

NON-VOTING IN U.S. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS:
REFLECTIONS ON PLURALISM AND ELITISM

A DISSERTATION
SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
IN THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE
TEXAS WOMAN'S UNIVERSITY
COLLEGE OF ARTS AND SCIENCES

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
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
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
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
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
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am indebted to many people for their assistance with this project. My committee members have supported and challenged me in many ways. Dr. Mahmoud Sadri was invaluable in developing the idea and theoretical application for this study. Dr. Sadri insisted in a clarity of language and usage of terms that will serve me well beyond the dissertation. Dr. Jim Williams provided important statistical expertise and reminded me of the importance of taking time away from the project. Dr. Joyce Williams was tireless in her review and commentary on the many drafts of this work. Her continual feedback vastly improved the quality of the dissertation, the quality of my writing, and the quality of my reasoning. The continual assistance of all these members made this final product possible. I thank you all for your professional support of this project and your personal support of my academic development.

I also want to thank several fellow graduate students who have made the last year bearable. The Tuesday Lunch Club of Cathy Coghlan, Denise Huggins, and Rosalva Resendiz provided sympathetic ears and wonderful advise. Most

importantly they provided extraordinary friendships that made even the toughest semester enjoyable.

I want to thank my mother for her support and love which helped make this work possible. Through all my endeavors she has encouraged me to follow my dreams and assured me of my ability to reach them. Thanks Mom.

Non-Voting in U.S. Presidential Elections:
Reflections on Pluralism and Elitism

ABSTRACT

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August 2000

The purpose of this quantitative research was to analyze the relationship between non-voting in U.S. presidential elections and political cynicism, political knowledge, and perceived political self-efficacy. Further, social-class variables were analyzed to allow for an understanding of any intervening or explanatory relationships involving income, education, and occupation. Data analyzed in this study come from the National Election Studies and encompasses presidential election years between and including 1964 and 1996.

The relationship between non-voting and the characteristics listed above were expected to support either the pluralist or elitist theories of democracy. The major findings of this study support both theories depending on the measure used. The elitist perspective is supported with regard to political knowledge and perceived

political self-efficacy while the pluralist perspective is supported with regard to political cynicism. Results related to the social-class measures were mixed.

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Chapter I

INTRODUCTION

The Purpose

Voting behavior has been of interest to researchers for many years, and recent trends promise continued exploration of the topic. In the 1996 U.S. general election, 54.2 percent of voting-age persons reported voting (Casper and Bass 1998). This turnout is the lowest recorded by the Census Bureau since the first collection of voting and registration data in 1964.

This research will examine voter participation and non-participation and offer a sociological analysis of such behavior, a perspective currently lacking in the literature which derives from a political science perspective. Analyzing the issue of voter participation and non-participation from a sociological perspective will allow for a more comprehensive consideration of voting behavior. This approach will further allow for an understanding of the impact of individual and group characteristics on a citizen's decision to vote or not to vote. A sociological

approach will also involve the analysis of voting behavior in socio-economic and historical context.

The Problem

The political choice of not voting has implications for the policy decisions and the actions of elected officials. Skocpol (1994) suggests that elections affect policy outcomes because politicians respond to the electorate. Therefore, those choosing not to vote are not being represented by elected officials, but they are affecting the political process. The social implications of policy decisions by U.S. presidents are many and varied. The elected president's attitude towards public education, healthcare, welfare, crime, and workers' rights, among other issues, potentially affects all citizens in some way. Many U.S. citizens, however, are not voting in presidential elections.

Casper and Bass report that of those who did not vote in the 1996 general election, 17 percent indicated they did not vote "because they were not interested or did not care about the elections" (1998, p. 4). Another 13 percent of those registered to vote, but who did not vote in 1996,

indicated this was because they "did not prefer any of the candidates" (1998, p. 4). These two reasons, being uninterested/not caring and not preferring any candidate, account for the reasons fully 30 percent of non-voters gave for not voting in the 1996 national election. In an attempt to understand more completely the characteristics associated with voting and non-voting, this study will analyze the relationship between not voting and political knowledge, political cynicism, perception of political self-efficacy, and social class.

Theoretical Concepts

The contrasting theories of pluralism and elitism inform the current research concerning political participation, political knowledge, political attitudes, and social class among U.S. citizens. Pluralist theories treat the lack of participation on the part of citizens as a sign of satisfaction among the public. Elite theorists, on the other hand, view this lack of participation as a sign of the public's disaffection and their resignation to elite control.

Pluralist theorist Robert Dahl included full and equal participation by citizens among his criteria for an ideal democracy. Dahl was also concerned about the knowledge of citizens and made the "enlightened understanding" (1982, p. 6) of citizens another criterion for democracy. Among the reasons offered by Dahl for low political participation is a "high confidence in the all-around justice, legitimacy, stability, and fairness of decisions in one's political system" (1984, p. 100).

In contrast to Dahl's pluralist theory, Mills wrote, "knowledge does not now have democratic relevance in America" (1963, p. 613). Mills's elite theory of American politics treats the citizenry as inactive and without knowledge. Citizens are viewed as a mass rather than as an active and informed public as the pluralists see them. The contrasting views of Dahl and Mills will inform the theoretical understanding of voting behavior sought in this work.

Rationale

The reasons for non-participation and the relationship between voting and political knowledge, political cynicism,

perception of political self-efficacy, and social class are not fully understood. This study represents an attempt to contribute to the body of scholarship concerning voter participation and to offer a sociological analysis of current voting trends utilizing the political theories of both Dahl and Mills. Should the study find that persons who choose not to vote also show low levels of political knowledge, high levels of cynicism, and low levels of self-efficacy, then support is provided for the elite theorists. This finding will suggest that citizens are a politically ignorant, cynical mass who feel they have little political power. If, on the other hand, those who choose not to vote are politically knowledgeable, low in political cynicism, and high in political self-efficacy support is provided for pluralists and their view of the public. This result would suggest that citizens are happy with the political structure and choose not to vote because of their satisfaction.

Analyzing the relationships between social class and levels of political knowledge, political cynicism, and political self-efficacy among non-voters will allow for an understanding of voter satisfaction and perceived power

within each class. This analysis may indicate that all non-voters, regardless of social class positions, are equally satisfied/dissatisfied, or that the theories of Dahl and Mills may apply differently to different classes. Because persons of lower social class consistently vote at a rate of just 60 percent of those of upper social class (Leighley and Nagler 1992), it is expected that class differences will appear in levels of political knowledge, political cynicism, and perceived political self-efficacy as well. It is possible then that the political knowledge and attitudes of non-voters in one class are consistent with a pluralist perspective while those of another class are consistent with an elitist perspective.

Because this study will include multiple presidential election years (1964-1996), it is possible that results may be inconsistent from election year to election year. Various politically charged events occurred during the period under study. These include the Vietnam war, the assassinations of Robert F. Kennedy and Martin Luther King Jr., Watergate, Nixon's resignation, the Iran hostage crisis, the Reagan years, and economic recessions and inflations. It is possible that cynicism and perceived

political self-efficacy were affected by these events. The historical context of each election year under study are analyzed along with the study findings in Chapter V.

Research Question and Hypotheses

The question of whether the U.S. political structure reflects a pluralist model of democracy or an elitist model of democracy frames the current study. Given the low turnout in U.S. presidential elections, it is important to understand why those who chose not to vote did so and how they differ from those who chose to vote. The works of Robert A. Dahl and C. Wright Mills inform the choice of characteristics with which to compare voting and non-voting. The hypotheses are as follows:

Hypothesis 1: Respondents with high levels of political knowledge will report higher levels of voting than those with low levels of political knowledge.

Hypothesis 2: Non-voters of high social class positions will report higher levels of political knowledge than non-voters of low social class position.

Hypothesis 3: Respondents with high levels of perceived political self-efficacy will report higher levels of voting than those with low levels of perceived political self-efficacy.

Hypothesis 4: Non-voters of high social class position will report higher levels of perceived political self-efficacy than non-voters of low social class position.

Hypothesis 5: Respondents with high levels of political cynicism will report lower levels of voting than those with low levels of political cynicism.

Hypothesis 6: Non-voters of high social class position will report lower levels of political cynicism than non-voters of low social class position.

Chapter II

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Introduction

This chapter will offer a brief history of political philosophy and a review of theories of power. Literature pertaining to non-voting in some European nations, U.S. voter participation, the economy and U.S. voter choice, and non-voting in the United States will also be reviewed.

A Brief History of Political Philosophy

Plato (427-347 B.C.) is considered the "first great systemic political theorist." Among his concerns was elucidating "the best type of political system" (Curtis 1981a p. 26). Plato recounted a dialogue between Socrates and others in which an attempt was made to illustrate an ideal political system. Thrasymachus asserted that "there is one principle of justice which is the interest of the stronger" (Plato 1936, p. 19). Socrates argued that the interest of the powerful must be in the best interest of

the weak. He stated that no "ruler considers or enjoins what is for his own interest, but always what is for the interest of his subject" (Plato 1936, p. 25). This dialogue appears to have had a great impact on the student Plato.

In The Republic it is clear that Plato has accepted Socrates' assertion of the noble ruler. He lays out his plan for the ultimate city-state in which a guardian class of educated noble men and women rule with justice and in the interest of all. "Men and women alike possess the qualities which make a guardian. . ." (Plato 1936, p. 184). By the time Plato wrote Laws there seems to have been a shift in his thinking. In that work he proposed laws as a substitute for the guardian class (Strauss 1987).

Aristotle (384-322 B.C.), the last of the great Greek philosophers, had views that did not vary greatly from Plato's city-state scheme. Aristotle did differ from Plato in his suggestion that the state should exist for the good of the citizen rather than the citizen's existing for the good of the state as Plato reasoned. Aristotle also indicated the need for a strong middle class to provide a stabilizing stratum between the elites and the

workers/slaves. Unlike Plato, Aristotle attempted to justify slavery and the subordination of women in his political writings (Bambrough 1963).

Long after the fall of the Roman Empire, Machiavelli (1469-1527) offered a political philosophy that exemplified a cynical view of politics. His concern was not for a good or ethical polity but for the attainment and preservation of power at all costs. He "had a remarkably low view of human nature" (Butterfield 1956, p. 111) and set out to offer a value-free prescription for a state with little concern for the public good but "for the private purposes of an unscrupulous prince" (1956, p. 110).

Hobbes (1588-1679) emphasized the baser nature of the human beings yet did not suggest the pursuit of power at the expense of others as the ultimate form of government. Instead, Hobbes offered a more scientific approach to understanding the social arrangements of power and rights. He saw the social contract as the key to avoiding continual war and struggle. The social contract obliges individuals within society to give up some freedoms to the sovereign in return for the preservation of order. Hobbes describes the sovereign ruler as a sum of the individuals within the

commonwealth (Hobbes 1904). The government was considered central to the survival of society, and any attempt to overthrow the sovereign government was deemed unjust. Government was perceived as the preserver of a peace not possible in the natural state of man (Goldsmith 1966).

The preceding philosophers did not question the legitimacy of elite rulers, monarchs, or sovereigns. Locke (1632-1704) also did not call for the end of monarchy; he did, however, question the absolute authority of rulers. Locke (1980) found it absurd that citizens would prefer monarchy and the intrusion of the monarch upon their lives. Locke (1980) suggested that government should serve the subjects in their common pursuits of life, liberty, and property. He further wrote that when the government becomes intrusive or falls short of its obligations to the subjects, that government must be set aside and replaced with a more responsive system. In an attempt to assure a government for the people, Locke (1980) suggested a system of checks and balances within which parliaments and kings would hold each other accountable to the masses. These

masses did not include women or the poor, whom he did not consider eligible for political rights.

Montesquieu (1689-1755) criticized the traditional monarchy of France and supported constitutional monarchy. He was supportive of liberty but was careful to distinguish between liberty and license, comparing man to a spring that works better when compressed (Loy 1968, p. 101). While he supported the rights of the individual to pursue happiness, he also wrote that bounds of behavior were of importance in maintaining the social order (Montesquieu 1977). Montesquieu initiated the study of the relationship between politics and society. This proved of great importance to the development of the political and social sciences (Loy 1968).

Rousseau (1712-1778) was the "first great modern political philosopher" (Curtis 1981b, p. 15). He rejected ideas such as those espoused by Hobbes and Aristotle, concluding that "no man has natural authority over another" (Broome 1963, p. 54). While many of his predecessors did not question the authority of kings, Rousseau found despotism invalid if it was not chosen by this general will of society (1968). Rousseau contended that it is the

general will of society which is "always right and tends always to the public good" (Broome 1963, p. 57). The governmental body was viewed as subordinate to the public and revocable when necessary. Though Rousseau was not enthusiastic about revolution, he was concerned about the potential need for replacing a degenerate government. He was confident that the general will of the people would serve that purpose when needed.

From Plato forward, philosophers have attempted to develop and refine the contours of a desirable political system. While all were constrained by their time and place, the successors of each have served to modernize and improve upon the preceding thinkers. By the time Rousseau died, the United States had declared its independence from British rule and embarked upon its own form of government. The founding fathers of the United States entered into their own debates in developing the new government. Locke's (1980) Second Treatise of Government originally published in 1690, greatly influenced these founding fathers. It was the predicate for the inalienable rights of U.S. citizens to life, liberty, property, and the right to rebel against unjust rulers and laws.

The Constitutional Convention of 1787 decided upon elections for the House of Representatives which would then choose the President; the President would choose the Supreme Court (Zinn 1995, p. 95). The electorate would include in most states only white propertied males. Starting in the early 1800s, suffragist movements began to extend those included within the electorate. Between the 1830s and 1840s, restrictions regarding property ownership were lifted in most states. While in the 1860s and 1870s laws were passed against interfering with the rights of blacks to vote, it would be almost 100 years (the civil rights movement of the 1960s) before many blacks received the protection afforded by those laws. Women won the right to vote in 1920, and thereafter, white women were not systematically denied their right to vote in most cases (Zinn 1995).

Winning the right to vote did not empower citizens with direct control of government. The party system of the U.S. allows citizens to evaluate party programs and the party's ability to deliver on those programs. Voters respond to candidates according to their identification with party programs (Campbell et al. 1976, p. 196).

However limited the impact of voting in U.S. political campaigns, Lipset describes voting as "the key mechanism of consensus in a democratic society" (1963, p. 12). Rose writes that a democratic society necessitates a citizenry which understands what is going on in its government and participates in the decision-making process (1967, p. 475). The informed, participating citizen serves the needs of the government through legitimization and his/her own need for confidence in that government. Understanding the relationship between voter participation and political power is central to this study.

Theories of Power

Olsen and Marger (1993) offer three theoretical perspectives on power: the Marxian, elite, and pluralist. This research examines participation and non-participation by voting in U.S. presidential elections, utilizing two of these perspectives.

The Marxian perspective, as described by Olsen and Marger (1993), is based on economically derived power. This perspective arranges social classes according to their relationship to the means of production. It looks to the

conflict between these classes to define power relations and social change. The Marxian perspective will not be used in this analysis. The elite perspective is a response to the Marxian model. Elite theorists are concerned with the concentration of power in the hands of small elite groups. They part company with Marx in his theory of revolution. Marx's expected revolution would replace the elite system with a socialist system. The elite theorists view the concentration of power in the hands of the elite as inevitable and do not expect revolutionary change (Olsen and Marger 1993).

The concept of "elitism was formulated by Vilfredo Pareto (1935), Gaetano Mosca (1939 [1986]), and Robert Michels (1962 [1911])" (Olsen and Marger 1993, p. 79). Mosca argued that regardless of the form of government, a small group should hold power within society. His was largely a historical analysis. Pareto and Michels were in agreement with Mosca's analysis while attending to other dimensions. Pareto saw the ruling class as able to manipulate the commoners through a myth of their worthiness to hold power (Curtis 1984b). Michels held that elites concerned themselves with power while non-elites were

concerned only with material things and that this difference allowed the elites to maintain control (Curtis 1984b).

C. Wright Mills' theory is the focus of the elite perspective in this study. Mills (1956) analyzed the power elite in U.S. society. Because his analysis was historical and written just after World War II, he included a military elite among his three elite powers in the U.S. The other two elite sectors included the corporate and political elite. These elites were described as "able readily to take over one another's point of view, always in a sympathetic way, and often in a knowledgeable way as well" (1956, p. 283). While Mills recognized three elite circles and the separate interests of each, he also recognized their shared interests and willingness to look out for one another.

Mills' understanding of the place of the citizen within this elite society is considered in the analysis of voting data to be presented in Chapter IV. As described in Chapter 1, Mills believed the non-elites to be a mass society resigned to elite control. The pluralist

perspective offers a different view of power and political participation.

The pluralist perspective contends that in modern democratic societies, power is dispersed. Pluralists agree that this dispersal in many cases is not very wide and should be expanded. They do not, however, see power as concentrated in the hands of a few elites. They see power as shared with a variety of elite groups or even non-elites who exert power over political processes.

Aristotle's work is considered within the pluralist perspective (Olsen and Marger 1993). He believed that in order to maintain stability, "the many should rule" (Curtis 1981a, p. 29). Montesquieu suggested separate bodies of government for legislative, executive, and judicial functions in order to maintain a system of checks and balances (Loy 1968; Olsen and Marger 1993). This separation of powers is also considered to be within the pluralistic perspective. Alexis de Tocqueville described the United States in terms consistent with the pluralist perspective. He found that the majority were effective in swaying political decisions, especially the decisions of the legislature (Curtis 1981b, pp. 219-220).

