

LORD LOTHIAN'S MISSION TO THE
UNITED STATES, 1939-1940:
A STUDY OF
DIPLOMATIC PERSUASION

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


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
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preface.....	iv
I. The Making of a Federationist.....	1
II. Lothian's Idea of the Road to World Peace....	14
III. Lothian's Quest for Anglo-American Entente...	20
IV. Gaining the Confidence of the Administration and The American Press.....	33
V. Lothian's Assessment of United States Foreign Policy.....	50
VI. The United States First Commitment.....	67
VII. Harsh Criticism.....	84
VIII. The Threat of War: The American Attitude Changes.....	94
Appendix A. "His Majesty's Ambassador," <u>St. Louis</u> Post-Dispatch, April 20, 1940.....	110
Appendix B. "To Lord Lothian," <u>Chicago Daily</u> <u>Tribune</u> , December 16, 1940.....	113
Appendix C. "Political Review of the United States For the Year 1939," Lord Lothian to Lord Halifax.....	116
Appendix D. Lord Lothian's Commitment to Secretary of State Cordell Hull.....	132
Appendix E. Secretary of State Cordell Hull's Reply to Lord Lothian.....	136
Appendix F. President Franklin D. Roosevelt's Notification to Congress of the Destroyer-Base Exchange.....	138

Appendix G.	Letter to Sam Rayburn from President Franklin D. Roosevelt, July 15, 1940.....	140
Appendix H.	Memorandum from President Franklin D. Roosevelt to the Secretary of State.....	141
Appendix I.	Excerpts from a letter from Lord Lothian to Sir D. Stevenson, November 24, 1933.....	143
Appendix J.	Excerpts from Arthur Krock's Commentary in the <u>New York Times</u> , December 13, 1940....	144
Appendix K.	Editorial Comment, "Lord Lothian" <u>New York Times</u> , December 13, 1940.....	145
Bibliography.....		147

PREFACE

The heads of government generally made the decisions on the foreign policy they will pursue. They use their influence to sway the public to follow their recommendations. While it is the heads of government, along with their close advisers, who decide on foreign policy, in democratic governments others must work behind the scenes to carry out the policies formulated by any democratic administration.

At the onset of World War II in Europe, the United States was still predominantly isolationist. The majority of the American people wanted no part in the "European War." Hitler was on another continent and although the Americans might feel that he should be halted, it was Europe's affair to take steps to stop the expansion. Although President Franklin Roosevelt was farsighted enough to see that the ultimate decision of what was to happen to Europe was also of much concern to the United States, he faced an electorate of which a good percentage was isolationist. Publicly, he had to carry on with a policy of neutralism, promising that the United States could avoid war.

Even before there was open warfare in Europe, Great Britain recognized that war was inevitable; Germany and Italy would prove formidable enemies. In late August, 1939, His Majesty's Government sent a new Ambassador to the United States, Lord Lothian. This Ambassador would be burdened with the task of convincing the Administration, the press, and the American people, that aid to Great Britain was essential for the future protection of the United States.

This thesis centers around the extent to which Lothian's Ambassadorship noticeably changed American public opinion during 1940--a change from largely isolationism to one of support for Great Britain. The British Ambassador would have little opportunity for close personal contact with the American people, but his contacts with the Administration and the press who report to the people would be of utmost importance in swaying public opinion. The reaction of the press to Great Britain would be the influencing factor on the American public.

I wish to thank members of my Thesis Committee, Dr. Kemp P. Yarborough, Dr. Valentine J. Belfiglio, and Dr. John L. Dawson for their assistance and advice. I am especially grateful to my committee Chairman, Dr. Harral E. Landry, for his advice, counsel, and patience. Without his aid, this work could not have been accomplished.

I. THE MAKING OF A FEDERATIONIST

In 1939, with war clouds looming on the horizon, Great Britain appointed a new Ambassador to the United States, Philip Henry Kerr, the Marquess of Lothian.¹ Lord Lothian had never held a diplomatic post, yet His Majesty's Government asked him to accept a position that was of vital importance to the British Empire. With war rapidly approaching in Europe, he would have to convince not only the President of the United States but the American people as well, that England's fate was their fate. He would have to persuade America that if England fell to the Axis powers, then America might tremble because of her own potential danger.

Although Washington was his first formal diplomatic post, diplomacy had been and was a constant part of Lord Lothian's life. The St. Louis Post-Dispatch, in a background sketch when Lothian made a speech to the St. Louis Chamber of Commerce, described him as being "one of the top-

¹Lord Lothian was born Philip Henry Kerr. In March, 1930, he inherited the Lothian title on the death of a cousin. His title will be used throughout as it is the accomplishments of Lord Lothian, the Ambassador, with whom this study is concerned.

ranking, if not the top diplomat in the British service."²
The complete sketch is included as Appendix A.

Lord Lothian was no stranger to America. In his position as General Secretary of the Rhodes Trust he had visited Forty-four of the then Forty-eight States and had made friends throughout the Country.³ He understood Americans, a quality of utmost importance in so crucial a period. He knew United States history and was considered an authority on Abraham Lincoln. Lothian's understanding of American politics enabled him to evaluate the political atmosphere.

Lothian needed to reach the American people and in order to be effective with his appeal, he had to receive a favorable reaction from the American press. Ultimately, his mission was successful and a closer relationship between Great Britain and the United States was evident at the time of his death.

The convictions and ideals of Lothian which appealed to the American people had been developed early in his life. He had been born in London on April 18, 1882. His father, Major General Lord Ralph Kerr, third son of the Marquess of Lothian, had just relinquished the command

²St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 20 April 1940.

³Ibid.

of his regiment, the 10th Hussars, then stationed in India. Lord Kerr spent the remainder of his years of active military service in England. Lothian's mother was Lady Anne Fitzalan-Howard, daughter of Henry, fourteenth Duke of Norfolk. Lady Anne had married Lord Ralph Kerr, who was twenty years her senior in 1878. In addition to Lothian, the oldest, the Kerrs had three daughters, Cecil, Margaret, and Minna. A second son was born eleven years after Lord Lothian.

After retiring from active military service, Lord Ralph settled his family at Woodburn, a dower-house of the family estate of Woodburn, where the children had a happy childhood. Both of the parents were ardent Catholics and raised their children in a religious atmosphere. At age ten, Lothian attended the Oratory School, Edgbaston, where he remained for eight years until he went to Oxford.⁴

Lothian adapted well to life at Edgbaston, playing both cricket and football for the school. Excelling in his studies, he won a school scholarship. Although Lothian was apparently popular at school, he formed no close or

⁴J. R. M. Butler, Lord Lothian (Philip Kerr) 1882-1940 (New York: St. Martin's Press, Macmillan & Co. LTD., 1960), p. v. (~~hereafter cited as~~ Butler, Biography).

lasting friendships. His interests in school included photography, the wireless, and bicycling.

As Lord Ralph Kerr was forty-five years older than his son, no close bond of companionship developed between Lothian and his father. Lord Ralph and Lothian did take bicycle rides together, but this was the only activity in which they participated together. Lothian was always devoted to his mother, and in later years, although they held divergent views, particularly toward religion, there was never any cloud on the close relationship between them. As a boy, Lothian was extremely devoted to the Catholic religion and at one time considered becoming a priest. His plans were to be a priest somewhere in the Empire, where he could work among the people. Although he never entered the priesthood, his life was spent working among the people.

The family decided that Lothian was to go to Oxford and begin his work at New College in October, 1900. The Boer War had broken out in the late autumn of 1899 in South Africa and Lothian wanted to join the militia. However, his parents did not approve his plan and Lothian went to Oxford as an undergraduate, spending some time in France to learn the French language and while there also studied some history.⁵ It was at Oxford that Lothian

⁵Ibid.

developed his first religious doubts. From this time on, there was evidently no more thought of becoming a priest, and from this time on, he gradually grew away from formal Catholicism.

Although he did not serve in the Boer War, Lord Lothian was soon to become involved in the aftermath of that war. After the war, Sir Alfred Milner was appointed colonial governor of the defeated and newly annexed Transvaal and Orange River Colony. Lord Milner had been appointed Governor and High Commissioner of Cape Colony in 1897. Milner's policy was to rehabilitate economically the area and to do this, he instituted a program of cultural assimilation involving use of the English language and the institution of a competent and corruption free government. To accomplish this, Milner recruited in England for personnel. A friend of Lothian's father offered Lothian a post in Milner's government. Lothian spent his next four and one-half years in South Africa, serving as Secretary to William W. Palmore, Earl of Selborne, Milner's replacement in South Africa. Lothian later served in the Transvaal as a director of the railroad being built there. In South Africa, Lothian became the youngest member of the group known as "Milner's Kindergarten."⁶ "Milner's Kindergarten"

⁶Ibid.

consisted of a group of Englishmen who shared a common base in the Moot House in Johannesburg. They exercised their varied wits upon racial and constitutional problems of the colonies annexed by Great Britain after the Boer War.

It was in South Africa that Lothian first became deeply committed to the idea of federation, the main stem of his political philosophy for the remainder of his life. He expanded his idea to that of federation for Europe and felt that only through federation could peace be assured.

When the South African Union was formed, Lothian did not wish to remain as a civil servant of the Union. A suggestion was made to Lothian that he become editor of a paper which was being founded by a group of colleagues. Since the main goal of the paper was to promote federation, the idea appealed to him and he became editor of The State, remaining in this position until after the Union Constitution for South Africa went into force. He returned to England in 1909 and with a group of friends established The Round Table, an unofficial journal dedicated to advancing the group's aim of cooperation and eventual union of the countries within the British Commonwealth. His success as an editor in South Africa led to his becoming editor of The Round Table.⁷

⁷Ibid., p. vi.

The Round Table was started by a group using the word "Moot" for their meetings--a word itself indicating clearly that the movement originated among those interested in South Africa. Lord Milner was head of the group. They hoped to travel to other countries, particularly those of the British Empire, as missionaries to promote the concept of cooperation until organic union might be possible. They hoped to recruit the general public through a periodical patterned after The State. Lothian became the first editor of this new publication, The Round Table, and remained associated with it for the remainder of his life. After he gave up the editorship, he continued as a contributor to the periodical.

On September 17, 1912, Lothian began a journey to Canada and the United States in connection with his duties as editor. He had previously planned to visit the United States to carry out personal plans for an inquiry into the Negro problems there, and he now combined his personal project with the trip to Canada for information for The Round Table. On this trip he travelled as far south as Atlanta. Lothian returned from his travels and settled down to his editorial duties in London, detaching himself from domestic issues and dealing only with the exchange of information and ideas about imperial problems in all parts of the British Empire.

expert on imperial and foreign affairs. He accompanied Lloyd-George on his trips to Paris, establishing friendly relations with the United States delegation and with the press. Lothian was more responsible than anyone else for that part of the Versailles Treaty containing the documentation with regard to the German nation. Lloyd-George always gave the credit for this work to Lothian. On his return from the Peace Conference Lothian challenged a reporter with: "'Certainly the Treaty is very stiff, but apart from the fundamental question of reparation, I have always found it difficult to see where it could really be revised.'"⁸ Later he changed his evaluation of the treaty, regarded it as overly harsh, and worked persistently to revise it.

After completing his service to the Prime Minister, Lothian became political director of the London Daily Chronicle, of which David Lloyd-George had acquired control. He did not remain long with the newspaper. Resigning in 1922, he traveled in America giving lectures. The primary reason for his trip was to learn more about Christian Science, to which he had been introduced by Lady Nancy Astor in 1915. He understood that this religious interest might affect his career; however, by this time, he was

⁸Ibid., p. 77.

deeply committed to the Christian Science religion, as evidenced in a letter to his friend, Lionel Curtis, on May 28, 1922: "'So far as I am concerned Christian Science will have the first claim on my time and activities'"⁹

Although he remained a firm follower of Christian Science, his biographer notes that: "None the less he regarded it as part of his duty as a landlord to help his neighbors to obtain the treatment they desired and he contributed generously to the Norwich-Norfolk Hospital."¹⁰

In 1925, Lord Lothian was appointed General Secretary to the Rhodes Trust. This position required that he devote all his energies to the Trust, and be prepared to travel in the Dominions and in the United States during part of each year. For the next fourteen years Lothian devoted himself to the duties of his position, and his travel in the United States furthered his acquaintance with the people of America.

When his father died in 1916, Lothian became the heir presumptive to the Lothian title. In March, 1930, the tenth Marquess of Lothian died and Lothian became the eleventh Marquess after his cousin's death, since the

⁹Ibid., p. 91.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 98.

cousin left no issue. When the British government levied the large death duties on the estate, Lothian later had to auction some of the art treasures belonging to the Lothian estates in order to pay the taxes due. The estates were in both Scotland and England. The eleventh Lord Lothian gave up Newbattle in order that it might become a college; it was later taken over by the Army Medical Service in World War II. Monteviot became the family home. Fernieheist was let at a small fee to a Scottish Youth Hostels Association and Blickling was transferred to the National Trust, with the right reserved for the donor's family to live there.

In 1931, Lothian served as Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, and in 1932, he received an appointment as Secretary of State for the India office and went to India a few weeks later to prepare detailed recommendations concerning the franchise for Indian legislators. After a year's service in India, Lothian returned to England, where he managed his estates and continued contributing articles to The Round Table.¹¹

Lothian made visits to Germany and met with Adolf Hitler twice, the last time in 1937. Because of these meetings, at a time when Lothian was searching for some way

¹Ibid., p. v.

maintain the peace, the American press later accused him of being an appeaser.

In 1938, the Court of St. James offered the ambassadorship to the United States to Lord Lothian at the suggestion of Viscount Edward Frederick Lindley Wood, Lord Halifax, the Foreign Secretary. Lord Halifax felt that Lord Lothian was the best qualified man for the position, as Lothian had spent much time in America and was acquainted with President Franklin D. Roosevelt. He had visited Franklin Roosevelt as a private British citizen and the two had discussed steps that might be taken to insure peace. Since Lothian had already planned trips to Australia, New Zealand, and the United States, he asked that the news of his new appointment be withheld until he completed these visits, as he wished to travel and speak as a private citizen. This announcement of his appointment did not appear publicly until April, 1939¹² and he departed for Washington in August.

Arriving in Washington on August 29, 1939, he began his service as British Ambassador. He was to return to England only once more, a three weeks trip in October, 1940. During this visit to England on leave from his Ambassadorship in Washington, His Majesty's Government

¹²Times (London), 25 April 1939.

designated him a Knight in gratitude for his service. However, he returned to his post in the United States and was never again in England; thus he was never Knighted and invested with the insignia. He died in Washington on December 13, 1940, of uremic poisoning, attended only by a Christian Science practitioner from Boston and a male nurse, along with Embassy attendants. After a state funeral in Washington, his ashes were interred in the National Cemetery at Arlington until December, 1945.¹³ After the war the remains were returned by an American warship and finally laid to rest in the family vault at Jedburg Abbey in Scotland.

¹³Chicago Daily Tribune, 16 December 1940. Complete article reprinted and presented in Appendix B.

II. LOTHIAN'S IDEA OF THE ROAD TO WORLD PEACE

Lothian's philosophy concerning the neeessary criteria for world peace did not materialize with his appointment as Ambassador to the United States. Nor did the emergence of the German pproblem in the 1930's completely guide him in forming his ideas. From his early days in South Africa, he had worked toward and sincerely believed that federation was the only means of survival for the newly formed southern African colonies. He had advanced the idea of union first of the colonies, then federation of the entire British Empire, followed by federation with Europe and close ties with America.

Lothian believed permanent peace could be secured and achieved only by some system of world government. In September, 1915, Lothian had written: "'The cure for war is not to weaken the principality of the state, but to carry it to its logical conclusion, by the creation of a world state.'"¹ In November, 1922, in a Canadian interview, Lothian was still advocating a form of world government.

¹Butler, Biography, p. 57.

He had said: "'The great task before us is to teach the nations how to work as a League of Nations which will do for the world what the British system now does for a quarter of it.'"²

Lothian saw the British Commonwealth as a step toward world government. J. R. M. Butler, in his biography of Lothian, strongly emphasizes that Lothian never departed from his views that national sovereignty was incompatible with world peace and orderly progress, but that he did come to realize that a world state was attainable only in the distant future.³

Lothian, writing in Foreign Affairs on "The World Crisis of 1936", revealed his recognition that world peace was not probable in the near future. Lothian analyzed events that helped lead to World War I, stating that all the nations of Europe began preparing for the war in 1904. Germany, believing she could win the war by carrying out her time table of defeating the French Army before Russia crossed her eastern borders, had provoked the war. Lothian commented that it was because of the German violation of their guarantee against the invasion of Belgium, and

²Ibid., p. 108.

³Ibid., p. 208.

the United States' conviction that Great Britain and France were fighting for democracy and national self determination, that the United States entered the war. Without the American aid, Germany might have won World War I or The Great War.

