

SOCIAL POLICY EVALUATION: HOW DID THE 1996 WELFARE REFORM
LEGISLATION INFLUENCE UNMARRIED TEEN
BIRTH RATES IN TEXAS COUNTIES?

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To the Dean of Graduate Studies and Research:

I am submitting herewith a dissertation written by Barbara J. Blake titled "Social Policy Evaluation: How Did the 1996 Welfare Reform Legislation Influence Unmarried Teen Birth Rates in Texas Counties?" I have examined the final copy of this dissertation for form and content and recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy with a major in Nursing.



Patti Hamilton, Ph.D., Major Professor

We have read this dissertation
and recommend its acceptance:



Accepted:



Dean of Graduate Studies
and Research

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DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to my husband, Paul Thomas Blake, whose never-ending love, support, and dedication gave me the confidence and opportunity to accomplish this goal. Thank you for always listening and for just being there. You are not only my husband, but also my very best friend. Thank you!

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ABSTRACT

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Implementation of the 1996 Welfare Reform Legislation radically changed a 61-year-old policy of providing welfare benefits to eligible low-income mothers and their children. Despite a lack of evidence, current welfare policies are being implemented based on the belief that welfare restrictions and sanctions can change the reproductive behavior of women, particularly teens. The purpose of this quasi-experimental study was to examine and describe the influence of the 1996 welfare reform legislation on unmarried teen childbirth rates in Texas counties and to examine the effect of the counties' teen population density, ethnic homogeneity, and welfare participation on the rate of change in unmarried teen childbirth rates post-welfare reform.

In this study, the 254 counties in Texas represented the population under examination. The variable of interest was the number of births to unmarried women less than 20 years of age from January 1, 1994 through December 31, 1999. Two-stage growth curve modeling was used to examine the pattern of the unmarried teen birthrates pre- and post-welfare reform. During the first stage of the modeling, trajectories that represented the quarterly unmarried teen birthrates were estimated using multiple regression analysis. A paired-sample t -test was used to test for across county differences in the pre- and post-welfare reform

slope estimates. In stage two, hierarchical linear regression was employed using teen population density, ethnic homogeneity, welfare participation, and the post-welfare reform intercepts to determine if they could explain the change in the unmarried teen birth rates post-welfare reform.

The results of the growth curve modeling found that 17 Texas counties had statistically significant changes in their slopes and/or intercept estimates post-welfare reform as compared to the estimates pre-welfare reform. The results of the paired sample t -test revealed no significant difference between the mean of the pre-welfare reform slopes ($\bar{x} = .047$) and the mean of post-welfare reform slopes ($\bar{x} = .045$), $t(253) = .053$, $p = .958$. The results of the hierarchical linear regression analysis indicated that the estimate of the post-welfare reform intercept and welfare participation were the only variables that contributed significantly toward predicting the slope of the unmarried teen birth rates post-welfare reform.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

| | Page |
|--|------|
| COPYRIGHT | iii |
| DEDICATION | iv |
| ACKNOWLEDGMENTS | v |
| ABSTRACT | vii |
| LIST OF TABLES | |
| LIST OF FIGURES | |
| Chapter | |
| I. INTRODUCTION | 1 |
| Problem of Study | 3 |
| Rationale for Study | 4 |
| Theoretical Framework | 5 |
| Assumptions | 10 |
| Hypotheses | 11 |
| Definition of Terms | 11 |
| Limitations | 13 |
| Delimitations | 14 |
| Summary | 14 |
| II. REVIEW OF LITERATURE | 16 |
| Trends in Unmarried Teen Childbirths | 17 |
| Population Density | 22 |
| Welfare | 27 |
| Study of Change | 42 |
| Summary | 44 |
| III. PROCEDURE FOR COLLECTION AND TREATMENT OF DATA | 47 |
| Setting | 47 |
| Population | 49 |
| Protection of Human Rights | 49 |
| Implementation and Data Collection | 50 |
| Treatment of the Data | 52 |
| Summary | 55 |
| IV. ANALYSIS OF DATA | 56 |
| Description of the Study Population | 56 |
| Research Findings | 68 |
| Summary | 84 |

| | Page |
|---|------|
| V. SUMMARY OF THE STUDY | 87 |
| Summary | 88 |
| Discussion of the Findings | 92 |
| Conclusions and Implications for Nursing | 97 |
| Recommendations for Further Study | 100 |
| REFERENCES | 102 |
| APPENDICES | |
| A. Graduate School Permission to Conduct Study | 111 |
| B. Sample Certificate of Birth | 113 |
| C. Number of Unmarried Teen Births and Annual Unmarried Teen Birth Rates per 1,000 Females Ages 12-19 Years for Counties in Texas | 115 |
| D. Texas Teen Population Density by County for 1997 | 128 |
| E. 1997 Texas Population and Percent White, Black, and Hispanic | 135 |
| F. Texas County Information on AFDC Recipients in 1996 | 142 |
| G. Initial Level, Change, and Significance in the Slope of the Pre- and Post-Welfare Reform Trajectories in Texas | 149 |
| H. Initial Level, Change, and Significance in the Intercept of the Pre- and Post-Welfare Reform Trajectories in Texas | 156 |
| I. Summary of Study Findings | 163 |

LIST OF TABLES

| Table | Page |
|--|------|
| 1. Percent of Adolescent Mothers Not Married by Age and Race/Ethnicity in 1998 | 3 |
| 2. Summary of Studies that Examined the Effect of Welfare on Childbearing Decisions | 37 |
| 3. A Comparison of Texas and Federal Welfare Reform Measures | 40 |
| 4. Percent of Birth Certificates Received after the Statistical Cut-off Date | 51 |
| 5. Number of Births in Texas and Missing Data for Selected Maternal Variables | 58 |
| 6. Births to All Teens in Texas from 1994-1999 | 59 |
| 7. Births to Unmarried Teens in Texas from 1994-1999 | 60 |
| 8. Frequency of Unmarried Teen Mothers in Texas by Year and Age | 60 |
| 9. Percentage of Teen Mothers Unmarried by Ethnicity in Texas from 1994-1999 | 61 |
| 10. Texas Female Teen Population (Ages 12-19 Years) | 63 |
| 11. Quarterly Unmarried Teen Birth Rates per Texas Counties from 1994-1999 | 64 |
| 12. Ethnic Distribution in Texas Counties in 1997 | 67 |
| 13. Level, Magnitude of Change, and Significance in the Slope and Intercept of Pre- and Post-welfare Reform Trajectories | 75 |
| 14. Hierarchical Regression Results of the Selected Predictor Variables | 83 |

LIST OF FIGURES

| Figure | Table |
|--|-------|
| 1. Unmarried teen birthrates per 1,000 teens aged 15-19 from 1940 to 1998 | 18 |
| 2. Birthrates per 1,000 unmarried teens aged 15-19 by ethnicity from 1990 to 1998 | 21 |
| 3. Map outlining the 254 counties in the state of Texas | 48 |
| 4. Geographic location of ethnically homogeneous/ heterogeneous counties in Texas | 67 |
| 5. Percentage of county population in Texas receiving welfare benefits | 69 |
| 6. Best fitting regression line for quarterly unmarried teen birth rates in Dallas County pre-welfare reform | 71 |
| 7. Best fitting regression line for quarterly unmarried teen birth rates in Dallas County post-welfare reform | 71 |
| 8. Texas counties and the change in direction of the slope estimates in the post-welfare reform unmarried teen birth rates | 76 |
| 9. Histogram of the pre-welfare reform slopes | 79 |
| 10. Histogram of the post-welfare reform slopes | 79 |

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (Public Law 104-193) that was signed into law on August 22, 1996 radically revised existing welfare policies in our nation. This law abolished the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program in favor of a block grant entitled Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF). The aim of this welfare reform legislation was to reduce (a) the number of single parent families, (b) teenage parenting, and (c) subsidies for non-working poor people (Berner, 1996; Videka-Sherman & Viggiani, 1996). The purpose of this quasi-experimental study was to examine and describe the influence of the 1996 welfare reform legislation on unmarried teen childbirth rates in Texas counties and to examine the effect of the counties' teen population density, ethnic homogeneity, and welfare participation on the rate of change (slope) in unmarried teen childbirth rates in Texas post-welfare reform.

The current social concern over teenage childbearing suggests its occurrence has increased significantly over time. Between 1950 and 1970, the birth rates among teenagers in the U.S. were higher than they have been in current years (Weinstein, 1998). Nonetheless, these rates did not attract attention because teenagers who gave birth during that era were usually married at the time of conception or they married before the baby's birth (Luker, 1996; Ventura & Curtin, 1999; Weinstein, 1998). In 1960 the teenage birth rates were 91.0 births per 1,000 women aged 15 to 19 (Luker, 1996) as compared to 51.1 births per 1,000 women aged 15 to 19 in 1998 (Ventura, Martin, Curtin, Mathews, & Park, 2000b).

However, from 1960 to 1992, the birth rate among unmarried women aged 15 to 19 increased from 15 to 45 births per 1,000 unmarried teens (Ventura, Bachrach, & Hill, 1995) and society labeled teenage pregnancy a "problem" (Weinstein, 1998).

Birth rates for unmarried Black teens have consistently been higher than the birth rates for unmarried White teens, but this disparity has been declining (South, 1999). Between 1970 and 1990, the birth rates for White unmarried teens aged 15-19 rose from 10.9 to 29.5 per 1,000 teens as compared to an increase from 96.9 to 110.1 per 1,000 Black unmarried teens (Luker, 1996). Birth data that include marital status for women of Hispanic origin have only been available since 1990. This data indicate that the unmarried birth rate for Hispanic teens aged 15-19 was 65.9 per 1,000 teens in 1990 and in 1997 it rose to 75.2 per 1,000 teens (Ventura, 1995; Ventura, Martin, Curtin, & Mathews, 1999b). In 1998, the birth rate for unmarried Hispanic teens decreased slightly to 73.9 per 1,000 teens (Ventura et al., 2000b).

The national birth rate for teenagers in 1999 was 49.6 per 1,000 births to women aged 15-19 years (Curtin & Martin, 2000b). Texas is one of five states in which the birth rate for teenagers consistently exceeds 70 per 1,000 females aged 15-19 (Ventura, Curtin, & Mathews, 2000a). Approximately 17% of the live births that occurred in Texas in 1998 were to women less than 20 years of age. Among all Texas births, 22.5% of births to Black women and 19.7% of births to women of Hispanic origin were to women less than 20 years of age, compared to 10.9% of births to White women. In 1998, age-specific birth rates indicate that Hispanic and Black adolescents aged 10 to 14 were approximately 5 times as likely as White adolescents to deliver a child and Hispanic and Black adolescents aged 15 to 19 were more than twice as likely as White adolescents to deliver a child. When examining marital status in 1998,

87.7% of the mothers aged 10-14 and 67% of mothers aged 15-19 in Texas reported not being married. Marital status by age and race/ethnicity for women less than 20 years of age living in Texas can be found in Table 1 (Texas Department of Health, 1999).

Table 1

Percent of Adolescent Mothers Not Married by Age and Race/Ethnicity in 1998

| Age | White | Black | Hispanic | All Races |
|-------|-------|-------|----------|-----------|
| 10-14 | 94.2 | 98.9 | 86.8 | 89.6 |
| 15-19 | 63.7 | 93.7 | 62.9 | 68.1 |

Problem of Study

Teenage pregnancy and out-of-wedlock childbearing became primary issues of the 1996 welfare reform legislation because they are often seen as major contributors to increased welfare costs and caseloads. Ironically, only 5% to 7% of mothers receiving welfare benefits in the U.S. are teenagers, and fewer than 2% are less than 18 years of age (U.S. General Accounting Office, 1994). Despite the fact that the number of teen mothers receiving welfare benefits at any one time is relatively small, the role of teen parenting does become significant over time. This is because a large proportion (42%-55%) of families receiving welfare benefits were begun by a mother who was under the age of 20 when she first gave birth (Sandefur & Cook, 1998; U.S. General Accounting Office, 1994). Women who begin childbearing as adolescents are more inclined to require public assistance for a longer period of time because they tend to have larger families, are less educated, and

are therefore less likely to find employment that will lead to self-sufficiency than women who delay childbearing (Alan Guttmacher Institute, 1995).

Historically, nurses have had a strong interest in health policy. In a letter to Francis Galton in 1891, Florence Nightingale wrote:

Put down what you expect from such and such legislation; after ____ years see where it has given you what you expected, and where it has failed. But you change your laws and your administering of them so fast, and without inquiry after results past or present, that it is all experiment, see-saw, doctrinaire, a shuttlecock between two battledores. (as cited in Nash, 1931, p. 36).

Based on Nightingale's advice, the results of this study can be utilized by community health nursing leaders to provide information to policy makers that could ultimately influence future legislative actions related to welfare reform and unmarried teen childbirth. Involvement in shaping policy that impacts the health of women and children is an expected outcome for the leadership standard of advanced nursing practice (American Nurses Association, 1996).

Rationale for Study

The relationship between unmarried child bearing and welfare benefits has been debated since welfare's inception in 1935. While some experts believe that the availability of welfare benefits provides an incentive for women not to marry if they become pregnant prior to marriage, examination of the relationship between welfare and unmarried childbearing has offered inconclusive evidence to support this belief (Ellwood & Bane, 1985; Lundberg & Plotnick, 1995; Moore & Caldwell, 1977; Murray, 1993; Ozawa, 1989; Plotnick, 1990). In spite of that, welfare policies are being implemented today based on the belief that welfare restrictions and sanctions can change the reproductive behavior of women, particularly teens. In reality, social policies constitute only part of a large set of personal, family, and environmental factors

that contribute to the incidence of unmarried childbirth among teenagers. By examining the rate of change (slope) in births to teens pre- and post-welfare reform, the effect of this legislation can be more accurately assessed.

Theoretical Framework

Reference group and social contagion theories allow us to test the hypothesis that welfare benefits are not be associated with the occurrence of unmarried childbearing among adolescents. Reference group theory proposes that the behavior of a person will be consistent with the expectations of the group that serves as a reference point at a given point in time (Mirande, 1968). The family provides the reference point in guiding and shaping behaviors in young children, but during adolescence, peers begin to assume an increasingly more important role. Studies that focus on the risk behaviors of adolescents have found that adolescents and their friends exhibit similar risk behaviors (Brooks-Gunn & Furstenberg, 1989; Dolcini & Adler, 1994; East, Felice, & Morgan, 1993; Evans, Oates, & Schwab, 1992; Fang, Stanton, Li, Feigelman, & Baldwin, 1998). Research findings indicate that adolescents are influenced by the expectations of their peers, but adolescents also will tend to seek those groups that reinforce their personal inclinations (Donohew, Hoyle, Clayton, Skinner, & Colon, 1999). The prevalence of peer influence among groups of adolescents has been found in urban and rural contexts (Chopak, Vicary, & Crockett, 1998; Doljanac & Zimmerman, 1998). These research findings provide evidence that supports Mirande's (1968) original hypothesis that "The sexual behavior of an individual will tend to be the function of the expectations of his peer reference group, irrespective of the direction of the influence" (p. 573).

Social contagion theory also contributes to the understanding of unmarried teenage childbearing. This theory has been used for nearly 2

centuries to explain the clustering and spread of human behavior. Social contagion can be broadly defined as the spread of affect, attitude, or behavior from one person to another where the recipient does not always perceive an intentional influence on the part of the initiator. Social is used as a prefix to contagion to denote the context of the phenomenon (Levy & Nail, 1993).

Social contagion can be characterized as both an individual and a group phenomenon. Social contagion theorists assume that peer modeling and reinforcement contribute to the initiation of a behavior (Ennett, Flewelling, Lindrooth, & Norton, 1997; Jones, 1998; Krishnan, Parakulam, & Zalmanowitz, 1999). Based on social contagion theory, adolescents are influenced by the sexual attitudes and sexual behaviors of others (Rodgers & Rowe, 1993; Rowe & Rodgers, 1991b, 1994; Rowe, Rodgers, & Mesech-Bushey, 1989). At a young age, only a few adolescents in the social network participate in sexual behaviors, but over time, sexual behavior spreads (Rodgers, Rowe, & Buster, 1998).

Rodgers and Rowe operationalized the social contagion process through the development of a model entitled the Epidemic Model of the Onset of Social Activities (EMOSA). This model has been used to examine adolescent transition behaviors such as drinking, smoking (Rowe & Rodgers, 1991a) and sexuality (Rodgers & Rowe, 1993; Rodgers et al., 1998; Rowe & Rodgers, 1991b, 1994; Rowe et al., 1989). Transition behaviors are defined as behaviors in which adolescents engage that signal the approach of adulthood. Initiation of these behaviors is of particular importance to an adolescent because it denotes passage into adulthood (Rodgers & Rowe, 1993).

The EMOSA model was designed to fit prevalence data across time in which prevalences reflect the number or percentage of members of some group who have ever performed a certain behavior. The model does not

differentiate between active and passive spread or diffusion of a behavior. One of the assumptions of the model is that the successful spread of ideas, activities, or products through a social environment is dependent on the attractiveness or positive utility attached to its spread. The model simulates the interaction process that helps spread behaviors, therefore, individual risk is highly influenced by group characteristics.

Early social contagion models assumed that females were pubertally mature before they participated in sexual intercourse (Rowe et al., 1989). As evidence to support the postulated relationship between pubertal maturation and the initiation of sexual activity began to appear in the literature (Presser, 1978; Smith, Udry, & Morris, 1985; Udry, Talbert, & Norris, 1986; Zabin, Smith, Hirsch, & Hardy, 1986), the need for maturational filters that could control for females less than 15 years of age who had not achieved pubertal maturity became important. Therefore, in the context of adolescent sexual behavior, the EMOSA model incorporates a unique biological component that mediates for pubertal development in females (Rodgers & Rowe, 1993; Rowe & Rodgers, 1991b, 1994; Rowe et al., 1989).

Rowe et al. (1989) first used their model to fit data on sexual intercourse prevalences from the Adolescent Sexuality data set collected between 1978 and 1982. The results of the study indicated that at age 16, the prevalence of sexual intercourse by race and gender was 20%-30% greater in males than females and greater in Blacks than Whites. Additionally, there is evidence that a racial difference exists in the pubertal maturation between Black and White females. At age 12, Black females were significantly more physically mature than White females. Therefore, after controlling for the difference in physical maturity, race differences in regard to sexual activity disappeared. Based on

these results, the "epidemic" process provided a new hypothesis for racial differences in the prevalence of sexual intercourse among adolescents. The hypothesis suggests that racial differences in pubertal maturation rates may lead to an earlier initiation of the social transmission of intercourse among Blacks. This difference then creates a snowballing effect on coitus prevalences at later ages.

In a later study, Rowe and Rodgers (1994) used the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) data collected in 1979, 1984 and 1985 to again examine the prevalence of sexual intercourse among adolescents. Their intent was to compare the latter results, which were obtained from a data set that represented an intact social network of adolescents, with results obtained from a data set that were a nationally representative sample of adolescents. Results from this study supported their previous work. The racial differences (Black and White) in maturational timing again produced large racial differences in the rates of sexual intercourse among adolescents. These results reinforced the researchers' opinion that maturational timing differences between Black and White females has been substantially underestimated in understanding adolescent sexual behavior.

Rodgers and Rowe (1998) have also developed a system of nonlinear EMOSA models that portray adolescent sexuality with pregnancy as an outcome. This model was based on a social psychological model in which adolescents interact, grow older, some have sexual intercourse, and some girls become pregnant. The researchers recognized the advantages and disadvantages of nonlinear modeling, but believed that a nonlinear model had the conceptual advantage of being generated from processes that were more realistic than those for which linear models account. In addition, the nonlinear models have the advantage of being descriptive and predictive.

Sexuality prevalence, pregnancy rates, and maturity rates representing national patterns from 1980 to 1990 for Whites, Black, Hispanics, and the total population were used to fit the nonlinear sexuality/pregnancy models (Rodgers et al., 1998). The pregnancy models that evolved in this study implied that pregnancy rates are a function of the proportion of sexually active girls in the social network. In the context of the models developed, pregnancy probabilities did not differ across age or sexual experience. The least ambiguous estimate of the demographic effect of pregnancy and childbirth found that the probability within a given year that a sexually active adolescent girl would get pregnant and ultimately give birth was .11 for Whites, .23 for Blacks, .26 for Hispanics, and .15 for the total population. Overall, the model that best fit the data predicted that approximately one in seven sexually active adolescent girls would have a pregnancy resulting in a live birth in any given year. The researchers believe that this type of modeling is sensitive to subtle processes and assumptions that are not easy to observe and estimate directly.

Adolescents interact through a variety of social settings and they exert various types of mutual influences on each another. Through these interactions, the social contagion process contributes to the formation of the adolescent's values, attitudes, and expectations regarding sexual behavior and welfare participation. Therefore, if the group norm is accepting of unmarried teen childbearing and welfare participation, then these norms will be more influential on their sexual behavior than a change in social policy. Based on social contagion theory, the informal norms and mores of the adolescent's reference group influence adolescent sexual behavior and not formal social policies.

Within the framework of social contagion theory, the number of potential partners with whom the adolescent comes in contact is also a

factor that influences adolescent sexual behavior. It is assumed that the likelihood of frequent social interactions between adolescents and potential partners will be more prevalent in areas that are more densely populated. Therefore, if the reference group and social contagion influence the pattern (either increasing or decreasing) of unmarried teen births, there will be less change in this pattern after the implementation of the 1996 welfare reform in more densely populated areas. But, if a change in social policy contributes significantly to a change in the pattern of the unmarried teen birth rates, an examination of these patterns after the implementation of the policy should provide evidence of a decreasing trend in all groups of adolescents.

Assumptions

The assumptions used in this study included:

1. The number of unmarried teen births not recorded by the Texas Department of Health was too small to effect the conclusions of the study.
2. The demographic data provided by the Department of Rural Sociology at Texas State A&M University was an accurate estimation of the population under investigation.
3. Six years was an adequate length of time for detecting any change in the unmarried teen birth rates.
4. The prevalence of unmarried childbearing among adolescents is a function of the sexual attitudes and behaviors of their reference group.

Hypotheses

The following hypotheses were addressed in this study:

H₁: There will be no significant difference in the rate of change (slope) of the unmarried teen birth rates pre- and post-welfare reform in Texas counties.

H₂: Teen population density, ethnic homogeneity, and welfare participation are predictors of the unmarried teen birth rates in Texas counties post-welfare reform.

Definition of Terms

The following definitions were used to specify how each concept or variable was operationally defined in this study:

1. Welfare Reform is a change that occurs in the welfare system due to the revision and implementation of social policies. Welfare refers to a government funded program that provides economic support to unemployed or under-employed people. Welfare reform legislation in Texas is represented by House Bill (HB) 1863 and is entitled "Achieving Change for Texas." Texas' welfare reform provisions were initiated in June 1996 and all major provisions of the legislation were implemented throughout Texas' 254 counties by January 1, 1997. The federal welfare reform legislation was signed into law in August 1996 and is entitled the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act.

2. Unmarried teen birth rate represents the quarterly (3 months) unmarried teen births for each county in Texas from January 1, 1994 through December 31, 1999. An unmarried teen birth is a birth that occurs to women less than 20 years of age. The teen was considered unmarried if there was a "no" response to the question regarding her marital status on the infant's birth certificate. The birth rates were based on the total number of unmarried births to women less than 20 years of age living in the county during that quarter divided by the

total number of females aged 12-19 living in the county during that year. Multiplying the result by 1,000 provided the unmarried teen birth rate per 1,000 female teens for that quarter. The population estimates for the number of teens living in each county per year were obtained from the Texas State Data Center.

3. Teen population density was used as a proxy for the theoretical construct of social contagion. It represents the number of adolescents 12 to 19 years of age per square mile in each Texas county. Teen population density was calculated based on the total number of adolescents 12 to 19 years of age living in each county in 1997 divided by the land area in square miles of that county. The number of teens living in each county was obtained from the Texas State Data Center. The 1997 teen population data were selected as the numerator in calculating teen density because they best represent the teen population after the statewide implementation of welfare reform in Texas. The land area in square miles for each county in Texas was obtained from the 2000 State of Texas Almanac (Ramos & Plocheck, 1999).

4. Welfare participation was used as a proxy for the theoretical construct of social contagion. It represents the number of recipients receiving welfare benefits in each county in Texas. Welfare participation was calculated based on the number of recipients in each county receiving welfare benefits divided by the total number of people living in the county. The result was multiplied by 100 to create a percentage of people receiving welfare benefits in a county. The percentage was created using data from 1996 since this year best represents the population receiving welfare benefits prior to the implementation of statewide welfare reform in Texas. The number of welfare recipients for each county in Texas was obtained from the Texas Department of Human Services.

5. Ethnic homogeneity was used as a proxy for the theoretical construct of reference group. It reflects the population of a geographic unit with greater than 50% of persons from a single ethnic background. The number of people in each county from a given ethnic background (White, Black, Hispanic, or Other) was divided by the total number of people living in the county. This number was multiplied by 100 to obtain a percentage of the county's population that represents each ethnic group. Any county with greater than 50% of its population comprised from a single ethnic group was considered to be ethnically homogeneous. The 1997 population estimates were selected as the numerator in calculating ethnic homogeneity for each county because they best represent the county's population at the time of implementation of welfare reform in Texas counties.

Limitations

The limitations that restrict the generalizability of this study to other situations or populations are:

1. The 1996 welfare reform legislation allows each state to develop and control their individual public assistance program. This decreases the ability to generalize these results outside of the State of Texas.

2. Birth certificate data obtained from the Texas Department of Health (TDH) may contain inaccurate or missing data.

3. Population density, ethnic homogeneity, and welfare participation at the county level are constantly fluctuating. This limits the ability to generalize findings from this study to another period in time.

4. The elapsed time post welfare reform may not be of sufficient duration to detect all the possible changes in unmarried teen childbirth rates.

Delimitations

1. Only the information about the unmarried teen births related to adolescents less than 20 years of age in Texas counties were used in this study.

2. Data were obtained for 3 years before and 3 years after the implementation of the 1996 welfare reform legislation.

Summary

Social welfare policies are often blamed for contributing to increasing unmarried teen childbirth rates. Previous studies examining the relationship between welfare and unmarried teen childbirth have provided inconclusive evidence to support the idea that welfare benefits have significantly contributed to the increase in unmarried teen childbirth rates over the last 50 years. Reference group and social contagion theory suggest that the propensity for unmarried teenage childbearing is a function of the sexual attitudes and behaviors that exist within the adolescent's personal and social environment, not an incentive to obtain welfare benefits. These theories provided the framework for testing the hypothesis that welfare benefits will not be associated with the occurrence of unmarried childbearing among adolescents.

One of the major aims of the 1996 welfare reform legislation is to reduce the incidence of unmarried teen parenting. The purpose of this study was to describe the effect of the 1996 welfare reform legislation on unmarried teen birth rates in Texas. The ability for teen population density, ethnic homogeneity, and welfare participation to predict the unmarried teen childbirth rates after the implementation of this legislation was explored. Unmarried teen childbearing is a multidimensional phenomenon that is prevalent within society and this

study tested the belief that changing public policies will not significantly reduce the incidence of unmarried teen childbearing.

CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

Sexual activity among adolescents in the United States has been steadily increasing since the 1970s (Ventura, 1995). Current studies indicate that 76% of young women and 80% of young men in the U.S. have sexual intercourse by age 20 (Ventura et al., 1999b). Approximately one million teenagers in the United States become pregnant each year (Ventura, 1995) and more than 75% of the teens who give birth will not be married (National Campaign to Prevent Teenage Pregnancy, 2000).

Unmarried teen mothers are characterized in the literature as predominately minority women from poor, urban families, but recent studies dispute the assumption that teenage childbearing is a problem found only among minorities living in urban settings (Ventura, 1995). Unfortunately, few research studies on unmarried teen childbirth include both rural areas and minority populations (Ventura, 1995).

Unmarried teen mothers are also portrayed as being financially dependent on government-sponsored programs to provide them support. This portrayal fueled the debate about the influence of welfare benefits on unmarried adolescent childbearing and prompted the implementation of the 1996 Welfare Reform Legislation. One of the major aims of this legislation was to reduce single parent families--especially among teens. This review of the literature examined the trends in unmarried teen childbirth rates, teen population density, and welfare participation. It also addressed welfare inception and reform and the study of change through growth curve modeling.

Trends in Unmarried Teen Childbirths

The primary measure used to describe and explain the patterns and trends in the incidence of nonmarital childbearing is the birth rate for unmarried mothers. This rate is usually defined as the number of nonmarital births per 1,000 unmarried women from 15-44 years of age. However, the numerator and denominator can be changed to reflect the population of women under study. The birth rate for unmarried mothers provides researchers with a means for measuring the "risk" of pregnancy for an unmarried woman in a particular year (Ventura, 1995).

Researchers have identified distinct periods in the history of unmarried teen birth rates over time (Ventura & Curtin, 1999). Beginning in 1940, the unmarried teen birth rate in the United States was 7.4 per 1,000 teens aged 15-19. From 1940 until 1957, the unmarried teen birth rates steadily increased until they had more than doubled at 15.7 per 1,000 teens. For the next 8 years, the rates remained virtually unchanged. Then, in 1965 the rates began to rise until they reached 22.8 per 1,000 teens in 1972. This change represents approximately a 43% increase from 1965 to 1972 (Ventura et al., 1999b). The unmarried teen birth rates rose again from 1978 until 1991, reaching 44.8 births per 1,000 teens. This change represented an increase in the unmarried teen child birth rate of approximately 80% (Henshaw, 1998). Finally, in 1992 the rates began to decline and from 1992 to 1998 the unmarried teen birth rates decreased from 44.6 to 42.2 births per 1,000 teens (see Figure 1) (Aral & Cates, 1989; Kaufmann et al., 1998).




Figure 1. Unmarried teen birthrates per 1,000 teens aged 15-19 from 1940 to 1998.

Despite a decrease in the unmarried teen birth rates during the 1990s, the number and proportion of births to unmarried teens have continued to increase. In 1940, there were 42,600 births to unmarried women less than 20 years of age (Ventura, 1995; Ventura et al., 1999b) as compared 390,005 births to unmarried women less than 20 years of age in 1998. Preliminary data from 1999 indicate there were 382,655 births to unmarried women less than 20 years old. This represents a decrease in the number of births to unmarried women less than 20 years of age, but it does not represent a change in the percent of births to this particular cohort of women (Curtin & Ventura, 2000).

Along with rising numbers, the proportion of births to unmarried teens has also continued to increase over time. From 1950 to 1997, the proportion of births to unmarried teens aged 15-17 has more than tripled--rising from 23% to 87%. The increase among older teens has been

even greater, rising from 9% in 1950 to 72% in 1997 (Ventura & Curtin, 1999). This trend has been the result of the sustained decline in the number of marriages that has occurred since the 1960s (Ventura, 1995). In 1960, about 28% of all 18-19 year old teens married in 1960 compared to 7% in 1997 (Lugaila, 1998; U.S. Census Bureau, 1971). No change in this trend is predicted for the future.

In 1966, population statistics describing marital status among teens aged 15-17 and 18-19 first became available. Researchers then had the opportunity to examine the birth trends in teenage subgroups (Ventura & Curtin, 1999; Ventura et al., 1999b). Between 1966 and 1980, the rates for teens 15-17 years of age rose from 13.1 to 20.7 per 1,000 teens or approximately 57% and the rates for teens 18-19 years of age rose from 25.6 to 38.7 per 1,000 teens or approximately 52%.

From 1980 to 1992 the unmarried teen birth rates for teens 18-19 years of age rose more sharply than for the 15-17 year old teens. During that 12-year time frame, the rate for older teens (18-19 years of age) increased 73% from 39 to 67.3 births per 1,000 teens. The younger teen (15-17 years of age) birth rate increased 50% from 1980 to 1991 and then dropped slightly in 1992 (Ventura, 1995). However, during the time period from 1994 to 1998, the birth rate for unmarried teens aged 15-17 years declined 16% and for teens aged 18-19 years it declined 8%. In 1998, the teen birth rate among unmarried women 15-19 years of age was 41.5 per 1,000 teens and among unmarried women 18-19 years of age it was 64.5 per 1,000 teens (Ventura et al., 2000b).

The higher rates of childbearing among older teens (ages 18-19) compared to younger teens (ages 15-17) may be explained by the findings that indicate that older teens have higher rates of sexual experience and more frequent sexual intercourse (Ventura, 1995; Ventura et al., 1999b). Older teens are also more likely to intentionally want to become

pregnant (Ventura & Curtin, 1999). This explanation supports the social contagion premise that young adolescents participate in sexual behaviors less frequently than their older counterparts, but as the adolescent ages, exposure to potential partners increases and the sexual behavior spreads (Abma, Chandra, & Mosher, 1997).

Birth rates for unmarried women by race for both White and Black teens have been available since 1969. Prior to 1980, birth data by race were tabulated based on the race of the child, but beginning with the 1980 data, tabulations are based on the race of the mother. The birth rates for unmarried White teens rose steadily during the 1970s from 9.7 births per 1,000 in 1969 to 16.5 per 1,000 in 1980 (Sonenstein, Ku, & Lundberg, 1998). From 1980 to 1994, the White unmarried teen birth rate more than doubled to 36.2 per 1,000 and then declined to 34.0 per 1,000 from 1995 to 1998. In 1969 the unmarried Black teen birth rate was 90.3 per 1,000 and by 1980 the rate had dropped to 87.9 per 1,000. The rate for unmarried Black teens then rose 20% to 105.9 per 1,000 from 1980 to 1992 (Ventura, 1995), but has since declined to 83.4 births per 1,000 in 1998 (see Figure 2) (Ventura et al., 2000b).

Birth and population data by marital status for women of Hispanic origin have only been available for extraction from birth records since 1990 (Ventura, 1995; Ventura et al., 1999b). The birth rate for unmarried Hispanic teens has increased at a pace similar to that of White teens since 1990 (Ventura & Curtin, 1999). In 1990, the unmarried birth rate for Hispanic teens 15-19 years of age was 65.9 per 1,000. The rate peaked in 1994 at 82.6 per 1,000 and in 1998 it had declined to 73.9 per 1,000. In 1998, the birth rate among unmarried Hispanic teens aged 18-19 was 107.8 per 1,000 as compared to 53.0 per 1,000 among unmarried Hispanic teens aged 15-17 (see Figure 2) (Ventura et al., 2000b).




Figure 2. Birthrates per 1,000 unmarried teens aged 15-19 by ethnicity from 1990 to 1998.

