WORLD SYSTEM AND URBAN SURVIVAL SQUATTING IN THE 21st CENTURY: A
STUDY OF INFORMAL HOUSING IN FOUR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

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DEDICATION

For my parents, Mathew English Sr. and Gudrun English.

ABSTRACT

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MAY 2022

This study had two main purposes. The first was to examine the impact of "world system" position on the persistence of urban squatting in the cities of developing countries for the period between 2000–2020. I examined data from the World Bank, International Labor Organization (ILO), the United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN Habitat), Land Matrix, and Prindex. Using a comparative-historical analysis (Lange 2012), this dissertation examined patterns of uneven development and persistence of urban squatting in Brazil (Rio de Janeiro), India (Mumbai), Nigeria (Lagos), and Indonesia (Jakarta). The results provide an extensive list of causal narratives including the newest available data explaining how uneven development and other factors contribute to the phenomenon of urban squatting in Brazil, India, Nigeria, and Indonesia.

The second purpose was to utilize a content analysis (Krippendorff 2013) to discover how culture, uneven development, and the "tourist gaze" (Urry 1990) shape the way informal settlements are framed within the slum tourism community in countries located in the Global South from a symbolic interactionist perspective (Blumer 1969). The testimonial literature from tourist review websites were examined to discover what kind of framing and narratives are used to promote poverty tourism. This yielded insights related to the phenomenon of "global recreational colonialism" in the 21st century (Lessenich 2019:98) and how the "tourist gaze" (Urry 1990) functions among slum tourists.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In the first two decades of the 21st century, urban squatting persists as a global social phenomenon found in almost all corners of the modern "world system" (Wallerstein 1974). Although estimates vary on the actual size of global squatter populations, many researchers have suggested that it may have already reached well over 1 billion squatters, with most of those numbers located in developing and poor countries (Alzamil 2017; Neuwirth 2016; Perlman 2011; Vasudevan 2015; Wittger 2017). According to the Un-Habitat, for example, the number of urban squatters/urban slum dwellers may actually double to more than 2 billion by the year 2030 (UN News 2013). These chilling statistics do in many ways seem to evoke images of dystopian global cities in the 21st century, as described by Mike Davis in his *Planet of Slums*, which predicted that:

> The cities of the future, rather than being made out of glass as envisioned by earlier
> generations of urbanists, are instead largely constructed out of crude brick, straw,
> recycled plastic, cement blocks, and scrap wood. Instead of cities of light souring
> toward heaven, much of the twenty-first century urban world squats in squalor,
> surrounded by pollution, excrement and decay. (2005:19)

The phenomenon of urban squatting and slums has also been appropriated in popular culture, including, films, movies, music, viral YouTube videos, and Facebook/Instagram pages. Even console and computer video game developers have used scenes from slums and squatter settlements in their games. The movie *Slumdog Millionaire* (2008) is one such prime example of cultural appropriation that is centered on a fictional underdog character from the slums of

Mumbai winning a TV contest (Boyle and Tandan 2008). In Brazil, hip-hop rap groups regularly mention the favelas in their songs and music lyrics. On the social media platform YouTube, countless individual users have channels filled with videos capturing scenes or imagery of urban squatters and slums. Professional food critics from the Global North often go on treasure hunts to find cheap foods from the slums in India and produce films and documentaries for their followers. Meanwhile, YouTube videos of recorded news broadcasts of urban squatters being evicted by police units from squatted houses in major cities in Europe often reach high viewership and produce fierce political commentary on the far left and far right sides of the political spectrum. Besides the statistics and the appropriation of urban squatting and squatter slums in popular culture, the reality is that countless people in the world call their informal dwelling home. Immiseration and suffering is experienced by those who currently live in them, and the countless future generations, mostly from the Global South, who are born daily in such conditions and are anticipated to live much shorter lives than their Global North neighbors.

While many researchers have documented aspects of the global squatting phenomenon in the past, there remains a need to also examine specific regional dynamics, including examining the variation in governance forms and state responses towards urban squatting/squatters in South America, Africa, Southeast Asia during the first two decades of the 21st century. This dissertation addresses these previous limitations by examining the global squatting phenomenon in four unique regions using a comparative-historical analysis (Lange 2012).

PROBLEM STATEMENT

This dissertation has two central objectives. The central purpose is to examine the impact of "world system" position on the persistence of urban squatting in the cities of developing countries for the period between 2000–2020. Accordingly, current data has been explicit in

articulating this uneven development growth in developing countries in the first two decades of the 21st century. This analysis uses data produced by the World Bank, International Labor Organization (ILO), the United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN Habitat), Land Matrix, Prindex, and WaterAid. Examining this pattern of uneven development and persistence of urban squatting found in many cities in developing countries like Brazil, India, Nigeria, and Indonesia is accomplished through a comparative-historical analysis (Lange 2012).

The second purpose of this dissertation is to make use of a content analysis (Krippendorff 2013) discovering how culture, uneven development, and the "tourist gaze" (Urry 1990) influence the way informal settlements are framed and utilized within the slum tourism community from a symbolic interactionist perspective (Blumer 1969). However, rather than looking at urban squatting through a macro-sociological angle or "world systems" perspective (Wallerstein 1974), I use content analysis to examine the recruitment and testimonial literature and what kind of messages and narratives are used to promote poverty tourism to the potential tourists coming from the Global North or elsewhere.

Definition of Terms

For the purposes of this dissertation, it is essential to define several key terms.

World System. For this study I utilize Wallerstein's (1974) definition of the "world system:"

> A world-system is a social system, one that has boundaries, structures, member groups, rules of legitimation, and coherence. Its life is made up of the conflicting forces which hold it together by tension and tear it apart as each group seeks eternally to remold it to its advantage. It has the characteristics of an organism, in that it has a lifespan over which its characteristics change in some respects and remain stable in others. (347)

State. It is important to note here that the definition of "world system" that I cite here from Wallerstein (1974) should not be confused with the term "state." A "state" may also have its own degree of agency or what some scholars like Skocpol (1979, 1985) refer to as "state autonomy." Whenever the term "state" appears in this study, it implies "state" in the Weberian tradition, which for Weber ([1948]1991:78) is "a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory." The "state" is still a key social and political institution guided by individual actors responsible for making autonomous political or economic decisions within a political territory. This also includes legal decisions by the courts whether to tolerate or sanction squatters with the use of law. In certain cases, the "state" may also be involved in decisions that involve using physical and sometimes violent deadly force to remove squatters from the informal communities occupied by them. Decisions, whether to discipline or punish urban squatters by bulldozing their informal settlements, thus, also reflect the peculiar kind of governance strategy the authoritarian or non-authoritarian "state" may adopt towards urban squatters at a given time or, also, determine to reverse such strategies if they produce serious ramifications for the "state" (Bloom 2016).

Urban Squatting. For the purposes of this study, I utilize Hans Pruijts' (2013:19) "urban squatting" definition. He defines urban squatting as "living in – or otherwise using – a dwelling without the consent of the owner." The definition I use here also implies scenarios in which squatters are those who may construct their own dwellings on land or property in which they have no established legal right of ownership or a legitimate authentic lease in the legal sense. An examination of the present literature has revealed that "urban squatting" or "urban squatters" may also be frequently associated with other terms and phrases, such as "informal settlements," "favelas" (Brazil), "shanty-towns" (South Africa), "slum dwellers" (Kenya), "illegal occupants,"

"besetzer" (Germany, Austria), "kraken" (Netherlands), "barriadas" (Peru), "jodpadpatti," "street-dwellers" (India), or "okupas" in Greece (Neuwirth 2016).

Scholars who have studied this phenomenon in previous years have also created their own terms and labels. These include phrases and terms like "black holes" theoretically associated with the so-called "fourth world" in an age of informational capitalism (Castells 1998, 2010).The late Polish sociologist Bauman (2004:6) on the other hand, described inhabitants of squatted slums in the age of 21st century globalization—or liquid modernity—as examples of "wasted humans" and "wasted lives," or redundant populations not fitting into the modern global social order and modern economies generally.

Besides Castells (1998, 2010) and Bauman (2004), other kinds of framing of urban squatters and informal settlements have appeared including "makeshift city" by Vasudevan (2015) and "Self-help housing" by Potter and Conway (1997), or the term "illegal city" by Datta (2016). While countless terms and phrases have been used to label those engaged in "urban squatting," these seem to come from both insiders as well as outsiders attempting to describe the phenomenon of urban squatting.

RATIONALE

Although social scientists have studied the phenomenon of urban squatting for more than 60 years, there is still an unfinished debate on linking urban squatting with macro-economic inequalities and uneven development trends found in the cities of the "world system" in the 21st century (Wallerstein 1974). Pure economic reductionism also seems unable to explain why urban squatting proliferates in some regions of the "world system," while in other regions and countries in the Global South it seems to be in decline because of its historical informal and hidden nature, or increasing state interventionism (e.g., Brazil and India). In addition, many social researchers

seeking to better comprehend this social phenomenon in the 21st century have frequently neglected to study urban squatting using a comparative method, with the notable exception of Campos and Martinez (2020), Corr (1999), Davis (2005), Neuwirth (2016), Isabaeva (2020), Smart and Aguilera (2020). Since previous urban squatting research has often focused more on single-case studies, this small-N comparative study of four countries (Brazil, Nigeria, India, Indonesia) spread across different global regions (South America, West Africa, Southern Asia, Southeast Asia) can shed additional light on urban squatting within the contexts of regions in the Global South. Besides the role of position in the "world system" (Wallerstein 1974), this study may shed additional light on the role of "state autonomy" (Skocpol 1979, 1985) and the "embedded" nature of the "state" (Granovetter 1985; Polanyi [1944]2014) with regards to "state" responses and governance strategies (legal, economic, political, land seizures etc.) towards urban squatters.

STRUCTURE OF DISSERTATION

This dissertation is made up of 11 chapters. Chapter 1 provides the introduction. Chapter 2 reviews literature related to urban squatting, the world system, global cities, and poverty tourism. Chapter 3 provides a background chapter to urban squatting. Chapter 4 describes the data, data collection process, the data analysis, and selection of cases in this study. Chapter 5 details the results of the Indian case. Chapter 6 details the results of the Brazilian case. Chapter 7 details the results of the Nigerian case. Chapter 8 details the results of the Indonesian case. Chapter 9 details the results of the poverty tourism analysis. Chapter 10 provides the discussion and summarizes key findings. Chapter 11 discusses the research questions, implications of the findings, discusses limitations, and offers suggestions for future research.

CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter reviews literature concerning urban squatting, five squatting typologies by Pruijt, poverty tourism, the theoretical framework, and lastly enumerates the research questions. The first section reviews previous literature on urban squatting. The second section examines Pruijt's (2013) five squatting typologies. The third section highlights uneven development trends. The fourth section reviews the poverty tourism literature. The fifth section summarizes the theoretical framework. The final section details the research questions.

URBAN SQUATTING

Early theories of squatting in the history of sociology may reach as far back as the Chicago school of urban sociology (Park and Burgess [1925]1967). This includes the famous "concentric zone" theory, which examined the development of zones of a city like Chicago from an ecological perspective (Park and Burgess [1925]1967). Since then, countless studies have taken interest in examining the intersection between urban squatting/squatters and social inequality patterns found throughout all corners of the modern "world system" (Corr 1999; Das 2003; Davis 2005; Fernandes and Varley 1998; Hardoy and Satterthwaite 1989; Penglase 2014; Perlman 2011; Wittiger 2017). Davis (2005), for example, links the rise of slums with social problems found in many third world cities, including stark social and economic inequalities (supported by descriptive statistics), accompanied by an often non-interventionist state failing to commit itself to providing social housing choices for the urban poor in many corners of the developing world.

On the other hand, Perlman (2011) in her four-decade ethnographic study of the favelas in Rio de Janeiro disagrees with the popular narrative of "marginality" being used to illustrate

the conditions of those who live inside them. Perlman (2011:150) posits that the narrative of "marginality" serves other societal purposes in Brazil such as "victim-blaming" and using favela residents as "scapegoats" for all social problems in Brazil. This is one reason why Perlman (2011:150) argues that the narrative of "marginality" is false and residents of the favela are in fact "inextricably bound into society." Wittiger (2017), meanwhile, in her own ethnographic study on several squats in Rio de Janeiro identified two important intersecting themes between citizenship rights on the one hand, and the gender makeup of urban squatters, and how they are crucial in understanding the social dimensions of squats in Brazil. She argues that it is important to also look at the gendered division of household labor that persists even inside informal settlements known as the favelas. In North America, meanwhile, Herbert (2018) in her ethnographic study on urban squatters focuses not just on the precarious lives of urban squatters in the city of Detroit, Michigan but also how squatters make use of abandoned properties and empty spaces in a city ravaged by economic and severe manufacturing decline in the last five decades.

PRUIJT'S FIVE SQUATTING TYPOLOGIES

Other studies on urban squatting have often also contributed to more theorizing on the phenomenon of urban squatting. For example, Pruijt (2013) has identified five distinct categories of squatting: 1) Deprivation-based, 2) Squatting as an alternative housing strategy, 3) Entrepreneurial, 4) Conservational, and 5) political forms of squatting. These are illustrated in Table 1.

Table 1. Overview of Pruijt's Typologies of Urban Squatting

Deprivation-based Squatting	Squatters who occupy buildings and/or make use of abandoned structures and physical places or construct informal settlements because of real housing needs and no other immediate housing options available.
Alternative housing Strategy	Squatters who decide to engage in squatting to add additional housing options.
Entrepreneurial Squatting	Squatters who decide to set up a business establishment or monetary enterprise.
Conservational Squatting	Squatters who have the intention to preserve something whether a landscape or some location.
Political Squatting	Squatters who engage in political activities and are "building up a counter-power to the state."

Source: Pruijt 2013:23.

Table 1 summarizes Pruijt's five typologies of urban squatting. As I illustrate later in this study, most of these five distinct squatting typologies from Pruijt (2013) appear relevant to numerous cases in developing countries. One of these distinct squatting typologies by Pruijt (2013) echoes the findings discovered by Mudu and Chattopadhyay (2018) in their work on impoverished migrant refugee groups throughout Europe engaging in survival squatting as a mode to survive or build new temporary communities. Such make-shift squatter settlements emerged during the refugee crisis in Europe in 2015 with thousands of migrants squatted inside the Hungarian train station (Erlanger 2015), while more recent examples of migrants squatting occurred in September 2021 in Del Rio, Texas when an estimated 10,000 Haitians squatted

underneath a bridge in their attempts to apply for political asylum in the United States (Ulmer 2021).

Vasudevan (2015), meanwhile, describes squatting as an attempt by squatters to more or less create a "makeshift city," which also reflects this new precarious kind of living found in many cities. A more intimate and personal account of urban squatters living near Mumbai airport in India can also be found in Boo's (2014) bestselling book *Behind the Beautiful Forevers*. A similar depiction of squatters and RV and van dwellers in North America can likewise be found in Bruder's *Nomadland* (2018). Bruder (2018) describes the precarious lives of squatters and forms of informal housing found among modern North American Nomads living in their converted vans or RVs on a more permanent rather than temporary basis often with limited financial support. More recent scholarship has tried to comment on the qualitative differences in squatting in the Global North and Global South. Anders and Sedlmaier (2018:9), for example, bring to light a number of issues in their edited volume such as the claim that squatting in the Global South has often taken the character of "self-help strategies," whereas in the Global North (especially in Europe) urban squatting may be linked to forms of "social practice" and "collective protest." In short, although qualitative differences still remain among squatting in both the Global North, there also seem to be shared commonalities and trends among squatting that are universal in the two hemispheres (Anders and Sedlmaier 2018).

Besides single case-studies or ethnographic works, increasingly, more research using the comparative-method (Lange 2012) has also examined urban squatting and informal communities. Smart and Aguilera (2020) for example, examined the degree of toleration towards urban squatters that existed over a historical period in Hong Kong and Paris. As expected, they discovered that different degrees of toleration of urban squatters existed and often changed over

time in Hong Kong and Paris (Smart and Aguilera 2020). Isabaeva (2020) in her study of squatters examined how differently the state reacts in countries like Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, both of whom became independent countries after the fall of the Soviet Union. Isabaeva (2020) discovered that Kazakhstan used a more violent method towards squatters while Kyrgyzstan utilized a more negotiation-based approach. Campos and Martinez (2020) on the other hand, studied the phenomenon of squatting in Brazil and Spain and noticed that there were different factors, including political and historical circumstances, that played a major role in the emergence of urban squatting in both countries.

Poverty Tourism

A variety of perspectives and approaches have shaped the sociological literature on poverty. These can be divided into ethnographic, novelistic (narrative), and visual studies of poverty. Liebow (1967) and Lewis (1968) are examples of early ethnographic approaches that focus on cultural explanations of poverty. Second, Boo (2014), Bruder (2018), and Ehrenreich (2001) are examples of novelistic approaches that tend to integrate a narrative approach that focuses on life-narratives of individuals impacted by poverty. Thirdly, Riis (1890) and his study on tenements in New York City in the late 19th century reflect early visual studies of poverty. Contemporary examples of visual studies of poverty in cities can be found in the work of Krase (2012).

Since the 1990s, the sociological literature on poverty has also taken interest in poverty tourism in the Global South (Conforti 1996; Dyson 2012; Freire-Medeiros 2009; Frisch 2012; Rolfes 2010; Spivak 1988). Conforti (1996), for example, makes the point that ghettos have more or less become favorite tourist attractions. Freire-Medeiros (2009) meanwhile, in her study on the favelas takes a different step than Conforti (1996), recognizing that poverty tourism in

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general and tourist destinations in particular was also the beginning of the process of the commodification of poverty. Research conducted on the favelas by Frisch (2012) meanwhile highlighted that there are actually multiple spatial levels to observe when analyzing how a social problem like a favela is suddenly transformed into a tourist attraction. Dyson (2012) argues tours also try to represent their own notion of "reality," which often differed from western representations of slums. Some poverty researchers have criticized poverty scholarship. In her essay "Can the Subaltern speak?" Spivak (1988), for example, examines the recognition and derecognition of voices in poverty research. In the work of Spivak (1988), the focus is on the missing voice of women in a country such as India still dominated by western intellectuals and western construction of the colonized exploited subject.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The key theoretical framework is "world systems theory." Wallerstein (1974) argues that the modern "world system" is divided into the "periphery," "semi-periphery," and "core" countries. Over a period of several centuries, a dependency relationship builds between the core countries like the United States, Canada, UK, Germany and France and periphery countries like Brazil, Indonesia, India and more. Countries located in the core or Global North depend on natural resources and cheap labor from the periphery or Global South to make many of their products. However, this social relationship becomes asymmetric in nature—since the core countries accumulate greater amounts of resources and capital in this uneven economic exchange than the periphery countries do. For Wallerstein (1974), then, this asymmetry between the core and the periphery also explains social position and power relationships within the world system of the 19th, 20th, and now 21st century. Hence, for Wallerstein (2015), the phenomenon of urban squatting seems to be mostly brought about by the constraints of the capitalist world

economy and attributed to the issue of 1) land, 2) space, and 3) people (Wallerstein 2015). In one

of his perhaps last known published articles, Immanuel Wallerstein (2015) briefly considers the

historical importance of the "title to the land" (Wallerstein 2015:2). What Wallerstein (2015:2)

calls the issue of the "title of the land" in this particular article, has been called by other scholars

the "embedded" nature of the "state" (Granovetter 1985; Polanyi [1944]2014). This dissertation

contends that world systems theory will help to explain peculiar "state" responses and

governance strategies (legal, economic, political, land seizures, etc.) towards urban survival

squatters—in four developing countries (Brazil, India, Indonesia, and Nigeria) in the 21st

century.

This study is also anchored theoretically in Sassen's (2001, 2018, 2019) previous work

on global cities. Sassen has studied the embeddedness of global cities within the world economy.

Highlighting the role of global cities in the world economy, Sassen (2019) provides several

reasons why cities do matter. One of these reasons is because cities continue to be relevant

"command points in the organization of the world economy" (Sassen 2019:6). They are also

important because cities are "key locations and marketplaces for leading industries …" (Sassen

2019:7). And thirdly, cities are important because they have become "major sites of production

…" (Sassen 2019:7). Like previous scholars, Sassen (2019) has also concluded that new visible

inequalities have emerged within cities. This is connected to the income gaps between the rich

and poor inhabitants in cities and is also reflected in the inequality of housing choices available

in cities.

Uneven Development Trends

At the heart of world systems theory (Wallerstein 1974) is the idea that uneven

development or asymmetry has occurred between the core and periphery over time with

unintended consequences. One such example is the uneven development that is reflected in

unequal economic development as represented by differences in GDP per capita between citizens

in rich countries of the core and poor citizens located in the periphery of the world system.

Hence, in an affluent Global North country like the United States the GDP per capita is around

$65,297 (World Bank 2020a). In Global South countries, the unequal economic development is

revealed when looking at the GDP per capita in Nigeria, which is $2,229, and in Indonesia where

it is slightly better but still only $4,136 per capita (World Bank 2020a). Perhaps slightly

improved when compared to Nigeria and Indonesia, but nowhere near the United States and

Germany, the GDP per capita in Brazil is $8,712.

In addition to uneven economic development, there remains an uneven development of

work and labor conditions between the core and periphery. While segments of the lay-public are

often familiar with the sweatshops in the developing world making their name-brand clothes and

athletic shoes, still many are unaware of the magnitude to which this persists in the world

system. Countries located in the Global South are regularly flagged by human rights

organizations like Walk Free Foundation (2020) and world trade union organizations like the

International Labor Organization (ILO) for tolerating repressive and slave-like working

conditions in their countries. This is also perhaps reflected in the vast amount of informal labor

that persists in the periphery as compared to the core of the world system. The rise of this unfree

and exploited labor contributes to the unequal economic exchange between rich and poor

countries. According to some estimates, there are around 24.9 million people estimated to be

engaged in some form of forced labor and some 345 billion dollars' worth of products

considered as risk-products often imported by many G20 countries of the world system. (Walk

Free Foundation 2020). Some scholars like Bloom (2016) point to this phenomenon of unfree

labor as examples of "Authoritarian Capitalism" emerging in many corners of the periphery of the world system.

The uneven development of the world system is also further reflected in corporations located in the Global North outsourcing and dumping trash, including toxic e-trash, in semi-periphery and periphery countries. Although estimates on the amount of trash dumped by the core on to the semi-periphery and periphery do vary, the amount is statistically substantial and provides some context to the uneven distribution of social risks and hazards in the world system. According to available statistics, countries like Ghana and the Philippines regularly make the top list for being common destinations for trash dumping, including large amounts of e-waste dumping (Dwyer 2019). The city of Lagos, located in the central African country of Nigeria, is said to receive around 15 packed shipping containers of daily waste that arrive from all corners of the world, but mostly from the Global North (Dwyer 2019). The countries that are the top dumping grounds for the Global North are India and Indonesia. Like its neighboring country Bangladesh, India receives large amounts of waste from European countries including tires and metals, as well as plenty of e-waste (Dwyer 2019). Besides receiving regular waste from the Global North, India also receives decayed and broken-down ships from the world that have to be further broken down by hundreds of workers every day (Dwyer 2019).

The uneven development of physical life chances and unequal access to housing/shelter between citizens of the Global North and the Global South further reflects the asymmetry within the world system. Thus, a Canadian male can expect to reach roughly 80 years of age while a Nigerian male is estimated to only reach 53 years of age (World Bank 2020a). Besides this illustration of life expectancy, there are other examples reflecting serious gaps in the uneven development of life chances of persons born in the Global North and the Global South. What

German sociologist Ulrich Beck (1992) once called the emergence of a "risk society" in 1986 is in many ways the daily and habitual cycle of uneven development and risk distribution of social risks and hazards between people in the core and people in the periphery to this day. The unevenness is also reflected in the realm of housing access and choices between the Global North and Global South countries to this day. This is reflected in the percent of the urban population living in slums throughout most of the periphery. In Nigeria, for example, nearly 54 percent of the urban population is estimated to live in slums (World Bank 2020a). Although lower than in Nigeria, in India nearly 35 percent of the urban population is estimated to live in slums (World Bank 2020a). By comparison, in a Global North country like Canada, 0 percent of the urban population is estimated to live in slums (World Bank 2020a). Although these statistics on urban slums do often vary even between regions located in the periphery, they do suggest a trend of uneven development of housing access and choices between core and the periphery. This, currently, seems to provide evidence for the general idea that one's social position and uncertainty within the world system, whether located in the Global North (Canada) or Global South (Nigeria, India) does still matter and has consequences for quality of life as well as physical life expectancy in the 21st century. This is related to the fact that persons in the 21st century, whether they may have or may not have passports, are still located in the container known as the nation-state, and the position of their nation state is also at the same time still socially positioned within the container called the world system.

Finally, uneven development is also highlighted by the contradictions of tourism mobility between citizens of the Global North and the Global South. This brutal ambivalence was once also summed up by the late Polish sociologist Zygmunt Bauman when he argued that "Traveling for profit is encouraged; traveling for survival is condemned" (2002:84). Globally, the issue of

tourism mobility in many ways also reflects the social positioning of citizens in the world system. The contradictions of tourism mobility demonstrates that citizens in the Global South, who lack resources, visas and passports, are simply prevented from traveling the world compared to their Global North counterparts.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The following research questions are addressed in this study:

1. Do macro-economic inequalities found in the global cities of the "world system" (Wallerstein 1974) help to explain the persistence of urban survival squatting in Brazil (Rio de Janeiro), India (Mumbai), Indonesia (Jakarta), and Nigeria (Lagos)?

2. Do any of Pruijt's (2013) five distinct categories of squatting help to explain the persistence of urban squatting in Brazil (Rio de Janeiro), India (Mumbai), Indonesia (Jakarta), and Nigeria (Lagos)?

3. To what extent can the "relative autonomy" and "embedded" nature of the "state" (Granovetter 1985; Polanyi [1944]2014) and state-intervention or non-state intervention help to explain patterns of urban squatting in Brazil (Rio de Janeiro), India (Mumbai), Indonesia (Jakarta), and Nigeria (Lagos)?

4. Can a content analysis (Krippendorff 2013) of slum tourism literature demonstrate how culture, uneven development, and the "tourist gaze" (Urry 1990) influence the way informal settlements are framed and utilized within the slum tourism community?

CHAPTER III

BACKGROUND

This chapter provides background information on urban squatting and informal settlements. This chapter supplements and aids the literature review section. The first section provides visual documentation of informal settlements around the world including India, Brazil, Indonesia, and Nigeria. The second section briefly re-examines the original slum typology created by Davis (2005). The third section summarizes current available World Bank data and estimates of the percent of global urban population living in slums from 2000 to 2018. The fourth section reviews the importance of the Gini index for measuring uneven economic development between and within countries.

URBAN SQUATTING AND INFORMAL SETTLEMENTS IN PICTURES

This section includes several images available from the public domain to illustrate urban squatting forms and the basic structure of informal settlements. These are intended to provide insights into the variation and similarities of urban squatting and informal settlements taking shape in the Global South in the 21st century. The pictures also illustrate some of the same informal settlements which are also part of this study. While different theoretical entry points are often used when describing some of the shared similarities of informal settlements in the Global South, for this specific selection of pictures it is helpful to use the phrase "pirate urbanization" by Davis (2005). The first picture (see Figure 1) provides an illustration of an informal settlement located in Dharavi, Mumbai, India. The second picture (see Figure 2) provides an illustration of the favelas located in the city of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. The third picture (see Figure 3) details a small squatter settlement in Jakarta, Indonesia. Finally, the fourth picture (see Figure 4) details an informal community located in Lagos, Nigeria.

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Figure 1. Informal Community in Dharavi, Mumbai, India (Picture was taken by Kristian Bertel)

Figure 1 above illustrates an example of an informal community located in Dharavi, Mumbai, India. Although Figure 1 is, perhaps, more reflective of urban squatting occurring in urban parts of Mumbai, India, I demonstrate in this study that informal communities located in Brazil, Nigeria, and Indonesia share commonalities tied to deprivation, absolute poverty, and marginality. To help with contextualizing this picture, I make use of the phrase "makeshift city" (Vasudevan 2015). A closer examination of Figure 1 does indicate perhaps what Vasudevan (2015) meant when he used the term "makeshift city" to describe informal settlements. The dwellings that appear in Figure 1 are marked not only by their makeshift character but also by their precarity. By this I mean that the dwellings appear to be fragile and lack stability for the aim to house people for extensive periods of time. The constructions of the dwellings seem to consist of a variety of used wood pieces and other recycled pieces of sheet. A close examination of the state of the river in the picture also seems to suggest that the dwellings lack basic water and sanitation pipes.

Figure 2. The Favelas in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil (Wikimedia Commons)

Figure 2 above illustrates informal communities in the city of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Architecturally speaking, they are slightly improved compared to the informal settlements one observes in Dharavi, Mumbai, India. Yet the favelas are representations of larger inequalities in major cities of Brazil and occupied by many of the urban poor who can no longer afford to live anywhere else in the metropolis of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. It is important to note that unlike other informal settlements in the Global South, the favelas are the favorite destinations for poverty tourists in the world. No other informal settlements receive as much tourism as the favelas in Rio de Janeiro. There might be several reasons for this. For example, Davis (2005) uses the term "pirate urbanization" in his works when explaining the phenomenon of informal settlements to his readers. The term may also help to explain why poverty tourists seem to be attracted to favelas rather than other informal settlements in the Global South. Hence, the interest of poverty tourism may be driven by the criminal elements. Second, poverty tourism may also be explained because of the spontaneous growth of the favelas compared to other informal settlements in the Global South.

Figure 3. Informal Community in Jakarta, Indonesia (Picture was taken by Jonathan Mcintosh)

Figure 3 illustrates a small informal settlement in Jakarta, Indonesia located beside a river; it does not appear the squatter settlement has access to formal water or sewer connection. Structurally, the makeshift buildings also appear to be mostly made of wood and/or recycled items. A closer examination of the picture does seem to indicate that the state of the housing structures in Jakarta are in a more precarious state than those observed in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Given this degree of precarity, it is fair to argue that informal communities like these are also at greater risk because of their close connection to rivers and flooding risk. Because of climate change, in the next decades of the 21st century informal settlements in Jakarta, Indonesia will likely be affected by rising coastal conditions and uncertain weather patterns. Although all inhabitants of cities near coastal areas will be affected by climate change, squatters who engage in "deprivation-based" squatting (Pruijt 2013) will be at greater risk.

Figure 4. Informal Community in Lagos, Nigeria (Wikimedia Commons)

Figure 4 above illustrates an informal community located in Lagos, Nigeria. As in the case of Jakarta, the informal settlement does not appear to be planned but rather a makeshift collection of small dwellings made of mostly wood and recycled items. Several small uncontrolled make-shift fires seem to be running rampantly throughout the area. After careful visual examination, the creek seems to be open to public access and it is unclear if any of the inhabitants of the informal community have access to basic water and sewer lines provided by the city. According to estimates provided by WaterAid (2017), some 67 percent of Nigerians lack basic sanitation access and bathroom facilities.

