

MINDSCAPES: A METATHEORETICAL EXPLORATION
IN POLYCULTURAL COMMUNICATION

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
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
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
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ABSTRACT

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MINDSCAPES: A METATHEORETICAL EXPLORATION IN POLY CULTURAL COMMUNICATION

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Rooted in phenomenological sociology, in which reality is understood to be constituted by individuals' underlying assumptions about it, this study examines conceptualizations of reality and the cultures which arise from them as well as the resulting problems and potentialities for communication. Its purpose is to explore the utility of regarding groups with shared mindscapes as cultures in themselves, and to investigate how the recognition of that congruence can benefit the study of social interaction. The concept of mindscapes represents different logical structures which involve elements of perception, cognition, cogitation, conceptualization, behavior, design, planning, and decision making.

The study asks three research questions:

- "How have prominent social scientists conceptualized culture?"
- "In what ways can shared mindscapes be considered congruent with the concept of culture?"
- "In what ways can the concept of mindscapes as cultures be integrated with the principles of intercultural communication?"

An enriched cultural orientation is proposed to expand traditional conceptualizations, giving consideration to questions of meaning, power, multiple identities, and the social construction of reality; culture as epistemology and epistemology as culture emerges as a new paradigm. Finally, principles of intercultural competence are applied to cross-mindscape interactions, emphasizing value orientations, expectations, and attributions, and proposing the discovery and development of cross-cultural/cross-scapal translators. The findings suggest that cognitive complexity, in place of a cognitively simple outlook, can alleviate the tendency to ethnocentric evaluations and judgments, and that conflict at all social levels holds potential for illumination if treated mindfully and as cases of intercultural contact.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION AND RATIONALE

We thus hope that scholars will read this article with the goal of learning more about how the “other side” thinks We especially hope that scholars will not read the article with the goal of noting how the assumptions of the other side are deeply flawed from within their own culture . . . (Mahoney and Goertz 2006, p. 246).

INTRODUCTION

In the growing field of Intercultural Communication it is taken for granted that interaction among people from different countries is plagued by mutual misperceptions, mistaken attributions of motivation, and verbal as well as nonverbal miscues. The very study of intercultural communication is premised on the belief that with education and training, people’s competence in dealing with cultural differences can be increased, and that destructive conflict among national, ethnic, and other cultural groups can thereby be minimized (Intercultural Communication Institute 2009). What is rarely recognized, however, is that these problems also afflict people who come from the same country, the same background, and even the same family, most of whom operate under the assumption that, at least within these familiar parameters, everyone shares the same reality. Alfred Schutz calls it the “world-given-to-me-as-being-there” (1960 [1932], p. 43), a ready-made, standardized pattern handed down by the ancestors, teachers, and authorities as an unquestioned and unquestionable guide providing a knowledge of “trustworthy recipes” for interpreting the social world. “Whoever proceeds as indicated

by a specific recipe” is assumed to intend – as well as to “correctly” understand – the correlated result (Schutz 1944, p. 500). And as long as the intended reality is defined in terms of observable features such as attitudes, norms, values, role perceptions, language, and so forth, the illusion of consensus is more or less supportable.

Social scientists, however, in studying these cultural realities, attend not only to the surface features but take account also of the underlying structures of individual perception and cognition through which surface cultural characteristics are manifested (Berry 2004; Zhang 2002; Mamchur 1996). This is significant because it is in these underlying structures that people’s fundamental assumptions are embodied and through them that they acquire and process information (Guild and Garger 1998, pp. 56-9). Further, examining internal structures and functions is foundational to understanding culture because the surface manifestations make sense only as external reflections of people’s beliefs and assumptions (Gregorc 1984, p. 51). Researchers in qualitatively-driven studies are advised to take an interest “not only in the physical events and behavior that is taking place, but also in how the participants . . . make sense of this and how their understandings influence their behavior” (Maxwell 2004, p.17). Behavior and symbols arise from the workings of much deeper cognitive processes incorporating assumptions, beliefs, values, and meanings, and therefore to study them means not only to explore differences in behavior but also to recognize the roots of the behavior (Guild and Garger 1998, pp. 5-10; Kraft 1978).

Different disciplines, depending on their interests and perspectives, have given a variety of names to these elusive mental phenomena incorporating people’s implicit

theories about themselves and the world, including “belief systems,” “structures of meaning,” “world models,” “personal theories of reality,” and maybe most familiarly, “worldviews” (Catlin and Epstein 1992, p. 189). Cultural futurist Magoroh Maruyama prefers to use the term “mindscape,” by which he means to convey “something more richly varied than the dry-sounding ‘models,’ ‘logics,’ and ‘paradigms,’ or the formidably abstract ‘epistemologies’” (1979a, p. 14). “Mindscape” is also largely unencumbered by preconceptions and will be used throughout this study for its lucid evocation of the mental “terrain” in which people live and from which they look upon the world. Maruyama defines mindscape as “a structure of reasoning, cognition, perception, conceptualization, design, planning, and decision making that may vary from one individual, profession, culture, or social group to another,” and that also includes behavior and action (Maruyama 2003a, p. 549; 1980, p. 591). Mindscapes reflect deep, driving force qualities of the mind regarding space, time, relationships, etc. (Gregorc 1984, p. 53), and serve to explain “how and why things got to be as they are and how and why they continue that way” (Kraft 1978, p. 408). They embody, whether implicitly or explicitly, sets of basic assumptions about the ultimate things on which people base their lives and which to a great extent shape the world they see (Filstead 1979, pp. 34-5). It is in terms of this “integrated and integrating perspective” that people conceptualize what reality should be like and interpret the events and environments to which they are exposed (Kraft 1978, p. 410). In essence, mindscapes establish each individual’s existential reality (Gregorc 1984, p. 52).

It follows of course, that people's mindscapes and underlying assumptions about themselves and the world are also in operation when they form social groups, particularly those which are made up of voluntarily associated like-minded people. Each social group thus formed can have a characteristic world view and a shared system of meanings, which often coalesce in "more or less systematized beliefs and values in terms of which that group evaluates and attaches meaning to the reality that surrounds it" (Kraft 1978, p. 407). The influence of these basic concepts within the minds of people is of tremendous importance in the process of interpersonal, intergroup, and intercultural communication. Indeed, people's ways of communicating are shaped by the values they hold, which are expressed through behaviors that symbolize them and are recognized in their own cultures (Sitaram and Haapanen 1979, p. 153). "Messages carry cultural meanings as well as being shared systems of symbols" (Ellis and Maoz 2003, p. 268). Not only that, but values lead people to communicate in certain ways, because "values will determine which ways of communicating are deemed more desirable than others" (Sitaram and Haapanen 1979, p. 154). Cultural group orientations can thus be "bridges or barriers" to communication, making them a vital piece of the puzzle of human interaction (Ellis and Maoz 2003, p. 268).

Patterns and codes of communication are relevant to group members but often incommunicable to outsiders; consequently, they serve to mark the boundaries of membership and signal distinctions from other groups or even other mindscape types (Ellis and Maoz 2003, p. 256). Communication from members of one group may be foreign or unfamiliar or even upsetting to others; participants communicate differently

because “communicative techniques are manifestations of one’s own values” (Sitaram and Haapanen 1979, p. 159). Interacting parties who are unaware of these differences typically see each other as the problem. In fact, people tend to accord more credibility to sources whose values are perceived – sometimes selectively – as being similar to their own, even to the point of preferring “certain sources and channels of communication that symbolize their values or provide information useful in attaining their values” (Sitaram and Haapanen 1979, pp. 155-6). There is also evidence that speech style and language is subject to value judgments, even though equivalent linguistic terms can have entirely different meanings in different cultures, covering over “profound differences in their sense of reality” (Docherty 2004, p. 716). The problem, of course, is that people tend to use their own values as a standard for comparison, rather than attempting to discern and understand differences. Comparing these tendencies to ethnocentrism and cultural relativism, respectively, Sitaram and Haapanen make a compelling case that “When members of different value systems interact, such communication becomes intercultural” (1979, p. 159). It is, then, the purpose of this dissertation to explore the utility of regarding groups with shared mindscapes as cultures in themselves, and, further, to investigate how the recognition of that congruence can benefit the study of social interaction.

RATIONALE

This dissertation aims to make several contributions, not the least of which is an increased understanding of the basis of conflict in human interaction. As mentioned

above, when people from different “realities” – whether cognitive or social – interact, the problems they experience, such as misperception, misattribution, or unintelligibility, are the products of mutually incompatible belief systems (Casmir 1978; Maruyama 1979a, 2003a). Bringing to awareness such fundamental differences is often the first step in negotiating conflict resolution procedures, creating sensitivity to cultural difference and an appreciation for “individuals’ basic orientations toward such matters as time, power, ‘face,’ or risk” (Avruch 2004, p. 404).

Beyond that, this study will ask new questions in order to develop new knowledge about the sources of the perceptions, assumptions, and attributions held by individuals and groups about other individuals and groups, which may contribute to enhanced understanding of culture by sociologists. There is an “emancipating effect” (Baert 2005, p. 196) to encountering difference, which may allow people to question their own deep-seated cultural experience, and enable them to “explore new worlds” and to “envisage alternative futures” (p. 197). In the terminology of Karl Mannheim, this “essayistic-experimental attitude in thought” (1936, p. 52), allows the experimental thinker to perceive contradictions as “points of departure from which the fundamentally discordant character of our present situation becomes for the first time really capable of diagnosis and investigation” (p. 53). Or as Maruyama states, “A new theory cannot be discovered unless you ask a new question” (2003a, p. 564).

Finally, a practical contribution is the potential for improved communication at all social levels: intergroup, interdisciplinary, interpersonal, etc. Interhuman conflict and miscommunication might be much more creatively and satisfactorily resolved and even

prevented when they are recognized as instances of contact between different cultures. And in this age in which globalization and cultural pluralism are often accompanied by a level of fear amounting almost to xenophobia, the need for effective intercultural communication is immediate and compelling.

PLAN OF WORK

This study is rooted in phenomenological sociology, in which reality is understood to be constituted by individuals' underlying assumptions about it. Chapter 2 reviews the literature pertinent to conceptualizations of reality and the culture which arises from them, as well as communication difficulties that result. Research questions will be investigated, as detailed in Chapter 3, using qualitative measures and multiple textual sources, with discussion in depth and synthesis of findings in Chapter 4. Finally, Chapter 5 summarizes the work, adducing implications and offering suggestions for further research.

CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW

To contextualize and support the contributions of this dissertation, this chapter will first survey the literature that deals with conceptualizations of culture. It will then examine work on the characteristics and descriptions of cognitive and perceptual structures – herein also referred to as “mindscapes” – as well as important efforts at classifying them, concluding with a review of the literature concerning communication difficulties and recommendations for intercultural competence.

CULTURAL CLASSIFICATION

Scholars in several fields have created classification schemes in which definitions of culture are arranged by types. Pioneer anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski wrote the “Culture” entry for the 1931 edition of the *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, declaring that “Culture is a reality *sui generis* and must be studied as such” (1931, p. 623). He traces the influence of two distinct schools of thought on the way in which culture is studied: the “evolutionary school,” in which cultural growth is presumed to proceed in fixed stages according to definite laws, with discrete and simple elements, and the “historical or diffusionist school,” which tries to understand the history of cultures by reconstructing their historical diffusion, recognizing that material culture and cultural values cannot be carried or investigated in the same way (pp. 623-4). He himself appears

to identify with the latter tradition, calling culture “a well organized unity divided into two fundamental aspects – a body of artifacts and a system of customs” (p. 623).

Another famous early effort to systematize the study of culture was Kroeber and Kluckhohn’s (1952) massive and ingenious arrangement of scores of cultural definitions into six major categories based on what they conceived culture to be. The typology, which will be discussed in detail in Chapter 4, includes:

- Group A: Descriptive. Broad Definitions with Emphasis on Enumeration of Content
 - Group B: Historical. Emphasis on Social Heritage or Tradition
 - Group C: Normative
 - C-I: Emphasis on Rule or Way.
 - C-II: Emphasis on Ideals or Values Plus Behavior
 - Group D: Psychological
 - D-I: Emphasis on Adjustment, on Culture as a Problem-Solving Device
 - D-II: Emphasis on Learning
 - D-III: Emphasis on Habit
 - D-IV: Purely Psychological Definitions
 - Group E: Structural: Emphasis on the Patterning of Organization of Culture
 - Group F: Genetic.
 - F-I: Emphasis on Culture as a Product or Artifact
 - F-II: Emphasis on Ideas
 - F-III: Emphasis on Symbols
 - F-IV: Residual Category Definitions
- (Kroeber and Kluckhohn 1952, pp. 43-71).

Earlier, Kluckhohn and another colleague, William H. Kelly, had used the term culture to mean “all those historically created designs for living, explicit and implicit, rational, irrational, and nonrational, which exist at any given time as potential guides for the behavior of men” (1945, pp. 97-9). Their definition also includes the characteristic sets of “unstated premises of hypotheses” which remain as “unquestioned background phenomena” and vary greatly from society to society (p. 100).