Sexual activity, contraceptive use, and induced abortions are major factors that affect the unmarried teen childbirth trends. The decline in birth rates for teens since 1991 has been attributed to a change in adolescent sexual behavior. According to the 1995 National Survey of Family Growth (NSFG), the proportion of teens who engage in sexual activity has stabilized as compared to the steady increase in teenage sexual activity that occurred during the prior two decades (Abma et al., 1997). Analysis of data in two surveys limited to teenagers, the National Survey of Adolescent Males (Sonenstein et al., 1998) and the 1997 Youth Risk Behavior Surveillance Survey (Center for Disease Control and Prevention, 1998), revealed a decline in sexual activity among

teenagers. In addition, there has been an increase in the consistent long-term use of contraception and condoms among teens (Piccinino & Mosher, 1998; Terry & Manlove, 2000). Perhaps this change also could be attributed to an overall change in normative behavior within specific adolescent reference groups.

Population Density

Unmarried Teen Childbearing

Although the relationship between teenage childbearing and population density has recently gained more attention, it has been studied infrequently. Rural and urban are terms often used in research to describe the population density of a geographical area. The concept of "population density" is operationalized based on the preference of the researcher when it is used as a variable in a study. Therefore, caution needs to be observed when comparing the findings from these studies.

South (1999) conducted a study using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) to examine whether the impact of previously identified sociodemographic risk factors of a first premarital birth have changed over time. The nationally representative sample included data from 2,794 women aged 15-38 over a 25-year period of time (1968-1993). The study found significant effects of race and ethnicity, family background, and geographic location on the likelihood that a woman will have an unmarried birth. The results of the study found that Black women were 2 1/2 times more likely to have an unmarried birth than White women. In addition, the results indicated that the risk of a first nonmarital birth increased significantly with increases in the level of socioeconomic disadvantage in the respondent's neighborhood. The risk was higher in metropolitan areas than in nonmetropolitan areas and lower in the South than in regions outside of the South.

In a study completed by the USDA Economic Research Service, researchers found a narrowing in the urban-rural difference in nonmarital childbearing from 1980 to 1994. The proportion of nonmarital births among women in urban areas was higher than the proportion of nonmarital births among women in rural areas, but as of 1994, unmarried teenage mothers accounted for 1 in every 9 infants born in rural areas as compared to 1 out of every 10 infants born in urban areas. This small difference suggests that place of residence does not significantly impact the incidence of nonmarital childbearing adolescents (Frenzen & Butler, 1997).

An analysis of the 1990 census and vital statistics data assessed the frequency and outcomes of adolescent pregnancy by rurality for eight southeastern states. Teenage birth rates were higher in rural areas than in metropolitan areas with the exception of Black teens who had higher birth rates in metropolitan areas (Bennett, Skatrud, Guild, Loda, & Klerman, 1997).

Tomal (1999) used population density (population per square mile) as a measure of urbanization to examine its relationship to teenage childbearing in Illinois. The population density at the county level, had no significant impact between urbanization and teenage childbearing. Nonetheless, the study did indicate that the proportion of White population living in a county was a significant factor in determining the teenage birth rate for teens under the age of 18. Other research findings also have found that since the early 1970s there has been a strong relationship between Black nonmarital childbearing and Black population density throughout the United States (Murray, 1993).

In Canada, teenage pregnancy rates declined steadily from the mid-1970s until the mid-1980s. To assess the reasons for the steady decline, researchers conducted a study, using selected sociodemographic

variables, to examine the relationship between these variables and the change in teen pregnancy rates over time. One of the variables selected by the researchers was person-average density. Person-average density represented a measurement of the 1981 population density (persons/square kilometer) for Health Units in the province of Alberta. The results of the study confirmed that person-average density played a major role in accounting for the variations in change in teen pregnancy rates across health units. Health units with large person-average densities in 1981 evidenced the greatest decline in teen pregnancy rates or the lowest increase during the period of time being studied (Krishnan et al., 1999).

Welfare Participation

Generally, participation rates in welfare programs among eligible individuals is always below 100%. Participation in these programs is dependent upon three factors: (a) an awareness that the program exists, (b) a belief that they are eligible for the program, and (c) a desire to apply for benefits. Thus, even though an individual might be aware of a program and believe they are eligible, they may choose not to participate (Hirschl & Rank, 1999; Rank & Hirschl, 1988). There is evidence that these three factors vary according to population density, but the role of geographic factors and its effect on participation in welfare programs has not been widely studied.

The most extensive work in studying the relationship between population density and welfare participation has been completed by Hirschl and Rank. Their first study (Rank & Hirschl, 1988) followed 2,796 households in Wisconsin who were receiving public assistance (either AFCD, Food stamps, and/or Medicaid) for 3 years to determine if there is a rural-urban difference in welfare exits. The researchers found that welfare participants from rural counties were more likely to

exit welfare programs than participants living in urban counties. After finding that population density affects welfare exits, the researchers used an in-depth qualitative interview to examine the participants' attitudes and experiences concerning welfare use. The urban and rural welfare participants differed in their attitude, perception in receiving public assistance, and patterns of interaction with providers and other recipients. All welfare participants felt stigmatized, but the participants in rural counties felt a greater degree of shame and had less association with individuals who could alleviate these negative feelings.

Recognizing that there were limitations in generalizing the results from the previous study to other rural areas, Hirschl and Rank (1991) replicated the study using a national sample. To test the hypothesis that urbanity influences welfare participation, the researchers used monthly AFDC and Food Stamp participation data for 1980. Data for all 3,137 counties and county equivalents in the U.S. were obtained from the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and from the U.S. Department of Agriculture. Urbanity was defined based on population density as measured by percent population urban. After controlling for levels of poverty, the results of the study indicated that counties with greater population densities were more likely to have higher participation rates than counties with lower population densities.

These findings supported the results from their earlier study. Regression models were then developed to control for rural/urban differences in educational attainment, labor force participation, work force disability, racial composition, age composition, household composition, and levels of poverty between counties. Several important relationships emerged from these models: (a) population density

continued to have a positive and consistent effect on both AFDC and food stamp participation; (b) counties with higher rates of poverty, unemployment, low education attainment, percent Black, and disabled individuals had higher levels of welfare participation; and (c) counties with higher rates of female headed households and higher average AFDC payments revealed greater AFDC participation. These findings suggest that in addition to individual characteristics, spatial and geographic factors influence the national rates of welfare participation.

In two recent studies (Hirschl & Rank, 1999; Rank & Hirschl, 1993) these researchers used the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), a nationally representative longitudinal sample of households, to examine the relationship between food stamp participation and county population density (measured as a percentage population urban). Selected years from 1976-1987 were included in both studies. Food stamp program participation was selected as the dependent variable representing welfare participation because eligibility standards for this program are similar across the U.S., whereas AFDC eligibility varies widely from state to state. Overall, the results of both studies found that poverty level and population density affect the decision to obtain food stamps.

However, in a sample of non-participating households who were eligible for food stamps, poverty rate within the county had an effect on the transition to participation, but population density did not (Hirschl & Rank, 1999). The results from the household, socioeconomic, and demographic control variables indicated that households headed by a minority were no more likely to participate in the food stamp program than are non-Hispanic Whites (Rank & Hirschl, 1993). The results suggest that population density cannot be ignored, but that the percentage of poverty within a county may be a greater predictor of food stamp participation.

The previous studies demonstrate several methods that have been used by researchers to operationalize population density at different geographic levels. The results provide evidence that population density has an affect on nonmarital childbearing and welfare participation. In addition, several studies argue that the racial or ethnic distribution within an area can also be a strong predictor of the unmarried childbirth rates, but not welfare participation. These studies support the use of reference group and social contagion as theoretical underpinnings for examining the relationship between unmarried teen childbearing, population density and welfare participation. They reinforce the idea that adolescent sexual behavior is a function of the expectations of their peer group and this influence is strongest within densely populated areas.

Welfare

Inception and Reform

In 1935, the Social Security Act included a program entitled Aid to Dependent Families with Children (AFDC). This act allowed states to formulate their own definition for welfare eligibility, to determine the nature and size of their welfare programs and to consider the "moral character" of a woman seeking assistance for her child when determining eligibility for AFDC benefits. The underlying purpose of the program was apparently aimed at providing public money to unmarried mothers (primarily White widows) and their dependent children (Thomas, 1998)

By 1961, the social climate, which reflected higher divorce rates, spousal desertion, rising fertility, and births outside of marriage increased the number of women who were receiving AFDC benefits. Women that were either separated or divorced or single, headed the majority of families who received AFDC benefits. Widowed families comprised just

7.7% of the recipients--down from 61% in 1939 (Gerber & McGuire, 1995; Thomas, 1997; Videka-Sherman & Viggiani, 1996).

During the 1950s and the 1960s, single minority mothers and their children became the target of welfare reform legislation. Lawmakers attributed the shifting AFDC caseload and spiraling welfare costs to the morality of poor women and on their willingness to bear children outside of marriage. According to Solinger (1992), "the White women's illegitimacy was perceived as a treatable individual psychological phenomenon, but African American unwed mothers were mythologized as innately biologically flawed by hypersexuality" (p. 45). Lawmakers across the country began to pass legislation that eliminated benefits for women who were promiscuous, lacked moral and ethical standards and who had children out-of-wedlock. The aim of their legislation was to "clean up" the welfare rolls and to provide an incentive for conforming women's behavior. Instead, these changes created negative attitudes toward the dependent population of indigent women and the treatment of poor mothers receiving public assistance, particularly unwed Black mothers (Jewell, 1993).

In an attempt to encourage AFDC recipients to work for wages rather than receive benefits for domesticity, the federal government passed the Family Support Act (FSA) in 1988. The FSA authorized one billion dollars annually for welfare recipients to receive employment training, education, and related childcare costs. According to the Women's Policy Research, 39% of AFDC recipients were motivated to obtain employment or to combine work with welfare (Rich, 1992). Unfortunately, not every state fully matched the federal investment as required by law and women were often trained for low paying, unstable jobs that did not provide economic security and the provisions for childcare costs broke down (Mink, 1994).

The concept of a benefit cap for women receiving AFDC benefits was initiated in 1992 when President George Bush approved the "Parental and Family Responsibility Initiative." The goal of the initiative was to impose harsh monetary penalties on women who bear children while they are eligible for AFDC benefits. The underlying premise for the benefit cap was that increased AFDC benefits for additional children would "encourage promiscuous behavior, lead to more illegitimate children and make women indifferent to their fault" (Thomas, 1997, p. 359). Opponents of the benefit cap cited that there was no empirical evidence to support the supposition that increased AFDC benefits for additional children encouraged women to conceive and bear additional children.

The major thrust of the welfare reform legislation that was signed into law on August 22, 1996, was to reduce single parent families (especially among teens) and subsidies for non-working poor people (Berner, 1996). The new legislation replaced AFDC with a block grant entitled Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) and ended a 61-year-old custom of providing welfare benefits to eligible low-income mothers and their children. Welfare reform changed eligibility requirements for potential recipients, but did not change the amount of the benefit the recipient would receive if they applied and were found to be eligible.

Implementation of the new law was to begin in all states by July 1, 1997 (some major provisions, including the end of AFDC, took effect October 1, 1996). However, states were allowed to continue waiver-based programs that were approved before the enactment, even if provisions of the state programs were inconsistent with the new law. Approximately 40 states (including Texas) have waivers that have been approved by the federal government.

The TANF program allows the federal government to provide an annual lump sum of money to each state, regardless of its number of AFDC recipients, instead of providing matching state payments. The size of the grant that a state receives is based on recent federal spending for welfare programs in that state. States are not required to spend their own matching funds in order to receive the TANF funds and the new law authorizes the states to develop and control their own public assistance programs. This flexibility can lead to great variations between states in the implementation of social policies (Berner, 1996; Blank, 1997; Hagen, 1999; Page & Arena, 1994).

There are constraints associated with receiving TANF benefits. These constraints stipulate that: (a) states must require adult recipients to work or do community service, (b) no family may receive TANF federal assistance for more than five years, and (c) no federal funds can be utilized to provide assistance to immigrants or to teen parents who live independently of a parent or adult guardian (Blank, 1997; Page & Larner, 1997; Velsor-Friedrich, 1997). New legally admitted aliens also are disqualified from receiving TANF benefits for the first 5 years after their arrival to the U.S. Additionally, their sponsor's income will be counted in determining whether they are eligible for welfare. Unmarried minor parents will also be ineligible for benefits if they do not have or are not pursuing a high school diploma (Castro, 1997; Knitzer & Bernard, 1997).

There are other responsibilities that recipients must fulfill to maintain TANF benefits. These include: (a) cooperating with the state to establish paternity of children in an effort to secure child support from the absent parent, (b) ensuring that minor children attend school as required by the state laws, and (c) complying with the state in establishing a plan for future employment (Castro, 1997; Hagen, 1999).

The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act also impacted the Food Stamp and Social Security Income (SSI) programs. Minor parents who live with their own parents are no longer eligible to be treated as a separate household for the purposes of establishing eligibility for Food Stamps. The earned income of students between the ages of 17 and 21 is also calculated when determining eligibility for the program (Castro, 1997). Most legal immigrants are denied Food Stamp benefits (Velsor-Friedrich, 1997) and Medicaid eligibility is no longer linked to AFDC as it was in the past (Page & Lerner, 1997).

Under the new law, states are required to provide Medicaid coverage to all families who meet the income and family structure guidelines that applied to the state's AFDC program on July 16, 1996. The states also have the option of lowering the income limits on eligibility to the level that applied on May 1, 1988 and to deny Medicaid benefits to legal immigrants (Moffitt & Slade, 1997). Although adults may lose Medicaid coverage if their cash benefits are terminated, coverage for children and pregnant women should not be affected.

Social Policy and Unmarried Childbearing

Teenage pregnancy was first perceived as a social problem in the 1960s and 1970s. The increasing number of single teen mothers on the welfare rolls contributed to this opinion. During this time frame, policies and legislation that focused on access to abortion, access to contraception, and the role of parents in monitoring sexual decision making and behaviors were enacted (Gilchrist & Schinke, 1983; Montessoro & Blixen, 1996; Rhode, 1993-1994; Weatherley, 1991). The underlying premise of these policies was based on that idea that easier access to information and contraception would decrease the incidence of pregnancy among teens.

Due to the continuing cost to society, unmarried teenage childbearing has remained a concern for politicians and the public. The recent welfare debates have focused on the "welfare incentives" that politicians and others perceive have been affecting unmarried teen birth rates. The hypothesis that the welfare system has encouraged nonmarital childbearing, especially among teenagers, cannot be examined in an experimental study, therefore a variety of less rigorous methods have been used.

Furstenberg (1976) completed one of the first studies that discussed the social consequences associated with adolescent pregnancy. His results were part of a 6-year longitudinal study that began in 1966. The sample consisted almost exclusively of first-time pregnant Black women under the age of 18 who were residing in low-income households. Only 9% said that they had deliberately failed to use contraception in order to get pregnant. At the end of the 5-year study, three out of five mothers were either self-supporting or were non-working women married to wage-earning males. Almost two-thirds of the mothers were on welfare at some time during the study and most of the women who were receiving benefits at the 5-year mark were not long-term recipients. Slightly half these mothers had been receiving welfare benefits for more than 12 months and only one-third had been on welfare for 30 months. Furstenberg believed that one of the major reasons why teenage mothers encounter problems is because they lack the resources to correct the damage caused by a birth during adolescence. He felt that to change the life course of the adolescent parent, society must provide the appropriate economic assistance. This assistance ought to involve stable employment for one or both parents, accessible and affordable childcare that would permit parental educational and/or economic participation, and family planning services.

In 1977, Moore and Caldwell completed one of the earliest studies that examined the relationship between government policies and unmarried childbearing. Survey data from 1,479 Black and 3,132 White females aged 15-19 in 1971 living in households or college dormitories were collected. The survey included questions about sexual attitudes, reproductive attitudes and histories, and personal and family backgrounds. Public policy variables, representing the governmental programs in the respondent's state of residence at the time of the survey, were added to the participant's computer record so that a correlation could be made with the answers to the survey. The major policy conclusion from this study was that the amount of AFDC benefits available and the level of AFDC acceptance rate were not economic incentives for childbearing outside of marriage for either Blacks or Whites.

Ellwood and Bane (1985) completed the most widely cited study that examined the relationship between unmarried women and the differences in AFDC benefits between states. Using data from the 1976 Survey of Income and Education, the researchers found that in states with high AFDC payments, a larger proportion of single women with children lived independently, while single women with children in states with low AFDC payments were more likely to live with a parent. In addition, the results of their study also revealed that young single women who lived in states with high AFDC payments did not have more babies than their peers in states with low AFDC payments.

Murray (1993) reviewed studies that examined the incentive effect of welfare on unmarried childbearing and then used both cross sectional analyses and time series presentations for further exploration into this relationship. The researcher created an illegitimacy ratio based on the number of illegitimate births as a proportion of all live births and

operationalized welfare as the mean family AFDC payment plus the food stamp allotment for a family of four in a given state. Between 1960 and 1975, Murray found that the nonmarital birth rates and the data on AFDC benefits tracked each other reasonably well. However, from 1975 until 1984, the nonmarital birth rates continued to increase at a rapid pace while the value of AFDC benefits decreased. A bivariate relationship between the size of the state's welfare benefits and illegitimacy was found for White females, but not for Black females. Murray concluded that a relationship between illegitimacy and AFDC exists, but whether that relationship is causal is still questionable.

Despite more sophisticated statistical analyses, studies continue to find contradictory relationships between welfare incentives and unmarried childbearing. Zimmerman and Gager (1997) used a pooled time series analysis that covered a 30-year period of time to examine the relationship between states' AFDC payments and unmarried teen birth rates. No positive relationship was found between the states' AFDC payments and teen birth rates. Their findings indicated that teen birth rates were higher in states where AFDC rates are lower. The researchers determined that the incentive effect of welfare was not applicable in states where teen birth rates are consistently high.

Winegarden and Bracy (1997) tested a structural model utilizing aggregate time series data (1973-1992) to ascertain the possibility of a link between unmarried childbirth and welfare benefits. In contrast to the previous study, the results of the study revealed a significant positive linkage between AFDC benefits and nonmarital childbearing despite the declining real value of welfare benefits over time. The welfare incentive was found for Black and White unmarried mothers, but the incentive effect was stronger among White females.

The difference in the samples used in these last two studies-- childbearing women aged 15-44 (Winegarden & Bracy, 1997) versus unmarried teens aged 15-19 (Zimmerman & Gager, 1997), has to be considered when comparing the results. This caution is suggested because unmarried teens represent only 5% to 7% of the women who receive welfare benefits in the U.S. (Alan Guttmacher Institute, 1995). Different results may have been obtained by either study if another representative sample had been selected.

Studies that find a relationship between the incentive effect of welfare benefits on unmarried childbearing, usually find a relatively weak relationship. But unlike previous studies, a recent study did find a statistically significant and quantitatively large positive welfare incentive effect on nonmarital childbearing among women who were less than 23 years old (Rosenzweig, 1999). Using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY), Rosenzweig used a cohort approach and multinomial logit modeling to test whether the AFDC program and marital prospects affect fertility/marital decisions of 6,283 women aged 14-21. The findings indicated that higher AFDC benefit levels have a small effect on the probability of nonmarital childbearing among all young women, but have a substantial effect among women whose parental income is less than \$10,000. Among women with poor parents, a 10% rise in welfare benefits increases a woman's probability of having a nonmarital birth before age 22 by 12% and decreases the probability of having no children by 2.3%. The effect of AFDC benefits on the fertility behavior of the nonpoor was insignificant. The findings from this study suggest that welfare programs encourage nonmarital childbearing among young women and aid nonmarital childbearing for young women who have poor marital and labor market prospects.

Hoffman and Foster (1999) replicated the above study using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). Their sample included 1,806 women who were 22 years of age or less. The researchers were able to reproduce Rosenszweig's main finding that AFDC generosity influences nonmarital childbearing for women less than 23 years of age. But, when they modified the modeling to examine teens only, the effect of a welfare incentive was not evident. In another modification in which the analysis focused only on women in their early 20s, the effect was again present. These results suggest that the sexual behavior of women in their early 20s is more sensitive to welfare generosity than the sexual behavior of teens. Since the results for the PSID and NLSY samples were similar, but contrary to findings in previous research, Hoffman and Foster attributed the significant results to the methodological approach used by Rosenzweig.

The available research that examines the relationship between welfare incentives and nonmarital childbearing varies extensively. The studies differ in the populations they examine (teenagers, all women of childbearing age, different racial and ethnic groups), the way in which they measure welfare benefits, the time period examined, the statistical analyses used, and the individual and state level characteristics they take into account (Acs, 1996). Therefore, the results have been inconsistent and contradictory. Table 2 summarizes many of these studies.

Table 2

Summary of Studies that Examined the Effect of Welfare on ChildbearingDecisions

| Study | Time Frame | Data Set | Research Question | Results |
|----------------------------|------------|---|---|---------------------------------------|
| Moore & Caldwell (1977) | 1971, 1974 | National sample of 1,479 Black & 3,132 White females aged 15-19 | Examined time trends of nonmarital childbearing and AFDC benefits | No effect |
| Ellwood & Bane (1985) | 1976 | National sample of over 10,000 unmarried mothers aged 16-44 | Likelihood of a nonmarital childbirth and level of AFDC benefits | No effect |
| Weingarden (1988) | 1947-1983 | National data on births to unmarried women aged 15-44 | Examined time trends of nonmarital childbearing and AFDC benefits | Positive effect for non-White females |
| Ozawa (1990) | 1984 | National state by state data for births to unmarried women aged 19 or younger | Examined time trends of nonmarital childbearing and AFDC benefits | Positive effect for White females |
| Plotnick (1990) | 1979-1984 | National sample of 1,184 girls aged 14 or 15 in 1979 | Likelihood of a nonmarital childbirth and level of AFDC benefits | Positive effect for White females |
| Duncan & Hoffman (1990) | 1968-1985 | National sample of 874 Black females aged 14 between 1969 and 1980 | Likelihood of a nonmarital childbirth and level of AFDC benefits | No effect |
| Lundberg & Plotnick (1990) | 1979-1985 | National sample of 1,181 White females aged 14 in 1979 | Likelihood of a nonmarital childbirth and level of AFDC benefits | Positive effect for White females |

Table 2 (continued)

| Study | Time Frame | Data Set | Research Question | Results |
|--------------------------------|------------------------------|--|--|--|
| Murray (1993) | 1954-1988 | National statistics on unmarried childbearing for women aged 15-44 | Likelihood of a nonmarital childbirth and level of benefits | Positive effect for White females |
| Moore, Morrison, & Glei (1995) | 1976-1987 | National sample of 1,143 youth aged 11-17 | Likelihood of a nonmarital childbirth and level of AFDC benefits | No effect |
| Lundberg & Plotnick (1995) | 1979-1986 | National sample of 1,718 Black and White women aged 14-16 in 1979 | Likelihood of a nonmarital childbirth and level of AFDC benefits | Positive effect for White females |
| Robins & Fronstin (1996) | 1980-1988 | National sample of 74,355 never married women aged 18-44 | Likelihood of a nonmarital childbirth and level of AFDC benefits | Positive effect for Black and Hispanic females |
| Zimmerman & Gager (1997) | 1960, 1970, 1980, 1985, 1990 | National statistics on unmarried childbearing for women aged 15-19 | Likelihood of a nonmarital childbirth and level of AFDC benefits | No effect |
| Winegarden & Bracy (1997) | 1973-1992 | National statistics on unmarried childbearing for women aged 15-44 | Likelihood of a nonmarital childbirth and level of AFDC benefits | Positive effect for Black and White females |
| Rosenzweig (1999) | 1979-1990 | National sample of 6,283 women aged 14-22 | Likelihood of a nonmarital childbirth and level of AFDC benefits | Positive effect. Effect double in low-income subsample |
| Hoffman & Foster (1999) | 1968-1991 | National sample of 1,806 women who were no older than age 12 in 1968 and were no older than 22 by 1991 | Likelihood of a nonmarital childbirth and level of AFDC benefits | No effect on teens. Large effect on women in their early 20s |

The inconsistent and contradictory research findings in the literature weaken the conclusion that the welfare system increases nonmarital childbearing. Research indicates that nonmarital childbearing is not limited to minority women or women who rely on welfare benefits. The phenomenon is found within all races, ethnic groups, and economic levels. Welfare benefits may discourage pregnant teens from marrying (Ozawa, 1989; Plotnick, 1993), but it has not been found to be the major impetus for adolescents to become pregnant (Moffitt, 1992; Murray, 1993; Winegarden & Bracy, 1997). Researchers have suggested that legislation aimed at removing single mothers from the welfare rolls needs to address broader social issues such as adequate housing, community services, employment opportunities for women, and provisions for adequate childcare rather than focusing on individual behaviors.

Texas and Welfare Reform

In May 1995, Texas' legislatures made the decision to significantly change the state's welfare system by passing House Bill (HB) 1863. Texas submitted its state plan, entitled "Achieving Change for Texas" (ACT), for reforming welfare to the federal government and was provided with a federal waiver in March 1996. The request for Texas' waiver was granted before the federal welfare reform was enacted, therefore, differences exist between Texas' welfare reform legislation and what is required in the federal legislation (see Table 3). Texas' federal waiver will expire in March 2002 and at that time the federal rules will apply (Texas Department of Human Services, 1997, 1998).

Implementation of Texas' welfare reform provisions under the federal waiver began in June 1996. As a condition of the waiver, there is a federal requirement to design and implement an evaluation project that includes both experimental and control groups within selected counties. The control groups' welfare eligibility and benefits are based

on policies that were in effect prior to implementation of the waiver. Twenty Department of Human Services (DHS) offices in eight counties were assigned to participate in the evaluation phase. Within each of the 20 offices, clients were randomly assigned to either an experimental or a control group. The eight counties involved are Ector, El Paso, Jefferson, Nueces, Caldwell, Medina, Walker, and Bexar (Texas Department of Human Services, 1998).

Table 3

A Comparison of Texas and Federal Welfare Reform Measures

| Key Provision | Texas (ACT) | Federal (PRWORA) |
|--|--|--|
| Time limits | Depending on a person's education and work history, time limits may be 12, 24, or 36 months. Five years must pass before TANF benefits can be received again. | Five-year lifetime limit (60 months). States can adopt shorter time limits. |
| Time limit exceptions | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Child only cases. • People who reside in counties that do not participate in Job Opportunities and Basic Skills (JOBS) programs. • Severe personal or local economic hardships. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Child only cases. • A state can exempt up to 20% of its TANF caseload. State determines the exemptions. |
| Mandatory participation in work or work activities | <p>Adult TANF caretakers who live in counties where JOBS is available must participate, with the following exemptions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Anyone age 15 or younger, or age 60 or older; • Anyone ages 16-18 who attends school full time; • Caretakers of children under age 4 (age 3 in control groups); • Anyone needed in the home to care for an ill or disabled child or adult; | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Adult TANF caretakers, except those who have a child under age 1 (a one-time only exemption) <p><u>Note.</u> There is no exemption for two-parent families with a child under age 1.</p> |

Table 3 (continued)

| Key Provision | Texas (ACT) | Federal (PRWORA) |
|--|--|---|
| Mandatory participation in work or work activities (continued) | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Anyone who is disabled; • Anyone who lives in an area that is remote from available employment and training resources; and • Anyone who volunteers full time for the Volunteers in Service to America (VISTA) program. | |
| Allowable work activities | Generally, the same work activities as were formerly allowed under JOBS are still allowed. There is no limit on the number of hours spent in a work activity. | Restrictions are placed on the types of work activities and hours spent in those activities-- such as education, literacy training, and job search--that can be counted in calculating a state's work participation rate. |

Note. From the Texas Department of Human Services. (1998). Process evaluation of the Achieving Change for Texans: Welfare reform waiver track one evaluation (p. 25). Austin: Texas Department of Human Services.

The Texas Department of Human Services (DHS) is the department primarily responsible for administering state and federal programs that provide financial, health, and social services to people residing in Texas. Services are provided to the 254 counties in Texas through 10 administrative regions and more than 400 local offices. In the past, the DHS responsibilities included employment and child-care service programs. But, under HB1863, there was a consolidation of all work-related programs into a new state agency entitled the Texas Workforce Commission and responsibility for these programs was transferred to the new agency (Texas Department of Human Services, 1996).

The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program (formerly AFDC) in Texas is one of the programs that DHS is responsible for overseeing. Under the TANF block grant, Texas receives \$486 million

each year from the federal government (Texas Department of Human Services, 1999). With these funds, TANF provides basic financial assistance for needy children and the parents or caretakers with whom they live. As a condition of their eligibility, caretakers must sign and abide by guidelines outlined in the personal-responsibility agreement. Two-parent households who meet the eligibility criteria also can apply for benefits when the primary wage earner is temporarily unemployed. In addition, households that are currently not receiving TANF, but would otherwise be eligible, can now receive a lump sum payment of \$1,000. The purpose behind providing this payment is to help solve a short time crisis and divert households from receiving ongoing TANF benefits. To qualify for this benefit, households must meet the crisis criteria as well as the requirements for TANF eligibility (Texas Department of Human Services, 1998).

The significant drop in the number of welfare recipients since fiscal year (FY) 1994 has been attributed to Texas' welfare reform legislation and its strong economy. In fiscal year (FY) 1999, there was an average of 369,938 TANF recipients per month receiving assistance as compared to 786,395 recipients in 1994. During FY1994, the annual cost to the state for providing welfare benefits was approximately \$544.9 million whereas in FY1999 the cost of providing benefits had decreased to 234.8 million dollars (Texas Department of Human Services, 1994; Texas Department of Human Services, 1999).

Study of Change

Change is a continuous process. Studies that examine the association between initial conditions and final outcomes often do not collect enough information to characterize change adequately over time. According to Rogosa, Brandt, and Zimowski (1982), studies of change should ideally be longitudinal with multiple repeated observations.

Techniques for analyzing multiwave data over time include repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA), multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA), and time series analysis. These methods have proven useful, but they do not allow for close exploration of the pattern of change over time and testing whether those patterns are related to other factors.

Growth curve analysis is a method that can be used to examine and measure change over time. Growth curve modeling provides an understanding of how a process unfolds and what variables influence the course of its development. The dependent variable in growth curve analysis does not represent an amount or rate of change, but rather it is a function that describes the process of change (Stoolmiller, 1995). The assumptions associated with using growth curve analysis are (a) the structure of the outcome measure does not change over time, (b) the outcome is measured in the same units over time, (c) the outcome variables has a normal distribution and is measured at an interval or ratio level, (d) homogeneity of variance exists within each analysis group, and (e) an adequate model has been selected to represent the patterns of change (Burchinal, Bailey, & Snyder, 1994). An advantage to using growth curve analysis over other longitudinal methods is that, within reasonable bounds, the estimation of individual growth curves is not jeopardized by the presence of measurement error (Rogosa, 1995).

In growth curve modeling, line segments (trajectories) are constructed that represent change over time. Modeling the occurrence of change in the data can be described as a function of any shape. Researchers have used polynomial, logistic, negative exponential, and nonlinear functions to model change (Karney & Bradbury, 1995). Once the model of change has been specified, the outcome variable is regressed onto a measurement of time or a transformation of time in order to

obtain an estimate of the slope and intercept that best summarize the trajectory (Brekke, Long, Nesbitt, & Sobel, 1997). The precision of the estimates will tend to increase as the number of data points per individual increases (Rogosa et al., 1982). The estimate of the slope for these trajectories can then be used as a new outcome variable to be explained by other background or contextual variables.

Major research questions that growth curve modeling can address include: (a) describing the pattern of change in groups and individuals; (b) identifying the different patterns of change; and (c) identifying correlates associated with the patterns of change (Burchinal, Bailey, & Snyder, 1994). This methodology has been used in other disciplines to examine longitudinal change in marital quality (Karney & Bradbury, 1995), to explore the developmental patterns of children (Burchinal et al., 1994), and to assess the functional outcomes of a community support program on patients with schizophrenia (Brekke et al., 1997).

Changes in the U.S. welfare policies have focused on women and teen's sexual behaviors in an attempt to decrease unmarried childbearing (Montessoro & Blixen, 1996; Wilcox, Robbenolt, O'Keeffe, & Pynchon, 1996). Studies to measure the change in unmarried childbearing among teens and the extent to which any change can be attributed to recent changes in public policy need to be completed. Growth curve analysis is a method that can be employed to examine the patterns in unmarried teen births before and after the implementation of welfare reform policies in Texas.

Summary

Research findings indicate that the unmarried teen birth rates have been dropping since 1992, but the number and proportion of births to unmarried teens has continued to increase. Unmarried teen birth rates vary by age, race and ethnicity; however, the rates have remained

consistently highest for Black females aged 18-19. Reasons for the geographic variation in unmarried teen childbirth rates and welfare participation are currently not well understood, but studies focusing on population density and race/ethnicity have found that these may be useful in predicting nonmarital childbearing (Krishnan et al., 1999; South, 1999; Tomal, 1999). Further investigation of these variables and their contagion effect on unmarried teen childbearing is therefore warranted.

On August 22, 1996, federal legislation ended a 61-year guarantee of providing welfare benefits to eligible low-income mothers and their children. The major aim of the welfare reform legislation was to reduce single parent families (especially among teens) and subsidies for non-working people. Since the inception of welfare in 1935, there has been an ongoing debate about the relationship between welfare and its influence on unmarried pregnancy and childbirth. There is evidence that welfare may discourage a pregnant teen to marry, but the contradictory findings in the current research studies weaken the conclusion that welfare is an incentive for teens to become pregnant.

Texas legislatures made the decision to significantly change the state's welfare system by passing House Bill (HB) 1863 in 1995. Implementation of Texas' welfare reform provisions under a federal waiver began in June 1996. The TANF program (formerly AFDC) provides basic financial assistance for needy children and the parents or caretakers with whom they live. The Department of Health and Human Services is the agency responsible for overseeing this program.

Literature regarding the variables of interest in this study were reviewed and discussed. These variables included unmarried teen births, welfare, and population density. Research studies that examined the possible connection between unmarried teen childbearing and welfare

benefits were also reviewed. Methodological issues related to the use of population density as a variable, examining the relationship between unmarried teen childbirth and welfare, and measuring change through the use of growth curve analysis were discussed.

CHAPTER III

PROCEDURE FOR COLLECTION AND TREATMENT OF DATA

This quasi-experimental study was designed to describe and examine the unmarried teen birth rate pattern before and after the implementation of the 1996 welfare reform legislation in each Texas county. A model that provides an estimate of the effect of welfare reform on the unmarried teen birth rate patterns was developed. Analysis to determine if population density, ethnic homogeneity, or welfare participation in a county are predictors for unmarried teen childbearing was also completed. The study used archival data for analysis and to test the hypotheses.