More recent contributions to the pluralist perspective have been offered within three subcategories: mobilization pluralism, mediation pluralism, and elite pluralism. Gabriel Almond, Sydney Verba, and Marvin Olsen are among the mobilization pluralists. These theorists are the most liberal in their ideas about the distribution of power. Mobilization pluralism envisions the participation of individuals through voting and other activities (Olsen and Marger 1993). William Kornhauser falls within the scope of mediation pluralism and finds that there are a number of sets of elites who dominate each other at different times. Further, he allows that in some situations non-elites have influence over the elite sets (Kornhauser 1968 and Olsen and Marger 1993).

Elite pluralism is the most conservative of the three pluralist perspectives and is exemplified in the writings of Robert Dahl (Olsen and Marger 1993). This form of pluralism holds that there are many competing elites of which none is dominant at all times (Dahl 1982). One elite group may be more powerful in one arena or at one time while another may be so in other times and/or places. This form of pluralism allows for the unification of individual

non-elites to form powerful alliances when needed, such as the organization of workers in unions to lobby for their needs at work and within the political structure.

Dahl's pluralist perspective is used in analyzing the data to be presented in Chapter IV. As described in Chapter I, this perspective presents individual citizens as knowledgeable, active participants in politics. Not voting is considered a show of confidence in the overall workings of the political system. A review of previous work on non-participation will allow for an understanding of other matters related to non-voting.

Non-Voting in Some European Nations

Justel (1995) studied non-voting in Spanish general elections from 1977 through 1993. The important variables included: size of city of residence, gender, age, marital status, education, and political attitudes. Community size and marital status both had a direct effect on abstention with persons living in rural areas being more likely to vote than those in urban ones and married persons being more likely to vote than the non-married. Gender and age had indirect effects on abstention with both education and

political attitudes intervening. The impact of gender was found to be insignificant when education and political attitudes were controlled. After controlling for education and political attitudes, age was still a significant predictor of voter abstention. Those aged 25 and under were most likely to abstain. As age progressed, participation increased until age 60 and over when abstention increased, though not to the levels of the youngest age group. Political attitudes included measures of political knowledge, political interest, and identification with a party or candidate.

Denver (1995) found marital status and age to be related to voter participation in British elections. Unmarried persons and younger persons were less likely to vote than were married persons and older persons. He also found party identification to be positively correlated with voting. Denver notes a disparity in the impact of class depending on the data employed. Aggregate data consistently found a relationship between social class and voting with the lower classes voting less while survey data rarely found this relationship in Britain. This

inconsistency may be related to the under-reporting of non-voting in British surveys (Denver 1995).

Schultze (1995) reports that in Germany direct political action rather than voting is viewed as an effective tool for affecting the political process, especially among the youngest non-voters. When asked why they chose not to vote in a 1994 election, 38 percent of West Germans and 25 percent of East Germans stated that they were no longer interested in politics. Other reasons given by between 21 and 35 percent of non-voters from West and East Germany included: most politicians are not trustworthy or are incompetent; voting does not influence politics or politicians; abstaining is a protest against bad policies; and a general dislike for the parties (Schultze 1995, p. 110). Schultze's study provides some insight into what may be found in the current study of non-voter attitudes in the United States.

U.S. Voter Participation

While non-voting is a concern for researchers in Europe, it is also a concern for those in the United States. Because non-voting is more common in the U.S. than

in any other industrialized democracy (Powell 1996), understanding the reason for U.S. non-voting is of special concern.

Dalton and Wattenberg described voting as "the one activity that binds the individual to the political system and legitimizes the rest of the democratic process" (1993, p. 212). These authors suggest several reasons for the lower rates of voter participation in the U.S. than in European democracies. The cumbersome election process is offered as one problem. These authors estimate that voting would increase by 10 percent in the U.S. should European style registration be adopted. They also indicate that the more polarized European party system elicits a greater response from its citizens than do the more harmonious U.S. political parties. The greater frequency with which those in the U.S. are asked to vote is another reason the authors offer for lower turnouts in the U.S. as compared to European democracies.

Looking at declining rates of voter participation in the U.S., Burnham contends that by the end of World War I, the U. S. political system was "congruent with the hegemony of laissez-faire corporate capitalism" dependent upon a

non-competitive party system and a huge mass of non-voters (1980, p. 57). After World War I through the 1970s, Burnham described voter participation as decreasing even further though varying by region of the country. Burnham did not offer actual national participation figures, and the Census Bureau did not begin to gather these data until 1964. The following table indicates that the trend which concerned Burnham between World War I and the 1970s, decreasing voter turnout, was steady between 1964 and 1996.

TABLE 2.1. Percent Reported Registered to Vote and Voted, Presidential Election Years, 1964 to 1996

Year	Registered to Vote	Voted
1996	65.9	54.2
1992	68.2	61.3
1988	66.6	57.4
1984	68.3	59.9
1980	66.9	59.2
1976	66.7	59.2
1972	72.3	63.0
1968	74.3	67.8
1964	Not Available	69.3

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census: Current Population Reports, Series P-20, No. 466

As Table 2.1 indicates, the decline in voting remained consistent through the 1990s.

The Economy and U.S. Voter Choice

Although the current research will not analyze directly the relationship between economic cycles and voter participation, the economy is an important determinant of electoral outcomes, if not voter participation. Researchers often focus on the issues that sway voters to support one or another candidate or issue. The economy has been linked to voter decision making by Uslander and Conway (1984); MacKuen et al. (1992); Alesina et al. (1993); Roemer (1994); Pacek and Radcliff (1995); and Gavin and Sanders (1997). A concise argument about the effect of the economy on voter decision making was offered in an article entitled "It's the Economy, Stupid" (1996). The research indicates that voters will support an incumbent when the economy is strong, but will not when the economy is weak.

Fair offered an economic model with which he was able to predict the outcomes of the 1988 election. His work suggests that when considering the economic growth rate, voters will look back only six months. When considering

the inflation rate, voters will look back about two years (1988, p. 177). Fair's work suggests that manipulation of the economy on the part of political administrations with the goal of effecting election outcomes is possible.

Looking at the economy and elections from a political perspective, Tuft developed an argument that it is presidential elections which affect some economic indicators rather than the economy affecting election outcomes. He found that, excluding the Eisenhower years, between 1948 and 1976, a two-year cycle in disposable income and a four year cycle in unemployment are evident (1978, p. 27). These cycles indicated accelerations in disposable income in even-numbered years (presidential election years) and decelerations in odd-numbered years. Unemployment cycles indicate lowered unemployment in the months preceding a presidential election and rising unemployment beginning 12 to 18 months after the election. Tuft (1978) further documents the strategies used by sitting administrations to insure these economic conditions.

Hibbs (1987) found that support for Democratic candidates is more sensitive to changes in unemployment

rates than is support for Republican candidates. Support for Republicans was found to be more sensitive to inflation than support for Democratic candidates. Hibbs concluded that Republican candidates are more concerned with lowering inflation while Democratic candidates are more likely to focus on lowering unemployment (1987, pp. 183-184). While links between the economy and voter choice are strong, they will not be addressed directly in this study.

Non-Voting in the United States

In contrast to works seeking to explain voter preference for one party or candidate, this work will examine the pluralist and elitist theoretical approaches to participation or non-participation in the electoral process in the United States in the form of voting or non-voting. Particular attention is given to voting, political knowledge, political cynicism, perceived political self-efficacy, and social class.

In studying political participation, Burnham (1974) offered a historical analysis of the American electoral system indicating the effects of universal suffrage and changes in tallying procedures and ballots on voting

behavior. He concluded that U.S. politics is a spectator sport rather than a participatory sport. Burnham indicated that should an election be "perceived to raise life and death issues," citizens will participate more fully (1974, p. 1019). It appears that the 1996 national U.S. election (with 54.2 percent of those registered to vote choosing to vote) was taken less seriously by voters than any election since the Census Bureau began collecting voter participation data in 1964.

In their studies of voter participation, Seeman (1966); Cutler and Bengtson (1974); and Southwell (1995) indicated a negative relationship between voter disaffection and voter participation. Seeman (1966) found a link between voter disaffection and political knowledge. The relationship between political knowledge and voter participation is of importance in this paper. Political knowledge refers to the degree to which the respondent is informed about the U.S. political process. In a study of voter political knowledge, Gant and Davis state that "citizens are not and cannot be informed to the degree required by democratic theory" (1984, p. 148). Despite the voter ignorance found by Gant and Davis, they explained

that voters are able to choose in "their own interest and are more efficient in the processing of campaign information than previously thought" (1984, p. 149).

In looking at knowledge and voter participation, Bennett (1997) found that among well-informed voters there is sometimes a perception that politics is confusing. This perception among the well informed is related to both a lack of trust in government and low rates of voter participation. While some of the well-informed respondents in the Bennett (1997) study thought politics were confusing (an attitude related to decreased voter participation), Finkel (1985) found that participation can increase the voters' efficacy. This suggests that should voting rise among the well informed who find politics confusing, their attitudes toward government and the voting process may become more positive and voting rates increase. This research will examine the link between knowledge and reported voting during the same election period.

The perception of self-efficacy is among the political attitudes to be addressed in this study. Self-efficacy indicates the degree to which respondents feel they can influence the political process. Pinkelton et al. (1998)

found that cynicism toward the political process reduces political efficacy. Austin and Pinkleton (1995) explored the relationship between cynicism and efficacy among young voters. These writers suggested that cynicism may actually increase efficacy and participation among young voters. Young voters were found to feel that they could see through the lies being told by candidates. The relationship between self-efficacy and voting is explored in this paper.

Another political attitude to be examined in this work is cynicism. Political cynicism concerns the degree to which the respondent thinks the government and its officials are concerned with the well being of the citizenry. Hunt (1982) found increased cynicism led to an increased acceptance of non-conventional political activities such as protests. Miller (1974) found that cynicism among Americans is related not only to a decrease in voting, but also reflects a dissatisfaction with both the Republican and Democratic political parties. Citrin (1974) responded to Miller, arguing that the dissatisfaction found by Miller can be applied only to the administration in place at the time of the survey. Citrin (1974) further argues that Miller's results do not confirm

a link between increased cynicism and decreased voting.

This study will examine the tenability of this link.

Erber and Lau gained access to the 1972 and 1976 National Election Survey (NES) respondents, randomly selected a panel from the respondents, and asked open-ended questions to find how the respondents "think about politics" (1990, p. 238). Based on the results, Erber and Lau offer a reconciliation of Miller (1974) and Citrin (1974), finding two different orientations to politics taken by citizens. One orientation is labeled an "issue chronicity" while the other is called a "person chronicity." Those with an "issue chronicity" are more likely to be concerned with the success or failure of issues while those with a "person chronicity" are more likely to follow the behavior of individual candidates and office holders.

The orientation of the respondent was found to affect the development of cynicism. Estrangement from political issues was found to lead to cynicism among those with an "issue chronicity" and discontent with the current administration was found to lead to cynicism among those with a "person chronicity." Although these issue

orientations can not be specifically identified in the current study, it appears they are important intervening variables. When considering the historical events surrounding particular elections it is important to consider whether those with high levels of cynicism during periods related to controversial issues such as the Vietnam war, may be different than those showing high levels of cynicism during periods of controversy surrounding politicians such as the Watergate hearings.

Howell (1994) found a link between the economic status of citizens and political cynicism. Specifically she suggests that cynicism among the economically deprived, white, southern voters led to protest voting for David Duke. Capella and Jamieson (1996) found another link to political cynicism through the media, indicating that the media can not only activate but can actually create political cynicism among media consumers. Whatever the cause of political cynicism, it is the relationship of that cynicism to voter participation that is addressed in this paper.

The relationship between the social class of non-voters and their political knowledge, political cynicism,

and perceived political self-efficacy is analyzed for further understanding of political participation. Citizens of lower social class vote at lower rates than do those of higher social class in the U.S. (Leighley and Nagler 1992). For this reason it is expected that the variables chosen to explain non-voting - political knowledge, political cynicism, and perceived political self-efficacy, will reflect some class differences in non-voting.

Low voter turnout among working class persons has resulted in policy decisions that have negatively affected the working class (Hill and Leighley 1996). Because class differences in voting can result in policy decisions against the non-voting class, understanding the reasons for non-voting are important. Increasing voting among the non-voting class may result in policy decisions in their favor. Therefore, it is important to understand why persons in the lower social classes are not voting.

It is possible that the relationships examined in this study will corroborate the theoretical position of either Dahl or Mills at all class levels or both of them at different class levels. Should those voting appear to be knowledgeable and content with the political process,

Dahl's pluralist theory is bolstered. If, however, non-voters are politically ignorant and dissatisfied with the political process, Mills' elitist theory is supported. Should no meaningful relationships be found, this study will, nevertheless, offer new insight and challenges for future research.

Other non-voter characteristics that are considered include age, sex, and ethnicity. Previous researchers have found that these traits can influence voting. Differences in voting behavior between women and men have been found by a number of researchers (Chaney, et al. 1998; Lien 1998; and Manza and Brooks 1998). Lien's work indicates an insignificant interaction between gender and ethnicity while Weakliem (1997) and Kaufmann (1998) found that differences in voting behavior do occur by ethnicity.

Hunt (1982) found that voting behavior changed between generations. These changes may have been affected by historical events. Winders (1999) found changes in voting patterns linked to historical periods of class conflict. Given the historical circumstances of the years between 1964 and 1996, it seems appropriate to include an analysis of the effects of such events as the Vietnam war, the

assassinations of Robert Kennedy and Martin Luther King, Watergate, Nixon's resignation, the Iran hostage crisis, the Reagan years, and economic recessions and inflations.

Summary

It is important to understand the low voter turnouts which are common in U.S. elections. Lijphart (1997) expressed concern that low voter turnout results in unequal political influence and representation for groups which consistently fail to vote - persons of low socio-economic status, the young, and minorities. Though Shaffer (1982) found no large or consistent differences in the ideologies of voters and non-voters, more recent works (Bennett and Resnick 1990; Leighley and Nagler 1992; Hill and Leighley 1996) have found differences.

Burnham warned that a broadening of political participation to include representatives from all sectors of U.S. society is required to ensure popular support of the political system (1980, p. 68). Besides their finding that policy decisions are directly affecting voters' conservative attitudes toward welfare spending, Bennett and Resnick offer other reasons for concern. In the case of

"economic calamity or profound sociocultural dislocations," (1990, p. 799) the authors worry about the volatility of a public "mass" unattached to traditional politics. Further, the authors are concerned about the lack for voice of non-voters, likening them to subjects rather than citizens.

The lack of participation in the U.S. electoral process is interpreted differently in the political theories of Robert Dahl and C. Wright Mills. Dahl's pluralist theory treats non-participation as a reflection of satisfaction among an informed public, while Mills' elitist theory treats non-participation as a form of resignation to elite rule. In addressing these theories, respondents' political knowledge and attitudes are compared with their participation in presidential elections in an attempt to understand non-voting.

An increasingly large portion of the U.S. population chooses not to participate in the election process (Casper and Bass 1998). Given the ideals of participatory democracy, which include high voter participation, it is important to understand non-voting. Previous research (Seeman 1966 and Gant and Davis 1984) indicates that

increased political knowledge is positively associated with voter participation. Finkel (1985) and Bennett (1997) found increased political self-efficacy to be positively related to voter participation. Cynicism (Pinkelton et al. 1998) was found to lower political self-efficacy. It is expected that this lowering of political self-efficacy will in turn lower voter participation.

Leighley and Nagler (1992) found that those of lower socio-economic class position are less likely to vote than those of higher socio-economic class position. Because they are less likely to vote, it is expected that persons of lower socio-economic class position are more likely to also have lower political knowledge and political self-efficacy and higher political cynicism than their counterparts of higher socio-economic class position.

Chapter III

RESEARCH PROCEDURES

Introduction

The focus of this study is non-voting in U.S. presidential elections. The variables expected to be related to non-voting include political knowledge, political self-efficacy, political cynicism, and social class. This chapter will describe how the data used in this study were collected, the variables used in the study, the data analyses employed, and the limitations of the study.

Data Collection

This study utilizes secondary data taken entirely from the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) American National Election Studies 1948-1997 (Sapiro et al. 1998). The data originated from surveys of voting behavior in the presidential elections from 1964 to the latest available year, 1996. The year

1964 was chosen as the beginning because it is the first year that the Census Bureau began to collect voting data. Examination of 32 years will allow for the study of trends in voting and for patterns in political knowledge and in attitudes across time as well as the relationships between voting and knowledge and voting and attitudes.

The sampling frame for these studies was all households within the continental United States. A multi-stage area probability sample was selected for each survey year (Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research, 1999). The first stage of the sample selection included a series of hierarchical steps, with geographically defined sampling units decreasing in size (size is defined by the most recent U.S. census data available at the time of sample). Geography, size, and median per capita income were used to stratify the selected Census Blocks or Enumeration Districts. During the second stage of the selection process, between 6 and 25 housing segments were selected. The third and final stage allowed for the listing of all housing units within each segment and the random selection of housing units. Within these housing units, the University of Michigan Survey Research

Center (SRC) field staff listed all eligible adults (those of voting age) and used a selection table to ensure random selection of respondents to be interviewed. Modifications of this process have occurred over the years, such as the over-sampling of African Americans in some years. The sample sizes for the presidential election years from 1964 to 1996 range in size from 1,614 in 1980 to 2,705 in 1972.

The SRC designs and implements, just before and just after each national election, the surveys used in the American National Election Studies (ANES) projects. The SRC field staff conducts all interviews and records all responses. These data are coded and entered at the SRC and are available to interested persons on the ANES website, by order on CD ROM, and in published book form.