Now in the 1930's, Lothian commented that if France and Great Britain had taken action immediately after Italy invaded Ethiopia, the coming of another war against Nazi Germany and Facist Italy might have been prevented. As a result, Hitler would make a mistake regarding British intentions and the world would find itself dividing into three groups, Communist, Facist, and Democratic. Lothian warned that the democracies must stand together in combating the threat of dictatorship.

His beliefs as to the role of America were evidenced in his statements that the British Commonwealth had been the outer ring of protection for the United States and as long as the British Commonwealth existed, the United States was secure. Lothian commented that if the British and Americans would act together, they could end world war, though perhaps not all wars, an illusory hope that the League of Nations had attempted to accomplish. Lothian added that in 1914, neither President Woodrow Wilson nor the American League to Enforce Peace had been able to grasp the lesson of American experience as outlined by

Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay in the pages of The Federalist. He said: "That lesson was that there is no real halfway house between the anarchy of state sovereignties and full federation"⁴ Lothian's predictions of what was to be unleashed on the world became a reality.

The outbreak of war in 1939 did not lessen Lothian's concern with achieving some type of world government. He constantly advocated some form of world government to insure lasting peace. His concern was not only with a successful conclusion of the war, but with what would follow after the war. In a speech at Swathmore, Pennsylvania, on November 11, 1939, at a Founder's Day celebration, he outlined requirements for such a world government. Not excusing the democracies, he said, "'The primary task for democracies is to set our own democratic houses in order.'"⁵ In the speech, Lothian recognized that first totalitarianism must be defeated, and then he advocated, "'unity of nations under law, with governments possessed of police powers.'"⁶

⁴Marquess of Lothian, "The World Crisis of 1936," Foreign Affairs 15 (October 1936): 125-40.

⁵Lawrence E. Davis, "Lothian Predicts Federated Europe," New York Times, 12 November 1939.

⁶Ibid.

It was on the occasion of this speech that Philip, Marquess of Lothian, was awarded an honorary degree of Doctor of Laws by Swathmore University President, Dr. Frank Aydelotte. The citation recognized "his life-long devotion to the cause of peace and ... contribution to friendly understanding between the English speaking peoples"⁷

On May 15, 1940, in an interview for the New York Times Lothian advanced the view that the weaknesses in all systems of cooperation, such as the League of Nations, was that they were leagues of governments, not peoples. In his opinion, the essential unit of a true democracy was not the government, but the citizens. He said: "The only final remedy for this supreme and catastrophic evil of our time is a federal union of the people, return to government of the people, by the people and ending war for good."⁸

Lothian's concept of stable world government required that any union or federation possess the power to enforce conformity to the union. Such an idea would play an important role in his thinking.

Lothian who had advocated federation and some form of world government to insure peace, was now called on by

⁷Ibid.

⁸New York Times, 15 May 1940.

country to use his powers of persuasion in influencing the United States to enter the war as Britain's ally. Lothian had not given up his hope for peace in the world but he had come to feel that the first step toward peace was to defeat the Axis powers. After their defeat, he could then return to devoting his efforts to federation and to securing a lasting peace.

Lothian's views on European federation with the hope of eventual world government had resulted in his having close contact with many Americans for many years. He felt that only with close ties between his country and the United States could such a goal be reached. This close contact with Americans worked to his advantage when he was appointed Ambassador to the United States as many Americans were well aware of Lothian's dedication to world peace. It was through his contacts in the United States that Lothian had learned how Americans thought and he was able to use this understanding in evaluating his best means approach to the American people.

III. LOTHIAN'S QUEST FOR ANGLO-AMERICAN ENTENTE

Lothian believed firmly in Anglo-American cooperation and friendship. He had not developed this belief only after it had become apparent that Great Britain would need aid in her conflict with Nazi Germany; from the time he had begun his writings, Lothian advocated close Anglo-American ties. He believed that World Peace depended on the cooperation of these two nations.

His absorbing interests in Anglo-American relations had appeared early in his career, which probably developed from his early dedication to the union of the South African colonies, to be followed by a union of the British Commonwealth and a union of other governments. It was his deep conviction that a closer union of the English speaking peoples would increase their own prosperity and, as a result of their example and leadership, also advance the hope of world peace.

After the disappointment of American failure to join the League of Nations and despite the isolationism of the Warren Harding regime, Lothian did not give up hope that America would enter into some form of cooperation with Great Britain. He did recognize that the United States

would not take part in international affairs unless she believed that it would be to her advantage or was her duty to do so. His committment was to bring home to America her responsibilities in the brotherhood of nations. In September, 1922, writing in The Round Table, Lothian expressed the opinion that America had "'... very little sense of the brotherhood of nations The preservation of world peace is however, a plain American interest.'"¹

In 1923, Lothian agreed to write some articles for the Christian Science Monitor, published in the United States. He wrote to his mother confessing that:

"for not the least of the reasons which have made me write for the Monitor is that it is perhaps the best available means of helping the American people to get the news of what is going on in the world, and as the future depends entirely on what they are going to do, it is important that they should understand about the rest of the world better than they do."²

Lothian did not ignore the shortcomings of his own countrymen in the lack of Anglo-American understanding. He felt it was difficult for the two countries to understand one another. Concerned in the late 1920's over the attitude of the British people and their distrust of the United States, he saw as the root of British distrust several factors.

¹Butler, Biography, p. 110.

²Ibid., p. 96.

One was United States isolationism, but Lothian did not believe this isolationism would be permanent. In December, 1926, writing in The Round Table, he said: "'The real danger is the animosity and bad feeling, perhaps over legitimate grievances, in Great Britain may delay that day or deflect the movement from its natural channels.'"³

Another grievance to which Lothian attributed the British mistrust was that Great Britain resented payment of huge war debts for sixty years to an ally who had suffered much less in the common cause in World War I, while other European debtors were let off with lighter terms. He felt the high American protective tariff also contributed to the mistrust, as well as the loss of British naval supremacy due to American insistence on maintaining a navy equal to that of the British.

Cordell Hull wrote in his Memoirs of an informal visit made by Lothian in October, 1934, to discuss what could be done to improve the bad feelings between Britain and the United States in view of accumulated proofs of German, Japanese, and Italian intentions toward the world. Hull remarked: "He told us frankly that MacDonald, Baldwin and Simon were not particularly well disposed toward us,

³Ibid., p. 117.

but that the great mass of British people desired the friendliest relations between the two countries."⁴

Lothian did not share the British attitude toward naval supremacy, but he understood the British grievance. On July 8, 1936, he wrote to General Jan Smuts regarding the Ethiopian surrender to Italy: "'My own view is that the only basis from which a new and better system can grow is from an informal cooperation between the British Commonwealth and the United States to control the oceans in this century as Great Britain alone controlled them in the last....'"⁵

Lothian felt that the people of Great Britain needed to understand how the people of America thought. In addition, he wanted English toleration of America's ideas; Englishmen should accept that there was as good a reason for the American view of international affairs as there was for the British view.

In June, 1939, Living Age published an article by Lord Lothian, entitled "A New Commonwealth," in which Lothian expressed the view that Britain's political

⁴Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, 2 vols. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1948), 1:384.

⁵Butler, Biography, p. 211.

philosophy of the last half century would no longer meet the needs of the empire. Lothian stated that no longer could the objective of growth in political, economic, and national liberty be a basis of progress. He pointed out that this philosophy was now challenged from two sides--Socialism and Communism. Lothian again advanced his theory that the nations of the Commonwealth and the nations of North and South America had been able to develop with this philosophy only because the British Navy had commanded the seas.

In the article he also argued that now that Germany and Japan had developed a balance of power, no longer could the Empire and the North and South American nations afford the leisure of remaining free to decide, only after war had broken out, whether they would become a part of it. Lothian admitted the United States could possibly retire behind its own ramparts, but others could not and would merely become totalitarian satellites. He felt a federation embracing only the British Commonwealth was insufficient to solve international problems; a federation of all nations in some new form was necessary.⁶ On the eve of war, Lothian

⁶Lord Lothian, "A New Commonwealth," Living Age 356 (10 June 1939): 308-10.

was still stressing that only United States-British cooperation could avoid complete anarchy and establish peace in the world.

After Lord Lothian reported to the United States as His Majesty's Ambassador, he worked tirelessly to improve Anglo-American relations and cooperation. In most of his public speeches in the United States, he referred to the need for such cooperation. Then a short time later, Hitler invaded into Poland and World War II began.

Speaking at Barnard College November 4, 1939, Lothian considered the common problems of all democracies, saying they had three major ones: "Unemployment and the economic disorder that unemployment spells; the maldistribution of wealth and war."⁷ He expressed the idea that if these problems could be solved by the democracies, there would no longer be any need for totalitarianism. The Ambassador did not excuse his own country as he stated:

There is no doubt that we have made many mistakes and have sometimes abused our power by giving too little and taking too much The international problem of peace and prosperity is now one which concerns all the democracies, though in different ways, and will have to be dealt with by democratic means.⁸

⁷"Text of Lord Lothian's Speech at Barnard College," New York Times, 15 November 1939.

⁸Ibid.

Lothian had used the right approach to appeal to the American people. The New York Times reported: "The speaker was interrupted by greatest spontaneous applause, however, when he paused after conceding that his government had erred and abused its power."⁹ American react favorably to admissions of abuse of power and probably more so when it comes from the country from which they won their independence.

Lothian well understood that America was reluctant to enter into a European war. On April 22, 1940, in a letter to his friend, Sir Alan Lascelles, he expressed the opinion that the United States would not formally declare war because of the constitutional difficulty involved. Although he felt the United States would gradually take more steps to assist Great Britain, he nevertheless noted: "'The ultimate decision of course rests not with the American people or with us, but with Hitler, Mussolini or the Japanese. If they go far enough they will push the United States into war, just as Hitler pushed us, for there is nothing pacifist about the American people.'"¹⁰

⁹New York Times, 15 November 1939.

¹⁰Butler, Biography, p. 278.

Lothian's ability to predict the actions of the American people allowed him to proceed cautiously in his post as Ambassador and to refrain from using propaganda. Instead, he attempted to point out to them their world-wide responsibility.

Lothian could be very frank, not only did he insinuate that this own country was inclined to rely on the United States, but he suggested that the United States also was inclined to rely on Great Britain. Reporting on a speech by Lothian to the Chamber of Commerce in St. Louis, the St. Louis Post-Dispatch reported:

The capacity audience of 450 found occasion for laughter when Lord Lothian, discussing British American relations, referred to what he said was the well known American gag: "England expects every American to do his duty." A gale of laughter subsided to a mere ripple when he continued referring to the British gag: "America expects the British Navy to defend her right to be neutral."¹¹

It is doubtful that Lothian's remarks on this occasion were a mere joke for the amusement of his audience. It is far more likely that they expressed his true analysis of the relationship. Americans complained that Great Britain wanted the United States to help fight her wars. Laughter subsided when the joke was reversed and Lothian referred to the United States' expectations of the British Navy.

¹¹St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 30 April 1940.

Perhaps his statement held a ring of truth for the audience. Perhaps the Americans were less interested in what went on in Europe because they depended on Great Britain and specifically the British Navy to keep the totalitarian powers away from American Shores.

However, Lord Halifax, in his "Confidential Dispatch, Political Review for 1941," noted that while Britishers focused their attention primarily on Europe, it was quite clear that the American people were more concerned with and disliked the Japanese more than any other nation. In discussing the Japanese-American negotiations in early 1941, Halifax points out that any sanctions against Japan were almost universally approved in America. Speaking of the imposition of restrictions on trade with Japan and the freezing of Japanese funds in the United States, the British Commonwealth, and the Netherlands, Halifax wrote: "The imposition of these measures received almost universal approval in the United States, and it was shown once more that isolationists were, in the main, only Isolationists in respect to Europe. Even Senator Wheeler gave the measure his support."¹² Senator Button K. Wheeler, of course,

¹²Thomas E. Hachey, ed., Confidential Dispatches, Anal ses of America b The British mbassador 1939-1945 Evanston, Ill.: New University Press, Inc., 1974), p. 33.

was known as one of the strongest and perhaps most verbal of the isolationists.

Lord Lothian continued to point out to his American audiences that Britain was, in a way, gaining time in order to allow the United States to have the opportunity to arrive at a state of readiness to defend herself. In a National Broadcasting Company network interview with Drew Pearson and Robert Allen, newspaper columnists, in Washington D. C., on July 22, 1940, Lothian pointed out that if Great Britain could hold out for two years, the United States would have time to rearm and there would then be hope of winning the war and saving world freedom. Emphasizing that it was far easier to defend the United States and Canada by controlling the Strait of Gibraltar, the English Channel, and Capetown, Lothian theorized that if those strategic positions were suddenly captured by hostile forces, the United States could be raided at any point.¹³ In a speech to the Yale University Alumni on June 19, 1940, Lothian reenforced his stand, saying: "The outcome of this grim struggle will affect you almost as much as it will affect us."¹⁴

¹³New York Times, 23 July 1940.

¹⁴Lord Lothian, The American Speeches of Lord Lothian July 1939 to December 1940 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1941), p. 43.

Lothian expanded the theme of Great Britain holding until the United States could rearm in a note which he wrote to the Chairman of Associated Industries of Massachusetts, on October 15, 1940. The British Ambassador informed the Chairman he was not free to speak to the group, but would send Sir Walter Layton to speak for him. Lothian praised and thanked the factory workers and employers of the United States for their aid to his country and urged the group to develop their own rearmanent program as fast as possible. Meanwhile, he promised that the British would attempt to hold their position, keeping the enemy from bringing war to the United States.¹⁵

J. R. M. Butler, in his book Grand Strategy, discussed Lothian's contribution to closer Anglo-American relations and cooperation in the British cause. Butler's book gives the strategy the British followed during the period. He reviews a meeting on November 8, 1940, between Lothian and the British Chiefs of Staff in which Lothian explained to the Chiefs that America now realized the importance of helping Britain. Lothian felt the Chiefs should formulate requirements and present them to America, regardless of whether or not they expected that the

¹⁵Ibid., p. 122.

requirements would be met in full. Lothian's summary of requirements involved considerations of financial, naval, and mercantile problems and included the areas of West Africa and the Far East. His presentation to the Chiefs of Staff centered around the idea that neither Great Britain nor America could solve these problems independently and there must be British-American cooperation.

As a result of his recommendations, Butler notes that the British Chiefs of Staff asked the Ambassador to pose the following significant suggestions to the United States government:

(1) issue instructions to Vice Admiral Robert L. Ghormely, Special Advisor in London for the United States Navy, with regard to the scope of more comprehensive naval discussions which Lothian knew the President to desire, provided that they could be conducted without publicity.

(2) consider the advantage of basing the United States fleet at Singapore.

(3) recognize the urgent need of naval and air power in Ireland.

(4) adopt paramount importance of providing Great Britain as rapidly as possible with supplies and equipment with which to continue the war.¹⁶

¹⁶J. R. M. Butler, Grand Strategy, 3 vols. (Frome and London: Butler & Tanner Ltd., 1957), 2:418.

Lothian was seeking to carry out these instructions at the time of his death.

In his last speech in America, which he himself wrote but which his Embassy staff delivered due to his illness, Lothian said to the meeting of the Farm Bureau:

But the more people think about the future the more they are drawn to the conclusion that all real hope depends on some form of cooperation between the United States and the British Commonwealth of Nations It has long been clear that your security no less than ours depends upon our holding the Atlantic impregnable and you the Pacific.¹⁷

Lothian's devotion to promoting closer Anglo-American relations had begun early in the century. With passage from peace time to war time, the basic idea had grown only more dominant in his philosophy as to how peace might be maintained in the future.

¹⁷Lord Lothian, American Speeches of Lord Lothian, p. 143.

IV. GAINING THE CONFIDENCE OF THE ADMINISTRATION AND THE AMERICAN PRESS

Lord Lothian presented his credentials to President Franklin D. Roosevelt informally on his arrival in Washington, D. C. in late August, 1939. He then spent ninety minutes chatting with the President, the first envoy ever to stay and chat on his first diplomatic call. Lothian was no stranger to the President. The two had visited at the time of some of Lothian's previous visits to the United States. President Franklin Roosevelt was well aware of Lothian's basic philosophies and quest for world peace.

Lothian, understanding the American people and politics as he did, was himself aware of the many problems President Franklin Roosevelt faced in any attempt to aid Britain. Robert E. Sherwood observed of the new envoy: "He most scrupulously avoided adding to the President's embarrassments by making excessive, improper demands."¹ This consideration was important to the President, who at this time had his own political problems with which to contend.

¹Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1948), p. 224.

Franklin Roosevelt was pro-British, but at the same time an astute enough politician to realize that his powers were limited and that to push too far, too fast, would mean disaster. A British Ambassador, who made public or private demands in excess of what the American people were willing to give at the time, would have been an added problem to the President.