Setting

The setting for this study included each of the 254 counties in the state of Texas. Located geographically in the southwestern section of the United States, Texas ranks second in size among the 50 United States and it covers a total area of 261,914 square miles (Ramos & Plocheck, 1999). The counties in Texas range in physical size, based on land area, from 112.8 square miles (Rockwall County) to 6,610 square miles (Brewster County). There are 176 counties that cover less than 1,000 square miles of land area, 66 counties cover between 1,000 and 2,000 square miles of land area, and the remainder cover more than 2,000 square miles of land area (see Figure 3).




Figure 3. Map outlining the 254 counties in the state of Texas.

According to the Texas State Data Center in the Department of Rural Sociology at Texas A&M University, from 1990 to 1997, 207 of the 254 counties have shown population increases. Counties with the largest percentage increases have tended to be located in the areas around the state's largest cities. The largest numerical increases can be found in Harris, Dallas, Bexar, Tarrant, Travis, and El Paso counties. Rural counties, particularly those in areas with economies based on extractive industries such as gas and oil, have tended to show patterns of slow growth or decline in their populations. Of the counties showing population declines, Terrell, Roberts, Motley, and Loving showed the largest percentage decreases (Murdock, Hoque, & Pecotte, 1999). Harris County is the most populous county with 3,178,995 people while Loving

County is the least populous with only 95 residents (Ramos & Plocheck, 1999).

In 1990, Texas had the second largest Hispanic population and the third largest Black population in the U.S. Minorities accounted for 39% of the population as compared to 24% of the U.S. population. If the current patterns of population growth continue, Texas' population is projected to be 36.7% White, 9.5% Black, and 45.9% Hispanic by 2030 (Murdock, Hoque, Michael, White, & Pecotte, 1997).

Population

In this study, the 254 counties in Texas represented the population under examination. The variable of interest within these counties was the births to unmarried women less than 20 years of age from January 1, 1994 through December 31, 1999. The unmarried teen birth information for each of these counties during this time frame was obtained from birth certificate data that are archived at the Bureau of Vital Statistics (BVS) in the Texas Department of Health (TDH).

Counties were selected as units of analysis because they are the primary legal divisions of every state, except Louisiana and Alaska. Louisiana has parishes, which are essentially similar to counties, and Alaska has boroughs. Despite differences in geographic size and characteristics, counties can be compared nationally because they represent an organizational unit within a state. Counties have also been found to represent a relatively stable measure of the population structure and are less subject to small area variation than other units of measurement (Hirschl & Rank, 1999).

Protection of Human Rights

This study followed the guidelines set forth by the Texas Woman's University Human Subjects Review Committee for a Level 1 study (no risk

to the participants). Permission to conduct the study was obtained from the Human Subjects Review Committee and from the Dean of the Graduate School prior to initiation of the formal investigation (see Appendix A). Birth data were obtained from birth certificate data that are archived at the BVS in the TDH. Due to the limited number of variables that were requested by the researcher, it was impossible to link any of information to a specific individual. Therefore, confidentiality was maintained.

Instrumentation and Data Collection

The data on unmarried teen births in this study were compiled from birth certificate information that are electronically stored at the Bureau of Vital Statistics (BVS) at the Texas Department of Health (TDH) in Austin, Texas. The specific variables requested from the birth certificate included the infant's birth date, the mother's age, marital status, mother's ethnicity, and county of mother's residence at the time of the infant's birth. During the time frame of this study, there were no changes in the birth certificate that altered the variables being used (B. Woldman, BVS, personal communication, May 17, 2000). A copy of the birth certificate form can be found in Appendix B. The information requested was sent from TDH to the researcher on a CD-ROM.

To register a birth in the state of Texas, the physician, midwife (or person acting as a midwife), or the mother or the father of the child must file a certificate of birth with the local registrar of the district in which the birth occurred. The birth is to be registered within 5 days of its occurrence. The local registrar in the county keeps a copy of the birth certificate and forwards the original to the Texas Department of Health, Bureau of Vital Statistics. Once the birth certificate is received at the Bureau of Vital Statistics, it is checked for completeness and accuracy by the Records Receiving, Nosology, and

Statistical Branches of the Bureau of Vital Statistics (Texas Department of Health, 1999).

The statistical files for births in Texas are composed of certificates of births that occurred during the calendar year and which are received by the statistical cutoff date (mid-May). Despite the Texas' civil statute requirement for the timely reporting of births, there is a small percentage of births in any given calendar year that are not received in time for inclusion in the statistical data sets for that year (see Table 4) (Texas Department of Health, 1999).

Table 4

Percent of Birth Certificates Received after the Statistical Cut-off Date

| Year | Percent |
|------|---------|
| 1994 | 0.12 |
| 1995 | 0.16 |
| 1996 | 0.20 |
| 1997 | 0.10 |
| 1998 | 0.12 |

Population estimates based on age, ethnicity, and gender at the county level were obtained from the Texas State Data Center in the Department of Rural Sociology at Texas A&M University. Estimates are usually for the past, while projections typically are for future dates. The Texas Population Estimates Program produces annual county estimates of the total population of each county and estimates of the population by age, gender, and race/ethnicity. Estimates are created through mathematical computations using existing data sets that include information on births, deaths, elementary school enrollment, vehicle registration, voter registration, and housing units. County estimates

are evaluated for consistency and reasonableness by comparing them to those from other State and local agencies before they are released. These data were used in creating the quarterly unmarried teen birth rates and the predictor variables of teen population density, welfare participation, and ethnic homogeneity. The information requested was sent from the Texas State Data Center to the researcher on a CD Rom.

The number of AFDC recipients in each Texas county during 1996 was obtained from Texas Department of Human Services 1996 Annual Report. The data provided in the report reflect the average monthly number of recipients, including children and caregivers, who received benefits during the year. For fiscal year 1996, the error rate for determining a potential recipient's eligibility was 4.29%. Among the six states in the nation with the largest issuance of welfare benefits, Texas had the second lowest error rate during fiscal year 1996 (Texas Department of Human Services, 1996).

Treatment of the Data

SPSS Graduate Pack 10 for Windows (SPSS, Inc., Chicago, IL) was used for exploratory data analysis, descriptive statistics, growth curve modeling, and regression analysis. Exploratory data analysis using graphical displays of the data allowed for identification of variation and patterns in the unmarried teen birth data. Descriptive statistics were used to examine and describe the unmarried teen birth rate patterns, ethnic homogeneity, teen population density, and welfare participation for each county in Texas. Growth curve modeling was used to examine the influence of the 1996 welfare reform on unmarried teen childbirth rates in each Texas County from January 1, 1994 through December 31, 1999. Ethnic homogeneity, teen population density, and welfare participation were used as predictor variables in hierarchical

regression analysis to estimate the slope of the post-welfare reform unmarried teen child birth rates.

Growth curve analysis requires two or more measures over time to create the trajectories. To meet this requirement, the unmarried teen birth data were aggregated into quarterly birth counts based on the county of residence of the teen mother. The quarterly birth counts for each county were then converted into rates using the number of teen births to unmarried female teens as the numerator and the county's female population aged 12-19 as the denominator. The result was multiplied by 1000 to obtain the rate of unmarried teen births per 1,000 female teens. Using a rate rather than the number of births to unmarried teen mothers controlled for the variation in the number of unmarried teen births that occur in each county. Quarterly birth rates for unmarried teens provided 24 different data points for the 6 years under study. Birth certificates that were missing mother's age, marital status, or a Texas county of residence were not included in the aggregated data set.

Growth curve analysis proceeded in two stages. In the first stage, the calculated unmarried teen birth rates were used in a regression equation to estimate the trajectory of the rates for each county pre- and post-welfare reform. These trajectories described the unmarried teen birth rates for each county by estimating the initial levels (the intercept) and the rates of change (a slope). A positive slope indicated that unmarried teen childbirth rates were increasing over time and a negative slope indicated decreasing rates. The two slopes were then compared to determine if there was a significant difference between them. The unmarried teen births that occurred during the first 9 months after the implementation of the welfare reform legislation were considered to be a function of the pregnancies that occurred prior to

the change in social policy and were controlled for in the statistical modeling. In stage two, estimates of the slope and intercept of the individual trajectories, or growth curves, were treated as a new outcome variables to be explained by other background or contextual variables in a between county analysis. In this study, teen population density, ethnic homogeneity, and welfare participation were selected to be used as predictor variables in a hierarchical linear regression equation.

Ethnic homogeneity and teen population density were operationalized using 1997 population estimates obtained from the Texas State Data Center. Ethnic homogeneity reflected the population of a geographic unit with greater than 50% of persons from a single ethnic background. The number of people in each county from a given ethnic background (White, Black, Hispanic, or Other) were divided by the total number of people living in the county. This number was multiplied by 100 to obtain a percentage of the county's population that represents each ethnic group. Any county with greater than 50% of its population comprised from a single ethnic group was considered to be ethnically homogeneous.

To calculate the teen population density, the number of teens aged 12-19 living in each Texas county was obtained from the 1997 population estimates and the number of land area in square miles for each county was obtained from the 2000 Texas State Almanac (Ramos & Plocheck, 1999). The number of teens living in each county was divided by the land area in square miles for that county. The result represented the number of teens living per square mile of land area in that county.

Welfare participation in each county in Texas during 1996 was based on the 1996 population estimates and the number of people receiving AFDC benefits for that year. The number of people receiving welfare benefits in each Texas county was divided by the total number of

people living in the county. The result was then be multiplied by 100 to obtain a percent of the population in each county that received welfare benefits in 1996.

Summary

Growth curve analysis was used in this quasi-experimental study to examine the influence of the 1996 welfare reform legislation on the unmarried teen birth rates in Texas' counties. Quarterly unmarried teen birth rates were calculated for each county in Texas based on the number of unmarried births to women less than 20 years of age from January 1, 1994 through December 31, 1999. These rates provided the measurements needed to create the trajectories for growth curve modeling. Estimates of the slope and intercept that were obtained from these trajectories were then used as outcome variables in hierarchical regression analysis. The predictor variables selected for inclusion in the regression equation were ethnic homogeneity, teen population density, and welfare participation.

CHAPTER IV

ANALYSIS OF DATA

This study used growth curve modeling to examine the effect of the 1996 Welfare Reform Legislation on unmarried teen childbearing rates in Texas. The chapter provides a description of the unmarried teen birth data and the selected county-level predictor variables. The predictor variables were teen population density, ethnic homogeneity, and welfare participation. In addition, this chapter describes the research procedures, presents the results of the statistical analysis, and provides a summary of the findings. The findings are presented in order of the study's hypotheses. The hypotheses were:

H₁: There will be no significant difference in the rate of change (slope) of the unmarried teen birth rates pre- and post-welfare reform in Texas counties.

H₂: Teen population density, ethnic homogeneity, and welfare participation are predictors of the unmarried teen birth rates in Texas counties post-welfare reform.

Description of the Study Population

In this study, the 254 counties in Texas represented the population under examination. The variable of interest within these counties was the number of births to unmarried women less than 20 years of age from January 1, 1994 through December 31, 1999. The unmarried teen birth information for each of these counties during this time frame was obtained from birth certificate data that are archived at the Bureau of Vital Statistics (BVS) in the Texas Department of Health (TDH). In

addition to the date of birth, information on the mother's age, marital status, county of residence, and ethnicity were obtained.

Counties were selected as units of analysis because they are the primary legal divisions of every state, except Louisiana and Alaska. Louisiana has parishes, which are essentially similar to counties, and Alaska has boroughs. Despite differences in geographic size and characteristics, counties can be compared nationally because they represent an organizational unit within a state. Counties have also been found to represent a relatively stable measure of the population structure and are less subject to small area variation than other units of measurement (Hirschl & Rank, 1999).

Birth certificate data were excluded from the analysis if (a) mother's age was unknown, (b) mother's marital status was unknown, or (c) the mother did not identify a Texas county of residence. The data were first examined to identify the number of birth certificates that were missing mother's age. The birth certificates without this information were eliminated from the data set. From the remaining birth certificate data, the ones in which the mother was less than 20 years old were then examined for information on mother's marital status. The birth certificates on which marital status was not indicated were then eliminated. In the final screening, those birth certificates without a Texas county of residence were eliminated from the data set. The final data set contained birth certificate information on the unmarried births to females less than 20 years old who resided in a Texas county. Based on this methodology of identifying missing data, less than 1% of the birth certificates were eliminated from the original data set that was received from the TDH. Lack of a Texas county of residence accounted for the majority of the birth certificates that were excluded. Table 5 provides descriptive information on the number of births to women in

Texas and the number of birth certificates that were excluded because of missing data in the order in which they were identified.

Table 5

Number of Births in Texas and Missing Data for Selected Maternal Variables

| Year of Birth | Total Number of Births | Age Missing on First Screening | Marital Status Missing on Second Screening | Texas County of Residence Missing on Third Screening |
|---------------|------------------------|--------------------------------|--|--|
| 1994 | 326,599 | 32 | 162 | 370 |
| 1995 | 327,615 | 23 | 72 | 407 |
| 1996 | 335,125 | 51 | 61 | 414 |
| 1997 | 338,605 | 60 | 64 | 282 |
| 1998 | 347,080 | 57 | 70 | 236 |
| 1999 | 353,976 | 49 | 52 | 227 |

From 1994 through 1999 there were 324,972 births to women less than 20 years of age who reside in Texas. An examination of the data found that the total number of births to all teens in Texas increased annually from 1994 through 1999 (see Table 6). The number of teen births in 1994 was 52,868. The number of births rose each year until peaking at 55,668 in 1999. The annual mean age for all teen mothers in Texas ranged from 17.55 to 17.67 years of age. Examination of the data indicated that most teens were not married at the time of their child's birth. In each year of the study, over 50% of the births were to Hispanic teens. The percent of births to White and Black teens decreased from 1994 to 1999, while the percent of births among Hispanic teens increased (see Table 6).

Table 6

Births to All Teens in Texas from 1994-1999

| Year | Number of Births | Mean Age | Percent Married | Percent Unmarried | Percent White | Percent Black | Percent Hispanic |
|------|------------------|----------|-----------------|-------------------|---------------|---------------|------------------|
| 1994 | 52,860 | 17.57 | 36.5 | 63.2 | 30.0 | 18.3 | 50.8 |
| 1995 | 53,498 | 17.55 | 34.7 | 65.3 | 29.6 | 17.3 | 52.0 |
| 1996 | 53,553 | 17.57 | 33.5 | 66.5 | 29.6 | 17.2 | 52.3 |
| 1997 | 54,074 | 17.59 | 32.5 | 67.4 | 29.1 | 17.2 | 52.7 |
| 1998 | 55,319 | 17.63 | 31.4 | 68.5 | 29.0 | 16.4 | 53.7 |
| 1999 | 55,668 | 17.67 | 31.8 | 68.1 | 28.1 | 15.6 | 55.3 |

When examining the unmarried teen birth data over time, the increase in the number of births to unmarried teens was consistent with the increase in the number of births to all teens. From 1994 through 1999 there were 216,076 births to unmarried teens residing in Texas. In 1994 there were 33,402 births to unmarried teens. The number of births to this cohort continued to increase annually until it reached 37,866 in 1999 (see Table 7). The percentage of births to White and Black unmarried teens decreased over the study period while the percent of births to unmarried Hispanic teens increased. These trends in births to teens based on ethnicity are similar to the trends that can be found within the birth data for all teens. The annual mean age for unmarried teen mothers was slightly younger than the annual mean age for all teen mothers and ranged from 17.36 to 17.51 years of age (see Table 7).

The Texas unmarried teen birth data from 1994 - 1999 revealed that the majority of these births were to females between 17-19 years of age. Since 1994, there has been a slight decrease in the total number of births among unmarried teens 16 years of age or younger, while the total number of births among unmarried teens aged 17-19 has increased (see Table 8).

Table 7

Births to Unmarried Teens in Texas from 1994-1999

| Year | Number of Births | Mean Age | Percent White | Percent Black | Percent Hispanic |
|------|------------------|----------|---------------|---------------|------------------|
| 1994 | 33,402 | 17.36 | 27.2 | 26.6 | 45.3 |
| 1995 | 34,912 | 17.36 | 26.9 | 24.7 | 47.5 |
| 1996 | 35,571 | 17.39 | 27.0 | 24.2 | 48.0 |
| 1997 | 36,433 | 17.42 | 27.3 | 23.8 | 48.1 |
| 1998 | 37,866 | 17.47 | 27.0 | 22.3 | 49.9 |
| 1999 | 37,892 | 17.51 | 26.4 | 21.3 | 51.4 |

Table 8

Frequency of Unmarried Teen Mothers in Texas by Year and Age

| Age | 1994 | 1995 | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 |
|-----|-------|-------|-------|-------|--------|--------|
| 11 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 1 |
| 12 | 30 | 24 | 19 | 25 | 17 | 23 |
| 13 | 198 | 198 | 191 | 183 | 182 | 201 |
| 14 | 998 | 983 | 991 | 843 | 847 | 840 |
| 15 | 2,630 | 2,904 | 2,743 | 2,637 | 2,588 | 2,501 |
| 16 | 4,977 | 5,244 | 5,253 | 5,205 | 5,239 | 5,011 |
| 17 | 7,140 | 7,344 | 7,641 | 8,032 | 8,064 | 7,991 |
| 18 | 8,500 | 8,899 | 9,004 | 9,699 | 10,188 | 9,919 |
| 19 | 8,928 | 9,314 | 9,728 | 9,808 | 10,737 | 11,405 |

During this study period, the highest percentage of births occurred among Hispanic teens, but Hispanic and White teens in Texas were more likely to be married at the time of their child's birth than Black teen mothers (see Table 9). The Kruskal-Wallis test was employed to determine if there was a statistical difference in the marital status of teen mothers based on ethnicity. This test is the non-parametric

counterpart of the one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA). Results from the Kruskal-Wallis test indicated that based on ethnicity, from 1994-1999, there was a significant difference in the marital status of teen mothers in Texas ($\chi^2 = 11.427$, $p = .003$).

Table 9

Percentage of Teen Mothers Unmarried by Ethnicity in Texas from 1994-1999

| Year | Percent White | Percent Black | Percent Hispanic |
|------|---------------|---------------|------------------|
| 1994 | 57.2 | 92.2 | 56.2 |
| 1995 | 58.8 | 92.9 | 59.5 |
| 1996 | 60.5 | 93.1 | 60.9 |
| 1997 | 63.1 | 93.1 | 61.2 |
| 1998 | 63.5 | 93.3 | 63.3 |
| 1999 | 64.1 | 92.6 | 63.2 |

To further explore where the difference in marital status between ethnic groups occurred, the Dunn procedure, based on Mann Whitney U-testing was employed. When using the Dunn Procedure to make multiple comparisons on the same sample, an adjustment to the alpha is required to prevent a Type I error (Pett, 1997). The adjustment involves revising the significance level such that the desired alpha is divided by the number of pairs being compared. Thus, to test for the difference in marital status between these three ethnic groups at the .05 significance level, .05 was divided by 3 and the alpha was set at .017. The results from the Mann Whitney U-tests indicated that there was no significant difference between the percentage of White and Hispanic teen mothers being unmarried ($p = .749$), but that there was a significant difference between White and Black teen mothers ($p = .004$) and Hispanic and Black teen mothers being unmarried ($p = .004$).

The quarterly unmarried teen birth rates were calculated for each county by first summing the daily unmarried teen birth data in 3 month periods beginning with the first quarter (January 1-March 31, 1994) and ending with the last quarter (October 1, 1999-December 31, 1999). The county's quarterly birth counts were then divided by the estimated female teen population aged 12-19 years living in that county during the year that the unmarried teen births occurred. To obtain the quarterly unmarried teen birth rate per 1,000 female teens, the result was multiplied by 1,000.

The annual population estimates that were obtained from the Texas State Data Center categorized each county's population into groups based on age, gender, and ethnicity. Thus, using the age and gender components of this data set, it was possible to extract the female teen population aged 12-19 for each county and year from 1994-1998. These data were used to create the quarterly unmarried teen birth rates. The 1999 rates were calculated using the 1998 female teen population because the 1999 population estimates by age and gender are not yet available. Population estimates show that the majority of female teens living in Texas from 1994-1998 were White. Hispanic teens comprised the second largest group followed by Black teens (see Table 10). Over the period of time being studied, there has been little change in the frequency distribution of these groups.

For this study, 24 quarterly unmarried teen birth rates were created for each county in Texas. From 1994 through 1999, there were 213 counties that had less than 20 unmarried teen births in at least one quarter. Including Loving County, which had no unmarried teen births, 80 of these 213 counties had no unmarried teen births in one or more quarters. According to the National Center for Health Statistics, rates based on fewer than 20 births are considered to be unstable (Curtin &

Martin, 2000a), but rates based on small numbers are often calculated because research conducted at varying geographic levels require them.

Table 10

Texas Female Teen Population (Ages 12-19 Years)

| Year | Female Teen Population | Percent White | Percent Black | Percent Hispanic |
|------|------------------------|---------------|---------------|------------------|
| 1994 | 1,100,602 | 51.44 | 13.16 | 33.00 |
| 1995 | 1,123,799 | 51.63 | 16.09 | 32.88 |
| 1996 | 1,152,229 | 51.78 | 13.01 | 32.81 |
| 1997 | 1,172,789 | 51.94 | 12.96 | 32.70 |
| 1998 | 1,193,006 | 52.00 | 12.90 | 32.69 |

The instability that is created by a small number of births in a Texas county is evident in the quarterly unmarried teen birth rates that were created in this study. King County is a prime example. Over the study period, King County had a maximum unmarried teen birth rate of 66.67. This rate was calculated based on one unmarried teen birth that occurred during one quarter in a county where only 15 female teens reside. However, in 21 quarters of this study, the county's unmarried teen birth rate was 0. In counties where a small number of female teens live, the probability of an event such as an unmarried teen birth occurring is small. Therefore, when it does occur, a high teen birth rate results. Examining the rates over time allows the researcher to take this variability into consideration.

Table 11 provides descriptive information on the quarterly unmarried teen birth rates for Texas. It includes the minimum and maximum rates for each quarter. During the period of time being studied, the data indicate that the highest unmarried teen birth rates consistently occurred during the third quarter (July through September)

of the year while the lowest rates occurred in the second quarter (April through June). The annual number of unmarried teen births and the annual rate for each county from 1994 -1999 can be found in Appendix C.

Table 11

Quarterly Unmarried Teen Birth Rates per Texas Counties from 1994-1999

| Quarter | Mean | Standard Deviation | Minimum | Maximum |
|---------|------|-----------------------|---------|---------|
| 1 | 6.42 | 4.35 | 0 | 26.91 |
| 2 | 6.19 | 3.87 | 0 | 22.42 |
| 3 | 6.97 | 4.32 | 0 | 26.14 |
| 4 | 6.70 | 3.96 | 0 | 22.22 |
| 5 | 6.49 | 3.78 | 0 | 17.86 |
| 6 | 6.37 | 4.89 | 0 | 45.45 |
| 7 | 7.55 | 5.19 | 0 | 35.71 |
| 8 | 7.01 | 4.32 | 0 | 35.71 |
| 9 | 6.52 | 4.05 | 0 | 21.13 |
| 10 | 6.21 | 4.75 | 0 | 55.56 |
| 11 | 7.50 | 4.45 | 0 | 27.03 |
| 12 | 7.00 | 4.21 | 0 | 23.81 |
| 13 | 7.15 | 5.78 | 0 | 66.67 |
| 14 | 6.53 | 5.02 | 0 | 60.00 |
| 15 | 7.43 | 4.35 | 0 | 21.74 |
| 16 | 7.27 | 4.30 | 0 | 30.30 |
| 17 | 7.22 | 4.42 | 0 | 31.25 |
| 18 | 6.66 | 3.78 | 0 | 20.41 |
| 19 | 8.33 | 4.67 | 0 | 31.25 |
| 20 | 7.65 | 4.76 | 0 | 32.79 |
| 21 | 7.59 | 3.83 | 0 | 21.28 |
| 22 | 7.20 | 4.46 | 0 | 31.25 |
| 23 | 7.87 | 5.20 | 0 | 45.05 |
| 24 | 7.33 | 4.59 | 0 | 43.48 |

Predictor Variables

Growth curve analysis provides a statistical tool that allows the researcher to test hypothesized patterns of change and to determine if those patterns can be predicted based on other related variables (Burchinal et al., 1994; Mitchell, Novins, & Holmes, 1999). Teen population density, ethnic homogeneity, and welfare participation were the variables selected as predictors of the slope of the unmarried teen birth rates in Texas after the implementation of welfare reform.

Teen population density. Teen population density represents the number of adolescents 12 to 19 years of age per square mile in each Texas County during 1997. The data on the number of teens residing in each Texas county were obtained from the Texas State Data Center. The 1997 teen population density data were selected because they best represent the teen population at the time of the statewide implementation of welfare reform in Texas. The land area in square miles for each county in Texas was obtained from the 2000 State of Texas Almanac.

Dallas County was found to be the most densely populated county with 247.37 teens per square mile. Bailey and Loving Counties tied as the sparsest populated counties, with .01 teens per square mile. Approximately 82% of the counties in Texas had less than 10 teens living in a square mile and 16% of the counties had between 10 and 100 teens living in a square mile. Bexar, Tarrant, Harris, and Dallas were the only counties that had more than 100 teens living in a square mile. Descriptive information on the land area, number of teens, and teen density by county can be found in Appendix D.

Ethnic homogeneity. Ethnic homogeneity is a measure of the ethnic distribution within each Texas county during 1997. The ethnicity data from the 1997 population estimates were selected because they best

represent the ethnic distribution within Texas at the time of the statewide implementation of welfare reform. The 1997 population estimates with the county level ethnic distribution data were obtained from the Texas State Data Center.

Counties with greater than 50% of their population representing a single ethnic group (White, Black, Hispanic) were considered ethnically homogeneous. In 1997, there were no counties in Texas that were homogeneously Black. Marion County had the highest percentage of Blacks with 35.22%. There were 36 counties identified as homogeneously Hispanic and 210 counties identified as homogeneously White. The counties that were identified as homogeneously Hispanic are located in the southern half of the state and are in close proximity to the Mexican border of Texas. There were eight counties that did not have 50% of their population represented by a single ethnic group. These counties were identified as being ethnically heterogeneous. Figure 4 illustrates the ethnic distribution geographically within the state. Descriptive information on the ethnic distribution within Texas during 1997 can be found in Table 12 and information on each county can be found in Appendix E.




Figure 4. Geographic location of ethnically homogeneous/heterogeneous counties in Texas.

Table 12

Ethnic Distribution in Texas Counties in 1997

| Ethnicity | Minimum Percent | Maximum Percent | Mean |
|-----------|-----------------|-----------------|-------|
| White | 2.05 | 96.20 | 65.85 |
| Black | .00 | 35.22 | 7.30 |
| Hispanic | 1.24 | 97.65 | 25.82 |

Welfare participation. Welfare participation was measured by the percent of the population who were recipients of welfare benefits in each Texas county during 1996. The year 1996 was selected because it represents the population receiving welfare benefits just prior to the statewide implementation of welfare reform in Texas. The number of welfare recipients for each county in Texas was obtained from the Texas Department of Human Services.

Borden, Kenedy, Kent, and Loving Counties did not have any welfare recipients during 1996. The Texas county with the highest percentage of its population receiving welfare benefits was Zavala County at 12.03%. During 1996, approximately 3.61% of the total Texas population received welfare benefits. The map in Figure 5 shades each county in Texas based on the percentage of the county's population that was receiving welfare benefits during 1996. Information on the number of welfare recipients by county and the percentage of the county's population that this represents can be found in Appendix F.

Research Findings

SPSS Graduate Pack 10 for Windows computer software was used to complete the statistical analysis for this study. The statistical analyses used to test the hypotheses included a two-stage growth curve analysis and a paired-sample *t*-test. A value of $p < .05$ was used to determine if there was a significant difference between estimates in the slope of the unmarried teen birth rates pre-and post-welfare reform in Texas and in individual counties. Basic assumptions that must be met in order to use these statistical techniques are included in the discussion. Geographical mapping was completed using Maptitude version 4.1 computer software. The results of this study are organized according to the specific hypothesis being tested.




Figure 5. Percentage of county population in Texas receiving welfare benefits.

Hypothesis 1

There will be no significant difference in the rate of change (slope) of the unmarried teen birth rates pre- and post- welfare reform in Texas counties.

Growth curve modeling. Growth curve analysis allows the researcher to examine and model change as a process rather than the difference between a beginning and an end point. In this study, a two-stage growth curve method was employed to determine if a change in welfare policies had an effect on unmarried teen birth rates in Texas. In stage one, the trajectories of change were estimated using multiple regression and the repeated quarterly observations of each county's unmarried teen birth rates from January 1, 1994 through December 31, 1999.

Growth curve modeling requires longitudinal data with at least two measurements to create the trajectories. Quarterly unmarried teen birth data provided 15 measurements of the unmarried teen birth rates pre-welfare reform and 9 measurements post-welfare reform for each county in Texas. Quarterly birth rates allowed for statistical control of the 9-month lag between pregnancy and birth. There was statewide implementation of the welfare reform policies in Texas as of January 1, 1997, but the unmarried teen births that occurred during the first 9 months after the implementation of the welfare reform policies were considered to be a function of the pregnancies that occurred prior to the change in the welfare policies. Therefore, births that occurred during the first 9 months of 1997 were included in the pre-welfare reform analysis.

Graphs with the best fitting trajectory for the quarterly unmarried teen birth rates pre- and post-welfare reform were created for each of the 254 counties in Texas. The graphs provided a visual representation of the change in the slope and intercept of the unmarried teen birth rate trajectories in each county. As an example, in Figures 6 and 7, the quarterly unmarried teen birth rates for Dallas County pre-and post-welfare reform have been graphed and the least squares regression line (trajectory) that best fits the unmarried teen birth rates has been inserted.




Figure 6. Best fitting regression line for quarterly unmarried teen birthrates in Dallas County pre-welfare reform.




Figure 7 Best fitting regression line for quarterly unmarried teen birthrates in Dallas County post-welfare reform.

The multiple regression equation (see Equation 1) used in this study provided information on the significance, direction, and magnitude of change between the trajectories' slopes and intercepts pre- and post-welfare reform (Trochim, 1984).

$$\hat{Y} = a + b_1x_1 + b_2D + b_3 (x_1 * D) + e \quad (1)$$

The outcome variable (\hat{Y}) is a prediction of the slope of the unmarried teen birth rates in the county post-welfare reform. The intercept (a) and the slope (b_1) denote the estimated values of the pre-welfare reform trajectory. Time (x_1) represents each of the 24 quarters from January 1994 through December 1999 and (e) represents the error term.

Time (D) was dummy coded as 0 to represent the pre-welfare reform quarters and 1 for the post-welfare reform quarters. When D is equal to 0, the interaction variable drops out of the equation and estimates of the pre-welfare reform intercept (a) and slope (b_1) are calculated (see Equation 2).

$$\hat{Y} = a + b_1x_1 + e \quad (2)$$

When $D = 1$, then ($a + b_2$) equals the estimate of the intercept post-welfare reform and ($b_1 + b_3$) equals the estimate of the slope post-welfare reform. The change in the intercept is represented by b_2 and the change in the slope is represented by b_3 (see Equation 3).

$$\hat{Y} = (a + b_2) + (b_1 + b_3) x_1 + e \quad (3)$$

The use of multiple regression as an inferential tool is based on several assumptions. One of the assumptions is that the errors of prediction are independent of one another. In this study, the assumption of independence was tested using the Durbin-Watson test. When data are collected over time, the Durbin-Watson statistic can be used to detect

autocorrelation (error in one time period is related to error in another period). The value for the Durbin-Watson statistic ranges from 0 to 4. Values close to 0 indicate that successive residuals are positively correlated and values close to 4 indicate a strong negative correlation. As the Durbin-Watson statistic approaches 2, the residuals are more likely to be independent of each other. In this study, the Durbin-Watson statistic at the county level generally ranged from 1.5 to 2.5. Counties that fell out of this range were found to have consecutive quarterly birth rates of zero.

The assumptions of linearity and homoscedasticity between the predicted dependent variable scores and the errors in predictions can be examined through scatterplots of the standardized residuals. The assumption of linearity assumes that there is a linear relationship between all pairs of variables. Homoscedasticity is a property that describes the variability between X and \hat{Y} . For every value of X , the distribution of \hat{Y} scores should be evenly dispersed and vice versa (Polit, 1996). When these two assumptions are met, the residuals are distributed approximately in a rectangular form, with a concentration of values along a straight line in the center of the scatterplot (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996). In this study, graphical exploratory data analysis using scatter plots of the residuals at the county level identified violations to these assumptions.

The assumption of normality of the residuals was tested using normal probability plots of the standardized residuals. If the variable is normally distributed, the plotted points should cluster around a straight line. The normal probability plots identified violations to this assumption in the individual county level data.

When assumptions are violated, transformation of the data is often recommended (Norusis, 1999; Polit, 1996), but this is not a universal

recommendation (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996). The decision not to transform the unmarried teen birth rates in counties that violated these assumptions was based on several reasons. First, multiple regression is a robust statistical test that can tolerate violations to the assumptions (Braden & Bryant, 1990). Failure to meet these assumptions does not invalidate the statistical analysis so much as weakens it. Second, transforming the variables would hinder the ability to interpret the results because the interpretation is dependent on the scale in which it is measured (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996). Third, violations of the assumptions did not improve after transformation of the variables was attempted. Therefore, based on the strength of the reasons provided in the discussion, the decision not to transform the data was made.

The results of the regression analysis indicated that there were 17 counties that had statistically significant differences between the estimates of their pre- and post-welfare slopes and/or intercepts (see Table 13). Eleven of the counties had a significant increase in the post-welfare reform slope and five counties had significant decreases in their slopes. Four of the 16 counties that had a statistically significant change in their slopes post-welfare reform did not have a statistically significant change in the estimate of their intercept. Two counties with statistically significant changes in their slope estimates had 10 or more quarters with no unmarried teen births. Falls County had a statistically significant decrease between the pre- and post-welfare reform estimate of its intercept, but the increase in the estimate of the slope did not reach statistical significance.