More recent work by cross-cultural anthropologists, who attempt to gauge levels of complexity among different cultures, is naturally concerned with observation and measurability. Chick (1997) reviews important measures of cultural complexity that have been used since the 1940s and proposes a new typology in which definitions of culture are arranged into four major types, in order of increasing inclusiveness: 1) culture as mental, meaning shared knowledge, ideas, concepts, or systems of meaning; 2) culture as mental and behavioral, including distinctive learned behavior patterns along with mental culture; 3) culture as mental, behavioral, and material, which adds material artifacts and their historical transmission through learning rather than genetic programming; and 4) culture as information, which defines culture as the set of information that is more or less shared by a social group, to be received or created, transmitted, used, and even lost (pp. 284-5). When viewed in this way culture may be associated with small groups or large aggregations. Of particular interest here, however, is the distinction between internal “mental” factors and others, which supports the idea that other factors are manifestations of underlying mental structures.

EXPANDING TRADITIONAL CONCEPTS

Definitions and descriptions of what constitutes culture typically vary depending on the interests of the discipline in which they originate, but with *The Interpretation of Cultures* (1973), Clifford Geertz broke new ground in the understanding of culture itself, moving beyond the confines of traditional definitions. Writing that culture “denotes an historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols, a system of inherited

conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which men communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and attitudes toward life” (p. 89), he alludes to inborn systems (“inherited conceptions”) as well as the more observable “historically transmitted” concepts. An amplified version of this definition comes from Schneider’s “Notes Toward a Theory of Culture” (1976), which includes “definitions, premises, statements, postulates, presumptions, propositions, and perceptions about the nature of the universe and man’s place in it” (p. 203). Schneider considers it a mistake to define culture as indistinguishable from patterns of action rather than “the symbols and meanings out of which those patterns are constituted” (p. 219), foreshadowing the amplified definition of culture which informs this study. And even more fundamentally, he believes that “every people has its explicit ideology, its own sort of social theory” (p. 220), furthering the thesis that observable cultural features emerge from what lies beneath the surface.

Sociologists Nolan and Lenski (1999) take an “ecological-evolutionary” theoretical approach, defining culture as “shared *symbols* rather than shared behavior” (p. 15). Unlike other species, which use genetically encoded *signals* to share information, human culture is *learned* information which is passed “from person to person and from generation to generation by means of symbols” (pp. 14-15). They distinguish five basic components of every human society: (1) population, (2) culture, (3) material products, (4) social organization, and (5) social institutions, which are intermingled and cannot be isolated from one another (p. 26). Culture, as a society’s “symbol systems and the information they convey” enables humans to:

handle information in ways that are impossible for other creatures. We can extract more information from an experience (i.e., learn more) because symbols permit us thought processes denied other species. We can also share more information, because symbols enable us to express so much of the subtlety, complexity, and diversity of our experiences. We can, in fact, do more with information whatever is involved: in recording it, accumulating it, storing it, combining it, or applying it, symbol users have a fantastic advantage over signal users (p. 33).

Cultural information, then, includes “a group’s total perception of reality: its ideas about what is real, what is true, what is good what is beautiful, what is important, what is possible,” ranging from factual statistical data to concepts of deity, attitudes, and art; it incorporates “everything humans are capable of experiencing and able to convert into symbolic form” (pp. 33-37). For Nolan and Lenski, humans, “like the members of every other species, are endowed with a genetic heritage that profoundly influences their actions,” but that “enables the members of human societies – and them alone – to create cultural heritages, and it is this that gives human life its unique qualities” (pp. 11-12). In their view, culture clearly serves to distinguish the human from the non-human.

In another sociological attempt to clarify the idea of culture, Peterson (1990), noting the rapid growth of the field of Cultural Studies, reviews works “marginal to the canon of contemporary sociology” (1990, p. 499) since innovations are currently being made at the borders of sociology with the humanities. He delineates two perspectives that employ the term in very different ways: one sees culture as codes of conduct that simultaneously shape social life and are expressed by it; the other focuses on the symbols and products of a society through which ideas and information are conveyed, including concepts such as knowledge, power, authority, affect, merit, beauty, and virtue. In this

case, symbolic elements also identify individuals and groups of like kind and serve to mark distinctions from others. The differentiation between internal and external indicators is again apparent in the terms “codes of conduct” as opposed to “symbols” (p. 498), and here the function of marking distinctions between groups emerges as another important feature.

Intercultural relations scholars have also noted a duality of views about culture. Berry (2004) samples definitions that have come and gone since the late 1800s, noting the increased emphasis on the nonmaterial or ideational meaning of culture that evolved in the mid-1900s. He finds that there are currently two different main views. On the one hand, culture is seen as something concrete and publicly observable which characterizes the group as a whole; this view pays little attention to the meanings people attribute to cultural phenomena. On the other hand, culture is considered something more abstract which is associated with individuals engaged in social interaction. This view requires inference and subjective interpretation to understand the underlying meanings, whether one is an observer or a member of the cultural group. So while it is possible to approach the study of culture from either perspective – what he calls the “*out there – in here* aspects of culture” (p. 169), it becomes clear that culture itself involves *both* objective and subjective dimensions, symbols *and* their meanings, as well as the various interpretations of everything. But Berry observes that when it comes to intercultural relations, it is necessary to study the less concrete and subjective levels in order to understand the dimensions by which cultures vary. He believes that the deep underlying processes of perception, cognition, and attitudes “can interfere with making valid

observations of one's own and other cultures and their individual members," leading to the misleading assumption that "what you see is what they are" (p. 181).

Intercultural communication specialists, while focusing more on the practical applications of theoretical conceptions than on their definition, also acknowledge the presence of both subjective and objective aspects of culture. Casmir, in his reader on *Intercultural and International Communication* (1978), sees culture as "a system for structuring the environment and responses to it, for purposes of explanation, understanding, use, control and social interaction by people" (p. 253). Further, he assumes that any approach to human communication is strongly, or even entirely, influenced by the underlying philosophy people bring to it. With these views he contributes to an expanded understanding of culture that takes account of underlying processes, even though it does not quite manage to break from the anthropological tendency to associate culture with ethnicity or nationality. Saral (1979) is much more explicit, stating in the *Handbook of Intercultural Communication* that the problem of intercultural communication is "essentially a problem of communication among varying states of consciousness" (p. 81). And more importantly, people's "normal" states of consciousness are not universal across cultures; they are specialized tools for coping with various surface environments. He argues that it is necessary to explore what underpins the surface structure of cultural features like attitudes, norms, values, role perceptions, and language, which incorporate both the subjective and objective dimensions. The basis of these manifestations is the deep structure of cultural experience, "characterized by the

reception, organization, and utilization of information gained through contact with the environment” (pp. 82-3). That deep structure is the root of cultural difference.

COGNITIVE TYPES AND STYLES

Among the earliest systematic work on underlying cognitive structure and processes was the social psychology of Gustav Ichheiser, a Polish refugee who came to the United States in 1940 as a displaced person, repeatedly failed to attain a suitable academic position, and died thirty years later alone, in poverty, and “under conditions that hinted at suicide” (Gilbert 1998, p. 127). Most of his work from the 1920s and ’30s was lost and did not reemerge in English until 1949 in a supplement to the *American Journal of Sociology*. Feeling victimized by those who judged him a professional failure without taking the circumstances of that failure into account, Ichheiser criticizes a too rigid “ideal of scientific exactness” for leading to the neglect of “facts and aspects which resist or elude precise or exact analysis.” In his own work he pursued instead a realistic understanding of the “structure and dynamics of interhuman relations” (1949, pp. 1-10). Clearly prefiguring contemporary attribution theory, Ichheiser recognizes that “socially shaped and socially functional” interpretive factors are at work in individual cognitive processes, giving rise to misattributions as well as misperceptions (Rudmin, Trimpop, Kryl and Boski 1987, p. 174). People, he says, disagree with each other and fight each other “because of the different ways they *see* the relevant social facts, always insisting that they themselves see the facts ‘as they really are,’ while their opponents, due to some

intellectual or moral perversion, are unable or unwilling” to see the very facts that form the basis of all values and morality to “right-thinking” people (Ichheiser 1966, p. 560).

While Ichheiser wrestled with the interpretive consequences of different cognitive processes, Karl Mannheim brought a sociological perspective to the study of different structures of reasoning (1936 [1929]). He believed that there are several types of “logics” or reasoning structures and that their use is based on factors which are beyond and independent of any of the types, asking the question “How is it possible that identical human thought-processes concerned with the same world produce divergent conceptions of that world?” (p. 9). He proposes that the thought processes involved are not at all identical, and that, when one has examined all the possibilities of human thought, it may be found “that there are numerous alternative paths which can be followed” (p. 9). The rise of philosophically opposed schools of thought in the social sciences can be cast in these terms, including the classic divide between the schools of realism and idealism (Filstead 1979, p. 34). The ongoing debate surrounding the question of how we know what we know continues to point to the existence of widely different views of reality which are shaped by underlying assumptions or mindscapes.

GROUPING COGNITIVE TYPES/STYLES

Ichheiser and Mannheim directed attention to recognizing and identifying these below-surface structures, but it was left to later researchers to discover how they varied. One area of study has the specific aim of grouping people in terms of how they learn, organize knowledge, and make judgments given that knowledge. Researchers in

education and curriculum development who work with learning/teaching styles, multiple intelligences, cognitive types, and similar phenomena have long argued for the recognition that mindscape differences affect external behavior. They point out that behavior can be considered the surface reflection of the individual's interpretation of a situation. Guild and Garger (1998) have organized the elements of individual styles by their functions under four main aspects: cognition, conceptualization, affect, and behavior (pp. 55-60). Some of these dimensions of mind can be conceived as falling along a continuum, while others are thought to be related to situational demand. All are considered as ranges of possibilities which occur in different combinations and intensities in different people. Cognition refers to the process by which people perceive or take in information, incorporating such diverse tendencies as sensory or intuitive; abstract or concrete; visual, auditory, kinesthetic, or tactile/emotional; and sequential/rank-ordered, simultaneous/holistic, or random/contextual means of perception. Conceptualization has to do with thinking, forming ideas, processing information, and memory. Some of the functions dealing with conceptualization are: extraversion (processes externally) and introversion (processes in private, internally); reflective observation (inside the head) and active experimentation (hands-on); random (accessing ideas in patterns or relationships) and sequential (linear, step by step progression); and homogenistic (recognizing only a single logic) and heterogenistic (using several logics). Affect refers to feelings, emotional response, motivation, values, and judgments. Some people are motivated internally, some externally; some seek to please, others are not attuned to people's expectations, and still others rebel against the very idea. Some tune in to meanings and

others prefer to get “just the facts.” Affective differences are also interrelated with conceptual and cognitive characteristics. Behavior, as the outward display or manifestation of all of the foregoing dimensions of mind, figures importantly, as we have seen, in defining culture under any conceptualization. If mindscape is “at the core of what it means to be a person” (p. 3), it is also at the core of culture.

Another attempt to organize style or mindscape differences analyzes the ways in which people adapt to their various environments. Writing in the journal *Educational Leadership*, Gregorc (1979) proposes three possible origins of these means of adaptation: 1) patterns of adapting are included in our genetic coding system; 2) patterns are made available through environment and culture; and 3) patterns “lie within the subjective part of our individual natures. They are properties of the self, or soul, and are used for self-actualization purposes” (p. 234). These three types of patterns can be at odds with each other or in total harmony, again marking the distinction between internal and external dimensions in the conceptualization of culture. Gregorc, however, contributes an important new element with his third pattern, which emphasizes the part of ourselves that is distinct from either genes or environment, and which he calls the self or soul. Transcending the nature-nurture dialogue he explains his phenomenological approach thus: “It consists of the cataloging of overt behavior (*pheno*) and the analysis of the behavior to determine its underlying cause (*noumena*). From this, certain inferences are drawn that tell us about the nature (*logos*) of the learner” (p. 234). In 1984 he bolsters this typology with data from a series of studies done over ten years in which interviewees

reflected about various behaviors. Regardless of the type of behavior, each respondent's reflections fell into particular themes around the following topics:

what living is all about (a world view), what time means to them, how thinking takes place, what is truth, what constitutes ethical and moral behavior, what change means, and what environmental and situational conditions are best for them (1984, p. 52).

These themes were consistently associated with particular behaviors and were found to arise from specific "driving force" qualities through which existential reality was established for each person (p. 53).

In their guide to intercultural interactions, Brislin, Cushner, Cherrie, and Yong (1986) recommend dealing with people's different "realities" by focusing on the underlying reasons that knowledge exists in the form that it does as well as on how it is used. Although some of their assumptions are a bit out of date, the chapter titled "The Bases of Cultural Differences" remains widely applicable and contemporary by attending to the cognitive and perceptual foundations of behavior. Although their belief that all humans categorize information immediately and universally is a decided limitation based on only partial awareness of human possibilities, their discussion of learning styles approximates an understanding of mindscapes as cultures, even though it emphasizes the influence of socialization over individual mindscape.