Lothian's understanding of the American people was to work to the advantage of both President Franklin Roosevelt and the British Empire. The St. Louis Post-Dispatch reported Lothian as being considered by many as "...the best British Ambassador since Viscount Bryce....He is considered dangerous by some because he can speak a typically American language when he talks with President Roosevelt, Secretary of State Hull, and other administration officials and to American audiences."²

Lothian was aware that American affairs were normally resolved by appeal to public opinion. His biographer, Butler, notes this awareness.

²"His Majesty's Ambassador," St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 20 April 1940.

He never forgot this, and though he was too straight forward to try to by-pass the Administration--indeed his purpose was often to help the Administration, he made a point of maintaining close relations with newspapermen, giving them free access to the Embassy and talking to them with a frankness he knew they would not abuse.³

As His Majesty's Ambassador, Lothian was to act as an intermediary for Winston Churchill, when he became Prime Minister, and President Franklin Roosevelt. Churchill and Roosevelt often corresponded directly, Churchill signing as a Former Naval Person, but Lothian was often the negotiator between the two. In early years, Winston Churchill had differed with Lothian over the treatment of Germany as a result of the Versailles Peace Treaty. After Churchill became Prime Minister in 1940, he wrote of Lothian's service in the destroyer-base exchange negotiations:

...a singularly gifted and influential ambassador.... We had differed much and often from Versailles to Munich and later. As the tension of events mounted, not only did Lothian develop a broad comprehension of the scene, but his eye penetrated deeply....In this he moved with the ruling minds in Washington who were deeply perturbed, not only by sympathy for Britain and her cause, but naturally even more by anxiety for the life and safety of the United States.⁴

³Butler, Biography, p. 261.

⁴Winston S. Churchill, Their Finest Hour (Cambridge: The Riverside Press, 1949), pp. 399-400.

Although Lothian was successful in establishing rapport on his arrival with President Franklin Roosevelt, it was also necessary for him to form a friendly working relationship with the Secretary of State, Cordell Hull. Secretary Hull and Lothian carried out their discussions quietly and informally, a change from the manner of diplomatic contacts in World War I.⁵

Lord Lothian called on Cordell Hull on September 1, 1939, establishing the first of many contacts between the Secretary of State and the British Ambassador. Cordell Hull, recalling their first meeting, recognized that few ambassadors had ever assumed their posts at so tense a moment. With Germany on the March in Europe, Great Britain would desperately need the friendship and support of the United States. The British representative in the United States would be facing the task of convincing the American people that their own safety depended on Great Britain's ability to stop Hitler. Cordell Hull later wrote: "Lothian to my mind was unexcelled as an ambassador by anyone of my acquaintance. His great ability, intensity of purpose and strong though charming personality make him virtually a perfect diplomatic representative."⁶

⁵Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, p. 681.

⁶Ibid., p. 674.

Secretary of State Hull appreciated Lothian's informality and often conducted affairs with the Britisher in a small narrow room leading out of his office to his secretary's room when the office was crowded. Later, when Hull would receive other foreign ambassadors in this small room, if they appeared to show the slightest signs of disappointment at being received in this manner, he would relate to them the cheery manner in which the British Ambassador had sat with him there for the most important conferences.⁷

Good relations with President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Secretary of State Cordell Hull were essential, but of no less importance was the manner in which the Ambassador related to the American press. The members of the press would, in the ultimate sense, influence the American people.

Lord Lothian's predecessor, Sir Ronald Lindsay, had impressed the American press as being cold, haughty, and avoiding interviews with the press as much as possible. Probably, no one could have been appointed to the embassy post who could have better altered this impression than Lothian. In view of the grave situation which England knew she was facing, it was of the utmost importance that

⁷Ibid., p. 187.

the new ambassador develop a close friendly relationship with the American press and public.

For his initial call on President Franklin Roosevelt, Lothian, of medium stature and build, arrived in a black pin-stripe business suit and wore a gray Homberg. Missing was the typical high hat normally worn by ambassadors in making official appearances. As Lothian opened the front door and started out after his first meeting with President Roosevelt to face the batteries of newsreel and flash bulb cameramen, a scrawny, tired black cat strolled casually across his path. He stooped and picked it up. the cat, a counterpart to one in London named "Appeasement", was instantly dubbed "Crisis." Time magazine said:

Most newsreelers agreed it was the best informal camera break in Washington since J. P. Morgan bounced a midget on his knee at a Senate investigation. That was all the U.S. Newshawks needed to make them realize that a change had been wrought in the huge spreading \$1,000,000. red and white Queen Anne⁸ palace that houses the British Embassy in Washington.

The Time article was not all praise, however, expressing suspicion of Lothian's sincerity and "Band-wagon jumping,"

⁸"The Chill Is Off," Time, 11 September 1939, p. 15.

calling Lothian "an original appeaser when appeasement was the fashion. The Washington press corps gathered he was a diplomat who missed few bets."⁹

Lothian was always informal in his contacts with the press and careful to avoid giving the impression of being a reserved Britisher. Newsweek spoke of his appearance: "...as one who might have been mistaken for a Midwestern businessman or a college professor."¹⁰ The Washington press corps found him to be a British Ambassador who was agreeable to informal interviews at any time.

Thus, most of the press across the country accepted him as a sincere, hard working ambassador. In the places where he spoke, he received an enthusiastic response. The New York Times, in reporting a visit to Yale, stated, "Yale was proud to receive him as an adopted son, a scholar, a friend of scholars, a distinguished public servant, a true friend of the United States."¹¹

Moreover, the press of his own country approved Lothian's appointment as its Ambassador. The London Times reported:

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰"Lord Lothian's Policy of Aid to Britain Marked His Success as an Envoy," Newsweek, 23 December 1940, p. 12.

¹¹New York Times, 19 June 1940.

Washington is one of the few capitals, perhaps the only capital left, to which the appointment of a British Ambassador outside the regular diplomatic service will hardly be criticized by those who belong to it. In these days it is also beyond doubt the most important capital in which this country is represented.¹²

Lothian, himself, recognized the importance of the post. On May 31, 1939, he wrote to a friend, R. C. Leffingwell, to advise of his acceptance of the post. Lothian said: "'There are few places where it is possible to make more mistakes with more unfortunate consequences than at the British Embassy in Washington.'" ¹³

The Canadian press comment on Lothian's appointment was also favorable. The London Times correspondent in Ottawa reported that:

Canada press comment wholly favorable. Montreal Gazette today says delighted. It feels certain that he will be faithful to the mission which has been his lifework--to place the relations of the United States and the British Commonwealth on a higher basis of right understanding and mutual confidence.¹⁴

Thomas E. Hachey, in his Introduction of the book, Confidential Dispatches, Analyses of America by the British

¹²"The Washington Embassy," Times (London), 25 April 1940.

¹³Butler, Biography, p. 257.

¹⁴Times (London), 27 April 1939.

Ambassador, 1939-1945, commented on Lothian's recognition of the influence of the American press: "Recognizing the formidable power of American public opinion, Lothian was particular attentive to cultivating close ties with the press of the United States."¹⁵

Lothian was aware of the best approach to use to secure the support of the American press. On December 14, 1939, in Dispatch No. 1412 to the Foreign Office in London, Lothian warned his government not to assume the Americans supported them; he repeatedly urged the release of prompt and accurate information to the news media as the best manner in which to discount enemy propaganda aimed at isolationist opinion in the United States. ¹⁶

Lothian was attentive to the press, but he was also an expert in using the press to reach the American people. In order to get Congressional support for Great Britain, he had to convince the American people to approve and support such aid. The President's ability to assist without the approval of Congress and the American people was limited. Lothian was well aware of American reluctance

¹⁵Thomas E. Hachey, ed., "Introduction," Confidential Dispatches, Analyses of America by The British Ambassador, 1939-1945, p. xxii.

¹⁶Ibid., p. xxiii.

to become involved in foreign wars and he was cognizant of the fact that only the people would make the ultimate decision.

Lothian's approach to the people indicates his shrewd judgment of how Americans thought. He realized that any forceful movements on his part would only push the people further into isolationism. Thus in order to avoid being accused of seeking overtly to influence sentiment, particularly with regard to the Neutrality Bill, he limited his speaking commitments. His first speaking engagement, made before the war actually started, was to Pilgrim's Club in New York City. Newsweek reported that Senator William E. Borah, a confirmed critic of everything British, charged the Ambassador with attempting to sway opinion on the neutrality fight. Senator Robert R. Reynolds of North Carolina sought to introduce into the Neutrality Bill two amendments aimed at excluding foreign speakers although he failed. The propaganda war was on in earnest. Nevertheless, Newsweek credits Lothian with being far too keen a student of this country to fall into such a trap and pointed out that Lothian had often written warnings against such an undertaking, which might result in an American swing to ultra-isolationism.¹⁷

¹⁷Newsweek, 6 November 1939, p. 29.

In his visits to the United States, he had learned that the most effective technique was to speak in a language the majority of the American people would understand and approve. He divorced himself from the stilted British language and attempted to speak on a level with the American public, using typical American expressions in his interviews with the press and his public speeches. In an interview, referring to an attack by the British Air Force on an Axis base, he said: "'Fine work. We've been doing too much talking. Now we're socking them in the nose.'"¹⁸

In February, 1940, newsmen quizzed him regarding rumors of a British shift on airplane orders in the United States. Rumors said that England and France would transfer \$1,000,000. in orders for airplanes from the United States to Italy unless the manufacturers, with the approval of the Administration were willing to guarantee that 3,000 pursuit planes and 5,000 bombers would be delivered within eighteen months and given priority over American needs. The United States was pulling out of the depression and such an order meant needed aircraft construction jobs for many Americans. Lothian gave a succinct reply to the queries about the rumor. "'In my opinion, its all moonshine.'"¹⁹

¹⁸New York Times, 22 March 1940.

¹⁹New York Times, 16 February 1940.

The American people understood this type language and it was important to them that the British Ambassador should reassure them.

In a speech to the Virginia Assembly on the occasion of the opening of the restored historic capital of Williamsburg, Lothian confided that he was an astute student of American history. Able to relate to American feelings that still remained concerning the American Revolution, he praised George Washington not only as one of the founders of America, but as also one of the founders of the British Commonwealth. Lothian, referring to George Washington said: "'He also destroyed the influence of those reactionary forces in England which were trying to undo the work of Cromwell. From that successful rebellion has sprung not only the United States but the modern British Commonwealth.'"²⁰

Lothian's manner of approach to the American people was to be frank and honest with them, giving them the correct information and allowing them to make their own decisions. In a speech at Yale University on June 19, 1940, Lothian talked candidly to his audience.

²⁰New York Times, 18 February 1940.

I am not concerned today to attempt to tell you what you should do in this grave matter. That is your business. But I am concerned that if and when the crisis arises you should not be able to turn on me and say "why did you not warn us about these facts which are vital to our own security in time, so that we are able to think about them and come to decisions about them before it was too late."²¹

At times, the British Press criticized the Ambassador for being too frank with the American people. One such occasion was his arrival at La Guardia Field, New York, after a visit to London in November, 1940. Lothian informed reporters on his arrival that the British were about out of money with which to pursue the war. He remained optimistic as to the outcome of the war if aid was forthcoming from the United States, but said Britain could pay cash for the equipment it needed for only about six more months. The London Sunday Dispatch referred to Lothian's interview as an "extraordinary diplomatic blunder."²²

The Ambassador may have been criticized in his own country for his remarks, but most of the press in America accepted his statements as another revelation of

²¹Lord Lothian, American Speeches of Lord Lothian, p. 108.

²²London Sunday Dispatch, 24 November 1940.

truth for the good of the United States. Columnist Arthur Krock commented in his report of newspaper sentiment:

The probability is that Lord Lothian expected this very thing to happen and is well content to have put the subject on view for public and official comment, inquiry and reflection. But the consensus seems to be that if the Ambassador had been indiscreet, his was a "planned indiscretion," a bit of diplomatic strategy well considered in advance.²³

Dewitt Mackenzie wrote: "Making allowances for the fact that his excellency is out to secure more aid from us, I should say he summed the matter up rather well."²⁴

Secretary of State Cordell Hull stated that when President Franklin Roosevelt learned of Lothian's interview giving out information as to Great Britain's lack of funds, he was annoyed at the Ambassador for giving out information on finances. Hull further commented it was no leakage of confidential information, as he and the President knew of the situation and had already been considering it.²⁵

Robert Post, a correspondent for the New York Times in London, wrote that he did not believe Lothian's speech

²³Arthur Krock, "In the Nation," New York Times, 26 November 1940.

²⁴Denison (Texas) Herald, 27 November 1940.

²⁵Cordell Hull, Memoirs of Cordell Hull, p. 872.

was made without the approval of the British government. Post believed that the speech meant a change in the British attitude toward the United States. He expected the British government would be asking for more help, they would be more frank and open in asking for it and they would emphasize the necessity of speed.²⁶

Lothian's interview at La Guardia brought a bitter attack from isolationists in the United States. Senator Hiram Johnson, California, declared he would "'...fight to the last ditch to prevent repeal of the Johnson Act.'"²⁷ The Johnson Act prohibited the extension of American loans to countries in default of debts owed the United States from World War I.

Nevertheless, Lothian's actions were applauded by some Americans as revealed in a typical "Letter to the Editor" of the New York Times from Bryant Morley French, Worcester, Massachusetts, written on November 28, 1940.

The conclusion is obvious. If the government of the United States is to take effective legislative action in regard to aid for Britain, the people must give their support. This means that the people must realize the necessity for the aid asked by Britain. In serving this end, the statement of Lord Lothian is of far greater value than some vague report of the bombings of a West of England town.²⁸

²⁶Robert Post, New York Times, 12 December 1940.

²⁷Turner Catledge, New York Times, 26 November 1940.

²⁸New York Times, 12 December 1940.

The question arises as to whether or not Lothian committed a diplomatic blunder. Thomas E. Hachey, in introducing the Confidential Dispatches of the British Ambassador, discusses the possibility that Lothian's statement was a planned release of information. Hachey says that on his visit with Churchill in November, 1940, the problems of England's finances had been discussed between the two and the situation of finances was very critical. The British Government had only two billion dollars in potential revenues left, but much of this was in the form of investments and could not be converted into ready cash.

Lothian told Churchill that Roosevelt's reelection victory would provide an excellent occasion to acquaint the United States Government with Britain's financial difficulties. Prime Minister Winston Churchill, as a result prepared a comprehensive statement on Britain's financial condition and sent it to President Franklin Roosevelt on December 8, 1940, by Lothian. The result was Congressional passage of the Lend-Lease Act.²⁹

²⁹Thomas E. Hachey, ed., "Introduction," Confidential Dispatches, Analyses of America by The British Ambassador, 1939-1945, p. xxvi.

Lord Halifax, in his "Political Review for 1940," written after Lothian's death, concurs.

On arriving at the New York air field, he told the assembled press at once that England was running short of her dollar resources, and that this was a situation which America would have to consider urgently. A first class sensation was created. Lord Lothian later felt remorse that he had launched a bombshell without consulting the Chancellor of the Exchequer; the immediate effect, however, he believed to be good, and in retrospect it was perhaps as well that the difficult subject was broached to the American public by a man who had won their confidence. Mr. Morgenthau, however, felt that his own ideas for approaching the subject with a view to securing the maximum advantage for ourselves has been considerably embarrassed by Lord Lothian's precipitate action.³⁰

The statement of Lord Halifax appears to clear up the "diplomatic blunder." Lord Lothian had apparently discussed with Prime Minister Churchill the fact that Britain's economic plight would be revealed to the United States. Apparently, they did not, however, decide on the exact manner in which it would be released. Surely, the statement was a diplomatic explosion, since it revealed that Britain urgently needed American aid. Again Lothian had revealed his understanding of how the Americans would react.

³⁰ Thomas E. Hachey, ed., Confidential Dispatches, Anal ses of America b The British mbassador 1 -1 4 , p. 2 .

V. LOTHIAN'S ASSESSMENT OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

Lord Lothian's reports to the British Foreign Office and his judgment of the atmosphere in America would be used extensively by the British Government in making decisions on their contacts with America. The "Political Review of The United States for The Year 1939" was written by Lord Lothian to Lord Halifax, Foreign Secretary on September 3, 1940. Halifax, who became the British Ambassador in Washington after Lothian's death, wrote the subsequent "Political Review for 1940."

These two reports reveal Lothian's complete understanding of the situation in America. A new British law, Public Records Act of 1967, introduced a "thirty year rule" opening up records of the British Government, dated through 1937, and subsequently there has been an annual advancement. Special authority in 1972 permitted declassification of documents through 1945 to facilitate work on studies pertaining to World War II and, for the first time, in 1972 Lothian's and Halifax's political reviews were made available for scholarly study. The reports by the two Ambassadors were deemed so important by the British Government at the time

they were written, that they were referred from the Foreign Office to the War Office for information and guidance.