REVISITING THE DAVIS SLUM TYPOLOGY

The visual examples above have provided some insights into the precarious nature of informal settlements throughout various corners of the world. Although early scholarship on cities may reach as far back as the Chicago school sociologists Park and Burgess ([1925]1967), I decided in this background chapter to limit my attention to Davis (2005) who is also reviewed and mentioned in the literature review in Chapter 2. In the second chapter of his book titled "The

Prevalence of Slums," Davis (2005) attempts to construct a "slum typology" that tries to map out the stratification of housing frequently found in most cities of the world. Besides issues related to the stratification, Davis (2005) also considers housing issues related to spatial inequality and how the urban poor face different forms of barriers and social exclusions than the non-poor urbanites. Davis (2005:27) posits:

> The urban poor have to solve a complex equation as they try to optimize housing costs, tenure security, quality of shelter, journey to work, and sometimes, personal safety. For some people, including pavement-dwellers, a location near a job – say, in a produce market or train station – is even more important than a roof. For others, free or nearly free land is worth epic commutes from the edge to the center. And for everyone the worst situation is a bad, expensive location without municipal services or security of tenure.

I have tried to reconstruct, in part, this original slum typology below by Davis (2005), with some variation and editing, including some of my own theorizing on informal settlements and types of urban squatting. To be sure, it is still partly inspired by the original slum typology that Davis (2005) sketched out in his book on slums. Like Davis (2005), I view it important to mention spatial dimensions in the city, including the importance of the center or business district of a city, and the importance of the edges of the city. I also adopt the same distinction of formal and informal housing that Davis (2005) also used in his slum typology. These two are also an important theoretical tool to highlight how the housing market has been divided into two prevailing camps including formal housing stock options as well as informal housing stock options. Figure 5 below attempts to sketch out an upgraded slum typology that is more fitting for the 21st century.

Often located near city center
(Business District)

(Formal/regulated Housing)
Upscale/middle class rental housing (private), Working-class block housing
Public housing (with state subsidy)
Short-term/ long term hotel housing (private)
bottom feeder housing

(Informal/ unregulated/ housing)
Urban squatters (in dwelling)
Street sleepers without any available dwelling

(Formal/regulated Housing)
Upscale/middle class rental housing (private), Working-class block housing, Public housing (with state subsidy)
Short-term/ long term hotel housing (private)
bottom feeder housing

(Informal/unregulated Housing)
Urban squatters (in dwelling) / Semi-Structured Encampments (Informal settlements)
Street sleepers without available dwelling

Often located on the margins of city

Figure 5. Partial Adaptation of Davis' (2005) Slum Typology

Figure 5 represents my partial adaptation of the slum typology first introduced by Davis (2005). I also explain here the important distinctions of formal housing versus informal housing types. By this distinction, formal housing normally operates within well-regulated and legal agreements that are managed by private owners, investors, banks, a co-operative, or the state, for example. The term "land tenure" or "land security" is also sometimes used as a way to describe formalized housing and land relations. According to the LandVoc (2021), this might include "land rights, common rights, community land rights, continuum of land rights etc." Informal housing and informal land relations, according to the LandVoc (2021), reflect "tenure arrangements that lack official recognition and protection." In short, this normally implies unregulated and non-legally protected informal settlements like urban squatter communities, or what Davis (2005:37) has characterized as "pirate urbanization."

When Davis (2005) originally developed his slum typology he felt it could be used universally and could reflect all global cities in the world leaving open the possibility that some regional variation existed in cities of the Global North and Global South. My adaptation of the original typology takes a similar inclusive approach and conceptualizes patterns of formal and informal housing options found in most comparable advanced cities in the world system of the 21st century. While my adapted typology also assumes some universal characteristics of cities in the world system, it also recognizes possible regional variation that may not entirely reflect the model in Figure 5. Thus, at the top of formal housing choices available in most comparable advanced global cities in the Global North or Global South, there is what can be described as "upscale/middle class rental housing." In recent decades, this has often been placed under the terminology of "gentrification," implying that upper and middle classes are beginning to dominate and transform once vibrant working-class communities found in the cities. Besides

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"upscale/middle class rental housing," what may follow is either working-class block housing or public housing with some form of public subsidy in play. Davis (2005:30) originally used the term "tenements" in his typology, which were associated with the notorious concrete-block housing also extensively visually documented in late 19th century New York City by Jacob Riis (1890). Rather than the term "tenements," I used the phrase working-class block housing, which seems to have improved since the brutal days of the "tenements" 'in the late 19th century. Yet, working-class block housing can still be found in numerous corners of the world from Hong Kong, in former post-Communist countries, to, even some co-op style housing found to this day in the lower-east side of New York City.

What may frequently follow below working-class block housing is short-term/long-term hotel housing under some form of private ownership and operate on a standard "for-profit" basis. The term "bottom feeder housing" is used here to describe the sub-renting housing regiment that exists below working-class block housing, which is used very cautiously here to indicate that whatever is left in the formal housing stock will more likely be housed by the urban poor. While "bottom feeder housing" may sound cynical in nature, it has some parallel connections to the phrase "race to the bottom," often associated with decline of economic living standards brought about by economic globalization (Tonelson 2002). "Race to the bottom" follows the logic once described by Gans (1971) that there are de facto "Uses of Poverty," which may also create a sub-renting market for remaining below-standard housing stock available in a city.

At the very bottom of the ladder exists the last remaining housing possibilities for the urban poor, outcasts, socially marginalized, or undocumented and stateless persons. This tends to include urban squatters living in a dwelling or informal settlement and street sleepers. Under most scenarios, urban squatters will likely occupy a dwelling or abandoned structure to transform

into their home. This is very different from street sleepers who may lack a structure or building to occupy and the street or sidewalk becomes the last resort. A fruitful example of the difference between street sleepers and urban squatters is, perhaps, shown with the photography produced by Dhawan (2015), who visually documented how the urban poor use sidewalks and streets as a living space in Mumbai, India. Davis (2005:30) also includes the category of "refugee camps" in his original typology. I did not include this for space reasons, but I believe it fits into the slum typology since there are frequently scenarios such as refugees or undocumented stateless persons who may also engage in urban squatting.

Figure 6. World Population Living in Slums (Percent of Urban Population) (Source: World Bank 2020a).

Figure 6 identifies the percent of the entire world population living in slums in the years 2000, 2005, 2010, 2014, and 2018. In the year 2000, nearly 39.6 percent of the global urban population lived in slums. In 2005, this slightly went down to 35.5 percent. It went down further

in 2010 to 33.1 percent, and much further down to 29.6 percent. The most recent estimate taken in 2018 suggests that 29.2 percent of the entire world population was living in slums. According to the typology originally produced by Davis (2005) both formal and informal housing was included in the typology. Hence, it is still important to briefly differentiate between "slums," and "informal housing," which are ambiguous terms that have sometimes been interchangeably used. For the purposes of this dissertation, I use the World Bank (2020c) definition of populations living in slums:

> A slum household is defined as a group of individuals living under the same roof lacking one or more of the following conditions: access to improved water, access to improved sanitation, sufficient living area, housing durability, and security of tenure, as adopted in the Millennium Development Goal Target 7.D. (World Bank 2020c)

While "slums" may sometimes be part of formal housing stock in a city, the term has also been used to describe informal housing and urban squatter settlements found in cities of the Global South. Given the ambiguity and use of the term "slums" in the Global North and Global South, the definition used by the World Bank (2020c) also seems appropriate for this study.

REVISITING THE GINI INDEX

Besides the use of grounded, visual, or interpretive tools studying "slums" and "informal housing" in the Global South, the Gini index has been used by social scientists as a quantitative measure to demonstrate how much income is equally or unequally distributed within the economy of a given country. The Gini index does not focus specifically on "slums" or "informal housing" per se, but it nevertheless is still useful as a tool for comparing and contrasting the degree of macro-economic inequalities that may account for the formation of "slums" and "informal housing" in the Global South. The Gini index since it will assist in illuminating the

degree of uneven development in my four cases. While various definitions are often used to describe this index, the World Bank glossary defines it as a tool which "measures the extent to which the distribution of income…among individuals or households within an economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution" (World Bank 2020c).

One standard use of the Gini index would be to use it as an analytical comparison tool to examine the degree of uneven income development between countries located in the Global North and Global South. Another might also use it to examine the variation of income inequalities or income concentrations found within so-called the Global North and the Global South countries. It is important to make this point since we frequently think of such labels within a closed homogenous framework of understanding rather than a framework of functionally differentiated regions and complex societies. Nevertheless, to use this index as a comparison tool between the Global North and Global South seems appropriate given the degree of unevenness in the world system. It would ideally also make sense to use it to correlate the persistence of urban survival squatting in countries with high uneven income development.

To make sense of the Gini index as a comparison tool, I briefly list countries with extremely high index scores. Global South countries will typically have higher scores of income inequality. In South Africa, for example, the Gini index of income inequality is 63 (World Bank 2020a). Three other countries also have similar high scores including the Central African Republic with a score of 56, Zimbabwe with a score of 50, and Ghana with a score of 43 (World Bank 2020a). Several Latin American countries also have similar high scores including Brazil with a score of 53, Ecuador with a score of 45, and Guatemala with a score of 48 (World Bank 2020a). While Global North countries will often have much lower scores reflected in the Gini index of income inequality, one should not assume that so-called rich and poor countries are

homogeneous. For example, Japan has a score of 32, followed by the Scandinavian countries like Sweden which has a score of 30, followed by Denmark which has a score of 31 (World Bank 2020a).

The scores for a number of countries contradict, at times, the binary conceptions of Global North and Global South. One such case is the United States with a score of 41. Its income inequality is comparable to Turkey with a score of 41, and Peru, also with a score of 41 (World Bank 2020a). Outliers are also visible with the Gini index scores of countries like Poland with a score of 30, compared to the Russian Federation with a score of 37, which is four points lower than the United States (World Bank 2020a).

While the Gini index measure of income inequality concentration may very well be a beneficial starting point for a comparative study of urban squatting in the world system, reliance on a single measure is insufficient. As illustrated with some of Gini index data above, some countries do not always line up within the perceived binary conceptions of Global North and Global South. Upcoming chapters demonstrate the shortcomings of a pure economic reductionist approach or pure state reductionist approach, and the need to expand our approaches and assumptions.

CHAPTER IV

METHODOLOGY

This chapter first outlines the data and data collection for the quantitative data used. The second section describes the quantitative data and data collection for the qualitative data. The third section discusses the selection of cases for the dissertation. The fourth section discusses the analysis of the qualitative data and the quantitative data.

QUANTITATIVE DATA AND DATA COLLECTION

Quantitative data covers the period 2000 to 2020. This was collected from multiple sources including the World Bank (2020a, 2020b), and the ILO (2020a, 2020b). Data were collected for percent of the urban population living in slums, Gini index, GDP per capita (US dollars), income share of highest 20 percent, income share by lowest 10 percent. This also comes from the World Bank (2020a). I used the newest data release from 2018.

In addition to the above-mentioned measures, I used the measure informal employment in total employment (Male/Female). This data comes from the World Social Protection database produced by the ILO (2020a, 2020b) and was also shared with the World Bank (2020a). I used the newest data release from 2018. I also used the measure population covered by at least one social protection benefit (percent/value percent). This data comes from the World Social Protection database produced by the ILO (2020a, 2020b) and was also shared with the World Bank (2020a). I used the newest available data for Brazil (2017), Nigeria (2016), India (2016), and Indonesia (2017).

I also used the measure public social protection expenditure by function (percent of GDP). This measure excludes expenditures made on health. This data comes from the World Social Protection database produced by the ILO (2020a, 2020b). I used the newest available data

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for Brazil (2017), Nigeria (2016), India (2016), and Indonesia (2017). I used the measure effective social protection coverage, by function/population (percent). This measure includes the following categories: total population, children, maternity, unemployment, work injury, disability, old-age, contributors to pension, and vulnerability. This data comes from the World Social Protection database produced by the ILO (2020a, 2020b). I used the newest available data for Brazil (2017), Nigeria (2016), India (2016), and Indonesia (2017). I also used the measure tenure insecurity from the non-governmental organization Prindex (2020). I used the newest data available from 2018. The chart web of transnational land deals was also used and comes from Land Matrix (2020). I used the newest data available from Land Matrix for 2020. Besides the measures of tenure insecurity and web of international land deals, I also included a corruption perception measure. This comes from the anti-corruption non-governmental organization known as Transparency International (2020). I used the newest data release for this index stemming from 2020. Finally, I used a global slavery index. This comes from the organization Walk Free Foundation (2020). I used the newest global slavery index results from 2018.

I also used basic descriptive statistics from the CIA World Factbook (2021), WaterAid (2017) and its sanitation rankings of countries, as well as public opinion survey data on trust from the World Values Survey Wave 7, World Happiness ranking from the Gallup World Poll (2021) ranking of worker rights/human rights from the International Trade Union Confederation ITUC (2019), and rankings on the state of journalists' rights from Reporters Without Borders.

QUALITATIVE DATA

The qualitative data cover the period 2000 to 2021. Several qualitative data sources were used. I used media news sources and online newspaper articles from *The Bombay Times*, *The Jakarta Post*, *Jakarta Globe*, *The Rio Times*, *The Indian Express*, *Daily Post* (Nigerian), Reuters,

Wall Street Journal, *The Diplomat*, *Times of India* (TNN), Al Jazeera, Deutsche Welle

(Germany), The Guardian, and the BBC. I also carefully examined laws that dealt with property

rights and land tenure as well as examined the constitution of the countries. I analyzed

documents pertaining to forced evictions and bulldozing of informal settlements. I examined

available documentation regarding the state of human rights and political freedom from the

following organizations: Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, Heinrich Boell

Foundation (Germany), Reporters Without Borders, Open Society, Walk Free Foundation,

Global Witness, WaterAid, and the World Food Program. I analyzed political literature from

political squatting groups, texts/documents from activists/movements for or against urban

squatters in all of the countries. I used visual documents, photo evidence of informal settlements

and squats from Wikimedia commons and made sure to give credit to photographers who made

such pictures available in the public domain. I also reviewed Internet articles, as well as social

media posts from social media websites like Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram that addressed

informal settlements and squats in Brazil, India, Indonesia, and Nigeria. To answer the last

research question, I used the Tripadvisor website that advertises and reviews slum tourism in

Mumbai, India.

SELECTION OF CASES

  The selection of countries (Brazil, India, Indonesia, and Nigeria) was based on my

decision to include cases that would truly enable a comparative-historical analysis (Lange 2012)

of urban squatting by contextualizing the cases within the foci of their specific regional

dynamics, including examining the variation of uneven development as well as the governance

strategies towards urban squatting in South America, Africa, Southeast Asia. By examining

specific regional dynamics, I mean that besides the evidence of uneven economic developments

to be found in many developing countries, the kind of governance forms during a 20–year period

in the four selected cases may also possibly also help to explain the urban squatting

phenomenon. Ultimately, the final decision on the selection of these cases was also shaped by

the current gaps of scholarly research done in multiple regions including South America, Africa,

and South Asia and Southeast Asia. Cases focused on the Global South because of the abundance

of academic scholarship on urban squatting already done in the Global North, especially in

Europe. Selection of cases in the Global South were also made in regard to the positionality of

the researcher. Although numerous scholars from the Global North have conducted research on

squatting in the Global South, an overwhelming amount of research, especially on urban

squatting, still frequently involves Global North scholars conducting research on Global North

regions while ignoring their Global South neighbors.

Figure 7. Selection of Cases

Figure 7 highlights the current selection of cases for this study. Highlighted in red, these

are (from left to right) the country Brazil, located in South America, the country Nigeria, located

in West Africa, the country India, located in South Asia, and finally the country Indonesia located in Southeast Asia.

DATA ANALYSIS

The research questions were addressed using qualitative and quantitative analysis. The qualitative analysis is described first. The qualitative analysis made use of a within-case method (Lange 2012). This technique shares some similarities with the Millian method of comparison (named after John Stuart Mill) and has been used successfully in the past by social scientists such as Moore (2010) and Skocpol (1979), and countless other scholars within the comparative-historical tradition (Lange 2012). Since this dissertation uses qualitative research techniques (within-case, narrative analysis, content analysis) as well as the use of quantitative data it is fair to characterize the research methodology as being mixed-methods (Lange 2012). I utilized a narrative analysis (including the use of causal narratives) to explain the social phenomenon of urban squatting in (Brazil, India, Indonesia, and Nigeria) including the relationship of uneven development in the Global South. The last part of the study also made use of another qualitative research technique known as content analysis (Krippendorff 2013) for the purpose of a study of slum tourism/ads/reviews demonstrating how culture, economic resources, and the "tourist gaze" (Urry 1990) influence the way informal settlements and squats are framed in India, Brazil, Nigeria, and Indonesia, especially via such new online tourist review platforms.

For the quantitative analysis, I collected and presented descriptive statistics on socio-economic trends to examine any variation or differences across the selected cases under investigation (Brazil, India, Indonesia, and Nigeria).

CHAPTER V

INDIAN CASE

What follows are the results of the Indian Case. The first section focuses on the comparative-historical analysis (Lange 2012) which was conducted for the historical period 2000-2020. This chapter presents a series of eight causal narratives which link uneven development and the persistence of urban survival squatting in India. It is important to first clearly define what is meant by making use of causal narratives and other similar heuristic devices. For all of the cases under investigation, I adopt the following definition of causal narrative which describes it as "an analytic technique that explores the causes of a particular phenomenon through a narrative analysis …" (Lange 2012:49).

BRITISH COLONIAL PAST

The British colonial past impacted India in various ways. This is important to emphasize since India, even prior to its independence in 1947, was already being slowly embedded and situated into the world system through the soft and sometimes hard military force of British colonial rule (Palmowski 2004). This colonial rule (also referred to as the British Raj) by most historical accounts lasted for more than 250 years (Palmowski 2004). During this 250-year time period, the British Raj significantly influenced and shaped the economic, social, legal, and political institutions of India.

Why India? Although historians may differ in their explanations, it seems one of the primary reasons why the British Empire colonized India was tied to British economic interests via, for example, the British East India Company (Palmowski 2004). Hence, besides the growing desire for Indian spices for many of their meat dishes, British and other European empires at the

time were also drawn to the various commodities available in India including coffee, tea, cotton, and silk (Palmowski 2004).

Besides direct economic linkages with what might be called the world economy at that time, British colonial rule also had a hand in the construction of numerous cities in India. This included the cities of Calcutta (1690), Bombay (1661), and Madras (1644), all of which in part were built and formed through British colonial rule (Spodek 2013). Besides linking India with the world economy, a civil bureaucracy, law, a trained military, and even the country's first railroads linking one corner of India to another were also established during British Colonial rule.

Hence, the earliest known implementation of laws affecting land policies during the British colonial period should not be disregarded but rather examined critically. One of these that reached back to the year 1824, known as the Bengal Resolution, was a series of legal land acquisition acts that allowed the government to acquire property or land for the purpose of public uses—whether for roads or constructing canals (Balachandran and Punit 2015). Similar laws would follow in the year 1850, with Act XLII, for example, which mandated land acquisition rights in an effort to build a rail network (Balachandran and Punit 2015). More land laws would subsequently follow including the Land Acquisition Act of 1894, which more or less gave government the power to evict private landholders yet also offer them some compensation (Balachandran and Punit 2015).

After independence, many of these land acts and laws simply carried over and essentially remained active with slight editing. Different sets of laws would emerge in the post-colonial period of India that would in many ways still carry echoes from the colonial past. For example, in 1948, the Indian Independence Acts basically incorporated the previously enacted Land

Acquisition Acts of 1894 and deleted the previous phrasing "British India" from the legal

documents (Balachandran and Punit 2015).

Laws regarding land issues previously shaped by British Colonial influence of the past

are important to use as a historical causal narrative because they did impact the inhabitants of

land or established a framework for the state to define ownership or permit early forms of

evictions sanctioned by the state. This did not mean that future laws would not change their

colonial character, or perhaps, even start to go in entirely different, even anti-colonial directions.

While on the one hand, the colonial influence would start to eventually fade away, on the other

hand, through laws emerging in the post-colonial era like the Slum Areas Improvement and

Clearance Act of 1956 and later the Urban Land Ceiling Regulation Act of 1976, for example,

the government of India began to use land laws and acts to regulate the inhabitants of slums and

even placed certain limits on their growth (Sehgal 1998).

Laws appear to become more or less reflective of the type of new pressing power

struggles of a state or government (whether colonial or post-colonial). One recent 21st century

example pertains to a Supreme Court ruling in India on the Forest Rights Acts of 2006 that

occurred in 2019 (Sirohi 2019). This ruling resulted in the eviction of some 1.8 million tribal

people living near forest lands (Sirohi 2019). As seen with the above example on a Supreme

Court ruling, laws relating to land use and rights continue to be a matter of contention even in the

first two decades of the 21st century in India.

HYPERGLOBALIZATION

In the first two decades of the 21st century, India, like the rest of the Global South, has

not been able to escape hyperglobalization. While hyperglobalization and other similar terms

have been used by social scientists such as Bauman (2004), Giddens (1999), Friedman (2009),

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and Rodrik (2011) in the past to mean different things, usage of the term here focuses more on the societal-wide impact of economic globalization. In short, this particular emphasis on hyperglobalization "refers to growing economic linkages at the global" (Ritzer 2010:517). This globalization definition cited by Ritzer (2010) will also be the one used for the purpose of this study and the remaining cases. Hyperglobalization has brought about a new wave of hyper-marketization in the first two decades of the 21st century. While hyperglobalization has contributed to development and enormous prosperity for some, it has also increased uneven development leaving behind many in the "urban slums" found in cities of India such as Mumbai.

To illustrate this point, I adopt a similar entry point found in Sassen's (2019) work on cities. One entry point that Sassen (2019) uses is based on a number of uneven development indicators. From a macro-economic frame of reference, this is the impact of uneven foreign direct investments (FDI), farmland purchases, the number of foreign companies or foreign assets located in a country, and the amount of external foreign debt owed (Sassen 2019). Scanning the World Bank database, similar trends are evident when examining the Indian case.

Like Sassen (2019), this does indicate that India by all accounts has been experiencing a form of hyperglobalization, especially when examining the growth of foreign direct investments in the country. This is further illustrated in Figure 8 below.

Figure 8. Foreign Direct Investment in India 2000-2018 (In $ Billions) (Source: Macro Trends 2021c)

Figure 8 illustrates FDI in India from the years 2000 to 2018. In the year 2000, for example, FDI was at nearly $3.58 billion (Macro Trends 2021c). This increased to $7.27 billion of FDI in 2005. In 2010, FDI would increase again to $27.4 billion (Macro Trends 2021c). The most recent available data comes from the year 2018 which indicates that foreign direct investment reached $50.61 billion (Macro Trends 2021c).

Besides the growth of FDI, the external debt accumulated by India in the first two decades of the 21st century has further skyrocketed in recent years.

Figure 9. India External Debt 2005–2019 (In $ Billions)

Figure 9 above highlights the increase of India's external debt from the years 2005–2018 in billions. Starting in the year 2005, the debt was already at $121.1 billion (Macro Trends 2021a, World Bank 2020a). This debt amount would increase nearly 139 percent to $290.4 billion in 2010 (Macro Trends 2021a, World Bank 2020a). The external debt owed would increase again in 2015 to $478.8 billion and again in 2019 to a total of $560 billion (Macro Trends 2021a, World Bank 2020a). Although the percent increase between 2015 and 2019 would be only 17 percent, it still has been increasing steadily year by year, with no reduction in sight.

One unintended consequence of external debt including World Bank and IMF loans is it may also bring about the shift of costs and risks (austerity measures) to other segments and areas of India. This burden of external debt can also be described as a new kind of asymmetric uneven

development between the Global North and Global South, which has taken place with often unintended consequences.

Consider the issue of increasing marketization in rural agriculture and its impact on rural Indian farmers. Like many rural farmers in the developing world, rural farmers in India are also increasingly confronted with having to purchase seeds, pesticides, and modern equipment, which may often lead to high numbers of farmers with limited financial means accumulating large levels of debt (Kamdar 2007). According to one scholar studying the plight of many Indian farmers:

> Since 1997, more than twenty-five thousand farmers have committed suicide. This grim number is directly linked to changes in India's agricultural policy, a lack of legitimate credit opportunities that drives farmers to borrow from rapacious moneylenders, and a serious water crisis. (Kamdar 2007:148)

While farmers committing suicide in rural areas may result from different kinds of economic problems than those faced by urban dwellers in the mega cities of India like Mumbai or Delhi, "deprivation-based" squatting (Pruijt 2013) represents a different form of collective adaptation to marketization and hyperglobalization in the first two decades of the 21st century.

Urban squatting should not be interpreted as a natural phenomenon. Rather, it should be interpreted as de facto "boomerang effects" (Beck 1992) of marketization and hyperglobalization waves happening in modern India during the last two decades.

THE CONTINUITY OF THE CASTE SYSTEM

Even prior to the 21st century, caste conflicts between upper and lower castes proliferated in colonial as well as post-colonial India. Unlike the class systems found in the Global North, the caste system found in India is far more closed, restrictive, and a byproduct of the Hindu religion

(Giddens 1991). One of the highest castes, also known as Brahmins, are encouraged to socially distance themselves from the untouchable castes like, for example, the Dalits (Giddens 1991). These caste dynamics have also often resulted in deadly conflicts between higher caste and lower caste members. Understanding the nature of the caste system, it is perhaps one reason why the framers of the Indian Constitution of 1950 felt it was important for the post-colonial state to formally recognize the problems the caste system may bring. Hence, in an effort to prevent possible social dysfunctions brought about by the caste system, the state would need to make sure that employment opportunities in government would not bring these old caste dynamics back into play. Hence, in attempting to provide more equal employment opportunities for those seeking state employment, Article 16 of the Indian Constitution clearly states that:

> 1. There shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters to employment or appointment to any office under the State, 2. No citizen shall, on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, descent, place of birth, residence or any of them, be ineligible for, or discriminated against in respect of, any employment or office under the State. (Constitution of India 2021)

One governance strategy by the government of India to remedy this history of caste conflict was to establish both legislation and commissions (also known as the National Commission for Scheduled Castes) to safeguard all of the historically oppressed castes. What might be described as a kind of caste "affirmative action policy," is reflected also within Article 338 of the Indian Constitution, and other significant state documents known as "scheduled castes" and so-called "scheduled tribes" (Bose 2013). As a legal procedure, for example, of the 543 constituency seats in the Indian Parliament (Lok Sabha), 15 percent are legally reserved for

the scheduled classes (Bose 2013). Meanwhile, so-called "scheduled tribes" sometimes called "Adivasis" are given 8 percent reservations in the Indian Parliament (Bose 2013).

Hence, given this caste legacy, it is fair to say that the caste system has still maintained its pivotal place in India in the 21st century. This continuity is also reflected in the degree of hierarchization and forms of social exclusion between different castes persisting in India to this day. These caste-related conflicts still play out in other issues tied to land tenure access and housing conditions. For example, various newspapers across India regularly report on lower caste members lacking land and or engaging in forms of urban squatting as a survival coping mechanism. Such examples can sometimes also be found by simply reading headlines like "Evicted Dalit Families to Intensify Protests at Attipra Village Office," (New Indian Express 2020) or "Dalit Couple Takes Poison during Eviction in Guna" (TNN 2020).

Besides caste discrimination found in land disputes, caste discrimination and exploitation of the lower caste members like Dalits has also been historically observed in work and labor relations in India. An article from 2015, for example, revealed that many tea plantation workers in India were actually lower caste Dalits who were often recruited regionally or as far away as Nepal (Raj 2015). A drastic change occurred to many of the tea plantation workers when their jobs were cut, and they were forced to move to different villages to seek different types of work (Raj 2015).

According to the article, although some Dalits attempted to hide their own caste identity, they noticed that their caste identity still nevertheless followed them, and they were humiliated and discriminated against for it (Raj 2015). Although this specific article focuses more on how caste politics is revealed in the arena of work relations, similar caste-related conflict in India can also be found in the database Land Conflict Watch (2021a).

The analysis presented suggests that urban squatting is more persistent among lower caste Indians such as the Dalits. Understanding that economic forces cannot be separated from culture, the caste system in India in many ways is still deeply anchored and embedded and overlaps with other institutions of society whether economic, political, legal, social, or religious.

FUNDAMENTALISM AND URBAN SQUATTER SURVIVALISM

Besides the caste system, another entry point is the issue of fundamentalism and an urban squatter survival habitus. Both of these help to explain the phenomenon of urban survival squatting in India in the 21st century. There are, of course, different texts and authors that inspired these two specific entry points and frame of references. This includes the works of anthropologist Harris (1974) and the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu (1984).

Harris (1974) offers an anthropological interpretation why cows, for example, are seen as sacred entities in Hindu religion and throughout Indian society. From a western point of view, this might be seen as a fundamentalist orientation towards cows. Still, for countless numbers of Hindus, cows really are literally seen as gods, and those who may counter or question this belief may often face scrutiny and sometimes even deadly violence in response. This admiration for cows in Hindu society is described beautifully by Harris (1974) in his book:

> Love of cow affects life in many ways. Government agencies maintain old age homes for cows at which owners may board their dry and decrepit animals free of charge… Farmers regard their cows as members of the family, adorn them with garlands and tassels, pray for them when they get sick, and call in their neighbors and a priest to celebrate the birth of a new calf. Throughout India, Hindus hang on their walls calendars that portray beautiful, bejeweled young women who have the bodies of big fat white cows. (12-13)

In India, the enthusiasm found among some Hindu nationalists for sacred cows also has a potentially violent flip side. According to Siyech and Narain (2018), for example, Hindu nationalist groups have on several occasions engaged in acts of violence towards Muslims for slaughtering cows as a source of food in India. Their interpretation of the cow issue is that it is used by Hindu Nationalist groups as a source of anti-Muslim propaganda as well Islamophobia (Siyech and Narain 2018). In addition to Harris (1974), the work of the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu (1984) may also be applicable in helping to account for the existence of what I characterize as an urban squatter survival habitus that is shaped by a strong survivalist ethos. For Bourdieu (1984), habitus should be seen as the formation of attitudes that are acquired within the social space, or reflect the habitat in which groups of people or individuals are embedded in. For urban survival squatters, for example, the act of squatting will essentially become part of a person's or group of people's habitual actions without even recognizing it. Occasionally the habitus may be challenged, as example, sometimes urban squatters turn squatting into something political and try to bring about better conditions for housing, or if all fails react violently to the state. On the other hand, the habitus can also be further entrenched leading to despair, further immiseration, and even suicide.

While my focus is more on habitus and its original usage with Bourdieu (1984), in the United States, concepts like the "code of the street" (Anderson 1999) takes a similar overtone when it comes to behavior and inner-city cultural scripts found in American inner cities among the urban poor. In short, in order to survive in the inner city, Anderson (1999) posits that a peculiar form of script and habitus is practiced daily on the streets in order to survive. It might be fair to claim that such a type of habitus (Bourdieu 1984) is also found among urban survival squatters in India.