Learning styles at home may be different from the learning styles teachers expect students to possess upon entering school. It has been suggested that the problems faced by many minorities and immigrants in schools today lie here, at the interface between the culture of the home and the culture of the school (pp. 316-317).

Another intercultural relations specialist makes an even more explicit statement: “Every social group has a worldview – a set of more or less systematized beliefs and values in terms of which that group evaluates and attaches meaning to the reality that surrounds it” (Kraft 1978, p. 407). Furthermore, all behavior is pervasively affected by that worldview’s assumptions, beliefs, values, meanings, and sanctions. In his essay titled “Worldview in Intercultural Communication,” Kraft argues that people conceptualize what reality *should be like* and interpret events and ideas through the “integrated and integrating perspective” (p. 410) that is a worldview – or mindscape.

CHARACTERISTICS OF MINDSCAPES

Since mindscapes embody people’s fundamental understandings of reality, descriptions of them focus on underlying values, assumptions, and interpretations rather than on the processes of cognition. Maruyama, as we saw earlier, developed the mindscape classification system, focusing on four main types, labeled H, I, S, and G, which will be fully discussed in Chapter 4. He believes these main types and their combinations account for about two-thirds of the population of most cultures (1979a, p. 14). To describe them briefly, H-type thinking is characterized by having a single-logic, and hierarchical and classificational thought and behavior; I-type has several logics and is individualistic and random-processing; S-type has several logics, is interactive and pattern-maintaining; and G-type has several logics, is interactive and pattern-creating (2003a, pp. 545-565; 1979a, p. 14). Maruyama’s full narrative descriptions of the types in different aspects and occupational situations occupy a substantial portion of his body

of work (particularly 1996; 1994a; 1974b; 1974a) and are given complete coverage in Chapter 4. He cautions, however, that pure types are theoretical constructs, and that each person may combine features of several of the types (1985, p. 126; 1980). This allows for a range of variability among members of the same mindscape group as well as accounting for the existence of multiple types or styles within similar structures of reasoning (1974a, p. 136).

Maruyama makes several other related points which are also important to this discussion. First, there is remarkable consistency throughout aspects of individual mindscape types. H-types, for example, tend to apply their hierarchical, classificational worldview to all they encounter, things as well as people, while G-types tend to operate interactively, holistically, and innovatively, seeing mutually beneficial outcomes and continually evolving patterns in everything. Second, what is self-evident in one type may be incomprehensible in another, and therefore, thirdly, persons of different mindscape types may accuse each other of being illogical, immoral, or infantile (1974a, p. 138). Fourth, however, puzzling behavior and thoughts may make sense in the framework of another mindscape, when it is understood as a different epistemology having different fundamental values, beliefs, and assumptions. And finally, Maruyama proposes the uniquely enlightening idea that the inability to understand or communicate with other types is not a moral or intellectual defect but an “epistemological limitation” (2003a, p. 563). He suggests that people may be incapable of seeing the dimensions that others take for granted, because they are not aware that they are “trapped in their mindscapes” (1979a, p. 22), just as:

it is impossible to explain music to congenitally deaf persons or to explain color to congenitally blind persons. In that case, we must be satisfied if the sub-understander can at least realize that the extra dimension exists but will remain invisible to him/her (2003a, p. 562).

COMMUNICATION AMONG TYPES

The study of different structures of reasoning and how they communicate has a long history. Filstead (1979) cites the writing of Hobbes, Locke, Bacon, Kant, Berkeley, and Hume as focusing on “the relation between the external world and the process of knowing” (p. 34). He also believes that the distinction between the quantitative and qualitative paradigms is rooted in the classic philosophical divide between the schools of realism and idealism. The continuing debate surrounding the question of “how do we know what we know?” highlights the existence of different sets of assumptions that underlie people’s views of the world and effectively shape the world they see, as well as their expectations of the other people in it (p. 35).

Each social group or culture also has a shared system of meanings which embodies a particular set of symbols and values. Under these collective meanings they select and develop only a small number of the totality of human potentials, rejecting others and remaining ignorant of many (Tart 1975, p. 4). Yet it is through these necessarily limited world views that they express their shared assumptions, which affect communication more than any other aspect of culture. Sitaram and Haapanen (1979) discuss this point in their chapter titled “The Role of Values in Intercultural Communication,” detailing two ways in which values and communication are related: 1) “Values are communicated, both explicitly and implicitly, through symbolic behavior;”

and 2) “The way in which people communicate is influenced by the values they hold” (pp. 153-4). Social customs, rituals, and language all reflect values that are recognized among group members but not necessarily by outsiders. Values and assumptions also determine what kind of communication is used and expected. And it is usually only with a great deal of effort, not to mention awareness and inclination, that we can unearth the values on which all the beliefs, expectations, and customs are based (p. 156). Since the chapter is part of a *Handbook of Intercultural Communication* the authors also warn that people tend toward unconscious ethnocentrism, often unknowingly using their own values as the standard for others. Their “two rules” for intercultural communication are that “each participant should understand the other’s values” and that “each should adapt his/her communication to the other’s values” (p. 159). Those are tall enough orders when we’re faced with “foreigners” whose cultural differences are obvious, but mindscape-cultural differences are often invisible, even – or especially – to their possessors. And people vary in the degree to which they are conscious of or can articulate their shared assumptions, since our own are simply “common sense” to us.

Churchill (2005), writing in *Qualitative Sociology*, offers the example of ethnographers functioning as intercultural translators. Communication as exchanges between the “internal languages” of different cultures is far from precise and misses meanings, intentions, and motivations. Cross-disciplinary or cross-cultural communication difficulties arise not so much from language or vocabulary differences as from the use of different structures of reasoning. “Communicative action, thus, is a limited means of conveying ideas, attitudes, and impressions from one self to another” (p.

22), relying on individuals translating as best they can or as poorly as they choose to. Churchill's argument that the ethnographer's mind should be seen as a "transitional space" for the translation of field data into an analytic report (p. 3) could be well applied to people in general.

GROUPS AS CULTURES

Professions and academic disciplines as problematic communicating and conflicting bodies have received plenty of press, especially since Thomas Kuhn's famous use of the word "paradigm" to describe the "set of interrelated assumptions about the social world which provides a philosophical and conceptual framework for the organized study of that world" (1962, p. 10). Nearly half a century later that idea has entered common usage in discussing social groups and their differences. As Denzin and Lincoln's (2005) methodological text shows, "one cannot easily move between paradigms as overarching philosophical systems denoting particular ontologies, epistemologies, and methodologies. They represent belief systems that attach users to particular worldviews" (p. 6). In addition, "every researcher speaks from within a distinct interpretive community that . . . has its own historical research traditions, which constitute a distinct point of view" (p. 21). These communities reflect the researcher's own interpretive framework, just as do other social and cultural groups, even though Denzin and Lincoln do not specifically employ the word culture.

Psychologists Hermann and Raybeck are unequivocal in their chapter titled "A Clash of Cultures: Basic and Applied Cognitive Research" (1997): "In this section we

identify differences between basic and applied research that demonstrate that these research fields function as two separate cultures” that also “subscribe to different beliefs and values” (p. 28). The two are neither opposites nor mutually exclusive alternatives, but they do reflect different priorities in approach and investigation (p. 33). These researchers base their work, however, on the belief that cultures are formed when a single culture splits, and that cultures split because their members become physically or socially separate. Further, “geographic or social barriers can lead to the development of increasingly distinctive variations” (p. 28). This explanation stops at surface structure and does not inquire into the reasons why such separations might develop or exist in the first place. Indeed, they point out that populations often define themselves in contrast to each other, suggesting that differences are much deeper than physical or social distance.

Clearly, research communities or other “local cultures” (Docherty 2004, p. 713) need have no reference to ethnicity or region; every profession or other social group also creates a culture – and even subcultures. Writing about the importance of “listening for culture” in negotiation and mediation procedures, Docherty states that “the most complete and sophisticated way of thinking about culture” requires a greatly enriched definition which assumes that individuals belong to multiple groups and therefore carry multiple cultures, and that culture is not perfectly shared by all members of a community (p. 715). Moreover, the awareness that “rationality is culturally constructed” (p. 717) compels new ways of recognizing culture through worldviews – or mindscapes, to use the equivalent term. In the “worldviewing process” that people engage in every day, questions are answered on an unconscious level about what is real and valuable, how

reality is organized, how do we know about what is real, and how should we act or not act. “People are not able to answer these questions directly, but their answers ‘leak out’ in their language, in their actions, and in their institutions – in their culture” (pp. 718-9). Docherty is close to saying that mindscapes constitute culture under an expanded and “enriched” definition.

Robert K. Merton, too, almost equates what we describe as “shared mindscape” with culture when he writes about the “balkanization of social science” (1972, p. 13). He argues that people’s social identities “find expression in various affiliative symbols of distinctive speech, bodily appearance, dress, public behavior patterns and, not least, assumptions and foci of thought” (pp. 11-13). He even points out “ethnocentric” behavior by “Insiders” of various groups toward “Outsiders” (pp. 17), describing instances in which the social scientist can act “as though the aspects of the reality which are neglected in his analytical apparatus *do not even exist*,” with the resulting theoretical and methodological hostilities (pp. 39-40). All of these writers contribute essential elements to this research, but stop short of identifying shared mindscapes as distinct cultures.

INTERCULTURAL CONFLICT

Communication research is increasingly focusing on conflict among ethnonational and cultural groups. Ellis and Maoz (2003) argue that all social systems begin with “intense micro-communicative coordination (e.g. natural conversation) that leads to a shared reality” (p. 256). Group members use communication patterns and codes that are

relevant to each other but often incommunicable to outsiders and that consequently serve to mark the boundaries of membership and signal distinctions from other groups. Their communication may thus be unfamiliar or even upsetting to other groups, and communicating parties who are unaware of these differences tend to see each other as the problem, as has been previously noted. Ellis and Maoz propose communication as an essential tool for “framing issues and managing the differences and incompatibilities that are fundamental to conflict” (p. 257), but they also caution that such communication “entails a continuous process of monitoring and coordinating among participants” (p. 263). Messages carry meanings that can vary according to cultural, historical, and social contexts. These authors discuss several such cultural communication “codes,” citing their work with argument in Israeli-Jewish and Palestinian dialogue groups, and offering ample evidence for hope that people can learn to modify and adapt to other codes as well as their own.

Intercultural conflict is also the concern of political scientists Mahoney and Goertz (2006), although with a twist. In “A Tale of Two Cultures: Contrasting Quantitative and Qualitative Research,” they refer to the mutual hostility and suspicion that can arise between the two traditions, in spite of surface politeness. Advice or insights can be misunderstood and unappreciated (pp. 227-8). They argue that the dominant research practices of both make good sense given their respective norms and goals, and the article lists major differences across the two traditions. While this is an admirable accomplishment, it treats them as almost completely opposite approaches to research, failing to register fundamental differences in values and structures of reasoning.

It is important to mention their hope that scholars will read their work with the goal of learning more about how the “other side” thinks about research, and not with the goal of “noting how the assumptions of the other side are deeply flawed from within their own culture” (p. 246), which echoes Merton’s description, discussed earlier, of ethnocentric behavior in the social sciences. “Perspectives become self-confirming as both Insiders and Outsiders tend to shut themselves off from ideas and information at odds with their own conceptions. . . . The members of each group then scan the outgroup’s writings just enough to find ammunition for new fusillades” (Merton 1972, p. 40).

Norman K. Denzin (2005) also addresses this unconscious ethnocentrism in his response to the National Science Foundation’s recommendations on the “Scientific Foundations of Qualitative Research” (Spalter-Ross 2005), pointing out the specifically positivist stance of the NSF’s definition of science. He observes that in recent decades there has grown up a large and complex body of literature on research methodologies, strategies of inquiry, interpretive paradigms, and criteria for reading and evaluating inquiry itself. Additionally, qualitative research “encompasses multiple paradigmatic formulations,” central among them being interpretive and critical paradigms (p. 2 online). He suggests that the narrow requirements of the NSF’s research department presuppose a model of value-free inquiry that is based on a “God’s eye view of reality” which fails to take into account the view that “all inquiry is moral and political” (p. 2 online). Denzin’s comments illustrate the difficulty of conducting intercultural communication at the invisible borders of different mindscape cultures.

This tendency to find conflict rather than complementarity also concerns Raybeck (2005), who believes that “seeking complementarity is conceptually more reasoned, more ambiguous, and consequently more difficult than finding conflict” (p. 242). Davidson (1975) concurs and refers to such behavior as being “cognitively simple,” noting that such people have only a single framework of explanation – their own. So when faced with behavior they do not understand they are likely to make ethnocentric evaluations (p. 80).