Lothian, in his report for 1939,¹ assessed the political situation to be of the utmost importance. The opposition forces were suspicious of the President and there had been a split between New Dealers and anti-New Dealers. President Roosevelt had lost control of Congress and had been unsuccessful in getting across much legislation, particularly in securing an amendment to the Neutrality Act to lift the embargo on the sales of arms to belligerents. Lothian went into details on the failure of the Administration to secure the amendment. It was his feeling that the Administration had delayed too long in starting its campaign for repeal of the embargo, perhaps mistakenly believing that feeling in Congress would improve. To the credit side of the Administration's efforts, Lothian listed the virtual passage of a record peace time appropriation for national defense. However, the Administration had failed to bring together the two leading labor factions, the American Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial Organizations. The labor unions remained divided in their opinions and efforts in behalf of the war.

¹Lord Lothian's report to Lord Halifax is reproduced and included in Appendix C, "Political Review of the United States for the Year 1939."

In reporting on the feeling in the United States toward Great Britain, the Ambassador commented that His Majesty's Government could count on the sympathy and support of the Administration on measures short of war. He reported, however, that public opinion persisted in feeling that as long as Mr. Neville Chamberlain remained Prime Minister, the policy of appeasement would prevail. Lothian reported that the outbreak of the war had changed this feeling, but only temporarily, as the inactivity in the early days on the Western Front renewed the feeling that Britain was not in earnest in pushing the war. However, the naval victory of the British over the German Graf Spee changed this feeling.

Lothian referred to the ownership of certain Pacific islands and the closely related trans-Pacific aviation routes as being an item for negotiation between Great Britain and the United States during the year. Lothian commented that: "Each Government was in fact concerned not merely with what the other really wanted but what it really wanted itself."² This problem was adequately settled

²Thomas E. Hachey, ed., Confidential Dispatches, Analyses of America by The British Ambassador, 1939-1945, p. 6.

in April, 1939, with an exchange of notes between His Majesty's Ambassador and the United States Secretary of State.

The Ambassador dwelt at length with the Pan-American situation. He reported a series of loans and credits to Latin American countries as being successfully negotiated by the Treasury and the Export-Import Bank. Brazil had received assistance as well as Nicaragua and Paraguay; requests for loans from Venezuela, Uruguay, and Chile were turned down due to Congressional reluctance to grant further loans with so many South American Government bonds in default. Lothian stated there was no indication that Haiti had been successful in her quest for aid and that no progress had been made in the oil dispute with Mexico. The Ambassador wrote: "The outbreak of war gave the United States Government an opportunity, which they were quick to seize, of further consolidating inter-American relations."³ Lothian certainly kept informed on all aspects of American affairs. The Pan-American countries and the United States met in Panama from September 23 to October 3, 1939 and adopted a series of measures designed to keep the war from the Western Hemisphere.

³Ibid., p. 7.

Lothian was very cognizant of American preoccupation with the Far East and reported in detail on United States action and feelings with regard to that area. Lothian commented that the United States Government showed signs of alarm, and that the disturbance of the balance of power in the Far East, resulting from British and French preoccupation in Europe, was most upsetting to the United States Government. The United States was determined not to abandon China to Japan. The United States fleet was moved back to the Pacific at the end of summer with dramatic suddenness. Lothian reported no new developments of note in the Philippines. Although President Manuel Luis Quezon seemed anxious to retain American connections with the Islands, the United States Congress did not encourage this and even refused funds for making Guam an advanced naval base.

In this report, Lothian revealed his knowledge of American concern in all theaters. Too, he had become quite knowledgeable in all phases of American life.⁴

The "Political Review of the United States for The Year 1940" was written by Viscount Halifax on December 31,

⁴Ibid., pp.1-9.

1941. It was based on Lothian's year as Ambassador and a summary of Halifax's views of events during Lothian's service. As Lord Halifax had no other means of judging affairs in America, the report had to be based on Lothian's findings and records kept before his death.

The report touched on the Presidential elections of 1940, as well as Congressional elections. The Ambassador gave credit to American democracy for electing the man most qualified to guide the country in a crisis, and applauded the adequate Democratic majority given to President Franklin Roosevelt in both the House of Representatives and the Senate. He also lauded Mr. Wendell Wilkie, the opposition party candidate, for his loyalty and aid to his victorious opponent in the ensuing crisis. He praised Roosevelt for his foresightedness in welding the opposition, as well as his own backers, into an efficient administrative team. Lord Halifax said of President Roosevelt: "His speeches were surpassed only by those of the British Prime Minister as dynamic contributions to the war and equalled only by those of Lord Lothian in educational effect."⁵ Lothian's ability to educate the American public was thus put on a

⁵Ibid., p. 12.

par with President Franklin Roosevelt by his peer Lord Halifax, who at the time was serving as British Foreign Secretary.

At this time, President Franklin Roosevelt was appealing for unity but still declaring the nation did not have to go to war. Internal affairs, according to the report, were almost wholly concerned with the elections and much of the report concerning internal affairs covered the party conventions and the election outcome.

The Ambassador's report to the British Foreign Office generally discredits the part the United States played in foreign affairs during the first six months of 1940. Although there was an emotional reaction to Finland's being overrun by Russia, no positive action was taken by either President Franklin Roosevelt or the Congress.

The report refers to the flare up of public opinion against Great Britain in January, 1940, because of resentment toward the British for censorship of the United States mails in Bermuda.⁶ Further antagonism was created by Great Britain's restrictions on United States exports and the British escort of American ships for examination into ports such as Gibraltar--ports where ships had been excluded

⁶Ibid., p. 16.

from entering by Presidential proclamation. Great Britain's announcement that she would discontinue the purchase of agricultural supplies, particularly tobacco, from the United States in favor of purchases from Turkey and Greece, angered southern Senators. The Administration needed the support of these Senators to get across its program.

These particular incidents were headline news in the United States and Lord Lothian had dealt about them directly with President Roosevelt and Secretary of State Cordell Hull. To counteract American antagonism over taking the United States ships into combat areas where the ships had been excluded by Presidential proclamation, Lothian worked out a system whereby the British were allowed to examine the vessels on the American side of the Atlantic. Much of the American protest resulted from the delay of the ships and censorship of the mails.

Frank L. Kluckhohn reported on the dispute over British examination of the United States mail, stating that the British Ambassador had denied that mails had been examined only after British Marines had made a display of bayonets. The confrontation resulted in a bitter attack by some members of Congress. Senator Malvin J. Maas, Republican from Massachusetts, called for a resolution to be introduced requiring Secretary of State Cordell Hull

to submit the full facts to Congress. Not all the Senators agreed. Senator Claude P. Pepper, Florida, told reporters: "In his opinion the British were justified in examining mail destined for Germany."⁷ The Governor of Bermuda, Major General Denis K. Bernard, later authorized Lothian to state that the report that British bayonets were employed was untrue.

The report for 1940 points out that the Administration, American public opinion, and the press were reluctant to recognize the importance of blockade as a war weapon.

As Lord Halifax's report for 1940 noted, another subject of contention between the British and the United States Governments was the Maritime Security Zone laid down by the Declaration of Panama, signed by the twenty-one American republics on December 23, 1939.⁸ This zone drew an imaginary line extending some three hundred miles from American shores, within which no military operations by belligerent powers would be allowed without protest and possible sanctions. His Majesty's Government was unable to accept this principle, as it provided a zone from which enemy

⁷Frank L. Kluckhohn, "Force in Mail Case Denied by Lothian," New York Times, 24 February 1940.

⁸Thomas E. Hachey, ed., Confidential Dispatches, Analyses of America by The British Ambassador, 1939-1945 p. 19.

vessels could emerge to prey upon allied shipping and then return to the zone for protection. No agreement was reached in the matter, but protests of subsequent violations of the zone by the British Navy became less and less serious.

The Ambassador states in his report that from the time in April, 1940, when Hitler occupied Denmark and overran Norway, the European War ceased to be a "phony" war in the eyes of the American people. After the Nazi attack on Belgium and the Netherlands, the Ambassador says isolationists in the United States began to adopt the new popular conception of Western Hemisphere defense. It was still clear to Embassy staff that America would not participate in the war unless it was necessary in order to protect some vital American interest. In addition, the Ambassador felt the United States had become obsessed with the fear of Fifth Column activity in the United States and Latin America.⁹ This obsession was extended to include the future of the British fleet if Germany should become victorious. Events in 1940 and 1941 proved the Ambassador's assessment of these activities in America correct.

That part of the report covering the destroyer-base exchange is excluded in this summation, as it will be

⁹Ibid., p. 21.

dealt with later as a special topic. Lord Lothian had initiated the destroyer exchange and completed it prior to his death; it clearly marked the beginning of full scale United States aid to Great Britain.

The section of the report covering United States-French relations brought out the Ambassador's ability to evaluate relations with countries other than the one which he represented. He noted that the United States was anxious to avoid trouble over the French islands of Martinique and Guadeloupe; the Washington government was not ready to accept a blockade of these French possessions by the British Navy. The Administration wanted sufficient oil to reach these places to keep sugar and other factories operating, thus providing employment for the black population.¹⁰ As a consequence, the United States, bargaining to keep the British from imposing a total blockade of Martinique and Guadeloupe, exacted a promise from the Vichy Representative for French possessions in the Caribbean, French Admiral Contre-Amiral Robert. Robert agreed that he would give notice to an American observer when his fleet put to sea and a firm pledge that he would not attempt to send any ships to French North

¹⁰Ibid., p. 22.

Africa or Metropolitan France without advance warning to the United States Government. British authorities had reasons to believe that at times Admiral Robert intended to evade his pledge, and on each occasion they communicated their fears to the United States State Department, which took appropriate measures. There was a standing American Air Patrol over Martinique.¹¹

At the end of 1940 Lord Halifax, using Lothian's files at the British Embassy, summed up the relations between the United States and Metropolitan France and French North Africa, noting them as being more difficult. Americans felt that if they did not impose extremely harsh restrictions on Vichy, France, Marshal Henri Philippe Pétain might make no more concessions to Nazi Germany beyond those imposed by Hitler's armistice. The British Ambassador was less optimistic than the Americans as to what Marshal Pétain could be depended on to do. Here again, Lothian's evaluation eventually proved to be more nearly correct.

The report also covered the subject of United States-Far East relations, particularly those relating to the Burma Road. The Burma Road was the route by which the British and the Americans supplied Generalissimo Chiang

¹¹Ibid., p.23.

Kai-shek's Chinese Army in his war against Japan. As a measure of appeasement to Japan when they had been unable to secure any early support from the American Administration, the British closed the road for three months, beginning in June, 1940.

The United States had refused to pledge support to the British in creating economic pressure on Japan, since the Navy Department was in the process of transferring the Pacific fleet to the Atlantic, dramatically reducing the American naval presence in the Pacific. After failing to secure American aid in creating economic pressure on Japan, the British suggested that they join in a proposal for a Pacific settlement involving large concessions to Japan. Secretary of State Cordell Hull rejected this proposal, feeling it would not result in halting Japanese expansion. The British Ambassador concluded that: "The United States Government preferred to abide by their policy of drift."¹²

As a result of the American failure to join the British in economic sanctions of Japan, the British closed the Burma Road and asked the United States to issue a statement giving them moral support. The statement, which the American Administration eventually released, was

¹²Ibid., p. 24.

interpreted by the American press as criticizing the British action. However, as a result of the Tripartite Agreement and the Japanese occupation of Indo-China, Great Britain reopened the Burma Road in October, 1940.

About the time of the reopening of the Burma Road, the United States began secret talks--secret at the insistence of Secretary of State Cordell Hull because of fear of influence on the Presidential elections--with the British. One subject of these talks was the American request for the use of Singapore,¹³ to which the British agreed. The other subject concerned the problem of the entire Pacific. During this time, the United States began building military reinforcements in the Philippines and pressing for the evacuation of citizens from Japan and occupied China.

The conclusion of the British Ambassador's report for the year 1940 was devoted by Lord Halifax to Lothian and his final activities after he had returned from leave in Great Britain. These were Lothian's activities in the few days preceeding his death. Lord Halifax reveals that Lothian released to the American press the British financial position and fashioned a final draft of a letter

¹³Ibid., p. 25.

from Prime Minister Winston Churchill to President Franklin D. Roosevelt giving the war strategy for the coming year and enumerating in full Britain's needs.

Lord Lothian also had drafted for the press a release on the British attitude toward Mr. Herbert Hoover's plans for feeding with American food the population of the non-Germanic territories occupied by Germany. The British position was that she could not allow this to proceed as Germany would only take food produced by the territories if food was received from the United States.

Lothian also took time to preside over a British Service Delegation arriving in Washington for secret talks with the Chiefs of Staff of the United States; these were mainly of a naval character. Lothian's last accomplishment before his illness and death was to draft and put the final touches on a speech to be delivered to a meeting of Farm Bureau specialists in Baltimore, Maryland. He was unable to deliver the speech personally and his second in command read the speech for him. Lothian died that same night.

Halifax said of Lord Lothian:

Apart from his exceptional intellectual abilities, the quality which probably contributed most to Lord Lothian's success as Ambassador in Washington was his liking for Americans, whom he regarded, though with some amusement, as the nicest people in the world....Secondly, there was his excessive accessibility in a country where accessibility is a fetish, coupled with his informality....Lastly there was his high character and the conviction he inspired that Anglo-American relations were all-important to him, not only from the point of view of his own country but from that also of the country next dearest to his heart.¹⁴

A study of these Confidential Dispatches to his Government by Lord Lothian--the one prepared by Lothian and the other prepared by his successor, Lord Halifax, on Lothian's activities for 1940, brings out more forcibly the Ambassador's understanding of the American people and the American political atmosphere. He readily understood the American public's reluctance to go to war and that their entry into the war would result only from action by the belligerents' threatening of their security. He was also cognizant of the fact that isolationist elements were very active in the United States and that the only means of combating this isolationist influence was to persuade, not coerce, the American people that Britain's defense was their own defense. Then and only then would the American

¹⁴Ibid., p. 26.

people support Administration efforts to aid Britain. Lothian recognized the importance of cultivating the American press in order to reach the American people.

Lord Lothian accepted the fact that the Administration could only go so far in aid to Britain and that heavy demands by the British at that time might only serve to alienate an otherwise sympathetic administration. Recognizing that an election year was always a difficult time to pass legislation with any semblance of controversy, Lothian was careful in his demands. He was wary enough not to alienate the opposition party on the possibility that it might be successful in its bid for power, although his reports reveal that he doubted that possibility and felt that President Franklin Roosevelt's reelection was vital to the country at that time. Lord Lothian was a farsighted and able representative of His Majesty's Government.

VI. THE UNITED STATES' FIRST COMMITMENT

Lord Halifax, in his "Political Review" of Lothian's activities in 1940, credited Lothian with largely originating and negotiating successfully an agreement under which the United States gave the British Navy fifty destroyers in a time of desperate need. The British in return awarded the United States bases on British territory, thus linking the defense of the British and American people.¹

The British had lost many of their ships at Dunkirk. As early as June, 1940, Lord Lothian announced to the American press that Great Britain was in need of destroyers, as well as planes, explaining that Great Britain had lost almost all of her equipment in Flanders and was further hurt by the German seizure of the French manufacturing areas around Lille. Anything the United States could give Great Britain might mean the difference between winning and losing the war.² Apparently, there had previously been some private discussion between Lothian and President Franklin Roosevelt, since Cordell

¹Ibid., p. 27.

²New York Times, 9 June 1940.

Hull states that President Roosevelt cabled Prime Minister Winston Churchill on May 16, 1940, opposing such a proposal.³

While Churchill and his Cabinet were concentrating on their need for destroyers, the Roosevelt Administration was just as concerned with what would happen to the British Navy if Great Britain went down to defeat. Thus, the possible disposal of the British Fleet and the negation of the destroyer-base exchange in the event of British defeat were matters considered together in so far as negotiations between the two governments were concerned, each government insisting on concessions before making any commitments.

J. R. M. Butler reported in his book Grand Strategy, that Roosevelt spoke with Lothian on May 25, 1940, suggesting the possibility of transferring the British Navy (both the British Navy warships with their aircraft and the merchant ships) to the United States before the British Navy could be captured by the Germans. This proposal by President Roosevelt met with a cold response by Lothian and Prime Minister Churchill; they felt it a misconception on the American side to believe that the United States could afford to wait until Great Britain had been liquidated and still expect to gain use of the British fleet.

³Cordell Hull, Memoirs of Cordell Hull, p. 831.

In reply, Lothian informed President Roosevelt that such a possible transfer would depend on whether or not the United States was on the British side. President Franklin Roosevelt replied to Lothian that such a decision was the prerogative of Congress but he thought it probable that Germany would challenge some vital United States interest, which was a condition necessary for American entrance into the war with the necessary public support. Roosevelt further elaborated that United States public opinion was changing rapidly as to what might constitute vital interests.⁴

The stage for negotiations was set. Cordell Hull reported that Lord Lothian suggested on August 4, 1940, that they arrange the purchase of the destroyers.⁵

President Franklin Roosevelt agreed that legislation to sell the destroyers was necessary before such action could be taken. He also felt that if such legislation were requested without preliminary preparation, it would be defeated or, at least, it would be delayed in its passage. The President then decided to approach the British, through Lothian, to determine if the British would agree to give

⁴J. R. M. Butler, Grand Strategy, p. 241.