Definition of Variables

Voting Behavior

For the purpose of this study, the examination of political participation is limited to whether the respondent reports having voted in the presidential elections between 1964 and 1996. The respondents' reports

of voting behavior is the dependent variable for hypotheses 1, 3, and 5 of this study. Political participation is measured by responses to an item on the National Election Survey (NES). See appendix A for a complete list of all included variables by NES number.

The question reflecting the respondents' voting behavior begins with an introduction. The following is taken from the 1984 survey and is consistent with all other years.

In talking to people about elections, we often find that a lot of people were not able to vote because they weren't registered, they were sick, or they just didn't have time. How about you—did you vote in the elections this November? (Rosenstone, et al., 1995)

1. yes,did vote, 5. no,did not vote, 8. don't know.

Those responding yes were considered as voting and coded 1. Those responding no were considered not voting and re-coded 0. Those responding don't know were re-coded as missing and were not included in the analysis. In the 1964 data set, response choices included various categories of voters by party affiliation. Any response indicating the respondent voted in the election under study was considered as voting and re-coded 1. Those responding in the non-

voter categories were considered as not voting and re-coded as 0.

Political Knowledge

Political knowledge is the independent variable for hypothesis 1 and the dependent variable for hypothesis 2. Two questions pertaining to political knowledge were consistently asked during the years under study. The questions follow a brief introduction similar to that of the 1984 data set:

Now we have a set of questions concerning various public figures. We want to see how much information about them gets out to the public from television, newspapers and the like.

Do you happen to know which party had the most members in the House of Representatives in Washington before the election this/last month?

Do you happen to know which party had the most members in the U.S. Senate before the election this/last month? (Rosenstone, et al., 1995)

1. Republicans 5. Democrats 8. No, don't know

In 1964 and 1968 the questions in this section asked which political party held the majority of seats in Congress before the most recent election and after the most recent election. In 1972, the questions in this section asked which party held the majority of seats in the House before

the most recent election and after the most recent election. A published authority (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1989 and 1999) was used to decide whether Republican or Democrat was the correct response for each question. All correct responses were re-coded 1. All incorrect and don't know responses were re-coded 0.

The 1980 and 1992 data sets include different knowledge measures. In 1980, respondents were asked to identify one congressional and one senate candidate from their district and their respective parties. The data identified those who knew the name and party of the candidates. The data set identified correct responses to these questions. Those correctly identifying the congressional candidate and his/her party were re-coded as a 1, while all others were re-coded as a 0. The same re-coding was used for the question regarding the senatorial candidate.

In 1992, questions were asked about general knowledge of political figures and the political process. The two questions chosen for inclusion regard the respondents' knowledge of Vice-President Dan Quayle's political office and who has the final responsibility for deciding the

constitutionality of a law. These two questions were chosen because, of those available, they had the most similar correct response rate compared with the knowledge questions used in previous years. Personal knowledge was used to identify correct responses to these questions. In the case of the first question, those identifying Dan Quayle as the Vice-President were considered correct and re-coded as 1, all other responses were re-coded as 0. In the case of the second question, those identifying the Supreme Court as the final authority on the constitutionality of law were considered correct and re-coded as 1, all other responses were re-coded as 0.

Regardless of the questions used, the number of correct responses will reflect the respondents' political knowledge for this study. A composite score is used to measure political knowledge by adding the total number of correct responses. Those with a score of 0 will reflect those with the least political knowledge while those with a score of 2 will reflect those with the most political knowledge. Those with a score of 1, answering one question correctly, will reflect a median score and a moderate amount of political knowledge.

Perceived Political Self-Efficacy

Perception of self-efficacy is the independent variable for hypothesis 3 and the dependent variable for hypothesis 4. Perceived political self-efficacy is measured with a three-item scale. This measure is considered to reflect the respondent's perception of his/her ability to affect the political process. The perceived political self-efficacy scale contains three items and begins:

Please tell me how much you agree or disagree with these statements.

- a. Public officials don't care much what people like me think.
 - b. People like me don't have any say about what the government does.
 - c. Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what's going on. (Rosenstone, et al., 1995)
1. Agree strongly 2. Agree somewhat 3. Neither agree nor disagree 4. Disagree somewhat 5. Disagree strongly 8. Don't know".

The scores corresponding to each response are added to calculate a perceived political self-efficacy score for each respondent. Those responding don't know are coded as missing. Scores can range from 3 to 15. A median score

was calculated. Those scoring below the median are considered as having low perceived political self-efficacy, and those scoring above the median are considered as having high perceived political self-efficacy. Those scoring at the median are considered as having average perceived political self-efficacy.

Political Cynicism

Cynicism is the independent variable for hypothesis 5 and the dependent variable for hypothesis 6. Political cynicism is measured on a four-item scale. This measure indicates the respondent's trust of the federal government. Political cynicism is measured with four questions. This set of questions begins:

People have different ideas about the government in Washington. These ideas don't refer to Democrats or Republicans in particular, but just to the government in general. We want to see how you feel about these ideas. For example:

How much of the time do you think you can trust the government in Washington to do what is right?"

1. Just about always 3. Most of the time
5. Some of the time 7. None of the time 8. Don't Know

Do you think that people in government waste a lot of the money we pay in taxes, waste some of it, or don't waste very much of it?

5. A lot 3. Some 1. Not very much 8. Don't know

Would you say the government is pretty much run by a few big interests looking out for themselves or that it is run for the benefit of all the people?

5. Few big interests 1. For the benefit of all
8. Don't know

Do you think that quite a few of the people running the government are crooked, not very many are, or do you think hardly any of them are crooked?

5. Quite a few 3. Not many 1. Hardly any
8. Don't know

The numbers corresponding to the response category are added to calculate the political cynicism score. In the 1996 data set, the response numbers were reversed so that lower numbers corresponded with the more cynical answers. These values were re-coded to match previous years before composites were calculated. Those responding "don't know" were re-coded as missing. Scores can range from 4 to 22. Those scoring above the median on this measure are considered to be high in political cynicism. Those scoring below the median are considered to be low in political cynicism. Those scoring at the median are considered as average in political cynicism.

Social Class

Social class is the independent variable for hypotheses 2, 4, and 6. The original intent to measure

social class using a composite of the respondents' reported income, education, and occupation proved unsatisfactory for the available data. Preliminary linear regression analyses indicated no consistent model across the time points using the three variables. Thus the three variables will be used as indicators of class but can not be said to offer an actual measure of social class. An analysis of the relationship between each of the three independent variables (class indicators) with the three dependent variables (political measures) will instead be presented.

Income

Income is categorized differently for most years in the data set. Because these categories are not consistent and are grouped by raw number rather than percentiles, approximated percentile categories were developed for each year. Five categories approximating quintiles were developed for each year. These categories are not consistent in percentiles because of the uneven groupings. There are also inconsistencies in dollar values because of the changes in dollar values across the time period under study.

The income groups do represent approximate percentiles with the re-code 1 given to the lowest approximated 20 percent for each year. The next lowest approximated 20 percent for each year was re-coded 2, the next 3, then 4, and the highest approximated 20 percent income level was re-coded 5. Appendix B illustrates the valid percent cut off points for each code for each year.

Education

The respondents' level of education was re-coded by collapsing the education levels available in the data set which included at least seven detailed categories, varying by year. The resulting groups are five levels with "1" representing the lowest level of education and "5" representing the highest level of education. These groups are:

- 1 = 11 grades or less; no further schooling
- 2 = High school diploma or equivalency and more than 12 years of schooling, no high school diploma
- 3 = Some college
- 4 = BA level degrees and 17+ years, no advanced degree
- 5 = Advanced degree

Occupation

The respondents' occupation was coded by the NES according to a variety of schemes throughout the years.

Census bureau codes (either full or collapsed) were available in the NES for each year under study. The coding within the census bureau categories changed in 1970 and 1980 making exact matches across the years under study impractical. Collapsing specific codes into broad inclusive categories resulted in approximate matching categories that are most similar to the 1980 collapsed census categories. The codes and categories are:

- 1 = Professional and Technical
- 2 = Self Employed Business, Managers and Officials
- 3 = Clerical and Sales
- 4 = Skilled Workers
- 5 = Unskilled Workers
- 6 = Unemployed

In 1964 and 1968, there was a specific category for unemployed which included students and housewives working less than 20 hours a week. In 1972, 1976, and 1984 through 1996, there was no specific unemployed/student/housewife category. There was a category 00 which appears to be similar to the unemployed/student/housewife category in size and relationship to other variables. For the purposes of this research the 00 category is considered as the unemployed/student/housewife category for those years.

In 1980, no unemployed/student/housewife category exists. The occupation question for that year requested

current or prior employment. It appears that all unemployed persons were coded under a previously held occupation or as missing. For 1980, there is no analysis of the unemployed category.

Demographic Variables of Interest

Other demographic variables under study include sex, age cohort, and race. The sex of the respondent was coded as either "1" for male or "2" for female. Age cohort is identified according to the age information available each year. In some years, birth year was available, in other years actual age was recorded. When actual age was available, the birth year of the respondent was calculated counting back from the year of the survey. Birth years were collapsed into the following age cohorts:

1. 1959 - Present, currently aged 40 years or less
2. 1943 - 1958, currently aged between 41 and 56 years
3. 1927 - 1942, currently aged between 57 and 72 years
4. 1911 - 1926, currently aged between 73 and 88 years
5. 1895 - 1910, currently aged between 89 and 104 years
6. Before 1895, currently aged more than 104 years

The race variable was re-coded into three categories. Category 1 is white, 2 is black, and 3 is other. Some years included up to five other categories. These were collapsed into category 3 for consistency and because there were very few respondents reporting as other.

Data Analysis

Data were analyzed using the Windows 9.0 version of the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS). Missing data are not included in the analyses. The cases for which a variable or measure are missing are omitted from the analyses of that variable or measure. Only valid cases are analyzed and all percentages represent the valid percent for that variable or analysis. Data are missing in some cases because an answer to a question was not obtained. In other cases, a post-election interview was not carried out omitting some measures and/or variables. The numbers of missing cases for each analysis are provided. Because missing values were not used in the analyses, the number of missing cases is calculated against the total reporting non-voting and voting in order to maintain consistency across the tables.

In obtaining a description of the major characteristics of the samples frequency distributions are reported. Cross tabulations of each demographic variable (including the class variables) and voting are presented to allow for an understanding of the relationships between these variables and voting. Chi-squares were used to test

the statistical significance of the relationship between the demographic variables and voting. Because these data are nominal and ordinal, Goodman and Kruskal's tau_y are used to measure the strength of association between each dependent variable and each of the demographic variables.

Cross tabulations of the independent and dependent variables under study were completed to test the statistical significance and relationship of these variables. The data used in testing hypotheses 1, 3, and 5 are nominal and ordinal. Chi-squares were used to test the statistical significance of the relationship between the dependent variable and the independent variables for these hypotheses. Goodman and Kruskal's tau_y were used to measure the strength of association between each dependent variable and each of the independent variables for hypotheses 1, 3, and 5.

The data used in testing hypotheses 2, 4, and 6 are all nominal. Gamma was used to measure the strength of association between each dependent variable and each measure of social class (independent variables) while significance was based on a normal approximation. When the cross tabulations of these variables were executed, the

vote/no vote variable was held constant. This will allow the relationship between each dependent variable and each class measure to be evaluated within non-voters only. The same process was repeated for the demographic variables, sex, age cohort, and ethnicity. This will allow for the consideration of the effects of these variables on each dependent variable among non-voters only.

A series of stepwise logistic regression models was used to test the ability of political knowledge, perceived political self-efficacy, and political cynicism to predict whether respondents voted in each of the election years under study. Logistic models have often been used in predicting variables related to voting behavior (Howell 1994; Karp 1995; Brooks and Manza 1997; Chaney, Alvarez, and Nagler 1998; Kaufmann 1998; and Lien 1998).

The presence of multicollinearity among the variables violates one of the assumptions for logistic regression. For example, a strong relationship may exist between the constructs of cynicism and perceived self-efficacy. The strength and statistical significance of the relationship was tested using a Pearson Correlation. Should multicollinearity be established with these variables or

others, corrections include the use of a structural equation model or the building of an index for the correlated variables.

Statistical comparisons among the nine years examined will not be offered. Instead, a review of the historical context surrounding each election and the possible implications of these circumstances is presented. While statistical correlation and significance will not be available through this approach, a thorough treatment of the circumstances surrounding the elections provides a greater understanding of variations found among the years under study.

Limitations

Because the study will include multiple presidential election years, there is a possibility of inconsistent results throughout the years examined. The study will examine all presidential election years between and including 1964 and 1996. Because of the various politically charged events which occurred during this period, such as the Vietnam war, the assassinations of Robert F. Kennedy and Martin Luther King Jr., and

Watergate, it is possible that cynicism and perceived self-efficacy were affected. Thus findings were considered in the historical context of each year under examination.

A major deficiency of this study is the lack of independently gathered data. The data and measures available on the ANES limit the study. The indicators of the underlying constructs are limited in validity. The data set will not allow for an absolute test of the theories under study. However, the ANES data are the best available to meet the parameters of the study and that are within the time, budgetary, and personnel constraints of this study. Doing original research of this scale is beyond the limits of this work.

Some consequences of the use of this data set are readily apparent, including the validity of the political knowledge, cynicism, and self-efficacy measures. The cynicism measure contains a question of particular concern, that is, whether the government looks out for a few big interests or for the benefit of all. Some respondents might not see these as mutually exclusive concepts. For example, some might consider looking out for a few big interests to be of benefit to all.

Domhoff (1967) considered the possibility that the ruling class makes decisions in the interest of all, though he found the question beyond the scope of his work at the time. Some persons might not consider the cynicism measures to be about cynicism, but actually about being realistic. Further, some persons who score low on the self-efficacy measure might feel very self-empowered, but not be confident that the government is concerned with their interests.

The inability to construct a measure of social class also limits the study. The reliance on individual measures of income, education, and occupation precludes generalizing the results to social class groups.

Chapter IV

RESEARCH FINDINGS

Introduction

The findings of the research are presented in this chapter. The characteristics of the sample for each year under study are described. Tests of hypotheses are presented. A historical examination is also offered.

Sample Description

The independent variable for hypotheses 2, 4, and 6 is social class as represented by three indicators. As discussed in Chapter III, for the purposes of this study, social class is measured using income, education, and occupation independently. Descriptions of these characteristics are presented independently. Following the social class descriptions, demographic characteristics of the sample including sex, age cohort, and ethnicity are presented. Income is shown in Table 4.1.

TABLE 4.1 Respondents Within Each Approximated Income Quintile, 1964-1996

Inc Quint	Year								
	1964	1968	1972	1976	1980	1984	1988	1992	1996
Low % (n)	23.0 (404)	17.3 (281)	19.2 (501)	18.6 (387)	19.9 (284)	20.6 (409)	19.1 (356)	19.7 (449)	20.4 (319)
2 % (n)	18.9 (333)	21.6 (351)	23.3 (608)	21.8 (454)	18.9 (269)	16.7 (333)	22.2 (414)	17.5 (400)	16.9 (264)
3 % (n)	25.2 (444)	18.1 (294)	20.8 (542)	18.1 (376)	24.3 (346)	21.7 (431)	18.4 (342)	21.0 (478)	21.5 (337)
4 % (n)	14.1 (248)	23.2 (377)	15.5 (404)	18.4 (383)	15.3 (218)	23.5 (468)	20.2 (376)	17.2 (393)	18.9 (296)
High% (n)	18.8 (331)	19.7 (319)	21.3 (557)	23.1 (479)	21.6 (307)	17.5 (349)	20.1 (374)	24.6 (561)	22.3 (348)
Total %	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	1760	1622	2612	2079	1424	1990	1862	2281	1564
Miss.	74	51	93	169	190	267	178	204	150

The income categories are approximated quintiles. Quintile one represents the lowest income group. Those in group one are approximately the 20 percent earning the lowest income. Group two represents the approximated 20 percent earning the next to lowest income. The income groups increase by approximately 20 percent until group five is reached which represents the approximated 20 percent earning the highest level of income.

Because these groupings were imposed on the data, the variance between groups represents only the inability to

exactly categorize each respondent within a group. Exact categorization was not possible because the data set utilized grouped income categories, as previously explained (see Chapter III).

Level of education is also considered as an indicator of class position for the purposes of this study. Table 4.2 shows the level of education of respondents by year.

TABLE 4.2 Respondents Within Each Level of Education, 1964-1996

Level Of Educ	Year								
	1964	1968	1972	1976	1980	1984	1988	1992	1996
Low % (n)	48.2 (876)	41.9 (701)	41.8 (1021)	31.8 (712)	25.9 (416)	25.0 (562)	21.1 (429)	18.5 (431)	15.6 (267)
2 % (n)	29.7 (539)	31.6 (528)	13.5 (329)	36.1 (807)	37.4 (601)	34.9 (784)	35.9 (784)	33.4 (778)	29.8 (511)
3 % (n)	12.1 (220)	13.6 (227)	17.8 (435)	16.2 (362)	19.7 (318)	22.5 (505)	23.1 (471)	24.6 (573)	26.0 (446)
4 % (n)	7.8 (142)	8.6 (144)	23.0 (563)	9.1 (204)	8.4 (136)	9.5 (214)	11.4 (232)	12.5 (290)	14.9 (256)
High% (n)	2.2 (40)	4.1 (68)	3.8 (92)	6.8 (153)	8.6 (138)	8.1 (183)	8.5 (172)	11.0 (257)	13.6 (233)
Total %	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	1817	1668	2440	2238	1609	2248	2035	2329	1713
Miss.	17	5	265	10	5	9	5	156	1

As described in Chapter III, the levels of education are broken into five categories with one representing the

lowest level of education (11 years of less) and five representing the highest level of education (advanced degree). The proportion within each level of education shifts over time. This shift represents the increased level of education attained by the voting-age population. Those reporting within group one drop steadily between 1964 and 1996 while those within categories three through five increase steadily across the same period. Group two rises and falls as respondents move between the lower and higher levels of education categories.