Finding common ground may actually be considered threatening to the “truth” held by either party. Maruyama calls this condition “monopolarization,” defined as the tendency to develop psychological dependency on *one* authority, *one* right, *one* truth, etc. (1974b, p. 276). When people who are strongly monopolized realize that there are other ways of thinking, they may feel as though their entire universe is collapsing. Far more typical, however, is failure to recognize other ways of thinking at all. People may believe that they understand someone completely when they are in fact reducing the thinking to fit their own mindscapes, producing “sub-understanding by dimension reduction” (Maruyama 2003a, p. 560). As noted earlier, Maruyama believes that sub-understanders may be incapable of seeing the extra dimensions. Cross-mindscape communication can be improved, however, by the realization that others are using different epistemologies than our own, and by developing, as far as possible, the ability to free ourselves from our single paradigms and function in other paradigms as well (Maruyama 1979b, p. 387; 1974b, pp. 275-6). This is the very basis of any cross-cultural effectiveness.

INTERCULTURAL COMPETENCE

Requirements for competency in intercultural relations are surprisingly consistent across disciplines. Generally they include: knowledge of others; knowledge of self; skills to discover and/or to interact; valuing others' values, beliefs, and behaviors; and relativizing oneself (Deardorff 2004, pp. 4-15). The development of skills and attitudes to interact with people from diverse backgrounds is also important, as is linguistic competence, since all cultural communication encodes symbols and traditions in speech. Specific behaviors that promote effective functioning in intercultural settings have been found to include: displaying respect and showing positive regard for others; responding in nonevaluating, nonjudgmental ways; an orientation to increasing one's knowledge, especially of the terms in which people explain themselves and the world; role flexibility in different groups; ability to be attentive, responsive, and perceptive in interaction; empathy; and tolerance of ambiguity with little visible discomfort (Lustig and Koester 2003, p. 72; Chen 1992, pp. 23-6).

The ability to appreciate both familiar and unfamiliar cultures allows for dialogue in which people listen for understanding and do not try "to score points by exploiting the weaknesses of others. [Rather, they try] to listen to them by understanding them in the strongest way," remaining open to other traditions and the chance of learning from them (Baert 2005, pp. 195-7). This is not possible when people view each other as members of adversarial camps engaged in demolishing or dismissing arguments. To counter that tendency requires that people be diligent in uncovering underlying presuppositions – their own as well as others' – and that they recognize the existence of alternative scenarios of

reality (p. 194). For Maruyama, people who can do this are “biscapal translators” (1994a, pp. 39-41) who become capable of functioning in two mindscapes, their own type in a private life and a mainstream pattern in public or professional life. They assume a valuable social role, since understanding across different mindscape types is impossible or very limited without them; interpersonal communication is often difficult for this very reason. Biscapal persons have become aware that communicating competently across cultures is facilitated by the development of habits and behaviors of mindfulness. And not only that, but practicing these habits and behaviors may also encourage the growth and emergence of more biscapal translators. Competence in communication may thus be facilitated by the development of specific, mindful habits and behaviors, as recommended for cross national communication. A basic shift in thought and approach to culture and multicultural interactions could yield a new paradigm (Casmir 1978).

In summary, this chapter reviewed the literature concerning cultural classification and various important traditional and non-traditional conceptualizations of culture, including both internal and external features and manifestations. Research with cognitive/perceptual characteristics and groupings was examined, along with coverage of the concept of mindscapes. Work in intercultural communication and conflict followed, concluding with a look at recent developments in the field of Intercultural Competence.

CHAPTER III

METHOD OF STUDY

In [a scientific] context, a theory is a set of general, parsimonious, logically related statements containing clearly defined terms, formulated to explain the broadest possible range of phenomena in the natural world. . . . Some sociologists would prefer to reserve the “theory” label only for the brand of theorizing just described, and use terms such as perspective, metatheory, orientation, framework, or ideology for writings that fail to satisfy the foregoing definition for theory. This view is far from normative, however and all manner of discursive, non-scientific products are referred to as theories in sociology. . . .

Much theorizing in sociology is non-scientific for yet another reason: the objects of discourse are not phenomena in the empirical world, but instead are other theoretical writings. . . . Whereas the greater good of such activity may be incomprehensible from a scientific standpoint, nevertheless there is a sense in which the intellectual products of such activities grow and evolve, with the potential to discover previously unrealized nuances and insights (Markovsky 2007, pp. 5-6).

In pursuit of discovery, then, three research questions will be explored in this study. This section will first list and expand them, defining terms more fully. Following that is a detailed discussion of how the study was conducted, including its analytic framework and strategy, along with information about sources and their relevance, concluding with limitations.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Research Question 1: How Have Prominent Social Scientists Conceptualized Culture?

Question 1 was formulated specifically to acknowledge the ambiguity inherent in any attempt to delineate culture, including this one. It also recognizes the lush heritage

from which sociology has grown, and the range of perspectives through which current understandings have been developed. The social sciences as referenced in this study will include sociology, anthropology, psychology, international relations, conflict resolution, political science, health sciences, education, communication science, and intercultural communication.

Research Question 2: In What Ways Can Shared Mindscales Be Considered Congruent With the Concept of Culture?

Question 2 presents one of the “new questions” that must be asked in order to develop new knowledge that may contribute to an enhanced understanding of culture, not only for sociologists, but for anyone interested in the ways of people. Maruyama’s typology of mindscales will be examined and its features considered along with significant cultural conceptualizations for indications of coincidence.

Research Question 3: In What Ways Can the Concept of Mindscales as Cultures Be Integrated With the Principles of Intercultural Communication?

Question 3 gives form to the practical contributions of this dissertation, in the potential for conflict resolution or prevention. Principles developed and taught in the discipline of intercultural communication are surveyed and checked for fit with descriptions of mindscales as cultures.

ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

Taken all together, these questions reflect an essentially phenomenological orientation, in which reality is constituted by the individual’s underlying assumptions

about it. In contrast to a traditional objectivist stance, which tends to view the social world as a reality existing independently of any individual's perception of it, phenomenologists make the standpoint of individual actors the central focus of their attention. Phenomenological sociology deals with human conduct by attempting to "describe the subjective perspectives of people, on the premise that one can only understand and account for what people do by understanding the reality they perceive and act toward" (Hewitt 2007, p. 17). According to Orleans' explication in the *Encyclopedia of Sociology*, phenomenology operates differently from conventional social science and more on a metasociological level, demonstrating "the means by which phenomena, originating in human consciousness, come to be experienced as features of the world" (Orleans 2001, p. 2101). Relying on "theoretical discourse and historical excavation of the usually taken for granted foundations of knowledge" (p. 2101), phenomenology holds that it is from consciousness that being emerges. It emphasizes that while people live in an intersubjective world, they "at best approximate shared realities" (p. 2102).

Phenomenological sociologists consider humans to be creative agents in the construction of their social worlds, and they investigate "social products," whether those are called attitudes, behaviors, families, aging, ethnic groups, classes, societies, or otherwise. "The central task in social phenomenology is to demonstrate the reciprocal interactions among the processes of human action, situational structuring, and reality construction" (Orleans 2001, pp. 2100-3). Far from belief in a single, objective social reality, the social phenomenologist sees multiple realities; "the important reality is what people imagine it to be" (Bogdan and Taylor 1975, p. 2). People's characteristic ways of

conceiving, speaking, and writing about things are believed to be situated in the social contexts that produce them, shaping their views of reality, as opposed to merely reflecting reality. “Indeed, pushed to an extreme, one might say that there are as many social realities as there are perspectives from which to view them” (Hewitt 2007, pp. 17-26). It follows, therefore, that since one major cause of conflict between persons and groups is the failure to recognize that people use different structures of reasoning with incompatible underlying assumptions about reality, a study exploring the connection between mindscapes and culture is inherently phenomenological.

Phenomenological analysis strives to take nothing for granted (Bogdan and Taylor 1975, p. 9), seeking “to discover the world as it is experienced by those involved in it” (Wilson 2002, p. 7). “Truth” is then found as a composite of how people think about that world and each other (Bogdan and Taylor 1975, p. 11). Researchers are asked to set aside natural prejudgments about the external phenomena of the world under analysis to focus instead on consciousness, attempting to get as close as possible to what the participants are experiencing (p. 7). They are expected to rely on “intuition, imagination, and universal structures to obtain a picture of the experience” (Creswell 1998, p. 52), through the process of *epoché*, the Greek-derived concept of suspending or abstaining from judgment in the ordinary, everyday way of perceiving things. “*Epoché* requires a new way of looking at things, a way that requires that we learn to see what stands before our eyes,” without imposing meaning too soon (Patton 2002, pp. 484-5). Specifically, it requires abstention

from the assumptions we hold, implicitly or explicitly, about the nature of reality; from the explanations we automatically invoke, be they physical, psychological, etc.; from the presuppositions we may have absorbed from current philosophies and ideologies; from any conceptual grid we may uncritically employ to categorize lived experience; in short, from anything that intervenes between the open consciousness and “the things themselves” (Behnke 1982, p. 94).

ANALYTICAL STRATEGY

Patton distinguishes five phases in the process of phenomenological inquiry, including: immersion, incubation, illumination, explication, and creative synthesis (2002, p. 487). Immersion is the stage of “steeping oneself in all that is” of the phenomenon under study: “the researcher’s total life and being are centered in the experience, questioning, meditating, dialoging, daydreaming, and indwelling.” Incubation allows time and space for contemplation and the awakening of insights, while illumination brings expanding awareness of themes, patterns, clusters, parallels. In the explication phase, new connections are made “through further explorations into universal elements and primary themes of the experience,” with an integration of meanings and a refinement of results. Lacity and Janson describe another dimension of this phase.

The researcher abstracts the “essences” from the text. Essences are wholly subjective gestalts of what is learned from studying the phenomenon. Abstracting essences requires creativity, intuition, and reflection. The researcher no longer asks, “What do the participants think about the phenomenon?” but rather, “What do I think? (1994, p.151).

And finally comes creative synthesis, bringing together the emergent elements into relationships and pointing the way for new perspectives. Patton cautions that “these brief outlines of phenomenological and heuristic analysis can do no more than hint at the in-

depth *living with the data* that is intended” (2002, p. 487), and indeed, his depiction of the process aptly describes the course of development of this dissertation.

Further, this study is investigative and integrative in nature, compiling, analyzing, and synthesizing insights that have previously gone unconnected. In this aspect it follows the example of UNT alumna Regina Gray Harris (2007), who describes her dissertation as “monographic, . . . aimed at analyzing [material] in some new manner” and “a kind of exploratory essay” intended to provide new information (p. 14-15). Like hers, this project was begun with no preconceived notions from which to develop hypotheses; instead certain integrative themes and unifying concepts began to emerge in the early years of data gathering, from which the research questions were generated and an organizational framework developed. Mahoney and Goertz (2006) compare work of this sort to that of criminal detectives, in that “they solve puzzles and explain particular outcomes by drawing on detailed fact gathering, experience working with similar cases, and knowledge of general causal principles” (p. 241). In such research, investigators are typically quite familiar with each of the cases or instances under investigation, and particular cases that do not conform to the proposed explanatory model are not simply ignored. Instead, researchers seek to understand exactly why particular cases diverge from expectations, and attempt to identify what special factors can lead to differences (p. 243).

This appreciation for fine points of contrast and distinction also prompts the analogy of researcher as “journalist, social critic, artist, performer, jazz musician, filmmaker, quilt maker, essayist, [or] as in filmmaking, a person who assembles images

into montages” (Denzin and Lincoln 2005, p. 4). Levi-Straus (1966) applies the term *bricoleur* to this kind of researcher, meaning one who “is adept at performing a large number of diverse tasks. . . . The rules of his [or her] game are always to make do with ‘whatever is at hand,’” with the outcome as the “contingent result of all the occasions there have been to renew or enrich the stock or to maintain it with the remains of previous constructions or destructions” (p. 17). This *bricolage*, in other words, is a “poetic making do,” combining new discoveries with the odds and ends and bits collected and retained from earlier projects, (Denzin and Lincoln 2005, p. 4), thus turning to great advantage the researcher’s familiarity and intuitive intimacy with the data. In parallel with three of the major sociological perspectives, (a) “the theoretical *bricoleur* reads widely and is knowledgeable about the many interpretive paradigms . . . that can be brought to any particular problem,” working within and between overlapping perspectives (p. 6). (b) The “interpretive *bricoleur*” understands research as an interactive process shaped by personal as well as social history and setting, while (c) the “critical *bricoleur*” knows that “the boundaries that previously separated traditional disciplines no longer hold” (p. 6).

Another line of thinking describes this kind of research as “thought experiments,” which draw on both theory and experience to answer “what if” questions while making explicit the experiential knowledge already possessed by the researcher (Maxwell 1996, p. 45). Traditionally, the influence of a researcher’s background and identity has been treated as bias, to be eliminated from the design, rather than considered a valuable component of it. C. Wright Mills argues to the contrary in *The Sociological Imagination*

(1959) that “the most admirable scholars within the scholarly community . . . do not split their work from their lives. They seem to take both too seriously to allow such dissociation, and they want to use each for the enrichment of the other” (p. 195).

