/fatchr/fatchr_ph_e.pdf).
- United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs. "Statistics Division." Retrieved June 1, 2018 (<https://unstats.un.org/unsd/methodology/m49/>).
- United Nations Development Programme. "Human Development Reports (1990-2018)."
Retrieved Sept. 1, 2018 (<http://www.hdr.undp.org/en/data>).
- Uvin, Peter. 2004. *Human Rights and Development*. Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press
- Van Arsdale, Peter W. 2017. in *Global Human Rights: People, Processes, and Principles*. Long Grove: Waveland Press, Inc.
- Van Steenberg, Bart. 1994. *The Condition of Citizenship*. London, UK: Sage Publications.
- Vasak, Karel. 1977. "30-Year Struggle-Sustained Efforts to Give Force of Law to Universal Declaration of Human Rights." *Unesco Courier* (10):28-41.

Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action. in *World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna.*"

Retrieved on Sept. 1, 2018.

(<https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/ProfessionalInterest/vienna.pdf>).

Vierdag, Egbert W. 1978. "The Legal Nature of the Rights Granted by the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights." *Netherlands Yearbook of International Law* 9:69-105.

Waters, Malcolm. 1995. "Globalisation and the social construction of human rights.-Paper presented at the Symposium: Human Rights and the Sociological Project, a plenary session of The Australian Sociological Association. Meeting (1994: Deakin University)." *Australian and New Zealand Journal of Sociology* 31(2):29.

—. 1996. "Human Rights and the Universalisation of Interests: Towards a social constructionist approach." *Sociology* 30(3):593-600.

Wejnert, Barbara. 2005. "Diffusion, development, and democracy, 1800-1999." *American Sociological Review* 70(1):53-81.

Wellman, Carl. 2000. "Solidarity, the Individual and Human Rights." *Human Rights Quarterly* 22:639.

Whelan, Daniel J, and Jack Donnelly. 2007. "The West, economic and social rights, and the global human rights regime: setting the record straight." *Human Rights Quarterly*:908-49.

Witte Jr, John, and M Christian Green. 2011. *Religion and Human Rights: An Introduction*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Young, Katharine G. 2008. "The Minimum Core of Economic and Social Rights: a concept in search of content." *Yale Journal International* 33:113.

Zhou, Min. 2013. "Public Support for International Human Rights Institutions: A Cross-National and Multilevel Analysis." *Sociological Forum* 28(3):525-48.

Zimmerman, Ekkart. 1980. "Macro-comparative research on political protest." *Handbook of political conflict: Theory and research*:167-237.

APPENDIX A
Countries used in the Study

Appendix A: Countries used in the Study

Afghanistan	Greece	Panama
Albania	Greenland	Papua New Guinea
Algeria	Grenada	Paraguay
American Samoa	Guadeloupe	Peru
Andorra	Guam	Philippines
Angola	Guatemala	Poland
Anguilla	Guernsey	Portugal
Antigua and Barbuda	Guinea	Puerto Rico
Argentina	Guinea-Bissau	Qatar
Armenia	Guyana	Réunion
Aruba	Haiti	Romania
Australia	Honduras	Russia
Austria	Hong Kong	Russian Federation
Azerbaijan	Hong Kong, China (SAR)	Rwanda
Bahamas	Hungary	Saint Kitts and Nevis
Bahamas, The	Iceland	Saint Lucia
Bahrain	India	Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
Bangladesh	Indonesia	Samoa
Barbados	Iran	San Marino
Belarus	Iran (Islamic Republic of)	Sao Tome and Principe
Belgium	Iraq	Saudi Arabia
Belize	Ireland	Senegal
Benin	Israel	Serbia
Bermuda	Italy	Serbia and Montenegro
Bhutan	Jamaica	Seychelles
Bolivia	Japan	Sierra Leone
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)	Jersey	Singapore
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Jordan	Slovak Republic
Bosnia Herzegovina	Kazakhstan	Slovakia
Botswana	Kenya	Slovenia
Brazil	Kiribati	Solomon Islands
British Virgin Islands	Korea (Democratic People's Rep. of)	Somalia
Brunei	Korea (Republic of)	Somaliland
Brunei Darussalam	Korea, Democratic People's Republic of	South Africa
Bulgaria	Korea, Democratic Republic of	South Sudan
Burkina Faso	Korea, Republic of	Soviet Union