The third variable used as an indicator of social class is occupation. Table 4.3 shows the occupational distribution. The occupation categories are arranged in reverse order from the previous two measures. In this table, group one represents those with the highest prestige occupations (professional and technical) and group six represents those not employed full-time (except in 1980 when this information was not available). Occupation categories 2 through 5 represent occupations between the highest and lowest categories. Chapter III offers a complete description of these categories.

TABLE 4.3 Respondents Within Each Occupation Group, 1964-1996

Occ Categ	Year								
	1964	1968	1972	1976	1980	1984	1988	1992	1996
High%	7.1	11.4	11.3	11.7	16.7	13.8	15.0	15.9	16.7
(n)	(129)	(187)	(305)	(259)	(217)	(310)	(305)	(393)	(286)
2 %	7.6	7.6	8.3	9.4	13.4	9.9	10.6	11.7	9.9
(n)	(137)	(124)	(223)	(208)	(174)	(223)	(215)	(289)	(169)
3 %	10.5	13.5	14.7	16.1	22.4	22.5	21.8	20.4	16.4
(n)	(190)	(221)	(396)	(357)	(290)	(506)	(443)	(504)	(280)
4 %	17.4	10.6	9.7	10.6	13.3	15.5	16.5	17.1	11.5
(n)	(316)	(173)	(261)	(235)	(172)	(349)	(335)	(422)	(197)
5 %	15.4	26.9	26.2	27.7	34.2	24.5	23.5	22.8	13.2
(n)	(280)	(440)	(704)	(625)	(444)	(551)	(477)	(562)	(226)
Low %	42.0	30.1	29.8	24.4	n/a	13.7	12.7	12.0	32.3
(n)	(762)	(493)	(800)	(541)		(309)	(258)	(297)	(553)
Total									
%	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	1814	1638	2689	2213	1297	2248	2033	2467	1711
Miss.	20	35	16	23	317	9	7	18	3

Similar to the education categories, the occupations of respondents also shifted over time. Within the occupation categories, however, the trend is not as dramatic as was the case of education. This lack of stability in occupations may simply reflect the changes in census categories and other changes in occupational titles over time. The trend across years, however, indicates a movement from skilled (4) and unskilled (5) labor to the

clerical/sales (3), managerial (2), and professional/technical (1) categories.

The demographic variables considered in this study include, sex, age cohort, and ethnicity. Table 4.4 provides the distribution of respondents by sex,

TABLE 4.4 Sex of Respondents, 1964-1996

Sex	Year								
	1964	1968	1972	1976	1980	1984	1988	1992	1996
Male%	43.9	43.3	43.2	41.4	43.6	43.8	42.7	46.6	44.8
(n)	(806)	(724)	(1168)	(790)	(614)	(989)	(872)	(1158)	(768)
Fem %	56.1	56.7	56.8	58.6	56.4	56.2	57.3	53.4	55.2
(n)	(1028)	(949)	(1537)	(1119)	(794)	(1268)	(1168)	(1327)	(946)
Total									
%	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	1834	1673	2705	1909	1408	2257	2040	2485	1714
Miss.	0	0	0	(339)	(206)	0	0	0	0

indicating that women were the majority of respondents each year. Women were 57.3 percent of the sample in 1988.

Age cohort is the second demographic variable. Table 4.5 shows the placement of respondents by age cohort. As described in Chapter III, respondents were placed into age cohorts for analysis. Cohort one includes those born in 1959 or after who are currently aged 40 years or less. Each succeeding cohort represents the fifteen birth years preceding the cohort before. Cohort six includes all those

born before 1895. Shifts in these categories represent the aging of respondents across the time period under study. Cohort one was not of adult age in 1964 and 1968 and had little to no representation in the following two elections. Conversely, those in age cohort six were not represented in the last three elections under study, presumably because of their advanced age or death.

TABLE 4.5 Respondents Within Each Age Cohort, 1964-1996

Age Cohort	Year								
	1964	1968	1972	1976	1980	1984	1988	1992	1996
Low %	0	0	0	0	6.7	15.1	21.7	29.1	34.0
(n)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(94)	(337)	(441)	(679)	(581)
2 %	1.7	10.0	27.7	33.8	37.1	37.1	36.5	32.4	31.3
(n)	(31)	(167)	(744)	(755)	(517)	(829)	(741)	(755)	(534)
3 %	33.3	32.0	26.9	24.0	24.0	20.7	20.0	19.3	19.7
(n)	(607)	(533)	(722)	(536)	(335)	(464)	(406)	(451)	(336)
4 %	33.7	31.4	25.4	24.6	21.0	18.9	16.2	16.9	13.3
(n)	(615)	(524)	(683)	(549)	(292)	(422)	(328)	(373)	(228)
5 %	22.0	20.9	16.4	15.5	10.5	8.1	5.5	3.1	1.7
(n)	(401)	(349)	(440)	(345)	(147)	(181)	(111)	(73)	(29)
High%	9.4	5.6	3.7	2.2	.6	.2	0	0	0
(n)	(171)	(94)	(99)	(48)	(9)	(4)	(1)	(0)	(0)
Total %									
N	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Miss.	1825	1667	2688	2233	1394	2237	2028	2331	1708
	(9)	(6)	(17)	(15)	(220)	(20)	(12)	(154)	(6)

The majority of respondents were in age cohort four in

1964, age cohort three in 1968 and age cohort one in 1996. Age cohort two contained the majority of respondents in the other six years.

Ethnicity is the final demographic variable presented. Table 4.6 illustrates the ethnic diversity of respondents.

TABLE 4.6 Respondents Within Each Ethnic Category, 1964-1996

	Year								
Race/ Ethn	1964	1968	1972	1976	1980	1984	1988	1992	1996
Wht % (n)	76.3 (1399)	83.0 (1388)	88.6 (2397)	89.3 (1680)	87.3 (1228)	86.7 (1946)	83.5 (1698)	84.6 (2074)	85.3 (1454)
Blk % (n)	23.0 (422)	15.8 (265)	9.9 (267)	9.1 (171)	11.8 (166)	11.1 (250)	13.2 (269)	13.0 (318)	12.1 (207)
Othr% (n)	.7 (13)	1.2 (20)	1.5 (41)	1.6 (31)	.8 (12)	2.2 (49)	3.3 (67)	2.4 (58)	2.5 (43)
Total %	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	1834	1673	2705	1882	1406	2245	2034	2450	1704
Miss	(0)	(0)	(0)	(366)	(208)	(12)	(6)	(35)	(10)

Whites make up the majority of respondents with Blacks accounting for the next largest group and the Other category making up the smallest group each year. In 1964, the NES ran a stratified sample to assure representation of Black respondents. This resulted in the highest response of Blacks in all the years under study. All other years

remain fairly constant with Whites accounting for over 80 percent of respondents and Others accounting for less than 3.5 percent.

Reported Non-Voting

Because non-voting is central to this study, it is important to understand who is reporting not voting in each election. The following tables will allow for an understanding of reported non-voting within the demographic groups described above. Table 4.7 shows total non-voting respondents. Table 4.7 indicates non-voting was at a low

Table 4.7 Reported Non-Voting and Voting, 1964-1996

	Year								
NotV/ Vote	1964	1968	1972	1976	1980	1984	1988	1992	1996
NotV%	23.2	24.9	27.2	27.1	28.6	26.4	30.3	24.6	23.4
(n)	(391)	(370)	(621)	(517)	(403)	(525)	(538)	(554)	(359)
Vote%	76.8	75.1	72.8	72.9	71.4	73.6	69.7	75.4	76.6
(n)	(1293)	(1118)	(1662)	(1392)	(1004)	(1464)	(1235)	(1700)	(1175)
Total									
%	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	1684	1488	2283	1909	1407	1989	1773	2254	1534
Miss.	150	185	422	339	207	268	267	231	180

in 1964 with 23.2 percent of respondents indicating they did not vote. Non-voting peaked in 1988, according to Table 4.7, with 30.3 percent of respondents reporting not voting.

	Year								
	1964	1968	1972	1976	1980	1984	1988	1992	1996
Non-Voters									
%	23.4	24.5	27.2	27.1	28.6	26.4	30.3	24.6	23.4
N	380	356	600	483	356	463	502	502	335
Miss.	11	14	21	34	47	62	36	52	24
Income									
Low %	39.2	40.8	39.9	42.5	41.4	43.0	52.6	45.4	39.6
(n)	(148)	(100)	(165)	(139)	(103)	(153)	(153)	(186)	(110)
2 %	24.9	34.5	36.4	31.9	30.5	30.3	36.9	30.2	28.9
(n)	(75)	(109)	(189)	(122)	(73)	(84)	(134)	(110)	(67)
3 %	20.8	22.0	27.4	27.6	29.8	27.3	30.7	23.3	25.8
(n)	(85)	(58)	(126)	(88)	(91)	(107)	(95)	(103)	(80)
4 %	15.3	17.1	18.9	24.6	20.5	18.8	21.3	12.3	16.1
(n)	(35)	(58)	(66)	(82)	(40)	(82)	(71)	(44)	(43)
High%	12.0	10.8	11.5	12.4	18.0	11.5	14.4	11.6	11.0
(n)	(37)	(31)	(54)	(52)	(49)	(37)	(49)	(59)	(35)
Tauy	.05**	.06**	.06**	.05**	.04**	.06**	.07**	.09**	.06**

** p < .01

As Table 4.8 indicates, there is a statistically significant though weak relationship between non-voting and income level. As income level increases, non-voting decreases. Those reporting the highest level of non-voting are those in the lowest income quintile, quintile one. For the period under study, the highest percent of non-voting was reported in 1988 by the lowest income quintile. Those reporting the lowest levels of non-voting are those in the highest income quintile, five. This group also reported its highest level of non-voting in 1988.

The following table describes the relationship between non-voting and level of education for each year under study. Table 4.9 indicates a statistically significant though weak relationship between non-voting and level of education. As education level increases, non-voting decreases. This relationship is consistent across all nine years. The lowest education-level category reported the highest non-voting in 1992. Those in the highest education-level category reported their highest level of non-voting in 1964.

TABLE 4.9 Reported Non-Voting by Level of Education, 1964-1996

	Year								
	1964	1968	1972	1976	1980	1984	1988	1992	1996
Non-Voters									
%	23.2	24.9	27.2	27.1	28.6	26.4	30.3	24.6	23.4
N	387	369	620	514	403	523	535	521	359
Miss.	4	1	1	3	0	2	3	33	0
Education									
Low %	32.3	36.5	40.7	40.2	43.7	43.0	49.4	50.5	44.4
(n)	(260)	(225)	(346)	(233)	(150)	(200)	(176)	(197)	(103)
2 %	17.8	17.1	24.7	28.0	30.7	30.2	38.4	28.7	29.4
(n)	(89)	(79)	(181)	(193)	(158)	(209)	(240)	(203)	(131)
3 %	10.2	20.8	16.1	16.1	24.9	17.0	20.7	16.1	20.3
(n)	(20)	(44)	(61)	(52)	(71)	(77)	(86)	(84)	(81)
4 %	10.5	13.6	11.0	12.7	9.1	13.0	10.7	8.4	9.7
(n)	(14)	(18)	(26)	(23)	(12)	(26)	(22)	(22)	(23)
High%	10.5	3.1	7.4	9.9	9.4	6.4	6.6	6.4	9.5
(n)	(4)	(2)	(6)	(13)	(12)	(11)	(11)	(15)	(21)
Tauy	.05**	.06**	.07**	.06**	.06**	.07**	.11**	.11**	.08**
** p < .01									

The following table illustrates the relationship between non-voting and occupation for the nine years under study. Table 4.10 indicates a consistent statistically significant and weak relationship between occupation and non-voting. Those in the higher status occupation categories (represented by the lower value labels) report lower percentages of non-voting than do those in the lower status occupation categories (represented by the higher value labels).

TABLE 4.10 Reported Non-Voting by Occupation Category, 1964-1996

	Year								
	1964	1968	1972	1976	1980	1984	1988	1992	1996
Non-Voters									
%	23.4	24.9	27.2	27.1	28.6	26.4	30.3	24.6	23.4
N	389	361	616	504	304	523	536	550	358
Miss.	2	9	5	13	99	2	2	4	1
Occupation									
High%	10.7	10.3	12.6	11.1	12.7	12.3	11.4	11.4	10.9
(n)	(13)	(18)	(34)	(25)	(25)	(36)	(32)	(41)	(29)
2 %	13.5	15.9	18.2	16.6	16.3	13.0	17.6	12.7	16.1
(n)	(17)	(17)	(35)	(30)	(25)	(26)	(34)	(32)	(25)
3 %	13.1	16.1	22.0	21.2	24.8	21.2	24.9	18.4	23.5
(n)	(23)	(31)	(72)	(65)	(62)	(94)	(95)	(86)	(59)
4 %	23.2	25.5	22.9	26.1	29.4	30.5	48.6	35.2	35.3
(n)	(68)	(40)	(49)	(49)	(45)	(93)	(139)	(134)	(59)
5 %	32.8	34.6	34.2	34.2	38.7	38.7	39.6	30.8	36.1
(n)	(84)	(135)	(199)	(173)	(147)	(184)	(161)	(156)	(70)
Low %	26.6	27.5	33.2	34.1	n/a	34.1	34.1	36.9	23.2
(n)	(184)	(120)	(227)	(162)		(90)	(75)	(101)	(116)
Tauy	.03**	.04**	.03**	.05**	.05**	.05**	.07**	.05**	.04**
** p < .01									

The unemployed (category 6) do not always follow the trend. Only in 1992 do the unemployed report higher levels of non-voting than do the unskilled laborers. Students and housewives are included in the unemployed category and may account for this reversal of the expected trend. There are other slight inconsistencies within the occupational categories. One of these inconsistencies includes the highest reported non-voting group. In 1988, skilled

workers (value label 4) reported not voting at a rate of 48.6 percent. Similarly, skilled workers reported more non-voting in 1992 than did the unskilled workers. The lowest level of non-voting was reported by the professional /technical workers (value label 1) in 1968 at a rate of 10.3 percent.

The non-class related demographic variables analyzed include sex, age cohort, and ethnicity. The following table depicts non-voting by sex for the years under study.

TABLE 4.11 Reported Non-Voting by Sex, 1964-1996

	Year								
	1964	1968	1972	1976	1980	1984	1988	1992	1996
	Non-Voters								
%	23.2	24.9	27.2	27.1	28.6	26.1	30.3	24.5	23.4
N	391	370	621	517	403	504	538	321	359
Miss.	0	0	0	0	0	21	0	233	0
	Sex								
Male	20.9	22.0	23.6	21.6	26.7	25.9	27.8	22.9	21.8
(n=)	(153)	(141)	(230)	(171)	(164)	(223)	(213)	(132)	(150)
Fe	25.0	27.0	29.9	30.9	30.1	26.2	32.2	28.0	24.7
(n=)	(238)	(229)	(391)	(346)	(239)	(281)	(325)	(189)	(209)
Tauy	.00*	.00*	.01**	.01**	.00	.00	.00*	.00*	.00
* p ≤ .05									
** p < .01									

As Table 4.11 indicates, approximately one fourth to over 30 percent of women reported not voting each year, compared to between 21 and 28 percent of men. However, this higher reported non-voting among women is not statistically

significant in the years 1980, 1984, and 1996. In 1972 and 1976 the relationship is statistically significant but extremely weak and is zero in all other years. The following table displays the association between age cohort and non-voting.

TABLE 4.12 Reported Non-Voting by Age Cohort, 1964-1996

	Year								
	1964	1968	1972	1976	1980	1984	1988	1992	1996
Non-Voters									
%	23.1	24.9	27.2	27.1	28.6	26.4	30.3	24.6	23.4
N	388	369	617	514	401	522	534	523	358
Miss.	3	1	4	3	2	3	4	31	1
Age Cohort									
Low %	0	0	0	0	42.6	48.3	51.1	34.1	33.8
(n)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(40)	(143)	(187)	(212)	(167)
2 %	56.0	41.0	33.9	37.2	37.4	25.3	27.4	23.4	19.9
(n)	(14)	(64)	(212)	(236)	(193)	(187)	(177)	(162)	(96)
3 %	28.8	24.7	23.3	19.7	21.5	20.5	23.5	16.8	18.7
(n)	(162)	(118)	(142)	(90)	(72)	(86)	(85)	(68)	(59)
4 %	18.2	17.4	21.5	20.1	18.8	16.3	19.0	18.9	14.7
(n)	(104)	(80)	(125)	(96)	(55)	(60)	(56)	(64)	(31)
5 %	19.0	24.4	27.2	24.8	24.5	30.7	30.2	27.4	18.5
(n)	(70)	(75)	(100)	(71)	(36)	(46)	(29)	(17)	(5)
High%	25.3	38.6	44.7	48.8	55.6	0	0	0	0
(n)	(38)	(32)	(38)	(21)	(5)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)
Tauy	.02**	.03**	.02**	.04**	.04**	.05**	.06**	.02**	.03**
** p < .01									

Table 4.12 indicates a statistically significant though weak relationship between age cohort and non-voting.

Cohorts one, two, and six (the two youngest and the oldest

cohorts) consistently report the highest levels of non-voting. Cohorts three, four, and five report the lowest levels of non-voting.