Maxwell concurs: “Separating your research from other aspects of your life cuts you off from a major source of insights, hypotheses, and validity checks” (1996, p. 28).

Researchers’ subjectivity is the very basis for the stories that they are able to tell, equipping them with the perspectives and perceptions that shape all their research, from the selection of topics to what is emphasized in the writing. “Seen as virtuous, subjectivity is something to capitalize on rather than to exorcise” (Maxwell 1996, p. 28).

Anselm Strauss, in *Qualitative Analysis for Social Scientists* (1987), also emphasizes these points. He insists that to ignore the researcher’s technical knowledge, research background, and personal experiences is to risk losing valuable “experiential data”:

“Mine your experience, there is potential gold there!” (p. 11). Patricia Hill Collins (1986) too urges intellectuals to learn to trust their own personal and cultural biographies as significant sources of knowledge. “Experienced reality is used as a valid source of knowledge for critiquing sociological facts and theories, while sociological thought offers new ways of seeing that experienced reality” (pp. S29-S30). This dissertation takes the advice of these experts and attempts seriously to capitalize on it.

The complicated and subtle endeavor of the thought experiment has a distinguished history – much of Einstein’s work was based on it – even though it receives little attention in discussions of research design (Maxwell 1996, p. 45). Proponents of such interpretive speculation call it “the soul of the social sciences,” cherishing any

attempt to discover possible interpretations of behavior, regardless of form or disciplinary origin (Lave and March 1975, p. 2). They point out that as a result of just this kind of speculative model “Aristotle, Smith, Toynbee, Marx, Malinowski, Camus, James, Weber, Dostoevsky, Freud, Durkheim, Cervantes and a host of other figures” have greatly enhanced our understanding of human behavior (p. 3). Models of behavior are metaphors through which “our understanding of behavior, the complexity of behavior, and the number of questions about behavior all increase over time” (p. 6). Social scientists who learn and develop the ability to abstract from reality to a model can participate in this spiral of knowledge through the “playful exercise of disciplined thought,” inventing new forms of thinking about familiar things and combining the ways of science with those of art (pp. 4-7).

Text analysis, as another research strategy with a long pedigree, permeates the social sciences, examining “words, sentences, paragraphs, pages, documents, ideas, meanings, paralinguistic features, and even what is missing from the text” (Ryan and Bernard 2003, p. 290). It is used both for exploratory and confirmatory purposes, “subjecting ideas to intellectual due process,” and employing a sort of “multidimensional critical thinking” that questions assumptions and challenges what is taken for granted (Gabennesch 2006, p. 4). The generation of “unthought-of possibilities and perspectives” is characteristic of a scholarship that is “free to question in any direction” (Lincoln and Cannella 2004, p. 12), building on but not restricted by conventional definitions of scientific inquiry. “Otherwise, diverse voices and perspectives are marginalized, denied, placed under suspicion, and ultimately rejected entirely,” according to these two feminist

scholars and alternating co-authors of “Dangerous Discourses” I and II (Cannella and Lincoln 2004, pp. 168-170). It is in this spirit of unfettered, disciplined, playful, systematic, speculative, subjectively-informed, scientific yet poetic making-do that the research aspect of this project was conducted.

Writing itself is affirmed as a research method in Laurel Richardson’s chapter of Denzin and Lincoln’s *Collecting and Interpreting Qualitative Material* (2003). As she explains it,

I write because I want to find something out. I write in order to learn something that I did not know before I wrote it. I was taught, however, as perhaps you were, too, not to write until I knew what I wanted to say, until my points were organized and outlined. No surprise, this static writing model coheres with mechanistic scientism and quantitative research. But, I will argue, this static writing model is itself a sociohistorical invention that reifies the static social world imagined by our 19th-century foreparents. The model has serious problems: It ignores the role of writing as a dynamic, creative process (Richardson 2003, p. 501).

The subject of this perceptive analysis also informs the process of this dissertation.

Writing as a means of finding something out is “validated as a method of knowing” (p. 509), and it is particularly endorsed as a way of capturing thought experiments and abstracting from reality to models. “It is necessary, but not easy, to form abstract representations of a delicately intricate reality” (Lave and March 1975, p. 4), and models of human behavior are, from this perspective, a form of art whose development is “a kind of studio exercise” (p. 4), requiring practice, drafts, restatements, trials, and fine tuning. Furthermore, with social phenomenology’s emphasis on understanding people’s experience of the world, “the research methods are the methods of philosophy. Those methods include, for example, conceptual analysis; linguistic analysis; hermeneutical

method and praxis; historical-critical method; literary philosophy; and formal logic” (Wilson 2002, p. 6). Neither art nor philosophy offers easy solutions or straightforward procedures, and that has emphatically been the case with this project. But since qualitative measures provide means of accessing unquantifiable facts about people as represented by textual traces (Berg 2004 [1989], p. 7), research that delves into perceptions and explores meaning will necessarily follow a meandering path.

According to Lave and March (1975), research in this tradition involves constructing metaphoric models to explain and appreciate the subject of study. As they tell it, “sometimes we call our simplifications theories, paradigms, hypotheses, or simply ideas” (pp. 3-4). A model, as a simplified picture of some part of the real world, is, like all pictures, simpler than the phenomenon it is supposed to explain. It is natural that different models could consider different aspects of the same thing. Each could be used to say something, but not everything, about its subject. Nor should they try. As Maxwell writes in *Qualitative Research Design: An Interactive Approach* (1996), to construct an explanatory framework based on either description or interpretation is to convert them into theory, “a model or map of *why* the world is the way it is” (p. 32). It is a simplification aimed at clarifying some aspect of how the world works. A useful theory actually tells a good story about some phenomenon that “gives new insights and broadens your understanding of that phenomenon” (p. 33). The qualitative paradigm is, in fact, “marked by a concern with the discovery of theory rather than the verification of theory” (Filstead 1979, p. 38).

In the same way, this dissertation aspires to discover theory or its antecedents, or at least to tell a good story, through disciplined and systematic textual analysis and narrative synthesis of important thought in the social sciences – in short, reading and writing – building on existing foundations, bridging gaps, and blending *bricoles*. This is, as noted in the online journal *Forum: Qualitative Social Research*, “not a linear process, but a tangled and intermittent procedure” (Konopasek 2008) from which arise fresh perspectives and insights. How is this new understanding of reality created? Original texts progressively emerge from and alongside the collected ones as the researcher lives with, listens to, and gets to know all the “voices” of the data while orchestrating them into harmony. “Such a textual practice, based as much on writing as on reading, is the primary vehicle of the production of a new understanding” (pp. 13-17).

SOURCES

In addition to the works already mentioned, this study examines relevant contributions to the understanding of culture, cognitive processes, and intercultural relations, from several disciplinary directions. Sociological thinkers, including Georg Simmel (1971), Max Weber (1946), Alfred Schutz (1973b, 1973a, 1968, 1960, 1944), Gustav Ichheiser (1970, 1966, 1949), Karl Mannheim (1936 [1929]), C. Wright Mills (1959, 1951), Robert K. Merton (1972), Patricia Hill Collins (1986), and Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann (1966) are tapped for their contributions to a conceptualization of the multifaceted dimensions of culture and personhood in society. Categorizations and definitions of culture from an anthropological perspective include: Garry Chick’s (1997)

typology of cultures, Clifford Geertz's (1973) *The Interpretation of Cultures*, Clyde Kluckhohn and William H. Kelly's (1945) massive categorization of the ways in which culture is defined, Bronislaw Malinowski's (1931) encyclopedic discussion of culture, and Claude Levi-Strauss' (1966) landmark, if controversial, work with "savage minds."

Significant research in cognitive processes is multidisciplinary. Theorists consulted include: James Aho (1998) for his work in social phenomenology, Stephen Cotgrove (1978) for styles of thought, Norman Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln (2005), who delineate qualitative and quantitative ways of thinking, Daniel Gilbert (1998) for his handbook of Social Psychology, Anthony Gregorc (1984, 1982, 1979), known for his work in teaching and learning styles, Egon Guba (1990), who writes extensively about paradigms and "alternatives," Douglas Herrmann and Douglas Raybeck (1997), because their version of "A Clash of Cultures" refers to different research traditions, James Mahoney and Gary Goertz (2006), for further developing the idea of research as culture, Carolyn Mamchur (1996), curriculum specialist and author of *A Teacher's Guide to Cognitive Type Theory and Learning Style*, Janice M. Morse (2000), credited with coining the term "qualitative thinking," and Eviatar Zerubavel (1995), for analyzing "rigid, fuzzy, and flexible" thinking. Mindscapes, although identified with cognitive processes, are the invention and near-exclusive property of Magoroh Maruyama, to whose extensive body of work this project is greatly indebted and by which it is extensively influenced.

Intercultural communication and competence research addresses a wide range of concerns and applications, and is still developing. Experts sampled include: John W.

Berry (2004), who examines psychological processes in intercultural relations, Fred L. Casmir (1978), author and editor of guides to intercultural and international communication, Jayne Seminare Docherty (2004), whose work in intercultural negotiation is widely consulted, Donald Ellis and Ifat Maoz (2003), writing about ethnonational conflict management, Charles Kraft (1978), who considers worldviews essential in communication, Myron Lustig and Jolene Koester (2003), for their noted text about interpersonal communication across cultures, Douglas Raybeck (2005), who promotes the search for “complementarities” in cross-cultural communication and negotiation, Tulsi B. Saral (1979), whose “consciousness theory” appears in *Intercultural Communication* references, and K. S. Sitaram and Lawrence Haapanen (1979), for their thinking about values in intercultural communication.

The works which were finally incorporated in this study represent only a fraction of works actually sampled, as befits the theoretical *bricoleur* who is striving to be knowledgeable about many paradigms and perspectives, described above by Denzin and Lincoln (2005, p. 6). Any print material was fair game for data collection and synthesis, but concentration was heaviest in journal articles (including: sociology, psychology, anthropology, cross-cultural research, organization/management studies, future studies, education, health research, communication, creativity, conflict resolution, and research methods), books and textbooks, scholarly newspapers, dissertations, novels, and other literary works. All of the aforementioned contributors and others emerged through something like snowball sampling, with references pointing to other important sources in the spiraling, interactive, empirically informed research process described earlier.

According to methodologist Katharyn A. May (1994), “knowledge is shaped *but not completely defined* by the process through which it was created” (p. 14). Tracing insight to “immeasurables and unobservables such as intuition and creativity,” she credits the expert qualitative researcher with an “exquisitely fine tuned capacity for pattern acquisition and recognition,” or the ability to know where to look (p. 18). In this, she argues, the expert analyst is as much informed by creative reasoning as by past experience of similarities and differences (p. 19). Even though, as the saying goes, “chance favors the prepared mind” (attributed to Louis Pasteur), creativity and intuition are the “manifest expression of substantive and methodologic expertise,” and moving from intuition to insight is governed not by chance but by a readiness to see and bring out the possibilities when they are there (p. 20).

We probably will continue to be slightly uncomfortable with this vaguely unscientific element in our work because we do not yet have the means to explain creativity and intuition. . . . Out of many possible paths to abstract knowledge, this one seems compelling (May 1994, p. 20).

Another side of the decision making process, according to Richard L. Daft (1983) in “Learning the Craft of Organizational Research,” concerns intuitions and feelings. “There is an uncertain, emotional, human side of research, and research that incorporates these properties can be science at its best” (p. 545). This way of operating, often called qualitative reasoning or qualitative thinking (Morse 2000), is not rule-based, but requires exploration and attention to perceptual detail. “There are no formulas to memorize and follow. There are no ‘right’ answers to conveniently list in the back of the teacher’s edition of the textbook or templates to use as benchmarks of success” (Siegesmund 2005,

p. 20). Instead, it takes the hard work of investigating ambiguities. Qualitative research is oriented to the “working intricacies of human agency and circumstance,” demanding a taste for complexity and a penchant for the problematic and the unanticipated (Gubrium and Holstein 1997, pp. 12-13). A world comprising “meanings, interpretations, feelings, talk, and interaction must be scrutinized on its own terms” (p. 13). Specifically, in the postmodernist stance of questioning conventional methods of knowing and introducing new methods – equally subject to critique – we are reminded that researchers are “writing from particular positions at particular times,” and are thus freed from “trying to write a single text in which we say everything at once to everyone” (Richardson 2003, p. 509).