Table 13

Level, Magnitude of Change, and Significance in the Slope and Intercept
of Pre- and Post-welfare Reform Trajectories

| County | Change in Slope | p Value | Change in Intercept | p Value |
|-----------|--------------------|---------|------------------------|---------|
| Brown | -1.125 | .037* | 17.147 | .069 |
| Clay | - .830 | .007* | 10.774 | .040* |
| Cottle† | 3.214 | .047* | -54.461 | .056 |
| Dallam | 1.393 | .023* | -19.734 | .062 |
| Dawson | 1.048 | .003* | -19.277 | .002* |
| Duval | 1.142 | .016* | -20.506 | .015* |
| Falls | .857 | .059 | -16.876 | .038* |
| Gillespie | .550 | .043* | - 9.407 | .050* |
| Hood | .577 | .033* | - 8.942 | .060 |
| Hopkins | .803 | .003* | -12.454 | .007* |
| Lavaca | - .888 | .002* | 15.256 | .002* |
| Leon | .796 | .034* | -15.379 | .022* |
| Lubbock | .355 | .010* | - 6.562 | .007* |
| Madison | -1.426 | .027* | 23.439 | .026* |
| Reeves | .937 | .049* | -11.407 | .166 |
| Robertson | -1.370 | .015* | 21.140 | .032* |
| Terrell† | 3.700 | .008* | -57.989 | .017* |

* $p < .05$.

† Counties with 10 or more quarters with no unmarried teen births.

In the counties that did not have a statistically significant change between the estimates of their pre- and post-welfare reform slopes, 111 counties had an increase in the slope of their unmarried teen birth trajectory post-welfare reform and 124 counties had a decrease. Two counties (Henderson and San Patricio) had no change between their pre- and post-welfare reform slopes and Loving county had

no unmarried teen births from January 1, 1994 through December 31, 1999. The map in Figure 8 illustrates the counties in Texas and shades them according to the change in direction of the post-welfare reform unmarried teen birth rate trajectory. The slope and intercept estimates for the pre- and post-welfare reform trajectories for each Texas county can be found in Appendixes G and H.




Figure 8. Texas counties and the change in direction of the slope estimates in the post-welfare reform unmarried teen birth rates.

ACT Waiver Counties. Among the eight counties (Ector, El Paso, Jefferson, Nueces, Caldwell, Medina, Walker, and Bexar) that are participating in the evaluation phase of the Achieving Change for Texans (ACT) waiver, a total of 39,116 cases within these counties were assigned to either a control or experimental group from June 1996 through December 1997. The control group's (19,420 cases) eligibility and benefits were based on the policies that were in effect pre-welfare reform (Schexnayder, Olson, Schroeder, Betsinger, & Sim, 1998). During the time frame of this study, there was no significant difference between the pre- and post-welfare reform slope estimates of their unmarried teen birth rates in these counties.

Paired sample t-test. To examine the effect of welfare reform across counties, a paired sample t -test was used to test if there was a difference in the mean of the pre-welfare reform slope estimates with the mean of the post-welfare slope estimates. A slope could not be estimated in counties where there were no unmarried teen births either pre- or post-welfare reform. Therefore, zeros were used in the analysis to represent that a line was not plotted and no slope was calculated. In the 15 pre-welfare reform quarters, there was only one county (Loving) that had no unmarried teen births and in the 9 post-welfare reform quarters there were four counties (Kent, King, Loving, and Motley) with no unmarried teen births.

A paired sample t -test is used in a study when the two means being compared are from the same group. In this study, the same counties in Texas were being used to compare the slope estimates in the unmarried teen birth rate trajectories pre-welfare reform and again after its implementation. This statistical test assumes that the dependent variable is normally distributed and that the variability within the two

groups is comparable. The latter assumption is robust to violation when the samples are related (Polit, 1996).

Exploratory data analysis using histograms found evidence that the pre- and post-welfare reform slopes were not normally distributed (see Figures 9 and 10). The distributions were not significantly skewed, but were found to be leptokurtic. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) test for normality indicated that these distributions deviated significantly from a normal distribution. The K-S statistic of .137 ($N = 254$) for the pre-welfare reform slopes and .131 ($N = 254$) for the post-welfare slopes were significant at $p = .000$. Kurtosis can produce an underestimate of the variance of a variable and transformations of the data are often recommended to rectify this problem. However, with samples of 200 or more, under-estimation of the variance disappears in positive kurtosis (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996). In addition, with large samples, if the assumption of normality is violated, the paired sample t -test is robust and the results are considered to be reasonably accurate (Polit, 1996). Based on this rationale, transformations of the estimates of the pre- and post-welfare reform slopes were not performed and parametric testing was used for the across Texas counties analysis.




Figure 9. Histogram of the pre-welfare reform slopes.




Figure 10. Histogram of the post-welfare reforms slopes.

The results of the paired sample t -test revealed no significant difference between the mean of the pre-welfare reform slopes ($\bar{x} = .047$) and the mean of post-welfare reform slopes ($\bar{x} = .045$), $t(253) = .053$, $p = .958$ across Texas counties. A separate test was performed to examine the effect of welfare reform across the eight counties that are participating in the evaluation phase of the ACT waiver. Since the assumption of normality was violated in this small sample, the Wilcoxon signed rank test, a non-parametric test for comparing two related samples was used. This non-parametric test was selected because it takes into account both the magnitude and direction of change within the samples. The results of the Wilcoxon signed rank test revealed that five counties (Bexar, Caldwell, El Paso, Medina, and Walker) had an increase in their post-welfare reform slope estimates and three counties (Ector, Jeff Davis, and Nueces) had a decrease. There was no significant difference between the median of the pre-welfare reform slope estimates ($Md = 4.40$) and the median of the post-welfare reform slope estimates ($Md = 4.67$), $z = -.560$, $p = .288$. Even if different results had been obtained, the control group from the eight counties that are participating in the evaluation phase of the ACT waiver consisted of less than 3% of the state's population who received AFDC benefits in 1996, and therefore they should not influence the across counties' results.

An examination of the state and county level unmarried teen birth data supported Hypothesis 1 that there will be no significant difference in the rate of change (slope) of the unmarried teen birth rates pre- and post-welfare reform in Texas counties.

Hypothesis 2

Teen population density, ethnic homogeneity, and welfare participation are predictors of the unmarried teen birth rates in Texas counties post-welfare reform.

Hierarchical linear regression. In stage two of growth curve analysis, the stage-one estimates of the post-welfare reform slopes ($N = 254$) became the dependent variable and hierarchical linear regression was used with selected predictor variables to determine if they can assist in explaining the change in the unmarried teen birth rates across time. The assumptions to be considered when fitting a regression model were addressed in a previous discussion. The statistical and graphical strategies formerly discussed were used to test for violations to the assumptions of linearity, normality, homoscedasticity, and independence. In stage two, an examination of the residuals through the use of scatter plots identified one county (Martin) as an outlier. Since this outlier was located only slightly beyond three standard deviations (-3.51) of the scatter and it is less than 2% of the N , the recommendation is that it be left in the analysis (Cohen & Cohen, 1983). No other violations to the assumptions were found.

In this study, the predictor variables selected for estimating the post-welfare slope were teen population density, ethnic homogeneity, and welfare participation. The post-welfare reform intercept estimates were also included as a predictor variable for the slope of the unmarried teen birth rates post-welfare reform. Teen population density, welfare participation, and the intercept post-welfare reform were all continuous variables. Ethnic homogeneity was dummy coded. Counties with greater than 50% of their population representing a single ethnic group (White, Black, Hispanic) were considered to be ethnically homogeneous. Since

there were no counties in Texas that had a population that was greater than 50% Black, this group was excluded from analysis. The homogeneously Hispanic counties were chosen to be the reference group. Homogeneously White counties ($n = 210$) were coded with a one and homogeneously Hispanic counties ($n = 36$) were coded with a zero. Counties that were ethnically heterogeneous ($n = 8$) were all found to be either predominantly White or Hispanic. In order to include them in the analysis, they were coded based on the dominant ethnic group. Therefore, five counties were coded as White (1) and three counties were coded Hispanic (0). The beta coefficient obtained for the dummy coded variable estimated the difference in the unmarried teen birth rate slopes between homogeneously White counties and homogeneously Hispanic counties.

In hierarchical regression analysis, the predictor variables are entered into the equation in a series of steps that are controlled by the researcher. This control allows the researcher to observe what the independent variable adds to the equation at the point that it is entered (Polit, 1996). The order of entry in this study was based on the theoretical framework of social contagion and reference group influences on behavior. The first variable entered into the equation was the estimated post-welfare reform intercepts that were created in the stage one growth curve analysis. Theoretically, this estimate should contribute to the second-stage analysis because it is an estimation of the unmarried teen birth rates at the point in time when welfare reform was implemented in each county in Texas. By entering the post-welfare reform intercepts first, it was possible to determine how much the selected predictor variables added to the equation (Polit, 1996).

The variables representing teen population density and welfare participation were entered into the regression equation in the second step. These two variables were the observed variables used to represent

the theoretical construct of social contagion. The last variable entered into the equation was the dummy code for ethnic homogeneity. This variable was the observed variable for reference group theory. The results of the hierarchical regression analysis are found in Table 14.

Table 14

Hierarchical Regression Results of the Selected Predictor Variables

| Predictor Variables | Step 1 Unstandardized (Standardized) Regression Coefficients | Step 2 Unstandardized (Standardized) Regression Coefficients | Step 3 Unstandardized (Standardized) Regression Coefficients |
|-------------------------------|--|--|--|
| Intercept post-welfare reform | -.049* (-.965) | -.050* (-.979) | -.050* (-.979) |
| <u>Social Contagion</u> | | | |
| Teen population | | .000 (.009) | .000 (.009) |
| Welfare Participation | | .034* (.128) | .034* (.128) |
| <u>Reference Group</u> | | | |
| Ethnic homogeneity | | | .008 (.006) |
| Adjusted R ² | .932 | .948 | .948 |

* $p < .000$.

The post-welfare reform intercept and welfare participation were the only variables selected that contributed significantly ($p < .000$) towards predicting the slope of the unmarried teen birth rates post-welfare reform. The adjusted R^2 for steps 1 and 2 was .932 and .948, respectively. This represents a .016 change in the R^2 . Since ethnic homogeneity did not significantly contribute towards predicting the slope of the unmarried teen birth rates, there was no change in the adjusted R^2 from step 2 to step 3. These findings indicate that estimates of the post-welfare reform intercept and welfare participation contribute significantly towards predicting the post-welfare reform slope estimates, but that teen population density and ethnicity do not.

Therefore, Hypothesis 2 is not supported statistically. However, these findings still lend support for the theoretical framework of social contagion and reference group theories. This conclusion is based on the premise that the post-welfare reform intercept estimates represent the unmeasured effects within counties at the point in time when welfare reform was implemented. Therefore, since a change in the welfare policies did not significantly change the slope estimates in the unmarried teen birth rates post-welfare reform, this demonstrates that adolescent sexual behaviors continue to be influenced by the normative behavior within their social environment and their reference groups.

Summary

Unmarried teen childbirth rates in Texas counties were examined to evaluate the effect of a statewide change in welfare policies. Statewide implementation of the welfare reform legislation occurred on January 1, 1997. Findings from data that were obtained from the TDH indicated that the number of unmarried teen births from January 1, 1994 through December 31, 1999 in Texas have continued to rise. This increase can be attributed primarily to the rise in the number of unmarried childbirths among females aged 17-19 years. Among females less than 16 years of age, the number of unmarried teen births has been dropping. The mean age for unmarried teen childbearing from 1994-1999 ranged from 17.36 to 17.51. In Texas, Hispanics have the highest percentage of teen births, but Hispanic and White teens are both more likely to be married at the time of their child's birth than their Black counterparts.

Two-stage growth curve analysis was used to model the unmarried teen birth rates in each Texas county pre- and post-welfare reform. Quarterly birth rates allowed for statistical control of the lag in time between pregnancy and birth. Births that occurred in the first 9 months of 1997 were considered to be a function of the pre-welfare reform

influences. In stage one of the growth curve modeling, a multiple regression equation was fit to the 24 quarterly unmarried teen birth rates in all 254 Texas counties. The significance, direction, and magnitude of change between the estimates of the pre-and post-welfare reform slopes and intercepts of the unmarried teen birth rate trajectories were obtained. There were 17 counties that had statistically significant changes between their pre- and post-welfare reform slope and/or intercept estimates. Eleven counties had a statistically significant increase in the slope of the unmarried teen birth rate trajectories post-welfare reform and five counties had a significant decrease. Falls County had a significant decrease in the estimate of its post-welfare reform intercept, but the increase in the estimate of the post-welfare reform slope did not reach statistical significance. In two of the counties with statistically significant changes in their slope estimates, there were 10 or more quarters with no unmarried teen births. Therefore, caution in drawing conclusions about the results in these two counties should be exercised because of the variability that could occur in calculated rates that are based on a small number of births.

A paired sample t -test was used to determine whether there was a statistically significant difference between the mean of the pre-welfare reform slope estimates ($N = 254$) and the mean of the post-welfare slope estimates ($N = 254$) for the counties in Texas. The results of the test revealed no significant difference between the mean of the pre-welfare slopes ($\bar{x} = .047$) and the mean of the post-welfare reform slopes ($\bar{x} = .045$), $t_{(253)} = .053$, $p = .958$. The findings supported Hypothesis 1 that there would be no significant difference in the rate of change (slope) of the unmarried teen birth rates pre- and post- welfare reform in Texas counties.

In stage two of the growth curve analysis, hierarchical linear regression was used to determine whether selected predictor variables could explain the change in the unmarried teen birth rates across time in Texas post-welfare reform. The stage-one estimates of the post-welfare reform slopes ($N = 254$) became the dependent variable. The selected predictor variables selected in this study were teen population density, ethnic homogeneity, and welfare participation. The post-welfare reform intercept estimates were also used as a predictor variable in the analysis. By entering the post-welfare reform intercepts into the equation first, it was possible to determine how much the selected predictor variables added to the equation.

The post-welfare reform intercepts and welfare participation were the only two variables selected that contributed significantly ($p < .000$) towards predicting the slope estimates of the unmarried teen birth rates post-welfare reform. The adjusted R^2 for these two steps was .932 and .948, respectively. These findings did not support Hypothesis 2 that teen population density and ethnic homogeneity are predictors of the unmarried teen birth rates in Texas counties' post-welfare reform. However, they lend support for social contagion and reference group as the theoretical framework for this study. This conclusion is based on the premise that the post-welfare reform intercept estimates represent the unmeasured effects within counties that represent normative social behavior within the adolescent's environment and reference group.

CHAPTER V

SUMMARY OF THE STUDY

Since the inception of welfare in 1935, there has been an ongoing debate about the relationship between increasing unmarried childbearing and welfare benefits. Some experts believe that the availability of welfare benefits provides an incentive for women not to marry if they become pregnant outside of marriage (Plotnick, 1993). Studies examining the relationship between welfare and unmarried teen childbirth have offered inconclusive evidence to support the belief that welfare benefits significantly increase unmarried teen childbirth rates (Ellwood & Bane, 1985; Lundberg & Plotnick, 1995; Moore & Caldwell, 1977; Murray, 1993; Plotnick, 1990). Even without evidence to support it, welfare policies are being implemented today based on the belief that welfare restrictions and sanctions can change the reproductive behavior of women, particularly teens.

This quasi-experimental study was designed to examine and describe the influence of the 1996 welfare reform legislation on unmarried teen childbirth rates in Texas counties. In addition, the study investigated the effect of counties' teen population density, ethnic homogeneity, and welfare participation on the rate of change in the unmarried teen childbirth rates in Texas post-welfare. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a summary of the study and a discussion on the findings. Conclusions, implications for nursing practice, and recommendations for future studies are also presented.

Summary

Teenage pregnancy and out-of-wedlock childbearing became primary issues of the 1996 welfare reform legislation because they are believed to be major contributors to increased welfare costs and caseloads. Ironically, only 5-7% of mothers receiving welfare benefits in the U.S. are teenagers, and fewer than 2% are less than 18 years of age (U.S. General Accounting Office, 1994). Despite the fact that the number of teen mothers receiving welfare benefits at any one time is relatively small, the role of teen parenting has become significant over time. There is evidence that a large proportion (42%-55%) of families receiving welfare benefits were begun by a mother who was under the age of 20 when she first gave birth (Sandefur & Cook, 1998; U.S. General Accounting Office, 1994). Research indicates that women who begin childbearing as adolescents are more inclined to require public assistance for a longer period of time because they tend to have larger families, are less educated, and are therefore less likely to find employment that will lead to self-sufficiency than women who delay childbearing (Alan Guttmacher Institute, 1995).

Nurses have a vested interest in the shaping of healthcare policies. Active involvement in developing policies that impact the health of women and children is an expected outcome for the leadership standard of advanced nursing practice (American Nurses Association, 1996). The results of this study can be utilized by community health nursing leaders to provide information to policy makers that could ultimately influence future legislative actions related to welfare reform and unmarried teen childbearing.

Reference group and social contagion theories provided the theoretical framework for this study. These theories predict that the behavior of a person will be consistent with the expectations of the

persons who serve as a reference group for that person at a given period in time. Through social interactions, the adolescent's values, attitudes, and expectations regarding sexual behavior and welfare participation are formed. Based on social contagion theory, the influence of these interactions is enhanced by the proximity of the group members. Therefore, if the group norm is accepting of unmarried teen childbearing and welfare participation, then these norms will be more influential on the adolescent's sexual behavior than a change in social policy. But, if a change in social policy yields the desired effect, the rate of change (slope) in unmarried teen birth rates after the implementation of the policy will decline more steeply among densely populated homogeneous adolescent groups.

Reference group and social contagion theories suggested specific hypotheses for testing whether changes in welfare benefits are associated with changes in the number of unmarried childbearing adolescents. These hypotheses were:

H₁: There will be no significant difference in the rate of change (slope) of the unmarried teen birth rates pre- and post-welfare reform in Texas counties.

H₂: Teen population density, ethnic homogeneity, and welfare participation are predictors of the unmarried teen birth rates in Texas counties post-welfare reform.

A review of the literature seems to suggest that the incidence of teenage childbearing has significantly increased over time. However, between 1950 and 1970, the birth rates among teenagers in the U.S. were higher than they have been in recent years. High teen birth rates during that era did not attract attention because these teens were usually married at the time of conception or they married before the baby's birth.

Implementation of the 1996 Welfare Reform Legislation radically changed a 61-year-old policy of providing welfare benefits to eligible low-income mothers and their children. One of the primary aims of the new legislation is to reduce single parent families--especially among teens. Studies that examine the relationship between welfare incentives and unmarried childbearing differ in the populations they examine, the way in they measure welfare benefits, the time period examined, the statistical analyses used, and the individual and state level characteristics they take into account. Therefore, the results have been inconsistent and contradictory. These incongruent findings in the research weaken the strength of the conclusion that the welfare system increases unmarried childbearing.

Unmarried teen mothers are often categorized as predominantly minority women from poor, urban families. The geographic variations in unmarried teen childbirth rates are currently not well understood, but studies focusing on population density and race/ethnicity have found these variables to be influential in predicting nonmarital childbearing (Krishnan et al., 1999; Tomal, 1999). Studies have also found that population density is connected to the welfare participation rates of an area. Research indicates that people who live in sparsely populated areas are less likely to become welfare recipients and more likely to exit the welfare rolls than people living in densely populated areas (Hirschl & Rank, 1999).

Texas is one of five states in the United States in which teen pregnancies exceed 70 per 1,000 females aged 15-17. Among all Texas births, 22.5% of Black births and 19.7% of Hispanic births were to mothers less than 20 years of age, compared to 10.9% of White births. In 1998, 87.7% of the mothers aged 10-14 and 67% of mothers aged 15-19 in Texas reported not being married (Texas Department of Health, 1999).

The setting for this study was the state of Texas. Texas ranks second in size among the 50 United States and it covers a total area of 261,914 square miles (Ramos & Plocheck, 1999). In 1990, Texas had the second largest Hispanic population and the third largest Black population in the U.S. By the year 2030, it is expected that 45.9% of the population in Texas will be of Hispanic origin (Murdock et al., 1997).

In this study, the 254 counties in Texas represented the population under examination. The variable of interest within these counties was the number of births to unmarried women less than 20 years of age from January 1, 1994 through December 31, 1999. Data on the births for each Texas county during the 6-year period of time were obtained from the Bureau of Vital Statistics in the Texas Department of Health. In addition to the birth data, information on the mother's age, marital status, county of residence, and ethnicity were obtained.

Counties were selected as units of analysis because they are the primary legal divisions of every state, except Louisiana and Alaska. Despite differences in geographic size and characteristics, counties can be compared nationally because they represent an organizational unit within a state. Counties also have been found to represent a relatively stable measure of the population structure and are less subject to small area variation than other units of measurement (Hirschl & Rank, 1999).

Population estimate data obtained from the Texas State Data Center in the Department of Rural Sociology at Texas A&M University were used to create quarterly unmarried teen birth rates and the selected predictor variables of teen population density, welfare participation, and ethnic homogeneity. The number of people receiving AFDC benefits in each Texas county was obtained from Texas Department of Human Services

1996 Annual Report. The land area in square miles for each county in Texas was obtained from the 2000 State of Texas Almanac.

The statistical techniques used to test the study's hypotheses included two-stage growth curve modeling and a paired sample t -test. Tables, graphs, and maps were used to illustrate the findings.

Discussion of the Findings

A discussion on the Texas teen birth data set and findings related to the hypotheses for this study is presented.

Texas Teen Birth Data Set

From 1994 through 1999 there were a total of 324,972 births to women less than 20 years of age in Texas. An examination of the data indicates that the total number of births to all teens in Texas increased annually from 1994 through 1999. The number of births to teens in 1994 was 52,860. The number rose each year until reaching 55,668 in 1999. The increase in the number of teen births in Texas from 1994 through 1999 is not consistent with the national trend in the number of births to all women 15-19 years of age. From 1990 to 1998, the total number of births to women aged 15-19 years in the United States declined from 521,826 to 484,975. This represents an approximate 7% decrease in the number of births to teens aged 15-19 years (Ventura, Mathews, & Curtin, 1999a). In contrast to the national statistics on the number of births to teens, Texas had no decrease during the time frame of this study and instead a slight increase in the number of teen births occurred.

When examining the Texas unmarried teen birth data, there also is evidence of an upward trend in the number of births to unmarried teens. From 1994 through 1999 there was a total of 216,076 births to unmarried females less than 20 years of age. In 1994 there were 33,402 unmarried

teen births as compared to 37,892 in 1999. These findings are consistent with national statistics that identify an increasing trend in the number of births to unmarried women less than 20 years old. However, preliminary findings from the 1999 national birth data indicate that there was a slight decrease in the number of births to unmarried women less than 20 years of age from 1998 to 1999 (Curtin & Ventura, 2000). This decrease is not reflected in the Texas unmarried teen birth data. Instead, Texas had a modest increase in the number of unmarried teen births from 1998-1999.

From 1994-1999, the majority of teen births in Texas was to females between 17-19 years of age. Since 1994, there has been a slight decrease in the number of births among unmarried teens 16 years of age or younger, but the number of births among unmarried teens aged 17-19 has increased. These findings are consistent with the national trends in teenage childbearing based on age. In the United States, the number of births to teens 15-17 years old decreased 4% from 1997 to 1998, while the number of births to all teens 18-19 years old increased 3%. The rise in the number of births to older teens in the U.S. has been attributed to the 5% increase in the number female teenagers aged 18-19 years from 1997 to 1998 (Ventura et al., 2000b).

During the time frame of this study, the highest percentage of teen births in Texas occurred among Hispanic teens. This high percentage of Hispanic teen births is a reflection of the ethnic composition of the state's population. Despite the high percentage of Hispanic teen births, findings indicate that Hispanic and White teens in Texas were more likely to be married at the time of their child's birth than Black teen mothers. These findings are consistent with the national statistics that examine the marital status of teen mothers based on ethnicity and age (Ventura et al., 2000b).

Hypothesis 1

There will be no significant difference in the rate of change (slope) of the unmarried teen birth rates pre- and post-welfare reform in Texas counties.

To test this hypothesis, growth curve modeling was used to evaluate the effect of welfare reform within each county and a paired sample t-test was used to evaluate the effect across counties. Growth curve modeling is a method that is used to examine and measure change over time. It provides an understanding of how a process unfolds and what variables influence the course of its development. The analysis proceeded in two stages.

During the first stage of the growth curve modeling, quarterly pre- and post-welfare reform unmarried teen birth rates for each county in Texas were created. Using these rates, trajectories that represented the rates from January 1, 1994 through December 31, 1999 were estimated using multiple regression analysis. The intercept and slope estimates of the trajectories for each county pre- and post-welfare reform were calculated and compared. The unmarried teen births that occurred during the first 9 months post-welfare reform were considered to be a function of the pregnancies that occurred prior to the change in policy and were included in the pre-welfare reform trajectory.

The results of the first stage growth curve analysis found that 17 of 254 Texas counties had statistically significant changes in their slopes and/or intercept estimates post-welfare reform as compared to the estimates pre-welfare reform. Eleven of the counties had a significant rise in their slope post-welfare reform and five had a significant decrease in their slopes. Four of these 16 counties did not have a statistically significant change in the estimate of their intercepts. Two counties with statistically significant changes in the estimate of

their slopes had 10 or more quarters with no unmarried teen births. The significant findings within counties that have a small number of unmarried teen births per quarter should be regarded cautiously. This caution is suggested because when the numbers used to calculate rates are small, large swings in the rates can occur which do not reflect real changes.

In the counties that did not have a statistically significant change in the estimate of their slopes, there were 111 counties that had a rise in the slope of their post-welfare reform unmarried teen birth rate trajectory and there were 124 that had a decrease. Two counties (Henderson and San Patricio) had no change and one county (Loving) had no births from January 1, 1994 through December 31, 1999.

The results of the paired sample t -test found no significant difference between the mean of the pre-welfare reform slopes ($\bar{x} = .047$) and the mean of post-welfare reform slopes ($\bar{x} = .045$) $t(253) = .053$, $p = .958$). The findings from the paired sample t -test support the hypothesis that there would be no significant difference in the rate of change (slope) of the unmarried teen birth rates pre- and post-welfare reform in Texas counties. These findings support those experts who believe that changes in welfare policies do not significantly influence the reproductive behaviors of women and that welfare does not provide an incentive effect for unmarried childbearing among teenage women. Therefore, if a change in policy does not significantly change the pattern in the unmarried teen birth rates, it is conceivable that social contagion and reference group theory will contribute towards understanding the phenomenon of unmarried teen childbearing in Texas.

Hypothesis 2

Teen population density, ethnic homogeneity, and welfare participation are predictors of the unmarried teen birth rates in Texas counties post-welfare reform.

In stage two of the growth curve analysis, estimates of the slope for the post-welfare reform trajectories were treated as new outcome variables to be explained by other background variables in an across county analysis. Based on the theoretical framework provided by social contagion and reference group theory, teen population density, ethnic homogeneity, and welfare participation were selected as predictor variables to be used in a hierarchical linear regression analysis. The estimates of the post-welfare reform intercept were also included as a predictor variable in the regression equation. Theoretically, the intercept should contribute to the second-stage analysis because it is an estimation of the unmarried teen birth rates at the point in time when welfare reform was implemented in each county in Texas.

Estimates of the post-welfare reform intercept and welfare participation were the only two selected predictor variables that contributed significantly towards predicting the slope of the unmarried teen birth rates post-welfare reform. The increase in the adjusted R^2 when welfare participation was included in the equation with the estimates of the post-welfare reform intercept was only .016. Therefore, based on the results of this study, the most parsimonious model for predicting the slope of the unmarried teen birth rates post-welfare reform simply requires knowing what the intercept was when the change in policy was implemented.

These findings did not support the second hypothesis that teen population density and ethnic homogeneity are predictors of the post-welfare reform unmarried teen birth rates in Texas counties. But,

these findings do demonstrate support for social contagion and reference group as theoretical underpinnings for understanding the phenomenon of unmarried teen childbearing. This conclusion is based on the premise that estimates of the post-welfare reform intercept represent the effects within the social environment that are influencing the sexual behaviors of adolescents at the time in which a change in the welfare policies occurred. Since there was no significant change in the pattern of the unmarried teen birth rates post-welfare reform, this strengthens the belief that the social norms of the reference group and social contagion within the adolescent's environment are more influential on a teen's sexual behavior than a change in policy. It is possible to conceive that other proxy variables that represent social contagion and reference group theory could provide additional explanatory power to the equation.

Conclusions and Implications for Nursing

The 1996 welfare reform legislation was intended to promote employment and marriage, and to prevent and reduce unmarried births, especially among teens. The focus of this study was to examine the effect of welfare reform on unmarried teen childbearing in Texas. Social contagion and reference group theories provided the theoretical framework for this study. These theories predict that the behavior of a person will be consistent with the social norms of the persons who serve as a reference group at a given period in time and that the proximity of group members heightens the effect of this influence.

The change in our outlook on smoking is a prime example of contagious behavior. When smoking was popular, individuals who chose to quit because of health warnings were chastised for not conforming. Now, it is the smokers and not the non-smokers who receive social disapproval (Sawhill, 2000). Once social trends are set in motion, and are then

promoted by the media and peer culture, they have a tendency to acquire their own momentum. Therefore, it is possible to presume that the sexual behavior of teens can also be influenced by the accepted social norms within their environment. Social norms that once condemned sex outside of marriage have become much more permissive, but recent findings indicate that sexual activity among teens has been declining and the use of contraception among teens has been rising (Terry & Manlove, 2000). It is these changes in adolescent sexual behaviors that have been credited for contributing to the decreasing birth rates among teens in the 1990s.

This study found that the 1996 welfare reform policy to date, have not significantly changed the pattern of the unmarried teen birth rates in Texas, but it did provide support for social contagion and reference group theories as a theoretical framework for studying the phenomenon of unmarried teen childbearing. This conclusion is based on the premise that the post-welfare reform intercept estimates represent the unmeasured effects within counties at the point in time when welfare reform was implemented. Welfare participation was used to represent social contagion, and although it was not a strong predictor of the estimate of the slope post-welfare reform, it did provide additional support for the theoretical framework. Therefore, since a change in the welfare policies did not significantly change the estimates of the slope for the unmarried teen birth rates post-welfare reform, this suggests that adolescent sexual behaviors continue to be influenced by the normative behavior within the social environment and reference groups. In future studies, variables that would be more representative of social contagion and reference group theories need to be identified.

Despite a lack of statistical difference between the pre- and post-welfare slope estimates in most counties, there were 124 out of 254 Texas counties that did have a decrease in the slope of their unmarried

teen birth rates post-welfare reform. In an effort to reduce unmarried teen childbirth rates over time, closer examination of these counties is warranted to determine what role the change in welfare policies versus other factors, such as increased access to birth control, or comprehensive sex and abstinence education programs, had on reducing the unmarried teen birth rates.

A large proportion of women who begin childbearing as teenagers eventually end up on the welfare rolls, therefore the avoidance of an unwanted birth could possibly prevent a lifetime of poverty. Unmarried teen mothers who receive welfare benefits for a limited amount of time are provided with the opportunity to finish their education and obtain job skills that can lead to self-sufficiency. Restricting welfare eligibility and implementing sanctions to reduce benefits can hinder an adolescent mother's ability to provide an adequate environment in which to care for her child, reduce her chances of becoming self-sufficient, and increase the probability of dependency on governmental agencies for support.

Revisions in the welfare policies could inadvertently put mothers and children at risk for other problems in the future. Children born into poverty, especially those of adolescent mothers, are more likely to be hospitalized because of infectious diseases, to experience chronic health problems such as asthma, anemia, and lead poisoning, and to suffer from accidents and injuries, including abuse from immature parents (Aber, Brooks-Gunn, & Maynard, 1995; Collins & Aber, 1996). Nurses who practice in community settings are often the healthcare professionals who identify these problems and intervene in coordinating the appropriate services.

Legislators who want to reduce teenage childbearing are more likely to be successful with policies and programs that are targeted

directly towards the behaviors that lead to teenage pregnancies rather than restricting welfare eligibility and reducing benefits. Therefore, community health nurse leaders can use the findings from this study to identify those communities where teens would benefit from educational programs and/or family planning services. These results also have implications for disciplines such as sociology, psychology, and health education. Hence, they provide a foundation for collaborative research between nursing and other disciplines to further examine the influence of social policy on unmarried teen childbearing. The next appropriate step would be to work with community agencies in developing services and programs for teens within their communities and to set up methods for evaluating and measuring the expected outcomes.

Community health nurse leaders need to become politically involved and communicate with their local legislators about how changes in policies and programs have positively or negatively influenced the health and well being of their constituents. Unfortunately, at this time, there is often little or no interaction between those legislators who enact social policies and the individuals who provide services and evaluate programs. Until the many disadvantages faced by teen mothers before they become pregnant are addressed, delaying births past the teen years will not prevent all the negative outcomes associated with unmarried teen childbearing.

Recommendations for Further Study

As a result of the findings of this study, the following recommendations for further study are suggested.

1. A continuation of the study to determine if there is a time lag between a change in welfare policies and its effect on unmarried teen childbearing.

2. Replication of the study using the birthrates for unmarried adult females.

3. During the time frame of this study, the increase in the unmarried teen birthrates has occurred among older teens, therefore, replication of the study with the rates sorted by age is suggested. Since the rates have also been found to be different among ethnic groups, sorting by both age and ethnicity might provide different results.

4. Replication of the study within other geographical units in which density or urbanization is more definitive.

5. Replication of the study in states that have a different ethnic diversity than Texas. Re-operationalizing ethnicity to provide more information on the distribution of ethnic groups within a geographical area might provide better insight into its influence on unmarried teen childbearing.

6. Future studies should include additional or other predictor variables that have been linked to unmarried teen childbearing. Suggested additional variables include economic indicators, religiosity, and percent of population that consists of single parent households or unmarried couples with children.

7. In order to generalize the results to national vital statistics, future studies examining rates should consider using women aged 15-19 as the denominator for calculating the unmarried teen birth rates.

8. The pattern in the unmarried teen birth data over time includes peaks and valleys. This variability suggests that nonlinear analysis techniques might provide more information about the phenomenon.

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APPENDIX A

Graduate School Permission to Conduct Study

TEXAS WOMAN'S
UNIVERSITY
DENTON / DALLAS / HOUSTON

THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
P.O. Box 425649
Denton, TX 76204-5649
Phone: 940/898-3400
Fax: 940/898-3412

July 27, 2000


Ms. Barbara J. Blake

Dear Ms. Blake:

I have received and approved the prospectus entitled "Social Policy Evaluation: How did the 1996 Welfare Reform Legislation Influence Unmarried Teen Childbirth Rates in Texas Counties?" for your *Dissertation* research project.

Best wishes to you in the research and writing of your project.

Sincerely yours,



Leslie M. Thompson
Associate Vice President for Research and
Dean of the Graduate School

LMT/sgm

cc Dr. Patti Hamilton, Nursing
Dr. Carolyn Gunning, Nursing

APPENDIX B

Sample of State of Texas Certificate of Birth

WARNING: THE PENALTY FOR KNOWINGLY MAKING A FALSE STATEMENT IN THIS FORM CAN BE 2-10 YEARS IN PRISON AND A FINE OF UP TO \$5000.