⁵Cordell Hull, Memoirs of Cordell Hull, p. 831.

positive assurance that the British Navy, in the event of German success in an invasion of Britain, would not under any circumstances fall into the hands of the Germans. President Roosevelt required that these assurances be received and made public in order to lessen opposition in Congress to the sale of the destroyers. Roosevelt's plan was that such assurance would include a commitment by British naval officials that they would not scuttle the British ships, but rather that they would sail for North America or British Empire ports, where the ships would remain afloat and available.⁶

Prime Minister Winston Churchill was very reluctant to give such a pledge for various reasons. One cause for concern over releasing such information publicly was the effect on British morale. He was apprehensive about the British reaction to such a statement by their own leader admitting the possibility of defeat. Another cause for concern by Churchill was that he did not expect to continue at the helm of government if Britain should fall and could not make promises which another leader might not carry out.

⁶Elliott Roosevelt, ed., assisted by Joseph P. Lash, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, His Personal Letters (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1940), pp. 1050-1051.

It was Lothian's idea that the offer of leasing naval bases to the United States might sway public opinion toward backing the destroyer sale. Lothian proposed that the Court of St. James make a formal offer to Washington to lease facilities, landing grounds particularly, in Trinidad, Newfoundland, and Bermuda. Apparently, Lothian felt that such an offer would make a deep impression in the United States and strengthen British security as well.⁷

Lothian, no doubt, was well aware of American interest in British possessions. On October 14, 1939, press releases had quoted Senator John A. Danaher, Republican from Connecticut, as informing the Senate that if the United States was going to help Great Britain and France, it should demand they cede to the United States in advance their island possessions in the American hemisphere, "Which might be used against us by an enemy."⁸

On September 2, 1940, Lord Lothian wrote Secretary of State Cordell advising that His Majesty's Government would award leases on two bases free--in Newfoundland and on the East Coast of the Bay of Bermuda.

⁷Butler, Biography, p. 244.

⁸Denison (Texas) Herald, 14 October 1939.

In addition, Lothian stated that in view of the United States interest in acquiring additional air and naval bases in the Caribbean and British Guiana, ninety-nine year leases would be awarded on ~~these~~ bases without endeavoring to place a tangible commercial value on the bases. Lothian's commitment to Secretary of State Cordell Hull is submitted in its entirety in Appendix D. Hull wrote a return letter to Lothian on the same date, advising fifty destroyers would be transferred to Great Britain.⁹

The announcement was made to the press immediately and the highly antagonistic criticism of the deal began. The St. Louis Post-Dispatch stated: "President Roosevelt committed an act of war....Of all the sucker real estate deals in history, this is the worst and the President of the United States is the sucker."¹⁰

The New York Times carried an article by Frank L. Kluckhohn, their Washington Correspondent, on September 3, 1940, releasing the information and advising that Franklin

⁹Samuel F. Rosenman, compiler, The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1941), pp. 392-393. Appendix E is a reproduction of Secretary of State Cordell Hull's reply to Lord Lothian.

¹⁰St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 3 September 1940.

Roosevelt had informed Congress he acted on his own authority. However, Senator David L. Walsh of Massachusetts, Chairman of Naval Affairs Committee, claimed the act was illegal. Just how important the deal was to President Roosevelt is shown in Kluckhohn's statement that this deal was: "...hailed by President Roosevelt as the most important act since the Jefferson administration completed the Louisiana Purchase in 1803."¹¹

Prime Minister Winston Churchill had found a means of counteracting the blow to British morale. This was accomplished by a letter from Lord Lothian to Secretary of State Cordell Hull quoted in the New York Times and released for International News Services. Lothian had informed Secretary Hull that: "Mr. Churchill must, however, observe that these hypothetical contingencies seem more likely to concern the German fleet than the British fleet."¹² Churchill was, of course, referring to his assurance to President Roosevelt that the British fleet would not be sunk but sent to places in the British Empire for use if Great Britain should fall after an invasion by Germany.

¹¹Frank L. Kluckhohn, New York Times, 4 September 1940.

¹²New York Times, 4 September 1940.

President Franklin Roosevelt wrote Congress directly on September 3, 1940, the same day the information had been given to the news media.¹³ He announced the lease of bases in Bermuda, Bahamas, Jamaica, Santa Lucia, Trinidad, and Antigua in British Guiana and the gift of the rights of lease on bases in Bermuda and Newfoundland in exchange for fifty destroyers. Roosevelt enclosed a copy of Attorney General Robert H. Jackson's opinion giving him the right to execute such an agreement. Roosevelt stated to Congress that preparation for defense was an inalienable prerogative of any sovereign state, and that he had exercised such a right in the destroyer-base deal.¹⁴

Attorney General Robert H. Jackson's opinion, dated August 27, 1940, and entered in the Congressional records, was addressed to President Franklin D. Roosevelt. In it, Jackson stated that the proposed agreement on the destroyer-base deal could be concluded as an Executive Agreement without awaiting ratification by Congress. The ~~Attorney~~ General further stated that the Powers of

¹³President Franklin Roosevelt's notification to Congress is reproduced in Appendix F.

¹⁴U.S. Congress, House, Letter from President Franklin D. Roosevelt, H. D. 943, 76th Cong., 3rd sess., 3 September 1940, Congressional Record 83:11477.

the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy were not defined or limited in the Constitution other than what the Congress might see fit to limit by necessary two-thirds ratification of the Senate or by legislation by Congress. No limitations in statutes or decisions by the United States Supreme Court existed limiting Presidential transfers or similar acts in foreign relations. Therefore, Chief of Naval Operations or Chief of the Army approval was not necessary. Jackson pointed out that Statutes 217 and 222, voted in a bill of June 15, 1917, were applicable to vessels not built as a service to belligerents. He also pointed out that transfer of mosquito boats, at that time under construction, would be legally impossible without further legislation.¹⁵ Apparently, there was some consideration of also transferring mosquito boats to Great Britain.

Attorney General Robert Jackson's opinion and President Roosevelt's action met with much bitter response in Congress. Representative Frederick C. Smith of Ohio

¹⁵U.S. Congress, House, Letter from Robert H. Jackson, Attorney General to President Franklin D. Roosevelt, H. D. 943, 76th Cong., 3rd sess., 27 August 1940, Congressional Record 86:11356.

roundly condemned the Presidential announcement: "This is an act of war and clearly a violation of our own statutes."¹⁶ Representative Jacob Thorkelson of Montana protested:

No one could have committed a more treasonable act than the President when he handed over a part of the United States Navy to a foreign power. If England wants to be fair, let her turn over the islands to us as our property.¹⁷

Mr. Thorkelson was not above expressing an imperialistic attitude when considering the possibility of securing the island possessions as American property rather than merely leases.

Samuel Flagg Bemis, a diplomatic historian, viewed the agreement between Great Britain and the United States, in which the fifty destroyers were traded for American naval bases in the British possessions, as a collapse of American neutrality and the beginning of undeclared naval hostilities with Germany. Bemis, in commenting on Attorney General

¹⁶U.S. Congress, House, Representative Smith protesting transfer of destroyers, 76th Cong., 3rd sess., 4 September 1940, Congressional Record 86:11413.

¹⁷U.S. Congress, House, Representative Thorkelson protesting transfer of destroyers, 76th Cong., 3rd sess., 4 September 1940, Congressional Record 86:11477, 11478.

Robert H. Jackson's opinion, concluded: "It was he who called upon a comma to save a Kingdom."¹⁸

Nevertheless, President Franklin Roosevelt won his battle and the exchange was made. Lord Lothian had accomplished his mission. There can be little argument with Bemis' statement that this exchange constituted the end of neutrality. Lothian's mission had been to secure United States aid for Britain, and he had accomplished it honorably, being at all times frank with the American people.

President Roosevelt, though he was expounding peace, recognized that war was coming. In 1940, Roosevelt was already making defense plans for the country. On July 15, 1940, he wrote to Representative Sam Rayburn of Texas about the possibility of war.

The War Department, in conjunction with the Civil Aeronautics Authority and the W.P.A. made up a specially selected group of municipal airports last February, which were considered to be the most important strategically to the national defense.¹⁹

¹⁸Samuel Flagg Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the United States, 5th ed. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston Inc., 1965), p. 858.

¹⁹Letter to Sam Rayburn, Rayburn Papers, 15 July 1940, Rayburn Library, Bonham, Texas. Appendix G is a replica of the letter.

Roosevelt was already planning to finance the expansion of airports under the 1941 Emergency Defense Act.

The United States had taken the initial step of aid to Great Britain by completing the destroyer-base exchange. Lord Lothian, the British Ambassador to Washington, had worked steadily in Washington negotiating the deal. His counterpart in London, the United States Ambassador to the Court of St. James, Joseph P. Kennedy receives little credit in the exchange deal. Prime Minister Winston Churchill and President Franklin D. Roosevelt both turned to Lothian to work out the terms for the destroyer-base exchange, often completely bypassing Ambassador Kennedy.

President Roosevelt, no doubt cognizant of the coming election and wanting to retain Kennedy's support, was careful to make an attempt to see that Kennedy did not feel ignored in the matter. On August 28, 1940, Roosevelt sent a memo to Secretary of State Cordell Hull asking that a message be sent to Joseph Kennedy regarding the destroyer-base exchange, and advising that: "The situation developed into a mapping proposition where the Army and Navy are in constant consultation with me here and the daily

developments have to be explained verbally to Lothian."²⁰

It was the British Ambassador, Lothian, who had been successful in negotiating the differences between the United States and Great Britain.

President Franklin Roosevelt had turned to Lothian because he was well aware of his own Ambassador's feelings toward the British hopes of winning the war; Kennedy felt that England would lose the war. Roosevelt was also aware of Joseph Kennedy's complete dedication to avoiding American entry into the war, no matter what the costs. Roosevelt realized that Kennedy nourished a strong tendency to appease Hitler, even after Hitler's march into the Sudetenland.

Joseph Kennedy had supported Franklin Roosevelt's bid for renomination and election to the Presidency in 1936. Kennedy, anxious to be in the center of things, had been eyeing the cabinet post of Secretary of Treasury. Roosevelt had appointed him to the chairmanship of the five-man Maritime Commission. Joseph Kennedy had maintained his visions of becoming Secretary of Treasury,

²⁰ Elliott Roosevelt, ed., assisted by Joseph P. Lash, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, His Personal Letters, p. 1061. Appendix H. is a facsimile of the memorandum.

but Franklin Roosevelt was completely satisfied with Henry Morgenthau as Secretary of Treasury. Roosevelt also recognized that he might not be able to control Joseph Kennedy's actions as Secretary of Treasury.²¹

Later, when the Ambassadorship to the Court of St. James became vacant because of the illness and subsequent death of Robert Worth Bingham, President Franklin Roosevelt offered the prestigious post to Joseph Kennedy. Although Roosevelt had second thoughts after his initial offer and attempted to change and appoint Joseph Kennedy as Secretary of Commerce, Kennedy held out for the Ambassadorship after a friend had told him: "Joe, you'll be the most important man in Europe."²² Joseph Kennedy subsequently received his appointment as Ambassador to the Court of St. James and reported to his position on March 1, 1938.

Kennedy at first did well in London. He and Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain became close friends. In mid-March, the Kennedy family arrived in London, with the exception of the two older sons, Joseph and John, who had remained in the United States in school. London

²¹Richard J. Whalen, The Founding Father (New York: The New American Library, Inc., 1964), p. 196.

²²Ibid., p. 198.

society accepted the Kennedys and Mrs. Kennedy and two of the daughters were presented at court.

However, Kennedy soon went further than merely confining himself to the social and ceremonial functions of his office. He became a working diplomat, attending to matters normally left to career employees of the diplomatic service.

The Ambassador soon appeared among the members of "The Cliveden Set." The name "The Cliveden Set" was given to a group of Britishers, lead by Lady Nancy Astor, who expressed appeasement sentiment when discussing England's relation to the growing Nazi power on the Continent. Lady Astor was the American born wife of Lord Waldorf Astor. She had become the first woman member of the House of Commons after her husband succeeded to his title and had to vacate his seat. A collection of Tory and Liberal politicians, editors, writers, and diplomats, Lord and Lady Astor brought them together at their estate of Cliveden. Lord Lothian had also been considered a member of this social set prior to his appointment as the British Ambassador to the United States.

Joseph Kennedy's rapidly achieved notoriety in British Society was frowned upon by some government members back home. Harold Ickes wrote: "At a time when we should be sending the best that we have to Great Britain,

we have not done so. We have sent a rich man, untrained in diplomacy, unlearned in history and politics, who is a great publicity seeker."²³

Meanwhile, Ambassador Joseph Kennedy and Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain became close friends and associates; both were dedicated to the appeasement of Nazi Germany and to avoiding war. Kennedy did not want to be involved in a war in which his capitalistic world would be in danger of destruction. Neither did he want his sons involved in war.²⁴

As a result of his expressed and often vociferous views opposing American entry into the war, President Franklin Roosevelt was probably justified in bypassing his own Ambassador to the Court of St. James as much as diplomatically possible. Instead, the American President had turned to the British Ambassador in Washington in negotiating the destroyer-base exchange.

While Joseph Kennedy was becoming well known in London for his views that Britain would lose the war and

²³Harold L. Ickes, The Secret _____ of Harold L. Ickes Vol. II The Inside Struggle (New York: Simon & Schuster, 195), p. 377.

²⁴Richard J. Whalen, The Founding Father, p. 228.

and becoming increasingly unpopular for his association with those known in Great Britain to favor appeasement, his counterpart in America, Lothian, was quietly working to create the most favorable impression possible on the American press and, through the press, the American people.

"The pity was that Lothian, whose human contacts with the English-speaking peoples were so fruitful, knew so little at first hand of conditions in Central Europe and altogether failed to comprehend the mentality of Hitler and his crew."²

Lothian, in his search for a means of securing peace with Germany, had visited Hitler twice, his last visit in 1937. Before his visit in 1937, however, he had advanced plans to allow Germany more leeway in armament. André Géraud, discussing the role of France and an Anglo-German Naval Agreement that had been signed June 18, 1935, in which Great Britain had agreed the German Navy could equate that of France, charged appeasement. He wrote: "Lord Lothian sketched the pacification plan and Anglo-German entente."³

On the occasion of Lord Lothian's first visit to Adolf Hitler on January 27, 1935, the German Ambassador to London, Leopold Von Hoesch, had reported to his superiors in Germany that Lothian was among the most influential of non-official personalities in England. The German Ambassador also felt that he was the most important

²Butler, Biography, p. 217.

³André Géraud, "France and the Anglo-German Naval Treaty," Foreign Affairs 14 (October 1935):60.

non-official Englishman to ask to see Hitler. Von Hoesch believed that Lothian was favorably inclined toward Germany and would contribute toward a better understanding between Germany and Great Britain.⁴

As a result of his meeting with Hitler in 1935, Lothian had come to the conclusion that Germany did not want war, but that she felt she must be on an equal footing with her European neighbors. Lothian's judgment was that no German was thinking of war, at least not in the next ten years, and that as a price for peace, Germany was prepared to relinquish her claims to the Alsace-Lorraine, form a treaty with Poland, and not interfere with Austria by force if others did not.⁵ Time Magazine quoted Lothian as saying after his 1935 visit with Hitler: "I believe he is sincere."⁶

On May 5, 1937, Lothian had again visited in Germany with Hitler. In this second meeting Lothian renewed his faith that Hitler desired peace. He discussed this meeting with der Fuhrer["] on May 11, 1937, with Norman Davis,

⁴Butler, Biography, p. 202.

⁵Ibid., p. 203.

⁶"The Chill is Off," Time, 11 September 1939, p. 15.

who was to relay the information to President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Lothian was now becoming concerned, however, that the situation regarding Germany was more dangerous than he had at first supposed.⁷ He nevertheless retained the hope of a world peace. Harold L. Ickes reported that later President Roosevelt joked with him about his confidence in Hitler as a result of the 1937 visit.⁸

When the Germans marched into the Rhineland, Lothian still excused Hitler's motives. William L. Shirer said: "As Lord Lothian remarked, 'The Germans after all are only going into their own back garden.'"⁹

Lothian was soon to begin to have a clearer understanding of Hitler's motives. By 1938, in an interview with Drew Pearson in July regarding his contacts with Hitler, there were indications Lothian was beginning to have doubts as to Hitler's true plans. Sir Edward Grigg

⁷Butler, Biography, p. 217.

⁸Harold L. Ickes, The Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes, II, p. 571.

⁹William L. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich (Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett Publication Inc., 1959), p. 404.

quoted Lothian's reply when Pearson inquired as to whether he had ever met Hitler.