TABLE 4.13 Reported Non-Voting by Ethnicity, 1964-1996

	Year								
	1964	1968	1972	1976	1980	1984	1988	1992	1996
Non-Voters									
%	23.2	24.9	27.2	27.1	28.6	26.4	30.3	24.6	23.4
N	391	370	621	511	401	522	537	546	355
Miss.	0	0	0	6	2	3	1	8	4
	Race/Ethnicity								
White	20.1 (260)	22.9 (284)	26.2 (532)	26.1 (439)	27.6 (339)	24.8 (427)	28.1 (419)	22.9 (431)	22.0 (290)
Black	32.2 (123)	33.5 (77)	35.3 (78)	33.9 (58)	32.7 (54)	34.4 (74)	40.3 (87)	32.2 (93)	32.2 (55)
Other	72.7 (8)	50.0 (9)	36.7 (11)	45.2 (14)	66.7 (8)	47.7 (21)	51.7 (31)	40.0 (22)	25.6 (10)
Tauy	.02**	.01**	.00**	.01**	.01**	.01**	.02**	.01**	.01**
** p < .01									

Table 4.13 indicates a weak statistically significant relationship between ethnicity and reported non-voting. Whites consistently report the lowest non-voting. In all but 1996, those in the Other category reported the highest non-voting. In that year, Others reported 25.6 percent non-voting (compared to 22 percent non-voting reported by Blacks) and came very close to the level of White non-voting.

Tests of Hypotheses

Hypothesis 1

Hypothesis 1 predicted that respondents with high levels of political knowledge would report higher levels of voting than those with low levels of political knowledge.

TABLE 4.14 Respondents Who Reported Voting by Level of Political Knowledge, 1964-1996

	Year								
	1964	1968	1972	1976	1980	1984	1988	1992	1996
	Voters								
%	76.9	82.7	72.9	73.0	71.3	85.3	69.6	75.5	76.6
N	1283	692	1657	1387	1002	891	1234	1694	1174
Miss.	10	426	5	5	2	573	1	6	1
	Political Knowledge								
Low %	52.2	78.6	67.7	52.0	61.0	77.4	46.6	37.6	50.2
(n)	(163)	(11)	(1004)	(297)	(504)	(65)	(291)	(82)	(45)
1 %	78.4	79.5	79.1	72.6	82.7	83.9	72.0	68.2	74.6
(n)	(301)	(147)	(201)	(268)	(325)	(431)	(206)	(535)	(179)
High%	84.3	83.7	84.0	85.6	93.0	88.4	85.5	86.6	84.7
(n)	(819)	(534)	(452)	(822)	(173)	(395)	(737)	(1077)	(850)
Tauy	.08**	.00	.03**	.11**	.08**	.01*	.15**	.12**	.10**
* p ≤ .05									
** p ≤ .01									

Appendix C, Table C-1 offers a description of overall respondent political knowledge by year. Table 4.14 shows the percent of those reporting having voted in the most recent presidential election by their level of knowledge. Those in the row labeled low have the least political

political knowledge (see Chapter III for an explanation of political knowledge measures). As Table 4.14 indicates, there is a weak, statistically significant relationship between voting and political knowledge for all years except 1968. Respondents with high levels of political knowledge are more likely to report voting than are those with low levels of political knowledge. Hypothesis 1 is supported for all years except 1968.

Hypothesis 2

Hypothesis 2 predicted that non-voters of high social class would report higher levels of political knowledge than non-voters of low social class. Tables 4.15, 4.16, and 4.17 test this hypothesis with separate analyses of each class indicator.

The following table describes the relationship between political knowledge and income for non-voters. Table 4.15 presents non-voters with a political knowledge score of two (high) by income quintile. The strength and statistical significance of the relationship between political knowledge and income for non-voters vary over time. There is no statistically significant relationship for the years 1968, 1980, or 1984. There were very few (13.2 percent,

The following table details the relationship between level of education and political knowledge for non-voters.

TABLE 4.16 Political Knowledge and Level of Education for Non-Voters, 1964-1996

	Year								
	1964	1968	1972	1976	1980	1984	1988	1992	1996
High Political Knowledge Non-Voters									
%	39.9	71.7	13.7	27.1	3.2	33.8	23.2	30.1	42.9
N	152	104	81	138	13	52	125	154	154
Education									
Low %	31.1	66.7	11.7	17.9	.7	21.1	18.2	16.8	36.9
(n)	(79)	(48)	(40)	(41)	(1)	(8)	(32)	(33)	(38)
2 %	50.6	68.4	13.6	29.5	2.5	31.6	22.1	28.0	35.9
(n)	(45)	(26)	(9)	(57)	(4)	(18)	(53)	(56)	(47)
3 %	70.0	83.3	24.6	42.3	5.6	45.9	27.9	47.6	50.6
(n)	(14)	(20)	(15)	(22)	(4)	(17)	(24)	(40)	(41)
4 %	71.4	90.0	13.2	52.2	16.7	31.3	45.5	59.1	60.9
(n)	(10)	(9)	(15)	(12)	(2)	(5)	(10)	(13)	(14)
High %	100	100	33.3	46.2	16.7	66.7	54.5	80.0	66.7
(n)	(4)	(1)	(2)	(6)	(2)	(4)	(6)	(12)	(14)
Total Non-Voters									
N	381	145	591	510	403	154	538	551	359
Miss.	10	225	30	7	0	371	0	3	0
Gamma	.47**	.30*	.24**	.39**	.16**	.19	.31**	.39**	.22**
* p ≤ .05									
** p < .01									

Table 4.16 presents non-voters with a political knowledge score of two (high) by level of education. As the table indicates, the higher the respondent's level of education (the higher value labels) the more likely the non-voting respondent is to have high political knowledge. The lower

the respondent's level of education (the lower value labels), the less likely the non-voting respondent is to have high political knowledge. In all years except 1984, there is a statistically significant relationship between non-voters with high political knowledge and their level of education. This relationship is moderate in 1964, 1968, 1976, 1988, and 1992. In all other years the relationship is weak. The level of education portion of Hypothesis 2 is supported for all years except 1984.

The following table illustrates the relationship between occupation and political knowledge for non-voters. Table 4.17 identifies a statistically significant relationship between occupation and political knowledge among non-voters in most years. The relationship is statistically significant and in the expected direction for every year except 1968 and 1984; however, the relationship is weak in all years. As Table 4.17 shows, non-voters in the higher status occupation categories (lower value labels) are more likely to have high political knowledge. Those in lower status occupations (higher value labels) are less likely to have high political knowledge. The

occupation portion of Hypothesis 2 is supported for all years except 1968 and 1984.

TABLE 4.17 Political Knowledge and Occupation for Non-Voters, 1964-1996

	Year								
	1964	1968	1972	1976	1980	1984	1988	1992	1996
High Political Knowledge Non-Voters									
%	39.9	71.7	13.9	26.9	3.9	33.8	23.2	30.1	42.9
N	153	103	85	134	10	52	125	165	153
Occupation									
High%	84.6	91.7	14.7	28.0	20.0	50.0	43.8	61.0	55.2
(n)	(11)	(11)	(5)	(7)	(5)	(12)	(14)	(25)	(16)
2 %	58.8	66.7	40.0	53.5	0	50.0	41.2	48.4	52.0
(n)	(10)	(4)	(14)	(16)		(6)	(14)	(15)	(13)
3 %	69.6	77.8	19.4	32.3	3.2	20.7	25.3	30.6	47.5
(n)	(16)	(7)	(14)	(21)	(2)	(6)	(24)	(26)	(28)
4 %	44.1	61.9	14.6	39.6	0	31.0	24.5	33.6	40.7
(n)	(30)	(13)	(7)	(19)		(9)	(34)	(45)	(24)
5 %	30.0	67.3	12.1	23.4	3.4	34.0	18.6	26.5	41.4
(n)	(24)	(33)	(24)	(40)	(5)	(16)	(30)	(41)	(29)
Low %	34.1	76.1	9.3	19.3	n/a	23.1	12.0	12.9	37.1
(n)	(62)	(35)	(21)	(31)		(3)	(9)	(13)	(43)
Non-Voters									
N	383	145	617	513	304	154	538	551	359
Miss.	7	225	4	4	99	371	0	3	0
Gamma	-.26**	-.03	-.18**	-.22**	-.22*	-.13	-.29**	-.28**	-.14*
* p ≤ .05									
** p < .01									

Hypothesis 3

Hypothesis 3 predicted that respondents with high levels of perceived political self-efficacy would report higher levels of voting than those with low levels of

perceived political self-efficacy. The following table illustrates the relationship between voting and perceived political self-efficacy for each of the years under study.

TABLE 4.18 Reported Voting by Level of Perceived Political Self-Efficacy, 1964-1996

	Year								
	1964	1968	1972	1976	1980	1984	1988	1992	1996
Voters									
%	77.1	75.5	72.9	74.1	71.6	74.8	69.9	75.6	76.6
N	1240	1022	1615	1311	934	710	1220	1676	1167
Miss.	53	96	47	81	70	754	15	24	8
Self-Efficacy									
Below	68.6	83.9	57.2	58.7	57.7	65.6	56.6	66.1	69.4
(n)	(459)	(516)	(346)	(297)	(194)	(261)	(418)	(722)	(455)
Mdn	81.9	72.6	71.3	71.0	68.1	80.1	74.7	79.5	76.1
(n)	(447)	(321)	(387)	(319)	(261)	(306)	(168)	(174)	(169)
Above	85.0	62.5	82.7	85.4	81.7	84.6	81.0	86.1	84.1
(n)	(334)	(185)	(882)	(695)	(479)	(143)	(634)	(780)	(543)
Tauy	.03**	.04**	.06**	.07**	.05**	.03**	.06**	.05**	.03**
** p < .01									

Appendix C, Table C-2 offers a description of overall perceived political self-efficacy of respondents by year. In each year the median political self efficacy score was calculated. The scores were then placed into three categories: above the median, the median, and below the median. These categories were used for the analyses of perceived political self-efficacy. As Table 4.18 indicates, there is a statistically significant, though

weak, relationship between perceived political self-efficacy and voting for all years under study. It was expected that those scoring above the median in perceived political self-efficacy would report the highest level of voting. This was true for every year except 1968. In 1968, the trend was reversed with those scoring below the median in political self-efficacy reporting the highest level of voting. Hypothesis 3 is supported for every year except 1968.

Hypothesis 4

Hypothesis 4 predicted that non-voters of high social class position would report higher levels of perceived political self-efficacy than non-voters of low social class position. Tables 4.19, 4.20, and 4.21 test this hypothesis with separate analyses of each class measure. The following table offers an analysis of the relationship between income and high (above-the-median) perceived political self-efficacy for non-voters. Table 4.19 shows that there is a statistically significant relationship between income and high perceived political self efficacy for non-voters in 1964, 1968, 1972, 1976, and 1988. Although the relationship is weak, the income portion

section of hypothesis 4 is supported for these years.

However, in 1968 the trend is in the opposite direction of that expected.

TABLE 4.19 Perceived Political Self-Efficacy and Income for Non Voters, 1964-1996

	Year								
	1964	1968	1972	1976	1980	1984	1988	1992	1996
High Self-Efficacy Non-Voters									
%	16.0	32.7	30.8	26.0	28.8	10.9	28.3	23.3	28.9
N	57	104	182	114	94	25	144	121	99
Income									
Low %	7.9	42.7	25.6	19.4	23.7	15.9	22.8	21.5	27.8
(n)	(11)	(38)	(40)	(24)	(22)	(10)	(34)	(39)	(30)
2 %	12.1	26.5	27.5	20.8	33.8	10.6	29.5	22.0	19.4
(n)	(8)	(26)	(50)	(22)	(23)	(5)	(39)	(24)	(13)
3 %	20.7	36.7	35.2	29.9	24.7	6.8	29.5	21.8	33.8
(n)	(17)	(18)	(43)	(23)	(21)	(3)	(28)	(22)	(27)
4 %	30.3	36.4	39.4	36.8	23.1	10.8	34.3	31.8	37.2
(n)	(10)	(20)	(26)	(28)	(9)	(4)	(24)	(14)	(16)
High%	30.6	7.4	43.4	34.0	40.4	17.6	38.8	37.3	37.1
(n)	(11)	(2)	(23)	(17)	(19)	(3)	(19)	(22)	(13)
Total Non-Voters									
N	357	318	600	458	371	239	526	541	357
Miss	34	52	21	59	32	286	12	13	2
Gamma	.38**	-.14*	.13**	.24**	.11	-.03	.12*	.08	.07
* p ≤ .05									
** p < .01									

The following table illustrates the relationship between perceived political self-efficacy and level of education. Table 4.20 shows the statistically significant

TABLE 4.20 Perceived Political Self-Efficacy and Level of Education for Non-Voters, 1964-1996

	Year								
	1964	1968	1972	1976	1980	1984	1988	1992	1996
High Political Self-Efficacy Non-Voters									
%	16.2	33.5	30.1	25.8	28.8	10.9	28.3	23.3	28.9
N	59	111	174	118	107	26	149	121	103
Education									
Low %	8.2	38.8	19.2	13.5	16.9	12.4	21.6	18.8	22.5
(n)	(20)	(78)	(63)	(27)	(22)	(11)	(36)	(36)	(23)
2 %	32.6	31.5	45.5	29.9	29.3	9.0	24.4	22.7	22.3
(n)	(28)	(23)	(30)	(53)	(43)	(9)	(58)	(45)	(29)
3 %	27.8	22.0	52.5	42.9	47.1	11.8	38.8	29.3	40.7
(n)	(5)	(9)	(31)	(21)	(33)	(4)	(33)	(24)	(33)
4 %	35.7	7.7	38.6	63.6	50.0	10.0	72.7	45.5	34.8
(n)	(5)	(1)	(44)	(14)	(6)	(1)	(16)	(10)	(8)
High%	33.3	0	83.3	33.3	25.0	16.7	54.5	40.0	47.6
(n)	(1)		(6)	(3)	(3)	(1)	(6)	(6)	(10)
Total Non-Voters									
N	364	331	574	457	371	239	526	541	357
Miss.	27	39	47	60	32	286	12	13	2
Gamma	.57**	-.27**	.31**	.46**	.37**	.25**	.29**	.13*	.29**
* $p \leq .05$									
** $p \leq .01$									

relationship between high perceived political self-efficacy and level of education for non-voters. The relationship is moderate for 1964 and 1976 and is weak in all other years. As was the case with income, in 1968, the relationship is not in the expected direction. It was hypothesized that as level of education increased, the percentage of non-voters with higher than average perceived political self-efficacy

would increase. This was the case in all years except 1968. The education portion of hypothesis 4 is supported for all years except 1968.

TABLE 4.21 Perceived Political Self-Efficacy and Occupation for Non-Voters, 1964-1996

	Year								
	1964	1968	1972	1976	1980	1984	1988	1992	1996
High Political Self-Efficacy Non-Voters									
%	16.1	33.5	30.8	26.0	26.7	10.9	28.3	23.3	28.9
N	59	107	185	117	75	26	149	125	102
Occupation									
High%	30.8	13.3	64.7	60.0	54.2	7.7	41.9	36.6	34.5
(n)	(4)	(2)	(22)	(12)	(13)	(1)	(13)	(15)	(10)
2 %	35.3	26.7	40.0	18.5	39.1	38.5	38.2	37.5	48.0
(n)	(6)	(4)	(14)	(5)	(9)	(5)	(13)	(12)	(12)
3 %	30.0	28.6	42.3	40.0	22.0	11.6	32.3	22.4	37.3
(n)	(6)	(8)	(30)	(24)	(13)	(5)	(30)	(19)	(22)
4 %	14.9	46.2	38.3	25.0	34.1	11.1	24.8	17.4	25.4
(n)	(10)	(18)	(18)	(11)	(14)	(4)	(34)	(23)	(15)
5 %	13.8	29.7	27.3	22.8	19.4	7.9	24.7	20.8	27.1
(n)	(11)	(35)	(53)	(36)	(26)	(7)	(39)	(31)	(19)
Low %	13.0	37.4	22.4	21.2	n/a	9.1	28.2	25.5	21.2
(n)	(22)	(40)	(48)	(29)		(4)	(20)	(25)	(24)
Total Non-Voters									
N	366	331	600	458	281	239	526	541	357
Miss.	25	39	21	59	122	286	12	13	2
Gamma	-.14	.08	-.29**	-.23**	-.25**	-.21*	-.11	-.11	-.23**
* $p \leq .05$									
** $p \leq .01$									

Table 4.21 presents the relationship between high perceived political self-efficacy and occupation for non-

voters. It was expected that the percentage of non-voters with high perceived political self-efficacy would be greater in the higher status occupation categories (lower value labels) than in the lower status occupation categories (higher value labels). Therefore, a negative relationship was expected. This relationship was significant and negative in 1972, 1976, 1980, 1984, and 1996. The occupation portion of hypothesis 4 is supported only for these years although the relationship was weak for every year.

Hypothesis 5

Hypothesis 5 predicted that respondents with high levels of political cynicism would report lower levels of voting than those with low levels of political cynicism. Appendix C, Table C-3 offers a description of overall political cynicism of respondents by year. In each year the median of political self-efficacy scores was calculated. The scores were then placed into three categories; above the median, the median, and below the median. These categories were used for the analyses of political cynicism. Table 4.22 indicates a significant relationship between political cynicism and voting only in 1972 and

1988. Even in these years, however, the relationship is so small that it is almost non-existent. Hypothesis 5 can not be supported for any year under study.