The formation of attitudes and habitus (Bourdieu 1984), or what Anderson (1999) has

called the "code of the street," may still often be reflected in the type of views or social

preferences that become salient in one region of the world and not in another. Since this study

does not engage in actual grounded ethnographic research in India to find out the values and

beliefs of urban squatters, I use The Inglehart-Welzel Cultural Map—World Values Survey 7

(2020) to demonstrate the variation of values between different countries around the world.

Figure 10. The Inglehart-Welzel Cultural Map—World Values Survey 7 (Source: World Values
Survey 2020)

Figure 10 represents the results of the World Values Survey 7 and presents different

country scores of traditional vs. secular values on the vertical axis, and the country scores of

survival vs. self-expression scores on the horizontal axis. Countries are both labeled and also

blocked into regional artificial groupings which include African Islamic, Latin America,

Orthodox Europe, West and South Asia, Confucian, Catholic Europe, Protestant Europe, and finally English Speaking. I examined India, which seems to be located vertically more on the traditional values side and horizontally more on the survival values side rather than the self-expression values side (World Values Survey 2020). In sum, fundamentalism and an urban squatter survival habitus may also help to explain the persistence of urban squatting in a country like India. I attempted to support my claims by summarizing several classic authors, as well as examples to be found in India.

HYPER URBAN POPULATION GROWTH

Another factor affecting the persistence of urban squatting in India is the phenomenon of hyper urban population growth in the 21st century. From the problem of increasing spatial inequalities within cities, like many countries located in the Global South, India has seen a significant surplus of population growth in cities. This hyper growth and movement towards cities in India have also contributed to a higher demand for urban housing stock. While different reasons may exist for people moving to cities, one reason is tied to existing problems in traditional agricultural employment in rural areas and thus people are lured into the cities where they think they may have better job opportunities (Munshi 2016). According to the World Bank (2020a), in 2000, nearly 292 million people lived in urban areas in India. This number would increase to 335 million in 2005, to 381 million in 2010, and again increase to 429 million in 2015 (World Bank 2020a). The latest estimates available from the World Bank from 2019 suggest that the urban population of India has now reached nearly 471 million (World Bank 2020a).

On a somewhat positive note, the overall urban population in 1980 grew at a rate of 3.8 percent, declining to 2.4 percent in 2010 and by 2.3 percent in 2019 (World Bank 2020a). It is important to note that changes of the urban population growth in India may also likely be the

result of changes in fertility rates. This is noticeable when examining the fertility rate for Indian

women in 2000 which was at 3.31, and by 2010 would decline down to an average 2.5 children

for most women in India (World Bank 2020a). According to the World Bank (2020a), in 2019

the fertility rate for Indian women further declined to a rate of 2.2. An examination of the

population pyramid for India in 2019 (PopulationPyramid.net 2021) indicates patterns similar to

other Global South countries which often have higher birth rates and younger populations that

make up the bulk of the population structure. Despite fertility rates among Indian women being

far lower than the average fertility scores found in other Global South countries (e.g., Nigeria),

the population pyramid for India in 2019 (Population Pyramid 2021) still does not reflect the

population structure found in Global North countries.

In sum, hyper urban population growth is also a result of high fertility rates, which may

still place enormous demand on the housing stock supply in cities. It is plausible to argue this

creates a strain on institutions and also likely contributes to the persistence of urban squatting in

cities in cities like Mumbai, India.

STATELESS PERSONS IN INDIA

Besides hyper urban population growth, the phenomenon of stateless persons has also

contributed to the phenomenon of urban survival squatting in India in the 21st century. India is a

unique case because many stateless persons are also a byproduct of more recent state decisions in

2019 not to legally include people from certain regions of India like Assam, into the so-called

NRC, or The National Register of Citizens (Shahid, Patel, and Hemadri 2019). This act

essentially makes nearly 4 million people, mostly Bengali Muslims, stateless in the future

(Shahid et al. 2019).

In addition to the 4 million people already mentioned here, I examined the most recent 2019 refugee population count listed for India from the World Bank (2020a). This number seems to have stayed constant from 2010 to the latest available in 2019. To my initial surprise, this estimated number of 195,103 refugees in 2019 was actually quite low when compared to neighboring countries like Bangladesh who had more than 854,779 refugees in 2019, according to the World Bank (2020a). Regionally, Pakistan seems to have the highest number of documented refugees with more than 1,419,596 in 2019 (World Bank 2020a).

Stateless persons including refugees are at greater risk to engage in urban squatting because they are more likely impoverished, or without land, property, or housing on arriving in the new host country. Although host governments do sometimes offer aid and protection to refugees, sometimes host governments neglect refugees and provide little or no aid. Given this reality, some stateless people and refugees might therefore engage in what is known as "deprivation-based" squatting (Pruijt 2013).

DEREGULATION AND STATE RETRENCHMENT

Besides stateless persons in India, the continued persistence of urban squatting in 21st century India may also be linked with the radical governance shift in India and move towards deregulation and state retrenchment implemented by the state in the early 1990s. Using a comparative-historical analysis (Lange 2012), I offer several examples of how deregulation and state retrenchment measures have helped contribute to the continued persistence of urban squatting in India.

First, it is important to note that during the first two decades of the 21st century, India has had several prime ministers and different political parties in control of government. These were Atal Bihari Vajpayee (Bharatiya Janata Party, from 1998-2004), Manmohan Singh (Indian

National Congress, from 2004–2014), and finally, the current prime minister of India, Narendra Damodardas Modi (Bloomberg 2021; Bose 2013).

The shift towards deregulation and state retrenchment in India is historically associated with P. V. Narasimha Rao, who was prime minister of India from 1991 to 1996 (Bose 2013). Under his watch, the state would implement radical structural reforms with his so-called "New Industrial Policy," which would include deregulation and privatization measures (Bose 2013). Several key measures were implemented during these deregulation reforms including doing away with some import licensing requirements, as well as reduction of tariff requirements, including the reduction of certain commodities from export controls (Panagariya 2004).

Deregulation also was implemented in other areas including opening certain public industries to private investment, including foreign investors (Panagariya 2004). In addition, deregulation, in short, also meant that FDI and foreign banks would now be allowed to do business with very few restrictions in India (Panagariya 2004). Consequently, with the new governance strategy of deregulation starting in the early 1990s, there was a move towards what may be called state retrenchment and reduction of a safety-net, which also affected the poor. According to Davis, this produced societal side-effects:

> As any reader of the business press knows, the drastic neoliberal restructuring of the Indian economy after 1991 produced a high-tech boom and stock-market bubble whose frenzied epicenters were a handful of Cinderella cities: Bangalore, Pune, Hyderabad, and Chennai. GDP grew at 6 percent during the 1990s, while the capitalization of the Bombay Stock exchange doubled almost every year – and one result was one million new millionaires…Less publicized, however, was the accompanying growth in poverty. India gained 56 million more paupers in the course of the 'boom.' (2005:170-171)

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With Singh and later Modi now taking charge of India during the beginning of the 21st century, deregulation would still be on the state's agenda. Besides deregulating the telecommunication sector to foreign investors, under Prime Minister Singh, for example, India would also begin to allow its infrastructure, including highways, bridges, toll roads, harbors, ports, tunnels, to be privatized and owned fully by foreign investors (Panagariya 2004).

Under Prime Minister Modi, India would stick with its game plan and continued with policies of deregulation and state retrenchment. For example, under Modi, state-owned Indian railways would undergo privatization and allow foreign investments (Riley 2015).

 Other plans for deregulation included reforming labor laws. His most recent plans are to privatize far more state-owned companies, as well as state-owned Air India (Dhume 2021). What consequential impact these new measures brought by Modi will have for the poor remains to be a bone of contention. By all accounts, deregulation and state retrenchment and neglect, especially in rural India during the last decade, has brought about unintended consequences and has contributed to greater inequalities in certain sectors of Indian society.

There are of course different measures one might use to make this claim. According to the World Bank (2020a), the wealthiest 20 percent still receives 44.4 percent of the income while the lowest 10 percent receives only 3.5 percent. Meanwhile, deregulation and patterns of state retrenchment in the rural sector may also be reflected in the overall state of social protection coverage numbers in India. According to the ILO (2020a, 2020b), in 2019 only 24.4 percent of the total population in India was covered. In addition, only 24.4 percent of children have some sort of coverage, of those in maternity only 41.5 percent are covered, none of the unemployed are covered, only 3.7 percent of those with work injury are covered, 5.6 percent of those with

disability are covered, only those 42.5 percent of the elderly are covered, and finally tenure

insecurity persists with 22 percent of the population in India (ILO 2020a, 2020b).

For the purpose of this study, tenure insecurity is defined as "the lack of right of

individuals or groups to effective protection from involuntary removal from their land or

residence by the state" (LandVoc 2021). State retrenchment and neglect of rural India at the

expense of urban India also help explain the mass exodus of rural people seeking refuge in urban

areas, which still lack affordable rental housing stock. According to current statistics, rural

poverty is substantially higher than urban poverty (Bhattacharya and Devulapalli 2019). For

example, according to government statistics in India, in the year 2017–2018 the rural poverty

rate was 29.6 percent while urban poverty was significantly lower at 9.2 percent (Bhattacharya

and Devulapalli 2019). Given this imbalance, state retrenchment and neglect seems to be

partially reflected in the imbalance of rural and urban poverty rates, which persist to this day in

India. When the state neglects rural India it produces "boomerang effects" (Beck 1992) and

unintended consequences for the growth of "urban slums" and squatting in its cities.

LAND TENURE INSECURITY AND LAND GRABBING

To help get a preliminary understanding of the dimensions of the issue of land tenure

insecurity in India, I used survey data from Prindex (2020). Prindex (2020) provides

representative survey data taken from persons in countries to better understand perceptions

concerning property security or insecurity. According to the most recent survey results in 2020,

nearly 22 percent of the adult population surveyed in India felt insecure on their property or land

(Prindex 2020). In addition, another 21 percent of the adult population surveyed in India also felt

insecure regarding their right to their home (Prindex 2020).

Besides using survey data from Prindex (2020), I used descriptive data from the data research agency Land Conflict Watch (2021a). Like Prindex (2020), Land Conflict Watch (2021a) also documents social conflicts over land in India. Unlike Prindex (2020), they have a very large user-produced database that includes background information on land disputes and conflicts happening all over India.

To begin, I initially examined some of the descriptive statistics independent researchers and land activists acquired on land conflict in India. According to the database, some 7,269,091 people in India are currently affected by some kind of land conflict (Land Conflict Watch 2021a). In addition, some 2,891,027 hectares of land were also currently affected and some 2,615,554 investments in rupees (Land Conflict Watch 2021a). To get a better feel for the database, I used the search feature to look for issues that would highlight caste dynamics and land use conflict in India using the filter function. Figure 11 below illustrates the findings.

Dalit Communities in Maharashtra Demand Watan Lands Promised by Government

Reported by
Nihar Gokhale

Last updated on February 8, 2021

Location of Conflict
Achakdani
Solapur

State

Reason or Cause of Conflict
Caste-Based Conflict
Government's refusal to allot watan land that
was promised to the Dalit communities

Sector

People Affected by Conflict
240
—
Land Area Affected (in Hectares)
20ha

Figure 11. Snapshot from Database Search from Land Conflict Watch (Source: Land Conflict Watch 2021b)

The search result documents several important things including a brief description over the nature of the conflict, the name of the individual who reported the conflict, exact location of conflicts, a summary explaining the reason or cause of conflict, an estimate of people affected, as well as the land area affected (Land Conflict Watch 2021b).

Another aspect of land conflict is the issue of land grabbing, which also has significant ramifications in India. Besides India, it has also been a major issue in other Global South countries. According to the LandVoc (2021), land grabbing is defined as "large-scale acquisition of farmland (over 1,000 hectares) whether by purchase, leases or other means." I used Land Matrix (2020) to identify some of these hidden trails of transnational deals that involve land acquisition by outside companies from different countries in the world system. The surprising fact is that besides Global North countries, a number of Global South countries have acquired land in India. For example, Land Matrix indicated that the UK including Northern Ireland was

leading with nearly 44,437 hectares, followed by Macedonia with 5,593 hectares, followed by

the United States with 3,642 hectares, followed by Romania with 2,500 hectares, and Japan with

roughly 1,458 hectares (Land Matrix 2020). This list of Global South countries involved in

transnational land deals is a little longer and revealed that Guyana was leading with 737,814

hectares, followed by Indonesia with 530,000 hectares, followed Ghana with 422,607 hectares,

followed by Zambia with 320,000 hectares, followed by Ethiopia with 202,311 hectares,

followed by Sierra Leone with 119,321 hectares (Land Matrix 2020).

The search function found on Land Matrix (2020) also allows the researcher to examine

the nature of the deal and type of investment made. This land is purchased and used for biofuels,

industry, and food crops.

Given the size and nature of these deals, it is certain to have ramifications not just for less

land hectares available for people in India, but also ecological ramifications and concerns. To

sum up, the phenomenon of urban squatting in India may also be linked with issues like land

tenure insecurity and land grabbing.

INFORMAL SETTLEMENT: MUMBAI

This section includes a brief description and summary of one informal settlement located

in Mumbai, India, called Dharavi. This analysis is partly visual, descriptive, and finally

contextualizing the examples of urban squatting found in India into Pruijt's (2013) five squatting

types.

Dharavi

Dharavi is an informal settlement located in the city of Mumbai (formerly known as

Bombay). According to the CIA (2021) World Factbook, Mumbai's total estimated population

reached 20.668 million in 2021. It is the second biggest city in India compared to the capital

New Delhi, with an estimated population of more than 31.181 million people (CIA 2021). Like

many cities in India, Mumbai has a very high population density estimated at 73,000 per square

mile, which makes the city one of the most densely populated cities known in the world (World

Population Review 2021a). In addition to high population density, Dharavi urban squatters live

in a city with extreme air pollution regularly going above and beyond World Health Organization

standards (Bhalerao 2020). Some reports suggest that there is only one toilet available for

roughly every 1,444 people in Dharavi (Sinha 2006). The writer Mira Kamdar provides some

additional illumination:

> Any visitor to Bombay (Mumbai) is struck by the city's massive slums, which stretch
>
> away endlessly from edge of the airport, the belly of the incoming aircraft nearly grazing
>
> the rusted corrugated roofs of the sea of dusty hovels before clearing the chain-link fence
>
> at the end of the runway. At night, the homeless crowd every spare patch of pavement.
>
> Sidewalks, building thresholds, the bare ground under half-built flyovers, are covered by
>
> the sleeping forms of the poor. Those lucky enough to have a charpai, a simple wood-
>
> and-string bed, crowd onto it head to toe. There are little huts, shanties, and pavement
>
> dwellers next to clubs, next to luxury apartments, next to five star hotels. (Kamdar
>
> 2007:195)

Given the current information on Dharavi, this kind of urban squatting is mostly

"deprivation-based" (Pruijt 2013). However, evidence also suggests that many urban squatters in

Dharavi engage in various kinds of informal employment. Besides "deprivation-based" squatting

then, a kind of informal "entrepreneurial" squatting is also taking shape (Pruijt 2013). The

remaining two types of urban squatting, "conservational" and "political," do not seem to apply in

the Dharavi case and its inhabitants seem to be more engaged in urban survival squatting as a basic mechanism to survive.

Figure 12. Dharavi, Mumbai, India (Wikimedia Commons)

Figure 12 above illustrates the informal community known as Dharavi located in Mumbai, India. A brief visual inspection does seem to suggest that Dharavi fits into what Pruijt (2013) calls "deprivation-based" squatting. Many of the dwellings appear to be put together to form a makeshift community. This is different in character when comparing it to the other four types of urban squatting. When examining the picture as is, it is also not possible to determine if

the dwellings have access to water and electricity. Table 2 below details the different squatting

types from Pruijt (2013) that seem to exist in India.

Table 2. Overview of Pruijt's Squatting Types in India

Pruijt's (2013) five squatting types	India
1. Deprivation-based (Survival squatting)	✓ Examples exist in nearly all regions of India.
	Ex: Dharavi community in Mumbai, India as shown in Figure 12 above.
2. Alternative-housing strategy	N/A
3. Entrepreneurial	✓ City merchants squatting on streets.
4. Conservational	N/A
5. Political squatting	✓Mathura, India – Religious Cult- Squatters in 2016 which resulted in 24 deaths, including cult leader after eviction drive.
	✓ Left-wing Maoist rebels squatting in forests in eastern Chhattisgarh state.

Source: Aljazeera 2021; BBC News 2016.

Table 2 identifies all forms of urban squatting in India that seems to fit into Pruijt's five

squatting types (Pruijt 2013). I have already noted that the Dharavi squatter community in

Mumbai seems to fit into "deprivation-based" squatting. It was difficult to determine if squatters

in India also used squatted housing as "alternative-housing." Given the number of street

merchants/vendors and pavement dwellers engaged in informal employment, "entrepreneurial"

squatting is also taking place in Mumbai, and more likely other major cities in India. There was

not enough evidence indicating that "conservational" squatting was taking place in India.

Meanwhile, evidence for "political squatting" seems to occur in India from the extreme

right as well as the extreme left side of the political/ideological spectrum. Back in 2016, on the

right side of the political spectrum, a religious cult was engaging in squatting and defying the

India state government and its laws which resulted in 24 deaths, including the cult leader (BBC News 2016). On the left side of the political spectrum, "political squatting" has been documented among armed Maoist rebels squatting in forests as a make-shift community. The squatting typologies produced by Pruijt (2013) could not account for all types of associated squatting in India. The indigenous tribal people known as Adivasi, for example, are a socially marginalized group of people who have become victims of "expulsions" (Sassen 2018) from their lands. Specifically, the Adivasi were legally evicted from living in forest areas because of a Supreme court decision in 2019 (India Environmental Portal 2019, Thekaekara 2019).

This type of phenomenon in which socially marginalized groups become squatters through no action of their own is not accounted for in the squatting typology produced by Pruijt (2013). For that reason, it is necessary to include "expulsions" as a new category to the list which Sassen (2018) also brings up on several occasions in her works. For Sassen (2018), "expulsions" implies large amounts of the poor, including refugees, being expelled from lands and territories, which is tied to drastic structural shifts and extensive commodification happening in global capitalism.

CHAPTER VI

BRAZILIAN CASE

What follows are the results of the Brazilian Case. This section focuses on the

comparative-historical analysis (Lange 2012) conducted for the historical period 2000 to 2020.

Similar to the Indian case, I organize this chapter around a list of eight causal narratives. There

are several key entry points connected to the structural dynamics found in Brazil, which help to

provide explanations for the persistence of urban squatting in such an unevenly developed

country.

ANTI-DEMOCRATIC AND AUTHORITARIAN LEGACY

Numerous South American countries like Brazil, Chile, or Argentina, experienced their

own anti-democratic and authoritarian pasts that occurred throughout the 20th century. In the

case of Brazil, this historical legacy was a coup and military dictatorship that lasted from 1964 to

1985 (Palmowski 2004). During this 20-year period, various radical anti-democratic measures

were established by the military dictatorship that had severe ramifications for Brazilian society,

affecting almost everyone. One of these included the passage of so-called "Institutional Acts"

from 1964 to 1974 that resulted in the suspension of elections at all political levels (Perlman

2011).

Besides the suspension of elections, other radical measures were implemented by the

military dictatorship including torture and countless arrests of members of the political

opposition (Perlman 2011). According to historical estimates, the new measures sanctioned by

the military dictatorship also likely resulted in the deaths of hundreds (Filho 2012). The military

dictatorship used "death squads" to punish its political opponents including union leaders, and

were also known to target journalists (Page 1996). In addition to state-sanctioned use of death-

squads, some estimates suggest that 50,000 people were possibly detained during the military dictatorship (Filho 2012). In addition to these known deaths and thousands of likely detentions, Filho also estimated that some 10,000 or so people were also forced into exile because of the military dictatorship (2012).

In the first two decades of the 21st century, Brazilian society seems to be slowly recovering from its anti-democratic and authoritarian past. While Brazil is no longer ruled by a military dictatorship, there are still signs it has not yet fully recovered and still has numerous societal problems that often evoke this anti-democratic and authoritarian past. Using this anti-democratic and authoritarian past, I demonstrate the continuity between the past and contemporary events in the first two decades of the 21st century.

An example that has often been brought up by various scholars studying Brazil is the continued phenomenon of police killings. This relates to the frequent questionable use of deadly force by the police that has often resulted in deaths of many inhabitants of the favelas (urban slums). According to one scholar studying the lives of urban squatters in the favelas:

> The police are the face of the state in the favelas. They are the most visible government presence in these communities, and they contribute to the problem by their unwarranted use of lethal force, technically referred to as extrajudicial violence. Community residents consider the police worse than the traffic because the police enter the favelas prepared to kill anything that moves and leave once they are finished. (Perlman 2011:167)

Perlman (2011) seems to suggest the absence of rule of law and process when it comes to the use of police force, especially in the favelas in Brazil. This is perhaps best illustrated with patterns of extrajudicial violence often impacting inhabitants of the favelas, which places them at far greater risk of being exposed to such deadly force compared to those who do not live in the

favelas. Patterns described by Perlman (2011) give further salience to the continuity of the anti-democratic and authoritarian past which still seem to linger in Brazil in the first two decades of the 21st century.

In the 21st century, an additional example concerns reports on human rights violations. The non-governmental organization Human Rights Watch (2021) produced a report that detailed human rights violations occurring in Brazil in 2020 (Human Right Watch 2021). The report places the numbers of police killings in 2020 at 6,357 (Human Rights Watch 2021). The report also mentioned how indigenous people living in the Amazon regions were victimized by various criminal elements, which resulted in about 200 people being killed over issues related to land (Human Rights Watch 2021).

In addition to the human rights violations reported by Human Rights Watch, the instances of oppositional politicians, environmental activists, and trade unionists who have been killed in the first two decades of the 21st century also seem to re-evoke the anti-democratic and authoritarian past. A notable example was the killing of Marielle Franco, a councilwoman in the city of Sao Paulo in 2018 (Langlois 2018). Franco was a known oppositional party member, political activist for the poor, and her killing reached international news outlets around the world highlighting the wave of killings happening in Brazil (Langlois 2018). Not only have well-known opposition politicians like Franco been killed, environmental activists have also been killed over the last two decades.

According to statistics provided by the non-governmental (human rights) organization Global Witness, in 2019, some 24 environmentalists or environmental defenders were killed (Global Witness 2021). Brazil ranks third after the Philippines, which had 43 recorded deaths,

and Colombia, another South American neighboring country ranking first with 64 documented cases of environmental activists being killed (Global Witness 2021).

Instances of trade unionists being intimidated and/or killed in Brazil have also received attention from various global trade union organizations. According to a report produced by ITUC (2019) in 2019, Brazil is one of the 10 countries with the highest negative ratings for global rights violations and workers' rights violations. In the section focusing on Brazil, the report notes the murder of a civil servants' union president Aroldo Pereira de Souza in 2018 as evidence for the hostile conditions for trade union organizing (ITUC 2019). The report also notes more recent trends by the Brazilian state under far-right President Jair Bolsonaro to reform and consolidate labor laws known as Consolidated Labor Law (CLT), which have severely reduced various collective agreements by more than 45 percent since being implemented in 2018 (ITUC 2019).

An anti-democratic and authoritarian legacy still haunts Brazil in the first two decades of the 21st century. Although Brazil has since changed and is no longer being ruled as a military dictatorship, there are patterns that suggest a continuity of the anti-democratic and authoritarian past.

ORGANIZED POLITICAL SQUATTING

Urban squatting in Brazil is also connected to what Pruijt (2013:23) has called political squatting or squatting that is often geared towards "building up a counter-power to the state." In the case of Brazil, this political form of squatting also seems to align with numerous urban squatting movements that have persisted throughout the late 20th century and early 21st century (Stronzake and Wolford 2016).

One notable example is the MST (*Movimento dos Trabalha-dores Sem-Terra*), a landless workers' social movement, which was founded in 1984 (Stronzake and Wolford 2016). One year

before the military dictatorship officially ended in Brazil, the MST was founded with the support of various institutions and organizations ranging from the Lutheran and Catholic church, trade union members, as well as leftists who had been barred from the country during the height of the military dictatorship (Stronzake and Wolford 2016).

As a left-wing movement, one of the primary political aims of the MST has been to encourage the poor and landless in Brazil to engage in squatting activities in accordance with Article 186 of the Brazilian Constitution, which was adopted in 1988 (Stronzake and Wolford 2016). Specifically, Article 186 stipulates the following precise conditions regarding land governance in Brazil:

> I – rational and adequate use; II– adequate use of available natural resources and preservation of the environment ; III–compliance with the provisions that regulate labor relations; IV– exploitation that favors the well-being of the owners and labourers.
>
> (Organization of American States 2021)

The 1988 Brazilian Constitution is an important legal development that came into force after decades of military dictatorship. Besides abolishing the death penalty, Article 186, for example, allows for the expropriation of land when it serves no apparent social function to the community (Stronzake and Wolford 2016). In addition to Article 186, Article 183 in the 1988 Brazilian Constitution indirectly also gave urban squatters more legal protections. For example, Article 183 maintains that one can attain ownership over land if it is occupied continuously for a minimum of 5 years. This has opened a legal pathway for some squatters to be able to acquire property (Stronzake and Wolford 2016).

Nowadays, the MST is still politically active organizing in various regions in Brazil and has, according to some estimates, some 1.5 million members, and around 2,000 settlements, and some 120,000 families that are still engaged in squatting (Stronzake and Wolford 2016).

Figure 13. Official Flag Used by Members of the MST Since 1987 (Wikimedia Commons)

Figure 13 represents the flag of the MST since 1987. While the MST is by far one of the largest social movements in Brazil that engages in political squatting to this day, several other smaller social movements have emerged since and have much in common with the MST. One of these is the MNLM (*Movimiento Nacional de luta pela Moradia*), which also engages in urban squatting (Wittger 2017). Organizations like MNLM also go about actually managing the squats they occupy (Wittger 2017). Wittger (2017) noted that organizations like the MNLM would also require weekly political organizational meetings in which all inhabitants of the squat would be forced to attend and participate. These had the purpose of informing participants of new rule

changes or prohibition of certain behaviors in the squats like fighting and/or use of drugs (Wittger 2017).

Besides the more well-known organizations like the MST and MNLM, other social movements have also emerged that often support urban squatters or the homeless including the MSTC (*Movimento de Se-Teto do Centro*) as well as FLP (*Frente de Luta Popular*) and the UNMP (*Uniao Nacional por Moradia Populat*), all of which have taken up issues related to housing insecurity in Brazil (Phillips 2006).

Meanwhile, state responses towards MST and movements that engage in urban squatting or side with urban squatters have often depended on which specific political party and president was governing Brazil at the time. To be sure, since the founding of the MST in 1984, a total of nine Brazilian presidents have held office. The frequent changes in this office have contributed to a lack of continuity in policies toward urban squatters.

It is important to note that former president Lula da Silva and former President Dilma Rousseff were both members of the left-wing Workers Party (PT; CIA 2021). It is fair to speculate that as members of the PT, they would have the most sympathy towards urban and rural squatters and the propertyless because it is generally a pro-worker and left-leaning party receiving much support from the trade unions and the poor in Brazil.

This, perhaps, also explains the political action that President Lula da Silva took in 2009 when he granted land rights to squatters who were living in the Amazon rainforest (Phillips 2009). The law would later permit current landowners who could prove they lived in the lands prior to 2004 be provided land tenure (Phillips 2009). When Dilma Rousseff assumed the presidency, a similar pattern of supporting the poor was also reflected in the Keynesian approach

adopted by the new president which involved the state committing itself to build roughly 350,000 new low-cost affordable housing units (Reuters 2014).

When Jair Bolsonaro became president in 2019, the state took what appears to be an authoritarian turn towards squatters and squatter movements generally. This can be observed as the new government went about classifying squatting, including squatting movements like the MST, as a form of terrorism (Spring and Boadle 2019). Other policy shifts under Bolsonaro also occurred that significantly affected squatters and their informal settlements. One such example was the passage of legislation in 2020 that would allow foreign entities to begin owning as well as being able to lease rural land (Araujo 2020). Under President Bolsonaro, military and police raids of informal settlements like the favelas in Rio de Janeiro would also further intensify. This is, perhaps, best illustrated by a police and military raid in the favelas that occurred in the spring of 2021 that resulted in the deaths of 25 people (BBC News 2021a).

In Brazil, a peculiar form of political squatting tradition has taken place which seems to be qualitatively different from the popular forms of squatting found in other areas of the Global South. The strength and power of squatting in Brazil can also be partially explained as an outcome of the efforts of various social movements and organizations including the MST and the MNLM, as well as many smaller organizations.

RELIGIOSITY

In addition to the social phenomenon of organized political squatting, another entry point is the degree of religiosity often found among numerous poor urban squatters in Brazil. The liberation theology turn within Catholicism in the 1970s, as well as the more recent turn to evangelicalism in the 21st century, still indicates that religiosity thrives among many residents of informal settlements to this day. This contributes to the persistence of informal housing in Brazil.

During the 1970s liberation theology spread throughout Latin America. McDonnell (2018:2) argues that a left turn took place among liberation theologians in Latin America during the 1970s that rejected the role of mainstream religion that favored "rites and adherence to a body of doctrine and ritualistic practice." Rather, for liberation theologians "an alternative understanding was put forward, reconceiving the demands of faith as, first and foremost, commitment to the oppressed and suffering" (McDonnell 2018:2). In summary, liberation theology reflected the influence of the Marxist inspired focus on class struggles/revolution with an important inclusion of religious altruistic principles that encourage mutually aiding the poor and oppressed in capitalism.

It is clear that in Brazil there were many religious activists who were often directly inspired by liberation theology. They also assisted in many of the social movements including the MST, and the PT (McDonnell 2018). This impact of religion persists and can often still be found in many corners of Brazil, including informal settlements. For example, in her ethnographic study on the favelas in Rio de Janeiro, Perlman (2011:104) described this religious presence in the following words:

> There are four Catholic churches, a number of Protestant churches, many dozens and types of Pentecostal and Evangelical churches, and a few remaining terreiros. The Evangelical churches have the greatest presence in the community—from the tiny ones on nearly every street to the large temples that rise above the houses. They hold weekly or daily prayer sessions, and singing can be heard as you walk by.

Over a decade has passed since Perlman (2011) conducted her ethnographic work, yet the continued resilience of religion and growth of new Protestant denominations persists in the favelas. This seems to be happening in one favela located in the southern part of Rio de Janeiro

in which two Catholic churches are competing with nearly 15 Evangelical churches (Arsenault 2017). In the midst of state retrenchment and growing despair among the urban poor in the favelas, it seems many are no longer connected with Catholicism and have found refuge in the Evangelical religion instead. It was perhaps one reason why Pope Francis decided to visit a favela in 2013 in Rio de Janeiro, recognizing the winds of change were starting (Watts 2013).