"Yes, five or six years ago, and he said to me much what he said a few nights ago before the Reichstag, that he was very anxious that Germany and England work together. But what he really meant was that we should rule the world together as two branches of the German race, treating all other nations as dependencies. But we cannot come to terms with Hitler on this basis."¹⁰

By April, 1939, Lothian had changed his opinions and realized the terrible menace which Nazi Germany posed for Great Britain after reading Mein Kampf for the first time. He promptly urged conscription in a speech in Parliament before the House of Lords.¹¹ On May 29, 1939, in a letter to T. W. Lamont, Lothian wrote: "But it now seems clear that Hitler is in effect a fanatical gangster who will stop at nothing to beat down all possibility of resistance anywhere to his will."¹²

There is little information as to Lothian's appraisal of Hitler as a person. J. R. M. Butler, his biographer said: "Of his personal impression of the

¹⁰ Lord Lothian, The American Speeches of Lord Lothian July 1939 to December 1940, with a Forward, "Memoir," by Sir Edward Grigg, p. xxxii.

¹¹ Newsweek, 23 December 1940, p. 12.

¹² Butler, Biography, p. 227.

Fuhrer, there is no record except that he is remembered by one of his sisters as saying: 'He has a dual personality and creates mass hysteria, but he left me cold.'"¹³

From the time he changed his opinions of Hitler's true plans for the world, Lothian worked tirelessly for the victory of his country and ultimately some type of world government that might bring eventual peace to the world. On May 13, 1939, Scholastic summed up his new fears: "He now believes Great Britain must take a firm stand against the Rome-Berlin Axis and match force against force if necessary."¹⁴ Too he had returned to England from the United States several months before and warned Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain that his policy of appeasement was creating a bad impression in the United States.

Thus, it is doubtful if the word "appeaser" should be used when referring to Lothian's attitude. Perhaps, it depended on which side of the Atlantic one lived as to how one was classified. Appeasement was used as a derisive description of those in Europe attempting to avoid war. Lothian was never an appeaser in the same sense as Neville Chamberlain--willing to give up much to avoid war.

¹³Ibid., p. 203.

¹⁴"Lord Lothian," Scholastic, 13 May 1939, p. 8.

The description "lover of peace" might better be used in referring to Lothian's views. He firmly and irrevocably believed in a federation or a union of world governments to maintain peace. He was more an idealist than an appeaser, believing as so many others did that Hitler was sincere in his statements regarding peace. When world events proved otherwise and that what Hitler really wanted was to master Europe and perhaps later the world, Lothian became a dedicated and outspoken critic of him.

On the American continent, the people who were willing to go along with events as they were, particularly as long as they did not effect America, were termed "isolationists." They continued their battle long after Hitler's true aims were out in the open. They might well be termed appeasers also, as it was soon apparent that Americans would have to defend world freedoms as much as the people of Great Britain.

After Lothian's appointment as Ambassador to the United States, Nazi and Facist spokesmen constantly ridiculed him in a barrage of propaganda aimed at the United States. The Berlin Press called Lothian a "turncoat," and referred to his speeches in the United

States as a "'misuse of his official position.'"¹⁵ Nazi propaganda, aimed at Lord Lothian, continued throughout his Ambassadorship.

Although Nazi propaganda was the main source of criticism against Lothian in the United States, along with that of isolationist Congressmen and members of the press, there was one other source of dissatisfaction in the United States with his appointment as Ambassador. This animosity came from Catholics, particularly Irish-American Catholics, who greatly resented Lothian's switch from Roman Catholicism, the religion of his family and his own early religion to Christian Science, of which he had become a devout follower.

Michael Williams stated that this religious change was often referred to as a "scandal," and that it was finally brought into the area of a public discussion on December 19, 1940, after Lothian's death by Rev. John S. Kennedy in his department "The Sitting Floor" in the Catholic Transcript of Hartford. Williams claimed that a very secret whispering campaign against Lothian had been carried on among American Catholics. Williams credited the United States national policy of aid to Great Britain

¹⁵New York Times, 16 January 1940.

as the original cause of very active underground Catholic opposition within the Country; Catholics were traditionally anti-British. Lord Lothian's arrival as Ambassador caused this discontent to ferment even more.¹⁶ This issue certainly never became an important one during Lothian's Ambassadorship; the above articles are the only indication to be found referring to the so-called "scandal." The Catholic opposition might have been forced into silence as a result of the fact that the American Ambassador to the Court of St. James was Joseph Kennedy, an Irish-Catholic serving in a predominantly Anglican England.

Lothian's switch from Catholicism to the Christian Science religion did not evoke criticism on the part of the majority of Protestant Americans. His personal characteristics were responsible for much of his appeal to the American public, and his devout adherence to his chosen religion was an added attraction. In addition, Americans still retained a certain mystique in their feeling toward British nobility. Since he began life as one who was not in direct line for the title of Marquess, he had had to support himself, and this touch of working class ethic appealed to the American romantic.

¹⁶Michael Williams, "Views and Reviews," The Commonweal, 31 January 1941, p. 404.

Too, Lord Lothian was a bachelor, although at one time he had seriously considered marriage, and he quickly became a target for mothers with unmarried daughters in America as well as in England. His casualness and complete lack of attention to fashionable attire would have endeared him to the middle class American. That he could appeal to the intellectual in America also was illustrated when Columbia University conferred the honorary degree of Doctor of Law on Lothian. The New York Times gave a glowing account of the esteem of those attending the ceremony: "Thousands including faculty members and alumni...arose and remained standing during the reading of the citation."¹⁷ Despite some small criticism, Lothian had become a very appealing figure in America.

¹⁷New York Times, 15 September 1940.

VII. THE THREAT OF WAR: THE AMERICAN ATTITUDE CHANGES

There was a definite change in the attitude of the American people toward the European situation in 1940. This change was even beginning to show up in late 1939. President Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Administration were in the main aware that the United States would eventually have to intervene in the war, but they were also aware that public sentiment must change before such intervention could take place.

Robert E. Sherwood, in discussing American attitudes in 1939, credits the isolationist sentiment as being representative of the entire American public, with only a very small minority feeling that a victory by Hitler would threaten American democracy. Sherwood said that only about 2.5 percent of the population could be considered interventionists and that the majority of these people were in the South, the Rocky Mountains, and the Pacific Coast states. Approximately 30 percent of the population, according to Sherwood, were determined isolationists.

¹Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 127.

Sherwood further stated that the reason President Franklin D. Roosevelt bypassed Secretary of State Cordell Hull in many matters was that Hull exhibited tendencies toward isolationism. Roosevelt turned to Harry Hopkins for advice, as Hopkins would have been an interventionist except for his complete devotion to President Roosevelt's capability and his refusal to believe that Roosevelt could be wrong on many issues.²

Much of the credit for the change in attitude of the American people toward the situation in Europe and for the recognition of the need for the United States to aid Great Britain must go to Lord Lothian. It was during his service as Ambassador that American public sentiment began to swing toward aid to the British. Lothian spoke to the American people frankly, giving them, in so far as possible, a true picture of Britain's needs in withstanding Hitler's advance. He expressed optimism in his country's ability to withstand the Nazi menace and turn the tide of the aggressor. This optimism, in turn, was reflected in the attitude of the American people.

During his Ambassadorship Lothian had many situations arise, which required delicate handling to forestall a

²Ibid., p. 130.

possibility of an anti-British bitterness creeping into the feelings of the American public. In August, 1940, Sir George Paish, a British economist on a lecture tour in the United States while visiting friends in Larchmont, New York, created a furor among the press in talks with Senator Burton K. Wheeler of Montana. Senator Wheeler claimed that Paish had informed him that he, Paish, was responsible for getting the United States into the first World War and that he intended to get the United States into the present one. The Ambassador immediately asked Paish to return to Great Britain as soon as possible in the interest of Anglo-British relations.³

Lothian had to explain and defend his country's refusal to go along with former President Herbert Hoover's food plan for feeding the conquered nations in Europe. England felt that if this were allowed, it would only mean more food for the German conquerors. Lord Lothian satisfactorily explained his country's position, and many Americans, though still retaining the humanistic outlook toward providing food for conquered nations, could understand the British attitude. A "Letter to the Editor" in

³New York Times, 31 August 1940.

the New York Times from Mr. Maurice Leon, dated October 26, 1939, commended Lord Lothian's message as a presentation of facts; Hoover had either forgotten or ignored the interest of the United States, since food materials would only be used in the further expansion of pan-Germanism.⁴

Although at times Lothian was criticized for his idealistic views on federation, the criticism rarely raised the question of Lothian's sincerity. In January, 1940, John Daniels wrote the New York Times that he took issue with Lothian's feelings that Europe and the seas should be controlled by democracies, but Daniels clearly stated his opinion that Lothian was frank and sincere in his statements. Daniels referred to Lothian's feelings as, "A welcome advance beyond the vague and meaningless platitudes which are so common in diplomatic utterances."⁵

Representative George Holden Tinkham of Massachusetts was one of Lothian's most outspoken critics. After a speech in Chicago in March, 1940, in which Lothian stated British war aims, Tinkham denounced the Ambassador vehemently. Tinkham called Lothian's speech: "'A clear

⁴New York Times, 29 October 1939.

⁵New York Times, 9 January 1940.

violation of diplomatic privilege and immunities...."⁶

Tinkham declared that if Lothian made another such speech, the Administration should request that the British Government recall the Ambassador. No such action was ever contemplated or taken.

The change in 1940 in the American outlook and attitude toward aid to Great Britain is particularly revealing in editorials and press releases, most of which credit Lothian directly or indirectly. On July 8, 1940, Time in an article "Lord Lothian's Job" said: "United States public opinion, which last year was unwilling to face the savage reality of war, last week was prepared to admit that it had a decisive, selfish, personal interest in what happens to the British fleet."⁷

Harold Callender, writing for the New York Times in October, 1940, reported essentially the same change. He noted that the American public had suddenly realized in mid-June the importance of British sea power as part of American defense. He commented that strategists had long been aware of this strategic value but the average American had only recognized the fact in June. The

⁶New York Times, 22 March 1940.

⁷"Lord Lothian's Job," Time, 8 July 1940.

columnist acknowledged that the American attitude toward Britain itself had changed, and that Americans had begun to admire the British and to throw off their traditional suspicions.⁸

In early September, 1939, there appeared in the Denison Herald an editorial claiming that the war did not affect the United States directly, but was an example of European politics at work. The editorial stated flatly that the issues were purely European and the interest of the United States was not involved.⁹ Less than eleven months later, the newspaper had completely reversed its position. On August 28, 1940, the same newspaper carried an editorial entitled "We are Involved." The editorial stated that the United States was drifting toward a war in which we were already involved and in which we must do everything possible to help the British stop Hitler's attack.¹⁰

This paper, in the heartland of American public opinion, had changed dramatically. The same Denison

⁸Harold Callender, "Our Help Britain Policy in a More Active Phase," New York Times, 20 October 1940.

⁹Denison (Texas) Herald, 4 September 1939.

¹⁰Denison (Texas) Herald, 28 August 1940.

Herald reported on September 8, 1940, the results of a poll of a private luncheon club members in response to President Franklin Roosevelt's trade of fifty destroyers for bases in the British possessions. There was only one dissenting vote among the thirty plus members.¹¹

Noted columnist Dorothy Thompson wrote on October 1, 1940, that the past of the Axis nations in itself should make clear to Americans that this was no European war. Rather in her view it was a "World revolution for the redistribution of the entire planet."¹² Her column appeared in a large number of American newspapers, metropolitan and small town.

Other commentators urged intervention. Walter Winchell commented on October 3, 1940, that America now realized that the road to isolation ended where it had always ended, with the enemy on the doorstep.¹³

Life Magazine on December 9, 1940, carried an article on the British Ambassador, calling Lothian a

¹¹Denison (Texas) Herald, 8 September 1940.

¹²Dorothy Thompson, Denison (Texas) Herald, 1 October 1940.

¹³Walter Winchell, Denison (Texas) Herald, 3 October 1940.

legitimate propagandist, stating that Americans were tired of U.S. Anglophiles who accused America of shirking her duty in not saving the British.¹⁴ The same magazine wrote after Lord Lothian's death that Lothian's loss meant much to Great Britain. It commended the Ambassador on his handling of a delicate job and said: "Lord Lothian early decided on a policy of plain talking. Because he never disguised his purpose, but always respected American feeling and interests, he was listened to and believed."¹⁵

Chesly Manly wrote in the Chicago Daily Tribune, on the occasion of Lothian's death, that it was a blow to Great Britain. The Ambassador would be very difficult to replace because of his popularity in the United States and his extraordinary success in persuading the American people that the British cause was their own.

Lord Lothian exerted an incalculable influence upon the Roosevelt administration and was credited with a major share of the responsibility for each successive step this government has taken toward more and more assistance to Britain.¹⁶

¹⁴Life, 9 December 1940.

¹⁵Life, 23 December 1940.

¹⁶Chesly Manly, "Lothian Death Blow to Britain in Critical Hour," Chicago Daily Tribune, 13 December 1940.

Arthur Krock, on the occasion of Lothian's death, wrote: "The cause he espoused officially and personally had far wider acceptance when Lord Lothian died than when he undertook it. And his understanding was as sincere as it was able and effective."¹⁷

Time Magazine wrote of the change in American attitude as a result of Lothian's Ambassadorship:

Though no historian would credit that great shift wholly to the Ambassador, there was no doubt he had been an intergral part of it....Last month as public men began to assess Lord Lothian's contribution, their tributes differed in degree but not in kind; few diplomats in United States history have accomplished so much in so brief and difficult a period.¹⁸

After Lothian's death the New York Times, in an editorial comment stated that he had worn himself out in the service of his country and that the burden he had carried had become the heaviest and most responsible in the British Foreign Service. The editorial opined that he, in part, was responsible for America now understanding the truth of the world situation. The editorial further

¹⁷Arthur Krock, "Unusual Fitness of Lothian for His Post," New York Times, 13 December 1940. Excerpts from Krock's column are included in Appendix J.

¹⁸Time, 23 December 1940, p. 10.

commented: "He grew in stature as his ambassadorship grew, until at the end he had become a rare asset to his Government, a living link between his embattled people and ourselves."¹⁹

Lord Lothian had carried out his mission and accomplished his job well. The United States attitude toward assistance and aid to Britain had changed dramatically during the period in which he had served in the United States. Perhaps, the greatest tribute toward his service came from J. R. M. Butler. When writing on British strategy for 1939-1940, he noted that the United States had already become a non-belligerent ally.

Perhaps no one except the President, the Prime Minister, and Hitler, had contributed more to this result than the man, who as Philip Kerr, had long shown an instinctive understanding of the American outlook.²⁰

The present Marquess of Lothian, who succeeded to the title on the death of his cousin, has also praised the Ambassador: "He was, I think, appointed Ambassador because

¹⁹Editorial, New York Times, 13 December 1940. The editorial is reproduced in Appendix K.

²⁰J. R. M. Butler, Grand Strategy, p. 38.

of his wide knowledge of and sympathy with the United States, and indeed, it did turn out to be a most inspired appointment."²¹

President Franklin D. Roosevelt, who was on a ship in the Caribbean at the time of Lothian's death, was stunned at the loss of his old friend. Robert Sherwood said the message sent by Roosevelt to King George VII was no perfunctory expression of routine regret; Roosevelt and Lothian had indeed been able to understand each other. Sherwood related Roosevelt's message as saying he was "Shocked beyond measure to hear of the death of his old friend, and that he was certain that the last message that Lord Lothian would wish to give to the world was that victory must and will come in this war."²² President Roosevelt returned to Washington on December 16, 1940 and immediately started preparations to push lend-lease legislation, a goal Lothian had consistently hoped for.

Lord Halifax, succeeded Lord Lothian as British Ambassador to the United States. He also praised his

²¹Letter from 12th Marquess of Lothian, 14 January 1975, to Author.

²²Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 224.

predecessor: "'Lord Lothian was an old friend of mine and I take a measure of credit for one superlative good thing in my life, recommending him to His Majesty for Washington.'"²³

Lothian's service to his country had been cut short by his death, but the results of his service were manifested in the continued United States aid to Great Britain and in the eventual entry of the United States in World War II as an ally of Britain.

American diplomatic historians have initially neglected Lord Lothian's effectiveness. Samuel Flagg Bemis praised Franklin D. Roosevelt for his statesmanship in coming to the conclusion that the risk of a double war was preferable to permitting Japan to destroy the British Empire in the Pacific, while the United States was making efforts to preserve it for the defense of the Atlantic. Bemis made no mention of Lord Lothian's role in President Franklin D. Roosevelt's decision.²⁴ Robert E. Ferrell, editor, and Samuel F. Bemis, advisory editor, in presenting

²³Times (London), 10 January 1941.