TABLE 4.22 Reported Voting by Level of Political Cynicism, 1964-1996

	Year								
	1964	1968	1972	1976	1980	1984	1988	1992	1996
Voters									
%	77.3	76.1	73.6	74.0	72.7	74.9	70.3	76.3	76.4
N	1148	941	1452	1177	902	1291	1124	1586	1111
Miss.	145	177	210	215	102	173	111	114	64
Political Cynicism									
Below (n)	76.6 (533)	77.0 (449)	76.4 (691)	75.6 (545)	73.8 (346)	74.3 (584)	74.5 (442)	75.8 (689)	78.2 (366)
Mdn (n)	81.4 (180)	81.3 (61)	71.7 (190)	74.1 (254)	71.9 (217)	74.0 (214)	70.1 (185)	76.9 (376)	76.0 (199)
Above (n)	76.6 (435)	74.6 (431)	71.1 (571)	71.7 (378)	72.3 (339)	76.0 (493)	67.1 (497)	76.6 (521)	75.3 (546)
Tauy	.00	.00	.00*	.00	.00	.00	.01**	.00	.00
* p ≤ .05									
** p < .01									

Hypothesis 6

Hypothesis 6 predicted that non-voters of high social class will report lower levels of political cynicism than non-voters of low social class. Tables 4.23, 4.24, and 4.25 test this hypothesis with separate analyses of each indicator of social class. Table 4.23 offers an analysis of the relationship between low political cynicism and income for non-voters.

TABLE 4.23 Low Political Cynicism and Income for Non-Voters,
1964-1996

		Year								
		1964	1968	1972	1976	1980	1984	1988	1992	1996
Low Political Cynicism Non-Voters										
%		49.1	45.4	41.0	42.5	36.4	46.7	31.9	44.7	29.7
N		162	130	206	167	112	181	142	202	96
Income										
Low %		50.0	37.2	40.8	48.0	45.8	45.6	25.6	49.7	35.0
(n)		(63)	(29)	(49)	(47)	(38)	(52)	(33)	(81)	(36)
2 %		49.2	46.6	40.4	36.0	40.9	43.4	33.3	47.0	27.3
(n)		(31)	(41)	(67)	(36)	(27)	(33)	(40)	(47)	(18)
3 %		44.7	43.5	39.8	41.4	35.4	45.8	31.8	38.1	24.7
(n)		(34)	(20)	(45)	(30)	(28)	(44)	(27)	(37)	(19)
4 %		50.0	54.2	43.3	47.3	27.8	46.2	43.1	48.8	29.3
(n)		(15)	(26)	(26)	(35)	(10)	(36)	(28)	(20)	(12)
High%		54.3	53.8	41.3	44.2	22.0	53.3	29.8	31.5	31.4
(n)		(19)	(14)	(19)	(19)	(9)	(16)	(14)	(17)	(11)
Total Non-Voters										
N		330	286	520	414	338	433	474	492	344
Miss.		61	84	101	103	65	92	64	62	15
Gamma		-.03	-.14	-.04	-.00	.16*	-.02	-.08	.06	.10
* p < .05										

Table 4.23 indicates a statistically significant but weak relationship between income and non-voters' level of political cynicism for 1980 only. The income portion of hypothesis 6 can be supported for the year 1980 only. In all other years, it must be rejected. The following table displays the relationship between low political cynicism and level of education for non-voters.

TABLE 4.24 Low Political Cynicism and Level of Education for Non-Voters, 1964-1996

	Year								
	1964	1968	1972	1976	1980	1984	1988	1992	1996
Low Political Cynicism Non-Voters									
%	48.3	45.4	40.6	42.3	36.4	46.7	31.9	44.7	29.7
N	161	134	202	174	123	201	150	208	102
Education									
Low %	45.8	40.7	36.3	35.3	33.9	40.3	28.0	55.7	30.5
(n)	(99)	(70)	(98)	(60)	(39)	(62)	(40)	(93)	(29)
2 %	54.9	47.9	45.9	49.7	38.0	54.6	34.4	41.1	30.7
(n)	(45)	(34)	(28)	(83)	(52)	(95)	(75)	(74)	(39)
3 %	57.9	51.5	41.4	34.1	40.6	42.6	31.6	39.2	32.1
(n)	(11)	(17)	(24)	(15)	(26)	(29)	(25)	(31)	(25)
4 %	38.5	75.0	48.6	61.9	25.0	40.0	35.0	33.3	17.4
(n)	(5)	(12)	(51)	(13)	(3)	(10)	(7)	(7)	(4)
High%	33.3	50.0	20.0	33.3	30.0	45.5	27.3	21.4	23.8
(n)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(3)	(3)	(5)	(3)	(3)	(5)
Total Non-Voters									
N	333	295	500	413	338	433	474	492	344
Miss.	58	75	121	106	65	92	64	62	15
Gamma	-.15	-.17	-.12	-.13	-.05	-.04	-.06	.19**	.04
** p < .01									

Table 4.24 indicates support for the education portion of hypothesis 6 in 1992 only. The relationship between low political cynicism and level of education for non-voters is weak and statistically significant only for 1992.

Table 4.25 Low Political Cynicism and Occupation for Non-Voters, 1964-1996

	Year								
	1964	1968	1972	1976	1980	1984	1988	1992	1996
Low Political Cynicism Non-Voters									
%	48.4	45.4	41.0	42.5	34.1	46.7	31.9	44.7	29.7
N	162	129	212	170	87	201	150	217	101
Occupation									
High%	46.2	47.1	57.1	50.0	34.8	55.6	23.3	41.5	13.8
(n)	(6)	(8)	(16)	(10)	(8)	(20)	(7)	(17)	(4)
2 %	43.8	35.7	35.5	42.3	39.1	64.7	41.9	31.0	37.5
(n)	(7)	(5)	(11)	(11)	(9)	(11)	(13)	(9)	(9)
3 %	50.0	52.0	39.0	55.2	40.4	48.8	33.7	38.2	26.3
(n)	(10)	(13)	(23)	(32)	(21)	(39)	(29)	(29)	(15)
4 %	49.1	28.1	34.8	42.9	20.0	44.9	25.0	37.8	21.4
(n)	(28)	(9)	(16)	(18)	(7)	(35)	(31)	(45)	(12)
5 %	50.0	42.9	37.6	37.8	34.4	42.0	35.2	49.6	40.6
(n)	(37)	(48)	(65)	(51)	(42)	(63)	(51)	(68)	(28)
Low %	47.7	51.7	45.3	39.7	N/a	47.1	33.9	57.0	30.6
(n)	(74)	(46)	(81)	(48)		(33)	(19)	(49)	(33)
Total Non-Voters									
N	335	295	500	414	255	433	474	492	344
Miss.	56	75	121	103	148	92	64	62	15
Gamma	-.00	-.12	-.06	.07	.12	.05	-.02	-.15**	-.12
** p < .01									

As was the case with income, Table 4.25 indicates support for the occupation portion of hypothesis 6 in 1992 only, although the relationship is weak but statistically significant for that year. The relationship is not statistically significant for other years.

Other Analyses

Holding Demographics Constant

Appendix D contains tables fully illustrating the relationships between each demographic variable (sex, age cohort, and ethnicity) and the three dependent variables (political knowledge, perceived political self-efficacy, and political cynicism), controlling for the vote/no vote variable. The tables show the demographic characteristics of non-voters who scored high on the political knowledge measure (2) high on the perceived political self-efficacy measure (3) and low on the political cynicism measure (1). The statistical significance and strength of the relationship between each demographic variable and political knowledge, perceived political self-efficacy, and political cynicism are shown in the following three tables. Table 4.26 indicates the relationship between the non-voters' sex and each political measure. Table 4.26 indicates occasional statistical significance and always very weak relationships between sex and all three political measures.

TABLE 4.26 Tauy Values for Non-voters by Sex and Three Political Measures by Year

	Year								
Pol. Msrs	1964	1968	1972	1976	1980	1984	1988	1992	1996
Knldg	.03*	.02	.01	.03**	.00**	.02	.04**	.03**	.02**
PSEff	.00	.00	.01*	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00
Cynic	.01	.00	.00	.01	.01*	.00	.00	.00	.00
* $p \leq .05$									
** $p < .01$									

Tables D-1, D-4, and D-7 (Appendix D) illustrate the relationship between the three political measures and sex for non-voters. For every year except 1968, men with high political knowledge were more likely to be non-voters than were women. For all years except 1968, 1976, and 1992, men with high perceived political self-efficacy were more likely to be non-voters than were women. In all years except 1976 and 1988, women with low political cynicism were more likely to be non-voters than were men. The following table illustrates the relationship between the non-voters' ethnicity and each of the three dependent variables: political knowledge, perceived political self-efficacy, and political cynicism.

TABLE 4.27 Tauy Values for Non-Voters by Ethnicity and Three Political Measures by Year

	Year								
Pol.	1964	1968	1972	1976	1980	1984	1988	1992	1996
Msrs									
Knldg	.04**	.01	.00	.00	.03**	.03	.01**	.02**	.01
PSEff	.02**	.01	.01	.00	.00	.00	.01	.01	.01
Cynic	.02**	.01	.01*	.01	.01	.01	.00	.01	.02*
* p $\leq$.05									
** p $\leq$.01									

Table 4.27 indicates occasional statistical significance and always very weak relationships between ethnicity and all three political measures. Tables D-2, D-5, and D-8 (Appendix D) fully illustrates the relationship between the three political measures and ethnicity for non-voters. The ethnicity of those with high political knowledge who were most likely to be non-voters was: White in 1964, 1976, 1980, and 1988; Black in 1984 and 1996; and Other in all other years. The ethnicity of those with high perceived political self-efficacy who were most likely to be non-voters was: White in 1964, 1968, and 1992; Black in 1976; and Other in all other years. The ethnicity of those with low political cynicism who were most likely to be non-voters was: White in 1972, 1984, and 1988; Black in 1980 and 1996; and Other in all other years. Table 4.28 shows non-voters' age cohorts and the three measures.

Table 4.28 Gamma Values for Non-Voters by Age cohort and Three Political Measures by Year

	Year								
Pol. Msrs	1964	1968	1972	1976	1980	1984	1988	1992	1996
Knldg	.01	-.03	.00	-.00	.21*	.03	.27**	.13*	.09
PSEff	-.20**	.32**	-.15**	-.25**	-.20**	-.07	-.18**	-.05	-.29**
Cynic	.14	.29**	.09	.17**	.15*	.07	.19**	.00	-.04
* $p \leq .05$									
** $p < .01$									

Table 4.28 indicates an often statistically significant and weak relationship between the political measures and the age cohort of non-voters. Tables D-3, D-6, and D-9 (Appendix D) fully illustrates the relationship between the three political measures and age cohort for non-voters.

The age cohort of those with high political knowledge most likely to be non-voters was: cohort 6 in 1964 and 1968; cohort 3 in 1972, 1976, and 1980; cohort 5 in 1984; cohort 4 in 1988 and 1996; and cohort 2 in 1992.

The age cohort of those with high perceived political self-efficacy most likely to be non-voters was: cohort 3 in 1964; cohort 6 in 1968; cohort 2 in 1972, 1976, and 1992; and cohort 1 in all other years. The age cohort of those with low political cynicism most likely to be non-voters was: cohort 2 in 1964, 1968, 1972, and 1996; cohort 6 in

1976; cohort 1 in 1980; cohort 3 in 1988; and cohort 5 in all other years. No other demographic variables were examined.

Logistic Regression

A series of logistic regression models was run to test the ability of political knowledge, perceived political self-efficacy, and political cynicism to examine the ability of these variables to predict voting behavior in each of the election years under study. It is expected that a strong relationship between the constructs of political cynicism and perceived political self-efficacy exists. For each year, a Pearson's Correlation with a two-tailed test of significance was done to test for multicollinearity. The results follow.

TABLE 4.29 Correlation of Perceived Political Self Efficacy and Political Cynicism by Year

	Year								
PSEff Cynic	1964	1968	1972	1976	1980	1984	1988	1992	1996
Corr.	-.19**	.28**	-.30**	-.26**	-.22**	-.34**	-.36**	-.21**	-.30**
** p < .01									

Table 4.29 indicates a statistically significant and weak relationship between the measures of perceived political self-efficacy and political cynicism. Hanushek

and Jackson indicate that when seeking to test for the presence of multicollinearity it is not possible to "define 'high' correlations with any precision" (1977, p. 90). Given the low correlations and the results of the logistic regression to follow, it appears that the relationship between perceived political self-efficacy and political cynicism is not strong enough to violate the assumption of non multicollinearity required for logistic regression. Table 4.30 illustrates the resulting coefficients of the logistic regression analysis.

Table 4.30 Logit Coefficients for Each Political Measure, 1964-1996

Pol. Msrs	Year								
	1964	1968	1972	1976	1980	1984	1988	1992	1996
Knldg	.203***	N/A	.113***	.229***	.194***	.109*	.284***	.260***	.254***
PSEff	.108***	.175***	.188***	.151***	.137***	N/A	.169***	.153***	.099***
-2LL	1408.04	612.87	2092.05	1520.33	1260.22	289.83	1648.88	1982.99	1442.12
DF	4	2	4	4	4	2	4	4	4
* P ≤ .05									
*** P < .001									

Table 4.30 does not include a coefficient for political cynicism. Cynicism was not useful in any year in increasing the classification of voting/non-voting. In 1968 and 1984, only one variable, perceived political self-

efficacy and political knowledge, respectively was needed to provide the most accurate classification of respondents as voters or non-voters. In all other years, both of these measures were needed to provide the most accurate classification. All coefficients are statistically significant and weak. For example, in 1988, the political knowledge coefficient was the strongest of all those tested at .284. Appendix E, Table E shows the classification model which indicates political knowledge and perceived political self-efficacy provide good classification of voting/non-voting.

Historical Analysis

It was expected that scores for political knowledge, perceived political self-efficacy and political cynicism would vary by year. The following table shows median scores for each of the three political measures by year.

TABLE 4.31 Median scores on each political measure by year

	Year								
Pol. Msrs	1964	1968	1972	1976	1980	1984	1988	1992	1996
Knldg	2	2	0	2	0	1	1	2	2
PSEff	11	11	7	7	7	11	8	9	8
Cynic	12	12	16	18	18	16	16	18	16

Table 4.31 shows variation in all three measures across the years. Political knowledge starts high, drops, returns, then drops again before recovering. Perceived political self-efficacy starts high then dips to a low before bouncing back and leveling off. Political cynicism is inversely related to perceived political self-efficacy starting low then rising before leveling off.

Brunner (1999) offers a "Headline History" which will help in understanding the changes in the three political measures across the time period under study. Looking at each year separately will allow for the best understanding of the historical context of the political measure scores.

In 1964, the U.S. was recovering from the assassination of President John F. Kennedy the previous year. Jack Ruby was convicted of the murder of suspected Kennedy assassin, Lee Harvey Oswald. Three civil rights workers were murdered in Mississippi. The Gulf of Tonkin resolution was passed by Congress authorizing then President Johnson to take "all necessary measures" to win the war in Vietnam. To top things off, the Warren Report was released affirming that Oswald acted alone in his assassination of President Kennedy (Brunner 1999, p. 141).

High political knowledge is understandable in a time when political assassins, the civil rights movement, and the Vietnam war were all making the news. High perceived political self-efficacy is not as easily explained but may result from the successes of the civil rights movement. Even those not in support of the movement saw political change resulting from the actions of citizens. Low political cynicism may also be the result of respondents being witness to governmental responsiveness to citizen pressure for increased civil rights.

The next year under study, 1968, was also dominated by news of Vietnam and political assassinations. The Tet offensive, considered the point at which many Americans withdrew support for the war in Vietnam, occurred while over 525,000 U.S. soldiers were in combat. Martin Luther King, Jr. was assassinated in Memphis. Later that same year, Robert F. Kennedy was assassinated in Los Angeles after winning the California presidential primary (Brunner 1999, pp. 141-142).

While Brunner (1999) does not address the 1968 Democratic National Convention in Chicago, another source (Blobaum, 2000) refers to it as "the focal point of the

decade." This source contends that the convention "changed our political and cultural institutions" because police reaction to the anti-war demonstrators was so strong and so violent. It seems appropriate to consider the convention and its impact on political knowledge, perceived political self-efficacy, and political cynicism.

Political knowledge maintained its 1964 high in 1968. Although things were looking grim in Vietnam and at home, perceived political self-efficacy remained high and political cynicism remained low. The effect of these measures on voting, however, was not the same as in 1964. Further discussion of the 1968 results will follow in Chapter Five.

The 26th Constitutional Amendment was ratified in 1971, changing the voting age from 21 to 18 years of age. The 1972 election year was the first in which these "new voters" were eligible and the first in which these young persons would be included in the National Election Surveys. These first time voters/respondents are part of age cohort 2.

In 1972, Nixon made an historic trip to communist China, while continuing the war in Vietnam. Governor

Wallace of Alabama was shot and injured. Five persons were arrested after breaking into the Democratic campaign offices in the Watergate hotel in Washington D.C. (Brunner 1999, pp. 75-76, 141, and 143).

Political knowledge plummeted in 1972 as did political self-efficacy. Eight years after the Gulf of Tonkin resolution and many years of television coverage of the war in Vietnam, Americans may have grown weary of political news and this may have lead to the drop in knowledge. Protests against the war were not entirely successful possibly causing a drop in political self-efficacy. Political cynicism rose for perhaps these same reasons and/or the Watergate break in.

By 1976, the South Vietnamese had surrendered to the North, and U.S. troops and personnel had been evacuated from the region. The U.S. celebrated its Bicentennial that summer (Brunner 1999, pp. 141 and 143). Political knowledge rose to its high again in 1976. Continuous television coverage of the Congressional Committee investigation of the Watergate scandal and subsequent resignation of President Nixon may have increased awareness of political figures and interest in politics in general.