Whether or not the Evangelical religion continues to displace Catholicism, religion remains a salient force in 21st century Brazil. To illustrate possible linkages between religion and urban squatting, I reference the Inglehart-Welzel Cultural Map—World Values Survey 7 (2020) that I previously used in the Indian case. Brazil is located vertically, more towards the traditional values side, and horizontally, more on the survival values side, rather than the self-expression-based values side (World Values Survey 2020). The Inglehart-Welzel Cultural map cannot be used here as a sole measure to fully establish that religiosity remains a salient force in Brazilian society in the 21st century, especially among poor urban squatters. As noted earlier, radical changes have occurred in the Christian religious landscape in Brazil as illustrated by an apparent drastic membership change occurring from Catholicism towards Protestantism and affiliated movements like Evangelical and Pentecostal denominations (Arsenault 2017). At first glance, this may initially complicate the argument that religiosity is still a salient force in Brazil given the fluidness and drastic membership changes happening between Catholicism and Protestantism. Nevertheless, it is fair to point to the impact and revivalism of so-called "charismatic christianity" in Brazil in the first two decades of the 21st century (Chesnut 2017). Hence, more recent scholarship on the role of "charismatic christianity" points to the fact that such charismatic-style mobilization in Brazil has often been useful in mobilizing people within such religious movements as well (Chesnut 2017). This widespread resonance of "charismatic

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christianity" in Brazil has also found support among the poor in informal settlements given the recorded growth of higher protestant denominations in the favelas (Arsenault 2017).

In sum, starting with the phenomenon of liberation theology in Brazil and the rest of Latin America in the 1970s, religion has had a direct impact on many supporters of political squatting movements like the MST in Brazil. In the first two decades of the 21st century, religion seems to remain salient among the poor in informal settlements including the favelas in Rio de Janeiro. The rise of "charismatic christianity" (Chesnut 2017) seems to still mobilize persons in Brazil, including the poor living in the favelas.

HYPERGLOBALIZATION

As demonstrated in the Indian case, during the last two decades of the 21st century, Brazil has also been significantly affected by hyperglobalization. Thus, when I imply hyperglobalization, this more or less "refers to growing economic linkages at the global" (Ritzer 2010:517). Similar definitions of economic globalization can also be found in the works of social scientists like Bauman (2004), Giddens (1999), Friedman (2009), Rodrik (2011), and Ritzer (2010).

I adopt the same measures of hyperglobalization that Sassen (2019) uses in her work. One of these pertains to foreign assets located in Brazil from 2005 to 2020 (Sassen 2019). This is illustrated in Figure 14 below.

Net of foreign assets in Brazil 2005-2020
(listed in $ billions except the year 2020
which is listed in $ trillion)

Figure 14. Net of Foreign Assets in Brazil (In Billions, Except the Year 2020 Reaches Trillions) (Source: World Bank 2020a)

Figure 14 illustrates the net increase of foreign assets in Brazil from the years 2005 through 2020. Starting in the year 2005, the net of foreign assets was at $78 billion and jumped significantly to nearly $376 billion in 2010 (World Bank 2020a). The newest data indicates that foreign assets have grown dramatically, reaching $1.298 trillion in 2020 (World Bank 2020a). The increase in foreign assets in Brazil has been enormous and increased 382 percent from 2005 to 2010. From 2010 to 2020 foreign assets in Brazil would again increase substantially by more than 245 percent. A similar trend can be observed when looking at the external debt accumulated by Brazil in the first two decades of the 21st century.

Figure 15. Brazil External Debt 2005–2019 (In $ Billions) (Source: World Bank 2020a)

Figure 15 above documents the increase in Brazil's external debt from the years 2005–2019 in billions. According to the World Bank, the external debt owed by Brazil in 2005 was $188 billion (World Bank 2020a). This would increase substantially to $352 billion in 2010 (World Bank 2020a). The latest estimates provided by the World Bank suggest that the external debt owed by Brazil has reached $569 billion (World Bank 2020a).

One side effect of large external debts is that governments may seek accelerated ways to pay off this huge debt owed by implementing austerity measures or avenues for privatization of state-owned enterprises to generate quick immediate cash. For example, in 2021, the current government privatized various industries that were previously public owned. A recent example is the sale of water treatment facilities and operation licenses to private entities for a price of $4 billion in the city of Rio de Janeiro (Deutsche Welle 2021). While the financial aspects of

privatizing may often bring immediate cash flows to the state, the long-term consequences, particularly to the poor, may only become noticeable decades later. Both the burden of external debt, as well as the privatization of key public utilities in Brazil also illuminates the asymmetry often found in many developing countries trying to compete in the world economy.

The immediate risk inherent in the state turning towards marketization as a solution for debt problems is that during the last two decades global warming has made the problem of water scarcity even worse. According to an article by the *New York Times* from 2015, water scarcity issues have become serious matters in major cities like Sao Paulo, Brazil, which has placed additional constraints on governments to address the problem (Romero 2015). Marketization slowly creeps in the shadows with the promise of quick profits and pressures for state privatization, placing no limits on what might be earned from water scarcity and other problems due to global warming in the 21st century.

In summary, hyperglobalization, as demonstrated by the growth of foreign assets and debt owed Brazil from 2005–2019, as well as trends of privatization of public utilities like water treatment and water services seem to indicate a greater shift towards marketization in Brazil in the 21st century. The phenomenon of urban squatting is also affected by the marketization turn implemented by the state. Urban squatting, especially "deprivation-based" squatting and "political squatting" as described by Pruijt (2013), is at least in part a direct consequence of increasing marketization in Brazil during the last two decades of the 21st century.

INFORMAL LABOR

Beck (2000) used the phrase "Brazilianization of the west," warning that many sectors of the labor economy in the Global North started to mimic the informal labor economy dominating cities of Brazil and the rest of South America. The study of informal economic and labor

structures has a long history and may even go as far back as Liebow's (1967) classic study of

African American men engaging in informal labor on the streets of Washington D.C. Almost 50

years later, Standing (2011) would apply the term *precariat* to this new phenomenon, which

Liebow (1967) previously observed. In short, for Standing (2011), this new *precariat* indicated

the new reality of insecure and non-standard working conditions and its appearance in a variety

of emerging sectors of the Global North rather than the Global South.

When the investigative journalist Neuwirth (2016) visited the famous favela known as

Rocinha, he reported on the visible underground economy that persisted in this unique informal

squatter neighborhood in Rio de Janeiro. In his book, he notes:

> I entered Rocinha from the Passarela…the first experience of Rocinha is a crowd of
>
> camelos (street vendors). Most of them are illegal, but they do business openly, even
>
> though there's a police kiosk strategically placed on the edge of the favela. Newly issued
>
> CDs of Caetano Veloso, MV Bill, pop, oldies, and current rock 'n' roll are sold here for
>
> a buck. They are all illegal, pirated, their jackets simply color copies of the
>
> originals…Next to the CDs are candy bars and soccer jerseys, bikinis and bibles, flip-
>
> flops and floppy disks. Anything and everything you could imagine. (Neuwirth 2016:31-
>
> 32)

Given this account by Neuwirth (2016), it is fair to assume that this informal labor

economy he observed in Rio de Janeiro likely also dominates the type of employment found in

many other informal settlements in Brazil to this day. This narrative also seems to be further

supported by data from the World Bank (2020a) detailed in Figure 16 below.

Figure 16. Informal Employment in Brazil 2012–2020 (Percent) (Source: ILO 2020c)

Figure 16 illustrates changes in the annual percentages of informal employment in Brazil from the years 2012 to 2020. In the year 2012, for example, informal employment was at 45.10 percent (ILO 2020c). This slightly reduced to 45 percent in 2015. Informal employment decreased to 39.80 percent in 2018 and stayed essentially constant at 38.2 percent in 2020 (ILO 2020c). Overall, when examining the available data, it is safe to say that since the year 2018 the percentage of those informally employed has remained fairly constant. Still, almost half of the working population in Brazil seems to be informally employed.

When Hochuli (2021) titled one of his articles "The Brazilianization of the World," he hinted that informal employment trends were no longer just limited to Brazil but were being exported globally. Besides Brazil, informal labor is extremely high in other neighboring countries in South and Central America (ILO 2020c). For example, in the neighboring country of

Bolivia, informal labor employment for 2020 was estimated to be around 84.9 percent, while in Mexico it was estimated to be at 65.9 percent (ILO 2020c). In Central America, informal labor is far more extreme and estimated to be at 79 percent in Guatemala, 82.6 percent in Honduras, and 81.8 percent in Nicaragua (ILO 2020c).

Unstable and informal employment regimes relate to the persistence of informal settlements and urban squatting phenomenon. Although labor and housing often seem to be two differentiated spheres, the descriptive account provided by Neuwirth (2016) on the favelas suggest that informal labor was deeply embedded in the informal communities in Rio de Janeiro. This also seems to be further supported by some authors who have written on informal settlements in India (Boo 2014).

HYPER URBAN POPULATION GROWTH

The continued problem of hyper urban population growth in the first two decades of the 21st century has also contributed to the persistence of urban squatting. As I also noted previously in the case of India, hyper population growth seems to increase the dimension of spatial inequalities in cities of the Global South. It also places a greater demand on available housing stock in the cities. There may be several reasons people from rural areas attempt their luck in the cities. First, the lack of opportunity structures in the rural areas of Brazil should be seen as push factors into the cities. Second, there is a land grabbing problem, which also should be seen as another push factor of Brazilians moving into the cities. Third, there are increasingly ecological problems like drought, which seems to also drive more individuals to take their chances in the overcrowded slums of the cities. World Bank data allows us to examine how this urban population growth has taken place in Brazil (World Bank 2020a). According to the World Bank in 2000, there were 141 million people located in urban areas (cities) in Brazil (World Bank

2020a). This number of urbanites increased to 165 million people in 2010 (World Bank 2020a). In 2015, the urban population would grow again in Brazil reaching 175 million, and the latest available data from 2019 indicated that nearly 183 million people live in urban areas (World Bank 2020a).

Such hyper urban population growth may help account for the increased demand placed on the urban housing stock in cities. This strain of hyper urban population growth also contributes to the persistence of urban squatting in cities like Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, Brazil.

REFUGEES FROM NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES

In addition to hyper urban population growth, as a result of mostly violent conflicts happening throughout South America, the forced migration of many refugees from neighboring countries like Venezuela has also brought about additional pressure to bear on the already overwhelmed urban housing stock in cities in Brazil. The data offers a better picture of refugee population trends in Brazil in the last two decades of the 21st century. This data shows that the refugee population increased from 2718 in 2000 to 32,844 in 2019 (World Bank 2020a).

Although these refugee numbers have remained below 35,000 from the year 2000 to 2019, any additional conflict and instabilities in the region may play a role in contributing to less or more refugee numbers in future decades (World Bank 2020a).

The term stateless persons is sometimes also used to describe the situation faced by many refugees. Similar to the situation of refugees in India, although the state will attempt to assist refugees, they will still often lack money and resources on arrival. In some cases, emergency housing might be provided to assist refugees by the state and charity organizations, yet this is often temporary in nature. There might then be a tendency among refugees to engage in some

form of "deprivation-based" squatting (Pruijt 2013). This is also supported by an article that documented the life of a Syrian refugee who arrived as a refugee in Brazil in 2015 and who spent some of his time as a squatter in the city of Rio de Janeiro (Brasileiro 2016).

LAND CONFLICT AND LAND GRABBING

Besides the prevalence of land conflict, land grabbing by foreign countries in Brazil has also brought a magnitude of social problems tied to huge land acquisitions. As with the Indian case, I used the Land Matrix to discover the hidden trails of transnational deals and purchasing significant amounts of land in Brazil. For example, the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland held 106,499 hectares, and the United States held 806,969 hectares (Land Matrix 2020). In addition, a number of Global South countries have also engaged in transnational land deals in Brazil. These include the neighboring South American country of Argentina with 37,000 hectares and Chile with 420,300 hectares (Land Matrix 2020).

It is important to note that Land Matrix (2020) also permits us to look at the nature of the land deals. For Brazil, the leasing and usage of land seems to be primarily for timber plantation, biofuels, food crops, industry, and so-called non-food agricultural commodities like clothing (Land Matrix 2020). Given the degree of land grabbing happening in Brazil in the 21st century, it is reasonable to assume this has also contributed to land tenure insecurities among many Brazilians who live near areas directly affected by land grabbing. According to recent survey data from Prindex (2020) in 2020, nearly 23 percent of the adult population surveyed in Brazil felt insecure on their property or land. Another 22 percent of the adult population surveyed in India also felt insecure regarding their right to their home (Prindex 2020). While the survey from Prindex (2020) only reveals subjective views of people and insecurities they are

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feeling, it may also be reflective of increasing anxieties about land tenure and land conflict in Brazil in the 21st century

Land grabbing and land conflict contribute to tenure insecurity issues among many Brazilians living in areas where marketization is starting to impact land relations. This has been partially confirmed by the most recent survey data from Prindex (2020) that has surveyed respondents regarding their feelings on their land and property. Land grabbing then may contribute to the continued phenomenon of urban squatting as a form of resistance towards marketization and land grabbing by various foreign companies or investors engaged in land speculation.

INFORMAL SETTLEMENT: ROCINHA

This section provides a short summary and description of an informal settlement located in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, known as Rocinha. The analysis contains a brief visual documentation of the informal settlement, as well as essential descriptive information. I link Rocinha to other known cases of urban squatting found in Brazil using the five original urban squatting typologies originally listed by Pruijt (2013).

Rocinha

Rocinha is considered by far the largest known informal settlement in Brazil and is located in the city of Rio de Janeiro. According to the CIA (2021) World Factbook, Rio de Janeiro's estimated population reached 13.544 million in 2021. Rio is considered the second biggest city in Brazil compared to the largest city of Sao Paulo with an estimated population of 22.237 million in 2021 (CIA 2021). Some rough estimates suggest that there may be as many as 180,000 people living in Rocinha alone (BBC News 2014). While Rio de Janeiro is not as

densely populated as Mumbai, India, Rio de Janeiro nevertheless still has a population density well over of 13,930 per square mile (World Population Review 2021a).

Academics as well as non-academics have taken substantial interest in studying favelas like Rocinha in Rio de Janeiro (Neuwirth 2016; Perlman 2011; Wittiger 2017). Although there are several other known favelas located in the city of Rio de Janeiro, the interest in Rocinha might be that it clearly represents what Vasudevan (2015) has once called "the make-shift city." The fact that Rocinha continues to be seen as a "make-shift city" rather than as a permanent city might also be the reason why it continues to generate so much outside interest. When the investigative journalist Neuwirth (2016) decided to stay with actual inhabitants in Rocinha to write his book — the theme of "make-shift city" was also evoked on several occasions. For example, Neuwirth (2016) notes that even in the very beginning it was never certain if Rocinha would remain as a neighborhood. In fact, according to Neuwirth (2016):

> Rocinha's early residents followed an unwritten rule: built nothing permanent. The early settlers assumed that building a stone or brick home would be so brazen that it might encourage the government to come out and demolish the homes, while making do with rickety mud and wood houses would not seem threatening to the government. (40)

Besides investigative journalists like Neuwirth (2016) in the last two decades, thousands of tourists from mostly well-off countries have also participated in so-called 'slum tours' of Rocinha (Draven 2019). Yet, many of these fee-based tours have raised ethical questions whether or not these further stigmatize poor communities in Brazil turning poverty into new forms of consumption (Draven 2019).

To this day, Rocinha remains a vibrant "make-shift city" that would best fit under the "deprivation-based" form of urban squatting (Pruijt 2013). Since ethnographic evidence suggests

that residents are engaged in informal employment, this indicates that some inhabitants of Rocinha also engage in forms of "entrepreneurial" squatting (Pruijt 2013). Although there appears to be no evidence of "political squatting" currently happening in Rocinha, there is substantial evidence that "political squatting" has taken place in other Brazilian communities including the city of Sao Paulo. This has already been well-documented by the ethnographic study of several politically organized informal settlements in Sao Paulo by Wittger (2017).

Figure 17. Rocinha, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil (Picture was taken by Alicia Nijdam)

Figure 17 above illustrates the informal community known as Rocinha located in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil in 2020. As illustrated in Figure 17, high rise apartments overshadow the smaller dwellings that are also divided by a major highway. The smaller dwellings on the other side of the highway make up the informal settlement known as Rocinha, Rio de Janeiro.

Table 3. Overview of Pruijt's 5 Squatting Types in Brazil

Pruijt's (2013) five squatting types	Brazil
1. Deprivation-based (Survival squatting)	✓ Examples exist in major cities of Brazil including Sau Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. Ex: Rocinha, Rio de Janeiro as shown in Figure 17 above.
2. Alternative-housing strategy	N/A
3. Entrepreneurial	✓ City merchants squatting on streets in Rio de Janeiro selling goods.
4. Conservational	N/A
5. Political squatting	✓ MST (*Movimento dos Trabalhadores Sem-Terra*) ✓ MNLM (*Movimento Nacional de luta pela Moradia*),

Source: Wittger 2017.

Table 3 identifies all forms of urban squatting in Brazil that appear to fit into Pruijt's five squatting types (Pruijt 2013). There is evidence from ethnographic studies that "deprivation-based" and "entrepreneurial" squatting is also taking place. There was not enough available evidence indicating the "conservational" squatting is taking place in Brazil. According to ethnographic research by Wittger (2017), left-inspired "political" squatting seems to be active in the city of Sao Paulo where political groups occupy as well as organize and manage many of the squats inside the city. Like many indigenous groups located in the Amazon, they face "expulsions" (Sassen 2018) from illegal loggers and others interested in extracting resources from the Amazon rainforest. Thus, it seems appropriate to place the tribe of Awa into the alternative "expulsions" category rather than in Pruijt's (2013) typologies.

CHAPTER VII

NIGERIAN CASE

This chapter presents the results of the Nigerian Case. It focuses on the comparative-historical analysis (Lange 2012), which was conducted for the historical period 2000–2021. Similar to the Indian and Brazilian cases, the results section is structured with nine causal narratives that appeared to be the most salient explanations for the persistence of urban squatting in this unevenly developed country. As illustrated also in the Indian and Brazilian cases, there are important historical and structural dimensions to consider in Nigeria that contribute to urban squatting in numerous regions of the country.

MILITARY RULE AND VIOLENCE

Nigeria has had an extensive history shaped by military rule and violence. This can be traced back to British Colonial rule, which started in the 1880s and would not end officially until Nigeria became an independent nation on October 1, 1960 (Palmowski 2004). In the post-colonial era, military violence and violence persisted in Nigeria throughout the 20th century. One can easily point to the bloody civil war that occurred in Nigeria from 1967–1970, which exemplified various examples of harsh military rule and violence (Palmowski 2004). Nevertheless, even after the civil war period from 1967–1970, the military and its leaders frequently instigated coups, nullified elections, and through the use of military force governed Nigeria throughout much of the late 20th century (Palmowski 2004). An example was the 1983 coup under General Muhammadu Buhari who used the military to take power away from the democratically-elected president in May 1984. Patterns of military-style governance would continue with General Ibrahim Babangida in 1992 when he allowed just two parties to operate in Nigeria, and when the results did not go in his favor, he canceled the election results and put in

place an interim president (Palmowski 2004). This move did not suffice for some of the higher Nigerian military brass, so another coup occurred by General Abacha in 1993 (Palmowski 2004).

Military violence and political repression towards environmental activists and trade union leaders has also been part of Nigerian history during the final decades of the 20th century. This is best reflected, perhaps, when the military regime under General Abacha in 1995 falsely accused nine environmental activists of murder and subsequently executed them (Deutsche Welle 2020). A similar story of excessive use of military force occurred in the fall of 1999 when Nigerian military troops entered a community known as Odi near the Niger Delta and exchanged gunfire with several youths there (Human Rights Watch 2000). Testimony was later put together by human rights activists that estimated a dozen or so people were killed by Nigerian troops (Human Rights Watch 2000). To this day, protests are held in Nigeria accusing both state actors and corporate involvement of the Anglo-Dutch oil firm Shell in the killings and burning of villages in the Ogoniland region that occurred in the 1990s (BBC News 2017). While Shell continues to deny being involved in the killings and burnings of villages that occured in the 1990s, human rights activists believe there is a link (BBC News 2017).

As Nigeria proceeds through the first two decades of the 21st century, the country is still recovering from its previous history of military rule and sustained violence. While Muhammado Buhari, the current president of Nigeria, was elected democratically in 2019, Nigeria has not transitioned beyond its military rule and violence, especially given what is continuing to unfold even in the first two decades of the 21st century. In fact, there is a pattern of continuity rather than transition, especially with state response towards urban squatters in the 21st century. In 2017, Amnesty International examined the various excessive uses of physical force by the Nigerian state security and police during the process of implementing forced evictions in various

informal settlements in the city of Lagos. The 2017 report highlighted a variety of human rights

violations that occurred during the forced evictions in Lagos among the informal settlements

known as Ilubrin and Otodo-Gbame (Amnesty International 2017). The report highlighted the

use of excessive force by the police towards squatters that caused the death of a minimum of 10

people who were all unlawfully killed between November 9, 2016 and April 9, 2017 (Amnesty

International 2017). The report included pictures as visual evidence in which members of the

Nigerian Police Force used military style weapons including a Kalashnikov/Ak-47 rifle as well

evidence of the use of tear gas discovered through the remains of the canisters left behind by the

police (Amnesty International 2017). The report also highlighted other evidence of additional

human rights violations including residents being assaulted, the use of non-uniformed armed

persons assisting in the evictions, and the housing and belongings of the squatters being set on

fire (Amnesty International 2017).

The report also maintained that by using the police to administer forced evictions of

informal settlements in Lagos, other important human rights were also systematically violated

(Amnesty International 2017). According to the report, these basic human rights violations also

affected the right of education, the right to work, the right to life, the right to be free from cruel,

inhuman, and degrading treatment, and finally the right to be able to protect one's family from

violence (Amnesty International 2017).

Besides the issue of human rights violations towards urban squatters in Lagos, the

frequent killing of trade union leaders also seems to suggest a continuity of military style

governance and violence in Nigeria in the 21st century. In 2004, for example, two people

involved in a trade union strike in Lagos were killed by Nigerian security police while others

were beaten and arrested (The New Humanitarian 2004). A similar incident occurred in 2008 in

Lagos with the assassination of Alhaji Saula Saka, the Chairman of the National Union of Road

Transport Workers (ITUC 2008). And in 2017, another similar deadly incident occurred in Kogi

State, Nigeria when Abdulmumini Yakubo, a union leader, was killed while resolving disputes

over unpaid salaries for teachers (Toromade 2017). The most recent killing of a trade union

leader named Alex Ogbu occurred in 2020 (Roape 2020).

Given the volume of basic human rights violations faced by both urban squatters and

trade union leaders in Nigeria in the 21st century, it makes sense that this would likely be also

reflected in ratings that Nigeria received regarding human rights and worker rights. Yet,

surprisingly, according to a report and ranking of workers' rights by ITUC in 2019, Nigeria was

no longer one of the 10 countries listed receiving the highest negative rating for global rights

violations and worker rights violations (ITUC 2019). Nigeria, in the latest report produced by

ITUC (2019) in 2019, moved down from the worst possible rating of 5 (no guarantee of right due

to the breakdown of the law) to rating of 4 (systematic violations of rights). However, this rating

still indicates that workers are not fully protected by laws and still face violation of their rights.

Besides growing concerns about the precarious state of human rights in Nigeria in the

21st century, according to the non-governmental organization Reporters Without Borders

(2021a), journalists reporting in Nigeria face a "climate of permanent violence" (Reporters

Without Borders 2021a). The summary on Nigeria provided by Reporters Without Borders

(2021a) provided numerous accounts why it is increasingly unsafe to be a journalist in Nigeria.

One such example is the view that regional governors in Nigeria have impunity when it comes to

harassing and shutting down radio stations or newspapers which appear to be critical of them

(Reporters Without Borders 2021a). Another concern highlighted in the summary relates to the

ambiguous 2015 cyber-crime law that is used to arrest and detain journalists without reason

(Reporters Without Borders 2021a). In addition to harassment of reporters, the summary noted that in 2019 three journalists died while reporting the Nigerian protests (Reporters Without Borders 2021a). The examples described above might also be reflected in the 115/180 rating that Nigeria received from Reporters Without Borders in 2020, which is indicative of relatively low level of basic press freedoms (Reporters Without Borders 2021a).

Terrorism has also resulted in violence and havoc in Nigeria during the last two decades. According to a report by Human Rights Watch, terrorism by the extremist group Boko Haram in 2021 resulted in the estimated deaths of around 362 civilians (Human Rights Watch 2021). Besides killings, the terror group is also responsible for kidnappings and attacking random villages throughout Nigeria (Human Rights Watch 2021). Besides terror groups like Boko Haram causing havoc, during the Covid crisis in 2020 and 2021 some 18 deaths were also attributed to Nigerian police forces using excessive force while enforcing Covid stay-at-home protocols according to the report (Human Rights Watch 2021).

While Nigeria has started to transition from military governance towards democracy, there are troubling indicators that may also strongly indicate a failure to fully transition away from military-style rule and violence. The ramifications of this failed transition include the killings of urban squatters during forced evictions of informal settlements in Lagos, the extrajudicial and sometimes police involvement of killings of trade unionists, as well as the low rating that Nigeria received from Reporters Without Borders (2021a). There have also been other forms of violence and terrorist killing acts coming from groups like Boko Haram, as well recent examples of excessive uses by the police force resulting in the deaths of 18 civilians during the Covid-19 pandemic crackdown (Human Rights Watch 2021). The brutal killings of 18 civilians

by members of the Nigerian police force in early 2021 corresponds to similar patterns of violence which have been committed towards squatters in the past.

POLITICAL CORRUPTION

Another entry point to examine is political corruption in Nigeria in the first two decades of the 21st century. Political corruption hinders the prospects of an open (transparent) form of state governance. The prevalence of political corruption in a country also has ramifications for democracy and will likely encourage the growth of public cynicism and political apathy, especially among those who are poor, powerless, and without the necessary amount of money to bribe officials like their more affluent counterparts. Political corruption illustrates weak governance in a state, which may also explain the persistence of poverty and urban squatting in a country like Nigeria (Ebekozien, Abdul-Aziz, and Jaafar 2019). To get better insights into the nature of political corruption in Nigeria, I used data from the 2020 Corruption Perception Index produced by the non-governmental organization Transparency International (2020). Transparency International (2020) produces yearly rankings and data on the perceived amount of political corruption that may be present in countries. The Corruption Perception Index is a scale that highlights scores 0-100 with 0 indicating a "highly corrupt" country while a score of 100 indicating a "very clean" country when it comes to perceived political corruption (Transparency International 2020). In 2020, Nigeria was ranked 25, which ranks political corruption in Nigeria to be "highly corrupt" rather than "very clean." (Transparency International 2020). Several other countries also received this score of 25, including Lebanon, Iran, Guatemala, Mozambique, Cameroon, Tajikistan, and Madagascar (Transparency International 2020). Corruption Perception Index scale results from Nigeria can also be tied to actual cases cited in newspapers and other important non-governmental organizations and outlets. For example, in 2011, the non-

governmental organization Human Rights Watch produced a special report titled "Corruption on Trial" that detailed specific forms of political corruption occurring at almost all levels of government in Nigeria (Human Rights Watch 2011). At the outset of the report, Human Rights Watch (2011) expressed significant concern with the lack of any real punitive measures placed on high-ranking Nigerian political officials accused of corruption. This is made very clear starting on page 1 in the report:

> Since its inception, the EFCC has arraigned 30 nationally prominent political figures on corruption charges and has recovered, according to the EFCC, some US $11 billion through its efforts. But many of the corruption cases against the political elite have made little progress in the courts: there have been only four convictions to date and those convicted have faced relatively little or no prison time … At this writing, not a single politician was serving prison time for any alleged crimes. (Human Rights Watch 2011:1)

This short passage offers additional evidence why Nigeria nearly ten years later would still receive a numerical ranking of "highly corrupt" by Transparency International (2020). The incidences of political corruption happening in Nigeria the 21st century further illustrates weak state governance. This legacy of political corruption in Nigeria may further weaken the ability of the state to deliver needed social protection to citizens of megacities like Lagos, thus contributing to the persistence of urban squatting in the 21st century.

ABSOLUTE POVERTY AND DEPRIVATION

Like many countries located in the Global South, Nigeria has not been able to fully eradicate absolute poverty and deprivation. Absolute poverty and deprivation in a country like Nigeria contribute to the persistence of urban squatting in the 21st century. Hence, for the purpose of this section, the definition of absolute poverty comes from *The Collins Dictionary of*

Sociology, which defined it as "that level of poverty defined in terms of the minimum requirements for basic subsistence" (Jary and Jary 1991:1). While single money-centric measures are frequently used to define absolute poverty and deprivation, this section uses a multi-dimensional and holistic definition/approach of poverty often called the capabilities approach influenced by the work of Sen (1999) and Nussbaum (2003). As an entry point for understanding the holistic barriers to development, Sen (1999:3-4) posited:

> Development requires the removal of major sources of unfreedom: poverty as well as tyranny, poor economic opportunities as well as systemic social deprivations, neglect of public facilities as well as intolerance or overactivity of repressive states…Sometimes the lack of substantive freedoms relates directly to economic poverty, which robs people of the freedom to satisfy hunger, or to achieve sufficient nutrition, or to obtain remedies for treatable illnesses, or the opportunity to be adequately clothed or sheltered, or to enjoy clean water or sanitary facilities.

Sen (1999) argued that there is a prevailing one-dimensional view of development that often highlights one measure of development while ignoring others. Sen (1999) favored a multi-faceted view of development as well as poverty definition. This kind of holistic view of human development is also found in the work of Nussbaum (2003). Nussbaum's (2003) contribution was, in part, inspired by the work of Sen (1999), which relates to the question of "The Central Human Capabilities," which, for Nussbaum (2003), can be broken down into a short list of ten basic human capability requirements.

While it may be impossible to find matching measures of data to fit with all the ten human capability requirements outlined by Nussbaum (2003), what follows aligns the human capability requirements Nussbaum (2003) made with measures of available data or descriptive

statistics. It is fair to argue that urban squatters who squat in Nigeria under scenarios fitting into the "deprivation-based" squatting lack the minimum essentials from the human capabilities list 1-3. For Nussbaum (2003:41), these are "1. Life," "2. Bodily Health," and "3. Bodily Integrity."

Several measures might be used here including the low life expectancy anticipated for Nigerians (total), which is around 54.68 years (CIA 2021). This may also relate to the persistent problem of food insecurity, which according to the CIA World Factbook (2021) was around 12.8 percent of people needing some kind of humanitarian aid. Urban squatters in Nigeria are assumed to be more affected because of the nature of informal settlements often lacking necessities including water, food, sanitation, toilet access, or electricity. According to the non-governmental organization known as WaterAid, 67 percent of Nigerians lacked basic sanitation in 2017 (WaterAid 2017).

In total, the report suggested that some 122 million people in Nigeria do not have access to basic sanitation (WaterAid 2017). In addition to the aforementioned measures, social protection coverages provided by the state in Nigeria might also minimally meet or not meet requirements in the list 1-3 provided by Nussbaum (2003). According to data from the ILO, only 2.1 percent of Nigerians were affiliated with a social health protection scheme, while only 11 percent were covered by a social protection benefit and only 1.2 percent of the GDP went towards social protection expenditures in Nigeria (ILO 2020a, ILO 2020b). Meanwhile, finding a suitable measure for what Nussbaum (2003:41) described as "4. Senses, Imagination, and Thought," and "5. Emotions" seems to be a challenge. I used the rankings for Nigeria from The World Happiness report 2018-2020 from the Gallup World Poll (2021). According to the rankings for 2018–2020, Nigeria was in the middle of the list of rankings for happiness with a ranking of 116 out of 141 (Gallup World Poll 2021). Although these measures of happiness

included all Nigerians, it is assumed that urban squatters may be less happy than others because of the constant risk of eviction.