Burma	Kosovo	Spain
Burundi	Kuwait	Sri Lanka
Cabo Verde	Kyrgyz Republic	St. Helena
Cambodia	Kyrgyzstan	St. Kitts and Nevis
Cameroon	Lao People's Democratic Republic	St. Lucia
Canada	Laos	St. Martin
Cape Verde	Latvia	St. Pierre and Miquelon
Cayman Islands	Lebanon	St. Vincent and the Grenadines
Central African Republic	Lesotho	Sudan
Chad	Liberia	Suriname
Channel Islands	Libya	Swaziland
Chile	Liechtenstein	Sweden
China	Lithuania	Switzerland
Colombia	Luxembourg	Syria
Comoros	Macao	Syrian Arab Republic
Congo	Macedonia	Taiwan
Congo (Democratic Republic of the)	Madagascar	Tajikistan
Congo, Democratic Republic of	Malawi	Tanzania
Congo, Republic of	Malaysia	Tanzania (United Republic of)
Cook Islands	Maldives	Thailand
Costa Rica	Mali	The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
	Malta	Timor-Leste
Cote d'Ivoire	Marshall Islands	Togo
Côte d'Ivoire	Martinique	Tokelau
Croatia	Mauritania	Tonga
Cuba	Mauritius	Trinidad and Tobago
Curaçao	Mayotte	Tunisia
Cyprus	Mexico	Turkey
Czech Republic	Micronesia	Turkmenistan
Czechia	Micronesia (Federated States of)	Turks and Caicos Islands
Czechoslovakia		Tuvalu
Denmark	Moldova	Uganda
Djibouti	Moldova (Republic of)	Ukraine
Dominica	Monaco	United Arab Emirates
Dominican Republic	Mongolia	United Kingdom
East Timor	Montenegro	United States
Ecuador	Montserrat	United States of America
Egypt	Morocco	Uruguay
El Salvador	Mozambique	Uzbekistan
Equatorial Guinea	Myanmar	Vanuatu
Eritrea		

Estonia	Namibia	Vatican City
Eswatini (Kingdom of)	Nauru	Venezuela
Ethiopia	Nepal	Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)
Falkland Islands	Netherlands	Viet Nam
Faroe Islands	New Caledonia	Vietnam
Fiji	New Zealand	Virgin Islands (U.S.)
Finland	Nicaragua	Wallis and Futuna Islands
France	Niger	West Bank and Gaza
French Guiana	Nigeria	Western Sahara
French Polynesia	Niue	Yemen
Gabon	North Cyprus	Yemen Arab Republic
Gambia	Northern Mariana Islands	Yemen, South
Gambia, The	Norway	Yugoslavia
Georgia	Oman	Yugoslavia, Federal Republic of
Germany	Pakistan	Zambia
Ghana	Palau	Zimbabwe
Gibraltar	Palestine, State of	

* not all countries listed are utilized for each dataset due to missing data

APPENDIX B
CIRI Variables, Description, and Measurements

Appendix B: CIRI Variables, Description, and Measurements

Variable	Description	Measurement
Physical Integrity	additive index constructed from: Torture Extrajudicial Killing Political Imprisonment Disappearance	Scores range from 0 (indicating no government respect for these 4 rights) to 8 (full government respect for these 4 rights)
Empowerment Rights Index	additive index constructed from: Foreign Movement Domestic Movement Freedom of Speech Freedom of Assembly & Association Workers' Rights Electoral Self-Determination Freedom of Religion	Scores range from 0 (no government respect for these 7 rights) to 14 (full government respect for these 7 rights)
Women's Economic Rights	This variable includes the following internationally recognized rights: Equal pay for equal work Free choice of profession or employment without the need to obtain a husband or male relative's consent The right to gainful employment without the need	A score of 0 indicates that there were no economic rights for women in law and that systematic discrimination based on sex may have been built into law. A score of 1 indicates that women had some economic rights under law, but these rights were not effectively enforced. A score of 2 indicates that women had some economic rights under law, and the government effectively enforced these rights in practice while still allowing a low level of discrimination against women