STATE COPY
VS-111 REV. 10/97

| STATE OF TEXAS | | | CERTIFICATE OF BIRTH | | BIRTH NUMBER | | |
|--|--|---|--|--|---|---|--|
| 1. Name First Middle Last | | | 2. Date of Birth | | 3. Sex | | |
| 4a. Place of Birth - County | | | 4b. City or Town (If outside city limits, give precinct no.) | | 5. Time of Birth | | |
| 7a. Place of Birth <input type="checkbox"/> Clinic / Doctor's Office <input type="checkbox"/> Licensed Birthing Center <input type="checkbox"/> Hospital | | | 7b. Name of Hospital or Birthing Center (If Not Institution, Give Street Address) | | | | |
| 8a. Attendance Name and Mailing Address | | | 8b. Certified - I certify that this child was born alive at the place and time and on the date as stated | | | | |
| 9a. Signature and Title | | | 9b. Date Signed | | | | |
| 10. Name First Middle Maiden Surname | | | 11. Date of Birth | | 12. Birthplace (State or Foreign Country) | | |
| 13a. Residence State | | | 13b. County | | 13c. City or Town | | |
| 13d. Street Address or Rural Location | | | | | | | |
| 14. Mother's Mailing Address (If Same As Residence, Enter ZIP Code Only) | | | | | | | |
| 15. Name First Middle Last | | | 16. Date of Birth | | 17. Birthplace (State or Foreign Country) | | |
| 18a. Registrar's File Number | | | 18b. Date Issued by Local Registrar | | 18c. Signature of Local Registrar | | |
| CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION FOR MEDICAL AND PUBLIC HEALTH USE - THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION WILL NOT BE SHOWN ON CERTIFIED COPIES | | | | | | | |
| 19a. Mother Married? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No | | 19b. I consent for my baby's immunization information to be included in the statewide immunization Registry and to share the immunization information with registered providers. <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No | | 19c. SSN for your new baby? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No | | 19d. SSN of Mother | |
| 19e. SSN of Father | | 20a. Signature of Mother | | 20b. Signature of Father - I affirm that I am the father and consent to be named on the birth certificate. | | | |
| 21. Father's mailing address (If Same as Mother's Enter Same) | | | | | | | |
| 22. Race (For example: American Indian, black, white, etc.) | | 23. Hispanic Origin: Yes, Specify (Mexican, Cuban, Puerto Rican, etc.) | | 24. Education - Highest grade completed (1-12+) | | 25. Usual Occupation (homemaker, student, teacher, clerk, programmer, attorney, realtor, artist, nurse, etc.) | |
| 25c-d. Type of Business / Industry (mining, health consulting, education, farming, government, manufacturing, etc.) | | 26a. Mother | | 26b. Mother | | 26c. Mother | |
| 26d. Father | | 26e. Father | | 26f. Father | | 26g. Father | |
| PREGNANCY HISTORY | | | | | | | |
| LIVE BIRTHS: | | OTHER PREGNANCIES: | | 27. Source of Prenatal Care (check all that apply) | | 28. Hospital B Immunization Status <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No | |
| 28a. Now Living | | 28b. Now Dead | | 28c. Date of Last Live Birth | | 28d. Date Last Other Pregnancy Ended | |
| 28e. Date of Last Live Birth | | 28f. Date Last Other Pregnancy Ended | | 28g. Mother's Medicaid Number | | 28h. HIV Test Done at Delivery <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No | |
| 28i. HIV Test Done at Delivery <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No | | 28j. Serologic Test Done at Delivery <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No | | 28k. Hospital Use | | | |
| 29a. MEDICAL RISK FACTORS FOR THIS PREGNANCY (Check all that apply) | | | | | | | |
| 29b. OTHER RISK FACTORS FOR THIS PREGNANCY (Complete all items) <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No | | | | | | | |
| 29c. OBSTETRIC PROCEDURES (Check all that apply) | | | | | | | |
| 29d. COMPLICATIONS OF LABOR AND/OR DELIVERY (Check all that apply) | | | | | | | |
| 29e. METHOD OF DELIVERY (Check one of 1-4) | | | | | | | |
| 29f. ABNORMAL CONDITIONS OF THE NEWBORN (Check all that apply) | | | | | | | |
| 29g. CONGENITAL ANOMALIES OF CHILD (Check all that apply) | | | | | | | |

APPENDIX C

Number of Unmarried Teen Births and Annual Unmarried
Teen Birth Rates per 1,000 Females Aged 12-19
Years for Counties in Texas

Number of Unmarried Teen Births and Annual Unmarried Teen Birth Rates
per 1,000 Females Aged 12 ~ 19 Years for Counties in Texas

| County Name | 1994 | | 1995 | | 1996 | | 1997 | |
|---------------|--------|-------|--------|-------|--------|-------|--------|-------|
| | Number | Rate | Number | Rate | Number | Rate | Number | Rate |
| Anderson | 94 | 37.48 | 75 | 29.67 | 75 | 29.50 | 88 | 34.04 |
| Andrews | 29 | 27.94 | 31 | 30.39 | 29 | 27.70 | 25 | 23.61 |
| Angelina | 133 | 28.79 | 135 | 28.53 | 148 | 31.42 | 168 | 34.53 |
| Aransas | 22 | 19.61 | 32 | 28.99 | 34 | 29.26 | 44 | 37.64 |
| Archer | 8 | 16.03 | 10 | 19.31 | 6 | 11.26 | 11 | 20.60 |
| Armstrong | 5 | 39.68 | 2 | 15.38 | 4 | 28.78 | 2 | 14.93 |
| Atascosa | 51 | 21.87 | 48 | 20.16 | 52 | 21.44 | 80 | 32.28 |
| Austin | 33 | 25.78 | 29 | 22.05 | 39 | 28.30 | 36 | 26.69 |
| Bailey | 10 | 20.96 | 16 | 35.24 | 18 | 38.54 | 24 | 51.95 |
| Bandra | 6 | 9.12 | 6 | 8.78 | 11 | 14.25 | 11 | 13.89 |
| Bastrop | 78 | 31.55 | 72 | 27.78 | 74 | 26.77 | 87 | 30.96 |
| Baylor | 3 | 15.08 | 4 | 18.52 | 2 | 9.35 | 12 | 54.55 |
| Bee | 60 | 38.99 | 65 | 39.51 | 60 | 35.82 | 70 | 41.74 |
| Bell | 364 | 29.67 | 382 | 30.62 | 400 | 30.75 | 427 | 32.56 |
| Bexar | 2,575 | 33.35 | 2,533 | 32.34 | 2,363 | 29.63 | 2,505 | 30.90 |
| Blanco | 1 | 2.59 | 1 | 2.42 | 5 | 11.96 | 6 | 13.36 |
| Borden | 1 | 22.22 | 0 | 0.00 | 0 | 0.00 | 3 | 60.00 |
| Bosque | 16 | 18.85 | 15 | 16.80 | 20 | 21.74 | 25 | 27.38 |
| Bowie | 204 | 40.70 | 205 | 40.61 | 207 | 40.76 | 188 | 38.17 |
| Brazoria | 346 | 26.92 | 349 | 26.52 | 371 | 27.49 | 390 | 28.10 |
| Brazos | 205 | 19.59 | 197 | 18.70 | 221 | 20.66 | 209 | 19.34 |
| Brewster | 9 | 16.22 | 15 | 25.86 | 14 | 24.05 | 10 | 17.06 |
| Briscoe | 3 | 22.90 | 3 | 21.13 | 2 | 13.99 | 2 | 15.27 |
| Brooks | 28 | 51.57 | 37 | 66.43 | 38 | 68.22 | 27 | 48.56 |
| Brown | 70 | 32.63 | 56 | 24.84 | 70 | 30.29 | 156 | 67.89 |
| Burleson | 32 | 36.24 | 31 | 34.25 | 39 | 43.14 | 30 | 32.79 |
| Burnet | 29 | 22.19 | 36 | 26.16 | 33 | 21.50 | 51 | 32.50 |
| Caldwell | 61 | 36.12 | 57 | 32.70 | 72 | 39.56 | 59 | 30.18 |
| Calhoun | 50 | 37.99 | 57 | 43.48 | 67 | 49.70 | 76 | 56.34 |
| Callahan | 11 | 14.44 | 13 | 16.56 | 11 | 13.50 | 22 | 26.32 |
| Cameron | 663 | 30.23 | 743 | 34.12 | 619 | 28.16 | 650 | 30.34 |
| Camp | 25 | 36.13 | 25 | 36.82 | 16 | 23.88 | 29 | 45.38 |
| Carson | 4 | 8.06 | 6 | 12.05 | 6 | 12.45 | 2 | 4.23 |
| Cass | 53 | 27.10 | 50 | 25.73 | 57 | 29.84 | 62 | 32.27 |
| Castro | 18 | 28.21 | 16 | 25.36 | 32 | 52.29 | 31 | 49.36 |
| Chambers | 35 | 22.98 | 31 | 19.34 | 25 | 15.38 | 36 | 21.82 |
| Cherokee | 64 | 25.33 | 77 | 29.66 | 89 | 34.48 | 81 | 30.35 |
| Childress | 18 | 44.67 | 9 | 22.90 | 11 | 29.02 | 17 | 45.58 |
| Clay | 3 | 4.94 | 11 | 17.46 | 13 | 20.34 | 15 | 22.32 |
| Cochran | 7 | 22.08 | 10 | 32.68 | 8 | 26.23 | 5 | 17.12 |
| Coke | 4 | 20.73 | 3 | 16.13 | 4 | 20.73 | 6 | 30.77 |
| Coleman | 9 | 17.82 | 22 | 42.23 | 20 | 39.06 | 12 | 22.73 |
| Collin | 243 | 13.00 | 274 | 13.82 | 299 | 14.09 | 276 | 12.16 |
| Collingsworth | 6 | 31.91 | 8 | 39.80 | 5 | 23.70 | 2 | 10.31 |
| Colorado | 26 | 23.05 | 30 | 24.81 | 42 | 33.10 | 49 | 37.96 |

| | | | | | | | | |
|------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Comal | 79 | 24.31 | 102 | 29.82 | 89 | 24.66 | 108 | 29.20 |
| Comanche | 17 | 25.76 | 11 | 16.01 | 16 | 22.70 | 12 | 15.94 |
| Concho | 2 | 13.51 | 3 | 18.63 | 2 | 11.76 | 1 | 5.78 |
| Cooke | 50 | 26.57 | 43 | 22.02 | 57 | 28.49 | 54 | 26.15 |
| Coryell | 78 | 19.68 | 56 | 14.01 | 70 | 16.96 | 72 | 17.05 |
| Cottle | 4 | 35.40 | 5 | 44.64 | 4 | 36.04 | 1 | 8.93 |
| Crane | 3 | 9.17 | 5 | 15.02 | 10 | 30.03 | 5 | 14.97 |
| Crockett | 10 | 34.13 | 9 | 30.82 | 8 | 26.76 | 10 | 31.75 |
| Crosby | 20 | 42.55 | 13 | 28.32 | 14 | 29.91 | 14 | 30.57 |
| Culberson | 16 | 71.75 | 7 | 31.82 | 7 | 32.56 | 4 | 18.35 |
| Dallam | 18 | 45.80 | 17 | 39.91 | 11 | 27.64 | 12 | 30.08 |
| Dallas | 4,214 | 41.81 | 4,371 | 42.80 | 4,554 | 43.78 | 4,614 | 43.32 |
| Dawson | 38 | 41.04 | 37 | 40.22 | 34 | 37.44 | 30 | 32.86 |
| Deaf Smith | 62 | 44.03 | 55 | 38.98 | 67 | 55.28 | 51 | 36.59 |
| Delta | 3 | 10.99 | 13 | 47.10 | 7 | 25.74 | 7 | 25.45 |
| Denton | 255 | 13.18 | 279 | 13.55 | 336 | 15.35 | 324 | 13.69 |
| De Witt | 45 | 37.07 | 37 | 29.62 | 35 | 28.88 | 40 | 32.89 |
| Dickens | 1 | 7.63 | 3 | 22.73 | 2 | 16.53 | 2 | 15.75 |
| Dimmitt | 19 | 22.65 | 19 | 23.69 | 31 | 38.85 | 23 | 29.26 |
| Donley | 8 | 29.85 | 6 | 23.26 | 8 | 29.20 | 2 | 7.25 |
| Duval | 40 | 43.34 | 35 | 38.55 | 44 | 49.05 | 27 | 29.97 |
| Eastland | 24 | 21.24 | 11 | 18.55 | 29 | 24.29 | 36 | 31.09 |
| Ector | 302 | 38.39 | 314 | 39.13 | 311 | 38.25 | 362 | 43.88 |
| Edwards | 2 | 8.62 | 6 | 28.71 | 4 | 18.87 | 5 | 23.26 |
| Ellis | 176 | 29.22 | 200 | 33.06 | 181 | 28.29 | 212 | 31.59 |
| El Paso | 1,438 | 34.03 | 1,563 | 37.06 | 1,496 | 35.35 | 1,518 | 35.87 |
| Erath | 23 | 13.32 | 42 | 21.92 | 26 | 13.56 | 37 | 18.50 |
| Falls | 40 | 44.30 | 46 | 49.84 | 35 | 37.35 | 42 | 44.21 |
| Fannin | 35 | 26.28 | 31 | 22.30 | 38 | 25.90 | 48 | 32.19 |
| Fayette | 28 | 23.61 | 15 | 12.31 | 23 | 18.23 | 22 | 17.31 |
| Fisher | 5 | 18.94 | 7 | 26.42 | 7 | 26.02 | 9 | 33.58 |
| Floyd | 7 | 12.17 | 15 | 25.25 | 20 | 33.73 | 15 | 26.09 |
| Foard | 3 | 30.30 | 2 | 18.35 | 4 | 34.48 | 3 | 24.00 |
| Fort Bend | 288 | 15.97 | 332 | 17.40 | 353 | 17.53 | 314 | 14.83 |
| Franklin | 5 | 10.04 | 11 | 22.13 | 10 | 19.34 | 7 | 13.86 |
| Freestone | 30 | 32.75 | 19 | 20.95 | 24 | 25.26 | 31 | 32.94 |
| Frio | 47 | 44.93 | 40 | 38.24 | 47 | 45.02 | 44 | 42.84 |
| Gaines | 32 | 29.99 | 27 | 25.94 | 31 | 28.65 | 28 | 26.39 |
| Galvestone | 476 | 34.54 | 457 | 32.19 | 468 | 31.98 | 463 | 31.82 |
| Garza | 5 | 14.12 | 9 | 27.03 | 16 | 45.07 | 10 | 28.17 |
| Gillespie | 24 | 25.10 | 21 | 21.43 | 19 | 18.79 | 14 | 13.36 |
| Glasscock | 0 | 0.00 | 0 | 0.00 | 0 | 0.00 | 2 | 18.35 |
| Goaliad | 11 | 30.56 | 10 | 26.11 | 9 | 22.17 | 10 | 24.21 |
| Gonzales | 40 | 38.95 | 34 | 32.72 | 38 | 35.38 | 47 | 42.46 |
| Gray | 49 | 33.93 | 50 | 34.84 | 26 | 18.03 | 36 | 24.88 |
| Grayson | 140 | 24.90 | 144 | 24.75 | 144 | 23.87 | 175 | 27.87 |
| Gregg | 219 | 32.96 | 237 | 35.13 | 271 | 39.09 | 250 | 35.73 |
| Grimes | 36 | 31.47 | 47 | 40.14 | 43 | 35.39 | 54 | 43.90 |
| Guadalupe | 128 | 29.66 | 128 | 28.83 | 123 | 26.47 | 132 | 28.18 |
| Hale | 78 | 32.53 | 71 | 29.89 | 84 | 34.20 | 99 | 40.42 |
| Hall | 5 | 22.52 | 13 | 60.47 | 10 | 45.87 | 7 | 34.31 |

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|------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Hamilton | 6 | 14.85 | 5 | 11.74 | 9 | 20.59 | 5 | 11.36 |
| Hansford | 4 | 10.81 | 5 | 13.44 | 5 | 12.85 | 7 | 17.50 |
| Hardeman | 8 | 28.27 | 12 | 41.24 | 10 | 32.89 | 9 | 31.14 |
| Hardin | 60 | 20.01 | 64 | 21.23 | 74 | 24.34 | 66 | 21.35 |
| Harris | 5,630 | 32.80 | 5,781 | 33.28 | 5,942 | 33.48 | 6,086 | 33.69 |
| Harrison | 103 | 25.89 | 110 | 27.40 | 118 | 28.68 | 108 | 26.73 |
| Hartley | 2 | 8.40 | 2 | 9.48 | 2 | 9.17 | 12 | 55.56 |
| Haskell | 4 | 10.72 | 6 | 16.30 | 10 | 26.67 | 2 | 5.36 |
| Hays | 109 | 17.78 | 113 | 17.19 | 119 | 16.92 | 128 | 17.10 |
| Hemphill | 2 | 6.94 | 1 | 3.52 | 1 | 3.38 | 1 | 3.53 |
| Henderson | 95 | 27.28 | 102 | 28.18 | 116 | 31.46 | 102 | 26.40 |
| Hidalgo | 946 | 26.73 | 1,054 | 29.59 | 1,110 | 30.68 | 990 | 27.38 |
| Hill | 61 | 36.72 | 47 | 27.53 | 54 | 30.96 | 59 | 33.13 |
| Hockley | 44 | 24.11 | 43 | 24.06 | 50 | 26.84 | 46 | 24.57 |
| Hood | 32 | 18.36 | 39 | 21.51 | 38 | 19.60 | 32 | 15.76 |
| Hopkins | 54 | 30.95 | 48 | 27.44 | 41 | 23.16 | 34 | 18.87 |
| Houston | 35 | 29.09 | 31 | 25.66 | 41 | 33.55 | 37 | 29.48 |
| Howard | 52 | 27.73 | 80 | 41.78 | 76 | 38.46 | 73 | 36.61 |
| Hudspeth | 10 | 44.84 | 12 | 50.00 | 5 | 20.83 | 7 | 28.46 |
| Hunt | 125 | 33.03 | 123 | 31.75 | 153 | 38.17 | 143 | 34.37 |
| Hutchinson | 44 | 26.76 | 47 | 27.76 | 36 | 20.99 | 34 | 20.35 |
| Irion | 2 | 22.47 | 2 | 22.47 | 2 | 23.81 | 0 | 0.00 |
| Jack | 9 | 21.13 | 6 | 13.89 | 1 | 2.21 | 9 | 19.03 |
| Jackson | 14 | 15.56 | 29 | 31.56 | 26 | 28.45 | 29 | 31.25 |
| Jasper | 49 | 23.75 | 74 | 35.12 | 78 | 35.76 | 70 | 32.68 |
| Jeff Davis | 0 | 0.00 | 1 | 7.87 | 1 | 9.09 | 1 | 10.20 |
| Jefferson | 533 | 37.92 | 513 | 36.40 | 511 | 36.30 | 495 | 34.58 |
| Jim Hogg | 5 | 15.58 | 14 | 39.77 | 8 | 24.32 | 13 | 42.76 |
| Jim Wells | 97 | 36.34 | 102 | 37.82 | 97 | 35.74 | 120 | 44.78 |
| Johnson | 139 | 20.97 | 177 | 25.89 | 167 | 23.87 | 164 | 22.83 |
| Jones | 33 | 42.04 | 23 | 26.29 | 18 | 19.31 | 33 | 35.29 |
| Karnes | 32 | 39.02 | 30 | 35.59 | 28 | 33.29 | 33 | 42.97 |
| Kaufman | 120 | 33.32 | 91 | 24.75 | 90 | 23.01 | 111 | 27.45 |
| Kendall | 11 | 12.29 | 10 | 10.72 | 13 | 12.94 | 14 | 13.37 |
| Kenedy | 0 | 0.00 | 2 | 71.43 | 1 | 27.03 | 1 | 30.30 |
| Kent | 0 | 0.00 | 1 | 17.24 | 0 | 0.00 | 1 | 15.87 |
| Kerr | 69 | 33.09 | 51 | 23.29 | 52 | 22.44 | 67 | 28.10 |
| Kimble | 4 | 16.95 | 10 | 39.22 | 11 | 41.20 | 9 | 35.86 |
| King | 0 | 0.00 | 1 | 45.45 | 1 | 55.56 | 1 | 66.67 |
| Kinney | 3 | 16.30 | 3 | 16.30 | 1 | 4.83 | 8 | 40.20 |
| Kleberg | 64 | 32.54 | 75 | 37.41 | 62 | 29.81 | 74 | 35.54 |
| Knox | 11 | 40.44 | 6 | 21.13 | 6 | 20.76 | 3 | 10.87 |
| Lamar | 88 | 34.63 | 112 | 42.73 | 104 | 39.39 | 93 | 35.05 |
| Lamb | 28 | 27.81 | 33 | 32.04 | 34 | 32.08 | 21 | 19.83 |
| Lampassas | 26 | 29.12 | 37 | 38.03 | 37 | 35.47 | 38 | 36.54 |
| La Salle | 14 | 40.94 | 19 | 51.49 | 21 | 54.83 | 12 | 30.38 |
| Lavaca | 25 | 22.85 | 25 | 22.30 | 32 | 27.95 | 30 | 27.25 |
| Lee | 25 | 29.00 | 26 | 30.09 | 27 | 30.65 | 20 | 22.73 |
| Leon | 20 | 26.74 | 11 | 14.18 | 25 | 30.79 | 18 | 21.35 |
| Liberty | 116 | 30.92 | 101 | 26.59 | 140 | 36.56 | 138 | 35.42 |
| Limestone | 55 | 44.90 | 45 | 36.09 | 34 | 26.90 | 35 | 26.99 |

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|-------------|-----|-------|-----|-------|-----|-------|-----|-------|
| Lipscomb | 1 | 5.56 | 5 | 25.91 | 2 | 10.10 | 2 | 10.15 |
| Live Oak | 11 | 17.30 | 13 | 20.06 | 26 | 39.27 | 15 | 23.51 |
| Llano | 7 | 14.83 | 17 | 34.55 | 12 | 23.53 | 11 | 20.95 |
| Loving | 0 | 0.00 | 0 | 0.00 | 0 | 0.00 | 0 | 0.00 |
| Lubbock | 455 | 30.73 | 423 | 28.37 | 467 | 31.26 | 469 | 31.41 |
| Lynn | 8 | 19.23 | 10 | 23.70 | 12 | 27.03 | 13 | 30.30 |
| McCulloch | 13 | 25.15 | 16 | 29.96 | 22 | 40.89 | 23 | 43.81 |
| McLennan | 554 | 42.46 | 511 | 38.37 | 475 | 35.17 | 469 | 34.36 |
| McMullen | 0 | 0.00 | 0 | 0.00 | 0 | 0.00 | 1 | 21.74 |
| Madison | 14 | 28.81 | 23 | 44.49 | 17 | 31.31 | 31 | 55.96 |
| Marion | 12 | 23.21 | 23 | 42.99 | 17 | 32.69 | 24 | 45.54 |
| Martin | 11 | 30.05 | 6 | 15.67 | 11 | 30.14 | 8 | 21.98 |
| Mason | 3 | 18.40 | 4 | 22.60 | 2 | 10.47 | 2 | 9.80 |
| Matagorda | 89 | 33.82 | 93 | 37.17 | 81 | 31.78 | 97 | 38.26 |
| Maverick | 67 | 19.24 | 75 | 22.12 | 68 | 20.81 | 63 | 19.53 |
| Medina | 41 | 22.59 | 39 | 20.56 | 52 | 26.24 | 59 | 28.61 |
| Menard | 5 | 37.59 | 2 | 14.71 | 0 | 0.00 | 3 | 22.06 |
| Midland | 211 | 29.02 | 248 | 32.97 | 250 | 32.38 | 259 | 32.45 |
| Milam | 56 | 37.31 | 51 | 34.86 | 60 | 39.81 | 49 | 31.84 |
| Mills | 5 | 19.69 | 1 | 3.62 | 1 | 3.69 | 5 | 17.24 |
| Mitchell | 17 | 34.91 | 18 | 39.05 | 17 | 34.34 | 20 | 44.25 |
| Montague | 21 | 22.32 | 17 | 17.42 | 32 | 31.53 | 26 | 25.29 |
| Montgomery | 300 | 21.88 | 313 | 21.86 | 334 | 22.31 | 326 | 20.86 |
| Moore | 37 | 29.79 | 46 | 36.60 | 60 | 44.78 | 66 | 49.74 |
| Morris | 28 | 34.31 | 30 | 36.76 | 30 | 35.34 | 32 | 37.56 |
| Motley | 1 | 13.51 | 0 | 0.00 | 0 | 0.00 | 1 | 16.95 |
| Nacogdoches | 106 | 23.58 | 108 | 23.80 | 96 | 19.98 | 96 | 20.00 |
| Navarro | 96 | 39.06 | 110 | 43.38 | 111 | 43.11 | 126 | 47.95 |
| Newton | 23 | 25.56 | 29 | 30.40 | 21 | 21.88 | 30 | 31.15 |
| Nolan | 32 | 30.59 | 50 | 46.43 | 38 | 35.55 | 42 | 41.26 |
| Nueces | 741 | 37.70 | 865 | 43.94 | 783 | 39.92 | 886 | 45.32 |
| Ochiltree | 18 | 29.95 | 8 | 12.82 | 14 | 20.86 | 15 | 22.90 |
| Oldham | 7 | 45.75 | 0 | 0.00 | 2 | 13.42 | 0 | 0.00 |
| Orange | 130 | 24.09 | 152 | 28.12 | 144 | 26.66 | 150 | 28.76 |
| Palo Pinto | 38 | 25.55 | 38 | 26.28 | 60 | 38.56 | 59 | 37.53 |
| Panola | 21 | 13.67 | 30 | 20.24 | 31 | 20.74 | 34 | 23.08 |
| Parker | 72 | 16.82 | 75 | 17.11 | 82 | 18.10 | 94 | 20.06 |
| Parmer | 16 | 24.24 | 20 | 30.12 | 18 | 26.16 | 22 | 33.43 |
| Pecos | 35 | 34.28 | 37 | 36.03 | 48 | 44.44 | 40 | 39.37 |
| Polk | 49 | 24.60 | 66 | 34.32 | 69 | 33.19 | 63 | 30.35 |
| Potter | 288 | 48.77 | 333 | 54.97 | 341 | 53.81 | 271 | 42.19 |
| Presidio | 19 | 36.26 | 16 | 32.06 | 16 | 32.59 | 15 | 29.64 |
| Rains | 8 | 19.32 | 10 | 22.94 | 14 | 31.82 | 7 | 15.95 |
| Randall | 100 | 15.94 | 84 | 13.13 | 105 | 15.90 | 106 | 15.91 |
| Reagan | 4 | 11.43 | 4 | 11.56 | 3 | 8.96 | 6 | 1 |
| Real | 6 | 45.11 | 3 | 22.22 | 7 | 49.30 | 4 | 28.57 |
| Red River | 33 | 38.73 | 29 | 34.90 | 29 | 35.32 | 29 | 36.20 |
| Reeves | 45 | 42.13 | 38 | 34.83 | 42 | 38.82 | 32 | 29.33 |
| Refugio | 18 | 34.88 | 17 | 33.20 | 23 | 43.15 | 19 | 36.47 |
| Roberts | 1 | 14.49 | 0 | 0.00 | 0 | 0.00 | 0 | 0.00 |
| Robertson | 53 | 62.87 | 48 | 57.55 | 53 | 60.23 | 56 | 61.27 |

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|---------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Rockwall | 23 | 11.90 | 29 | 14.21 | 35 | 16.07 | 46 | 19.97 |
| Runnels | 22 | 32.45 | 22 | 32.45 | 25 | 36.98 | 22 | 32.98 |
| Rusk | 88 | 31.47 | 75 | 26.49 | 85 | 29.95 | 86 | 30.11 |
| Sabine | 19 | 37.85 | 18 | 34.35 | 14 | 26.47 | 11 | 21.57 |
| San Augustine | 17 | 38.37 | 19 | 40.17 | 20 | 40.16 | 23 | 46.37 |
| San Jacinto | 23 | 23.40 | 24 | 23.48 | 31 | 28.47 | 22 | 19.70 |
| San Patricio | 161 | 36.29 | 188 | 41.62 | 175 | 37.97 | 187 | 40.68 |
| San Saba | 11 | 42.80 | 10 | 36.50 | 4 | 13.65 | 4 | 14.49 |
| Schleicher | 6 | 23.62 | 0 | 0.00 | 3 | 12.10 | 5 | 20.75 |
| Scurry | 21 | 16.54 | 34 | 26.34 | 36 | 28.44 | 38 | 30.35 |
| Shackelford | 3 | 14.42 | 2 | 9.35 | 1 | 4.69 | 2 | 9.43 |
| Shelby | 39 | 29.46 | 52 | 39.42 | 48 | 36.14 | 44 | 32.52 |
| Sherman | 4 | 18.52 | 7 | 32.71 | 2 | 9.66 | 4 | 20.62 |
| Smith | 273 | 29.09 | 271 | 28.48 | 309 | 31.85 | 320 | 32.07 |
| Somervell | 6 | 17.00 | 14 | 37.94 | 7 | 17.95 | 8 | 20.36 |
| Starr | 68 | 18.35 | 57 | 15.43 | 65 | 18.00 | 61 | 16.94 |
| Stephens | 17 | 30.30 | 15 | 26.09 | 13 | 22.11 | 21 | 36.14 |
| Sterling | 1 | 8.55 | 4 | 38.10 | 1 | 9.17 | 3 | 25.86 |
| Stonewall | 2 | 17.39 | 2 | 18.18 | 1 | 8.77 | 2 | 18.18 |
| Sutton | 5 | 16.03 | 7 | 22.73 | 8 | 26.23 | 6 | 20.27 |
| Swisher | 14 | 31.46 | 19 | 39.01 | 20 | 38.68 | 27 | 55.44 |
| Tarrant | 1,862 | 27.95 | 2,068 | 29.89 | 2,096 | 28.91 | 2,260 | 30.18 |
| Taylor | 267 | 34.17 | 261 | 32.37 | 246 | 29.63 | 267 | 31.60 |
| Terrell | 4 | 38.83 | 0 | 0.00 | 2 | 22.22 | 0 | 0.00 |
| Terry | 39 | 41.45 | 37 | 38.70 | 35 | 37.27 | 48 | 51.61 |
| Throckmorton | 0 | 0.00 | 3 | 26.32 | 0 | 0.00 | 2 | 23.81 |
| Titus | 41 | 27.15 | 53 | 34.39 | 69 | 43.53 | 62 | 39.62 |
| Tom Green | 198 | 30.66 | 179 | 26.55 | 202 | 29.00 | 214 | 30.35 |
| Travis | 949 | 26.02 | 1,090 | 28.17 | 1,010 | 25.38 | 1,160 | 28.43 |
| Trinity | 22 | 34.48 | 26 | 39.94 | 27 | 39.94 | 19 | 27.70 |
| Tyler | 34 | 35.79 | 24 | 25.26 | 24 | 25.13 | 25 | 26.65 |
| Upshur | 44 | 20.58 | 36 | 16.31 | 63 | 27.84 | 54 | 23.90 |
| Upton | 5 | 15.48 | 4 | 12.16 | 7 | 21.60 | 11 | 33.95 |
| Uvalde | 43 | 25.84 | 74 | 44.47 | 62 | 36.82 | 56 | 33.55 |
| Val Verde | 77 | 27.68 | 70 | 25.66 | 87 | 32.40 | 69 | 26.62 |
| Van Zandt | 42 | 18.95 | 49 | 21.49 | 63 | 26.60 | 52 | 21.46 |
| Victoria | 191 | 37.55 | 195 | 37.75 | 220 | 41.99 | 193 | 36.06 |
| Walker | 75 | 22.62 | 80 | 23.09 | 65 | 18.11 | 71 | 19.39 |
| Waller | 50 | 23.39 | 44 | 19.90 | 71 | 31.64 | 60 | 26.17 |
| Ward | 27 | 31.25 | 28 | 31.78 | 16 | 17.84 | 28 | 31.35 |
| Washington | 39 | 20.72 | 50 | 25.13 | 49 | 23.96 | 41 | 19.62 |
| Webb | 434 | 36.58 | 472 | 38.57 | 501 | 40.77 | 425 | 33.66 |
| Wharton | 84 | 32.00 | 89 | 33.53 | 97 | 35.56 | 95 | 34.71 |
| Wheeler | 6 | 17.54 | 7 | 20.90 | 8 | 23.74 | 5 | 14.29 |
| Wichita | 254 | 34.37 | 256 | 33.54 | 285 | 35.40 | 250 | 31.44 |
| Wilbarger | 31 | 37.53 | 26 | 30.70 | 33 | 38.15 | 38 | 44.97 |
| Willacy | 36 | 23.09 | 41 | 26.80 | 36 | 24.26 | 45 | 32.89 |
| Williamson | 162 | 14.67 | 183 | 15.21 | 196 | 15.17 | 208 | 15.18 |
| Wilson | 28 | 16.62 | 36 | 21.00 | 33 | 18.26 | 29 | 15.19 |
| Winkler | 21 | 33.28 | 15 | 24.08 | 16 | 25.72 | 24 | 38.96 |
| Wise | 45 | 20.27 | 51 | 22.24 | 61 | 25.77 | 75 | 30.69 |