Included here is another measure with regards to education and literacy rates in Nigeria. Overall, the literacy rate was 62 percent; for males it was 71.3 percent, and for females in Nigeria it was 52.7 percent in 2018 (CIA 2021). I suspect that many urban squatters including the children of urban squatters may have less access to formal education compared to regular children in formal communities. Finding a suitable measure for "6. Practical Reason" the following measure was used to examine trust levels among Nigerians. When 1237 Nigerians in 2018, for example, were asked in a survey whether or not "most people could be trusted," only 13 percent responded positively, while more than 86.4 percent responded with "need to be very careful" (World Values Survey 2021). For "7. Affiliation," and "8. Other species," Nussbaum (2003:41) addressed that no fitting measure could be found. Finally, the last two items listed in the human capabilities list by Nussbaum (2003:41) included "9. Play" and "10. Control Over One's Environment," which may be partially measurable. For "10. Control Over One's Environment," I used the measure of the 23 percent of Nigerians who felt some sort of tenure insecurity when it came to their land or property (Prindex 2020). Compared to Nigerians who have access to formal housing options and some sense of stability, urban squatters face risks because they do not have control over their environment or dwelling and are always at risk for demolition or forced eviction.

There are linkages between absolute poverty, deprivation, and urban squatting in Nigeria in the 21st century. Using a capabilities approach inspired by the work of Sen (1999) and Nussbaum (2003) demonstrates that many Nigerians face inequalities and are unable to attain several of the basic human capabilities listed by Nussbaum (2003:41).

HYPERGLOBALIZATION

As noted also in the Indian and Brazilian cases, Nigeria has also been directly impacted by waves of hyperglobalization in the first two decades of the 21st century. The definition of economic globalization is the same I used in the previous two cases and is linked to the works of social scientists like Bauman (2004), Giddens (1999), Friedman (2009), Rodrik (2011), and Ritzer (2010). To further demonstrate the scope of economic globalization affecting Nigeria during the last two decades of the 21st century, I display the growth of foreign assets in Nigeria from 2005 to 2019. This is further illustrated in Figure 18 below.

Figure 18. Net of Foreign Assets in Nigeria 2005–2019 (In $ Trillions)

Figure 18 highlights the net increase of foreign assets in Nigeria from the years 2005 – 2019. I begin with the year 2005; the net of foreign assets in Nigeria was estimated at $3.865 trillion (World Bank 2020a). This net of foreign assets would increased to nearly $6.195 trillion

in 2010 and increased again to $7.852 trillion in 2016 (World Bank 2020). The latest available data from the World Bank (2020a) suggests that the net of foreign assets has actually declined to $5.944 trillion.

A slightly different picture emerges when one examines the amount of external debt owed by Nigeria in the 21st century. It is important to note that external debt means money owed by Nigeria to governments, foreign creditors, and organizations like the World Bank, the IMF etc., which sooner or later will have to be repaid.

Figure 19. Nigeria External Debt 2005-2019 (In $ Billions) (Source: World Bank 2020a)

Figure 19 highlights the evolution of Nigeria's external debt from the years 2005–2019. To begin, the external debt owed by Nigeria in 2005 was $28 billion (World Bank 2020a). This debt amount would decrease substantially to $16 billion in 2010 (World Bank 2020a). In 2015, the external debt owed by Nigeria would again increase significantly to $39 billion (World Bank

2020a). The latest numbers from 2019 suggest another substantial increase in external debt owed

of $52 billion (World Bank 2020a).

Faced with such large amounts of external debts owed by Nigeria, governments may seek

alternative ways to find cash by either radically cutting into their own spending budgets or by

implementing privatization measures of state-owned enterprises and other publicly owned

sectors. For Nigeria, the state directed push towards privatization started officially on July 20,

1998 (Nigerian Embassy USA 2021). Although the initial guidelines for privatization by the

Nigerian government in 1998 maintained that 40 percent of the electricity, oil, and gas sectors

would still be retained by the government, far more privatization has occurred since then and

throughout much of the first two decades of the 21st century (Nigerian Embassy USA 2021).

A further illustration is the magnitude of privatization of public owned institutions in

Nigeria that have occurred under the lead of Nigeria's Bureau of Public Enterprises (Bureau of

Public Enterprises 2021). The state's own website lists both so-called successful "transactions,"

meaning privatized, and so-called "on-going transactions," which indicated partially privatized

public institutions (Bureau of Public Enterprises 2021). A view of the state's website offers a

better understanding of previous state-owned enterprises, which were privatized and those that

are starting to be privatized by the current government. According to the Bureau of Public

Enterprises (2021), in the electric sector, for example, more than eleven enterprises were

privatized, meanwhile in the oil and gas sector several oil marketing companies were also

privatized; in the mining sector, the Nigerian Mining Corporation was also privatized, the

National Inland Waterways Authority was privatized. While in the automobile industry, the

Anambra Motor Manufacturing Company was privatized, the state-owned railway company was

also privatized (Bureau of Public Enterprises 2021). Because of space issues, I could not list

every single state-owned enterprise that has been privatized so far and listed by the Bureau of

Public Enterprises (2021). It is fair to say that the list is massive and includes both small sized

state-owned enterprises as well as medium and large state-owned enterprises that have been

privatized or are being privatized in the future. Available data demonstrates then that

hyperglobalization, as demonstrated by the amount of foreign assets and external debt owed by

Nigeria, privatization of important state-owned enterprises indicates a more radical push towards

marketization in Nigeria in the 21st century. The phenomenon of urban squatting is also

intertwined and affected here by the push towards marketization and sale of state-owned

enterprises, especially during the last two decades of the 21st century.

INFORMAL LABOR

As a phenomenon found in many Global South countries, informal labor employment

also seems to be the norm in Nigeria. According to informal labor statistics, in 2018, around 80.5

percent of Nigerians were estimated to be engaged in some kind of informal employment (ILO

2020c). This also seems to be supported with research done by important non-governmental

organizations examining the size and impact of the informal labor sector in a country like

Nigeria. For example, a 2017 report produced by the Heinrich Boell Foundation (2017) cited

data from the National Bureau of Statistics (Nigeria), which estimated that around 2.38 million

men and another 3.2 million women may make up this sector in the city of Lagos alone.

It is important to note that informal work plays a pivotal role in a variety of economic

sectors in Nigeria. This use of informal work in Nigeria includes sectors like manufacturing,

which may include both apparel as well as shoe production, to wood production, as well as

metal, furniture, and baked goods (Heinrich Boell Foundation 2017). Besides the manufacturing

sector, another sector which utilizes much of informal work in Nigeria includes the

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transportation sector (Heinrich Boell Foundation 2017). Although very little data exists, what is known is that the bulk of the motorcycle taxi operators and minibusses located in Lagos and other major cities in Nigeria are mostly operated by informal rather than formal workers (Heinrich Boell Foundation 2017).

Figure 20. Popular Mode of Transportation in Nigeria (Wikimedia Commons)

Figure 20 above provides a visual example of a Keke or tricycle motorcycle that is frequently used as a means of transportation in Nigeria. Besides the transportation and tourism sectors, informal workers can also be found in the real estate sectors, construction, and wholesale trade. Even informal actors are frequently used in the Nollywood (movie) industry in Nigeria (Heinrich Boell Foundation 2017).

While many adults are known to be informal workers in Nigeria, children are also frequently involved and forced to do labor. According to a report produced by the U.S.

Department of Labor in 2019, around 47 percent of children aged 5 to 14 are believed to be engaged in some form of child labor in Nigeria (U.S. Department of Labor 2019).

Various examples demonstrate how the use of informal labor seems to be extensive throughout Nigeria in the 21st century. The persistence of informal labor may also help to explain why informal settlements and urban squatting also continues to exist in a country like Nigeria. This is consistent with accounts supported by Neuwirth (2016) who noticed how informal labor was also embedded within informal settlements that he studied in Africa and Brazil.

RELIGIOUS CONFLICT AND VULNERABLE COMMUNITIES

Another entry point to explore is the extent to which religious conflict may impact vulnerable communities in Nigeria in the 21st century. Existing evidence links examples of religious conflict examples with certain trends of community vulnerability that negatively impacts informal communities and villages in Nigeria. The heterogeneous character of Nigerian society is reflected not just in its distinct ethnic groups but also in the diversity of distinctive religious groups.

Hence, according to the CIA World Factbook (2021), there are around 250 or so distinctive ethnic groups in Nigerian society. This includes distinctive ethnic groups like the Yoruba, the Hausa, the Igbo (Ibo), the Fulani, the Kanuri/Beriberi, the Tiv, the Ibibio, and countless others (CIA 2021). Meanwhile, Nigeria is a Muslim-majority country with 53.5 percent of the population identified as Muslim, followed by 35.3 percent identified as Christian (Protestant), 10.6 percent identified as Roman Catholic, and .6 percent identified as "other" in 2018 (CIA 2021). According to the Inglehart-Welzel Cultural Map—World Values Survey 7

(2020), Nigeria is located in the so-called African-Islamic artificial grouping as previously shown in Figure 10 (World Values Survey 2020).

Based on the results and country scores from Figure 10, Nigeria is located more on the traditional values vertical axis side and also more towards the survival values horizontal axis side (World Values Survey 2020). According to the Inglehart-Welzel Cultural Map, Nigeria also shares traditional and survivalist-oriented values similar with countries like Uganda, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Rwanda, and Pakistan (World Values Survey 2020).

In the first two decades of the 21st century, Nigeria has also seen examples of religious violence and conflict in various regions of the country often committed by extremist terrorist groups like Boko Haram. These acts of violence committed by groups like Boko Haram have also impacted vulnerable communities and innocent civilians. The CIA World Factbook (2021) listed Boko Haram as a terrorist group that formed in 2002. It has been responsible for the deaths of some 30,000 to 35,000 people as well as the displacement of some 2.5 million people (CIA 2021). The terror group has been known to attack both civilian and government targets, as well as religious places, schools, tourists, humanitarian organizations, etc. (CIA 2021).

The impact that Boko Haram has had on vulnerable communities in Nigeria is also supported by findings from a report produced by Amnesty International in 2020. The report, which was conducted from interviews of victims of attacks made by Boko Haram, highlights the ways people were negatively affected (Amnesty International 2020). The report produced by staff members of Amnesty International also noted that victims they interviewed informed them that both members of the terrorist group Boko Haram as well as members of the Nigerian military have committed both violence and crimes towards them in their villages and communities during military operations during 2020 (Amnesty International 2020). The report

highlighted a variety of issues expressed by the victims including issues related to displacement

and its drastic effects on older people, since such groups are far more vulnerable (Amnesty

International 2020). Through direct interviews, staff members of Amnesty International (2020)

were also able to document from the victims the type of human rights violations that members of

the terror group Boko Haram committed. Victims addressed issues like torture and murder, the

killing and abduction of their children, physical violence, looting, as well as having to flee from

Boko Haram members (Amnesty International 2020).

Religious violence and conflict examples happening inside Nigeria included acts of

terrorism and deadly violence conducted by the terror group known as Boko Haram. Evidence

from a report produced by Amnesty International (2020) illustrated the scope in which

vulnerable communities in Nigeria were negatively impacted.

HYPER URBAN POPULATION GROWTH

Urban squatting in Nigeria may also be directly linked to the hyper urban population

growth that has taken place in the last two decades of the 21st century. Illustrative of similar

trends observed in India and Brazil, hyper urban population growth seems to contribute to

greater spatial inequalities in many of the cities of the Global South. In short, it tends to cause a

disequilibrium between the supply and demand of available housing stock. Thus, from an

economic angle, the supply of available housing in many cities in Nigeria like Lagos seems to be

inadequately matched with the growing demand. This means that more people will likely seek

informal housing as an alternative to formal housing options available. World Bank data

illustrates the hyper urban population growth problem in Nigeria. According to the World Bank

in the year 2000, there were nearly 42 million people situated in urban areas (cities; World Bank

2020a). By 2005, this number rose to a total of 54 million (World Bank 2020a). In 2010, the

numbers would increase again to 68 million people living in urban areas (World Bank 2020a). In 2015, the total urban population reached 86 million people and increased again to 107 million people living in urban areas (cities) in 2020 (World Bank 2020a). As also shown in the previous two cases, hyper urban population growth may also be the direct result of the fertility rates in a country. There is no question that in the case of Nigeria the fertility rate has an influence on hyper urban population growth and the population structure. According to the World Bank, in 2000 the fertility rate for Nigerian women was 6.10, and by 2010 would decline slightly to 5.83 (World Bank 2020a). In 2019, the fertility rate would slightly decline again to 5.31 (World Bank 2020a). An examination of the population pyramid for Nigeria in 2019 (Population Pyramid 2021) indicates patterns that appear similar to those found in many Global South countries. Such patterns reflect much higher birth rates and younger populations making up the bulk of a society's population structure.

Increasing hyper urban population growth produces a strain and demand on the available housing stock in Nigerian cities. Data from the World Bank (2020a) and the age sex pyramid of Nigeria in 2019 from Population Pyramid (2021), demonstrated that urban population growth is also likely linked to higher birthrates and younger populations, which make up the bulk of the population structure of Nigeria. Hence, patterns of urban squatting are related to hyper urban population growth taking place in urbanized areas of Lagos, Nigeria in the 21st century.

GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE

As a legitimate global ecological concern in the 21st century, climate change has directly impacted all Global North/South countries of the world system. A legitimate growing global ecological concern is that humanity, with its "organized irresponsibility," type of governance of the 19th, 20th, and early 21st century, continues to harm the world's ecological habitat (Beck

1999; Moore 2003). While a variety of definitions are sometimes used to define terms like "climate change" and "organized irresponsibility," for the purpose of this specific causal narrative, I utilize the following widely used definition from LandVoc (2021), which defines climate change as:

> a change of climate which is attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere and which is in addition to natural climate variability observed over a comparable time period.

The definition of "organized irresponsibility" is adopted, in part, from Beck (1999:32) who defined this as "The state administration, politics, industrial management and research negotiate the criteria of what is 'rational and safe.'" This discussion also makes use of the concept of "boomerang effect," which Beck summarized as:

> Risks of modernization sooner or later also strike those who produce or profit from them. They contain a boomerang effect, which breaks up the pattern of class and national society. Even the rich and powerful are not safe from them. These are hazards not only to health, but also to legitimation, property and profit. (1992:23)

This section demonstrates that global climate change has the potential for creating a human produced social boomerang effect (Beck 1992), which helps to explain the persistence of land inequality and urban squatting in countries like Nigeria. While different kinds of measures may be used to illustrate the human made forms of environmental degradation, which have been linked to climate change in the 21st century, the focus here is demonstrating internal ecological damage done in Nigeria. Although external ecological damages could definitely also be considered since our global ecological system is global rather than just confined to a single national boundary or political system.

A simple measure to illustrate the process of environmental degradation in Nigeria is

deforestation, which includes the logging of trees to make room for agricultural lands or

development. It is a simple measure to use here for demonstration because it focuses on the

decline of forests in square kilometers over a period of time. I focus on the period from 2000–

2018. While other measures could have been used to consider the direct impact of global climate

change on Nigeria, finding data that highlights the decrease of forest areas in square kilometers

seemed simpler and would not require additional technical training and interpretation of complex

ecological data.

Figure 21. Nigeria Forest Area (sq.km) 2000-2018 (In Thousands) (Source: World Bank 2020a)

Figure 21 illustrates the decline of forest areas (sq.km) in Nigeria from 2000–2018. As

illustrated, in the year 2000, the estimated (sq.km) in Nigeria were still roughly 248,000 (sq.km)

(World Bank 2020a). The estimated (sq.km) in Nigeria would further decline to 240,000 (sq.km) in the year 2005 (World Bank 2020a). In 2010, another reduction of the total forest areas (sq.km) in Nigeria would occur and decline even further down to 232,000 (sq.km) (World Bank 2020a). The last known estimate from the year 2018 revealed a continual decline to 219,000 (sq.km) (World Bank 2020).

The 2019 climate risk profile report on Nigeria from Climate Links (2019) demonstrates the projected impact of climate change. Climate Links (2019) is a non-governmental organization receiving aid from US Aid to assess and illuminate growing climate risks around the globe. According to the 2019 report, it is anticipated that by the year 2060, temperatures are likely to further increase in Nigeria somewhere between 1.1-2.5° C (Climate Links 2019). In addition to temperature increases, the sea level near the coast is also projected to increase by roughly .4-1 meter by 2100 (Climate Links 2019). The report also focuses on four areas that will be further directly impacted by global climate change, which are agriculture, water, human health, and energy (Climate Links 2019). In the area of agriculture, the report hinted at the increase of desertification, increasing crop failures, as well as saltwater likely to furthering harm coastal production (Climate Links 2019). Meanwhile, in the area of water, the report projected that water quality will likely be negatively affected in Nigeria, as well as increased flood risks, and saltwater in the coastal aquifers will also likely increase due to flooding (Climate Links 2019). In the area of human health, global climate change will likely produce more heat-related mortality, food insecurity, and more deaths tied to air pollution (Climate Links 2019). Finally, in the area of energy, the report projected that global climate change will likely cause harm to the infrastructure in Nigeria, decrease the capacity for hydropower production, and produce a greater significant demand for energy (Climate Links 2019).

Land conflict issues have been an on-going concern in Nigeria. One classic land conflict example is best reflected in the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) and their political activism in the early 1990s against the Royal/Dutch Shell company (Meier 2000). In addition to land conflict issues, land grabbing by mostly foreign countries has also created additional social problems in Nigeria. Again, when implying land grabbing, I use the following definition from LandVoc (2021): "large-scale acquisition of farmland (over 1,000 hectares) whether by purchase, leases or other means."

Land Matrix (2020) identified the hidden trails of transnational deals and purchasing significant amounts of land in Nigeria. Numerous Global North countries have either owned or leased land, including the United States leading with 72,464 hectares, followed by the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland with 60,964 hectares, followed by France with 45,664 hectares. In the group of Global North countries, the countries with the highest number of deals involving land in Nigeria were the United Kingdom, Northern Ireland, and the United States with five deals, and France with four deals (Land Matrix 2020).

Global South countries also engage in transnational land deals that affect Nigeria. These include Brazil with 50,000 hectares, Ghana with 45,290 hectares, Malaysia with 29,964 hectares, and South Africa with 61,000 hectares (Land Matrix 2020). The top Global South countries involved with the greatest number of land deals are China with 4 deals and South Africa with 3 deals (Land Matrix 2020).

As in the previous cases of India and Brazil, the search function in the search engine on Land Matrix (2020) allowed me to examine the nature of the deals. In Nigeria, land grabbing seems to be used by foreign countries mostly for food crops, livestock, and biofuels (Land

Matrix 2020). The amount of land grabbing by foreign countries in Nigeria also creates risks and land tenure insecurities for many Nigerians. Data from Prindex (2020) demonstrated the degree of land tenure insecurity. According to the most recent survey data available from Prindex (2020) in 2020, among those who were surveyed, 23 percent felt insecure on their property or land. In addition, of those surveyed, 20 percent surveyed in Nigeria felt insecure regarding their right to their home (Prindex 2020). This is not a problem faced solely by Nigerians. For example, in the neighboring country of Burkina Faso, almost 44 percent also felt insecure in their homes, while 31 percent felt insecure in their homes in Mali, followed by 32 percent in Cameroon, and 35 percent felt insecure in their homes in the neighboring country of Benin (Prindex 2020).

INFORMAL SETTLEMENT: LAGOS

This section includes a brief description and short summary of one informal settlement in Lagos, Nigeria called Makoko. This brief overview of the informal settlement is partly visual, descriptive, and then fitted with examples of urban squatting found in Nigeria into Pruijt's (2013) five squatting types.

Makoko

Makoko is an informal settlement on water located near the mainland of Lagos (Udoma 2017). Makoko is unlike most known informal settlements in the world because it is partly on land and water. Hence, this is also the reason why it is sometimes called the "Venice of Lagos" (Udoma 2017). According to a report produced by the Heinrich Boell Foundation (2014), the estimated number of residents of Makoko in 2006 was 113,740. Makoko can also be viewed via satellite using Google Earth and is estimated to be roughly 72 hectares in size with an estimated population density of about 731 people per hectare. Although very little known history exists

about its origins, which may date as far back as the 18th century, what is known is that it actually

started out as a fishing village (Udoma 2017).

To this day, residents of Makoko depend on a variety of activities for employment and

subsistence including fishing, selling regular needed household items, including basic groceries

for consumption and water. All of these are completed every day by canoe, the only available

mode of transportation (Udoma 2017). Drinking water is extremely scarce and it is common for

households in Makoko to spend roughly 5000 naira ($31) every month retrieving water from

small kiosks or informal sellers (Gaedtke 2013). In addition, basic infrastructure problems

continue to affect residents of Makoko such as the lack of basic toilet and restroom facilities and

sanitation to deal with sewage. It is estimated that around 15 or more households tend to share

single community latrines and raw sewage wastewater and rubbish ends up back in the river

(Udoma 2017).

Figure 22. Informal Community/Makoko in Lagos, Nigeria (Picture was taken by Temilade
Adelaja)

Figure 22 illustrates the informal settlement Makoko in Lagos, Nigeria. As illustrated in the picture, the canoe is the primary mode of transportation in Makoko. Out of all of the informal settlements studied so far, Makoko is one of the rare informal settlements in Lagos, Nigeria where squatters live on water and land. Given this situation, it also makes it difficult for people to acquire basic supplies compared to squatters who reside in the center of cities where it is always possible to access basic supplies like food and water.

Table 4. Overview of Pruijt's 5 Squatting Types in Nigeria

Pruijt's (2013) five squatting types	Nigeria
1. Deprivation-based (Survival squatting)	✓ Examples of deprivation-based squatting exist throughout Nigeria including urban and rural areas. Ex: Makoko in Lagos, Nigeria as shown in Figure 22 above.
2. Alternative-housing strategy	N/A
3. Entrepreneurial	✓ Urban squatters engage in formal and informal economic transactions and regularly sell to other squatters of informal settlements
4. Conservational	✓ Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP)
5. Political squatting	✓ Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP)

Source: Meier 2000.

Table 4 identifies all forms of squatting in Nigeria that appear to fit with Pruijt's five squatting types (Pruijt 2013). Evidence from a variety of primary and secondary literature confirms that "deprivation-based" squatting occurs throughout various regions in Nigeria to this day. While Makoko was one such example, many other informal settlements in Nigeria that seem

to fit the "deprivation-based" squatting type from Pruijt's (2013) list of typologies. Both "conservational" and "political squatting" examples fit together with the MOSOP and Ogoni political activists during the early 1990s and their political campaign against Royal/Dutch Shell company (Meier 2000). At the time, the Royal/Dutch Shell company extracted oil and caused serious environmental damage on Ogoniland, which created tensions and sometimes violent confrontation with members of MOSOP. In one of the founding political documents of the movement, the Ogoni Bill of Rights (1990), it was carefully framed that members of this movement desired to be independent and considered an autonomous region of Nigeria (Ogoni Bill of Rights 1990). The document addressed a variety of issues and topics that centered around land and environmental pollution issues in the region known as Ogoniland. This included the political claim that Nigerian independence did not have a positive impact on all ethnic groups in Nigeria and the continuation of "indigenous colonialism" (Ogoni Bill of Rights 1990). To some extent, the Ogoni Bill of Rights (1990) can be interpreted as a document of resistance and a call for Ogoniland sovereignty against the Nigerian government and its military style politics at the time. Besides "political squatting," "entrepreneurial squatting" is known to exist in all cities in Nigeria. In fact, the informal settlement Makoko is one such example which fits examples of both "deprivation-based" squatting as well as entrepreneurial squatting. In order to survive, squatters who live in Makoko engage in all kinds of economic transactions and sell basic water supplies and food items to other squatters.

CHAPTER VIII

INDONESIAN CASE

What follows are the results of the Indonesian case. This chapter focuses on the

comparative-historical analysis (Lange 2012) that was conducted for the historical period 2000–

2020. Again, similar to the technique used in the previous three cases of India, Brazil, and

Nigeria, this chapter presents eight important causal narratives for Indonesia that seemed to be

the most salient explanations for the persistence of urban squatting in Indonesia in the 21st

century.

MILITARISM AND AUTHORITARIAN RULE

There is no question that the military legacy during the colonial and post-colonial era has

left its mark on Indonesia to this day. Early European colonizers often made use of the military

in Indonesia as an early form of imperialism and political and economic extensions of their own

empires or kingdoms. Colonization initially began with the Dutch colonizing Indonesia in 1602

(Palmowski 2004). During World War II, the Japanese also utilized its military during the

occupation of Indonesia between the years of 1942 to 1945 until independence was declared by

Sukarno in 1945 (Palmowski 2004). Yet, the proclaimed Indonesian Independence in 1945 was,

however, not accepted by the Dutch, which resulted in two major military engagements in 1947

and 1948 (Palmowski 2004).

Ultimately, the Dutch would consent with Independence in 1949 (Palmowski 2004).

During the post-colonial era, the military would still play a major role in Indonesia. For example,

during the years between 1965 and 1966 Indonesia military forces under Suharto were again

used against leftists or individuals assumed to be affiliated with the Communist Party of

Indonesia or *Partai Komunis Indonesia* (PKI; Palmowski 2004). According to some figures,

around 500,000 to 1,000,000 persons were likely killed by the Indonesian military, often with direct civilian involvement in the killings (Leksana 2020). Besides military involvement in the killings, the Indonesian military and civilian collaborators were likely responsible for basic rights violations like sexual abuse, torture, forced labor, etc. (Leksana 2020).

Nearly a decade later, in 1975, the Indonesian military would be used in invading East Timor (Palmowski 2004). Although accounts do vary on the number of people killed during the Indonesian military invasion, a truth commission later placed the figure between 104,000 to 183,000 (Klinken 2012). Another deadly use of military force by Indonesia would occur again in 1991 in Dili, East Timor when Indonesian troops fired live rounds of ammunition on protestors, killing an estimated 200 mostly peaceful protestors (Human Rights Watch 2020).

As Indonesia entered into the 21st century, the country still had difficulty in its own transition away from this military and authoritarian form of governance, which was visible throughout much of the 20th century. For example, according to news reporting, Indonesian military forces in the Papua region since the first decade of the 21st century have been responsible for an estimated 95 unlawful killings, most of whom are indigenous people of the region (Wright 2018).

Meanwhile, other evidence also exists to indicate how the military authoritarianism in Indonesia has also had a negative impact on the eviction of urban squatters in the 21st century. This is mentioned in a published 2006 report by a Human Rights Watch titled "Condemned Communities: Forced Evictions in Jakarta" (Human Rights Watch 2006). The 2006 report highlighted a long list of human rights violations, which often occurred during forced evictions of squatters in Jakarta (Human Rights Watch 2006). One of these concerns about human rights

violations, for example, was the use of violent and excessive use of force by the police and military towards squatters during the evictions in Jakarta (Human Rights Watch 2006).

One additional concern mentioned in the report was the government sanctioned use of vigilantes and urban gangs to carry out some of the forced evictions of informal settlements (Human Rights Watch 2006). In the view of Human Rights Watch (2006), this use of vigilantes and urban gangs carries ramifications because these groups are often untrained and may be unaccountable for some of the violent actions committed. The report also details many of the ramifications associated with forced evictions of informal settlements including its impact on women and girls and the increased risk of gender-based violence, as well as the negative impact that forced evictions has on children and their education, the lack of adequate shelter after evictions, and finally the cyclical process involving evictions (Human Rights Watch 2006). In short, many squatters who lack housing simply go from one location to another and the cyclical process of forced evictions begins again (Human Rights Watch 2006).

Similar to the basic human rights violations faced by urban squatters during forced evictions in Indonesia, trade union members and environmental activists have also faced similar patterns of deadly violence and intimidation in Indonesia during the 21st century. In 2019, for example, two environmental activists involved in the anti-palm oil struggle were assassinated (Widianto and Damiana 2019). In the same year, another incident of intimidation and arrest happened towards Reni Desmiria, member of the BMI Workers' Union, who was arrested and later sentenced to four months in prison (ITUC 2020). These forms of intimidation and sometimes deadly violence may also be reflected in ratings that Indonesia received regarding human rights and workers. Although Indonesia is not among the worst countries listed for

worker and human rights by the ITUC (2019) in 2019, it still had an extremely bad rating of 5 (no guarantee of rights).

Besides the persistence of human rights and workers' rights violations in Indonesia during the 21st century, the non-governmental organization Reporters Without Borders (2021b) has also given Indonesia a bad report on the state of press freedom. The summary produced by Reporters Without Borders (2021b) on Indonesia indicates that local journalists have increasingly faced violence when reporting. Especially in cases where reporters report on human rights violations or police and military abuse, journalists have often been intimated or received violence themselves (Reporters Without Borders 2021b). Several laws introduced including the anti-blasphemy law, as well as the so-called "Informasi dan Transaksi Elektronik" banning the publishing of "false information," has made it increasingly difficult for reporters in Indonesia from doing their work without being criminalized themselves (Reporters Without Borders 2021b).

Numerous examples illustrate how both military and authoritarian governance structures in Indonesia in the 20th century seem to still be visible in the first two decades of the 21st century.

ABSOLUTE POVERTY AND DEPRIVATION

While significant strides have been made to reduce forms of absolute poverty in the world system, Indonesia is one of many countries in the Global South in which segments of the population face absolute poverty and deprivation in the 21st century. Several salient examples illustrate how absolute poverty and deprivation in Indonesia may contribute to the phenomenon of urban squatting in this country in the first two decades of the 21st century. As in the Nigerian case, I adopt the same definition of absolute poverty from *The Collins Dictionary of Sociology*

which defines it as "that level of poverty defined in terms of the minimum requirements for basic subsistence" (Jary and Jary 1991:1).

The same multi-dimensional and holistic definition/approach of poverty I used in the Nigerian case shaped by the work of Sen (1999) and Nussbaum (2003) is also used in the Indonesian case. Recalling briefly, the list of ten basic human capability requirements for Nussbaum (2003:41) included "1. Life," "2. Bodily Health," "3. Bodily Integrity," "4. Senses, Imagination, and Thought," "5. Emotions," "6. Practical Reason," "7. Affiliation," "8. Other species," "9. Play," and "10. Control Over One's Environment."

While limitations may exist in finding suitable matching measures to all of the ten human capability requirements listed by Nussbaum (2003:41), I will nevertheless attempt to fit as many as possible. Given the fact that some urban squatters in Indonesia engage in what Pruijt (2013) described as "deprivation-based" squatting, this is also a useful entry point for examining the human capabilities list 1-3 from Nussbaum (2003:41), which included "1. Life," "2. Bodily Health," "3. Bodily Integrity."