²⁴Samuel Flagg Bemis, "The Shifting Strategy of American Defense and Diplomacy," American Foreign Policy and The Blessings of Liberty and Other Essays (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1962), pp. 403-404.

material from Secretary of State Cordell Hull's papers, quote many of Hull's statements and memos regarding Lothian, but they make no comment.²⁵ Sumner Welles refers to the destroyer-base exchange as necessary for the security of both the United States and Great Britain, but makes no mention of Lord Lothian's negotiations.²⁶ Charles A. Beard, in his book, President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War 1941, makes no reference to Lord Lothian in developing the steps leading to the war.²⁷

In the final analysis, the aid given by the United States to Great Britain during his Ambassadorship testifies to Lord Lothian's achievements. The destroyer-base exchange had been completed and lend-lease was well on the way to being solidified during Lothian's duty in Washington. America began to rearm, American public opinion had changed from neutrality to support, and Great Britain had the will and the resources to continue the battle until America could

²⁵Robert H. Ferrell, editor, and Samuel F. Bemis, Advisory editor, The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy, XIII, Hull, 2 volumes (New York: Cooper Square Publishers Inc., 1964), 1:328, 349, 354, 357.

²⁶Sumner Welles, The Time for Decision (New York and London: Harper & Bros. Publishers, 1944), pp. 181-184.

²⁷Charles A. Beard, President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War 1941 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948).

be in a position to enter the war. Much of the credit for these fundamental policy changes must surely go to Lothian.

Perhaps the complete lack of acknowledgment by diplomatic historians is in itself an indication that Lothian had been successful in his mission. Lothian, understanding the American people as he did, realized that the best method of reaching the public was to work quietly in the background. Any effort on his part to push the United States into war would have been met with a further tendency toward isolationism. By being frank with and easily accessible to the American press, he could depend on the press to report on his country's progress in the war and the dire need for assistance. If he had attempted to sway the press with propaganda, they would have become hostile. Lothian was well aware that the reaction of the press to his country's efforts in the war and their determination to halt Axis aggression would ultimately sway American public opinion.

Lothian made every effort to support the American Administration. He upheld Administrative views and actions instead of attempting to convince them to take drastic steps which would only have caused the American people to lean still further toward isolationism.

Lothian was careful to be divorced, as far as the public was concerned, from American politics. His one visit back to England was timed to coincide with the American Presidential election in early November; he would be out of the country during elections and therefore, could not be accused of trying to influence the elections in late October and early November.

Lothian's sudden death, though a blow to Great Britain, may have created some sympathy for the British cause. It is the normal reaction of Americans to sympathize at a time of bereavement and more so when the death is of a sudden and unexpected nature.

Lothian served as a liaison between President Franklin Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill. Churchill could not be present in the United States to be in constant contact with the Administration. Lothian's actions in carrying out his job created a favorable attitude from the American press and as it is the press who paints the picture for the American public, in the end he influenced the American people.

It is not always the heads of government who are most influential in carrying out their determined policy. The success of the policy often rests on someone in a lower position to some extent to determine that the policy is

successful. The entrance into the war of the United States as a British ally and the United States giving of assistance desperately needed by Great Britain prior to her entrance into the war, must in part have been due to Lothian's service as the British Ambassador in Washington.

APPENDIX A.

THE ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH

Section 1, Page 5A, Column 5

April 20, 1940

"His Majesty's Ambassador"

Lord Lothian is considered by many informed persons to be the ablest British Ambassador to Washington since Viscount Bryce. He is considered "dangerous" by some because he can speak a typically American language when he talks with President Roosevelt, Secretary of State Hull, other administration officials and American audiences.

This is his fifteenth visit to the United States. He has been in 44 states, and through his Rhodes scholarship connections he has intimate and candid friends in every United States city. He knows American history and politics, is an authority on Lincoln and as a former editor knows newspapermen and publicity. As Philip Kerr he wrote a political column in a London newspaper, after the war, and in recent years was a prolific and respected letter writer to the Times of London.

When he succeeded to a long list of titles in 1930, through the death of a cousin, he was greatly annoyed at his elevation to the House of Lords. He had contemplated a

career of active politics and possibly hoped eventually to become Prime Minister. Although he inherited 28,000 acres in Scotland, these were mortgaged to the hilt and he had to sell many of the family paintings and books to pay the death duties. His new position also carried great financial responsibilities, which he thought would hamper his other activities.

He is the oldest son of Gen. Lord Ralph Kerr and traces his family back to 1357. He is a graduate of New College, Oxford, and after the Boer War became one of Lord Milner's bright young men in South Africa, where he got his early training in politics, government and journalism. He still considers himself a Liberal, and at one time was vaguely attracted by Socialism.

In 1916 he became a secretary of Lloyd George, then Prime Minister and toward the end of the war and during the peace conference he was the British "Col. House." He is said to have drafted more sections of the Versailles treaty than any other person.

In 1925 he became the secretary of the Rhodes Trust, a position that took him around the world several times. On one of his trips to this country he accompanied Gen. Smuts of South Africa. He visited Soviet Russia in 1931 with Lady Astor and had an interview with Stalin, and in 1935 on an official "unofficial" visit, interviewed Hitler.

In 1931-32 he was the Parliamentary Undersecretary for India and has retained his interest in that country.

During the early days of Hitler's rule he urged British cooperation with Germany. He was called a leading figure in the "Cliveden Set," and was bitterly criticized in Parliament. Washington is his first diplomatic post, in the formal sense of that term, but he has been one of the top-ranking, if not the top diplomat, in the British service.

He is 58 years old, a bachelor and a Christian Scientist. He has broken with the tradition of aloofness long maintained at the British Embassy, and is enormously popular in Washington in both official and social circles. There is no pose about him and he works on his assignment of cultivating better American-British relations at every opportunity.

APPENDIX B.

THE CHICAGO DAILY TRIBUNE

Page 16, Column 1

December 16, 1940

"To Lord Lothian"

Washington, D. C. Dec. 25.--Officials of the United States and diplomats stationed in Washington today paid tribute to the marquess of Lothian, British ambassador to the United States, in funeral services at the Washington cathedral.

The brief service in the rites of the Anglican church included no eulogy or mention of the achievements of the 58 year old nobleman who died in the early hours of Thursday, soon after he had addressed an appeal to this nation to give more aid to Great Britain in her war against Germany and Italy.

A caisson escorted by a troop of cavalry bore the body from the rambling, red brick British embassy to the Episcopal cathedral in a procession which moved slowly along Massachusetts avenue, lined on both sides by watchers.

Cremation Is Private.

After the church service, a private cremation service was held. Tomorrow, with full military honors, the ashes

will be placed temporarily in a vault at Arlington cemetery, the national burial ground for American military heroes. Whether the ashes will be taken to his native England for eventual burial has not been announced.

The flower banked cathedral was filled with dignitaries of many lands when the Rt. Rev. James E. Freeman, bishop of Washington, met the procession at the door. The casket, draped in a British flag, bore wreaths from King George of England, the British and Canadian governments and President Roosevelt.

Every nation with diplomatic envoys in Washington, except Germany and Italy, was represented at the funeral. President Roosevelt, who was in Warm Springs, Ga., enroute home from his Caribbean cruise was represented by Stephen Early, White House Secretary. Near him were Mrs. Roosevelt, Secretary of State Cordell Hull and Mrs. Hull and Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes and Mrs. Hughes.

Other Dignitaries Present.

Also attending were the other Supreme court justices, cabinet members and their wives, members of congress, ranking members of the army and navy, high administrative officials; Joseph E. Kennedy, ambassador to Great Britain, and William C. Bullitt, former ambassador to France.

By royal command, Neville Butler, counsellor of the British embassy, represented King George at the services and placed the wreath from the king and from his government.

The 30 minute service consisted of Scripture reading, including the familiar 23d Psalm, "The Lord is my Shepherd," music, and the committal service.

Assisting Bishop Freeman were three other members of the cathedral clergy, Dean Noble C. Powell, Dr. T. O. Wydell, canon Chancellor, and the Rev. William M. Bradner, canon preceptor.

APPENDIX C.

"POLITICAL REVIEW OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE YEAR 1939"

Lord Lothian to Lord Halifax.--(Received 24th September.)¹
(No. 772.) Washington 3rd September, 1940.

I-Internal Affairs

The legislative achievement of the first session of the 76th Congress was as meagre as its proceedings were undistinguished. The preoccupation of both Houses with the war threat overseas aggravated instead of curbing the usual tendency of a pre-election year to play politics. The Opposition, considerably strengthened by the 1938 elections, and reinforced with Democrats disgruntled by the President's attempted "purges" of the previous autumn, remained obstinately suspicious of the President. Added to a strong desire for economy in public spending, was the fear lest "that man in the White House" should exploit the international situation in order to perpetuate the more objectional features of the New Deal and himself in office for a third term. In the Democratic party, the split between New Dealers and anti-

¹Thomas E. Hachey, ed., Confidential Dispatches, Anal ses of America b The British Ambassador I -1 4
Evanston, Ill.: New University Press, Inc., 1947, pp. 1-9.

New Dealers refused to heal, the latter being just as strongly opposed to a third term and suspecting the President to boot of political flirtation with the radical elements of the country.

The President for his part tried to avoid controversial legislation so that Congress would concentrate on defence and amendment of the Neutrality Act, but he got off on the wrong foot with two trivial incidents, one concerning the "secret" sale of aircraft to the French and the other the Senate's rights of patronage. He failed to obtain amendment of the Labour Relations and the Wages and Hours acts, while two "pump-priming" measures, the Works Financing and the Slum Clearance Bills were shelved. The Relief Appropriations Bill was passed but only with substantial cuts from the amounts asked and in the teeth of strong Administration pressure to restore them. Worst of all the President's failure to secure amendment of the Neutrality Act to lift the embargo on the sale of arms to belligerents, (a subject which is dealt with separately in Section II below) showed how seriously he had lost control of Congress

On the credit side, however, Mr. Roosevelt could reckon the passage with virtual unanimity, of the next most important desideratum, a record peace-time appropriation for national defence. He also secured passage of a Government Reorganisation Bill aimed at "streamlining" the civil service

and of the Revenue Bill, whilst the Hatch Bill to exclude Federal employees from political activities and certain amendments to the Social Security Act were more or less in accordance with his wishes. Presidential appointments of Mr. Harry Hopkins, formerly Works Programme Administrator, to be Secretary of Commerce, of Mr. Frank Murphy, formerly Governor of Michigan, to be Attorney General, of Mr. Felix Frankfurter and Mr. W. O. Douglas to the Supreme Court were duly confirmed by the Senate though not without criticism, particularly of the first two.

No question of importance other than neutrality was debated during the extraordinary session called after the outbreak of war, ignoring the President's invitation to remain on hand in Washington for consultation, the Congressional leaders preferred to disperse afterwards to their constitutencies, the lull in European hostilities predisposing them to concentrate on party politics.

Labour continued divided and repeated admonitions from the President to the American Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial Organisations to compromise their rivalry had no apparent effect. Labour unrest remained endemic on the West Coast and the activities of the Australian agitator Harry Bridges provoked the usual insistent though abortive demands for his deportation extending even to a threat to impeach the Secretary of Labor for failure

to intervene. There were several more or less serious strikes notably in the coal mining and automobile industries.

II-Foreign Affairs

Neutrality Legislation.

It was clear as soon as Congress met in January that one of the main questions with which it would have to deal was the amendment of the existing Neutrality Act. The principal provisions of this legislation were that on the outbreak of a declared war the President must issue a proclamation naming the belligerents and thereafter the supply of any arms, ammunition or implements of war to such belligerents from the United States was forbidden. Furthermore the President had the power to declare that certain other materials could only be supplied to belligerents on the "cash and carry" system, i.e., in non-American Ships and after all American interest in the title had been transferred; this last provision was due to expire on May 1st, and did so.

The Administration and the President made no secret of the fact that they wished to see the Act amended and in particular the mandatory embargo on the export of war material repealed. There was a large body of opinion in the country which shared these views, feeling that the embargo would prejudice the non-dictator states and that it was in the interest of the United States to remove this handicap as

soon as possible in view of the threatening European situation. On the other hand, considerable sections of opinion, more especially in Congress and particularly in the Senate, were opposed to repeal of the embargo, partly from an ingrained spirit of isolationism, partly from apprehension lest the President might lead the country into war and partly from purely political motives and hostility to the President. It soon became apparent that any attempt to secure the amendment of the Act would meet with much opposition in Congress.

In the mistaken belief that feeling in Congress would improve as the session wore on and perhaps in the hopes that growing tension in Europe would convince Congress of the necessity of altering the Act, the Administration delayed over long in starting its campaign for the repeal of the embargo. It was not until March 20th that Senator Pittman, the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, tabled a bill, which was understood to have the support of the Administration, and the Committee had still reached no conclusion at the end of June.

In the meantime the House of Representatives losing patience with the Senate had passed a bill of their own, but their uncertain debate and the weakness of their compromise bill naturally encouraged the opposition in the Senate. On July 11th the Senate Committee decided by 12 votes to 11 to defer consideration of any proposals for

the amendment of the Neutrality Act until the next session of Congress. A meeting on July 18th between the President and the majority and minority leaders in the Senate convinced Mr. Roosevelt that in the circumstances then prevailing there was no chance of obtaining a majority for his proposals in the Senate, and he decided to take no further action for the time being.

On the outbreak of war the President issued the prescribed proclamations and embargoes, and then called Congress into special session for September 21st. In his opening message Mr. Roosevelt made it clear that he considered it desirable that the Neutrality legislation should be amended and the embargo repealed as soon as possible. Senator Pittman's bill embodying the Administration's proposals came before the Senate on October 2nd. The debate opened on a high level but steadily deteriorated and most speeches were only equalled in their dullness by their length. It was not until October 27th that the Bill, amended in various directions but still including the all-important repeal of the arms embargo, passed the Senate. Proceedings in the House were much more rapid and after a short debate the Bill was passed. It was officially approved and signed by the President on November 4th. The debate had showed three things--a wide sympathy with the Allies, an unanimous determination that the United States must be kept out of war, and

a readiness to impose appreciable burdens on American interests in order to minimise the risk of "Lusitania" incidents.

The new Act repealed the embargo on the export of arms; reimposed the "Cash and Carry" principle and made it applicable to all materials, but exempted certain "safe" belligerent areas from the operation of the clause; empowered the President to define "combat areas" into which American ships and citizens might not enter; repeated the earlier prohibition on Americans travelling on belligerent ships and on American ships being armed; prohibited, as before, loans to belligerent governments except for relief purposes; forbade, as before the use of American ports as supply bases by belligerents; enabled the President to ban belligerent submarines and armed merchant vessels from American ports; and continued the operations of the National Munitions Control Board.

Europe

The impending catastrophe in Europe could not fail powerfully to preoccupy the minds of most Americans from the President downwards. But allied to an almost unanimous detestation of the policies of the European dictators was no less solid determination that America should not be dragged into any war. The German annexation of Bohemia and Moravia in March and the Italian invasion of Albania on Good Friday

met with a full measure of condemnation. But in the existing state of public opinion and despite the President's efforts to educate it, the only action open to the United States Government was in the former case to withhold recognition from the German protectorate and to apply certain economic sanctions, while in the latter case, the Secretary of State could only issue a statement condemning the destruction of confidence and the undermining of economic stability to the detriment of American welfare. The President also addressed messages on the 15th April to Hitler and Mussolini, inviting them to pledge themselves to keep the peace for ten years. Similarly, when war became imminent in September over the Danzig crisis, the President could only repeat his performance of twelve months previously and send messages urging reconciliation to the Polish President and to Herr Hitler, to the King of Italy inviting his intercession for peace and to the King of the Belgians, associating himself with the latter's peace plea on behalf of the Oslo powers. Opinion was unanimous in condemning Germany for the invasion of Poland and there was stupefaction at the perfidy of the Hitler-Stalin pact, but with the neutrality debate in progress the isolationist elements were inclined to accuse Great Britain and France of abandoning the Poles to their fate and generally to cast doubt on their motives in waging war at all. In the same way there was a tendency to discount

the otherwise strong emotions aroused by events, such as the sinking of the Athenia, and the German seizure of the American freighter City of Flint and although the Russian invasion of Finland provoked an intense emotional outburst and an imperious demand to go to the little country's assistance, in the end very little practical aid was forthcoming except from private sources while Congress wavered and procrastinated. The President, however, did intercede at Moscow to restrain the aggression and the good offices of the United States were offered for reaching a settlement though expressly not for mediation or arbitration. The President also sent a message of support to the Conference of Nordic States at Stockholm.

Although with no intention of lending countenance to a compromise peace on Hitler's terms yet the President took a step at the end of the year to keep open a channel of mediation between the Allies and Germany when he appointed Mr. Myron C. Taylor as his special personal representative to the Holy See.

Great Britain.