LIMITATIONS

To state a methodological position is a way of describing one’s view of the nature of reality, and research methods are the practical technologies with which that reality may be known (Lindlof and Taylor 2002; Wilson 2002, p. 5). In conventional quantitative research, generalizability is an assumed standard. In phenomenological research, however, the world one chooses to explore is made up of intersubjectively constructed meanings, and given that both qualitative and phenomenological thinking assume the importance of individual perspective and experience, generalizability to a larger population is neither possible nor appropriate. “Reluctance to standardize data collection and unwillingness to sacrifice depth for generality are matters of analytic necessity, not technical inadequacies” (Gubrium and Holstein 1997, p. 13). An aspect of qualitative research which alleviates anxiety about generalizability is its ability to

combine raw observations into “meta-observations” (Alasuutari 1995, p. 147). The researcher explores the topic not in terms of isolated cases but at a more general level. “When several different versions are collected of the same theme and the object of study is defined at a metalevel . . . then we are no longer operating with isolated, individual cases” (p. 147). Instead of generalization, “*extrapolation* better captures the typical procedure in qualitative research (p. 157).

Rather, an exploratory, theoretical work is limited by its very tenuousness; it awaits discovery and application by those with similar reasoning structures who will play with its possibilities. It is also inherently subjective, and while in the qualitative paradigm, the researcher’s background and personal experiences are valued for their potential insight generation (Mills 1959; Strauss 1987), verification can be problematic. As Maxwell (1996) suggests, validity “has to be assessed in relationship to the purposes and circumstances of the research, rather than being a context-independent property of methods or conclusions” (p. 86). What most researchers need is “some grounds for distinguishing accounts that are credible from those that are not. Nor are you required to attain some ultimate truth in order for your study to be useful and believable” (p. 87).

Objective proof seldom will exist somewhere outside one’s self that will demonstrate correctness or validity. No statistical test will do this for us; no amount of replication will make acceptable an idea that does not square with experience (Daft 1983, p. 543).

As a preventive measure, this project follows Berg’s recommendation that “qualitative analysis needs to be very well documented as a process,” both to assure availability to

other researchers and to permit evaluation of analysis strategies, self-reflection, and refinement of methods and procedures (2004 [1989], p. 40).

CHAPTER IV

DISCUSSION AND SYNTHESIS

Having laid the foundation and examined the essential components, we can now turn to the research questions, which are addressed in this chapter. Calling on theoretical, textual, and literary data, as outlined in Chapter 3, responses to each question will be discussed in turn, presenting relevant contributions and synthesizing findings.

RESEARCH QUESTION 1

Typologies

The first question is “How have prominent social scientists conceptualized culture?” A useful approach to this question is to examine typologies that have been created by social scientists to classify not just cultures but the very ways in which culture can be defined, thus affording a broad overview before moving to focus on more specific ideas. One of the most noted typologies, as introduced in Chapter 2, is *Culture: A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions* (1952), created by two influential cultural anthropologists, A. L. Kroeber and Clyde Kluckhohn. This benchmark reference work, which, even though now fallen out of favor, is still often cited in astonishment over its sheer magnitude, assembles some 156 definitions under six main headings, each presupposing a different understanding of what culture is all about:

Group A: Descriptive. Broad Definitions with Emphasis on Enumeration of Content

Group B: Historical. Emphasis on Social Heritage or Tradition

Group C: Normative

C-I: Emphasis on Rule or Way.

C-II: Emphasis on Ideals or Values Plus Behavior

Group D: Psychological

D-I: Emphasis on Adjustment, on Culture as a Problem-Solving Device

D-II: Emphasis on Learning

D-III: Emphasis on Habit

D-IV: Purely Psychological Definitions

Group E: Structural: Emphasis on the Patterning of Organization of Culture

Group F: Genetic.

F-I: Emphasis on Culture as a Product or Artifact

F-II: Emphasis on Ideas

F-III: Emphasis on Symbols

F-IV: Residual Category Definitions

(Kroeber and Kluckhohn 1952, pp. 43-71).

For Group A, which encompasses “descriptive” definitions, the distinctive criteria are “(a) culture as a comprehensive totality, and (b) enumeration of aspects of culture content.” Holders of this view believe culture can be defined by listing all relevant aspects. Critics point out that lists can never be exhaustive and that whatever is not included is left out of consideration (pp. 43-46). In contrast, Group B’s “historical” definitions, with an emphasis on “social heritage or tradition,” select one feature instead of trying to address the cultural totality. Viewing culture as something more or less fixed, these definitions stress that humans “have a social as well as a biological heritage,” but impute too passive a role for people and too much weight to tradition (pp. 47-49).

Group C, the “normative” definitions, has two subdivisions with different emphases. One focuses on “rules” or “ways,” which can include any of the following: a culture’s shared patterns, the sanctions for failure to follow rules, and/or the expected

ways of behaving. The other attends specifically to “ideals or values plus behavior,” examining the dynamic force of normative ideas on shaping how people behave in cultural context (pp. 50-54). Similarly, conceptualizations in Group D emphasize the individual level, but these take a psychological tack. In subgroup 1, “culture as a problem-solving device or adjustment,” culture is “reduced” to psychology, stressing the effects of individuals’ acquisition, retention, and change of habits on their collective culture (pp. 55-58). Subgroup 2 emphasizes “learning” and stresses the non-genetically transmissible features of culture at the expense of other features (pp. 58-59). Subgroup 3 locates “habit” in the individual rather than as part of culture (p.60), and subgroup 4 incorporates the “purely psychological definitions,” couched in terms that lie completely outside mainstream anthropological or sociological thought (p.60).

In the “structural” Group E, where emphasis is on the “patterning or organization of culture,” definitions make it clear that “culture is inevitably an abstraction.” Under these terms culture is conceived as based on and interpreting behavior but not including behavior itself. Culture is the design or system for living, irrespective of material, concrete cultural manifestations (pp. 61-63).

Lastly, Group F, labeled “genetic,” acts as something of a catchall, including four very different subgroups. In the first, conceptualizations which emphasize culture “as a product or artifact” are interested in the end result of the transmission process, but not the historic or biological processes themselves (pp. 64-66). Subgroup 2, with an emphasis on “ideas,” could be proto-symbolic interactionists, expressing the idea that “strictly speaking, there is no such thing as ‘material culture.’ . . . What is culture is the idea

behind the artifact.” Kroeber and Kluckhohn place this subgroup along with the “structural” Group E in a position “farthest out on the frontier of culture theory,” at least of their day, dealing as these definitions do with highly abstract issues (pp. 66-69). There is reason to believe, however, that in the nearly six decades since they wrote, that theoretical frontier has grown as multidisciplinary as nations have grown multicultural. Subgroup 3 emphasizes “symbols” (pp. 69-70), although it is difficult to determine how they can be separated from the “ideas” that are dealt with in subgroup 2, and subgroup 4, carrying the label “Residual Category Definitions,” deals with “whatever is above the animal level in mankind” that does not fit elsewhere (pp. 70-71).

One of the coauthors of this massive effort had earlier defined culture in his own terms to mean:

all those historically created designs for living, explicit and implicit, rational, irrational, and nonrational, which exist at any given time as potential guides for the behavior of men. . . . But it also includes a characteristic set of unstated premises or hypotheses which vary greatly in different societies (Kluckhohn and Kelly 1945, pp. 97-99).

This description fits squarely within Group E, the “structural” group, where culture is considered strictly an abstraction or a system for living, “a plan, not the living itself” (Kroeber and Kluckhohn 1952, p.63). It could be argued that Kroeber, Kluckhohn, and Kelly were in fact pushing the frontiers of cultural theory, which at the time largely endorsed the universality of culture, believing that certain “biological, psychological, social, and cultural features are shared by all human populations in every culture” (Alex 2009). These three pioneers held that all people share the same ultimate logic, which allows for the possibility of some form of communication, but that the thought processes

they use “depart from radically different premises – especially unconscious or unstated premises” (Kluckhohn and Kelly 1945, pp. 103-4). This dissertation upholds their views about thought processes but proposes in place of a single ultimate logic the existence of multiple human logics.

Another influential but more current typology was developed in cross-cultural anthropology. Garry Chick (1997) reviewed important measures of cultural complexity in use since the 1940s and arranged definitions of culture into four major types, in order of increasing inclusiveness. In the first, “culture as mental,” culture is conceptualized as being “primarily in the heads of members of particular societies,” emphasizing such abstracts as knowledge, beliefs, ideals, values, and so on. These definitions refer to shared systems of meanings and conceptual designs that underlie the ways in which any given groups live (pp. 284-5). The second category, “culture as mental and behavioral,” includes socially distinctive behavioral patterns along with mental culture. Here culture is the set of learned values, beliefs, ideals, etc., *along with* the behaviors that are characteristic of a particular society or population (pp. 284-5). Category three definitions add material culture to ideas and behavior, under the label “culture as mental, behavioral, and material.” In this sense culture is believed to be the “conventional patterns of thought, activity, and artifact that are passed on from generation to generation” in a manner assumed to involve learning rather than genetic programming (pp. 284-5). The fourth and most inclusive type of definition is called “culture as information,” reflecting the idea that culture is a system of information with the particular “set of information that is more or less shared by a social group constituting their culture.” Any single culture

can be seen as an “information economy” in which information is received, created, embodied in artifacts, retained in individual heads, transmitted, lost, recorded for storage at any level of technology, and “characterized by stereotypical behavior patterns.” It may be the property of small groups or large aggregations (pp. 284-5). This category encompasses all the others and at least hints at the possibility of genetic transmission of culture by not specifically ruling it out. With this characteristic it comes close to providing the expanded conceptualization of culture that this study proposes.

An important Intercultural Relations approach to conceptualizing culture has a psychological orientation, in which culture-behavior relationships are examined. The basic issue in this line of thought is to decide how behavioral similarities and differences will be interpreted, using a three-part typology of perspectives: absolutism, relativism, and universalism (Berry 2004, p.166). The absolutist point of view assumes that psychological phenomena are qualitatively the same in all cultures. “Culture is thought to play little or no role in the development of human characteristics” (pp. 166-167). Relativism, on the other hand, assumes that all human behavior is culturally patterned; human diversity is explained by the cultural context in which people have developed. Universalism bridges the other two, assuming that while a set of basic psychological processes are common to all humans, culture influences the development and display of psychological characteristics; culture, in other words, “plays different variations on these underlying themes” (p.167).

At the root of this typology are two different views about culture. One sees culture as a concrete and collective entity, publicly observable and characteristic of the

group as a whole, “and there is usually little concern about the meanings people may attribute to these cultural phenomena” (p.169). In the other view, culture is seen as abstract and subjective, a feature of the individuals who are engaged in social interaction, requiring “both *inference* (by the observer) to achieve the underlying meaning and *subjective interpretation* by the members of the cultural group who are exhibiting the custom or behavior” (p.169). Berry himself concludes that culture is both objective and subjective, explicit as well as implicit, involving “a range of essentially psychological phenomena, including beliefs, evaluations, meanings, ideals, and values,” and including the human-made parts of the environment along with characteristic ways of regarding them (p.169).

While the foregoing examples are by no means exhaustive, they represent the essential perspectives and cover the area of typologies sufficiently. In the next section then, individual contributions to the conceptualization of culture are examined.

Individual Conceptualizations

To take them in chronological order – but by no means implying development or sequential progression – one of the earliest social scientists to influence the understanding of culture is Bronislaw Malinowski. The 1931 *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences* includes his lengthy entry, aptly titled “Culture” (pp. 621-645), which states that “Culture is a reality *sui generis* and must be studied as such” (p.623). There are two fundamental cultural aspects, “a body of artifacts and a system of customs,” and culture thus comprises “inherited artifacts, goods, technical processes, ideas, habits and values”

(p.621). Malinowski also offers a rudimentary typology of cultural conceptualizations, divided into two schools of thought, the evolutionary and the historical or diffusionist. According to the evolutionary school, the growth of culture has proceeded according to definite laws in a fixed sequence of successive, spontaneous stages. This view presupposes the divisibility of culture into discrete, simple elements, and considers all elements comparable to all others, as units of the same order (p.623). The historical or diffusionist school has a different focus, maintaining that cultures have arisen through imitation or borrowing of artifacts and customs. This way of thinking “attempts to reconstruct the history of human cultures by tracing their diffusion,” mapping out cultural similarities over the globe and engaging in “speculative reconstructions” as to how similar cultural units might have gotten from one place to another (p.624). Malinowski, however, differs from both these schools of thought, reasoning that “Culture cannot be regarded as a fortuitous agglomerate of such [units]” (p.624). Culture embodies “commodities and instruments” as well as customs and “bodily or mental habits,” all of which are meant to work directly or indirectly for the satisfaction of human needs (p.625). Economic organization, law, education, magic, religion, knowledge, and art – all reflect the underlying foundations of concrete cultures and arise from and in response to the “synthetic imperative of human culture” (p.634). The isolated treatment of cultural traits is therefore sterile because the significance of culture resides in the relationships among its elements. The “insignificant details” of material culture must be treated differently from social institutions and cultural values, since they are not “invented” in the same ways, nor can they be “carried, diffused, or implanted” in similar manners

(pp. 624-625). "Culture is then essentially an instrumental reality which has come into existence to satisfy the needs of man in a manner far surpassing any direct adaptation to the environment" (p.645). This stance was a major departure from the received wisdom of his day and changed its course.