The following measures seemed fitting to mention. The anticipated life expectancy for Indonesians (total) is estimated at 72.82 years (CIA 2021). Although this statistic is substantially higher than the anticipated life expectancy for Nigerians, which was 54.68 years, Indonesian life expectancy is ranked 152 out of 227 (CIA 2021). In short, anticipated life expectancies for Indonesians was in the group of countries like Iraq. This brings in the important measure of food insecurity in Indonesia. Although the level of food insecurity does not seem to be as prevalent as in Nigeria, food insecurity issues nevertheless still exist in Indonesia. According to the World Food Program (2021), of a population 258.7 million, there are estimated to be around 19.4 million Indonesian people (or 7.49 percent) who face some sort of food insecurity.

Besides facing food insecurities, segments of the population in Indonesia, including many of the poorest urban squatters, lack other basic necessities such as electricity, or toilet access and sanitation. This is also indicated when examining data from the non-governmental organization known as WaterAid (2017). In 2017, for example, some 32 percent of Indonesians lacked access to basic sanitation (WaterAid 2017). This includes around 82 million people in a country of roughly 258.7 million people (WaterAid 2017). Other measures, including social protection coverage provided by the state in Indonesia may also be relevant for the subjective evaluation of whether a country does or does not seem to meet the first three human capabilities minimum standards set by Nussbaum (2003). According to data from the ILO (2020a, 2020b), 81.3 percent of Indonesians were affiliated with a social health protection scheme, while only 27.8 percent were covered by a social protection benefit, and only 2.7 percent of the GDP went towards social protection expenditures in Indonesia. This compares to 4.7 percent of the GDP, which went towards military spending in Indonesia (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 2020).

I also examined human capabilities of "4. Senses, Imagination, and Thought," and "5. Emotions," which Nussbaum (2003:41) discussed. To do this, I examined the rankings for Indonesia in The World Happiness Report 2018-2020 from the Gallup World Poll (2021). Indonesia had a ranking of 82 out of 141. Although these measures of happiness indicated that Indonesians are not the unhappiest people, it also did not indicate that they are the happiest. It is also important to note that these rankings may not be representative of all populations in Indonesia, including urban squatters and other marginalized people who may have not been represented in the survey.

To examine what Nussbaum (2003:41) identifies as the human capability "4. Senses, Imagination, and Thought," I included available descriptive statistics on education and literacy

rates in Indonesia. According to the CIA World Factbook (2021), the literacy rate in Indonesia for the total population was 97.3 percent for males and 94 percent for females in 2018. While a gender gap does appear between males and females regarding literacy rates, this measure can compare to literacy standards often found in Global North Countries.

The next human capability listed "6. Practical Reason" by Nussbaum (2003:41) can be examined when looking at trust levels in Indonesia. In 2018, for example, when 3200 Indonesians were asked in a nationally representative survey to comment whether or not "most people could be trusted," only 4.6 percent responded positively, while more than 95.3 percent responded, "need to be very careful" (World Values Survey 2021). Sadly, for human capabilities "7. Affiliation," and "8. Other species," that Nussbaum (2003:41) originally listed, no fitting measure could be found. I also attempted to examine the last two human capabilities that Nussbaum (2003:41) listed, "9. Play" and "10. Control Over One's Environment." This was done by highlighting the tenure insecurity measure from Prindex (2020), which noted that 24 percent of Indonesians felt some sort of tenure insecurity when it related to their land or property situation. From this standpoint, it makes sense to assume that specifically urban squatters in Indonesia face greater risks since their situation may always be more precarious and therefore also risk the possibility of acquiring no control over their environment and/or state of housing.

This links absolute poverty, deprivation, and urban squatting in Indonesia in the 21st century. Theoretically, this was inspired by previous work by Sen (1999) and Nussbaum (2003), which has sometimes been called the capabilities approach. Although data and descriptive statistics could not be found to match all of Nussbaum's (2003) ten human capabilities list, descriptive statistics did indicate that gaps and inequalities in these areas persist in Indonesia.

HYPERGLOBALIZATION

Waves of hyperglobalization also impacted Indonesia during the first two decades of the 21st century as well. The focus is towards the phenomenon of economic globalization as explored in the works of social scientists like Bauman (2004), Giddens (1999), Friedman (2009), Rodrik (2011), and Ritzer (2010).

A simple way to demonstrate how economic globalization has impacted Indonesia in the last two decades of the 21st century is by highlighting the growth of foreign assets in Indonesia from 2005 to the year 2020. In addition to the measure of the growth of foreign assets, I also used the measure of external debt in Indonesia. Certainly, other measures could have been used here besides foreign assets and external debt to highlight economic globalization and its direct impact on Indonesia in the 21st century. There were several reasons why my analysis of how economic globalization impacted Indonesia was limited to the following two available measures. First, the availability of data covering the last two decades for other measures was limited for Indonesia. Second, data was not always converted into U.S dollars, which created problems in the evaluation and interpretation of currency using U.S. dollars as the reference currency. Data from Macro Trends (2021b) provided data for the measures net of foreign assets and the external debt owed by Indonesia.

Figure 23. Net of Foreign Assets in Indonesia 2005–2019 (In $ Billions)

Figure 23 highlights the net increase and decrease of foreign assets in Indonesia from the year 2005 through 2019. In 2005 the net of foreign assets in Indonesia was at an estimated $8.34 billion (Macro Trends 2021b). This would increase substantially to 15.29 billion worth of foreign assets in Indonesia in 2010 (Macro Trends 2021b). By 2015, the net of foreign assets in Indonesia would substantially decline to $4.54 billion (Macro Trends 2021b). In the year 2019, the net of foreign assets would quadruple and increase to $24.99 billion (Macro Trends 2021b). Hence, in this 20-year period foreign assets increased by 199 percent.

A similar pattern of excessive monetary strain emerges when one examines the amount of external debt owed by Indonesia in the 21st century.

Figure 24. Indonesia External Debt 2005–2019 (In $ Billions) (Source: World Bank 2020a)

Figure 24 displays the gradual change in Indonesia's external debt from the years 2005

through 2019. The external debt owed by Indonesia in 2005 was $142 billion (World Bank

2020a). In 2010, this external debt amount would increase significantly to $198 billion (World

Bank 2020a). By the year 2015, the external debt amount owed by Indonesia would increase

again to $308 billion (World Bank 2020a). In the year 2019, the external debt would again

increase substantially to $408 billion (World Bank 2020a). This represents a 187 percent increase

in 20 years.

INFORMAL LABOR

As in many Global South countries affected by uneven economic development, informal

employment seems to also be visible in most economic sectors in Indonesia. Although statistics

on informal labor vary, the ILO (2020c) estimates that in the year 2019, around 80.4 percent of

Indonesians were estimated to be involved in some form of informal employment.

This acknowledgment of significant high levels of informal employment throughout Indonesia seems to be also confirmed by financial institutions as well. For example, a 2011 study conducted by the Asian Development Bank titled "The Informal Sector and Informal Employment in Indonesia" examined informal employment in Indonesia (Asian Development Bank 2011). According to the report, nearly all non-governmental sectors in Indonesia utilize informal workers to some extent (Asian Development Bank 2011). It is important to note that the study focused on two important cities, Yogyakarta and Banten, rather than all of the islands and country (Asian Development Bank 2011).

Although the results found in the report may not be fully representative of the type of informal labor found throughout all of Indonesia, it offers an instructive glimpse into informal labor trends in Indonesia in two major cities. According to the 2011 report, the top sectors with the most informal employment in Indonesia (both cities of Yogyakarta and Banten) included agriculture and fishery, manufacturing, retail and wholesale, real estate, mining hotels, as well as restaurants, and finally transport and communication (Asian Development Bank 2011). The sectors with nearly no informal employment were finance, electricity, water, gas, and public administration (Asian Development Bank 2011). Echoing the report, I repeat here the estimates of informal labor which suggest that 80.4 percent of Indonesians were estimated to be involved in some form of informal employment (ILO 2020c). Conversely, using data from the ILO (2020c), less than 20 percent of Indonesians are in formal employment. In an effort to demonstrate the magnitude of informal labor in Indonesia, more examples will be provided using the sulfur work example below.

Figure 25. Example of Informal Worker in East Java in Indonesia (Picture was taken by Uwe Aranas in 2015)

Figure 25 provides a visual example of an informal worker engaging in sulfur work near a Kawah ljen volcano in East Java in Indonesia. According to a previous journalistic story in 2008, around 200 or so informal workers every day walk up the mountain and earn depending on the amount of sulfur weight they carry back down to be weighed (Davies 2008). With all the physical labor hauling the sulfur done the mountain, the workers only make around 15,000 rupiah, or roughly $1.64 a day (Davies 2008).

REFUGEES AND STATELESS PERSONS IN INDONESIA

In addition to the informal labor phenomenon, it is legitimate to briefly address the population flow and forced migration of many refugees from neighboring countries who seek status and protection in a transit country like Indonesia located in the Southeast Asia region. According to a report produced by the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), in June 2021, 707 had arrived from Myanmar, 7490 refugees had arrived from

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countries like Afghanistan, another 1376 from Somalia, 708 from Iraq, 326 from Iran 517 from

Sudan, 468 from Sri Lanka, 448 from Yemen, 352 from Palestine (UNHCR 2021a).

The Indonesian military conflict in East Timor that occurred in 1999 may also partially

account for the refugee population total count numbers of nearly 122,611 in 2000 (World Bank

2020a). The numbers of refugees in Indonesia would drastically reduce down to 82 known and

registered persons in 2005, and then increase to 1811 total refugees (World Bank 2020a). In

2015, the refugees and stateless persons numbers in Indonesia would rise again to 5954 total

refugees (World Bank 2020a). The latest available estimate from 2020 indicated that the refugee

population has risen to more than 10,134 total refugees (World Bank 2020a). Refugees from

different regions of the world arriving in Indonesia are constantly added given the nature of

conflict and state repression of ethnic minority groups around the world. In the autumn of 2020,

for example, some 300 Rohingya refugees arrived in Indonesia after fleeing state repression in

the country of Myanmar (BBC News 2020).

As briefly highlighted above, the number of refugees in Indonesia may be influenced by

the nature of regional conflicts and human displacements found throughout the Southeast Asia

region during the last two decades of the 21st century. Similar to trends in other Global South

countries, the state may sometimes be overwhelmed with providing resources and will depend on

international organizations like UNHCR and providing both technical and financial assistance.

Meanwhile, the state may also not always provide a clear pathway to legal status to refugees

when they arrive, which may sometimes lead towards actions in which refugees commit suicide

or self-harm. This phenomenon was discussed in an article that highlighted several suicide cases

that have occurred among refugees who end up squatting in various "make-shift" shelters

throughout Jakarta, Indonesia (The New Humanitarian 2021). While Indonesia provides some

sanctioned shelter for refugees in various cities across the country supported by international humanitarian agencies like UNHCR, many refugees may still attempt their luck with squatting as a means for survival. Hence, we see that "deprivation-based" squatting (Pruijt 2013) may sometimes be a direct consequence of one's stateless or refugee status in Indonesia.

Thousands of refugees and stateless persons have migrated to Indonesia in the last two decades of the 21st century. Although the total estimated populations have decreased since 1999 during the East Timor conflict, Indonesia still receives anywhere from several hundred to a thousand refugees annually from neighboring Global South countries in the region including Myanmar, Afghanistan, Somalia, Iraq, Iran, Sri Lanka, Yemen, and Palestine (UNHCR 2021a). Enough evidence exists to suggest that at least some forms of urban squatting in the 21st century is attributed to impoverished refugees and stateless people in Indonesia fleeing from repressive political regimes and/or excessive levels of absolute poverty in their own countries.

HYPER URBAN POPULATION GROWTH

Hyper urban population growth is another phenomenon that seems to have increased in Indonesia in the last two decades of the 21st century. Such rapid growth happening in Indonesia's cities may also be linked to the persistence of urban squatting there. As illustrated in the previous three cases, hyper urban population growth often overwhelms urban spaces and the available supply of housing stock. When formal housing stocks shrink, it is fair to assume that more people will seek informal housing alternatives and look towards urban squatting alternatives instead. World Bank statistics help to contextualize hyper urban population growth in Indonesia.

In the year 2000, there were only 88 million people living in urban areas (cities) in Indonesia (World Bank 2020a). By 2005, this would increase to almost 103 million people

living in Urban areas (World Bank 2020a). By 2010, the urban population would increase again to 120 million people and to 137 million in the year 2015 (World Bank 2020a). The latest estimate from 2020 suggested that some 154 million people now reside in urban areas in Indonesia (World Bank 2020a). This represents a 75 percent increase.

Data from the World Bank (2020a) has shown an increase of urban population growth in Indonesia during the 21st century, placing additional strain on the current available housing stock. Taken together, it is fair to link such hyper population growth in Indonesia contributing to patterns of urban squatting, especially in the metropolitan area of Jakarta.

GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE

As was the case with Nigeria, it is important to note that global climate change will substantially impact both Global South countries and have consequences for the entire world system. Much of this legitimate global ecological concern is tied to previous and current governance marked by what has been called by some an "organized irresponsibility" throughout the 19th, 20th, and now 21st century (Beck 1999; Moore 2003). Importantly, my usage of the definition of "climate change" and "organized irresponsibility" here will be similar to the one I used also in the Nigerian case.

Global climate change seems to create a human produced boomerang effect that may help to explain the continued phenomenon of land conflict in the future and is likely to have an effect on urban squatting and urban squatters in Indonesia. Deforestation or logging of trees in the country from 2000 to 2018 illustrates current human made forms of climate change in Indonesia.

Figure 26. Indonesia Forest Area (sq.km) 2000–2018 (Source: World Bank 2020a)

Figure 26 illustrates the decline of forest areas (sq.km) in Indonesia from 2000-2018. In the year 2000, the sq.km in Indonesia were still over 1.01 million sq.km (World Bank 2020a). By 2010, it would decline below a million to 996,000 sq.km (World Bank 2020a). The sq.km in Indonesia would further decline to 950,000 in the year 2015 (World Bank 2020a). In 2018, another reduction of the total sq.km in Indonesia would occur and again decline down to 933,000 (World Bank 2020a). This represents a 6.7 percent decline since 2000.

Data from Climate Link (2019) highlighted the projected impact of global climate change in Indonesia in the 21st century and beyond. According to its 2019 report on Indonesia, it projected by the year 2050 that temperatures will go up in Indonesia by about 0.8 to a full 2.0° C (Climate Links 2019). Specifically, the report focuses on five areas that are projected to be substantially impacted by global climate change in Indonesia in the 21st century. These four

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areas included agriculture, water, human health, coasts and fisheries, and forests and biodiversity (Climate Links 2019). In the first area, agriculture, the report listed that global climate change will have a mostly negative effect on rice productivity and reduce its anticipated volume amount (Climate Links 2019). In addition, there is a risk that crops will be damaged from drought, flooding, etc. (Climate Links 2019). In the next area, water, the report highlights that Indonesia will likely have to deal with a reduction of water supplies, worsening of the water quality, and salt affecting aquifers in the coastal areas (Climate Links 2019). In the next area, human health, the report projected that Indonesia will likely see an increase of the mortality rates because of floods and landslides (Climate Links 2019). In addition, the report projected there will also be greater incidences of diseases brought about by floods (Climate Links 2019). In the area, coasts and fisheries, the report projected a reduction of various fish populations, more erosions on the coastlines, as well as damage to the reefs (Climate Links 2019). In the final area, forests and biodiversity, the report projected that Indonesia will likely be affected with more forest fires, introduction of new types of pests, and also the decline of species as well as habitat loss (Climate Links 2019).

In summary, global climate change will likely produce a "boomerang effect" (Beck 1992) for Global South countries like Indonesia in the 21st century. Global climate change will also likely increase problems tied to land inequality and conflict over land, which may be directly linked with the phenomenon of urban squatting in Indonesia in the 21st century.

LAND CONFLICT AND LAND GRABBING

Both land conflict and land grabbing issues continue to persist in Indonesia and other Global South countries in the 21st century. My definition of land grabbing comes from LandVoc (2021), which defined this as "large-scale acquisition of farmland (over 1,000 hectares) whether

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by purchase, leases or other means." As in the previous cases exploring the nature of land grabbing in India, Brazil, and Nigeria, data from Land Matrix (2020) illustrated the hidden trails of transnational deals and entities which are purchasing land or lease land in Indonesia in the 21st century. A number of Global North countries have either purchased or leased land, including the Republic of Korea leading with 328,361 hectares, followed by the United States with 270,182 hectares, followed by the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland with 158,227 hectares, followed by the British Virgin Islands with 131,619 hectares (Land Matrix 2020). Global North countries also have a number of deals giving them a stake in Indonesian land. These include the British Virgin Islands leading with an estimated 30 deals, United Kingdom and Northern Ireland with 16 deals, the Republic of Korea with 9 deals, the United States with 8 deals, and Belgium with 6 deals (Land Matrix 2020).

Several Global South countries have also engaged in land deals in Indonesia. This includes Malaysia leading with 1,726,244 hectares, followed by Singapore with 998,835 hectares, followed by China (Hong Kong Special Administrative Region) with 863,588 hectares, followed by China with 138,000 hectares, followed by Sri Lanka with 131,619 hectares, followed by India with 53,000 hectares (Land Matrix 2020). The Global South countries having the most numbers of land deals included Malaysia with 80 deals, followed by Singapore with 46 deals, followed by China (Hong Kong Special Administrative Region) with 32 deals, followed by Sri Lanka with 10 deals, and India with only 1 deal (Land Matrix 2020).

For Indonesia, land grabbing seems to be used by foreign countries for biofuels, food crops, agriculture, timber plantation, and forest logging (Land Matrix 2020). Land grabbing by foreign countries in Indonesia contributes to more land tenure insecurities for many Indonesians whose land might be up for land grabbing. To demonstrate this degree of land tenure insecurity, I

made use of survey data from Prindex (2020). According to the most recent survey data available from Prindex (2020) in 2020, of those who were surveyed, 24 percent felt insecure on their property or land in Indonesia. Meanwhile, of those surveyed, 23 percent felt insecure regarding their right to their home (Prindex 2020). When examining the regional situation, I also briefly noted the levels of land tenure insecurity This is in line with other countries including the neighboring country of the Philippines, nearly 48 percent felt insecure in their homes, while 10 percent felt insecure in Vietnam, 17 percent felt insecure in Thailand, and 35 percent felt insecure in Cambodia, while 22 percent felt insecure in India (Prindex 2020).

In summary, foreign land grabbing happening in Indonesia in the 21st century may contribute to land tenure insecurities faced among Indonesians in regions where foreign investments and marketization is starting to have an effect on the supply of land. Using recent survey data from Prindex (2020), I was able to confirm that portions of the population in Indonesia did feel insecure on their land and in their homes. Land grabbing may account for a portion of urban squatting as a push back to marketization and land grabbing occuring by foreign countries or investors engaged in the purchase or lease of land in Indonesia.

INFORMAL SETTLEMENTS: JAKARTA

This section briefly describes two formerly known informal settlements that were located in the Indonesian capital city of Jakarta, Indonesia. This brief overview of the informal settlements is partly visual, descriptive, and then fitted with examples of urban squatting found in Nigeria into Pruijt's (2013) five squatting types.

Kampung Bandan/Kampung Pulo

The first is a former informal settlement located in the neighborhood of Kampung Bandan that was built by squatters and later evicted and bulldozed by authorities in July, 2020

(Baskoro 2020). The other, known as Kampung Pulo, was also a former informal settlement in Jakarta that was also evicted and subsequently bulldozed by authorities in 2015 (Pratiwi, Purnamasari, and Tambun 2015).

Both of these informal settlements were located within the proximity of the capital city of Jakarta. According to the CIA World Factbook (2021), Jakarta's estimated population reached an estimated 10.915 million in 2021. This makes Jakarta by far the largest city in Indonesia compared to the second largest city of Bekasi, which had a population of 3.510 million people in 2021 (CIA 2021). Similar to previous trends observed in other cities of the Global South, Jakarta has a population density well over 37,460 per square mile (World Population Review 2021b).

The actual population count of the informal settlement once referred to as Kampung Bandan is unclear and previous estimates from journalistic accounts in 2020 during the violent eviction placed the number at several hundred squatters (Baskoro 2020). Prior to its demolition by authorities in 2020, Kampung Bandan, was initially surveyed by a researcher in 2017 who provided important visual documentation of the site, and also provided data from surveys of 25 respondents (Alzamil 2017). In the study, 25 respondents were asked to give feedback on a number of issues relating to the informal settlement and survey questions about the state of housing, shortage of housing spaces, lack of housing services, as well as topics around access to water supply, sewage, waste collections, etc. (Alzamil 2017). Results of the survey conducted indicated that some respondents did confirm some problems while also not confirming some problems asked by the researcher (Alzamil 2017).

What makes the former informal settlement known as Kampung Bandan interesting is that it was initially constructed on lands near a railway line that was state owned and managed by the railway company Kereta Api Indonesia (Baskoro 2020). Similar to the spontaneous and

autonomous building patterns found in the construction of the favelas in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, it

is fair to suggest that development of Kampung Bandan in Jakarta, Indonesia near a railway line

is an example of what Davis (2005) called "pirate urbanization."

Figure 27. Former Informal Community Known as Kampung Bandan in Jakarta, Indonesia
(Picture was taken by Jonathan Mcintosh in 2004)

The second former informal settlement Kampung Pulo was an informal settlement

located on small strips of land on the riverbanks of the Ciliwung River, in East Jakarta, Indonesia

until the regional government evicted and bulldozed the informal settlement in the summer of

2015 (Meilasari-Sugiana, Sari, and Anggraini 2018). In 2010, five years before the eviction, the

estimated population of Kampung Pulo was 10,022 residents (Meilasari-Sugiana et al. 2018).

Spatially, all of Kampung Pulo represented a highly densely populated informal

community with a total 8 hectares of land available (Meilasari-Sugiana et al. 2018).

Retrospectively, the forced eviction of Kampung Pulo was already set in motion legally back in

2014 when a new law was passed making riverbank communities "illegal communities" subject

to bulldozing all dwellings and structures within the range of 15 meters of the riverbanks of the Ciliwung River (Dovey, Cook, and Achmadi 2019). The decision by the regional Indonesian government to go ahead with the forced evictions in 2015 was said to have been influenced by a number of political issues, but a peculiar new form of framing took place, unlike prior justifications for evictions of informal settlements.

A new framing strategy was used to justify evictions from the standpoint of arguing that the removal of urban squatters from their dwellings is also tied to "flood risk reduction" (Dovey et al. 2019:268). In their paper on discourses around evictions of informal settlements in Indonesia, Dovey et al. (2019:269) suggested that the use of words by Indonesian officials like "normalization," "legalization," "formalization," are actually used for the purpose of using "floods" rather than people as a way to maintain state power and avoid opposition and resistance to evictions of informal settlements on the riverbanks. To sum up, since evictions of informal settlements need some kind of official justification, the case of Kampung Pulo has shown that Indonesian state actors have utilized new framing strategies which focus attention towards issues like "floods" rather than the urban squatters themselves.

Figure 28. Location of the Former Informal Community Known as Kampung Pulo in East Jakarta, Indonesia

As shown in Figure 28 above, urban squatters in Kampung Pulo constructed their makeshift dwellings in a high-concentrated area near the riverbanks of the Ciliwung River that has often been impacted by flooding (Google Earth 2021a).

Table 5. Overview of Pruijt's 5 Squatting Types in Indonesia

Pruijt's (2013) five squatting types	Indonesia
1. Deprivation-based (Survival squatting)	✓ Examples exist in all major cities of Indonesia including informal settlements such as Kampung Bandan and Kampung Pulo (See Figure 27 and Figure 28 above.)
2. Alternative-housing strategy	N/A
3. Entrepreneurial	✓ Informal street food sellers on city streets and pavements in Jakarta.
4. Conservational	N/A
5. Political squatting	✓ United Liberation Movement for West Papua (LMWP), which has been declared a terrorist organization by the government of Indonesia.

Source: Harvey 2009.

Table 5 above summarizes all observed forms of squatting in Indonesia that seem to align with Pruijt's five squatting types (Pruijt 2013). Based on several peer-reviewed articles and journalistic accounts, "deprivation-based" squatting seems to be more prevalent in Indonesia when compared to the other four squatting types from Pruijt's (2013) typology. Hence, both Kampung Bandan and Kampung Pulo seem to fit into examples of "deprivation-based" squatting. Similar patterns were also observed in previous informal settlements of Indonesia, which also demonstrated patterns of inequality and deprivation. The existence of informal settlements in Jakarta, Indonesia demonstrates what may be called examples of "boomerang effects" (Beck 1992) and illustrates larger macro-economic inequalities found between cities of the Global North and cities of the Global South that persist to this day.

Meanwhile, the phenomenon of street vendors throughout Jakarta seems to provide evidence that "entrepreneurial" forms of squatting are also occurring (Pruijt 2013). According to one Indonesian newspaper, it is estimated that around 90 percent of sidewalks are squatted and occupied by such vendors (Murti 2021). Meanwhile, there currently seems to be insufficient evidence to suggest that "conservational" squatting is taking place in Indonesia. However, there is evidence of "political squatting" in Indonesia with the activities of the separatist political movement known as the United Liberation Movement for West Papua (LMWP) in the West Papua Region (Harvey 2009). This group is also listed as a terrorist organization by the Indonesian government.

CHAPTER IX

POVERTY TOURISM ANALYSIS

This chapter presents the results of the poverty tourism analysis. The first section

discusses the theoretical framework used in the poverty tourism analysis. The second section

highlights the research method, sample, selection of cases, data collection process and the coding

process. The third section discusses the results of the four individual poverty tourism websites

reviewed. The fourth section provides a summary of findings.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The analysis is grounded in a symbolic interactionist perspective. Urry posited that

tourists often attach symbolic meanings to the places and persons they visit. He defined this

phenomenon as the "tourist gaze" (Urry 1990). The theoretical approach that Urry (1990) used to

conceptualize this "tourist gaze" can be traced back to symbolic interactionism in the tradition of

Blumer (1969). According to Blumer (1969), symbolic interactionism has the following core

underlying principles:

> Human beings act toward things on the basis of the meanings that things have for
>
> them; the meaning of such things is derived from, or arises out of, the social
>
> interaction that one has with one's fellows; these meanings are handled in, and
>
> modified through, an interpretative process used by the person in dealing with the
>
> things he encounters. (1969:2)

The work of Urry (1990) and Blumer (1969) helped to explain how culture, uneven

development, and the "tourist gaze" (Urry 1990) influence the way informal settlements and

squats are framed and utilized within the slum tourism community. Approaching them from a

view of symbolic interactionism as originally posited by Blumer (1969), poverty slum tours are

useful entry points to better understand why individuals tour informal settlements in poor countries and what sort of meanings are attached by tourists to these places as well as the urban squatters that live in them.

DATA

The data came from individual review comments of poverty slum tours on the TripAdvisor and GetYourGuide tour review websites. Using content analysis as the main qualitative research technique, a total of four poverty slum tour websites were analyzed (Krippendorff 2013). Content analysis was selected because it seemed the most appropriate qualitative technique in evaluating the popular narratives and frames used by tourists describing their own experiences of poverty that has sometimes also been described as the "tourist gaze" (Urry 1990).

The first poverty tour comments section analyzed was located on the website TripAdvisor and offered by Reality Tours and Travel in Mumbai, India titled "Dharavi Slum Tour." It received 2612 individual reviews (TripAdvisor 2021). The second poverty tour comments section was located on the website GetYourGuide in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil and titled "Rio De Janeiro: Half-Day Rocinha Favela Walking Tour" (GetYourGuide 2021). It received 581 individual reviews. The third poverty tour comments section analyzed was located on the website TripAdvisor in Jakarta, Indonesia and titled "Jakarta Hidden Tours" (TripAdvisor 2021). It received 196 individual reviews. The fourth and final poverty tour comments section analyzed was located on the website TripAdvisor in Cape Town, South Africa and titled "Siviwe Township Tours" (TripAdvisor 2021). It received 753 individual reviews.

SAMPLE

All individual reviewers were considered participants and used in the content analysis.

Some individual reviews and statements which seemed unrelated to the study were eliminated. Moreover, although occasionally reviewers provided information about their own region or country of origin, it is difficult to determine where exactly reviewers came from.

SELECTION OF CASES

The four poverty tour sources were selected with a basic snowball technique and basic search using Google Search. The initial case selection process occurred by including sources if they initially had a minimum of 100 reviews. Hence, poverty tour internet sources were eliminated if they did not have an adequate number of reviews or responses. The initial selection process also included only poverty tour sites that had English reviews available. This process also eliminated several tour review websites and reduced the sample sizes. To enable some regional variation in the selection process, four different regions and countries were selected. These were India, Brazil, Indonesia, and Africa.

DATA COLLECTION

The collection of the data began May 1, 2021 and ended September 1, 2021. Given the volume of qualitative data, Microsoft Excel was used to structure as well as color code the amount of online qualitative data. In addition, enormous caution was taken to delete any possible biographical identification markers shared by individuals when they made comments on poverty tours. Hence, while such posts made by individuals in public are considered public, any visible usernames and identifying markers were deleted.

CODING AND THEMATIC

Separate folders were created during the process of identifying major themes acquired from individual internet users providing reviews on poverty tours. The individual review

comments were downloaded and re-organized into folders aligned according to themes. The themes were organized to address research question four.

ANALYSIS OF FINDINGS/RESULTS

Qualitative data presented here comes from individual internet users providing reviews on poverty tours comments from the TripAdvisor or the GetYourGuide tourist review websites (GetYourGuide 2021; TripAdvisor 2021). The comment feature on TripAdvisor and GetYourGuide allows registered users to give their own review on any tour they took part in. The following research question shaped the analysis: "Can a content analysis (Krippendorff 2013) of slum tourism literature demonstrate how culture, uneven development, and the "tourist gaze" (Urry 1990) influence the way informal settlements are framed and utilized within the slum tourism community?" To assist with the organization of the findings/results of the poverty tourism analysis, the findings were divided into five broad themes: Romanticizing the Slums; Privilege Guilt and Shame; Poverty Shock, Deprivation, Government Malfeasance; Recognition of Work Ethic of Slum Dwellers; Moral Economy of Poverty Tourism.

ROMANTICIZING THE SLUMS

A theme that emerged repeatedly during the initial analysis of the testimonial literature in all four poverty tours was what may be described as a romanticization of the slums. Individuals initially often dodged and ignored the degree of absolute poverty in the slums they visited and focused instead on things like the survivalist/adaptive spirit of the slum dwellers they visited in the informal settlements. Below are examples of such claims made by tourists in this study discussing their experiences in the poverty tours in Mumbai, India, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, Jakarta, Indonesia and Cape Town, South Africa:

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We particularly enjoyed the afternoon in the Slum. It was a real experience that

everybody on a tour should do.

Even with the struggle of these fine people, you can see the beauty in them.

A really interesting tour of the slum area. Incredible to see how people can live and work

in such an enclosed environment with limited sanitation and accommodation.

It was an experience to see how people really live below the poverty line.

Even with the struggle of these fine people, you can see the beauty in them. The Langa

people smile, the kids are still kids playing and you have a sense of real community.