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|--------|----|-------|----|-------|----|-------|----|-------|
| Wood | 39 | 23.35 | 30 | 17.57 | 36 | 20.37 | 37 | 20.89 |
| Yoakum | 15 | 20.75 | 12 | 17.05 | 16 | 22.70 | 17 | 24.32 |
| Young | 23 | 22.53 | 25 | 23.88 | 26 | 24.53 | 26 | 24.44 |
| Zapata | 15 | 19.23 | 14 | 18.79 | 20 | 26.88 | 14 | 19.44 |
| Zavala | 43 | 47.46 | 40 | 46.73 | 27 | 33.09 | 31 | 39.79 |

| County Name | 1998 | | 1999 | |
|---------------|--------|-------|--------|-------|
| | Number | Rate | Number | Rate* |
| Anderson | 94 | 36.66 | 88 | 34.32 |
| Andrews | 31 | 29.52 | 34 | 32.38 |
| Angelina | 165 | 34.52 | 160 | 33.47 |
| Aransas | 41 | 34.86 | 34 | 28.91 |
| Archer | 12 | 22.10 | 12 | 22.10 |
| Armstrong | 2 | 17.09 | 4 | 34.19 |
| Atascosa | 79 | 31.39 | 84 | 33.37 |
| Austin | 52 | 38.72 | 41 | 30.53 |
| Bailey | 19 | 44.81 | 24 | 56.60 |
| Bandra | 21 | 24.91 | 25 | 29.66 |
| Bastrop | 80 | 27.10 | 105 | 35.57 |
| Baylor | 7 | 32.86 | 10 | 46.95 |
| Bee | 89 | 53.84 | 79 | 47.79 |
| Bell | 449 | 33.44 | 422 | 31.42 |
| Bexar | 2,561 | 31.10 | 2,632 | 31.96 |
| Blanco | 4 | 9.11 | 11 | 25.06 |
| Borden | 0 | 0.00 | 2 | 42.55 |
| Bosque | 15 | 16.67 | 27 | 30.00 |
| Bowie | 191 | 39.73 | 199 | 41.39 |
| Brazoria | 365 | 25.99 | 404 | 28.77 |
| Brazos | 204 | 18.45 | 233 | 21.07 |
| Brewster | 13 | 22.81 | 18 | 31.58 |
| Briscoe | 1 | 8.26 | 0 | 0.00 |
| Brooks | 35 | 61.73 | 24 | 42.33 |
| Brown | 144 | 63.07 | 114 | 49.93 |
| Burleson | 37 | 40.09 | 43 | 46.59 |
| Burnet | 55 | 34.31 | 37 | 23.08 |
| Caldwell | 71 | 35.25 | 76 | 37.74 |
| Calhoun | 64 | 48.48 | 69 | 52.27 |
| Callahan | 14 | 16.67 | 19 | 22.62 |
| Cameron | 758 | 36.67 | 777 | 37.59 |
| Camp | 30 | 47.17 | 17 | 26.73 |
| Carson | 11 | 23.50 | 7 | 14.96 |
| Cass | 57 | 30.05 | 39 | 20.56 |
| Castro | 29 | 46.70 | 30 | 48.31 |
| Chambers | 21 | 12.60 | 32 | 19.20 |
| Cherokee | 96 | 36.12 | 97 | 36.49 |
| Childress | 19 | 53.98 | 15 | 42.61 |
| Clay | 6 | 9.12 | 6 | 9.12 |
| Cochran | 11 | 38.87 | 12 | 42.40 |
| Coke | 5 | 25.77 | 10 | 51.55 |
| Coleman | 12 | 23.76 | 22 | 43.56 |
| Collin | 311 | 12.89 | 312 | 12.93 |
| Collingsworth | 3 | 15.08 | 2 | 10.05 |
| Colorado | 36 | 28.53 | 46 | 36.45 |
| Comal | 98 | 25.69 | 109 | 28.58 |
| Comanche | 24 | 32.43 | 21 | 28.38 |
| Concho | 4 | 24.10 | 2 | 12.05 |
| Cooke | 64 | 30.96 | 52 | 25.16 |

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|------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Coryell | 71 | 16.66 | 69 | 16.19 |
| Cottle | 0 | 0.00 | 7 | 63.06 |
| Crane | 9 | 25.50 | 10 | 28.33 |
| Crockett | 11 | 35.14 | 15 | 47.92 |
| Crosby | 19 | 44.60 | 18 | 42.25 |
| Culberson | 4 | 18.87 | 4 | 18.87 |
| Dallam | 11 | 28.06 | 21 | 53.57 |
| Dallas | 4,898 | 44.44 | 4,702 | 42.66 |
| Dawson | 30 | 33.86 | 44 | 49.66 |
| Deaf Smith | 57 | 40.92 | 60 | 43.07 |
| Delta | 13 | 47.27 | 11 | 40.00 |
| Denton | 337 | 13.39 | 363 | 14.42 |
| De Witt | 46 | 38.37 | 41 | 34.20 |
| Dickens | 4 | 32.00 | 4 | 32.00 |
| Dimmitt | 34 | 46.01 | 32 | 43.30 |
| Donley | 6 | 22.73 | 2 | 7.58 |
| Duval | 37 | 42.63 | 46 | 53.00 |
| Eastland | 30 | 26.91 | 32 | 28.70 |
| Ector | 377 | 44.57 | 400 | 47.29 |
| Edwards | 7 | 30.57 | 6 | 26.20 |
| Ellis | 216 | 30.99 | 248 | 35.58 |
| El Paso | 1,551 | 36.71 | 1,573 | 37.23 |
| Erath | 35 | 17.69 | 54 | 27.29 |
| Falls | 33 | 36.22 | 42 | 46.10 |
| Fannin | 37 | 24.39 | 44 | 29.00 |
| Fayette | 22 | 17.25 | 17 | 13.33 |
| Fisher | 8 | 32.92 | 7 | 28.81 |
| Floyd | 12 | 22.02 | 19 | 34.86 |
| Foard | 2 | 15.63 | 2 | 15.63 |
| Fort Bend | 347 | 15.61 | 329 | 14.80 |
| Franklin | 10 | 19.49 | 8 | 15.59 |
| Freestone | 19 | 20.47 | 20 | 21.55 |
| Frio | 46 | 45.10 | 53 | 51.96 |
| Gaines | 21 | 19.77 | 31 | 29.19 |
| Galvestone | 448 | 30.75 | 461 | 31.65 |
| Garza | 14 | 43.08 | 6 | 18.46 |
| Gillespie | 15 | 14.18 | 20 | 18.90 |
| Glasscock | 0 | 0.00 | 1 | 8.55 |
| Goaliad | 9 | 21.43 | 13 | 30.95 |
| Gonzales | 52 | 46.72 | 43 | 38.63 |
| Gray | 41 | 29.73 | 35 | 25.38 |
| Grayson | 207 | 32.79 | 196 | 31.05 |
| Gregg | 257 | 36.25 | 274 | 38.65 |
| Grimes | 46 | 36.62 | 51 | 40.61 |
| Guadalupe | 166 | 34.03 | 165 | 33.83 |
| Hale | 79 | 32.10 | 101 | 41.04 |
| Hall | 10 | 48.78 | 10 | 48.78 |
| Hamilton | 8 | 20.30 | 6 | 15.23 |
| Hansford | 8 | 20.05 | 11 | 27.57 |
| Hardeman | 9 | 31.47 | 13 | 45.45 |
| Hardin | 58 | 19.45 | 45 | 15.09 |

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|------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Harris | 6,061 | 32.88 | 5,978 | 32.42 |
| Harrison | 138 | 34.36 | 103 | 25.65 |
| Hartley | 4 | 18.02 | 6 | 27.03 |
| Haskell | 9 | 24.93 | 9 | 24.93 |
| Hays | 142 | 17.62 | 149 | 18.49 |
| Hemphill | 5 | 17.24 | 4 | 13.79 |
| Henderson | 129 | 33.15 | 124 | 31.87 |
| Hidalgo | 1,157 | 32.30 | 1,132 | 31.61 |
| Hill | 62 | 33.44 | 54 | 29.13 |
| Hockley | 52 | 27.48 | 60 | 31.71 |
| Hood | 51 | 24.76 | 56 | 27.18 |
| Hopkins | 37 | 20.40 | 59 | 32.52 |
| Houston | 49 | 38.10 | 37 | 28.77 |
| Howard | 103 | 51.29 | 75 | 37.35 |
| Hudspeth | 2 | 9.22 | 4 | 18.43 |
| Hunt | 135 | 32.90 | 138 | 33.63 |
| Hutchinson | 54 | 33.09 | 26 | 15.93 |
| Irion | 1 | 10.87 | 1 | 10.87 |
| Jack | 9 | 20.09 | 8 | 17.86 |
| Jackson | 29 | 30.66 | 30 | 31.71 |
| Jasper | 71 | 34.60 | 83 | 40.45 |
| Jeff Davis | 0 | 0.00 | 1 | 10.75 |
| Jefferson | 470 | 32.84 | 543 | 37.94 |
| Jim Hogg | 12 | 37.97 | 7 | 22.15 |
| Jim Wells | 101 | 37.77 | 107 | 40.01 |
| Johnson | 207 | 27.81 | 195 | 26.20 |
| Jones | 29 | 29.50 | 31 | 31.54 |
| Karnes | 33 | 43.36 | 39 | 51.25 |
| Kaufman | 101 | 23.85 | 121 | 28.58 |
| Kendall | 17 | 15.36 | 12 | 10.84 |
| Kenedy | 2 | 62.50 | 1 | 31.25 |
| Kent | 0 | 0.00 | 0 | 0.00 |
| Kerr | 71 | 29.15 | 75 | 30.79 |
| Kimble | 10 | 39.84 | 10 | 39.84 |
| King | 0 | 0.00 | 0 | 0.00 |
| Kinney | 7 | 35.00 | 5 | 25.00 |
| Kleberg | 69 | 33.33 | 69 | 33.33 |
| Knox | 11 | 40.59 | 9 | 33.21 |
| Lamar | 97 | 36.11 | 102 | 37.97 |
| Lamb | 34 | 33.24 | 30 | 29.33 |
| Lampassas | 22 | 21.38 | 36 | 34.99 |
| La Salle | 16 | 40.61 | 11 | 27.92 |
| Lavaca | 41 | 38.00 | 19 | 17.61 |
| Lee | 25 | 27.32 | 18 | 19.67 |
| Leon | 12 | 14.27 | 30 | 35.67 |
| Liberty | 148 | 38.26 | 135 | 34.90 |
| Limestone | 45 | 33.96 | 31 | 23.40 |
| Lipscomb | 5 | 26.88 | 3 | 16.13 |
| Live Oak | 17 | 28.38 | 16 | 26.71 |
| Llano | 11 | 19.96 | 11 | 19.96 |
| Loving | 0 | 0.00 | 0 | 0.00 |

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|-------------|-----|-------|-----|-------|
| Lubbock | 463 | 30.58 | 568 | 37.52 |
| Lynn | 17 | 39.26 | 10 | 23.09 |
| McCulloch | 20 | 37.17 | 16 | 29.74 |
| McLennan | 534 | 39.01 | 485 | 35.43 |
| McMullen | 2 | 40.82 | 0 | 0.00 |
| Madison | 35 | 64.10 | 22 | 40.29 |
| Marion | 22 | 40.74 | 21 | 38.89 |
| Martin | 9 | 23.44 | 7 | 18.23 |
| Mason | 2 | 11.36 | 2 | 11.36 |
| Matagorda | 93 | 37.39 | 93 | 37.39 |
| Maverick | 65 | 20.28 | 71 | 22.15 |
| Medina | 71 | 34.35 | 74 | 35.80 |
| Menard | 4 | 27.78 | 5 | 34.72 |
| Midland | 286 | 35.16 | 291 | 35.78 |
| Milam | 51 | 32.95 | 44 | 28.42 |
| Mills | 6 | 20.20 | 5 | 16.84 |
| Mitchell | 18 | 36.73 | 21 | 42.86 |
| Montague | 25 | 23.92 | 26 | 24.88 |
| Montgomery | 334 | 20.36 | 334 | 20.36 |
| Moore | 68 | 51.83 | 60 | 45.73 |
| Morris | 36 | 43.32 | 19 | 22.86 |
| Motley | 0 | 0.00 | 0 | 0.00 |
| Nacogdoches | 82 | 17.35 | 100 | 21.16 |
| Navarro | 101 | 38.30 | 82 | 31.10 |
| Newton | 26 | 28.63 | 29 | 31.94 |
| Nolan | 38 | 38.15 | 42 | 42.17 |
| Nueces | 804 | 41.38 | 789 | 40.60 |
| Ochiltree | 15 | 24.67 | 15 | 24.67 |
| Oldham | 3 | 20.69 | 2 | 13.79 |
| Orange | 144 | 27.94 | 121 | 23.48 |
| Palo Pinto | 73 | 46.62 | 55 | 35.12 |
| Panola | 38 | 26.21 | 41 | 28.28 |
| Parker | 106 | 21.62 | 118 | 24.07 |
| Parmer | 26 | 40.19 | 19 | 29.37 |
| Pecos | 55 | 53.09 | 51 | 49.23 |
| Polk | 69 | 32.86 | 54 | 25.71 |
| Potter | 310 | 47.67 | 305 | 46.90 |
| Presidio | 16 | 31.62 | 14 | 27.67 |
| Rains | 9 | 20.22 | 6 | 13.48 |
| Randall | 114 | 16.73 | 102 | 14.97 |
| Reagan | 5 | 14.25 | 9 | 25.64 |
| Real | 2 | 14.81 | 4 | 29.63 |
| Red River | 23 | 29.60 | 28 | 36.04 |
| Reeves | 39 | 36.90 | 58 | 54.87 |
| Refugio | 15 | 29.07 | 26 | 50.39 |
| Roberts | 3 | 49.18 | 1 | 16.39 |
| Robertson | 49 | 52.46 | 29 | 31.05 |
| Rockwall | 43 | 18.14 | 43 | 18.14 |
| Runnels | 17 | 26.15 | 25 | 38.46 |
| Rusk | 74 | 25.92 | 85 | 29.77 |
| Sabine | 14 | 28.63 | 10 | 20.45 |

| | | | | |
|---------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| San Augustine | 19 | 40.69 | 20 | 42.83 |
| San Jacinto | 25 | 22.77 | 26 | 23.68 |
| San Patricio | 183 | 39.19 | 195 | 41.76 |
| San Saba | 8 | 30.30 | 6 | 22.73 |
| Schleicher | 5 | 21.65 | 7 | 30.30 |
| Scurry | 30 | 23.81 | 38 | 30.16 |
| Shackelford | 3 | 14.22 | 3 | 14.22 |
| Shelby | 46 | 35.06 | 32 | 24.39 |
| Sherman | 6 | 32.97 | 3 | 16.48 |
| Smith | 299 | 29.43 | 314 | 30.91 |
| Somervell | 8 | 19.90 | 7 | 17.41 |
| Starr | 68 | 18.96 | 81 | 22.58 |
| Stephens | 16 | 28.67 | 14 | 25.09 |
| Sterling | 0 | 0.00 | 2 | 16.67 |
| Stonewall | 6 | 59.41 | 4 | 39.60 |
| Sutton | 11 | 37.41 | 9 | 30.61 |
| Swisher | 23 | 48.52 | 22 | 46.41 |
| Tarrant | 2,391 | 30.82 | 2,476 | 31.92 |
| Taylor | 271 | 31.97 | 290 | 34.21 |
| Terrell | 2 | 28.99 | 4 | 57.97 |
| Terry | 44 | 48.25 | 46 | 50.44 |
| Throckmorton | 1 | 11.63 | 2 | 23.26 |
| Titus | 71 | 44.46 | 54 | 33.81 |
| Tom Green | 246 | 35.03 | 234 | 33.32 |
| Travis | 1,205 | 28.68 | 1,175 | 27.97 |
| Trinity | 29 | 42.40 | 20 | 29.24 |
| Tyler | 24 | 27.00 | 31 | 34.87 |
| Upshur | 54 | 23.95 | 66 | 29.27 |
| Upton | 11 | 34.38 | 11 | 34.38 |
| Uvalde | 67 | 41.10 | 75 | 46.01 |
| Val Verde | 95 | 36.78 | 91 | 35.23 |
| Van Zandt | 70 | 28.52 | 59 | 24.04 |
| Victoria | 246 | 45.67 | 226 | 41.95 |
| Walker | 71 | 19.99 | 73 | 20.55 |
| Waller | 78 | 34.27 | 60 | 26.36 |
| Ward | 30 | 33.52 | 30 | 33.52 |
| Washington | 48 | 22.89 | 49 | 23.37 |
| Webb | 454 | 34.72 | 396 | 30.29 |
| Wharton | 104 | 38.17 | 105 | 38.53 |
| Wheeler | 11 | 31.07 | 8 | 22.60 |
| Wichita | 256 | 31.77 | 283 | 35.12 |
| Wilbarger | 31 | 36.38 | 29 | 34.04 |
| Willacy | 49 | 38.04 | 46 | 35.71 |
| Williamson | 216 | 14.81 | 212 | 14.53 |
| Wilson | 35 | 17.59 | 45 | 22.61 |
| Winkler | 25 | 41.12 | 22 | 36.18 |
| Wise | 52 | 21.18 | 75 | 30.55 |
| Wood | 51 | 28.46 | 44 | 24.55 |
| Yoakum | 13 | 18.92 | 18 | 26.20 |
| Young | 26 | 23.90 | 38 | 34.93 |
| Zapata | 17 | 23.71 | 20 | 27.89 |

| | | | | |
|--------|----|-------|----|-------|
| Zavala | 32 | 41.29 | 33 | 42.58 |
|--------|----|-------|----|-------|

*1999 birth rates were calculated using 1998 population estimates
for females 12 - 19 years old

APPENDIX D

Texas Teen Population Density by County for 1997

Texas Teen Population Density by County for 1997

| County Name | Land Area in Square Miles | 1997 Teen Population | Teen Density |
|---------------|---------------------------|----------------------|--------------|
| Anderson | 1,070.90 | 5,819 | 5.43 |
| Andrews | 1,500.70 | 2,168 | 1.44 |
| Angelina | 801.60 | 9,882 | 12.33 |
| Aransas | 252.00 | 2,383 | 9.46 |
| Archer | 909.80 | 1,222 | 1.34 |
| Armstrong | 913.70 | 299 | .33 |
| Atascosa | 1,232.20 | 5,039 | 4.09 |
| Austin | 652.70 | 2,849 | 4.36 |
| Bailey | 82,637.00 | 946 | .01 |
| Bandera | 791.80 | 1,636 | 2.07 |
| Bastrop | 888.50 | 6,016 | 6.77 |
| Baylor | 870.80 | 489 | .56 |
| Bee | 880.20 | 3,596 | 4.09 |
| Bell | 1,059.00 | 27,853 | 26.30 |
| Bexar | 1,246.90 | 167,157 | 134.06 |
| Blanco | 711.30 | 923 | 1.30 |
| Borden | 898.90 | 100 | .11 |
| Bosque | 989.30 | 1,895 | 1.92 |
| Bowie | 887.90 | 9,972 | 11.23 |
| Brazoria | 1,386.90 | 28,560 | 20.59 |
| Brazos | 585.80 | 22,278 | 38.03 |
| Brewster | 6,193.00 | 1,197 | .19 |
| Briscoe | 900.30 | 250 | .28 |
| Brooks | 943.30 | 1,157 | 1.23 |
| Brown | 944.00 | 4,774 | 5.06 |
| Burleson | 665.60 | 1,883 | 2.83 |
| Burnet | 995.30 | 3,274 | 3.29 |
| Caldwell | 545.80 | 4,008 | 7.34 |
| Calhoun | 512.40 | 2,651 | 5.17 |
| Callahn | 898.70 | 1,717 | 1.91 |
| Cameron | 905.60 | 43,182 | 47.68 |
| Camp | 197.50 | 1,300 | 6.58 |
| Carson | 923.20 | 930 | 1.01 |
| Cass | 937.50 | 3,993 | 4.26 |
| Castro | 898.40 | 1,317 | 1.47 |
| Chambers | 599.40 | 3,452 | 5.76 |
| Cherokee | 1,052.30 | 5,473 | 5.20 |
| Childress | 710.40 | 867 | 1.22 |
| Clay | 1,097.90 | 1,357 | 1.24 |
| Cochran | 775.20 | 574 | .74 |
| Coke | 898.90 | 415 | .46 |
| Coleman | 1,272.90 | 1,121 | .88 |
| Collin | 847.70 | 46,218 | 54.52 |
| Collingsworth | 918.80 | 403 | .44 |
| Colorado | 963.00 | 2,534 | 2.63 |
| Comal | 561.50 | 7,631 | 13.59 |
| Comanche | 937.80 | 1,597 | 1.70 |

| | | | |
|------------|----------|---------|--------|
| Concho | 991.50 | 342 | .34 |
| Cooke | 873.80 | 4,277 | 4.89 |
| Coryell | 1,051.90 | 11,247 | 10.69 |
| Cottle | 901.20 | 264 | .29 |
| Crane | 785.60 | 712 | .91 |
| Crockett | 2,807.60 | 646 | .23 |
| Crosby | 899.60 | 957 | 1.06 |
| Culberson | 3,812.70 | 468 | .12 |
| Dallam | 1,504.80 | 755 | .50 |
| Dallas | 879.90 | 217,657 | 247.37 |
| Dawson | 902.10 | 1,898 | 2.10 |
| Deaf Smith | 1,497.40 | 2,885 | 1.93 |
| Delta | 277.20 | 555 | 2.00 |
| Denton | 888.50 | 46,458 | 52.29 |
| De Witt | 909.30 | 2,467 | 2.71 |
| Dickens | 904.30 | 240 | .27 |
| Dimmitt | 1,331.00 | 1,614 | 1.21 |
| Donley | 929.80 | 545 | .59 |
| Duval | 1,792.90 | 1,810 | 1.01 |
| Eastland | 926.10 | 2,538 | 2.74 |
| Ector | 901.10 | 16,976 | 18.84 |
| Edwards | 2,119.90 | 419 | .20 |
| Ellis | 940.00 | 13,499 | 14.36 |
| El Paso | 1,013.10 | 87,424 | 86.29 |
| Erath | 1,086.40 | 4,061 | 3.74 |
| Falls | 769.10 | 2,074 | 2.70 |
| Fannin | 891.60 | 3,115 | 3.49 |
| Fayette | 950.10 | 2,566 | 2.70 |
| Fisher | 901.20 | 539 | .60 |
| Floyd | 992.30 | 1,125 | 1.13 |
| Foard | 706.70 | 254 | .36 |
| Fort Bend | 875.00 | 44,066 | 50.36 |
| Franklin | 285.70 | 1,034 | 3.62 |
| Freestone | 885.30 | 2,120 | 2.39 |
| Frio | 1,133.10 | 2,058 | 1.82 |
| Gaines | 1,502.40 | 2,207 | 1.47 |
| Galvestone | 398.70 | 29,611 | 74.27 |
| Garza | 895.60 | 695 | .78 |
| Gillespie | 1,061.20 | 2,217 | 2.09 |
| Glasscock | 900.80 | 207 | .23 |
| Goaliad | 853.60 | 840 | .98 |
| Gonzales | 1,067.90 | 2,375 | 2.22 |
| Gray | 928.30 | 3,084 | 3.32 |
| Grayson | 933.70 | 12,629 | 13.53 |
| Gregg | 274.10 | 14,217 | 51.87 |
| Grimes | 793.80 | 2,742 | 3.45 |
| Guadalupe | 711.20 | 9,686 | 13.62 |
| Hale | 1,004.70 | 4,988 | 4.96 |
| Hall | 903.10 | 430 | .48 |
| Hamilton | 835.80 | 926 | 1.11 |
| Hansford | 919.90 | 817 | .89 |

| | | | |
|------------|----------|---------|--------|
| Hardeman | 695.40 | 598 | .86 |
| Hardin | 894.40 | 6,380 | 7.13 |
| Harris | 1,729.00 | 368,688 | 213.24 |
| Harrison | 898.80 | 8,261 | 9.19 |
| Hartley | 1,462.40 | 483 | .33 |
| Haskell | 903.00 | 775 | .86 |
| Hays | 677.90 | 14,188 | 20.93 |
| Hemphill | 909.70 | 540 | .59 |
| Henderson | 874.40 | 7,952 | 9.09 |
| Hidalgo | 1,569.10 | 72,819 | 46.41 |
| Hill | 962.40 | 3,638 | 3.78 |
| Hockley | 908.30 | 3,737 | 4.11 |
| Hood | 421.60 | 4,163 | 9.87 |
| Hopkins | 784.80 | 3,738 | 4.76 |
| Houston | 1,231.00 | 2,605 | 2.12 |
| Howard | 902.90 | 4,631 | 5.13 |
| Hudspeth | 4,571.30 | 474 | .10 |
| Hunt | 841.20 | 8,553 | 10.17 |
| Hutchinson | 887.40 | 3,527 | 3.97 |
| Irion | 1,051.60 | 180 | .17 |
| Jack | 917.40 | 990 | 1.08 |
| Jackson | 829.50 | 1,949 | 2.35 |
| Jasper | 937.50 | 4,436 | 4.73 |
| Jeff Davis | 2,264.60 | 223 | .10 |
| Jefferson | 903.60 | 29,902 | 33.09 |
| Jim Hogg | 1,136.20 | 732 | .64 |
| Jim Wells | 864.70 | 5,522 | 6.39 |
| Johnson | 729.40 | 14,726 | 20.19 |
| Jones | 931.10 | 2,127 | 2.28 |
| Karnes | 750.30 | 1,683 | 2.24 |
| Kaufman | 786.10 | 8,208 | 10.44 |
| Kendall | 662.50 | 2,328 | 3.51 |
| Kenedy | 1,456.90 | 124 | .09 |
| Kent | 902.40 | 125 | .14 |
| Kerr | 1,106.30 | 4,743 | 4.29 |
| Kimble | 1,250.80 | 530 | .42 |
| King | 912.30 | 42 | .05 |
| Kinney | 1,363.50 | 394 | .29 |
| Kleberg | 871.10 | 4,281 | 4.91 |
| Knox | 854.20 | 563 | .66 |
| Lamar | 917.10 | 5,381 | 5.87 |
| Lamb | 1,016.30 | 2,123 | 2.09 |
| Lampassas | 712.10 | 2,099 | 2.95 |
| La Salle | 1,489.00 | 833 | .56 |
| Lavaca | 970.00 | 2,321 | 2.39 |
| Lee | 628.60 | 1,834 | 2.92 |
| Leon | 1,072.10 | 1,728 | 1.61 |
| Liberty | 1,159.80 | 8,279 | 7.14 |
| Limestone | 908.90 | 2,677 | 2.95 |
| Lipscomb | 932.20 | 437 | .47 |
| Live Oak | 1,036.40 | 1,304 | 1.26 |

| | | | |
|-------------|----------|--------|-------|
| Llano | 934.90 | 1,046 | 1.12 |
| Loving | 673.10 | 10 | .01 |
| Lubbock | 899.60 | 30,122 | 33.48 |
| Lynn | 891.90 | 906 | 1.02 |
| McCulloch | 1,069.40 | 1,064 | .99 |
| McLennan | 1,041.90 | 27,572 | 26.46 |
| McMullen | 1,113.10 | 89 | .08 |
| Madison | 469.70 | 1,569 | 3.34 |
| Marion | 381.20 | 1,239 | 3.25 |
| Martin | 914.90 | 767 | .84 |
| Mason | 932.10 | 436 | .47 |
| Matagorda | 1,114.50 | 5,317 | 4.77 |
| Maverick | 1,280.20 | 6,458 | 5.04 |
| Medina | 1,327.90 | 4,342 | 3.27 |
| Menard | 902.00 | 291 | .32 |
| Midland | 900.30 | 16,228 | 18.03 |
| Milam | 1,016.80 | 3228 | 3.17 |
| Mills | 748.20 | 611 | .82 |
| Mitchell | 910.10 | 976 | 1.07 |
| Montague | 930.70 | 2,108 | 2.26 |
| Montgomery | 1,044.30 | 32,046 | 30.69 |
| Moore | 899.70 | 2,633 | 2.93 |
| Morris | 254.50 | 1,733 | 6.81 |
| Motley | 989.40 | 142 | .14 |
| Nacogdoches | 946.80 | 9,196 | 9.71 |
| Navarro | 1,071.20 | 5,577 | 5.21 |
| Newton | 932.80 | 1,966 | 2.11 |
| Nolan | 912.10 | 2,095 | 2.30 |
| Nueces | 835.90 | 40,333 | 48.25 |
| Ochiltree | 917.60 | 1,341 | 1.46 |
| Oldham | 1,500.70 | 338 | .23 |
| Orange | 356.40 | 10,667 | 29.93 |
| Palo Pinto | 953.00 | 3,188 | 3.35 |
| Panola | 801.00 | 3,005 | 3.75 |
| Parker | 903.60 | 9,669 | 10.70 |
| Parmer | 881.70 | 1,450 | 1.64 |
| Pecos | 4,764.00 | 2,190 | .46 |
| Polk | 1,057.40 | 5,068 | 4.79 |
| Potter | 909.40 | 13,297 | 14.62 |
| Presidio | 3,855.80 | 993 | .26 |
| Rains | 232.10 | 937 | 4.04 |
| Randall | 914.50 | 13,322 | 14.57 |
| Reagan | 1,175.40 | 722 | .61 |
| Real | 700.00 | 281 | .40 |
| Red River | 1,050.20 | 1,634 | 1.56 |
| Reeves | 2,636.10 | 2,201 | .83 |
| Refugio | 770.30 | 1,008 | 1.31 |
| Roberts | 924.10 | 122 | .13 |
| Robertson | 854.60 | 1,906 | 2.23 |
| Rockwall | 128.80 | 4,574 | 35.51 |
| Runnels | 1,054.50 | 1,457 | 1.38 |

| | | | |
|---------------|----------|---------|--------|
| Rusk | 923.60 | 5,802 | 6.28 |
| Sabine | 490.30 | 1,008 | 2.06 |
| San Augustine | 527.90 | 977 | 1.85 |
| San Jacinto | 570.70 | 2,553 | 4.47 |
| San Patricio | 691.80 | 9,349 | 13.51 |
| San Saba | 1, | 640 | .56 |
| Schleicher | 1,310.70 | 494 | .38 |
| Scurry | 902.60 | 2,591 | 2.87 |
| Shackelford | 914.00 | 445 | .49 |
| Shelby | 794.20 | 2,713 | 3.42 |
| Sherman | 923.10 | 397 | .43 |
| Smith | 928.50 | 20,066 | 21.61 |
| Somervell | 187.20 | 860 | 4.59 |
| Starr | 1,223.10 | 7,337 | 6.00 |
| Stephens | 894.70 | 1,372 | 1.53 |
| Sterling | 923.40 | 214 | .23 |
| Stonewall | 918.70 | 216 | .24 |
| Sutton | 1,453.90 | 577 | .40 |
| Swisher | 911.50 | 1,059 | 1.16 |
| Tarrant | 863.50 | 153,218 | 177.44 |
| Taylor | 915.70 | 17,272 | 18.86 |
| Terrell | 2,357.90 | 160 | .07 |
| Terry | 889.90 | 1,923 | 2.16 |
| Throckmorton | 912.40 | 166 | .18 |
| Titus | 410.60 | 3,118 | 7.59 |
| Tom Green | 1,522.20 | 14,380 | 9.45 |
| Travis | 989.40 | 83,256 | 84.15 |
| Trinity | 692.90 | 1,373 | 1.98 |
| Tyler | 923.00 | 2,088 | 2.26 |
| Upshur | 587.70 | 4,608 | 7.84 |
| Upton | 1,241.80 | 676 | .54 |
| Uvalde | 1,556.60 | 3,357 | 2.16 |
| Val Verde | 3,170.70 | 5,423 | 1.71 |
| Van Zandt | 848.80 | 4,998 | 5.89 |
| Victoria | 882.60 | 10,962 | 12.42 |
| Walker | 787.50 | 7,531 | 9.56 |
| Waller | 513.60 | 4,543 | 8.85 |
| Ward | 835.60 | 1,830 | 2.19 |
| Washington | 609.30 | 4,373 | 7.18 |
| Webb | 3,357.00 | 25,562 | 7.61 |
| Wharton | 1,090.20 | 5,632 | 5.17 |
| Wheeler | 914.30 | 737 | .81 |
| Wichita | 627.70 | 17,458 | 27.81 |
| Wilbarger | 971.10 | 1,832 | 1.89 |
| Willacy | 596.70 | 2,813 | 4.71 |
| Williamson | 1,124.40 | 27,630 | 24.57 |
| Wilson | 807.20 | 3,915 | 4.85 |
| Winkler | 841.10 | 1,222 | 1.45 |
| Wise | 904.70 | 5,125 | 5.66 |
| Wood | 650.30 | 3,860 | 5.94 |
| Yoakum | 799.80 | 1,337 | 1.67 |

| | | | |
|--------|----------|-------|------|
| Young | 922.40 | 2,188 | 2.37 |
| Zapata | 996.80 | 1,468 | 1.47 |
| Zavala | 1,298.60 | 1,602 | 1.23 |