	<p>to obtain a husband or male relative's consent</p> <p>Equality in hiring and promotion practices</p> <p>Job security (maternity leave, unemployment benefits, no arbitrary firing or layoffs, etc...)</p> <p>Non-discrimination by employers</p> <p>The right to be free from sexual harassment in the workplace</p> <p>The right to work at night</p> <p>The right to work in occupations classified as dangerous</p> <p>The right to work in the military and the police force</p>	<p>in economic matters. A score of 3 indicates that all or nearly all of women's economic rights were guaranteed by law and the government fully and vigorously enforces these laws in practice.</p>
Women's Political Rights	<p>This variable includes the following internationally recognized rights:</p> <p>The right to vote</p> <p>The right to run for political office</p> <p>The right to hold elected and appointed government positions</p> <p>The right to join political parties</p> <p>The right to petition government officials</p>	<p>A score of 0 indicates that women's political rights were not guaranteed by law during a given year. A score of 1 indicates that women's political rights were guaranteed in law, but severely prohibited in practice. A score of 2 indicates that women's political rights were guaranteed in law, but were still moderately prohibited in practice. A score of 3 indicates that women's political rights were guaranteed in both law and practice.</p>
Women's Social Rights	<p>This variable includes the following internationally recognized rights:</p> <p>The right to equal inheritance</p> <p>The right to enter into marriage on a basis of equality with men</p> <p>The right to travel abroad</p> <p>The right to obtain a passport</p> <p>The right to confer citizenship to children or a husband</p> <p>The right to initiate a divorce</p> <p>The right to own, acquire, manage, and retain property brought into marriage</p> <p>The right to participate in social, cultural, and community activities</p>	<p>A score of 0 indicates that there were no social rights for women in law and that systematic discrimination based on sex may have been built into law. A score of 1 indicates that women had some social rights under law, but these rights were not effectively enforced. A score of 2 indicates that women had some social rights under law, and the government effectively enforced these rights in practice while still allowing a low level of discrimination against women in social matters. A score of 3 indicates that all or nearly all of women's social rights were guaranteed by law and the government fully and vigorously enforced these laws in practice. [This variable was retired as of 2005.]</p>

	<p>The right to an education</p> <p>The freedom to choose a residence/domicile</p> <p>Freedom from female genital mutilation of children and of adults without their consent</p> <p>Freedom from forced sterilization</p>	
Independence of the Judiciary	<p>This variable indicates the extent to which the judiciary is independent of control from other sources, such as another branch of the government or the military.</p>	<p>A score of 0 indicates “not independent”, a score of 1 indicates “partially independent” and a score of 2 indicates “generally independent”.</p>

APPENDIX C
Social Progress Index Variables

Appendix C: Social Progress Index Variables

<u>Variable</u>	<u>Indicators</u>
Nutrition and Basic Medical Care	Undernourishment Maternal mortality rate Child mortality rate Child stunting Deaths from infectious diseases
Water and Sanitation	Access to at least basic drinking water Access to piped water Access to at least sanitation facilities Rural open defecation (% of population)
Shelter	Access to electricity Quality of electrical supply Household air pollution attributable deaths
Personal Safety	Property crime rate Political killings and torture Perceived criminality Traffic deaths
Access to Basic Knowledge	Adult literacy rate Primary school enrollment Secondary school enrollment Access to quality education
Access to Information and Communications	Mobile telephone subscriptions Internet users Access to online governance Access to independent media

Health and Wellness	Life expectancy at 60 Premature deaths from non-communicable diseases Access to essential services Access to quality healthcare
Environmental Quality	Outdoor air pollution attributable to deaths Wastewater treatment Greenhouse gas emissions Biome protection
Personal Rights	Political Rights Freedom of expression Access to justice Freedom of religion Property rights Property rights for women
Personal Freedom and Choice	Vulnerable employment Early marriage Satisfied demand for contraception Corruption
Inclusiveness	Acceptance of gays and lesbians Discrimination and violence against minorities Equality of political power by gender Equality of political power by socioeconomic position Equality of political power by social group
Access to Advanced Education	Tears of tertiary schooling Women's average years in school Globally ranked universities Percent of tertiary students enrolled in globally ranked universities

APPENDIX D
Countries Sorted by Region

**Appendix D: Countries Sorted
by Region**

Africa

Algeria
Angola
Benin
Botswana
British Indian Ocean Territory
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cameroon
Cape Verde
Central African Republic
Chad
Comoros
Congo (Brazzaville) republic
Congo, (Kinshasa) Democratic
republic
Côte d'Ivoire
Djibouti