PRIVILEGE, GUILT, AND SHAME

Another repeated theme that emerged during the analysis of the testimonial literature

from poverty slum tourists was an occasional acknowledgement of their own superior position

and privileges in direct references to the impoverished people they were observing in the slums.

This also occasionally brought forward emotions such as shame and empathy expressed towards

the people they observed in the slums. These themes, which I characterize as feelings,

demonstrate privilege, guilt, and shame, and fit into what some symbolic interactionists have

described as the phenomenon of "interaction ritual chains" (Collins 2004). I list a small sample

of such claims and statements by tourists who engage in "interaction ritual chains" (Collins

2004) while describing their feelings of privilege, guilt, and shame about participating in poverty

tours in Mumbai, India, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, Jakarta, Indonesia and Cape Town, South Africa:

I was a bit reluctant to do this tour in light of its theme. However, this is so well put

together and very humbling that I didn't feel uncomfortable at all.

I have to admit I was conflicted when I saw this tour being offered as it is a fine line

between being supportive and exploitative.

I was skeptical about the ethics of touring a "slum," but this tour taught me a bunch about

this community and completely changed my idea of what it is

Going in, we were a little concerned with the ethics of doing a slum tour, but the Dharavi

is so much more than poverty.

We were a bit nervous about visiting a township as we did not want to disturb the people

living there or giving them the feeling, that we intrude their personal space.

I wasn´t sure about doing this with my kids, 10 and 14.

I was thinking, what is this - Tourists staring at poor people - it just felt awkward and

wrong. But I was wrong.

POVERTY SHOCK, DEPRIVATION, GOVERNMENT MALFEASANCE

Besides the theme of privilege guilt and shame, another theme that emerged during the

content analysis of the testimonial literature from poverty slum tourists was poverty shock,

deprivation, and what appeared to be sometimes a shifting of blame on government malfeasance

in the informal settlements they visited. Again, I list a small sample of such "claims" and

statements by tourists when they described in their own words various forms of poverty,

deprivation, or an absent state in poverty:

The tour itself opened my eyes to the extremely poor conditions, by Western standards,

that most of these people live in.

This is what third world poverty looks like. Something that even in the poorest areas of a

first world country you will never see. Be prepared to have your heart strings pulled. It's

dark, dirty and eye opening.

Breathing conditions are horrifying for residents but also unpleasant for tourists, if you

are sensitive.

We saw the tiny homes built out of corrugated iron, carpet, waste wood (…) anything that can be used. The children - most looked beautiful and well kept but some didn't. Most were running in bear feet.

By the governments own admission at least 700,000 are living on less than $1US a day. These people often live in illegal housing settlements scattered around the city. This tour, takes you into those areas and introduces you to the families who live there

We visited shanty villages, makeshift homes built literally near the train tracks, and an area off the coast of a village that was demolished leaving people without homes. This tour shows you first hand the disparity between wealth and poverty in Jakarta and how people are living in some horrendous conditions.

They deserve so much better. The government really needs to pay attention and give them the standard of living they need.

RECOGNITION OF WORK ETHIC OF SLUM DWELLERS

Another set of "claims" that emerged during the content analysis of the testimonial literature from poverty slum tourists was a recognition of a work ethic among slum inhabitants. This was often made through the observation how people in their precarious situation in the slums were still illustrating a notable worth ethic. In other words, the analysis of the testimonial literature did not seem to indicate any arguments that framed poverty in the slums as a result of a "culture of poverty" (Lewis 1968), which associated poverty with dependency or some other perceived deficiency. Rather, some "claims" made by poverty slum tourists seemed to evoke, at times, a recognition of a (protestant) view of work, which identified a strong "work ethic" attitude among those affected by poverty in the slums (Weber [1905]1968). This is visible in the following set of comments made by poverty slum tourism tourists:

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This is a must see in Mumbai, it will change your idea of a slum completely. It is in fact a city within a city, and it is thriving…The work ethic across the many different industries puts many of us in the west to shame. The people we encountered were all happy to engage with us, the children especially loved a high five!

Dharavi itself is not at all what I had imagined a slum to be like. it's incredibly busy, industrious, and entrepreneurial. it's a mini-India, originally built on illegal land, where everything gets recycled, and each area has its field of expertise (plastic, fabric, aluminum, pottery, etc). all in all, it is a real eye opener.

People live in difficult conditions, but they all have jobs and work hard.

Great tour. They dispel many negative aspects of the slum and show the productive business in the slum as well as the Hindu and Muslim residential areas.

The place is an amazing. It is a filthy maze of incredible enterprise on every corner - a testament to the ingenuity and grit of the people of Dharavi and Mumbai.

The Slum was far more vibrant and entrepreneurial than I thought. I envisaged an appalling area with a sense of tension in the area, but this was not so! There were two areas: the residential and business zones. The latter plays host to in excess of 10,000 businesses.

MORAL ECONOMY OF POVERTY TOURISM

Finally, one peculiar theme that emerged in the content analysis of the testimonial literature was tied to justifying their participation in poverty slum tours through a moral economy frame. Rather than coming to terms with materialistic deprivation in the informal settlements they visited, there seemed to be a sudden shift towards "moral" based explanations for what they observed. This moral economy frame also appeared on several occasions when poverty slum

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tourists defended paying the tour guide fee and also on numerous occasions referencing that they had made additional voluntary extra contributions to poverty slum tour guide companies and tour guides. While there are many ways scholars have used the term "moral economy," mine comes closest to that definition also used by Cheal (1988):

> By a moral economy I mean a system of transactions which are defined as socially desirable (i.e. moral), because through them social ties are recognized, and balanced social relationships are maintained. (1988:15)

> This "moral economy" frame appears in the following set of comments made by poverty slum tourists:

> We brought pens and pencils and candy to give to the local children, which they received with gratitude.

> It's great to know that a percentage of the costs go to support startup businesses in areas of need as well as providing visitors with authentic experiences

> We were most impressed with the fact that the Tour company gives 80percent of the profits (after taxes) towards education of the children of the slum.

> Half of the entrance fee is donated to the people you visit, so you know you are really helping them by doing the tour.

> One tends to be preventive about visiting a slum, however the experience was touching and leaves you with a sense of admiration.

> This is a locally run initiative, so it benefits the community too. We ended at the community craft center where pottery, jewelry and other local arts are available - buy your African souvenirs here where the community benefits.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

To restate the fourth research question which formed the basis of the content analysis: "4) Can a content analysis (Krippendorff 2013) of slum tourism literature demonstrate how culture, uneven development, and the "tourist gaze" (Urry 1990) influence the way informal settlements are framed and utilized within the slum tourism community?" The online testimonial literature online poverty tourism websites seem to offer sociologists a new avenue to study how tourists attach different sets of meanings and claims to the informal settlements and people they visit.

The poverty tourism analysis also made it possible to expand previous theorization in the symbolic interactionist perspective, especially by expanding the original framework of the "tourist gaze" and its application to online poverty tourism testimonial literature (Urry 1990). The set of themes that poverty tourists made when visiting poverty tours in Mumbai, India, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, Jakarta, Indonesia and Cape Town, South Africa, seemed to go into a variety of directions. One of the earliest themes recognized during the analysis was the issue of romanticizing the slum. Poverty tourists in the testimonial literature often seemed to dodge issues of absolute poverty and replaced them with a frame that shifted towards emphasizing the survivalist/adaptive spirit of the slum dwellers. This peculiar gaze of romanticization of slums among poverty tourists also seems to give salience to what some scholars have described as a new form of "global recreational colonialism," especially noticeable among tourists interested in poverty tourism (Lessenich 2019:98).

The second theme that emerged from the testimonial literature often dealt with the issue of privilege, guilt, and shame. On several occasions poverty tourists recognized their own superior position and privileges in direct references to the impoverished people they were

observing in the slums. This pattern of feeling one's superior position and privilege can also fit into what has been described by some symbolic interactionists as the formation of "interaction ritual chains" (Collins 2004). Another important theme that emerged from the testimonial literature addressed a mix of issues such as poverty shock, deprivation, and the government malfeasance. Here poverty tourists addressed themes such as witnessing poverty in the informal settlements, the magnitude of deprivation in the slums, and blaming the government for inaction. The fourth theme that emerged from the testimonial literature seemed to recognize the hard worth ethic they observed with some of the slum inhabitants. The last theme that emerged from the testimonial literature can be characterized as the moral economy of poverty tourism.

This was observed on several occasions when poverty tourists seemed to frequently utilize "moral" rather than materialistic statements on what they observed in the informal settlements. This "moral economy" frame was also noticed when tourists mentioned they defended their actions and the fee for the poverty tour since it was also directly benefiting individuals living in the informal settlements. A similar "moral economic" argument was used by poverty tourists with regard to voluntarily providing gifts to children in the slums.

CHAPTER X

DISCUSSION

This chapter synthesizes findings with reference to each of the themes developed in the

four case studies. This chapter is organized into twelve subthemes (land grabbing,

hyperglobalization, hyper urban population growth, informal labor, structural inequalities in

cities, cultural ambivalence, the state of social protection efforts, authoritarian statism and

militarism, unfree labor and unpaid labor, environmental risks affecting informal settlements, the

refugee paradox, and poverty tourism). These converging themes account for the change or

continuity of global urban squatting in Rio de Janeiro (Brazil), Mumbai (India), Jakarta

(Indonesia), and Lagos (Nigeria) in the 21st century.

LAND GRABBING

Using data from Land Matrix (2020), the study revealed that extensive foreign land

grabbing in the first two decades of the 21st century has been a persistent phenomenon in all of

the cases. It is important to note that the definition of land grabbing was adopted for this study

from LandVoc (2021), which defined it as "large-scale acquisition of farmland (over 1,000 ha)

whether by purchase, leases or other means."

While the data revealed that land grabbing is done by foreign entities and foreign

companies located in the Global North whether for agricultural uses or producing timber,

biofuels, food crops, industry uses, and so-called non-food agricultural commodities like

clothing, it illustrated that land grabbing also occurs regionally by neighboring Global South

countries and governments which also engage in land grabbing. I discuss the magnitude of land-

grabbing in only one of the four countries I examined previously. According to Land Matrix

(2020), numerous Global North countries have purchased land in India, such as the UK including

Northern Ireland leading with nearly 44,437 hectares, followed by Macedonia with 5,593 hectares, followed by the United States with 3,642 hectares, followed by Romania with 2,500 hectares, and Japan with roughly 1,458 hectares (Land Matrix 2020). Meanwhile, Global South countries have also taken a piece of India including Guyana leading with 737,814 hectares, followed by Indonesia with 530,000 hectares, followed Ghana with 422,607 hectares, followed by Zambia with 320,000 hectares, followed by Ethiopia with 202,311 hectares, followed by Sierra Leone with 119,321 hectares (Land Matrix 2020).

Similar patterns of land grabbing were observed from data provided by Land Matrix (2020) in all four of the cases. While this data from Land Matrix (2020) did indicate Global North countries were active in the practice of land grabbing, it was shown that Global South countries were also significantly involved. This material and physical aspect of land grabbing throughout the four cases may explain at least in part why nearly a quarter of the population surveyed felt insecure on their property or land (Prindex 2020). More specifically, in India, tenure insecurity is felt by 22 percent of the population, while in Brazil it is one point higher at 23 percent of the population who feel insecure on their lands or property, 23 percent tenure insecurity in Nigeria, and 24 percent of Indonesians felt some sort of tenure insecurity in 2020 (Prindex 2020). Urban squatting is often tied to land conflicts because of the growing scarcity and demand for land, the greater population growth in cities, and the predatory role of foreign investors and companies in owning such lands often for externalizing production outside of their home countries.

HYPERGLOBALIZATION

Besides the constraints of land grabbing, hyperglobalization has had a consequential impact on Mumbai (India), Rio de Janeiro (Brazil), Lagos (Nigeria), and Jakarta (Indonesia) in

the first two decades of the 21st century. I noted previously that my usage of the term

hyperglobalization is best aligned with concerns about economic globalization as it has also been

framed previously in the works of social scientists like Bauman (2004), Giddens (1999),

Friedman (2009), Rodrik (2011), and Ritzer (2010). The material side of economic globalization

in the 21st century is best described in available data highlighting the net of foreign assets in a

country and the external debts owed by a country. Starting with India, I noted that the net of

foreign assets increased year by year and was at 12.554 trillion in 2010 (World Bank 2020a). A

similar trend can be observed when examining external debt owed by India which was $290.4

billion in 2010 (World Bank 2020a, Macro Trends 2021a). Besides India, both the net of foreign

assets and external debts owed have also been increasing in Brazil, Nigeria, and Indonesia during

the first two decades of the 21st century. There are different sets of consequences for each

country that is experiencing hyperglobalization in their own ways. Urban squatting in the 21st

century seems to also be intertwined and affected here by the greater push towards global

marketization and state retrenchment (privatization) of available social transfers, and reduction

of public benefits available to the poor. These constraints in the world system resulting from

economic globalization have also created unintended consequences for the financing of social

protection programs in countries in the Global South.

HYPER URBAN POPULATION GROWTH

In all four of the cases there is evidence that these societies are still facing hyper urban

population growth and a decline of rural population. For example, in India alone, urban

population increased from 429 million in 2015 to nearly 471 million in 2019 (World Bank

2020a). Meanwhile in Brazil, the urban population increased from 175 million to nearly 183

million in 2019 (World Bank 2020a). Nigeria has also seen hyper urban population growth

increasing from 68 million people living in urban areas in 2010 to 107 million people in 2015 (World Bank 2020a). Finally, Indonesia has also seen hyper urban population increase from 137 million people in 2015 to 154 million people in 2020 (World Bank 2020a). Such urban population growth found in India, Brazil, Nigeria, and Indonesia may also be the direct result of changes in births happening during the last two decades of the 21st century. These specific fertility rates were highlighted in the four cases demonstrating that Nigerian women seemed to have the highest fertility rate average of 5.31 in 2019 compared to a rate of 2.2 fertility rate among Indian women in the same year (World Bank 2020a).

An examination of the population pyramids of India, Brazil, Nigeria, and Indonesia in 2019 (Population Pyramid 2021) indicated patterns often found in Global South countries including high birth rates and the bulk of the population being young. These imbalances illustrated in the population pyramids in 2019 found in all four cases also likely contribute to hyper urban population growth in India, Brazil, Nigeria, and Indonesia.

Taken together, such persistent hyper urban population growth is a serious challenge for countries like India, Brazil, Nigeria, and Indonesia if the supply of housing stock is not keeping up with the growing demand by more urban dwellers. To that extent, if societies place too much reliance on market mechanisms and if such mechanisms fail then levels of state response and governance (via social protection programs and social transfers) are also critical in providing adequate and affordable formal housing stock outside of regular market mechanisms. Thus, hyper urban population growth in cities of the Global South accompanied by a lack of state responses/governance adjustments towards market failures in the formal housing sector may also contribute to more urban dwellers squatting instead of finding a pathway into formal housing.

INFORMAL LABOR

This study has also shown the persistence and growth of informal labor in India, Brazil,

Nigeria and Indonesia in the first two decades of the 21st century. In Brazil nearly half of the

working population is engaged in informal labor. According to statistics provided by the ILO,

some 47.70 percent of the population in Brazil were in some sort of informal employment in

2018. In Nigeria, some estimates suggest that 80.5 percent of Nigerians were estimated to be

engaged in some kind of informal employment in 2018 (ILO 2020c). Meanwhile in Indonesia,

roughly 80.4 percent of Indonesians are estimated to be involved in some form of informal

employment in 2019 (ILO 2020c).

Given the journalistic reports by Neuwirth (2016) highlighting the abundance of informal

labor in all of the informal settlements he visited, informal labor still seems to play a significant

role in the precarity of employment structures in countries like India, Brazil, Nigeria, and

Indonesia.

Increasing patterns of informal labor seem to suggest a decomposition of formal

employment sectors in all four of the cases. Accompanied by limited social protection measures

and lack of labor regulations (e.g., child labor regulations, sanctioning unpaid work) by the state

to reduce patterns of informal labor, this should be seen as a potential latent function contributing

to urban squatting in each case.

STRUCTURAL INEQUALITIES IN CITIES

Urban squatting and the mere existence of informal settlements in India (Mumbai), Brazil

(Rio de Janeiro), Nigeria (Lagos), and Indonesia (Jakarta) in the 21st century demonstrates the

strain of structural inequalities reflected in cities of the world system. Similar to previous social

indicators and measures used by scholars like Sassen (2019), the Gini index, and other income

concentration measures highlighting income gaps in a country illustrate the importance of the way social inequalities are structured and "embedded" in cities of the world system.

Although the growth of income gaps between the top 20 percent of a population and the lowest 10 percent of a population is one useful measure at the country level, another crucial measure is the percentage of urban population living in slums in a country which can be argued to reflect the unit of analysis at the city level. Hence, in India this inequality is also manifested in structural inequalities in that the income share of the highest 20 percent is 44.4 percent while the share of the lowest is 10 percent (World Bank 2020a). This income inequality between the highest 20 percent and lowest 10 percent of the population might also explain why in 2018 35.2 percent of the urban population in India lives in slums (World Bank 2020a). In Brazil, an even more extreme form of structural inequality prevails as the income share of the highest 20 percent is 57.8 percent while the share of the lowest 10 percent is 1 percent (World Bank 2020a). The uneven pattern is likewise reflected in that Brazil has an even larger percentage of the population living in slums when compared to India, where an estimated 47 percent of the Brazilian urban population are living in slums in 2018 (World Bank 2020a). In Nigeria, structural inequality also persists with the income share of the highest 20 percent at 42.4 percent and the share of the lowest 10 percent at 2.9 percent (World Bank 2020a). According to the World Bank (2020a), in 2018 around 54 percent of the urban population was living in slums in Nigeria. Indonesia also demonstrates a pattern of structured inequality in that the income share of the highest 20 percent is 45.5 percent while the share of the lowest is only 2.9 percent (World Bank 2020a). For Indonesia, in 2018 some 30.6 percent of the urban population was living in slums in (World Bank 2020a). Such numbers not only reflect unevenness in the social structure of India, Brazil, Nigeria, and Indonesia, they also seem to reveal a mirror image of the structure of society and

how humans try to make cities and exclude those they do not want to be part of their cities. Although statistics such as those above seem to illustrate the power of structures over individuals, in the words of Harvey (2019) they should not be interpreted in this predetermined/ fatalistic frame. Rather, Harvey (2019) posits:

> We have abrogated our right to make ourselves to the rights of capital to make us through the passive acceptance or mindless embrace of the restructuring of daily life by the projects of the capitalist class interests. If the results are not to prepossessing, the new have to reclaim our right to change them. (2019:89)

Harvey (2019) speaks here to the prospects of all to acquire a "right to the city," whether one is a member of the highest 20 percent income group or the lowest 10 percent income group. Expanding such "rights to the city" (Harvey 2019) may be theoretically doable with the help of state responses towards fighting the structural inequalities in the cities in the 21st century. Hence, this study has shown that when income gaps between the highest 20 percent and the lowest 10 percent, as well as the percentage of the urban population living in slums, are used to illustrate structural inequalities in cities, they significantly impact urban squatting in countries like India, Brazil, Nigeria, and Indonesia in the 21st century.

CULTURAL AMBIVALENCE

This study has also shown that ambivalence found in cultures has often contributed to violent conflict —directly impacting urban squatters living in informal settlements in, at least, two of the cases in this study— India and Nigeria. For this purpose, my definition of the term comes from Merriam-Webster Dictionary (2021), in which ambivalence is defined as "simultaneous and contradictory attitudes or feelings toward an object, person, or action." Culture is defined as "a society's symbols systems and the information they convey" (Nolan and

Lenski 2015:36). This cultural ambivalence is best observed in the Indian case where the caste system continues to create tensions among upper and lower castes, especially Dalits who are at greater risk of living in informal settlements. One of these tensions brought to light in this study has often centered on land conflict disputes in which caste dynamics still tend to interplay with one's position and status in Indian society. Besides land–conflict disputes, religious conflicts between Hindus and Muslims in India during the 21st century have also occurred with sometimes deadly outcomes. One example is the violence centered around cows, which have been the source of vigilante and deadly violence propagated by Hindus towards Muslim cattle herders. Unlike Hindus, Muslims in India are not required by their religion to restrict beef consumption. In India, cultural ambivalence also seems to align with what some scholars have described as "culture wars" between secularism and Hinduism (Elst 2019).

Similarly in Nigeria, cultural ambivalence can sometimes be displayed with religious fundamentalists terrorizing vulnerable communities in Nigeria by terrorist groups like Boko Haram. According to estimates provided by the CIA World Factbook (2021), the group is responsible for the deaths of 30,000 to 35,000 people as well as for the displacement of some 2.5 million people. Many of the tactics used by Boko Haram have also been to seek out vulnerable communities and engage in killing innocent civilians.

Forms of cultural ambivalence have often resulted in tensions and violence affecting vulnerable communities in India and in Nigeria. It was noted that caste-dynamics in India still seem to play out in land disputes which often affects urban squatters in informal settlements. The persistence of religious fundamentalism and violence in India among Hindus and Muslims over the cow issue also seems to point towards a persistence of cultural ambivalence in India. Similarly, in Nigeria, the prevalence of fundamentalist ideologies as represented in terror groups

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like Boko Haram point to the persistence of cultural ambivalence as well. A final cultural issue the study explored was the extent to which "habitus" (Bourdieu 1984) could contribute to the phenomenon of informal settlements in a single case situated in Mumbai, India. Given that this research was not ethnographic, and did not have access to human subjects, the study relied on data from the World Values Survey 7 and The Inglehart–Welzel Cultural map to assist in the analysis of values in India, Brazil, Nigeria, and Indonesia in the 21st century. This yielded a general theoretical picture that individuals in India, Brazil, Nigeria, and Indonesia were more likely to carry survival values rather than self-expression values. In addition, individuals in these same countries also carry more traditional values rather than secular values (World Values Survey 2020). Although plausible, whether this data leaning towards survivalist values supports the view that a specific "habitus" (Bourdieu 1984) within the squatters themselves may be blamed for the urban squatting phenomenon in countries like India, Brazil, Nigeria, and Indonesia seems difficult to defend here given the heterogeneous character of many of these societies. Rather than shifting all attention towards the "habitus" (Bourdieu 1984) of squatters, it seems far more accurate to claim that the specific "cultural ambivalences" in all four cases contribute to forms of social chaos and instability in such societies which are often a greater risk to vulnerable communities, including informal settlements.

THE STATE OF SOCIAL PROTECTION EFFORTS

In the first two decades of the 21st century social protection coverages remain minimal and unevenly delivered among persons in India, Brazil, Nigeria, and Indonesia, when compared to social protection coverages in a typical country located in the Global North such as France. This comparison of the state of social protection coverage in the 21st century was made possible with data on social protection from the International Labor Organization (ILO 2020b).

According to estimates provided by the ILO (2020b), for example, 100 percent of the total population in France receives some sort of social protection coverage and "benefit" from the state in 2018. Meanwhile, 100 percent of the vulnerable population receives some sort of social protection coverage and "benefit" from the state in 2018 (ILO 2020b). Although social protection coverages and benefits tend to also vary in the Global North, these coverages tend to still often be above 70 percent or higher.

In comparison to India, for example, the percent of the total population in India receiving some sort of social protection coverage by the state in 2018 was at 24.4 percent, while the vulnerable population had only 16.4 percent social protection coverage and "benefit" from the state (ILO 2020b). In Brazil, the percentages were substantially higher than those observed in India, as the percent of the total population in Brazil receiving some sort of social protection coverage by the state in 2018 was 69.9 percent and 45.9 percent of the vulnerable population received some sort of "benefit" from the state in Brazil (ILO 2020b).

Nigerians by far receive the lowest amount of social protection coverages and "benefits" from the state of all four of the cases studied. The percentage of the total population in Nigeria receiving some sort of social protection coverage by the state in 2018 was only 11.0 percent, while only 1.89 percent of the vulnerable population had a "benefit" from the state (ILO 2020b). Indonesia appears as slightly better when compared to Nigeria. In Indonesia, the percentage of the total population receiving some sort of social protection coverage by the state in 2018 was 27.0 percent, while 16.5 percent of the vulnerable population in Indonesia had a "benefit" from the state (ILO 2020b).

Social protection coverages in India, Brazil, Nigeria, and Indonesia in the 21st century remain minimal and often unevenly distributed among citizens. Brazil has the highest percentage

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of social protection coverages and "benefits" for its citizens while the remaining countries lag in this effort, with Nigeria having the least coverage in terms of percentages of social protection provided by the state. Hence, with such limited social protection efforts for its citizens no social safety net is in place to safeguard citizens from absolute poverty and deprivation. Social protection coverages including benefits play an important role in mitigating the effects of absolute poverty and material deprivation that may exist in a country. When a state fails to act to mitigate or reduce such patterns via the implementation of social protection coverages for its citizens, the latent consequences of such inaction may contribute to the persistence of urban squatting.

AUTHORITARIAN STATISM AND HYPER MILITARISM

This study has also brought to light examples of authoritarian statism and hyper militarism that have plagued most of the countries in this study into the 21st century. While previous scholarship has often employed terms such as "authoritarian capitalism" (Bloom 2016), this study employs the terms authoritarian statism and hyper militarism in the contexts of governance by the state as they seem to affect the lives of urban squatters in informal settlements in the cases of Brazil, Nigeria, and Indonesia. In attempting to demonstrate its monopoly of physical violence in a territory under its political control (Weber [1948]1991), state power, including the usage of formal military units, and armed police forces in civilian spaces has been directed towards urban squatters living in informal settlements in the 20th and 21st centuries. Military spending likewise continues to make up a significant portion of government social spending in all four cases. For example, starting in India, military expenditure as a percentage of government spending was 9.1 percent of the GDP in 2020 (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 2020), compared to the 2.4 percent of GDP spent on public social protection

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(ILO 2020b). Besides military spending (percent of GDP), other examples of authoritarian statism and hyper militarism have been documented through the work of non-governmental organizations reporting on human rights violations towards union and environmental activists, journalists, and urban squatters in all four of the cases. For example, in Brazil, military and police forces have frequently entered into the informal settlements or favelas in Rio de Janeiro in the first two decades of the 21st century and this has often resulted in the deaths of many urban squatters. This documented pattern of excessive use of physical force by Brazilian police has also been mentioned on several occasions by Human Rights Watch (2021), who reported that police had killed some 6357 people in 2020. Besides the killing of urban squatters in the favelas, according to the non-governmental organization Global Witness, around 24 environmentalists were killed in 2019 (Global Witness 2021).

Similar to patterns discovered in Brazil, authoritarian statism and hyper militarism has continued to plague Nigeria in the 21st century. Some examples can be traced back to the fall of 1999 when a dozen or so people were killed by Nigerian troops near a community known as Odi near the Niger Delta (Human Rights Watch 2000). According to Amnesty International (2017), human rights violations also occurred in 2016 and 2017 when the police engaged in forced evictions of informal settlements located in Lagos killing an estimated 10 people.

Indonesia also seems to have examples of authoritarian statism and hyper militarism in the 21st century. According to another human rights source, Indonesian military forces in the Papua region have been responsible for more than 95 unlawful killings of indigenous people of the region (Wright 2018). This has also appeared in the treatment of evicted urban squatters from informal settlements in Jakarta, Indonesia. Rather than expanding the "rights to the city" (Harvey 2019) to all citizens by facilitating more formal housing choices, this study has shown that a

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peculiar form of authoritarian statism and hyper militarism has plagued the four cases in this study. These patterns are reminiscent of what Neckel (2019) has coined as the "refeudalization of modern capitalism" reflected by an asymmetry between political conditions in the Global North that reflect liberal democratic capitalism on the one hand, while in the Global South patterns of authoritarian statism/hyper militarism on the other, including the denial of rights to the city for some inhabitants of cities of India, Brazil, Nigeria, and Indonesia in the 21st century. Urban squatters will continue to engage in squatting unless they also acquire "rights to the city" and accommodation in the city in which they already live (Harvey 2019).

UNFREE AND UNPAID LABOR

In addition to informal labor trends, this study has also uncovered forms of unfree and unpaid labor conditions in India, Brazil, Nigeria, and Indonesia, which have also been issues faced by vulnerable marginalized groups such as urban squatters living in informal settlements. While informal labor has already been shown to flourish in the economies of all four cases in this study, the phenomenon of unfree and unpaid labor carries far more detrimental life chances for those forced into it. According to the Global Rights Index 2020 report, of the worlds' ten worst countries for workers, two of them included Brazil and India (ITUC 2020). While Indonesia and Nigeria were not included in the list, Indonesia was only one step down and received a high rating of 5 indicating "no guarantee of rights," while Nigeria received a slightly lower rating 4 indicating "systematic violations of rights" (ITUC 2020).

Patterns of unfree and unpaid labor have also been linked to the phenomenon of modern slavery in the 21st century (Walk Free Foundation 2020). According to Walk Free Foundation (2020), in India it is estimated that there are around 8 million people working in conditions that have often been described as modern slavery. Meanwhile, in Brazil, there are more than 369,000

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people estimated to work in conditions that can be described as modern slavery (Walk Free Foundation 2020). Similar to India, in Brazil, this modern slave labor is used in the production of goods and livestock such as clothes, apparel, laptops, phones, computers, cattle, and cocoa (Walk Free Foundation 2020). In Nigeria, some 1.3 million are estimated to work in conditions often described as modern slavery and unpaid labor (Walk Free Foundation 2020). A strikingly similar amount of people are estimated to work in conditions of modern slavery in Indonesia where some 1.2 million are estimated to be in such a detrimental condition of unfree and unpaid labor (Walk Free Foundation 2020). According to estimates provided by Walk Free Foundation (2020), an estimated 4.73 victims per 1,000 population in Indonesia are forced to do unfree and unpaid labor.

Unfree and unpaid labor patterns in India, Brazil, Nigeria, and Indonesia reflect a larger pattern of uneven development growth between the core and periphery countries of the world system in the 21st century. The persistent phenomenon of unfree and unpaid labor patterns in India, Brazil, Nigeria, and Indonesia seems to again evoke what Neckel (2019) has described as the "refeudalization of modern capitalism" in the 21st century. Such patterns of "refeudalization" in modern societies also reflect the asymmetry of development between labor regulation regimes which persist in the countries of the Global North and those repressive, unregulated, informal, unfree, unpaid labor regimes that exist to this day in the Global South. Unfree and unpaid labor contributes to the persistence of "deprivation-based" squatting in the major cities of India, Brazil, Nigeria, and Indonesia in the 21st century (Pruijt 2013).

ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS AFFECTING INFORMAL SETTLEMENTS

Using descriptive statistics from the World Bank (2020a, 2020b) and country-profile reports from the non-governmental organization Climate Links (2019), this study has illuminated

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the way global climate change unmasks the man produced "boomerang effect" (Beck 1992) linked with the continued intensified pressures on the ecosystems and agricultural lands in the 21st century. This man produced "boomerang effect" (Beck 1992) can also be linked with various environmental risks in store for informal settlements of major cities in the Global South in the first two decades of the 21st century.