APPPENDIX E

1997 Texas Population and Percent White,
Black, and Hispanic

1997 Texas Population and Percent White, Black, and Hispanic

| County Name | 1997 Total Population | Percent White | Percent Black | Percent Hispanic |
|---------------|-----------------------|---------------|---------------|------------------|
| Anderson | 52,949 | 65.58 | 23.80 | 9.84 |
| Andrews | 14,662 | 60.94 | 1.73 | 35.70 |
| Angelina | 78,115 | 72.73 | 14.80 | 11.44 |
| Aransas | 21,023 | 73.31 | 1.55 | 20.32 |
| Archer | 8,657 | 96.20 | .20 | 3.01 |
| Armstrong | 2,137 | 93.40 | .00 | 4.12 |
| Atascosa | 34,810 | 43.05 | .37 | 56.00 |
| Austin | 22,862 | 71.76 | 12.91 | 14.84 |
| Bailey | 6,794 | 54.93 | 1.38 | 43.38 |
| Bandera | 14,598 | 88.29 | .18 | 10.49 |
| Bastrop | 48,178 | 69.30 | 9.45 | 20.23 |
| Baylor | 4,313 | 85.69 | 4.59 | 9.04 |
| Bee | 27,633 | 40.16 | 6.74 | 51.84 |
| Bell | 225,419 | 61.77 | 19.69 | 14.97 |
| Bexar | 1,334,722 | 39.52 | 6.79 | 51.82 |
| Blanco | 7,645 | 80.85 | 1.20 | 16.85 |
| Borden | 759 | 83.40 | .00 | 15.15 |
| Bosque | 16,436 | 85.25 | 2.06 | 12.19 |
| Bowie | 83,591 | 74.73 | 22.79 | 1.71 |
| Brazoria | 224,910 | 68.85 | 8.07 | 21.22 |
| Brazos | 139,352 | 68.82 | 10.75 | 15.91 |
| Brewster | 9,279 | 55.17 | 1.00 | 42.83 |
| Briscoe | 1,958 | 74.62 | 3.32 | 21.86 |
| Brooks | 8,362 | 7.69 | .01 | 91.89 |
| Brown | 37,233 | 79.75 | 5.58 | 13.84 |
| Burleson | 15,214 | 67.79 | 18.99 | 12.59 |
| Burnet | 30,272 | 83.65 | 2.12 | 13.31 |
| Caldwell | 30,707 | 48.88 | 11.85 | 38.38 |
| Calhoun | 20,761 | 55.36 | 2.72 | 38.52 |
| Callahn | 12,709 | 94.91 | .07 | 4.27 |
| Cameron | 316,542 | 15.54 | .25 | 83.66 |
| Camp | 10,886 | 65.85 | 23.49 | 10.08 |
| Carson | 6,657 | 93.04 | .21 | 5.95 |
| Cass | 31,056 | 75.65 | 22.37 | 1.45 |
| Castro | 8,581 | 44.81 | 2.54 | 52.15 |
| Chambers | 25,028 | 70.67 | 15.73 | 11.75 |
| Cherokee | 44,736 | 71.79 | 17.43 | 9.84 |
| Childress | 7,457 | 69.67 | 13.14 | 16.37 |
| Clay | 10,771 | 93.34 | .96 | 4.01 |
| Cochran | 4,118 | 47.33 | 4.57 | 47.79 |
| Coke | 3,567 | 84.58 | .14 | 14.52 |
| Coleman | 9,941 | 81.77 | 4.48 | 13.07 |
| Collin | 401,443 | 84.14 | 3.94 | 7.83 |
| Collingsworth | 3,449 | 74.08 | 6.32 | 18.61 |
| Colorado | 19,600 | 62.83 | 17.84 | 18.97 |
| Comal | 71,043 | 77.02 | .65 | 21.55 |
| Comanche | 14,470 | 77.95 | .14 | 21.32 |

| | | | | |
|------------|-----------|-------|-------|-------|
| Concho | 3,127 | 55.55 | .70 | 43.30 |
| Cooke | 33,857 | 88.23 | 3.76 | 6.58 |
| Coryell | 75,521 | 63.83 | 22.75 | 10.49 |
| Cottle | 2,112 | 71.45 | 10.13 | 18.04 |
| Crane | 4,603 | 57.53 | 2.45 | 39.43 |
| Crockett | 4,652 | 48.19 | .84 | 50.58 |
| Crosby | 7,083 | 48.68 | 2.96 | 48.00 |
| Culberson | 3,299 | 21.73 | .09 | 77.27 |
| Dallam | 5,852 | 73.77 | 2.14 | 23.12 |
| Dallas | 2,021,087 | 57.73 | 19.76 | 19.47 |
| Dawson | 14,947 | 46.94 | 8.33 | 44.40 |
| Deaf Smith | 19,250 | 43.58 | 1.27 | 54.66 |
| Delta | 5,098 | 86.99 | 9.14 | 2.53 |
| Denton | 371,518 | 83.89 | 4.75 | 7.99 |
| De Witt | 20,586 | 59.58 | 12.74 | 27.30 |
| Dickens | 2,334 | 72.75 | 4.58 | 5.40 |
| Dimmitt | 10,806 | 13.85 | .49 | 85.28 |
| Donley | 3,810 | 89.71 | 4.91 | 4.70 |
| Duval | 13,826 | 11.84 | 1.92 | 85.95 |
| Eastland | 19,181 | 88.42 | 1.88 | 9.17 |
| Ector | 123,795 | 59.22 | 4.54 | 35.17 |
| Edwards | 2,937 | 47.57 | .00 | 50.97 |
| Ellis | 100,100 | 74.98 | 9.06 | 15.14 |
| El Paso | 683,657 | 22.89 | 3.34 | 72.49 |
| Erath | 31,425 | 86.73 | .74 | 11.65 |
| Falls | 18,375 | 58.49 | 28.08 | 12.91 |
| Fannin | 27,832 | 86.35 | 8.98 | 3.26 |
| Fayette | 21,759 | 79.76 | 7.93 | 11.97 |
| Fisher | 4,484 | 73.73 | 3.81 | 22.30 |
| Floyd | 8,221 | 50.99 | 3.43 | 45.09 |
| Foard | 1,849 | 78.10 | 5.90 | 15.36 |
| Fort Bend | 316,686 | 50.11 | 22.90 | 19.31 |
| Franklin | 8,741 | 86.72 | 5.22 | 7.28 |
| Freestone | 17,834 | 72.54 | 20.55 | 6.29 |
| Frio | 15,751 | 24.70 | 4.72 | 69.90 |
| Gaines | 14,412 | 64.06 | 1.74 | 33.75 |
| Galvestone | 242,133 | 63.65 | 17.77 | 16.01 |
| Garza | 4,974 | 62.08 | 6.11 | 31.24 |
| Gillespie | 20,160 | 82.27 | .14 | 17.05 |
| Glasscock | 1,380 | 72.32 | .00 | 27.10 |
| Goaliad | 6,576 | 57.27 | 6.36 | 35.66 |
| Gonzales | 17,896 | 51.35 | 9.54 | 38.53 |
| Gray | 24,864 | 83.87 | 5.14 | 9.29 |
| Grayson | 102,998 | 84.01 | 7.62 | 5.85 |
| Gregg | 112,399 | 75.07 | 19.19 | 4.75 |
| Grimes | 21,950 | 59.94 | 23.54 | 16.03 |
| Guadalupe | 75,155 | 61.78 | 4.71 | 32.29 |
| Hale | 36,079 | 46.84 | 5.71 | 46.65 |
| Hall | 3,951 | 68.97 | 8.38 | 21.99 |
| Hamilton | 8,254 | 88.20 | .02 | 10.75 |
| Hansford | 5,540 | 74.96 | .00 | 24.42 |

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|------------|-----------|-------|-------|-------|
| Hardeman | 5,048 | 80.41 | 5.82 | 12.82 |
| Hardin | 47,178 | 86.18 | 11.47 | 1.76 |
| Harris | 3,157,875 | 50.96 | 18.56 | 26.17 |
| Harrison | 60,681 | 68.52 | 28.03 | 2.80 |
| Hartley | 4,979 | 75.48 | 13.88 | 9.96 |
| Haskell | 6,433 | 74.23 | 3.37 | 21.79 |
| Hays | 84,800 | 69.55 | 2.81 | 26.50 |
| Hemphill | 3,690 | 86.40 | .19 | 12.60 |
| Henderson | 67,645 | 86.56 | 7.25 | 5.59 |
| Hidalgo | 511,324 | 11.12 | .21 | 88.02 |
| Hill | 29,885 | 79.08 | 9.85 | 10.57 |
| Hockley | 24,130 | 61.17 | 3.97 | 34.63 |
| Hood | 34,142 | 93.16 | .19 | 5.45 |
| Hopkins | 31,143 | 83.44 | 8.60 | 7.05 |
| Houston | 21,876 | 63.19 | 30.86 | 5.39 |
| Howard | 33,090 | 66.09 | 3.69 | 29.08 |
| Hudspeth | 3,397 | 32.94 | .62 | 65.97 |
| Hunt | 70,443 | 82.57 | 10.73 | 5.66 |
| Hutchinson | 25,709 | 84.71 | 2.62 | 11.11 |
| Irion | 1,533 | 77.56 | .33 | 21.72 |
| Jack | 7,626 | 93.61 | .97 | 4.73 |
| Jackson | 14,559 | 66.29 | 9.99 | 23.52 |
| Jasper | 34,159 | 76.08 | 21.02 | 2.30 |
| Jeff Davis | 2,028 | 59.47 | .39 | 39.05 |
| Jefferson | 247,646 | 59.06 | 32.23 | 6.15 |
| Jim Hogg | 4,929 | 6.76 | .08 | 92.78 |
| Jim Wells | 39,865 | 24.87 | .45 | 74.18 |
| Johnson | 113,052 | 86.92 | 2.61 | 9.49 |
| Jones | 18,129 | 72.01 | 8.78 | 18.54 |
| Karnes | 14,679 | 42.95 | 11.66 | 45.02 |
| Kaufman | 62,941 | 78.44 | 12.61 | 8.00 |
| Kendall | 20,386 | 80.56 | .42 | 18.27 |
| Kenedy | 419 | 22.43 | .00 | 75.89 |
| Kent | 941 | 85.87 | .96 | 13.07 |
| Kerr | 42,874 | 78.27 | 1.91 | 19.00 |
| Kimble | 4,346 | 73.95 | .25 | 24.53 |
| King | 343 | 84.55 | .00 | 15.45 |
| Kinney | 3,366 | 44.89 | 1.66 | 52.08 |
| Kleberg | 31,440 | 31.25 | 3.07 | 64.01 |
| Knox | 4,606 | 66.61 | 7.01 | 25.99 |
| Lamar | 45,746 | 81.78 | 15.56 | 1.24 |
| Lamb | 15,186 | 53.89 | 5.03 | 40.65 |
| Lampassas | 16,755 | 79.96 | 2.70 | 15.23 |
| La Salle | 6,061 | 20.34 | 5.97 | 73.07 |
| Lavaca | 20,040 | 79.39 | 10.35 | 9.72 |
| Lee | 14,380 | 72.04 | 12.29 | 15.31 |
| Leon | 14,044 | 82.59 | 11.78 | 5.14 |
| Liberty | 65,044 | 73.13 | 14.51 | 11.21 |
| Limestone | 21,449 | 69.38 | 20.71 | 9.21 |
| Lipscomb | 3,244 | 84.43 | .03 | 14.30 |
| Live Oak | 10,268 | 61.83 | .05 | 37.17 |

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|-------------|---------|-------|-------|-------|
| Llano | 13,129 | 94.17 | .24 | 5.13 |
| Loving | 95 | 84.21 | .00 | 15.79 |
| Lubbock | 232,458 | 65.63 | 7.58 | 25.21 |
| Lynn | 6,644 | 51.52 | 3.30 | 44.64 |
| McCulloch | 8,753 | 67.43 | 1.85 | 30.34 |
| McLennan | 203,788 | 68. | 15.79 | 14.36 |
| McMullen | 763 | 58.58 | .00 | 40.37 |
| Madison | 12,307 | 59.97 | 24.82 | 13.88 |
| Marion | 10,594 | 62.36 | 35.22 | 1.89 |
| Martin | 5,123 | 55.18 | 1.62 | 42.69 |
| Mason | 3,646 | 74.36 | .80 | 23.45 |
| Matagorda | 38,304 | 56.75 | 13.32 | 27.33 |
| Maverick | 45,218 | 7.44 | .06 | 90.57 |
| Medina | 35,051 | 53.90 | 3.38 | 41.65 |
| Menard | 2,353 | 61.24 | .72 | 37.06 |
| Midland | 118,634 | 66.67 | 7.34 | 24.71 |
| Milam | 24,939 | 67.91 | 13.41 | 18.31 |
| Mills | 5,223 | 84.28 | .61 | 14.13 |
| Mitchell | 9,183 | 54.87 | 14.48 | 30.32 |
| Montague | 18,188 | 91.91 | .10 | 7.07 |
| Montgomery | 253,744 | 83.98 | 3.79 | 10.84 |
| Moore | 19,643 | 60.75 | .46 | 36.75 |
| Morris | 13,465 | 71.93 | 25.20 | 2.28 |
| Motley | 1,360 | 84.63 | 4.34 | 10.00 |
| Nacogdoches | 59,699 | 75.70 | 16.02 | 7.25 |
| Navarro | 42,803 | 70.76 | 18.60 | 9.45 |
| Newton | 14,356 | 73.35 | 24.63 | 1.31 |
| Nolan | 16,674 | 66.71 | 4.55 | 28.24 |
| Nueces | 311,496 | 40.46 | 3.84 | 54.66 |
| Ochiltree | 9,267 | 77.48 | .02 | 21.31 |
| Oldham | 2,375 | 87.66 | .38 | 9.98 |
| Orange | 84,603 | 87.76 | 8.82 | 2.56 |
| Palo Pinto | 26,474 | 83.29 | 3.42 | 12.21 |
| Panola | 22,832 | 78.57 | 18.50 | 2.44 |
| Parker | 76,267 | 93.39 | .86 | 4.84 |
| Parmer | 10,308 | 52.35 | 1.04 | 46.10 |
| Pecos | 15,883 | 35.32 | 6.09 | 58.09 |
| Polk | 42,358 | 77.31 | 12.89 | 6.79 |
| Potter | 109,316 | 64.72 | 9.15 | 22.29 |
| Presidio | 7,484 | 15.69 | .03 | 83.93 |
| Rains | 7,552 | 92.35 | 4.01 | 3.01 |
| Randall | 100,829 | 89.23 | 1.36 | 8.16 |
| Reagan | 4,240 | 48.68 | 1.63 | 49.53 |
| Real | 2,671 | 72.44 | .00 | 26.13 |
| Red River | 14,549 | 75.29 | 21.54 | 2.50 |
| Reeves | 15,329 | 17.82 | 2.00 | 79.82 |
| Refugio | 8,091 | 50.27 | 7.82 | 41.61 |
| Roberts | 881 | 95.69 | .00 | 3.97 |
| Robertson | 15,484 | 57.87 | 27.79 | 14.09 |
| Rockwall | 36,618 | 88.66 | 2.73 | 7.32 |
| Runnels | 11,753 | 71.23 | 1.74 | 26.68 |

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|---------------|-----------|-------|-------|-------|
| Rusk | 45,568 | 73.14 | 20.85 | 5.58 |
| Sabine | 10,776 | 85.68 | 12.75 | 1.32 |
| San Augustine | 8,237 | 66.20 | 31.31 | 2.22 |
| San Jacinto | 19,332 | 82.36 | 13.86 | 3.21 |
| San Patricio | 66,796 | 45.98 | 1.42 | 51.84 |
| San Saba | 5,608 | 75.20 | 3.80 | 20.60 |
| Schleicher | 3,358 | 60.42 | 1.22 | 38.12 |
| Scurry | 18,827 | 68.13 | 5.19 | 26.06 |
| Shackelford | 3,410 | 89.82 | .32 | 9.33 |
| Shelby | 23,122 | 73.40 | 22.53 | 3.71 |
| Sherman | 3,075 | 78.34 | .13 | 20.94 |
| Smith | 165,705 | 70.81 | 20.32 | 7.95 |
| Somervell | 5,941 | 81.27 | .37 | 17.32 |
| Starr | 50,380 | 2.05 | .02 | 97.65 |
| Stephens | 9,905 | 83.09 | 5.33 | 10.86 |
| Sterling | 1,397 | 69.86 | .00 | 29.49 |
| Stonewall | 1,826 | 81.00 | 13.36 | 13.36 |
| Sutton | 4,482 | 52.86 | .02 | 46.63 |
| Swisher | 8,551 | 58.98 | 7.36 | 33.12 |
| Tarrant | 1,328,732 | 70.90 | 11.86 | 13.93 |
| Taylor | 127,909 | 76.10 | 6.39 | 15.93 |
| Terrell | 1,194 | 35.76 | .08 | 63.57 |
| Terry | 13,322 | 52.15 | 4.65 | 42.59 |
| Throckmorton | 1,695 | 91.21 | .00 | 7.85 |
| Titus | 26,220 | 69.87 | 12.95 | 16.51 |
| Tom Green | 105,416 | 65.55 | 3.97 | 28.91 |
| Travis | 693,517 | 62.54 | 10.51 | 23.26 |
| Trinity | 12,628 | 81.65 | 14.93 | 2.98 |
| Tyler | 19,797 | 78.46 | 18.03 | 3.17 |
| Upshur | 34,579 | 83.33 | 13.06 | 3.04 |
| Upton | 4,061 | 52.67 | 1.90 | 44.87 |
| Uvalde | 25,057 | 35.25 | .15 | 63.89 |
| Val Verde | 42,976 | 24.08 | 1.68 | 73.41 |
| Van Zandt | 42,802 | 90.24 | 3.61 | 5.51 |
| Victoria | 82,580 | 56.61 | 6.74 | 35.52 |
| Walker | 57,346 | 63.21 | 22.79 | 12.82 |
| Waller | 28,277 | 48.64 | 33.35 | 17.47 |
| Ward | 12,797 | 54.79 | 3.39 | 40.98 |
| Washington | 29,785 | 73.13 | 19.88 | 5.65 |
| Webb | 184,980 | 6.31 | .12 | 92.87 |
| Wharton | 41,309 | 56.54 | 15.22 | 27.78 |
| Wheeler | 5,839 | 88.41 | 2.79 | 7.84 |
| Wichita | 129,232 | 78.86 | 9.47 | 9.48 |
| Wilbarger | 15,516 | 73.16 | 9.00 | 16.80 |
| Willacy | 19,332 | 12.24 | .40 | 87.12 |
| Williamson | 207,123 | 78.47 | 4.39 | 15.15 |
| Wilson | 28,562 | 63.76 | 1.02 | 34.76 |
| Winkler | 8,335 | 55.16 | 1.46 | 42.71 |
| Wise | 41,521 | 87.55 | 1.99 | 9.46 |
| Wood | 33,359 | 87.03 | 8.39 | 4.00 |
| Yoakum | 8,560 | 57.57 | .69 | 41.33 |

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|--------|--------|-------|------|-------|
| Young | 17,813 | 90.38 | 1.44 | 7.58 |
| Zapata | 10,558 | 15.30 | .01 | 84.31 |
| Zavala | 11,842 | 5.01 | 1.97 | 92.76 |

APPENDIX F

Texas County Information on AFDC Recipients in 1996

Texas County Information on AFDC Recipients in 1996

| County Name | 1996 County Population | Number of AFDC Recipients | Number of AFDC UP Recipients | Percent of Population Receiving AFDC |
|---------------|------------------------|---------------------------|------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| Anderson | 52,031 | 1,387 | 31 | 2.73 |
| Andrews | 14,532 | 489 | 14 | 3.46 |
| Angelina | 75,924 | 1,994 | 30 | 2.67 |
| Aransas | 20,854 | 857 | 93 | 4.56 |
| Archer | 8,594 | 81 | 1 | 0.95 |
| Armstrong | 2,192 | 11 | 1 | 0.55 |
| Atascosa | 34,152 | 1,631 | 130 | 5.16 |
| Austin | 22,969 | 378 | 0 | 1.65 |
| Bailey | 6,841 | 232 | 27 | 3.79 |
| Bandera | 14,373 | 219 | 10 | 1.59 |
| Bastrop | 46,738 | 1,076 | 31 | 2.37 |
| Baylor | 4,289 | 104 | 20 | 2.89 |
| Bee | 27,590 | 1,561 | 90 | 5.98 |
| Bell | 222,146 | 5,705 | 55 | 2.59 |
| Bexar | 1,318,431 | 57,605 | 734 | 4.42 |
| Blanco | 7,352 | 48 | 2 | 0.68 |
| Borden | 762 | 0 | 0 | 0.00 |
| Bosque | 16,595 | 329 | 30 | 2.16 |
| Bowie | 85,080 | 3,206 | 42 | 3.82 |
| Brazoria | 219,898 | 5,274 | 10 | 2.40 |
| Brazos | 138,093 | 3,327 | 51 | 2.45 |
| Brewster | 9,290 | 213 | 9 | 2.39 |
| Briscoe | 2,038 | 43 | 6 | 2.40 |
| Brooks | 8,331 | 822 | 127 | 11.39 |
| Brown | 37,283 | 1,042 | 19 | 2.85 |
| Burleson | 15,136 | 658 | 4 | 4.37 |
| Burnet | 29,426 | 563 | 13 | 1.96 |
| Caldwell | 29,558 | 1,101 | 20 | 3.79 |
| Calhoun | 20,505 | 751 | 19 | 3.76 |
| Callahn | 12,442 | 272 | 7 | 2.24 |
| Cameron | 312,064 | 21,699 | 3,950 | 8.22 |
| Camp | 10,965 | 367 | 8 | 3.42 |
| Carson | 6,592 | 55 | 4 | 0.90 |
| Cass | 30,725 | 1,208 | 31 | 4.03 |
| Castro | 8,395 | 361 | 36 | 4.73 |
| Chambers | 24,330 | 552 | 17 | 2.34 |
| Cherokee | 43,611 | 1,397 | 15 | 3.24 |
| Childress | 7,462 | 215 | 44 | 3.47 |
| Clay | 10,566 | 83 | 9 | 0.87 |
| Cochran | 4,250 | 215 | 18 | 5.48 |
| Coke | 3,529 | 41 | 0 | 1.16 |
| Coleman | 9,888 | 352 | 24 | 3.80 |
| Collin | 373,095 | 2,725 | 15 | 0.73 |
| Collingsworth | 3,657 | 137 | 24 | 4.40 |
| Colorado | 19,574 | 546 | 0 | 2.79 |

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|------------|-----------|--------|-------|-------|
| Comal | 68,525 | 875 | 15 | 1.30 |
| Comanche | 14,072 | 304 | 14 | 2.26 |
| Concho | 3,170 | 46 | 0 | 1.45 |
| Cooke | 33,196 | 839 | 17 | 2.58 |
| Coryell | 74,119 | 813 | 22 | 1.13 |
| Cottle | 2,117 | 77 | 10 | 4.11 |
| Crane | 4,648 | 111 | 6 | 2.52 |
| Crockett | 4,544 | 100 | 0 | 2.20 |
| Crosby | 7,187 | 371 | 73 | 6.18 |
| Culberson | 3,290 | 101 | 2 | 3.13 |
| Dallam | 5,765 | 159 | 1 | 2.78 |
| Dallas | 1,999,926 | 71,661 | 122 | 3.59 |
| Dawson | 15,011 | 672 | 54 | 4.84 |
| Deaf Smith | 19,403 | 1,013 | 47 | 5.46 |
| Delta | 5,014 | 220 | 19 | 4.77 |
| Denton | 350,905 | 2,857 | 11 | 0.82 |
| De Witt | 20,546 | 807 | 42 | 4.13 |
| Dickens | 2,372 | 82 | 9 | 3.84 |
| Dimmitt | 10,681 | 869 | 299 | 10.94 |
| Donley | 3,905 | 91 | 16 | 2.74 |
| Duval | 13,543 | 978 | 113 | 8.06 |
| Eastland | 19,498 | 420 | 24 | 2.28 |
| Ector | 123,211 | 5,707 | 87 | 4.70 |
| Edwards | 2,878 | 105 | 13 | 4.10 |
| Ellis | 95,990 | 2,282 | 16 | 2.39 |
| El Paso | 673,893 | 37,538 | 1,976 | 5.86 |
| Erath | 30,769 | 615 | 12 | 2.04 |
| Falls | 18,457 | 931 | 10 | 5.10 |
| Fannin | 27,435 | 689 | 5 | 2.53 |
| Fayette | 21,756 | 313 | 1 | 1.44 |
| Fisher | 4,516 | 94 | 0 | 2.08 |
| Floyd | 8,398 | 383 | 50 | 5.16 |
| Foard | 1,845 | 34 | 1 | 1.90 |
| Fort Bend | 302,017 | 4,841 | 8 | 1.61 |
| Franklin | 8,724 | 131 | 1 | 1.51 |
| Freestone | 17,757 | 508 | 23 | 2.99 |
| Frio | 15,841 | 1,052 | 15 | 6.74 |
| Gaines | 14,742 | 314 | 10 | 2.20 |
| Galvestone | 241,981 | 8,955 | 35 | 3.72 |
| Garza | 4,954 | 186 | 5 | 3.86 |
| Gillespie | 19,700 | 111 | 1 | 0.57 |
| Glasscock | 1,460 | 9 | 0 | 0.62 |
| Goaliad | 6,570 | 224 | 38 | 3.99 |
| Gonzales | 17,754 | 915 | 40 | 5.38 |
| Gray | 24,819 | 582 | 9 | 2.38 |
| Grayson | 100,611 | 2,619 | 25 | 2.63 |
| Gregg | 111,509 | 3,371 | 53 | 3.07 |
| Grimes | 21,721 | 658 | 6 | 3.06 |
| Guadalupe | 73,679 | 2,103 | 71 | 2.95 |
| Hale | 36,253 | 1,667 | 98 | 4.87 |
| Hall | 3,972 | 185 | 29 | 5.39 |

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|------------|-----------|---------|-------|------|
| Hamilton | 8,218 | 138 | 7 | 1.76 |
| Hansford | 5,478 | 38 | 2 | 0.73 |
| Hardeman | 5,133 | 88 | 6 | 1.83 |
| Hardin | 46,367 | 1,034 | 23 | 2.28 |
| Harris | 3,117,376 | 117,757 | 402 | 3.79 |
| Harrison | 60,838 | 2,177 | 55 | 3.67 |
| Hartley | 4,895 | 5 | 0 | 0.10 |
| Haskell | 6,463 | 192 | 8 | 3.09 |
| Hays | 81,563 | 1,188 | 19 | 1.48 |
| Hemphill | 3,805 | 13 | 0 | 0.34 |
| Henderson | 65,144 | 1,978 | 51 | 3.11 |
| Hidalgo | 496,485 | 35,561 | 6,376 | 8.45 |
| Hill | 29,538 | 988 | 26 | 3.43 |
| Hockley | 24,209 | 841 | 26 | 3.58 |
| Hood | 33,113 | 529 | 21 | 1.66 |
| Hopkins | 31,012 | 468 | 1 | 1.51 |
| Houston | 21,362 | 1,103 | 13 | 5.22 |
| Howard | 33,285 | 1,305 | 51 | 4.07 |
| Hudspeth | 3,245 | 134 | 1 | 4.16 |
| Hunt | 69,176 | 2,228 | 21 | 3.25 |
| Hutchinson | 25,907 | 469 | 18 | 1.88 |
| Irion | 1,550 | 41 | 0 | 2.65 |
| Jack | 7,435 | 188 | 12 | 2.69 |
| Jackson | 14,329 | 388 | 24 | 2.88 |
| Jasper | 33,944 | 1,235 | 27 | 3.72 |
| Jeff Davis | 2,061 | 13 | 0 | 0.63 |
| Jefferson | 245,849 | 11,655 | 146 | 4.80 |
| Jim Hogg | 5,164 | 279 | 15 | 5.69 |
| Jim Wells | 39,941 | 2,585 | 219 | 7.02 |
| Johnson | 109,463 | 2,431 | 22 | 2.24 |
| Jones | 18,422 | 436 | 20 | 2.48 |
| Karnes | 15,259 | 732 | 39 | 5.05 |
| Kaufman | 61,646 | 1,935 | 7 | 3.15 |
| Kendall | 19,835 | 205 | 10 | 1.08 |
| Kenedy | 418 | 0 | 0 | 0.00 |
| Kent | 939 | 0 | 0 | 0.00 |
| Kerr | 42,168 | 950 | 35 | 2.34 |
| Kimble | 4,504 | 67 | 0 | 1.49 |
| King | 357 | 1 | 0 | 0.28 |
| Kinney | 3,389 | 111 | 25 | 4.01 |
| Kleberg | 31,805 | 2,188 | 191 | 7.48 |
| Knox | 4,708 | 151 | 5 | 3.31 |
| Lamar | 45,656 | 1,646 | 25 | 3.66 |
| Lamb | 15,162 | 691 | 11 | 4.63 |
| Lampassas | 16,707 | 473 | 16 | 2.93 |
| La Salle | 5,911 | 338 | 27 | 6.17 |
| Lavaca | 20,450 | 283 | 13 | 1.45 |
| Lee | 14,189 | 157 | 0 | 1.11 |
| Leon | 13,775 | 387 | 13 | 2.90 |
| Liberty | 63,173 | 2,506 | 45 | 4.04 |
| Limestone | 21,307 | 850 | 19 | 4.08 |

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|-------------|---------|--------|-----|------|
| Lipscomb | 3,210 | 16 | 0 | 0.50 |
| Live Oak | 10,476 | 294 | 12 | 2.92 |
| Llano | 12,852 | 154 | 0 | 1.20 |
| Loving | 97 | 0 | 0 | 0.00 |
| Lubbock | 233,496 | 9,075 | 291 | 4.01 |
| Lynn | 6,769 | 238 | 30 | 3.96 |
| McCulloch | 8,862 | 270 | 1 | 3.06 |
| McLennan | 202,679 | 8,285 | 10 | 4.09 |
| McMullen | 766 | 14 | 3 | 2.22 |
| Madison | 12,283 | 458 | 0 | 3.73 |
| Marion | 10,405 | 548 | 4 | 5.31 |
| Martin | 5,056 | 156 | 596 | 3.14 |
| Mason | 3,578 | 39 | 8 | 1.31 |
| Matagorda | 38,184 | 1,750 | 76 | 4.78 |
| Maverick | 44,107 | 3,520 | 2 | 7.99 |
| Medina | 33,471 | 1,124 | 64 | 3.55 |
| Menard | 2,339 | 45 | 0 | 1.92 |
| Midland | 116,767 | 3,123 | 60 | 2.73 |
| Milam | 24,556 | 965 | 33 | 4.06 |
| Mills | 4,964 | 64 | 8 | 1.45 |
| Mitchell | 8,862 | 233 | 13 | 2.78 |
| Montague | 18,194 | 345 | 18 | 2.00 |
| Montgomery | 241,855 | 4,955 | 19 | 2.06 |
| Moore | 19,759 | 296 | 6 | 1.53 |
| Morris | 13,485 | 483 | 8 | 3.64 |
| Motley | 1,436 | 24 | 1 | 1.74 |
| Nacogdoches | 59,250 | 1,735 | 43 | 3.00 |
| Navarro | 42,257 | 1,595 | 15 | 3.81 |
| Newton | 14,209 | 585 | 21 | 4.26 |
| Nolan | 16,793 | 700 | 39 | 4.40 |
| Nueces | 310,561 | 16,100 | 717 | 5.42 |
| Ochiltree | 9,298 | 148 | 4 | 1.63 |
| Oldham | 2,372 | 15 | 0 | 0.63 |
| Orange | 85,433 | 3,091 | 125 | 3.76 |
| Palo Pinto | 26,380 | 836 | 1 | 3.17 |
| Panola | 22,643 | 600 | 15 | 2.72 |
| Parker | 73,897 | 873 | 4 | 1.19 |
| Parmer | 10,401 | 143 | 14 | 1.51 |
| Pecos | 16,515 | 497 | 22 | 3.14 |
| Polk | 41,959 | 1,453 | 47 | 3.57 |
| Potter | 108,765 | 5,348 | 73 | 4.98 |
| Presidio | 7,285 | 427 | 5 | 5.93 |
| Rains | 7,457 | 156 | 1 | 2.11 |
| Randall | 100,400 | 859 | 15 | 0.87 |
| Reagan | 4,277 | 72 | 1 | 1.71 |
| Real | 2,740 | 167 | 16 | 6.68 |
| Red River | 14,662 | 448 | 11 | 3.13 |
| Reeves | 15,309 | 624 | 27 | 4.25 |
| Refugio | 8,198 | 350 | 11 | 4.40 |
| Roberts | 875 | 4 | 0 | 0.46 |
| Robertson | 15,355 | 997 | 16 | 6.60 |

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|---------------|-----------|--------|-------|-------|
| Rockwall | 34,287 | 359 | 1 | 1.05 |
| Runnels | 11,928 | 306 | 8 | 2.63 |
| Rusk | 45,572 | 1,119 | 11 | 2.48 |
| Sabine | 10,892 | 346 | 11 | 3.28 |
| San Augustine | 8,193 | 378 | 3 | 4.65 |
| San Jacinto | 18,625 | 939 | 42 | 5.27 |
| San Patricio | 66,005 | 3,269 | 214 | 5.28 |
| San Saba | 5,565 | 123 | 7 | 2.34 |
| Schleicher | 3,325 | 69 | 0 | 2.08 |
| Scurry | 19,027 | 495 | 3 | 2.62 |
| Shackelford | 3,413 | 74 | 6 | 2.34 |
| Shelby | 22,857 | 961 | 38 | 4.37 |
| Sherman | 3,068 | 37 | 0 | 1.21 |
| Smith | 164,547 | 4,268 | 71 | 2.64 |
| Somervell | 5,961 | 153 | 2 | 2.60 |
| Starr | 49,206 | 4,151 | 1,218 | 10.91 |
| Stephens | 9,938 | 239 | 11 | 2.52 |
| Sterling | 1,394 | 14 | 0 | 1.00 |
| Stonewall | 1,885 | 37 | 2 | 2.07 |
| Sutton | 4,531 | 75 | 0 | 1.66 |
| Swisher | 8,801 | 300 | 14 | 3.57 |
| Tarrant | 1,306,287 | 32,054 | 131 | 2.46 |
| Taylor | 127,440 | 3,247 | 80 | 2.61 |
| Terrell | 1,256 | 25 | 0 | 1.99 |
| Terry | 13,361 | 686 | 18 | 5.27 |
| Throckmorton | 1,842 | 16 | 0 | 0.87 |
| Titus | 26,264 | 531 | 5 | 2.04 |
| Tom Green | 104,973 | 2,813 | 45 | 2.72 |
| Travis | 680,541 | 15,167 | 163 | 2.25 |
| Trinity | 12,553 | 580 | 13 | 4.72 |
| Tyler | 19,604 | 593 | 5 | 3.05 |
| Upshur | 34,520 | 906 | 38 | 2.73 |
| Upton | 4,144 | 127 | 7 | 3.23 |
| Uvalde | 25,012 | 1,257 | 55 | 5.25 |
| Val Verde | 43,291 | 2,213 | 125 | 5.40 |
| Van Zandt | 42,067 | 898 | 74 | 2.31 |
| Victoria | 81,023 | 2,777 | 78 | 3.52 |
| Walker | 56,253 | 1,511 | 42 | 2.76 |
| Waller | 26,577 | 1,159 | 1 | 4.36 |
| Ward | 12,886 | 479 | 26 | 3.92 |
| Washington | 29,295 | 876 | 7 | 3.01 |
| Webb | 177,147 | 10,486 | 397 | 6.14 |
| Wharton | 41,385 | 1,257 | 4 | 3.05 |
| Wheeler | 5,584 | 134 | 6 | 2.51 |
| Wichita | 131,661 | 3,215 | 73 | 2.50 |
| Wilbarger | 15,863 | 344 | 12 | 2.24 |
| Willacy | 19,584 | 1,512 | 483 | 10.19 |
| Williamson | 196,190 | 1,810 | 23 | 0.93 |
| Wilson | 26,989 | 718 | 42 | 2.82 |
| Winkler | 8,297 | 198 | 15 | 2.57 |
| Wise | 40,212 | 589 | 9 | 1.49 |

| | | | | |
|--------------|-------------------|----------------|---------------|-------------|
| Wood | 33,312 | 741 | 38 | 2.34 |
| Yoakum | 8,646 | 190 | 7 | 2.28 |
| Young | 17,796 | 430 | 22 | 2.54 |
| Zapata | 10,662 | 629 | 53 | 6.40 |
| Zavala | 12,000 | 1,136 | 307 | 12.03 |
| Total | 19,128,261 | 665,981 | 24,040 | 3.61 |

APPENDIX G

Initial Level, Change, and Significance in the Slope
of the Pre- and Post-Welfare Reform Trajectories
in Texas