The Bicentennial or the previous year's end of the war in Vietnam may also have sparked interest in politics. Political self-efficacy remained at its lowest point and political cynicism rose from the previous election year; both were likely remnants of Vietnam and Watergate.

By 1980, Vietnam and Watergate were out of the headlines. Iran was the new trouble spot because of the seizure of 52 American hostages on November 4, 1979, subsequently held captive until January 20, 1980. The U.S. broke diplomatic ties with Iran and eight service members were killed in an attempt to rescue the hostages seized in the U.S. embassy the previous year. The Shah of Iran died in 1980 (Brunner 1999, pp. 144 and 236).

Political knowledge again dropped to a low in 1980. This was one of the years that the political knowledge questions were different and was the year with the fewest respondents answering both questions correctly. Though there was much turmoil in Iran, U.S. citizens may not have felt as directly threatened by these activities as they had been by the U.S. involvement in Vietnam. The events surrounding the 1980 election did nothing to change perceived political self-efficacy and political cynicism

which remained as low and high (respectively) as they had been in 1976.

In 1984, President Reagan ended U.S. participation in the international peacekeeping force in Beirut. Congress condemned Reagan's use of federal funds for the mining of Nicaraguan harbors. The Soviet Union and other Eastern Bloc nations withdrew from the Summer Olympic games in Los Angeles. The Democrats nominated Mondale and Ferraro for President and Vice-President. Reagan and Bush were nominated for re-election by the Republicans. Indian Prime Minister Indira Ghandi was assassinated. Reagan won re-election with a landslide 59 percent of the vote (Brunner 1999, p. 145).

In 1984, political knowledge was up to a medium level. The U.S. had left Beirut and the only assassination in the headlines occurred in India. Reagan's mining of Nicaraguan harbors did not necessarily concern a large number of U.S. citizens. Perceived political self-efficacy rose to its highest level, matching the levels of the 1960s, while political cynicism dropped slightly to the level it had been in 1972. The popular support of then President Reagan may have allowed for increased feelings of political

contentment. Because political cynicism did not drop a great deal, it can not be said that Americans were entirely trusting of the administration and/or the Congress.

In 1988, the U.S.-Canada free trade agreement was passed. Robert McFarlane, former National Security Adviser, pleaded guilty to charges surrounding the Iran-Contra case. A U.S. Navy ship shot down an Iranian airliner killing 290 persons. Terrorists killed nine tourists on an Aegean Cruise. Dukakis and Bentsen were nominated as the Presidential and Vice-Persidential (respectively) candidates for the Democratic party. The Republicans nominated Bush and Quayle who swept 40 states in their election win (Brunner 1999, p. 146).

Political knowledge remained at the same medium level as in 1984. The major upsets of 1988 again seemed far from U.S. shores and did not threaten most citizens. Political self-efficacy dropped three points while political cynicism remained the same as in the previous presidential election year. The trade agreement with Canada (which many labor groups opposed) and the end of the Reagan reign, seem most likely of the previously listed news events to have caused this decrease in political self-efficacy.

By 1992, the U.S. had successfully pushed Iraq out of Kuwait during the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf War. In 1992, the first text-based web browser was made available to the public. The Yugoslav Federation broke up. Bush and Yeltsin proclaimed a formal end to the cold war. U.S. trade sanctions against China were lifted. General Manuel Noriega (Panama) was convicted on drug charges in a U.S. court and sentenced to 40 years in prison. Four Los Angeles police officers were acquitted on charges of beating African American, Rodney King, in a California court. Riots broke out in Los Angeles as a result of the verdict. Federal charges were filed against the four officers later the same year. The Supreme Court reaffirmed a woman's right to abortion. Former Secretary of Defense under Ronald Reagan, Casper Weinberger, was indicted on charges related to Iran-Contra. A court cleared the skipper of the Exxon Valdez on all charges related to the biggest oil spill in history. Clinton and Gore were nominated by the Democratic party as their Presidential and Vice-presidential candidates. Bush and Quayle were nominated for re-election by the Republicans. After losing the election, Bush pardoned all Reagan Administration

officials in connection with the Iran-Contra affair (Brunner 1999, p. 148).

All three political measures were up in 1992. Political knowledge was back to high. Given the recent war in the Persian Gulf in which U.S. troops were active, it is likely that Americans turned their attention back to politics. Further, riots following the Rodney King verdict were of concern to Americans. The rise in perceived political self-efficacy may have been influenced by the previous success in the Persian Gulf war, the end of the cold war, and the capture and trial of Noriega. The increase in political cynicism could have been fueled by the Rodney King beating and the acquittal of the officers in California State court, the acquittal of the Exxon Valdez skipper, and the continuing indictments in the Iran-Contra affair (Bush's pardon came after the surveys were complete). It is interesting that 1992 is the only year in which perceived political self-efficacy and political cynicism both increased.

The final year under consideration, 1996, began with a budget crisis which shut down government operations the pervious year. Most government operations were resumed

that January. Global warming was at an all time high. The Senate ratified a major arms reduction treaty. The FBI arrested the suspected "Unabomber." Clinton signed the line-item veto bill. Late-term abortion was banned. A ValuJet plane crashed in Florida killing 110 persons. A truck bomb killed 19 people at a U.S. base in Saudi Arabia. An airline crash off the coast of Long Island killed 230 passengers. A bomb exploded at the Atlanta Summer Olympics killing a woman and injuring over 100 others. Clinton signed a bill to increase the minimum wage. Congress passed and Clinton approved a welfare reform bill. Dole and Kemp were nominated by the Republicans as their Presidential and Vice-presidential candidates. Clinton and Gore were nominated for re-election by the Democrats. The Virginia Military Institute admitted women for the first time (Brunner 1999, p. 150).

Political knowledge remained high in 1996 while perceived political self-efficacy and political cynicism both decreased. Domestic issues such as the budget, the Unabomber arrest, plane crashes, the minimum wage increase, and welfare reform were likely to keep the attention of Americans in 1996, maintaining their political knowledge.

The decline in perceived political self-efficacy may be linked to inability for most citizens to affect issues such as the budget, global warming, plane crashes, and bombings. The drop in political cynicism may be because of the seeming non-political nature of global warming and plane crashes. This drop may also be related to the lack of any major political scandals such as Iran-Contra as seen in 1992. It is interesting to note that 1996 is the only year in which perceived political self-efficacy and political cynicism both decreased.

Summary

The representative sample of voting aged U.S. residents used in this study appears to have over reported voting and under reported non-voting. This is evidenced by the low rates of voting reported by the U.S. Census Bureau (Table 2.1) and the high rates of voting reported by the study sample (Table 4.7). Even with this difference in reported voting/non-voting, the ANES data were used because it includes the political measures of interest to this study. However, caution must be used when drawing

conclusions based on this data in which voting was perhaps over reported.

All three class measures (income, level of education, and occupation) are statistically significant but weak in their relationship to non-voting. Those of high income, education, and occupational status are less likely to report not voting than those of low income, education, and occupational status. Level of education provides the strongest relationship to non-voting.

All three demographic variables of interest (sex, age cohort, and ethnicity) are statistically significant but weak in their relationship to non-voting. Men were less likely to report non-voting than women. Three age cohorts (3, 4, and 5) including those born between 1895 to 1942 were less likely to report not voting than others in most years. Whites were less likely to report non-voting than non-whites. Age cohort provided the strongest relationship with non-voting of the three (non-class related) demographic variables. Even this relationship was very weak, however, with a correlation of .06 between age cohort and non-voting (1988).

The hypotheses related to political knowledge (1 and 2) and perceived political self-efficacy (3 and 4) were supported more consistently than were the hypotheses related to political cynicism (5 and 6). When testing the relationship between political knowledge and voting (Hypothesis 1), a statistically significant relationship was found in all years except 1968.

Hypothesis 2 included only non-voters and predicted a relationship between the social class variables and political knowledge. The different social-class measures resulted in differing support, with level of education the most consistently resulting in statistical significance for every year except 1984. The occupation variable was statistically significant every year except 1968 and 1984. The income variable was not related to political knowledge to a statistically significant degree in 1968, 1980, or 1984.

Hypothesis 3 predicted a relationship between voting and perceived political self-efficacy. This relationship was statistically significant in all years except 1968. Hypothesis 4 included only non-voters and predicted a relationship between non-voting and the three social class

measures with varying support. Level of education was related most consistently to non-voting, resulting in statistical significance every year except 1968. The occupation variable was statistically significant every year except 1964, 1968, 1988, and 1992. The income variable was not statistically significantly related to perceived political self-efficacy in 1980, 1984, 1992, or 1996.

Hypothesis 5 predicted a relationship between voting and political cynicism. This hypothesis could not be supported for any of the years under study. Hypothesis 6 included only non-voters and predicted a relationship between the three social class variables and political cynicism. Each of these variables was found to have a statistically significant relationship with political cynicism in only one year. Income was related to a statistically significant degree in 1980 only, level of education and occupation in 1992 only.

Holding the three demographic variables (sex, age cohort, and ethnicity) constant indicates that these variables are neither explanatory nor intervening in the relationships found in the six hypotheses (see Table 4.26).

Stepwise logistic regression allowed for combining the three political measures (political knowledge, perceived political self-efficacy, and political cynicism) confirming the lack of importance of political cynicism.

The logistic regression also indicates that political knowledge and perceived political self-efficacy effectively predict voting/non-voting. In 1968, perceived political self-efficacy alone provided the best classification while in 1984, political knowledge alone classified most accurately; in all other years the combination of perceived political self-efficacy and political knowledge provided the best classification of voting/non-voting.

The continual changes in median scores for political knowledge, perceived political self-efficacy, and political cynicism suggest that historical events surrounding each election year are of importance to the analysis. Years which included a war involving U.S. troops and/or domestic struggles are the years in which political knowledge was high. Years that included political scandals and/or news reports of issues not easily influenced by citizen action are the years in which perceived political self-efficacy was low and political cynicism was high.

The results of the tests of hypotheses, the logistic regression analysis, and the historical context are discussed in the following chapter. Some conclusions regarding the meaning of these findings and their theoretical implications are considered. Limitations of the study are examined and suggestions for future research are offered.

Chapter V

CONCLUSIONS

Introduction

This final chapter will provide a summary of the major findings of the study including the tests of hypotheses, results of the logistic regression analysis, and the historical analysis. Theoretical implications of the findings, limitations of the study, and recommendations for future research will also be offered.

Major Findings

The data set used in this study is large with well over 1,000 respondents represented in each year under study. Because tests of significance are sensitive to such large samples, the strength of the relationships under study must be considered when assessing the importance of statistical significance. The strength of the statistically significant relationships hypothesized and the lack of statistically significant relationships hypothesized are described in the following table.

TABLE 5.1 Strength of Relationships, by Year

Hyp	Year								
	1964	1968	1972	1976	1980	1984	1988	1992	1996
1 Knw	W	I	W	W	W	W	W	W	W
2 Inc	W	I	W	W	I	I	W	W	W
2 Edu	M	M	W	M	W	I	M	W	W
2 Occ	W	I	W	W	W	I	W	W	W
3 PSE	W	WR	W	W	W	W	W	W	W
4 Inc	W	WR	W	W	I	I	W	I	I
4 Edu	M	WR	W	M	W	W	W	W	W
4 Occ	I	I	W	W	W	W	I	I	W
5 Cyn	I	I	W	I	I	I	W	I	I
6 Inc	I	I	I	I	W	I	I	I	I
6 Edu	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	W	I
6 Occ	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	W	I

I = Statistically Insignificant

W = Statistically Significant Weak Relationship

M = Statistically Significant Moderate Relationship

R = Relationship Reverse From Predicted

As Table 5.1 shows, most (59 of 108) of the statistically significant relationships are weak (W). Three of these weak relationships are in reverse of the expected direction. Only six of the statistically significant relationships are moderately (M) strong. All of the moderate relationships were found when education was the independent variable. Non-voters' political knowledge (1964, 1968, 1976, 1976, 1988) and perceived political self-efficacy (1964 and 1976) were moderately related to a statistically significant degree to level of education. Forty six of the relationships examined are not statistically significant.

Hypothesis 1, which predicted that respondents with high levels of political knowledge would report voting more often than those with low levels of political knowledge, was supported in all years except 1968. In 1968, there was no statistically significant relationship between political knowledge and voting. In that year, people with low political knowledge were just as likely to vote as those with high political knowledge. As was discussed in the historical analysis, political knowledge was high among respondents in 1968. The combination of the escalating U.S. presence in the war in Vietnam, the assassinations of Martin Luther King, Jr. and Robert F. Kennedy, and police violence at the Democratic National Convention in Chicago may have encouraged both political knowledge and voting. Whatever the provocation, voters in 1968 were unlike those of the other years under study. In all other years, those with high political knowledge were more likely to vote than those with lower political knowledge.

Table 5.1 illustrates the support for the three parts of Hypothesis 2 which predicted that non-voters of higher social class would have higher political knowledge than those of lower social class position. The three indicators

of social-class, income, education, and occupation, were analyzed separately. The income portion of Hypothesis 2 was not supported in 1968, 1980, or 1984. The education section was not supported in 1984 and the occupation section was not supported in 1968 or 1984. In 1968, non-voters with high political knowledge were just as likely to be of lower income and occupational status as they were to be of higher income and occupational status. In 1980, non-voters with high political knowledge were just as likely to be low income as high income. In 1984, non-voters were just as likely to be of lower income, education and occupational status as they were to be of higher income, education, and occupational status. In all other years, Hypothesis 2 was supported, indicating that non-voters of higher social class position had more political knowledge than those of lower social class position.

Hypothesis 3 predicted that respondents with higher perceived political self-efficacy would be more likely to vote than those with lower perceived political self-efficacy. This hypothesis was supported in all years except 1968 (see Table 5.1). Although the relationship was statistically significant in 1968, the relationship was

opposite of the hypothesized relationship. In 1968, those with lower perceived political self-efficacy were more likely to vote than those with higher perceived political self-efficacy. Perceived political self-efficacy was at its high in 1968 (11), but this high was reached in 1964 and 1984, as well. As stated in the discussion of the results of the tests of Hypothesis 1, 1968 was a year of great political upheaval. This upset appears to have reversed voting behavior relative to perceived political self-efficacy.

Table 5.1 shows the results for the three parts of Hypothesis 4 separately. In two years, 1972 and 1976, all three parts of Hypothesis 4 were supported. In those years, non-voters of higher class position (higher income, education, and occupation) were more likely to have high perceived political self-efficacy than were non-voters of lower social class position. No part of Hypothesis 4 was supported in 1968. The income and education portions of the hypothesis were statistically significant. The relationship, however, was opposite of the hypothesized relationship. In 1968, non-voters with lower income and lower education were more likely to have high perceived

political self-efficacy than were non-voters of higher income and higher education. There was no statistically significant relationship between non-voters' perceived political self-efficacy and occupation in 1968. In 1964 and 1988 the income and education portions of Hypothesis 4 were supported while the occupation portion was not. In 1980, 1984, and 1996 the education and occupation portions of Hypothesis 4 were supported while the income portion was not. In 1992, only the education portion of Hypothesis 4 was supported.

Hypothesis 5 which predicted respondents with high political cynicism would report lower levels of voting than those with lower levels of political cynicism was supported only in 1972 and 1988 (see Table 5.1). However, even in these two years, the relationship is too weak to be considered of any importance (.00 in 1972 and .01 in 1988). Persons of low political cynicism are just as likely to vote as those of high political cynicism.

Hypothesis 6 which predicted that non-voters of high social class position would report lower levels of political cynicism than non-voters of lower social class position was not supported. In 1980 only the income

portion of the hypothesis was supported while in 1992 only the education and occupation sections of the hypothesis were supported. Non-voters of high social class position are just as likely to have high political cynicism as are non-voters of lower social class position.

When demographic variables (sex, ethnicity, and age cohort) are held constant in relation to non-voters' political knowledge, perceived political self-efficacy, and political cynicism (see appendix D) only age cohort is important (see Tables 4.26, 4.27, and 4.28). The relationship between sex and non-voters' political knowledge is statistically significant in six of the nine years, but the strongest of these relationships is only a .04 correlation. Sex and non-voters' perceived political self-efficacy and political cynicism are each only statistically significant in one year and have only a .01 correlation. The relationship between ethnicity and non-voters' political knowledge is statistically significant in four of the nine years with the strongest relationship being a .04 correlation. The relationship between ethnicity and non-voters' perceived political self-efficacy and political cynicism are statistically significant two

and one years respectively with the strongest relationship for each being a .02 correlation.

Age cohort is of more importance than the other two demographic variables. Non-voters in the higher age cohorts (older) were more likely to have high political knowledge than were those in the lower age cohorts (younger) to a statistically significant degree in 1980 (.21), 1988 (.27), and 1992 (.13). Non-voters in the higher age cohorts (older) were less likely to have high perceived political self-efficacy than were those in the lower age cohorts (younger) to a statistically significant degree in 1964 (.20), 1972 (.15), 1976 (.25), 1980 (.20), 1988 (.18), and 1996 (.29). In 1968 (.32), the opposite was true, as the older non-voters were more likely to have high perceived political self-efficacy than were the younger non-voters. One might have expected the younger persons to feel more politically powerful during the turbulent 1968 period; however, this was not the case. Non-voters in the higher age cohorts (older) were less likely to have low political cynicism than were non-voters in the lower age cohorts (younger) to a statistically significant degree in 1968 (.29), 1976 (.17), 1980 (.15) and 1988 (.19).