Karl Mannheim followed suit in 1944 [1990] with the publication of *A Scientific Theory of Culture*, which takes a "bird's eye view," envisioning culture as "the integral whole consisting of implements and consumers' goods, of constitutional charters for the various social groupings, of human ideas and crafts, beliefs and customs" (p.36). It is the "vast apparatus," partly material, partly human, and partly spiritual, through which people cope with their environment and its problems. Mannheim itemizes a three-part classification of the human needs that are addressed by culture: organic or basic, instrumental, and integrative. Basic, organic needs are those of physical existence, which must be met through the construction of a "new, secondary, or artificial environment." This environment must be permanently maintained and managed, requiring the transmission of cultural tradition from each generation to the next (p.37). Instrumental needs are those that are aroused and met through such types of activity as economic, normative, educational, and political, while integrative needs involve the realms of knowledge, religion, and magic. Art and recreation are sometimes considered integrative and sometimes organic, depending on their function (p.38). And here Mannheim introduces his idea of defining culture "more concretely, precisely and exhaustively," by using two types of analysis, functional and institutional. Functional analysis assesses the satisfaction of needs by activities in which human beings have to "cooperate, use

artifacts, and consume goods,” while instrumental analysis examines those units of human organization, or institutions, which imply agreement on a set of values for which humans come together in order to achieve any purpose or end (p.39). From this point of view, culture is a composite of partly autonomous, partly coordinated institutions. It is integrated on such principles as “the community of blood through procreation; the contiguity in space related to cooperation; the specialization in activities; and . . . the use of power in political organization” (p.40). Each culture in some way satisfies the entire range of basic, instrumental, and integrative needs, thereby opening the definition of culture to questions of how and why and meaning.

That opening became a paradigm shift when Clifford Geertz published *The Interpretation of Cultures* (1973), including meaning not only in his concept of culture but in the very science that studies it.

Believing . . . that man is an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun, I take culture to be those webs, and the analysis of it to be therefore not an experimental science in search of law but an interpretive one in search of meaning (p.5).

Weary with anthropology’s tendency toward “proving the indubitable” and “reincarnating” the work of great thinkers of the early 20th century, Geertz proposed instead that they should match it by abandoning habitual ways and skills and addressing problems that are complex and multi-layered enough to make discovery possible (p.88). “The way to do this is not to abandon the established traditions of social anthropology in this field, but to widen them” by working toward an expansion of the “conceptual envelope” in which cultural studies take place (p.88). Acknowledging the inherited

vagueness of the term culture, he adheres to a concept that “denotes an historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols, a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which men communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and attitudes toward life” (p.89). The conceptual expansion he seeks comes with the explication of exactly such terms as meaning, symbol, conception, sign, and communication, among others. The concept of “mind” has traditionally been regarded with suspicion by those upholding an ideal of “objectivism,” and terms like insight, understanding, conceptual thinking, idea, feeling, reflection, and so on, have been stigmatized as “contaminated with the subjectivity of consciousness” (p.55). This fear rests on the baseless assumption that the same occurrence cannot be governed by mechanical laws and moral principles, “as though a golfer cannot at once conform to the laws of ballistics, obey the rules of golf, and play with elegance” (p.57). It is arguably a stroke of genius not only to effect a paradigm shift, but to illuminate it with a sports analogy. Geertz argues convincingly that understanding meaning in all its varieties is the dominant philosophical concern of our time, and that social anthropology (and by extension, all the social sciences) should become aware of that fact (p.89). The present study is heavily indebted to his many insights, particularly the admonition to expand the conceptual envelope.

For D. M Schneider, whose “Notes Toward a Theory of Culture” was published in the compilation, *Meaning in Anthropology* (1976), culture is all about meaning: “Culture constitutes a body of definitions, premises, statements, postulates, presumptions, propositions, and perceptions about the nature of the universe and man’s place in it”

(p.203). Nature, the world at large, “the facts of life, whatever they may be,” are always perceived through cultural formulations of them (p.204). Since culture shapes human perceptions, there are only cultural constructions of “reality,” which are decisive in what is perceived, experienced, and understood. Indeed, he says, the “facts” of the natural world have “no independent existence apart from how they are defined by the culture” (p.204). Science itself is no less than a cultural construction of reality, determining what the “facts” of nature are, and subject to the shifting tides of discovery between yesterday and tomorrow. Meaning in this theory is not simply attributed to reality; reality is itself constructed as a body of beliefs, understandings, perceptions, feelings, images, categories, and comprehensions entailed in cultural meanings (pp. 204-206). This is a definition of culture as a social creation, building on Berger and Luckmann’s *Social Construction of Reality* (1966).

Another important development in the conceptualization of culture is the field of cultural studies itself, originally associated with the Birmingham Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies in Britain in the 1960s, according to Pertti Alasuutari in *Researching Culture: Qualitative Method and Cultural Studies* (1995). The concept of culture within the Birmingham School referred to something like “collective subjectivity – that is, a way of life or outlook adopted by a community or a social class” (pp. 23-25). This was in opposition to the formerly predominant hierarchic notion, “which takes culture as referring to the best and most glorious achievements of a people or civilization” (p.25). The point, in fact, was, to take a critical stance toward the hierarchic definition; not that cultural achievements could not be studied, just that they are treated as

“socially and culturally conditioned and defined phenomena,” and as such quite comparable to more mundane cultural products (p.26). Nevertheless, culture is taken seriously, if granted some independence, but at the same time it is emphasized that the practices and symbols of everyday life “must not be treated in isolation from questions of power and politics” (p.24).

The field of cultural studies incorporates a wide range of different theoretical traditions, within which the concept of culture is understood in many different ways, as Alasuutari points out. Perhaps the only feature shared in common is the position that “reality and social life are always and essentially mediated through meanings” (p.35). Cultural studies can be described as a crossroads, a shared view acquired through the application of concepts from various disciplines, that cultural distinctions and meaning systems can usefully be studied from the point of view of both actors and structures. People apply models and schemes of interpretation to make sense of the world and, conversely, those commonly used interpretive models produce and reproduce social reality and are an integral part of that reality (p.36). The fact that the many lines of inquiry within cultural studies differ from each other in their theoretical orientations makes this discipline uniquely inclusive and aptly suited for studying the current social and cultural picture, sometimes referred to as “the postmodern condition” (p.24).

The conceptualization of culture which will conclude this section comes from the field of conflict analysis and resolution. Writing for *Harvard Negotiation Law Review* (2004), Kevin Avruch examines “Culture as Context, Culture as Communication.” For the purposes of humanitarian negotiation, culture is understood as the framework through

which members of a social group interpret and attribute meaning to both their own and others' experiences and behavior. For Avruch the roles of culture in negotiation and conflict resolution are of paramount interest, especially those in which culture can be handled as "context" and "communication" (p.395). Context includes "deep presuppositions and presumptions about how the world works" which shape people's experiences and behavior, while communication incorporates "cognitive and affective frameworks" for interpreting behavior and motivations of self and others (pp. 395-396). It is therefore crucial to understand the sources of culture and their different modes of transmission (p.394). A key assumption of this perspective is that culture is a "quality" of groups and organizations and that people may belong to multiple groups and so carry multiple cultures. "Thus, for any given individual, culture always comes 'in the plural,' and therefore every interaction (including negotiation) between individuals is likely to be multicultural on several levels" (p.393). Additionally, *intracultural* variation is often present among individual members, particularly in collectives formed by societally imposed designation or categorization, precluding any uniformity of value, belief, or behavior. With this conceptualization Avruch contributes important elements to an expanded understanding of culture, and we can now turn to a consideration of the second research question.

RESEARCH QUESTION 2

Historical Background

Question 2 asks “In what ways can shared mindscapes be considered congruent with the concept of culture? In order to answer this question, the mindscapes idea and its context must be studied in some depth. As mentioned in the introductory chapter, cultural futurist Magoroh Maruyama defines mindscape as “a structure of reasoning, cognition, perception, conceptualization, design, planning, and decision making that may vary from one individual, profession, culture, or social group to another” and that also includes behavior and action. Originally called “perceptual/cognitive/cogitative/behavioral types,” his concept proved much easier to handle when simplified to “mindscape types” (2003a, p.549; 1980, p. 591), though throughout his extensive body of work – some 190 publications as of March, 2008 – Maruyama uses the terms epistemological types, mindscapes, and structures of reasoning somewhat interchangeably (Nyfelt 2008, not paginated online).

Awareness of the existence of different structures of reasoning is at least as old as the beginnings of philosophy (Maruyama 1978b, p. 24). Where Plato maintained that people form social groups for purely personal and utilitarian functions, Aristotle held that personality and disposition are inadequate explanations in themselves. He regarded human nature as inherently social and believed that people’s construal of situations influences how they respond to them (Taylor 1998, p. 59). Beyond that, in ancient Western philosophical tradition phenomena were understood to reveal the truth of their being spontaneously if people awaited their presence in meditative receptivity, but when

the Romans, informed by a political-military worldview, assimilated Greek metaphysics they gave it a twist with which 21st century readers will be familiar. Truth became something that must be “‘captured,’ ‘apprehended,’ ‘grasped’ by the power of reason” (Aho 1998, p. 142). Things to be known were “objects” that resisted attempts at knowing them; they must be set upon as one might an enemy and brought under human control. The concept was transformed from “a passive beholding and wondering to an active seizing, a regimenting of things by measurement and causal analysis,” reflecting the workings of a very different kind of reasoning (pp. 142-143).

Similarly, in the 18th century, Giambattista Vico’s “new science” (1976 [1744]) pointed out a basic separation between the aims and assumptions of the natural and human sciences, proposing that a full understanding of people’s ways and creations requires the interpretive, historical study of cultural forms (Lindlof and Taylor 2002, p. 32). His argument was extended by Immanuel Kant, who maintained in *The Critique of Pure Reason* (1952 [1781]) that people’s “conceptual categories” provide a framework of presuppositions through which knowledge and questions about empirical reality develop (Lindlof and Taylor 2002, p. 32). Differing from the mainstream philosophical position of his day which held that the things of the world are directly and easily perceivable by individuals, Kant maintained that the social perceiver took a much more active, constructive role in interpreting experienced objects, that in fact, “we do not know people and objects as they are in themselves, we know them as we infer them to be” (Taylor 1998, p. 70). Gilbert (1998) sees this as a radical departure that “instantly neutered” several centuries of epistemological thought, wryly observing that “timid philosophy

professors make unlikely revolutionaries” (p. 121). But this dissertation argues that Kant’s presentation of the psychological properties of perception “structured by innate knowledge of time, space, object, causality, and the like,” rather than demolishing the belief that perception is a physiological process “by which the world is faithfully projected on the brain as if by a series of mirrors,” actually asserts the reality of multiple, mutually incomprehensible mindscape types. Hegel’s *The Phenomenology of Spirit* (1989 [1801]) augmented Kant’s idea with the suggestion that perception could also be influenced by acquired knowledge, beliefs, and attitudes, thereby contributing one of modern psychology’s fundamental principles (Gilbert 1998, p. 121). Yet here again, the principles of psychology and physiology in no way negate each other; merely they represent different assumptions, angles, and applications, which, if exercised cooperatively, contribute to a more nuanced, dimensional understanding than either taken alone.

Max Weber’s (1946) concept of *verstehen* – understanding from the actor’s point of view – was also developed mostly in oppositional response to prevailing philosophical and scientific ways of knowing, which sought facts or causes of social phenomena in the discovery of universal laws and favored the application of positivism to the study of human behavior (Lindlof and Taylor 2002, p. 32; Bogdan and Taylor 1975, p. 2). In *The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Sociology* this disjunction is referred to as “the tension between logical positivism and interpretivism or (in nineteenth-century terms) the natural and cultural sciences” (Schutte 2007, not paginated online). Meaning is one of the key components in *verstehen* sociology, which attempts to explain social action through the

actor's perspective. Edmund Husserl, believing that this approach telescoped insider and outsider perspectives without considering how meaning is constituted subjectively (Hall 2007, p. 2 online), refined it by insisting that "it is the social scientist's task to distinguish the actor's motivation from the observational understanding of an outside observer" (Schutte 2007, not paginated online). This insight, of course, laid the foundation of the twentieth-century phenomenological movement and opened the door to the investigation of the subjective and even to the idea of mindscapes themselves. But Alfred Schutz expanded and made it accessible, synthesizing Weber's and Husserl's work in explaining the root of social action and establishing a conceptual basis for the interpretive study of communication (Lindlof and Taylor 2002, p. 34). In *The Phenomenology of the Social World* (1960 [1932]) Schutz asserts that individuals unquestioningly accept that a mundane world exists and is understood and reciprocated by others, an idea he restates in a collection of essays published as a memorial to Husserl:

All this is self-evident to me in my naive life just as it is self-evident to me that the world actually exists and that it is actually *thus*, as I experience it (apart from deceptions which subsequently in the course of experience prove to be mere appearances.) . . . From things inherited and learned, from the manifold sedimentations of tradition, habituality, and his own previous constitutions of meaning, which can be retained and reactivated, his *store of experience* of his life-world is built up as a closed meaningful complex. This complex is normally unproblematical for him, and it remains controllable by him in such a way that his momentary interest selects from this store of experience those things which are relevant to the demand of the situation (Schutz 1968, pp. 182-183).