Initial Level, Change, and Significance in the Slope of the Pre-and Post-Welfare Reform Trajectories in Texas

| County Name | Before | After | Change | p Value |
|---------------|--------|--------|--------|---------|
| Anderson | -.014 | .004 | .018 | .950 |
| Andrews | -.037 | .051 | .087 | .807 |
| Angelina | .145 | -.098 | -.243 | .180 |
| Aransas | .349 | .415 | .066 | .939 |
| Archer | .039 | -.068 | -.107 | .808 |
| Armstrong | -.136 | .855 | .991 | .260 |
| Atascosa | .166 | .103 | -.063 | .782 |
| Austin | .118 | .039 | -.078 | .837 |
| Bailey | .664 | .615 | -.049 | .933 |
| Bandera | .109 | .602 | .494 | .094 |
| Bastrop | -.043 | .156 | .199 | .424 |
| Baylor | .670 | .489 | -.181 | .848 |
| Bee | .040 | -.059 | -.099 | .818 |
| Bell | .036 | -.133 | -.169 | .137 |
| Bexar | -.061 | .087 | .149 | .106 |
| Blanco | .289 | .494 | .205 | .615 |
| Borden | .968 | 1.419 | .450 | .824 |
| Bosque | .151 | .120 | -.031 | .945 |
| Bowie | -.072 | .102 | .174 | .456 |
| Brazoria | .021 | .040 | .019 | .895 |
| Brazos | .012 | .159 | .147 | .085 |
| Brewster | -.006 | .331 | .337 | .486 |
| Briscoe | -.305 | -.784 | -.479 | .483 |
| Brooks | -.012 | -.342 | -.330 | .605 |
| Brown | .715 | -.410 | -1.125 | .037* |
| Burleson | -.058 | .283 | .342 | .363 |
| Burnet | .293 | -.057 | -.351 | .395 |
| Caldwell | .059 | .070 | .052 | .884 |
| Calhoun | .441 | .194 | -.247 | .434 |
| Callahan | .006 | -.282 | -.288 | .431 |
| Cameron | -.034 | .112 | .146 | .421 |
| Camp | -.209 | -1.095 | -.886 | .175 |
| Carson | -.066 | -.283 | -.216 | .523 |
| Cass | .156 | -.371 | -.528 | .109 |
| Castro | .625 | -.286 | -.910 | .087 |
| Chambers | -.064 | -.015 | .049 | .871 |
| Cherokee | .164 | .109 | -.055 | .842 |
| Childress | .116 | -.063 | -.179 | .831 |
| Clay | .334 | -.496 | -.830 | .007* |
| Cochran | .034 | .647 | .613 | .416 |
| Coke | .269 | 1.204 | .935 | .314 |
| Coleman | .179 | 1.293 | 1.114 | .102 |
| Collin | -.002 | -.013 | -.011 | .873 |
| Collingsworth | -.331 | -.092 | .239 | .753 |
| Colorado | .339 | .410 | .071 | .842 |
| Comal | .073 | -.077 | -.150 | .483 |
| Comanche | -.038 | .228 | .267 | .588 |

| | | | | |
|------------|--------|-------|--------|-------|
| Concho | -.127 | -.301 | -.174 | .755 |
| Cooke | -.003 | -.185 | -.182 | .565 |
| Coryell | -.024 | -.140 | -.116 | .516 |
| Cottle | -.661 | 2.553 | 3.214 | .047* |
| Crane | .167 | -.126 | -.294 | .604 |
| Crockett | .021 | .855 | .834 | .371 |
| Crosby | -.248 | .161 | .409 | .598 |
| Culberson | -1.043 | .244 | 1.287 | .089 |
| Dallam | -.490 | .903 | 1.393 | .023* |
| Dallas | .060 | -.060 | -.120 | .196 |
| Dawson | -.040 | 1.008 | 1.048 | .003* |
| Deaf Smith | -.049 | -.131 | -.082 | .848 |
| Delta | .068 | -.060 | -.128 | .863 |
| Denton | .044 | .031 | -.013 | .861 |
| De Witt | -.005 | .075 | .080 | .829 |
| Dickens | .326 | .667 | .340 | .628 |
| Dimmitt | .281 | .619 | .338 | .458 |
| Donley | -.411 | -.178 | .233 | .727 |
| Duval | -.090 | 1.083 | 1.142 | .016* |
| Eastland | .296 | .534 | .239 | .510 |
| Ector | .052 | .050 | -.002 | .987 |
| Edwards | .144 | .054 | -.090 | .883 |
| Ellis | .018 | .245 | .226 | .318 |
| El Paso | .047 | .083 | .036 | .770 |
| Erath | .080 | .339 | .259 | .329 |
| Falls | -.071 | .786 | .857 | .059 |
| Fannin | .079 | .208 | .129 | .694 |
| Fayette | -.097 | -.275 | -.179 | .548 |
| Fisher | .177 | -.017 | -.194 | .769 |
| Floyd | .323 | .069 | -.254 | .574 |
| Foard | -.072 | -.937 | -.864 | .401 |
| Fort Bend | .005 | .012 | .007 | .932 |
| Franklin | .082 | .128 | .046 | .904 |
| Freestone | .087 | .114 | .027 | .935 |
| Frio | -.076 | .530 | .606 | .204 |
| Gaines | -.116 | .267 | .383 | .417 |
| Galvestone | -.044 | .014 | .059 | .388 |
| Garza | .466 | -.768 | -1.234 | .084 |
| Gillespie | -.189 | .361 | .550 | .043* |
| Glasscock | .197 | -.326 | -.523 | .239 |
| Goaliad | -.039 | .674 | .713 | .164 |
| Gonzales | -.032 | -.500 | -.467 | .275 |
| Gray | -.247 | -.151 | .095 | .807 |
| Grayson | .010 | -.143 | -.153 | .365 |
| Gregg | .099 | .060 | -.039 | .832 |
| Grimes | .296 | .241 | -.054 | .884 |
| Guadalupe | -.076 | .034 | .110 | .662 |
| Hale | .174 | .282 | .108 | .674 |
| Hall | .440 | -.001 | -.441 | .672 |
| Hamilton | -.058 | -.327 | -.270 | .457 |
| Hansford | .172 | .355 | .183 | .762 |

| | | | | |
|------------|-------|--------|--------|-------|
| Hardeman | .157 | .995 | .838 | .206 |
| Hardin | .029 | -.222 | -.251 | .242 |
| Harris | .030 | -.021 | -.051 | .536 |
| Harrison | .057 | -.168 | -.225 | .276 |
| Hartley | .577 | -.409 | -.986 | .300 |
| Haskell | .065 | .416 | .351 | .530 |
| Hays | -.029 | -.094 | -.065 | .652 |
| Hemphill | -.049 | .000 | .049 | .886 |
| Henderson | .022 | .022 | .000 | .999 |
| Hidalgo | .030 | .051 | .021 | .848 |
| Hill | -.032 | -.067 | -.035 | .924 |
| Hockley | -.016 | .171 | .187 | .453 |
| Hood | -.062 | .515 | .577 | .033* |
| Hopkins | -.236 | .567 | .803 | .003* |
| Houston | -.020 | -.430 | -.411 | .125 |
| Howard | .223 | -.461 | -.684 | .153 |
| Hudspeth | -.854 | -.685 | .421 | .647 |
| Hunt | .124 | .221 | .086 | .686 |
| Hutchinson | -.132 | -.565 | -.433 | .158 |
| Irion | -.061 | .544 | .605 | .538 |
| Jack | -.208 | -.304 | -.096 | .810 |
| Jackson | .347 | .171 | -.176 | .581 |
| Jasper | .131 | .184 | .053 | .856 |
| Jeff Davis | .264 | .179 | -.085 | .876 |
| Jefferson | -.058 | .120 | .178 | .332 |
| Jim Hogg | .459 | -.492 | -.951 | .231 |
| Jim Wells | .041 | -.247 | -.288 | .264 |
| Johnson | .048 | .018 | -.030 | .870 |
| Jones | -.088 | .549 | .637 | .201 |
| Karnes | -.052 | .140 | .192 | .614 |
| Kaufman | -.196 | .071 | .268 | .167 |
| Kendall | .064 | .053 | -.011 | .964 |
| Kenedy | .162 | -3.062 | -3.224 | .134 |
| Kent | .212 | .000 | -.212 | .760 |
| Kerr | -.117 | .168 | .285 | .224 |
| Kimble | .103 | .000 | -.103 | .896 |
| King | 1.262 | .000 | -1.263 | .647 |
| Kinney | .192 | -1.007 | -1.198 | .240 |
| Kleberg | -.031 | -.133 | -.102 | .710 |
| Knox | -.546 | -.487 | .058 | .944 |
| Lamar | .041 | .017 | -.023 | .933 |
| Lamb | -.065 | .288 | .352 | .374 |
| Lampassas | .119 | .055 | -.064 | .864 |
| La Salle | -.243 | -1.057 | -.814 | .332 |
| Lavaca | .186 | -.702 | -.888 | .002* |
| Lee | -.043 | .022 | .065 | .854 |
| Leon | .038 | .833 | .796 | .034* |
| Liberty | .206 | .039 | -1.670 | .449 |
| Limestone | -.347 | -.461 | -.113 | .802 |
| Lipscomb | -.120 | -.588 | -.468 | .512 |
| Live Oak | .291 | .021 | -.270 | .631 |

| | | | | |
|-------------|-------|--------|--------|-------|
| Llano | -.078 | -.362 | -.284 | .595 |
| Loving | .000 | .000 | .000 | n/a |
| Lubbock | .038 | .393 | .355 | .010* |
| Lynn | .272 | -.542 | -.814 | .235 |
| McCulloch | .312 | -.459 | -.771 | .228 |
| McLennan | -.164 | -.016 | .148 | .288 |
| McMullen | .544 | -1.021 | -1.564 | .125 |
| Madison | .401 | -1.026 | -1.426 | .027* |
| Marion | .338 | .324 | -.013 | .984 |
| Martin | -.169 | -.689 | -.521 | .339 |
| Mason | -.159 | -.189 | -.031 | .960 |
| Matagorda | .015 | .074 | .059 | .830 |
| Maverick | .029 | .148 | .119 | .547 |
| Medina | .210 | .240 | .030 | .918 |
| Menard | -.596 | .088 | .685 | .381 |
| Midland | .079 | .090 | .012 | .926 |
| Milam | .011 | -.025 | -.026 | .947 |
| Mills | -.087 | -.235 | -.148 | .807 |
| Mitchell | .130 | -.023 | -.153 | .800 |
| Montague | .164 | .089 | -.074 | .795 |
| Montgomery | -.014 | -.091 | -.077 | .456 |
| Moore | .325 | -.344 | -.670 | .129 |
| Morris | .114 | -.474 | -.588 | .283 |
| Motley | -.035 | .000 | .035 | .957 |
| Nacogdoches | -.086 | .108 | .194 | .100 |
| Navarro | .198 | -.242 | -.440 | .181 |
| Newton | .035 | .121 | .086 | .824 |
| Nolan | .186 | .430 | .244 | .596 |
| Nueces | .118 | -.080 | -.197 | .189 |
| Ochiltree | -.055 | .078 | .133 | .787 |
| Oldham | -.672 | .230 | .903 | .306 |
| Orange | .121 | -.099 | -.220 | .137 |
| Palo Pinto | .342 | -.083 | -.425 | .204 |
| Panola | .171 | -.142 | -.312 | .218 |
| Parker | .059 | .126 | .066 | .705 |
| Parmer | .230 | -.043 | -.273 | .531 |
| Pecos | .169 | .133 | -.036 | .949 |
| Polk | .104 | -.165 | -.268 | .368 |
| Potter | -.087 | -.052 | .035 | .882 |
| Presidio | -.066 | .264 | .330 | .501 |
| Rains | .000 | -.566 | -.566 | .295 |
| Randall | .015 | -.069 | -.085 | .511 |
| Reagan | .063 | .223 | .160 | .675 |
| Real | -.186 | -.229 | -.043 | .970 |
| Red River | -.077 | .342 | .419 | .361 |
| Reeves | -.312 | .624 | .937 | .049* |
| Refugio | .276 | .939 | .663 | .279 |
| Roberts | -.311 | .000 | .310 | .790 |
| Robertson | .047 | -1.323 | -1.370 | .015* |
| Rockwall | .141 | -.137 | -.278 | .260 |
| Runnels | -.028 | .557 | .585 | .367 |

| | | | | |
|---------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Rusk | -.017 | .129 | .146 | .587 |
| Sabine | -.256 | -.421 | -.165 | .781 |
| San Augustine | .104 | -.058 | -.163 | .809 |
| San Jacinto | -.009 | -.144 | -.136 | .687 |
| San Patricio | .077 | .077 | .000 | .999 |
| San Saba | -.550 | .138 | .688 | .400 |
| Schleicher | .139 | .794 | .655 | .320 |
| Scurry | .338 | .250 | -.088 | .753 |
| Shackelford | -.291 | -.394 | -.102 | .874 |
| Shelby | .161 | -.508 | -.669 | .052 |
| Sherman | -.089 | .000 | .088 | .902 |
| Smith | .099 | .043 | -.057 | .734 |
| Somervell | -.055 | -.633 | .581 | .341 |
| Starr | -.014 | .275 | .289 | .053 |
| Stephens | .111 | .074 | -.037 | .938 |
| Sterling | .264 | .694 | .430 | .612 |
| Stonewall | -.054 | .054 | .108 | .906 |
| Sutton | .137 | .115 | -.022 | .978 |
| Swisher | .354 | .062 | -.292 | .706 |
| Tarrant | .049 | .071 | .022 | .786 |
| Taylor | -.071 | .091 | .162 | .400 |
| Terrell | -.560 | 3.140 | 3.700 | .008* |
| Terry | .166 | .564 | .398 | .486 |
| Throckmorton | .172 | -.406 | -.578 | .505 |
| Titus | .219 | -.497 | -.716 | .078 |
| Tom Green | -.005 | -.090 | -.086 | .437 |
| Travis | .044 | -.006 | -.050 | .566 |
| Trinity | -.098 | -.656 | -.557 | .364 |
| Tyler | -.051 | .687 | .738 | .070 |
| Upshur | .094 | .119 | .025 | .920 |
| Upton | .408 | .526 | .119 | .818 |
| Uvalde | .151 | .268 | .117 | .749 |
| Val Verde | .062 | .092 | .030 | .912 |
| Van Zandt | .101 | .009 | -.092 | .717 |
| Victoria | .014 | .070 | .056 | .772 |
| Walker | -.090 | -.032 | .058 | .748 |
| Waller | .221 | -.027 | -.248 | .415 |
| Ward | -.119 | -.076 | .043 | .922 |
| Washington | -.056 | .142 | .198 | .449 |
| Webb | .010 | -.208 | -.219 | .263 |
| Wharton | .082 | .173 | .091 | .721 |
| Wheeler | .050 | -.381 | -.431 | .424 |
| Wichita | -.012 | .153 | .165 | .304 |
| Wilbarger | .125 | -.241 | -.366 | .306 |
| Willacy | .209 | .023 | -.186 | .629 |
| Williamson | -.015 | -.093 | -.079 | .277 |
| Wilson | -.051 | .178 | .229 | .416 |
| Winkler | .141 | -.538 | -.680 | .143 |
| Wise | .220 | .167 | -.052 | .810 |
| Wood | -.065 | -.079 | -.013 | .954 |
| Yoakum | .232 | .390 | .158 | .670 |

| | | | | |
|--------|-------|-------|------|------|
| Young | .120 | .621 | .501 | .220 |
| Zapata | .101 | .698 | .597 | .246 |
| Zavala | -.404 | -.274 | .130 | .812 |

NB = No unmarried teen births in county

* = $p < .05$

APPENDIX H

Initial Level, Change, and Significance in the Intercept
of the Pre- and Post-Welfare Reform Trajectories
in Texas

Initial Level, Change, and Significance in the Intercept of the Pre- and Post-Welfare Reform Trajectories In Texas

| County Name | Before | After | Change | p Value |
|---------------|--------|---------|---------|---------|
| Anderson | 8.322 | 8.627 | .306 | .952 |
| Andrews | 7.187 | 6.542 | -.645 | .919 |
| Angelina | 6.639 | 10.354 | 3.715 | .245 |
| Aransas | 4.684 | 1.625 | -3.059 | .832 |
| Archer | 3.828 | 6.823 | 2.995 | .703 |
| Armstrong | 7.534 | -10.544 | -18.078 | .246 |
| Atascosa | 4.603 | 6.269 | 1.665 | .679 |
| Austin | 5.536 | 7.767 | 2.231 | .741 |
| Bailey | 4.410 | .782 | -3.628 | .726 |
| Bandera | 2.139 | -5.105 | -7.244 | .162 |
| Bastrop | 7.467 | 5.069 | -2.398 | .586 |
| Baylor | 1.204 | .578 | -.626 | .970 |
| Bee | 9.330 | 13.746 | 4.416 | .566 |
| Bell | 7.418 | 10.683 | 3.264 | .107 |
| Bexar | 8.310 | 6.228 | -2.083 | .196 |
| Blanco | .002 | -5.586 | -5.584 | .441 |
| Borden | -1.297 | -22.226 | -20.929 | .562 |
| Bosque | 4.014 | 3.878 | -.136 | .986 |
| Bowie | 10.459 | 8.299 | -2.159 | .601 |
| Brazoria | 6.583 | 6.227 | -.356 | .887 |
| Brazos | 4.810 | 1.919 | -2.891 | .058 |
| Brewster | 5.247 | .316 | -4.931 | .565 |
| Briscoe | 6.511 | 16.662 | 10.150 | .403 |
| Brooks | 14.776 | 19.662 | 4.887 | .666 |
| Brown | 4.589 | 21.705 | 17.147 | .069 |
| Burleson | 9.515 | 5.340 | -4.175 | .529 |
| Burnet | 4.514 | 7.889 | 3.375 | .642 |
| Caldwell | 7.377 | 7.552 | -1.146 | .856 |
| Calhoun | 8.623 | 8.820 | .197 | .972 |
| Callahan | 3.879 | 11.044 | 7.165 | .273 |
| Cameron | 7.834 | 7.099 | -.735 | .818 |
| Camp | 9.794 | 30.924 | 21.130 | .073 |
| Carson | 2.777 | 9.882 | 7.105 | .243 |
| Cass | 6.048 | 13.543 | 7.495 | .194 |
| Castro | 5.128 | 17.401 | 12.273 | .186 |
| Chambers | 5.303 | 4.553 | -.750 | .889 |
| Cherokee | 6.213 | 7.039 | .826 | .867 |
| Childress | 8.129 | 12.828 | 4.698 | .752 |
| Clay | 1.504 | 12.277 | 10.774 | .040* |
| Cochran | 6.303 | -3.270 | -9.573 | .474 |
| Coke | 3.661 | -13.719 | -17.381 | .292 |
| Coleman | 6.743 | -16.877 | -23.620 | .054 |
| Collin | 3.328 | 3.496 | .167 | .889 |
| Collingsworth | 9.024 | 5.110 | -3.913 | .772 |
| Colorado | 4.936 | .463 | -4.473 | .483 |
| Comal | 6.617 | 8.369 | 2.202 | .561 |
| Comanche | 5.453 | 2.711 | -2.742 | .753 |

| | | | | |
|------------|--------|---------|---------|-------|
| Concho | 4.202 | 9.732 | 5.530 | .577 |
| Cooke | 6.290 | 10.780 | 4.490 | .426 |
| Coryell | 4.336 | 6.892 | 2.556 | .420 |
| Cottle | 12.965 | -41.496 | -54.461 | .056 |
| Crane | 2.840 | 9.371 | 6.531 | .517 |
| Crockett | 7.659 | -6.308 | -13.967 | .398 |
| Crosby | 9.912 | 7.555 | -2.357 | .864 |
| Culberson | 17.291 | .067 | -17.224 | .192 |
| Dallam | 12.492 | -7.242 | -19.734 | .062 |
| Dallas | 10.316 | 12.000 | 1.684 | .303 |
| Dawson | 10.020 | -9.257 | -19.277 | .002* |
| Deaf Smith | 11.233 | 13.100 | 1.867 | .807 |
| Delta | 6.085 | 12.050 | 5.965 | .651 |
| Denton | 3.193 | 2.857 | -.336 | .792 |
| De Witt | 8.216 | 7.271 | -.945 | .886 |
| Dickens | 1.891 | -5.556 | -7.447 | .551 |
| Dimmitt | 5.155 | -.986 | -6.140 | .447 |
| Donley | 8.605 | 7.155 | -1.449 | .902 |
| Duval | 10.917 | -9.589 | -20.506 | .015* |
| Eastland | 3.988 | -3.495 | -7.482 | .250 |
| Ector | 9.422 | 10.687 | 1.265 | .623 |
| Edwards | 3.979 | 5.749 | 1.815 | .867 |
| Ellis | 7.470 | 3.656 | -3.814 | .343 |
| El Paso | 8.559 | 7.644 | -.915 | .674 |
| Erath | 3.724 | -1.110 | -4.834 | .305 |
| Falls | 11.786 | -5.090 | -16.876 | .038* |
| Fannin | 5.889 | 3.095 | -2.794 | .633 |
| Fayette | 5.126 | 9.157 | 4.031 | .446 |
| Fisher | 5.263 | 8.010 | 2.747 | .815 |
| Floyd | 3.526 | 6.160 | 2.634 | .741 |
| Foard | 6.582 | 23.042 | 16.461 | .368 |
| Fort Bend | 4.112 | 3.538 | -.575 | .680 |
| Franklin | 3.654 | 1.688 | -1.966 | .772 |
| Freestone | 6.501 | 3.103 | -3.397 | .560 |
| Frio | 11.028 | 2.238 | -8.790 | .296 |
| Gaines | 7.519 | 1.527 | -5.992 | .473 |
| Galvestone | 8.477 | 7.552 | -.925 | .444 |
| Garza | 3.801 | 22.369 | 18.568 | .138 |
| Gillespie | 6.439 | -2.968 | -9.407 | .050* |
| Glasscock | -.764 | 8.169 | 8.933 | .256 |
| Goaliad | 7.141 | -6.995 | -14.135 | .122 |
| Gonzales | 9.290 | 20.481 | 11.191 | .145 |
| Gray | 8.805 | 9.614 | .809 | .907 |
| Grayson | 6.094 | 10.809 | 4.714 | .124 |
| Gregg | 8.233 | 8.174 | -.059 | .985 |
| Grimes | 7.448 | 4.896 | -2.552 | .698 |
| Guadalupe | 7.481 | 7.895 | .414 | .926 |
| Hale | 7.340 | 3.721 | -3.620 | .430 |
| Hall | 7.472 | 11.407 | 3.934 | .831 |
| Hamilton | 3.851 | 10.927 | 7.076 | .275 |
| Hansford | 3.134 | 1.409 | -1.725 | .872 |

| | | | | |
|------------|--------|--------|---------|-------|
| Hardeman | 7.342 | -9.596 | -16.938 | .152 |
| Hardin | 5.098 | 8.886 | 3.788 | .317 |
| Harris | 8.088 | 8.640 | .552 | .706 |
| Harrison | 6.504 | 10.444 | 3.940 | .282 |
| Hartley | .232 | 14.289 | 14.597 | .385 |
| Haskell | 3.483 | -2.355 | -5.837 | .555 |
| Hays | 4.472 | 6.343 | 1.871 | .465 |
| Hemphill | 1.498 | 3.450 | 1.952 | .746 |
| Henderson | 6.920 | 7.613 | .693 | .865 |
| Hidalgo | 6.898 | 6.986 | .088 | .964 |
| Hill | 8.217 | 9.160 | .942 | .884 |
| Hockley | 6.252 | 4.165 | -2.087 | .635 |
| Hood | 5.250 | -3.691 | -8.942 | .060 |
| Hopkins | 8.048 | -4.406 | -12.454 | .007* |
| Houston | 7.351 | 16.670 | 9.319 | .054 |
| Howard | 7.505 | 19.557 | 12.051 | .156 |
| Hudspeth | 14.238 | 19.190 | -.661 | .968 |
| Hunt | 7.824 | 4.186 | -3.638 | .338 |
| Hutchinson | 7.037 | 16.652 | 9.616 | .081 |
| Irion | 5.014 | -7.911 | -12.925 | .459 |
| Jack | 4.640 | 10.927 | 6.288 | .381 |
| Jackson | 4.040 | 4.162 | -.242 | .966 |
| Jasper | 6.887 | 5.980 | -.908 | .861 |
| Jeff Davis | -.035 | -2.210 | -2.174 | .820 |
| Jefferson | 9.385 | 6.767 | -2.618 | .419 |
| Jim Hogg | 4.512 | 16.753 | 12.241 | .380 |
| Jim Wells | 9.052 | 14.950 | 5.898 | .200 |
| Johnson | 5.514 | 6.319 | .804 | .805 |
| Jones | 8.598 | -3.294 | -11.892 | .180 |
| Karnes | 9.557 | 9.305 | -.251 | .970 |
| Kaufman | 8.085 | 5.349 | -2.735 | .418 |
| Kendall | 2.713 | 2.109 | -.604 | .887 |
| Kenedy | 5.429 | 71.995 | 66.526 | .084 |
| Kent | .723 | .000 | -.723 | .953 |
| Kerr | 7.497 | 4.207 | -3.290 | .424 |
| Kimble | 7.095 | 10.623 | 3.529 | .802 |
| King | 2.339 | .000 | -2.339 | .962 |
| Kinney | 2.495 | 28.027 | 25.532 | .162 |
| Kleberg | 8.501 | 11.158 | 2.657 | .584 |
| Knox | 9.789 | 17.862 | 8.072 | .585 |
| Lamar | 9.237 | 8.916 | -.321 | .947 |
| Lamb | 7.586 | 2.010 | -5.577 | .427 |
| Lampassas | 7.080 | 6.284 | -1.517 | .820 |
| La Salle | 12.360 | 25.257 | 12.897 | .385 |
| Lavaca | 4.960 | 20.216 | 15.256 | .002* |
| Lee | 7.420 | 5.442 | -1.978 | .751 |
| Leon | 5.626 | -9.753 | -15.379 | .022* |
| Liberty | 6.594 | 8.393 | 1.799 | .644 |
| Limestone | 11.062 | 15.727 | 4.665 | .562 |
| Lipscomb | 3.608 | 17.070 | 13.462 | .292 |
| Live Oak | 4.330 | 6.253 | 1.923 | .846 |

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|-------------|--------|--------|---------|-------|
| Llano | 6.171 | 12.381 | 6.210 | .513 |
| Loving | .000 | .000 | .000 | n/a |
| Lubbock | 7.408 | .845 | -6.562 | .007* |
| Lynn | 4.469 | 17.739 | 13.271 | .274 |
| McCulloch | 6.117 | 17.844 | 11.728 | .299 |
| McLennan | 10.616 | 9.506 | -1.110 | .650 |
| McMullen | -2.355 | 23.925 | 26.280 | .145 |
| Madison | 7.058 | 32.496 | 25.439 | .026* |
| Marion | 6.635 | 3.739 | -2.896 | .801 |
| Martin | 6.970 | 18.944 | 11.974 | .218 |
| Mason | 5.196 | 6.122 | .926 | .932 |
| Matagorda | 8.560 | 8.135 | -.425 | .930 |
| Maverick | 4.937 | 2.429 | -2.508 | .475 |
| Medina | 4.604 | 3.984 | -.620 | .903 |
| Menard | 8.641 | 6.081 | -2.560 | .852 |
| Midland | 7.378 | 7.041 | -.337 | .880 |
| Milam | 9.018 | 8.236 | -.782 | .911 |
| Mills | 3.099 | 9.357 | 6.258 | .562 |
| Mitchell | 8.524 | 10.514 | 1.991 | .852 |
| Montague | 4.902 | 4.375 | -.527 | .917 |
| Montgomery | 5.494 | 6.910 | 1.416 | .439 |
| Moore | 7.393 | 19.139 | 11.746 | .133 |
| Morris | 8.485 | 16.871 | 8.386 | .386 |
| Motley | 2.276 | .000 | -2.276 | .844 |
| Nacogdoches | 6.063 | 2.828 | -3.235 | .120 |
| Navarro | 9.468 | 13.496 | 4.028 | .483 |
| Newton | 6.539 | 5.237 | -1.302 | .850 |
| Nolan | 8.430 | 1.625 | -6.805 | .408 |
| Nueces | 9.505 | 11.953 | 2.448 | .353 |
| Ochiltree | 5.875 | 4.504 | -1.344 | .877 |
| Oldham | 8.652 | -.537 | -9.189 | .553 |
| Orange | 5.934 | 8.255 | 2.322 | .367 |
| Palo Pinto | 5.622 | 11.503 | 5.881 | .318 |
| Panola | 3.489 | 9.577 | 6.088 | .178 |
| Parker | 4.079 | 3.211 | -.867 | .780 |
| Parmer | 5.483 | 9.388 | 3.905 | .612 |
| Pecos | 8.497 | 9.824 | 1.328 | .896 |
| Polk | 6.956 | 10.436 | 3.479 | .508 |
| Potter | 13.120 | 12.854 | -.265 | .949 |
| Presidio | 8.903 | 2.015 | -6.888 | .429 |
| Rains | 5.697 | 15.008 | 9.311 | .331 |
| Randall | 3.680 | 5.294 | 1.614 | .482 |
| Reagan | 2.481 | .857 | -1.624 | .811 |
| Real | 10.504 | 10.079 | -.425 | .984 |
| Red River | 9.549 | 1.902 | -7.647 | .348 |
| Reeves | 11.067 | -.340 | -11.407 | .166 |
| Refugio | 7.661 | -8.588 | -16.248 | .140 |
| Roberts | 3.140 | 7.286 | 4.146 | .841 |
| Robertson | 14.850 | 35.990 | 21.140 | .032* |
| Rockwall | 2.783 | 7.262 | 4.479 | .305 |
| Runnels | 8.487 | -2.231 | -10.718 | .352 |

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|---------------|--------|---------|---------|-------|
| Rusk | 7.470 | 4.591 | -2.879 | .546 |
| Sabine | 9.283 | 14.319 | 5.036 | .632 |
| San Augustine | 9.473 | 11.717 | 2.244 | .850 |
| San Jacinto | 5.981 | 8.602 | 2.621 | .661 |
| San Patricio | 9.130 | 8.818 | -.312 | .930 |
| San Saba | 10.774 | 3.676 | -7.098 | .622 |
| Schleicher | 2.794 | -9.309 | -12.103 | .301 |
| Scurry | 4.093 | 1.777 | -2.316 | .641 |
| Shackelford | 4.252 | 11.164 | 6.912 | .549 |
| Shelby | 7.648 | 16.921 | 9.272 | .123 |
| Sherman | 5.732 | 5.499 | -.234 | .985 |
| Smith | 6.849 | 6.817 | -.032 | .991 |
| Somervell | 6.068 | 17.012 | 10.944 | .312 |
| Starr | 4.402 | -.143 | -4.545 | .083 |
| Stephens | 6.520 | 5.134 | -1.385 | .869 |
| Sterling | 3.596 | -11.338 | -14.934 | .325 |
| Stonewall | 3.942 | 10.984 | 7.042 | .664 |
| Sutton | 4.505 | 5.755 | 1.250 | .930 |
| Swisher | 7.536 | 10.972 | 3.436 | .803 |
| Tarrant | 6.926 | 6.492 | -.434 | .764 |
| Taylor | 8.442 | 6.586 | -1.856 | .585 |
| Terrell | 7.987 | -50.002 | -57.989 | .017* |
| Terry | 9.317 | 1.570 | -7.747 | .444 |
| Throckmorton | 1.342 | 12.907 | 11.565 | .452 |
| Titus | 7.261 | 19.559 | 12.298 | .088 |
| Tom Green | 7.274 | 10.193 | 2.919 | .143 |
| Travis | 6.409 | 7.222 | .813 | .598 |
| Trinity | 9.478 | 21.551 | 12.073 | .270 |
| Tyler | 7.666 | -5.818 | -13.484 | .063 |
| Upshur | 4.721 | 4.541 | -.179 | .968 |
| Upton | 2.281 | -1.678 | -3.959 | .667 |
| Uvalde | 7.803 | 5.448 | -2.355 | .718 |
| Val Verde | 6.540 | 7.107 | .567 | .906 |
| Van Zandt | 4.862 | 6.212 | 1.350 | .764 |
| Victoria | 9.515 | 9.423 | -.092 | .979 |
| Walker | 5.830 | 5.687 | -.142 | .964 |
| Waller | 4.844 | 7.826 | 2.982 | .579 |
| Ward | 7.641 | 10.010 | 2.369 | .760 |
| Washington | 5.939 | 3.136 | -2.803 | .544 |
| Webb | 9.250 | 12.263 | 3.011 | .382 |
| Wharton | 7.894 | 6.208 | -1.687 | .709 |
| Wheeler | 4.365 | 13.831 | 9.467 | .325 |
| Wichita | 8.556 | 5.376 | -3.179 | .266 |
| Wilbarger | 8.425 | 13.722 | 5.297 | .402 |
| Willacy | 5.089 | 8.727 | 3.638 | .594 |
| Williamson | 3.793 | 5.577 | 1.784 | .168 |
| Wilson | 4.712 | 1.731 | -2.981 | .550 |
| Winkler | 6.389 | 20.076 | 13.687 | .099 |
| Wise | 4.513 | 3.477 | -1.035 | .789 |
| Wood* | 5.560 | 8.014 | 2.454 | .553 |
| Yoakum | 3.933 | -2.233 | -6.166 | .352 |

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|--------|--------|--------|---------|------|
| Young | 5.208 | -4.741 | -9.950 | .172 |
| Zapata | 4.823 | -7.368 | -12.191 | .184 |
| Zavala | 12.855 | 16.380 | 3.526 | .716 |

NB = No unmarried teen births in county

* = $p < .05$

APPENDIX I

Summary of Study Findings

Summary of Study Findings

| Hypothesis | Variables | Statistical Test Employed | Findings |
|---|--|--|--|
| H ₁ : There will be no significant difference in the rate of change (slope) of the unmarried teen birth rates pre- and post-welfare reform in Texas counties | Quarterly unmarried teen birth rates Time Time dummy coded Interaction between time and the dummy code of time | Two-stage growth curve analysis. First stage: Multiple regression. | Hypothesis supported. Sixteen counties had statistically significant changes in their slope estimates. Eleven counties had a statistically significant rise in their slopes post-welfare reform and five counties had a significant decrease. One county had a statistically significant decrease in their intercept post-welfare reform. |
| | Mean of the pre- and post welfare reform slopes | Paired sample <u>t</u> -test | There was no significant difference between the mean of the pre-welfare reform slopes and the mean of the post-welfare slopes. |
| H ₂ : Teen population density, welfare participation, and ethnic homogeneity are predictors of the unmarried teen birth rates in Texas counties post-welfare reform. | Post-welfare reform slopes <u>Predictor Variables</u> Post-welfare reform intercepts Teen population density Welfare Participation Ethnic Homogeneity | Second stage: Hierarchical linear regression | Hypothesis not fully supported. The post-welfare reform intercept and welfare participation were the only predictor variables that contributed significantly towards predicting the slope of the unmarried teen birth rates post-welfare reform. |