His Majesty's Government continued to keep the President and the State Department informed of their policies with regard to international developments and although the United States Ambassador in London may possibly have maintain-

ed an all too consistently pessimistic attitude in reporting on them to Washington, mutual confidence remained unimpaired and of the closest. In "Measures short of war" His Majesty's Government could in fact count on the fullest sympathy and support from the Administration. Where public opinion was concerned there persisted suspicion that so long as Mr. Chamberlain remained Prime Minister, the discredited policy of appeasement would prevail. The announcement in April of the British undertaking to Poland was welcomed therefore with relief and no credence was of course given to German claims on encirclement. The same to a great extent applied to the guarantees to Roumania and Greece and to abortive negotiations at Moscow. The Royal Air Force flights to France, the decision to grant credits to the guaranteed states, the calling up of naval reserves, the supplementary advance estimates, the introduction of conscription and the creation of the Ministry of Information were all in their several ways looked upon as proving that His Majesty's Government's strength and determination were steadily growing, and that Britain at last meant business with Hitler. There was no doubt relief when the outbreak of war failed to bring the anticipated immediate bombardment of London but on the other hand, the R.A.F. raids and the comparative inactivity in the early days on the Western front provoked impatience and renewed the feeling that this was a "phony

war" and that Britain even now was not in earnest. However, the naval victory over the Graf Spee served to redress the balance at the year's close.

Amid so many anxieties the visit of the King and Queen in June to the United States at the President's invitation was a tremendous personal success for Their Majesties and the feeling was that it would have a solid influence towards a good understanding on both sides of the Atlantic. Only a few taunts of "British propaganda" were levelled at this first visit of a British King and Queen to American soil and in truth the impression created was deep and extended to every stratum of the population.

The British Pavilion at the New York World's Fair contributed its own modest share to Anglo-American goodwill and the same could be said, for example, of the act whereby, after the Fair's close and to avoid the perils of a wartime ocean crossing, the original Lincoln Magna Carta exhibited in the Pavilion on loan, was formally handed over by His Majesty's Ambassador for temporary safe-keeping in the Library of Congress.

The British White Paper on Palestine in May was bitterly attacked by American Jews and protests poured into the State Department and His Majesty's Embassy. But the country as a whole accepted it with indifference.

The disputed ownership of certain Pacific islands and the closely related question of trans-Pacific aviation routes continued to engage the rather leisurely attention of both Governments throughout the year, although the United States Government forged ahead with its preparations for resuming the Pan-American Airways service to Australia and New Zealand. Discussion was mostly inter-departmental on both sides; but such few Anglo-American exchanges as took place were perfectly amicable if a trifle suspicious in undertone. Each Government was in fact concerned to discover not merely what the other really wanted but what it really wanted itself. Some doubt persisted on both scores at the end of the year; but the status of Canton and Enderbury Islands had at any rate been adequately defined by the notes exchanged on April 6th between the Secretary of State and His Majesty's Ambassador.

Latin America.

Following the paper success of the Lima Pan-American Conference in December 1938, the United States Government showed much activity in 1939 directed towards strengthening by commercial and financial means its position in Latin America. A secondary objective was to stem the inroads of totalitarian economic and political ideas. A series of loans and credits to Latin American countries were successfully negotiated by the Treasury and the Export-Import Bank and it

was not until the breakdown of the Argentine and Uruguayan commercial negotiations in January 1940 that any visible setback occurred.

The first of the series of visitors was Senor Oswaldo Aranha, Foreign Minister of Brazil, who remained two months in Washington and on the 9th March signed agreements whereby Brazil received credits up to \$19,200,000 in order to liquidate short-term United States dollar debts; a promise, subject to Congressional approval of a loan of \$50 million gold to assist in the creation of a Central Reserve Bank; and the promise of other technical and financial assistance designed to facilitate the exchange of goods between the two countries.

The President of Nicaragua visited Washington from 1st May to 24th May and negotiated an agreement for United States financial and technical assistance to Nicaragua. Likewise, in June, a similar agreement on a smaller scale was reached with Paraguay. Loans to Venezuela, Uruguay and Chile were also canvassed during the year but Congress opposed further loans with so many South American Government bonds in default and arrangements were not concluded by the end of the year.

The President of Haiti was in Washington for some time in December and although he brought with him Haitian experts on agriculture, medicine and highway-construction there was no sign that he had obtained the assistance in

these fields he was believed to be seeking.

No progress was made during the year towards settlement of the oil controversy with the Mexican Government.

The outbreak of war gave the United States Government an opportunity, which they were quick to seize, of further consolidating inter-American relations. Under the Buenos Aires and Lima agreements, the American Foreign Ministers met at Panama from 23rd September to 3rd October and there adopted a series of measures designed to "keep war out of the Western Hemisphere." The chief of these was the declaration of a "safety belt", 300 miles or more in width, round the whole continent south of Canada, in which belligerent acts were banned "as of inherent right". The idea dated from the first world war but the sponsor who brought it into being in 1939 was Mr. Sumner Welles. "Violated" by the sinking of the Admiral Graf Spee off Uruguay in December it led to collective protest addressed to Great Britain, France and Germany.

The meeting at Panama resulted also in the formation of two further standing Committees designed to implement its main objective--the Inter-American Neutrality Committee, of Rio de Janeiro, and the Inter-American Financial and Economic Advisory Committee, of Washington. The latter met on November 15th and set about elaborating plans for an Inter-

American Bank and other financial matters. Simultaneously at Guatemala City there sat the First Meeting of Finance Ministers of the American Republic pursuant to resolution LXIV of the Lima Conference of 1938.

Far East.

The United States remained determined as ever not to abandon China to Japan nor to sign away any American rights in the Far East unless forced to do so. There were the usual insistences on observance by Japan of treaties and the "open door" and further protests against the Japanese bombing of open towns in China, interference with American trade, damage to American school and mission property and molestation of American citizens. Looking beyond specific injuries, the United States Government also showed some signs of alarm at the growing disturbance of the balance of power in the Far East, resulting from British and to a less extent French pre-occupation in Europe. By way of a warning to Tokyo and taking the advantage of a Republican resolution to the same effect before the Senate, the Administration took the stern course of denouncing on July 26th the Commercial Treaty with Japan of 1911. Again in a speech at Tokyo in October, the United States Ambassador strongly admonished the Japanese Government to cease interference with American rights and in November the Acting Secretary of State made a statement to the press reaffirming the American position in regard to

China. The reaction of the State Department to the Japanese "friendly suggestion" in August that British troops be withdrawn from Shanghai, was both vigorous and public and there is no doubt that Mr. Hull timed the remarks he then made to the Japanese Ambassador in such a way as to help His Majesty's Government. The application in December of the "moral embargo" to Japan together with Russia was a further proof of United States determination to stand pat on this attitude. In China itself, the United States withheld recognition from the puppet government of Wang Ching-wei while continuing to bolster up the resistance of Chang Kai-shek with credits and supplies. By way of a gesture the United States fleet was moved back into the Pacific at the end of summer with somewhat dramatic suddenness. The end of the year found the Japanese Government apparently nervous and angling to negotiate a new commercial treaty. But no negotiations materialized and the State Department showed every disposition to let matters drift.

In the Philippines there were no new developments of importance to report and President Quezon seemed anxious to retain the American connection with the Islands. The United States Congress, however, was not inclined to encourage this trend and refused funds for beginning to make the Island of Guam an advanced naval base.

APPENDIX D.

LORD IOTHIAN'S COMMITMENT TO
SECRETARY OF STATE CORDELL HULL

Secretary of State of the United States,¹
Washington, D. C.

Sir:

I have the honour under instructions from His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to inform you that in view of the friendly and sympathetic interest of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom in the national security of the United States and their desire to strengthen the ability of the United States to cooperate effectively with the other nations of the Americas in the defence of the Western Hemisphere, His Majesty's Government will secure the grant to the Government of the United States, freely and without consideration, of the lease for immediate establishment and use of naval and air bases and facilities for entrance thereto and the operation

¹U.S. Congress, House, Lord Lothian's Commitment to Secretary of State Cordell Hull, 76th Cong., 3rd sess., 3 September 1940, Congressional Record 86:11354-11355.

and protection thereof, on the Avalon Peninsula and on the southern coast of Newfoundland, and on the east coast and on the Great Bay of Bermuda.

Furthermore, in view of the above and in view of the desire of the United States to acquire additional air and naval bases in the Caribbean and in British Guiana, and without endeavouring to place a monetary or commercial value upon the many tangible and intangible rights and properties involved, His Majesty's Government will make available to the United States for immediate establishment and use naval and air bases and facilities for entrance thereto and the operation and protection thereof, on the eastern side of the Bahamas, the southern coast of Jamaica, the western coast of St. Lucia, the west coast of Trinidad in the Gulf of Paria, in the island of Antigua and in British Guiana within fifty miles of Georgetown, in exchange for naval and military equipment and material which the United States Government will transfer to His Majesty's Government.

All the bases and facilities referred to in the preceding paragraphs will be leased to the United States for a period of ninety-nine years, free from all rent and charges other than such compensation to be mutually agreed on to be paid by the United States in order to compensate the owners of private property for loss by expropriation or damage arising out of the establishment of the bases and

facilities in question.

His Majesty's Government, in the leases to be agreed upon, will grant to the United States for the period of the leases all the rights, power, and authority within the bases leased, and within the limits of the territorial waters and air spaces adjacent to or in the vicinity of such bases, necessary to provide access to and defence of such bases, and appropriate provisions for their control.

Without prejudice to the above-mentioned rights of the United States authorities and their jurisdiction within the leased areas, the adjustment and reconciliation between the jurisdiction of the authorities of the United States within these areas and the jurisdiction of the authorities of the territories in which these areas are situated, shall be determined by common agreement.

The exact location and bounds of the aforesaid bases, the necessary seaward, coast and antiaircraft defences, the location of sufficient military garrisons, stores, and other necessary auxiliary facilities shall be determined by common agreement.

His Majesty's Government are prepared to designate immediately experts to meet with experts of the United States for these purposes. Should these experts be unable to agree in any particular situation, except in the case of

Newfoundland and Bermuda, the matter shall be settled by the Secretary of State of the United States and His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

I have the honour to be, with the highest
consideration, Sir,

Your most obedient, humble servant,

Lothian

British Embassy.

Washington, D. C., September 2, 1940.

APPENDIX E.

SECRETARY OF STATE CORDELL HULL'S
REPLY TO LORD LOTHIAN

Department of State,¹

Washington, September 2, 1940.

Excellency:

I have received your note of September 2, 1940.²

I am directed by the President to reply to your
note as follows:

The Government of the United States appreciates the
declarations and the generous action of His Majesty's
Government as contained in your communication which are
destined to enhance the national security of the United
States and greatly to strengthen its ability to cooperate
effectively with the other nations of the Americas in the
defense of the Western Hemisphere. It therefore gladly

¹U.S. Congress, House, Secretary of State Cordell
Hull's Reply to Lord Lothian, 76th Cong., 3rd sess.,
3 September 1940, Congressional Record 86:11355.

²Cordell Hull quoted Lord Lothian's letter in full.
It is omitted here as the complete letter of Lord Lothian is
submitted in full in a separate Appendix.

accepts the proposals.

The Government of the United States will immediately designate experts to meet with experts designated by His Majesty's Government to determine upon the exact location of the naval and air bases mentioned in your communication under acknowledgment.

In consideration of the declarations above quoted, the Government of the United States will immediately transfer to His Majesty's Government fifty United States Navy destroyers generally referred to as the twelve hundred-ton type.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

Cordell Hull

His Excellency The Right Honorable
The Marquess of Lothian, C. H.
British Ambassador.

APPENDIX F.

PRESIDENT FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT'S NOTIFICATION TO CONGRESS OF DESTROYER-BASE EXCHANGE

To the Congress of the United States:¹

I transmit herewith for the information of the Congress notes exchanged between the British Ambassador at Washington and the Secretary of State on September 2, 1940, under which this Government has acquired the right to lease naval and air bases in Newfoundland, and in the islands of Bermuda, the Bahamas, Jamaica, St. Lucia, Trinidad, and Antigua, and in British Guiana; also a copy of an opinion of the Attorney General dated August 27, 1940, regarding my authority to consummate this arrangement.

The right to bases in Newfoundland and Bermuda are gifts--generously given and gladly received. The other bases mentioned have been acquired in exchange for 50 of our over-age destroyers.

¹U.S. Congress, House, President Franklin D. Roosevelt Notifies Congress of the Destroyer-Base Exchange, 76th Cong., 3rd sess., 3 September 1940, Congressional Record 86:11354.

This is not inconsistent in any sense with our status of peace. Still less is it a threat against any nation. It is an epochal and far-reaching act of preparation for continental defense in the face of grave danger.

Preparation for defense is an inalienable prerogative of a sovereign state. Under recent circumstances this exercise of sovereign right is essential to the maintenance of our peace and safety. This is the most important action in the reinforcement of our national defense that has been taken since the Louisiana Purchase. Then as now, considerations of safety from overseas attack were fundamental.

The value to the Western Hemisphere of these outposts of security is beyond calculation. Their need has long been recognized by our country, and especially by those primarily charged with the duty of charting and organizing our own naval and military defense. They are essential to the protection of the Panama Canal, Central America, the northern portion of South America, the Antilles, Canada, Mexico, and our own eastern and Gulf seaboard. Their consequent importance in hemispheric defense is obvious. For these reasons I have taken advantage of the present opportunity to acquire them.

Franklin D. Roosevelt

The White House

September 3, 1940.

APPENDIX G.

LETTER TO SAM RAYBURN FROM PRESIDENT FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

The White House¹

July 15, 1940

My Dear Sam:

re Tyler, Texas Airport Project

The War Department, in conjunction with the Civil Aeronautics Authority and the W.P.A., made up a specially selected group of municipal airports last February, which were considered to be of the most important strategically to the National defense. They can now be financed under 1941 Emergency Relief Act.

Tyler not included.

Signed: F.D.R.

¹Letter to Sam Rayburn, Rayburn Papers 15 July 1940, Rayburn Library, Bonham, Texas., from President Franklin D. Roosevelt.

APPENDIX H.

Memorandum from President Franklin D. Roosevelt.¹

Hyde Park, Aug. 28, 1940.

Memorandum for the Secretary of State:

If you approve, will you send the following message to Ambassador Kennedy:

"The destroyer and base matter was handled in part through Lothian but the situation developed into a mapping proposition where the Army and Navy are in constant consultation with me here and the daily developments have had to be explained verbally to Lothian.

There is no thought of embarrassing you and only a practical necessity for personal conversations makes it easier to handle details here.

I should be glad to have you explain to former Naval person that I am totally precluded from giving away any Government vessels or equipment and that latest plan

¹Elliott Roosevelt, ed. and Joseph P. Lash, assistant ed., Franklin Delano Roosevelt, His Personal Letters, p. 1061.

covers both angles, British and American.

It is essential that two of seven bases be donated by free will and accord of Great Britain and that other five bases be transferred by Britain in consideration of simultaneous transfer by us of fifty destroyers.

Don't forget that you are not only not a dummy but are essential to all of us both in the Government and in the Nation.

Franklin D. Roosevelt"

(F.D.R.)

APPENDIX I .

From a letter from Lord Lothian to Sir D. Stevenson,
November 24, 1933.¹

Like most Liberals I loathe the Nazis regime, but I am sure that the first condition to reform is that we should be willing to do justice to Germany. The second is that Liberal nations should be willing to stand together to resist any unjust pretension which she herself may later put forward.

¹Butler, Biography, p. 197.

APPENDIX J.

THE NEW YORK TIMES

December 13, 1940

Excerpts from Arthur Krock's Commentary: "Unusual Fitness of Lothian for His Post."

Recalling what he had done, and the manner in which he had done it, contemplating the Prime Minister's task of finding a successor of equal or equivalent fitness for the post, the capitol community became conscious for the first time of the degree of Lord Lothian's achievement in the United States. Today, those same persons (before not quoted would have said done well) decided that the labors of this modest, simple gentleman had been brilliantly performed.

He understood, though he feared the consequences of the isolationist point of view in this country; and he was a great idealist, as exemplified by his (later recanted) belief that Hitler merely sought justice and did not preach war and conquest as heroic and legitimate aims in themselves.

The cause he espoused officially and personally had far wider acceptance when Lord Lothian died than when he undertook it, and his understanding was as sincere as it was able and effective.

APPENDIX K.

THE NEW YORK TIMES

December 13, 1940

Editorial Comment

"Lord Lothian"

Lord Lothian wore himself out in the service of his country. The burden he carried had become the heaviest and most responsible in the British foreign service.

He grew in stature as his ambassadorship grew, until at the end he had become a rare asset to his Government, a living link between his embattled people and ourselves.

His speech in Baltimore, read for him on the night he died, was the kind of valedictory he would have wished. It was a far-sighted reminder of truths which are more recognized among us today, thanks, in part, to Lord Lothian's efforts, than when he began his term as Ambassador. We know it true that war depends on the resources we can throw Great Britain.

For such frankness and for many other good qualities, Lord Lothian will hold a high place among British Ambassadors. He knew this country better than any of his predecessors

since Bryce. He was an aristocrat, yet a simple man; he was a product of Oxford, yet he gave an indefinable impression of Americanism in all his dealings. It will be hard for the British Government to find a successor, who will make so few errors, or ruffle so few tempers, or leave so enduring a memory.

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