Americas

Anguilla
Antarctica
Antigua and Barbuda
Argentina
Aruba
Bahamas
Barbados
Belize
Bermuda
Bolivia
Bouvet Island
Brazil
British Virgin Islands
Canada
Cayman Islands
Chile

Asia

Afghanistan
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Bahrain
Bangladesh
Bhutan
Brunei Darussalam
Cambodia
China
Hong Kong, SAR China
Macao, SAR China
Cyprus
Georgia
India
Indonesia

Europe

Aland Islands
Albania
Andorra
Austria
Belarus
Belgium
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Bulgaria
Croatia
Czech Republic
Denmark
Estonia
Faroe Islands
Finland
France

Oceania

American Samoa
Australia
Christmas Island
Cocos (Keeling) Islands
Cook Islands
Fiji
French Polynesia
Guam
Kiribati
Marshall Islands
Micronesia, Federated States of
Nauru
New Caledonia
New Zealand
Niue

Egypt		Iraq	Gibraltar	Northern Mariana Islands
Equatorial Guinea	Costa Rica	Israel	Greece	Palau
Eritrea	Cuba	Japan	Guernsey	Papua New Guinea
Ethiopia	Dominica	Jordan	Holy See (Vatican City State)	Pitcairn
French Southern Territories	Dominican Republic	Kazakhstan	Hungary	Samoa
Gabon	Ecuador	Korea (North)	Iceland	Solomon Islands
Gambia	El Salvador	Korea (South)	Ireland	Tokelau
Ghana	Falkland Islands (Malvinas)	Kuwait	Isle of Man	Tonga
Guinea	French Guiana	Kyrgyzstan	Italy	Tuvalu
Guinea-Bissau	Greenland	Lao PDR	Jersey	US Minor Outlying Islands
Kenya	Grenada	Lebanon	Latvia	Vanuatu
Lesotho	Guadeloupe	Malaysia	Liechtenstein	Wallis and Futuna Islands
Liberia	Guatemala	Maldives	Lithuania	
Libya	Guyana	Mongolia	Luxembourg	
Madagascar	Haiti	Myanmar	Macedonia, Republic of	
Malawi	Heard and McDonald Islands	Nepal	Malta	
Mali	Honduras	Oman	Moldova	
Mauritania	Jamaica	Pakistan	Monaco	
Mauritius	Martinique	Palestinian Territory	Montenegro	
Mayotte	Mexico	Philippines	Netherlands	
Morocco	Montserrat	Qatar	Norway	
Mozambique	Netherlands Antilles	Saudi Arabia	Poland	
Namibia	Nicaragua	Singapore	Portugal	
Niger	Panama	Sri Lanka	Romania	
Nigeria	Paraguay	Syrian Arab Republic (Syria)	Russian Federation	
Réunion	Peru	Taiwan, Republic of China	San Marino	
Rwanda	Puerto Rico	Tajikistan	Serbia	
Saint Helena	Saint-Barthélemy	Thailand	Slovakia	

Sao Tome and Principe	Saint Kitts and Nevis	Timor-Leste=East Timor	Slovenia
Senegal	Saint Lucia	Turkey	Spain
Seychelles	Saint-Martin (French part)	Turkmenistan	Sweden
Sierra Leone	Saint Pierre and Miquelon	United Arab Emirates	Switzerland
Somalia	Saint Vincent and Grenadines	Uzbekistan	Ukraine
South Africa	South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands	Viet Nam	United Kingdom
South Sudan	Suriname	Yemen	
Sudan	Svalbard and Jan Mayen Islands		
Swaziland	Trinidad and Tobago		
Tanzania, United Republic of	Turks and Caicos Islands		
Togo	United States of America		
Tunisia	Uruguay		
Uganda	Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic)		
Western Sahara	Virgin Islands, US		
Zambia			
Zimbabwe			

APPENDIX E
List of Acronyms

Appendix E: List of Acronyms

ARDA	Association of Religion Data Archives
CEDAW	Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
CIRI	Cingranelli-Richards Human Rights Index
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNP	Gross National Product
GNI	Gross National Income
HDR	Human Development Report
ICCPR	International Covenant on Civil and Political
ICERD	International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
ICESCR	International Covenant on Economic, Social and
OLS	Ordinary Least Squares
SNA	System of National Accounts
SPI	Social Progress Imperative
UDHR	Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UN	United Nations
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and
WB	World Bank
WDI	World Development Indicators