The results of these analyses in which the demographic variables are held constant allow for more confidence in the previous findings. Sex and ethnicity clearly are not explanatory in the relationships of political measures and non-voting. Age allows for some explanation, but is not strongly related to non-voters' political knowledge, perceived political self-efficacy, or political cynicism. Therefore, the hypotheses testing is not affected by intervention of these demographic variables.

Logit coefficients were consistent with other correlation analyses. Logit coefficients indicate a statistically significant and weak relationship between political knowledge and voting behavior and perceived political self-efficacy and voting behavior. Classification analysis indicates that a model utilizing political knowledge, and perceived political self-efficacy provides good classification of unclassified cases. Low political knowledge and low perceived political self-efficacy allow for the classification of a respondent as a non-voter.

Theoretical Implications

The support for Hypothesis 1 in all years except 1968 supports the elite theorists' view of non-voters as lacking political knowledge. The political upheaval surrounding 1968 may have affected voting and allowed for this one-time support for the pluralist view. It may be that prior to 1964, political knowledge and voting were not significantly related. An analysis of the election years prior to 1964 might indicate support for the pluralist theorists view of citizens as equally active in voting regardless of their level of political knowledge. The elitist view regarding knowledge and voting is supported for all years under study except 1968 while the pluralist view can be supported only in 1968.

Hypothesis 2 was supported for all years except 1968, 1980, and 1984. Non-voters of lower class position also had lower levels of political knowledge than did non-voters of higher class position in six of the years under study. This result supports the elitist view (in six of the nine years under study) that those in lower class positions are less likely to be politically knowledgeable than those in higher class positions. Only in 1984 can the pluralist

view regarding citizens as equally knowledgeable be supported. This was the year Ronald Reagan, who enjoyed support from many people of working and lower social-class position, was re-elected. This popularity among the "masses" may have increased knowledge among non-voters of lower social class. In 1968 and 1980 the results are mixed and do not fully support either the elitist or the pluralist view.

The support of hypothesis 3 in all years except 1968 bolsters the elitist view of non-voters as feeling less powerful in terms of their ability to influence their government than voters. In each year under study, except 1968, persons with high perceived political self-efficacy were more likely to vote than were those with low perceived political self-efficacy. The 1968 results do not support either the elitist or the pluralist view. Results in that year indicate that persons with low perceived political self-efficacy were more likely to vote than were those of high perceived political self-efficacy. Pluralists would expect those with high and low perceived political self-efficacy to be equally likely to vote.

Hypothesis 4 was supported for 1972 and 1976 only.

Non-voters of lower class position had lower levels of perceived political self-efficacy than did those of higher class position in two of the years under study. This result supports the elitist view (in two of the nine years under study) that those in lower class positions are less likely to perceive themselves as politically powerful than those in higher class positions. All other years are mixed. The pluralist view that perceived political power as distributed equally across social classes can not be supported by these data for any year under study.

The inconsistent and very weak support of Hypothesis 5 does not sustain the elite perspective. It can not be said that non-voters are more or less cynical than are voters. Therefore, the pluralist perspective that cynicism does not affect the political activity of citizens was supported. Hypothesis 6 was rejected and the pluralist view was supported. Political cynicism is just as likely to be high among non-voters of high social class as it is to be high among non-voters of lower social class.

The logistic regression results indicate that non-voters lack political knowledge and have low perceived

political self-efficacy. The logistic regression results support the elite perspective that low political knowledge and a low political self-efficacy result in non-voting. The fact that the cynicism variable did not predict voting behavior supports the pluralist view that political cynicism does not affect the political involvement of citizens.

Study Limitations

The limitations of this study include the exclusive use of quantitative data, the political measures used, and the over-reporting of voting by subjects. Because this study utilized only quantitative data, it is impossible to ascertain the level of political knowledge, perceived political self-efficacy or political cynicism beyond the few questions provided by the survey. Respondents with very different levels of these constructs may appear to be identical in the data set. Combining this data with qualitative data will allow for a more in-depth understanding of respondents' political knowledge, perceived political self-efficacy, and political cynicism and how these measures relate to the respondents' political activity.

Beyond the limited information available from the closed-ended survey questions, the questions themselves are limited in scope. Political knowledge was measured in most years with two questions regarding the party of the majority in the House and Senate. A larger variety of questions would allow for a more complete measure of political knowledge. Similarly, the measures for perceived political self-efficacy and political cynicism are limited in scope. Because these measures are limited, applying the results of this study to complex theories such as elitism and pluralism is precarious. No combination of questions in the data allows for an in-depth analysis of either theoretical school. The measures chosen were the most complete available, but care must be taken when evaluating the legitimacy of either theoretical view based solely on this study.

The inability to construct a composite social class measure limits the findings related to each class indicator to that indicator alone. No generalizations related to social class can be made beyond the individual indicators used. Voting was over-reported in the data set. Therefore, all results can only be generalized to those who

report voting or not voting and can not be generalized to actual voters or non-voters.

Recommendations

In order to provide a more complete understanding of non-voting and its relationship to the political measures under study, a qualitative component should be added to future research. In-depth interviews would allow for a more complete understanding of motivations to vote or not as well as the respondents' political knowledge, perceived political self-efficacy and political cynicism.

Since the 1968 relationships between the political measures and voting/non-voting were opposite from those of other years, an analysis of the years prior to 1964 would aid in understanding this phenomenon. If it were found that the relationships of interest in the seven election years prior to 1964 were similar to the seven following 1968, there would be more support for the view that results in 1968 were a historical anomaly. Should the results prior to 1964 match those of 1968, there would be support for the view that these relationships have merely changed over time.

Analyzing similar data (if available) in nations with similar electoral processes would also allow for a more complete understanding of the relationships under study. Similar results in similar nations would bolster these results. Dissimilar results would allow for further questions regarding the differences between "democracies".

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APPENDIX A

NES Variables Under Study

Political Knowledge

1964	1968	1972	1976	1980	1984	1988	1992	1996
640405	680386	720950	763683	800826	841006	880878	925916	961072
640306	680387	720951	763684	800837	841008	880879	925920	961073

Perceived Political Self Efficacy

1964	1968	1972	1976	1980	1984	1988	1992	1996
640174	680141	720269	763815	801030	841070	880937	926102	961244
640176	680143	720271	763817	801032	841071	880938	926103	961245
640177	680144	720272	763818	801033	841072	880939	926104	961246

Political Cynicism

1964	1968	1972	1976	1980	1984	1988	1992	1996
640401	680503	720570	763162	800401	841063	880955	926120	961251
640402	680504	720571	763163	800402	841064	880956	926121	961252
640403	680505	720572	763164	800403	841065	880957	926122	961253
640405	680507	720574	763166	800405	841066	880958	926123	961254

Demographic Variables

Var	1964	1968	1972	1976	1980	1984	1988	1992	1996
Age	640187	680145	720293	763368	801178	840428	880416	923902	960604
Sex	640182	680263	720424	763951	801180	840707	880413	924201	960066
Rac	640183	680264	720425	763952	801181	840708	880412	924202	960067
Edu	640196	680156	720300	763384	800429	840431	880419	923905	960607
Occ	640202	680161	720309	763412	800516	840516	880466	923955	960665
Inc	640269	680261	720420	763507	800686	840680	880520	924104	960701
Vte	640286	680310	720477	763655	800988	840783	880756	925601	961074

Source: American National Elections Studies, 1964-1996

APPENDIX B

TABLE B Income Coding: Valid Percent at Which Code Group is Cut

	1	2	3	4	5
1964	23.0	41.9	67.1	81.2	100
1968	17.3	39.0	57.1	80.3	100
1972	19.2	42.5	63.2	78.7	100
1976	18.6	40.5	58.5	77.0	100
1980	19.9	38.8	63.1	78.4	100
1984	20.6	37.3	58.9	82.5	100
1988	19.1	41.4	59.7	79.9	100
1992	19.7	37.2	58.1	75.3	100
1996	20.4	37.3	58.8	77.7	100

APPENDIX C

TABLE C-1 Political Knowledge by Year

	Year								
Pol Knowl	1964	1968	1972	1976	1980	1984	1988	1992	1996
0	18.7 (312)	1.7 (14)	70.6 (1904)	30.1 (571)	58.8 (827)	8.0 (84)	43.6 (890)	18.1 (448)	27.4 (469)
1	23.0 (384)	22.2 (186)	9.4 (254)	19.4 (369)	28.0 (393)	49.2 (514)	14.0 (286)	31.7 (785)	14.0 (240)
2	58.3 (972)	76.2 (639)	20.0 (538)	50.5 (960)	13.2 (186)	42.8 (447)	42.3 (863)	50.2 (1243)	58.6 (1004)
%	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	1668	839	2696	1900	1406	1045	2039	2476	1713
Miss.	166	834	9	348	208	1212	1	9	1

TABLE C-2 Perceived Political Self Efficacy by Year

	Year								
Self Effic	1964	1968	1972	1976	1980	1984	1988	1992	1996
Above	42.3 (738)	44.3 (671)	28.0 (731)	28.6 (506)	25.7 (336)	41.9 (398)	42.3 (740)	49.3 (1093)	43.0 (656)
Mdn	34.0 (593)	33.5 (508)	25.1 (655)	25.4 (449)	29.3 (383)	40.3 (382)	12.9 (225)	9.9 (219)	14.6 (222)
Below	23.7 (414)	22.2 (337)	46.9 (1225)	46.0 (814)	44.9 (587)	17.8 (169)	44.8 (783)	40.8 (906)	42.4 (646)
%	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	1745	1516	2611	1769	1306	949	1748	2218	1524
Miss.	89	157	94	479	308	1308	292	267	190

TABLE C-3 Political Cynicism by Year

	Year								
Pol Cynic	1964	1968	1972	1976	1980	1984	1988	1992	1996
Below	46.9 (696)	47.2 (584)	45.9 (905)	45.2 (837)	37.6 (531)	45.6 (786)	37.1 (594)	43.7 (909)	32.2 (468)
Mdn	14.9 (221)	6.1 (75)	13.4 (265)	21.4 (396)	24.6 (347)	16.8 (289)	16.5 (264)	23.5 (489)	18.0 (262)
Above	38.2 (568)	46.8 (579)	40.7 (803)	33.5 (620)	37.8 (533)	37.6 (649)	46.4 (742)	32.8 (681)	49.8 (725)
%	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	1485	1238	1973	1853	1411	1724	1600	2079	1455
Miss.	349	435	732	395	203	19	440	406	259

APPENDIX D

Table D-2 High Political Knowledge and Ethnicity of Non-Voters, 1964-1996

	Year								
	1964	1968	1972	1976	1980	1984	1988	1992	1996
High Political Knowledge Non-Voters									
%	39.7	71.7	13.9	26.9	3.2	33.8	23.2	30.1	42.9
N	153	104	86	138	13	52	125	166	154
Race/Ethnicity									
White	46.7	70.7	13.6	27.8	3.5	31.9	26.3	33.4	44.1
(n)	(120)	(87)	(72)	(121)	(12)	(43)	(110)	(143)	(128)
Black	25.8	75.0	15.4	21.1	1.9	57.1	11.5	15.1	41.8
(n)	(31)	(15)	(12)	(12)	(1)	(8)	(10)	(14)	(23)
Other	25.0	100	18.2	21.4	0	20.0	16.1	36.4	30.0
(n)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(3)		(1)	(5)	(8)	(3)
N	385	145	617	507	403	154	538	551	359
Miss.	6	225	4	10	0	371	384	3	0
Tauy	.04**	.01	.00	.00	.03**	.03	.01**	.02**	.01

** p < .01

Table D-3 High Political Knowledge and Age Cohort of Non-Voters, 1964-1996

	Year								
	1964	1968	1972	1976	1980	1984	1988	1992	1996
High Political Knowledge Non-Voters									
%	39.8	71.7	13.9	26.9	3.2	33.8	23.2	30.1	42.9
N	152	104	86	138	13	52	125	166	153
Age Cohort									
Low %	0	0	0	0	0	31.6	11.2	18.6	39.5
(n)						(12)	(21)	(39)	(66)
2 %	35.7	69.2	11.3	25.1	2.6	33.8	24.9	39.8	41.7
(n)	(5)	(18)	(24)	(52)	(5)	(22)	(44)	(64)	(40)
3 %	41.9	77.1	17.1	33.3	8.3	25.0	31.8	35.3	49.2
(n)	(67)	(37)	(24)	(30)	(6)	(6)	(27)	(24)	(29)
4 %	38.2	65.5	16.0	27.1	1.8	42.1	42.9	35.9	54.8
(n)	(39)	(21)	(20)	(26)	(1)	(8)	(24)	(23)	(17)
5 %	36.8	69.0	13.3	26.5	2.8	50.0	31.0	35.3	20.0
(n)	(25)	(20)	(13)	(18)	(1)	(4)	(9)	(6)	(1)
High%	42.1	80.0	13.2	23.8	0	0	0	0	0
(n)	(16)	(8)	(5)	(5)					
N	382	145	617	513	403	154	538	551	359
Miss.	9	225	4	4	0	371	384	3	0
Gamma	0.01	-.03	.00	-.00	.21*	.03	.27**	.13*	.09
* p < .05									
** p < .01									

* $p \leq .05$ ** $p < .01$

Table D-4 High Perceived Political Self-Efficacy and Sex of Non-Voters, 1964-1996

Non-Voters, 1964-1996									
	Year								
	1964	1968	1972	1976	1980	1984	1988	1992	1996
	High Perceived Political Self-Efficacy Non-Voters								
%	16.0	33.5	30.8	26.0	28.8	10.9	28.3	23.3	28.9
N	59	111	185	119	107	26	149	126	103
	Sex								
Male	19.2	33.3	36.8	25.6	30.9	13.9	29.5	23.2	32.0
(n)	(28)	(42)	(82)	(40)	(47)	(14)	(62)	(55)	(48)
Fem	14.0	33.7	27.3	26.2	27.4	8.7	27.5	23.4	26.6
(n)	(31)	(69)	(103)	(79)	(60)	(12)	(87)	(71)	(55)
N	368	331	600	458	371	239	526	541	357
Miss.	23	39	21	59	32	283	12	13	2
Tauy	.00	.00	.01*	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00
* p < .05									

* $p < .05$

Table D-5 High Perceived Political Self-Efficacy and Ethnicity of Non-Voters, 1964-1996

	Year								
	1964	1968	1972	1976	1980	1984	1988	1992	1996
High Perceived Political Self-Efficacy Non-Voters									
%	16.0	33.5	30.8	26.0	28.8	10.9	28.3	23.3	28.9
N	59	111	185	119	106	26	149	126	103
Race/Ethnicity									
White	19.0	35.0	32.6	25.8	28.9	12.0	28.5	23.9	26.4
(n)	(47)	(89)	(168)	(102)	(91)	(23)	(117)	(101)	(76)
Black	10.5	30.4	18.4	30.4	26.1	5.0	26.2	16.9	38.2
(n)	(12)	(21)	(14)	(14)	(12)	(2)	(22)	(15)	(21)
Other	0	12.5	33.3	23.1	37.5	12.5	33.3	23.8	40.0
(n)		(1)	(3)	(3)	(3)	(1)	(10)	(5)	(4)
N	368	331	600	454	371	239	526	541	357
Miss.	23	39	21	63	32	283	12	13	2
Tauy	.02**	.01	.01	.00	.00	.00	.01	.01	.01

** p < .01

Table D-6 High Perceived Political Self-Efficacy and Age Cohort of Non-Voters, 1964-1996

	Year								
	1964	1968	1972	1976	1980	1984	1988	1992	1996
High Perceived Political Self-Efficacy Non-Voters									
%	16.0	33.5	30.8	26.0	28.8	10.9	28.3	23.3	28.9
N	59	111	178	118	107	26	149	126	103
Age Cohort									
Low %	0	0	0	0	39.4	13.3	34.6	23.4	34.7
(n)					(13)	(8)	(64)	(49)	(58)
2 %	16.7	20.0	36.5	32.5	30.8	11.4	28.2	29.9	30.2
(n)	(2)	(12)	(69)	(69)	(57)	(10)	(49)	(47)	(29)
3 %	23.2	25.2	32.9	25.6	32.8	8.9	27.1	18.2	23.7
(n)	(36)	(27)	(46)	(21)	(22)	(4)	(23)	(12)	(14)
4 %	11.0	35.2	25.0	17.4	16.3	10.3	17.3	18.0	6.9
(n)	(11)	(25)	(30)	(15)	(8)	(3)	(9)	(11)	(2)
5 %	9.4	49.2	25.0	15.0	16.7	6.3	14.8	11.8	0
(n)	(6)	(31)	(23)	(9)	(5)	(1)	(4)	(2)	
High%	11.8	55.2	27.0	23.5	40.0	0	0	0	0
(n)	(4)	(16)	(10)	(4)	(2)				
N	365	331	600	458	371	239	526	541	357
Miss.	26	39	21	59	32	283	12	13	2
Gamma	-.20**	.32**	-.15**	-.25**	-.20**	-.07	-.18**	-.05	-.29**

** p < .01

[illegible]

APPENDIX E

TABLE E Percent Classified Correct as Voting/Not Voting in Steps
by Year

Year	Step 1	Step 2
1964	77.65***	78.35***
1968	82.93***	N/A
1972	73.49***	73.49***
1976	74.85***	75.71***
1980	72.48***	72.48***
1984	87.63***	N/A
1988	72.36***	75.44***
1992	78.29***	78.39***
1996	76.52***	77.34***

Step 1= one variable (1968 and 1972 political self-efficacy only all
Other years knowledge only)

Step 2= political knowledge and political self efficacy only

N/A = Step does not improve classification

*** $p < .001$

VITA

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