In two of the four cases in this study, descriptive statistics from the World Bank (2020) and reports from the non-governmental organization Climate links (2019) were examined. The measure of available forest areas (sq.km) from the World Bank (2020a) provided insights into deforestation trends in Nigeria and Indonesia. In the Indonesian case, a similar warning notice emerged regarding the anticipated impact of global climate change in the upcoming decades of the 21st century.

Like Nigeria, Indonesia during the last few decades has also seen evidence of hyper deforestation when examining data from the World Bank (2020a). Similar to what is anticipated to occur in Nigeria, Indonesia by the year 2060, should also anticipate that temperatures will go up in Indonesia by about 0.8 to a full 2.0 ° C (Climate Links 2019). The reports also voiced additional concerns regarding the negative effect global climate change will have on water, human health, coasts and fisheries, and forests and biodiversity (Climate Links 2019).

In the Indonesia case, former informal settlements like Kampung Pulo, were located on small strips of land on the riverbanks near the Ciliwung River, in Jakarta was known to be affected by rains and flooding, according to several accounts (Meilasari-Sugiana et al. 2018). While certainly formal communities are also likely to be affected by global climate change in the 21st century, informal communities face a greater amount of risk because of their locations near high impact areas like rivers and hidden coastal areas. Global climate change remains a salient

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causal narrative and definitely needs to be factored into the mix. Global climate change will continue to produce consequential "boomerang effects" (Beck 1992) for informal settlements in the 21st century as illustrated in the Nigerian and Indonesian cases with regards to patterns of deforestation (World Bank 2020a), and other projected climate risks which will impact agriculture, water, human health, and energy (Climate Links 2019).

THE REFUGEE PARADOX

This study has also brought to light what may be called the refugee paradox. Using World Bank (2020a) and UNHCR (2021a, 2021b) data, this study illuminated the absolute numbers of refugee populations fleeing zones of conflict and seeking temporary and permanent protected status in Global South countries in the first two decades of the 21st century.

A sizable amount of refugee populations have fled to these four countries in the 21st century. In the Indian case, for example, refugee populations along with stateless persons do make up a significant part of the population. This was also brought about by a legal decision in India in 2019 that made around 4 million people, mostly Bengali Muslims, stateless in an instant (Shahid et al. 2019). India has also seen an influx, for example, from its neighboring countries such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Bangladesh with an estimated 195,103 refugees in 2019 alone (World Bank 2020a).

Because of various regional instabilities and violent conflicts happening in the Central and South American region, Brazil has also seen a flow of refugee populations fleeing and seeking protected status. For example, in 2007, Brazil had nearly 20,764 refugees, which grew to 32,844 refugees in 2019 (World Bank 2020a).

In the Nigerian case, although there were an estimated 66,081 refugees fleeing from neighboring countries and seeking protected status in 2020, according to more recent data

provided by UNHCR (2021b), there are another estimated 2.9 million internally displaced persons throughout the entire northeastern Nigerian region in 2021. Some of this seems to be driven by both Nigerian military engagements as well as Boko Haram terrorist attacks, which have created a displacement of millions of people, according to the UNHCR (2021b).

In addition, Indonesia has received a steady stream of refugees during the last two decades brought about by the Indonesian military conflict in East Timor. The largest wave occurred in the year 2000 with nearly 122,611 refugees arriving in Indonesia from East Timor (World Bank 2020a).

At least some forms of urban squatting in the 21st century may be attributed to impoverished refugees and stateless persons often forced to flee from repressive political regimes and/or excessive levels of absolute poverty and unemployment in their own countries.

POVERTY TOURISM

This study has also brought forward examples of poverty tourism in the 21st century. Results further demonstrate to us how the "tourist gaze" (Urry 1990) functions among tourists who engage in poverty tourism in four countries located in the Global South. This peculiar "tourist gaze" (Urry 1990) was reflected in the ways how tourists attached different sets of meanings and "claims" to the informal settlements and people they visited.

CHAPTER XI

CONCLUSION

The first section of this chapter summarizes and discusses key findings with reference to each of the four research questions. The second section of the chapter discusses implications of the findings. The third section discusses limitations. The fourth section identifies suggestions for future research.

RESEARCH QUESTION ONE

The first research question asked, "Do macro-economic inequalities found in the global cities of the "world system" (Wallerstein 1974) help to explain the persistence of urban survival squatting in Brazil (Rio de Janeiro), India (Mumbai), Indonesia (Jakarta), and Nigeria (Makoko)?" In all four cases, the use of descriptive statistics, specifically the percentage of urban population in slums, the GDP per capita, percentage of informal employment, income share of highest 20 percent, income share of lowest 10 percent, the Gini index, as well social protection expenditures (social transfers) implemented by a state indicated a number of deep macroeconomic inequalities or uneven development growth that has taken place in the four Global South countries and cities.

The initial analysis of descriptive statistics provided measures illustrating the scope of macroeconomic inequalities within the four cases. When used as a theoretical comparison tool, the data from India, Brazil, Nigeria, and Indonesia indicated substantial uneven development growth between countries of the Global North and the Global South.

This feature of uneven development growth helps understand the persistence of "deprivation-based" squatting in the four cases in the 21st century (Pruijt 2013). Table 6 summarizes the descriptive statistics. While GDP per capita, and the Gini index measures

certainly reflect the amount of macroeconomic inequalities in a given society, other measures like the percentage of people in informal labor may reflect patterns of precarity and labor inequalities, meanwhile the percent of the urban population living in slums and percentage of tenure insecurity measures may represent the impact of macro-economic inequalities in a society.

The same might be said for the measure of the percentage of the population that lacks basic sanitation, which fits with examples of absolute poverty reflecting the impact of macroeconomic inequalities in a society. Meanwhile, the degree to which a country tries to establish some sort of social safety net for its vulnerable citizens might be measured by the percentage of GDP in a country going towards social protection expenditures.

Table 6. Summary of Descriptive Statistics for France, India, Brazil, Nigeria, Indonesia

	France	**India**	**Brazil**	**Nigeria**	**Indonesia**
Percent of urban pop. in slums	N/A	35.2 percent	47 percent	54 percent	30.6 percent
Percent of pop. that lacks basic sanitation	1 percent	56 percent	14 percent	67 percent	32 percent
GDP Per capita	$41,896	$2,099	$8,751	$2,229	$4,135
Informal Employment	N/A	80.3 percent	38.3 percent	80.5 percent	74.7 percent
Gini index	31.6	35.7	53.9	35.1	32.8
Tenure Insecurity	18 percent	22 percent	23 percent	23 percent	24 percent
Soc. Protection Expenditure by percent of GDP	32.6 percent	2.4 percent	19.7 percent	1.2 percent	2.7 percent

Source: ILO 2020a; ILO 2020b; Prindex 2020; WaterAid 2017; World Bank 2020a, World Bank 2020b.

Table 6 displays a summary of seven selected descriptive statistics for France, India, Brazil, Nigeria, and Indonesia. In comparison, in the year 2020, the percentage of urban population in France is N/A or unknown, while in India it is 35.2 percent, in Brazil it is 47 percent, in Nigeria it is 54 percent, and in Indonesia it is estimated to be at 30.6 percent (World

Bank 2020a). Meanwhile, in the year 2017, when examining the percentage of the population lacking basic sanitation for France was only 1 percent, in India it was 56 percent, in Brazil it was 14 percent, in Nigeria it was 67 percent, in Indonesia it was 32 percent (WaterAid 2017). In 2020, unevenness is also displayed when examining the GDP per capita which was $41,896 for France, $2,099 for India, $8,751 for Brazil, $2,229 for Nigeria, and finally $4,135 for Indonesia (ILO 2020a, ILO 2020b). In 2018, the levels of informal employment also differentiate between France which is N/A or unknown, while in India it was estimated to be as high as 80.3 percent, in Brazil it was 38.3 percent, in Nigeria it was 80.5 percent, and in Indonesia it was 74.7 percent (ILO 2020a, ILO 2020b).

The Gini index was another measure used to illustrate uneven development. The Gini index for France is 31.6, and is by far the lowest Gini index score when compared to my other cases (ILO 2020b). India, for example, has a Gini index of 35.7, while Brazil had the highest score of 53.9, Nigeria with 35.1 and Indonesia with a score of 32.8 (ILO 2020b). The final statistic used was the percentage of population in a country indicating land tenure insecurity or feeling insecure about their homes and property (Prindex 2020). For France, this was 18 percent and the lowest among those listed in Table 6 (Prindex 2020). In India tenure insecurity was 22 percent, in Brazil tenure insecurity was 23 percent, in Nigeria it was also 23 percent, and 24 percent in Indonesia (Prindex 2020).

The continued existence of the phenomenon of urban squatting and informal settlements in each of four cases (India, Brazil, Nigeria, Indonesia) can be described as "boomerang effects" (Beck 1992) of macroeconomic inequalities appearing in many of the cities of the 21st century. Meanwhile, for scholars like Neckel (2019), informal settlements mentioned in this study are representative of a "refeudalization of modern capitalism." Starting with the Indian case, this

study mentioned the informal settlement known as Dharavi located in Mumbai, India and how it appears to fit with Pruijt's (2013) notion of "deprivation-based" squatting. This was also reflected in the display of absolute poverty as highlighted by the precarity of basic toilet access for inhabitants of Dharavi.

In the Brazilian case, the informal settlement known as Rocinha located in Rio de Janeiro certainly was another example of the "boomerang effects" (Beck 1992) of larger macroeconomic inequalities and its direct impact on the Brazilian poor. In the Indian case, the favelas like Rocinha in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil seem to also fit with Pruijt's (2013) typology of "deprivation-based" squatting. The favela known as Rocinha in Brazil is a reflection of larger macroeconomic inequalities in Brazil in the 21st century. This very high Gini index score of 53.9 is also reflected in the fact that to this day in Rocinha affluent gated communities directly border this informal settlement. This is best reflected in Figure 29 below which is a snapshot of the informal settlement Rocinha I captured and edited using Google Earth (2021b).

Figure 29. Arial Snapshot of Rocinha, an Informal Settlement in Rio de Janeiro

Figure 29 above illustrates the favela Rocinha in Rio de Janeiro to the east of this picture, while to the west side it borders a more affluent community (Google Earth 2021b). Besides the informal settlement of Rocinha, this study has observed similar patterns of inequality and deprivation when examining the informal settlement near Lagos, Nigeria known as Makoko.

RESEARCH QUESTION TWO

The second research question asks: "Do any of Pruijts' (2013) five distinct categories of squatting help to explain the persistence of urban squatting in Brazil (Rio de Janeiro), India (Mumbai), Indonesia (Jakarta), and Nigeria (Makoko)?" This is summarized below in Table 7.

Table 7. Summary of Pruijt's Typologies of Urban Squatting in India, Brazil, Nigeria, Indonesia

Pruijt's (2013) five squatting types	India	Brazil	Nigeria	Indonesia
1. Deprivation-based (Survival squatting)	✓	✓	✓	✓
2. Alternative-housing strategy	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
3. Entrepreneurial	✓	✓	✓	✓
4. Conservational	N/A	N/A	✓	N/A
5. Political squatting	✓	✓	✓	✓

Source: Pruijt 2013.

Table 7 specifically notes which types of urban squatting appeared in my four cases. It appears that "deprivation-based" squatting seemed to best align with the informal settlements investigated in the four cases. However, what Pruijt (2013) describes as urban squatting, in which people merely seek an "alternative housing strategy," was difficult to trace and confirm in the four cases that were studied. Hence, there is not enough available evidence suggesting such urban squatting seems to be happening in the four cases. What Pruijt (2013) describes as "entrepreneurial" squatting was observed in all four cases, especially represented in the behavior of many city merchants squatting on city pavements selling goods without legal permits. In order to produce income, many urban squatters often are known to engage in some sort of informal labor. Surprisingly, the poverty tourism study revealed that sometimes current or former urban squatters of informal settlements in Brazil, India, and Nigeria, work as tour guides. What Pruijt (2013) calls "conservational" squatting was observed in only one of the four cases.

In the Nigerian case, "conservational" squatting seems to be reflected in the political activism of activists associated with the MOSOP. Located in South Nigeria, activists of this particular movement have engaged in political protests with Shell company and its consequential impact on the local environment for several decades (Meier 2000). It has engaged in acts that can be described as both "conservational" as well as "political squatting."

Meanwhile, what Pruijt (2013) calls "political squatting" seems to be persistent across all four cases. Starting with the Indian case, there were two immediate examples occurring in the 21st century which gives evidence that "political squatting" has been practiced in India. One example is the type of squatting in which a religious cult engaged in 2016 as an attempt to defy the India government and establish its own autonomous community (BBC News 2016). Another

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example of "political squatting" in India can be attributed to armed Maoist rebels who squatted in forests in Eastern Chhattisgarh state (Aljazeera 2021).

Brazil has perhaps the most extensive tradition of this type of "political squatting," when compared to all other cases in this study. A variety of organized political movements have openly endorsed "political squatting" as a political strategy and also often organize and manage the squats after they are occupied. One early example is the political organization known as MST, a landless workers' social movement, which has engaged in urban squatting since its founding back in 1984 (Stronazke and Wolford 2016). It is still active in Brazil to this day and by some estimates there are around 1.5 million members and around 2,000 settlements supported by the MST, with some 120,000 families still engaged in squatting (Stronazke and Wolford 2016). Other smaller political organizations in Brazil also engage in forms of "political squatting" including the MNLM (Wittger 2017).

In the Nigerian case, one immediate example points to the use of "political squatting" as a political strategy. As mentioned previously, the MOSOP, is also a separatist political movement seeking to split away from Nigeria. Political activists and supporters of the MOSOP movement have engaged in examples of "political squatting" often echoed in language used in their political manifestos (Meier 2000). It is important to note that the MOSOP movement has engaged in environmental/political protests against the Shell company as well as the Nigerian government because of oil production on their lands which has resulted in toxic spills and severe environmental pollution in the region (Meier 2000). Meanwhile, in the Indonesia case, there is evidence of "political squatting" with the activities of the separatist political movement known as the LMWP located in the West Papua Region (Harvey 2009). According to journalistic accounts,

members of the movement have been known to squat in the jungle areas to hide from Indonesian military units who consider it a terrorist organization (Harvey 2009).

Finally, a new "expulsions" category was introduced using Sassen's (2018) pioneering work in two of the four cases. This new "expulsions" category was introduced since some of the social phenomena observed in India and Brazil could not be fitted into the five squatting typologies produced by Pruijt (2013). In the Indian case, the indigenous tribal people known as the Adivasi who have lived in forest areas for centuries have become victims of "expulsions" after being evicted from living forest areas because of a Supreme court decision in 2019 (India Environmental Portal 2019; Thekaekara 2019). The same "expulsions" category seemed fitting in the Brazilian case where the Awa people continue to engage in squatting inside the Amazon Forest to this day (BBC News 2021b).

RESEARCH QUESTION THREE

The third research question asks: "To what extent can the "relative autonomy" and "embedded" nature of the "state" (Granovetter 1985; Polanyi [1944]2014) and state-intervention or non-state intervention help to explain patterns of urban squatting in Brazil (Rio de Janeiro), India (Mumbai), Indonesia (Jakarta), and Nigeria (Makoko)?"

This study examined state interventionism or non-state interventionism towards urban squatting and informal settlements in the first two decades of the 21st century in India, Brazil, Nigeria, and Indonesia. "Embeddedness" was manifested via the various forms of state governance policies towards urban squatters and informal settlements by the state, and its political actors, which, at times, seemed independent of pure economic influences rather seem to reflect arbitrary decisions made by the state (at all levels). State responses towards urban squatting can be narrowly divided into two likely outcomes: passively tolerated by the state, or

not tolerated by the use of state punitive action. This analysis of punitive state interventionism and state passivity was confined to the first two decades of the 21st century and limited to patterns found in the four cases.

In the Indian case, both forms of passive state toleration and state punitive action towards urban squatting have occurred throughout the 21st century. For India, some of this passive state toleration is visible in the fact that informal communities such as Dharavi, Mumbai, India are often tolerated and continue to exist. On the other hand, there are also countless examples in which punitive state interventionism has occurred towards urban squatters in India. This is often represented in the forms of legal decisions that evict squatters or nullify their rights of land that have been deemed to violate Indian environmental laws. An example is a Supreme Court ruling in India relating to the Forest Rights Acts of 2006 that caused the eviction of tribal people (some 1.8 million) living near forest lands (Sirohi 2019). Other punitive state intervention examples may involve the use of police and military units to force the eviction of urban squatters. This was previously noted in the case of the eviction of a religious cult that was engaging in squatting and defying the Indian government and its laws which resulted in 24 deaths, including the cult leader in 2016 (BBC News 2016).

In the Brazilian case, given the extensive tradition of "political squatting" and strength of political movements, there have often been far more examples of passive state toleration than state punitive action towards urban squatters in the 21st century. Some of this shift towards passive state toleration of urban squatting is also reflected in the development of Brazilian laws that address land governance in Brazil. As exemplified in the prevalence and toleration of the favelas throughout the major cities of cities like Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, it seems that the mere size and growth of such informal settlements make it often impossible for the state with its

limited resources to use physical force without facing the prospect of a large population

backlash. Still, there are plenty of examples in Brazil of the uses of state punitive action towards

urban squatters in Brazil. Such patterns of state punitive action are also often brought to light

with levels of human rights violations happening in Brazil that have also impacted informal

settlements and urban squatters in the favelas. Hence, in a report produced by Human Rights

Watch (2021), there were estimates that some 6357 people were killed by the police in 2020

alone. Similar forms of state punitive action have also been reported towards indigenous people

living in the Amazon regions being victimized and some 200 killed over issues tied to land and

squatting (Human Rights Watch 2021).

In the Nigerian case, when it came to state responses towards urban squatting both forms

of passive state toleration and state punitive action towards urban squatting have occurred

throughout the 21st century. Given the magnitude of absolute poverty and deprivation

throughout many cities in Nigeria, the social problems of informal housing have expanded

beyond the scope of state power making it irrelevant or impossible for the state to act other than

to passively accept such patterns of urban squatting and informal settlements. Many examples

exist in which state power in Nigeria has shifted towards state punitive action which has included

forced evictions and/or bulldozing efforts. In many cases, state punitive action in Nigeria seems

to have shifted towards the legal power of using basic eviction notices to squatters and then

subsequent forced evictions. Some decisions regarding enforcement often appeared arbitrary in

nature and may depend on the physical location where squatters begin to build their informal

settlements in high risk versus low-risk areas, for example. One such example is the use of state

power to evict squatters within the Lagos port back in 2015 where the state claimed that the

squatters posed a risk to the port's operations (Daily Post 2015). Other times known informal

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settlements located in Lagos, Nigeria are passively tolerated and no known state action is ever taken against them.

In the Indonesian case, however, the study revealed a much greater tendency towards state punitive action towards urban squatters than all other cases studied. This was also demonstrated in the two specific former informal settlements known as Kampung Bandan and Kampung Pulo that were both subject to forced evictions and bulldozing. Kampung Bandan was an informal settlement constructed on small strips of lands owned by the state railway company Kereta Api Indonesia (Baskoro 2020). While the initial age of the informal settlement was unknown, in the summer of 2020 the entire settlement was evicted, and the structures were bulldozed (Baskoro 2020). A similar fate would occur to the informal settlement known as Kampung Pulo that was located on strip of lands on the riverbanks of the Ciliwung River in East Jakarta and in the summer of 2015 was evicted as well as bulldozed (Meilasari-Sugiana et al. 2018). Willingness of the state in Indonesia to use state power towards urban squatters also seems to align with patterns of human rights violations towards urban squatters during forced evictions reported by non-governmental organizations like Human Rights Watch (2006).

RESEARCH QUESTION FOUR

Research question four asks: "Can a content analysis (Krippendorff 2013) of slum tourism literature demonstrate how culture, uneven development, and the "tourist gaze" (Urry 1990) influence the way informal settlements are framed and utilized within the slum tourism community?" To help address this research question, poverty tourism comments made by internet users who individually commented on the following four selected poverty slum tours from four different global regions including "Dharavi Slum Tour," "Rio de Janeiro: Half-Day

Rocinha Favela Walking Tour," "Jakarta Hidden Tours," and "Siviwe Township Tours" were analyzed.

The content analysis of poverty slum tours revealed how the "tourist gaze" (Urry 1990) functions among slum tourists as illustrative of the following five themes: 1) Romanticizing the Slums; 2) Privilege Guilt and Shame; 3) Poverty Shock, Deprivation, Government Malfeasance; 4) Recognition of Work Ethic of Slum dwellers; and 5) Moral Economy of Poverty Tourism. The testimonial literature revealed patterns in which poverty slum tourists often neglected addressing issues of absolute poverty and deprivation and rather took effort to highlight the creativity, and survivalist/adaptive spirit of the slum dwellers. A second theme that emerged from the testimonial literature revealed the theme of privilege, guilt, and shame. Poverty slum tourists occasionally made some implicit self-referencing towards their own superior position and privileges when talking about the absolute poverty they often observed during the poverty tours. This behavior acknowledging one privilege and shame can be fitted into an example of "interaction ritual chains" (Collins 2004), which also seem to form in the poverty tourism community. A third theme that emerged related to the tourists' immediate experiences of poverty shock, mentioning the forms of deprivations they witnessed in the informal settlements, and also blaming the government for inaction and malfeasance. The fourth theme included frames utilized by poverty slum tourists in which they personally acknowledged the hard work ethic they witnessed among persons living and working in the informal settlements. The fifth and final theme took on the frame of the moral economy of poverty tourism. Examples of such frames utilized moral rather than materialistic explanations for what they observed in the informal settlements they visited. This moral economy frame was also observed with examples of gifts that poverty tourists gave to children in the slums.

IMPLICATIONS

Urban squatting and growth of informal settlements in India (Mumbai), Brazil (Rio de Janeiro), Nigeria (Lagos), and Indonesia (Jakarta) remains deeply embedded within the uneven development growth between the Global North and Global South in the 21st century. Besides making use of descriptive statistics highlighting macroeconomic inequalities in specific regions of the Global South, this study developed a set of causal narratives as theoretical entry points in each of the four cases to address the persistence of urban squatting in each of the four cases.

While world systems (Wallerstein 1974) theory set the initial stage in this study, it was also the theoretical re-direction and specific focus on global cities found in the work by Sassen (2001, 2018, 2019) which shaped this study of urban squatting in the contexts of structural inequalities. Sassen (2019) includes new theoretical entry points which Wallerstein (1974) seemed to have neglected in his world systems theory. One observable neglect is tied to the "nation-state" reductionism found in Wallerstein's (1974) theory of the world system. This places the "unit of analysis" on the level of the "nation-state" often at the expense of ignoring cities.

For that reason, Sassen (2019:295) predicts that in the upcoming decades of the 21st century cities will increasingly act "as frontier spaces for global governance." According to Sassen, cities will also expose new risks including "new military asymmetries," "global warming, energy, and water insecurity," and "urban violence" (Sassen 2019:296). As demonstrated in this study, the issues raised by Sassen (2001, 2018, 2019) also in many ways relate to the ways urban squatting poses new problems and new governance issues for the state, especially in regions of the world system where urban squatting continues to persist.

Harvey (2019) points out, for example, that there are exhaustive ways scholars have tried to think about uneven development via their own set of entry points and emphases. According to Harvey (2019:72), the first of these are called historicist/diffusionist interpretations; basically, the idea that the west was always "the engine of capitalism" and every other nation is "backwards" and needs to catch up to the west.

Another approach has been the constructivist approach that Harvey (2019) suggests frames uneven development as:

The exploitative practices of capitalism backed by the political, military, and geopolitical activities of the most powerful nation states engaging in imperialist, colonial or neo-colonial exploitation of territories and whole populations and their cultures lie at the root of uneven geographical development. (72)

A close examination of the constructivist approach reveals similarities to the world systems theory (Wallerstein 1974) that sees uneven development as a result of dependencies that have systematically tied the core countries with the semi-periphery countries. In addition to the "constructivist approach," Harvey (2019:73) mentions "environmentalist explanations," that have often depended on a variety of issues for explaining the uneven development including issues like "environmental capacities," the issue of "natural limits" and "differential exposure to health problems and diseases."

I have included environmental explanations and global climate change in the 21st century as one of the causal narratives for urban squatting in two of the four cases of this study. Beside the uses of environmentalist explanations for uneven development, Harvey (2019:73) also posited that some scholars have sometimes used "geopolitical interpretations." In this framing, Harvey (2019:73) often highlights what he describes as the "unpredictable outcome of political

and social struggles between territorially organized powers operating at a variety of scales."
Hence, this study has taken precaution in the selection of cases in order to produce a
heterogenous representation of Global South countries in four different regions. Yet, state
responses towards urban squatting in India, Brazil, Nigeria, and Indonesia may often be shaped
by specific geopolitical problems in regions. This does not mean that all other avenues are
irrelevant or should not be studied. Rather, it forces us to carefully contextualize the geopolitical
region in which urban squatting occurs, the history, the economy, the culture, the religion, and
state responses.

PRACTICAL/POLICY IMPLICATIONS

This study has also addressed critical issues impacting urban squatters in informal
settlements in the Global South which may also be useful for implementing policy changes by
local, national, regional, or global state actors. One of these often discussed in the literature
repeatedly pertains to slum upgrading efforts. Many political actors recognize that conditions in
many informal settlements could be upgraded and improved. The UN Habitat (2021) lists some
of these specific targeted improvement slum upgrading efforts related to water, sanitation, land,
housing, waste management, gender equality, participation, climate, and livelihood. As
illustrated in the work being already done by UN Habitat and other governmental and non-
governmental actors, these efforts that have already been implemented should be further
intensified by countries and regions of the Global South who continue to deal with urban
squatting and informal settlements growth in the 21st century. To that end, such slum upgrading
efforts in the next decades of the 21st century might also be matched with more social cash
transfers or basic income pilot programs towards urban squatters. One such example is the non-
profit charity known as GiveDirectly (Matthews 2019). This organization has given out about 10

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million dollars in basic income cash transfers to poor residents in countries like Liberia, Rwanda, Malawi, Uganda, and Kenya (Matthews 2019).

A similar basic income program known as Bolso Familia was started in Brazil in 2003 under President Lula da Silva (Centre for Public Impact 2019). Although this government program did have specific eligibility conditions attached, studies of the program suggest that it has assisted in the reduction of poverty in Brazil and is estimated to have impacted around 46 million people in Brazil and around 11.1 million families (Centre for Public Impact 2019). Similar basic income pilot programs have also been implemented in India in the 21st century with similar positive results in reducing poverty.

Basic income programs such as those described above might be further expanded in countries where the phenomenon of urban squatting and informal settlements occurs. While basic income may not in itself solve the problem of urban squatting entirely, together with other governance measures resolving the issue of housing insecurities, it may reduce the most extreme examples of "deprivation-based" squatting found often in informal settlements with far more absolute poverty in the 21st century (Pruijt 2013).

LIMITATIONS

Given the limited focus on only four cases (India, Brazil, Nigeria, Indonesia) and the socio-cultural complexities and variations of urban squatting across the Global South, the findings may not be generalized to all regions across the Global South, which is geographically large and difficult for a single researcher to fully capture in one study. Variation in local and national state responses to the urban squatting phenomenon may still occur differently and unexpectedly between cities and sub-regions that is not always consistent or identical with a single national territory. Taken together, there are also methodological limitations such as the use

of comparative-historical analysis (Lange 2012) or content analysis (Krippendorff 2013) that may not yield the same results or interpretations when compared to the utilization of an ethnographic or anthropological research method that may be far more descriptive in nature and may often focus more on cultural scripts associated with urban squatting in each specific regions and culture of the world (Geertz 1973).

FUTURE RESEARCH

Future researchers may want to engage in regions and areas in the Global South that remain unexplored yet may have known cases of urban squatting and informal settlements that vary from previously studied regions. For example, future researchers should also aim to examine countries located in the semi-periphery such as Bulgaria, Turkey, Mexico rather than just the periphery of the world system. The impact of Global North scholars exploring topics such as the phenomenon of urban squatting in regions in the Global South may also be useful for future research on researcher positionality and the nature of framing and privilege positioning in the world system. Finally, future researchers should aim to incorporate more research and theories from the Global South that may compete or offer alternative theoretical entry points than world systems theory or other Global North perspectives. This shift in scholarship towards the Global South is also reflected in the work of Connell (2011) that may help to contextualize the impact of region position and the asymmetry of global knowledge production.

POSTSCRIPT

POSITIONALITY STATEMENT

What follows is my own statement regarding how I have tried to address the issue of reflexivity and positionality while conducting research on urban squatting in four developing countries in this dissertation. I recognize that as a researcher I have a strong Global North background. This relates to my own biography and experiences acquired in high school, college, and university studies which have taken place in three different Global North countries: the United States, Germany, and Sweden. I have also never personally lived or visited any of the countries that I study in this dissertation. This background reveals my own position in the world system.

I further recognize that the theories, approaches, and research methods that I have used in this dissertation have been overwhelmingly produced and written by mostly Western scholars located in the Global North. I am aware that I have lived in three countries where the wealth, income, health, housing, and overall life chances radically differs from those people who are positioned in Global South countries.

Moreover, I recognize that the Global North "gaze" I bring to the study of poverty and urban squatting needs careful reflexivity and self-scrutiny. Recognizing this "gaze" is, perhaps, the first step for considering the weight of my own positionality and the positionality of those countries and places I study throughout this dissertation, including urban squatters who lack basic housing access which is taken for granted in the Global North. This includes respecting the livelihoods and voices of those who often have not had a voice or opportunity in the academic production of knowledge which remains dominated by social and economic institutions of the Global North.

My own Global North "gaze" was challenged on several occasions in this study. It was challenged when I first studied the informal settlement in Mumbai, India known as Dharavi. I was deeply shocked to find out that a single toilet is available for roughly every 1,444 people in Dharavi (Sinha 2006). It was this basic deprivation of bathroom accessibility combined with absolute poverty observed in many other informal settlements in this study that has made me realize how much asymmetry persists between the people located in the Global North and the Global South. Lessenich (2019:48) has described this gap as an example of "externalization" between the Global North and Global South which is also psychological in that we use our own Global North "gaze" as a hidden tool for "burden-shedding" and "guilt-shifting." In that sense, our Global North "gaze" blinds us from recognizing the magnitude of inequality and suffering of our neighbors in the Global South. Critically observing my own positionality in the Global North has made me realize how much this Global North "gaze" functions and easily distorts and therefore must always be scrutinized.

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APPENDIX A

IRB APPROVAL

Texas Woman's University

Institutional Review Board (IRB)

irb@twu.edu

https://www.twu.edu/institutional-review-board-irb/

January 26, 2021

Michael Buhl
Sociology

Re: IRB Not Required for IRB-FY2021-169 World System and Urban Survival Squatting in The 21st Century, A Study of Informal Housing In 4 Developing Countries and Cities (Brazil, India, Indonesia, and Nigeria)

Dear Michael Buhl,

The above referenced project has been received by the TWU IRB - Denton and it has been determined that this project does not require IRB review.

Given that the focus of the study is not on living individuals, this study does not fall under the category of human subjects research and therefore does not need IRB review.

If you have any questions or need additional information, please contact the IRB.

Sincerely,

TWU IRB - Denton