Here are mindscapes in embryo. From Schutz, then, for whom "the important reality is what people imagine it to be" (Bogdan and Taylor 1975, p. 2), developed a sensitivity to multiple social realities and the play of situated meanings (Hall 2007, p. 4).

Gustav Ichheiser, as mentioned in Chapter 2, was also working on the problems of situated meaning, particularly in matters of personality and social perception and the ways in which people misunderstand each other.

This unawareness of persistently and, in some respects, even “systematically” operating misinterpretations, affect not only the image of personality as constituted in the common-sense social perception of everyday life. It insinuates itself also into scientific thought. Even psychologists and sociologists are frequently not aware to what extent their perceiving or nonperceiving of certain facts concerning personality, their asking or not asking certain questions, preferring or rejecting certain approaches and methods, performing or not performing certain interpretations, is influenced by silent, individually or collectively, conditioned patterns of misinterpretations or misinterpretative assumptions (1949, p. 6).

There is even foreshadowing of mindscapes in his thinking that people misunderstand each other because they belong to another psychological type, another cultural type, or another “situational” type. By “situational” he means people who are placed in a situation which is radically different from one’s own, citing for example Marie Antoinette, whose purported response to bread-starved French peasants was “let them eat cake,” or the “social blindness of the privileged of our own era, whether they are privileged individuals, privileged classes, or privileged nations” (1949, p. 40). His three categories of types – psychological, cultural, and situational – all have elements which can be found in Maruyama’s mindscape concept.

Ichheiser also presages the difficulties in cross-epistemological interaction that Maruyama later elaborates. For Ichheiser, the unreflective person, much like Schutz’s “natural” person (1973b),

lives and acts under the silent assumption that he perceives and observes other people in a correct, factual, unbiased way. . . . He is unaware that certain

misinterpretative mechanisms are at work within himself, distorting and falsifying his perception of other people, beginning even on the level of immediate observation. It remains concealed from him that much of what he considers as “fact” is permeated by, and a result of, misinterpretations functioning within his social perception and of which he is totally unaware (Ichheiser 1949, p. 6).

Ichheiser finds that “as long as the interpretative mechanisms operate to make us understand and anticipate the behavior of other people accurately, we remain, as a rule, entirely unaware of their presence” (1949, p. 9). In that depiction of the awakening of awareness one can sense the truth behind social psychologist Daniel Gilbert’s comment that “Ichheiser’s circumstances were difficult indeed, and they led him to develop a poignant and penetrating analysis of his own suffering” (Gilbert 1998, p. 127).

One of the first people to systematically study the problems of different structures of reasoning from a sociological standpoint was Karl Mannheim, who recognized in the clashing of modes of thought the possibility of divergent conceptions of the world.

“Were not the Sophists of the Greek Enlightenment the expression of an attitude of doubt which arose essentially out of the fact that in their thinking about every object, two modes of explanation collided?” (1936, p. 9). On the one hand was the legitimating mythology of the dominant nobility and on the other a “more analytical habit of thought,” which expressed its characteristic dissatisfaction with previous interpretations and questioned glaring contradictions (1936, p. 9). Mannheim maintained that each human situation is characterizable “only when one has also taken into account those conceptions which the participants have of it, how they experience their tensions in this situation and how they react to the tensions so conceived” (1936, p. 44). Maruyama bases much of his work with mindscapes on Mannheim’s points that: a) there are several types of logics or

reasoning structures; b) the use of logics is based on extralogical factors which are beyond and independent from any logic; and c) communicating parties who are unaware that they are using different logics often perceive each other as being illogical, unintelligent, insincere, infantile, etc. (Maruyama 1978b, p. 25; 1974a, p. 138).

Maruyama himself comments on the lack of attention that has been paid to communication problems between culture groups, finding only Margaret Mead's (1946) study of communication between English people and Americans, Theodore Balgooyen's (1962) research on communication between American Indians and White people, and his own analysis of communication between Danes and "foreigners" (1961c) and between individuals of the same culture with different paradigms (1974a, p. 141; 1963).

Mindscapes

Before the congruence of mindscapes and culture can be discussed, it is important that the mindscapes concept be fully developed. The reader will recall that Maruyama uses the terms mindscapes, epistemological types, and structures of reasoning somewhat interchangeably, as seen in the following excerpt, and for practicality that usage will also be followed in this dissertation.

Epistemological types have been variously labeled "models," "logics," "paradigms," and "epistemologies." I have spoken of "psychotopology" in this connection. . . . [Lately] I have been using the term "mindscapes," which seems to me to suggest something richly varied (Maruyama 1980, p. 591).

Until recently, the study of epistemological types had been conducted mainly in two separate fields with different variables. In psychology the focus was on individual patterns in cognition and/or perception, often in relation to personality. Sociologists and

anthropologists, on the other hand, concentrated on cultural and social differences in patterns of cognition, perception, behavior, and causal explanation, often averaging the individual differences within a culture or a social group. For Maruyama, however, in the course of studying various causal models in the physical, biological, and social sciences, it became evident that “the choice of causal model types in research depended on researchers’ epistemological types, which were related to their personality characteristics and cultural backgrounds” (1980, p. 589). Thus, a mindscape is an “epistemological framework” (1994b, p. 380), and mindscape theory

relates seemingly unrelated aspects of an individual’s mental activities and behavior, such as reasoning pattern, perception, choice of science hypothesis and theories, ethics, social interaction, spatial organization, [and] aesthetic preferences (1994b, p. 380).

As defined at the start of this section, mindscapes involve elements of perception, cognition, cogitation, conceptualization, behavior, design, planning, and decision making, and they represent different logical structures. Maruyama suggests that there are possibly as many of these epistemological types as there are individuals, but in his daily interactions with specialists from various fields, professionals from different governmental and nongovernmental agencies, and people from many countries, he has found it practical to distinguish four main types which are found most frequently, together with mixtures among themselves and with other types. These four main types and their combinations are believed to account for about two-thirds of the individuals in most countries. Some aspects of mindscape types are inborn while other aspects are learned, but according to Maruyama, “We do not yet know which aspects” (2003b, p.

607;1996; 1992, p. 2; 1979a, p. 14). It must be kept in mind, however, that pure types are strictly theoretical constructs, and that in reality each person may combine aspects of several pure types (1985, p. 126).

The four main types, which were previewed in Chapter 2, are labeled H, I, S, and G, and carry three-word descriptors that identify 1) the nature of the mindscape's components, 2) the relation between components of that mindscape, and 3) the major process employed (1994a, p. 7). H-type, then, is characterized by Homogenistic (defined below), hierarchical, and classificational thought and behavior; I-type is heterogenistic (defined below), Individualistic, random; S-type is heterogenistic, interactive, homeoStatic (defined below); and G-type, heterogenistic, interactive, morphoGenetic (defined below). Homogenistic means having or believing in only one logic, which characterizes the H-type; heterogenistic means several logics occur, which happens in I, S, and G-types. Homeostasis, the important identifier of S-types, indicates the maintenance of a certain pattern among heterogeneous elements, whereas morphogenetic interactions, typical of G-types, create new and developing patterns among increasingly heterogeneous elements; the patterns themselves grow and develop (2003a, pp. 545-565; 1979a, p. 14).

Maruyama's full narrative descriptions of the types in different aspects and occupational situations occupy a substantial portion of his body of work. What follows is a summary of important generalized features.

H-type. H-type thinking tries to standardize everything, seeks universal principles, rank-orders things and values – indeed, assumes that all persons in all cultures live in a universe of rankable values and have a hierarchical epistemology – puts things in discrete categories in which the parts are subordinated to the whole, looks for opposites (using dichotomous logic), believes in one truth and one best way for everyone, competes with others and holds that one's gain is someone else's loss, and therefore in order to win one must make someone else lose (zero-sum); believes in majority rule, domination, and preventive aggression. The unknown or unfamiliar is seen as uncomfortable, disturbing, or dangerous. Perception is linear and sequential. Society consists of categories, supercategories, and subcategories, and cultural change and world history proceed by leaps and bounds in a single direction of development. Personal integrity consists in adhering to higher values regardless of the situation and the context. Maruyama adds a final discouraging comment about this type:

It is extremely difficult, if not impossible, for persons who think using I, S, or G-type logics to communicate with those who use H-type logic, because the H-type believes in its 'universal truth' and tries to reduce everything into the limited dimensions of its thought structure. As long as the result of the dimension reduction is internally consistent, the H-type person is convinced that it is the correct interpretation even though it may miss the point completely (1996, p. 33).

I-type. I-type thinking rebels against homogeneity, looks for freedom from interference, tends to isolate phenomena, seeks self-sufficiency, uniqueness, and subjectivity, and believes that if many people work together their efficiency decreases (negative-sum). Everyone should do his/her own thing; do what you like as long as it does not bother anyone else. People work together only when and if their interests

coincide; “why bother to learn beyond my own interest?” The unknown or unfamiliar is seen as either irrelevant or uninteresting. Society is merely an aggregate of individuals who think and act independently, and cultural change is random and haphazard, punctuated by sudden changes in unpredictable directions. Integrity consists in adhering to one’s own value system regardless of others’ opinions.

S-type. S-type thinking believes that individual differences make cooperation possible, while sameness breeds competition and war. Heterogeneous elements interact to maintain a pattern (homeostatis), and interaction is considered mutually beneficial. Perception is simultaneous, not sequential: as in binocular vision, the differences between two images enable the brain to perceive depth. Membership in groups is mutually advantageous, providing balance and stability (positive-sum). Values are interrelated and the meaning of each depends on situations, contexts, and cultures. The unknown or unfamiliar is seen as uncomfortable, disturbing, or dangerous. Society consists of heterogeneous individuals who interact to mutual advantage, maintaining harmonious patterns, and attaining stable internal configuration. Mutual balance and stability is sought. Personal integrity consists of behavior and opinion which reflect the social situation and context.

G-type. G-type thinking is similar to S-type, except in the belief that interaction generates new patterns, which continue to grow and develop (morphogenesis). Groups are non-hierarchical and heterogeneous, interacting for mutual benefit and generating new diversity, new harmony, and new relations (positive-sum). Symbiosis exists thanks

to diversity – generate new diversity and new patterns of symbiosis emerge. Interest is in flexibility and innovation, and the unknown or unfamiliar is perceived as something interesting. Values are interrelated, not classifiable or rank-orderable, and can interact and generate new values and new meanings; contexts and situations change, therefore meanings change and new meanings arise. Cultures and societies are never in a state of unchanging equilibrium. Multiple meanings and ambiguity are basic to further development and change; one perceives potentials and alternatives. Reasoning is simultaneous and spiral. Integrity consists of inventing new patterns of interactive behavior which generate mutual benefit in new contexts (1996, p. 33; 1994a; 1985, pp. 125-149; 1978a; 1974b; 1974a).

Table 1, which presents Characteristics of Maruyama's Four Main Epistemological Types, can be read horizontally across the rows for a comparative delineation of the types and vertically down the columns for a more graphic depiction. The underlined terms are described below the table, which can be found on the following page.

Table 1. Characteristics of Maruyama's Four Main Epistemological Types			
H-type	I-type	S-type	G-type
<u>homogenistic</u> hierarchical classificational <u>universalist</u> <u>sequential</u> competitive zero-sum opposition extrapolation	<u>heterogenistic</u> independent random individualist no order unique negative-sum isolation caprice	<u>heterogenistic</u> interactive <u>homeostatic</u> <u>mutualist</u> <u>simultaneous</u> cooperative positive-sum <u>absorption</u> stability	<u>heterogenistic</u> interactive <u>morphogenetic</u> <u>mutualizing</u> <u>simultaneous</u> cogenerative positive-sum <u>unfolding</u> evolution

Homogenistic means having or believing in only one logic; heterogenistic means several logics occur. Homeostatic indicates the maintenance of a certain pattern among heterogeneous elements, whereas morphogenetic interactions create new and developing patterns among increasingly heterogeneous elements. Universalist conveys belief in universal or general principles that apply to all; mutualist refers to stable group relationships, while mutualizing is creating mutually beneficial new patterns. Sequential denotes step by step linear processing; simultaneous means multiple processes occur simultaneously and can interact. Absorption is the result of deviation-counteracting forces such as socialization or institutionalization, and unfolding means emergent or evolving new forms and patterns (1979a, p. 14). Maruyama comments that these descriptions are not meant to be exhaustive or mutually exclusive. "Any attempt to separate epistemologies into non-overlapping categories is itself a victim of an

epistemology that assumes that the universe consists of non-overlapping categories. Such an attempt excludes non-classificational epistemologies” (1978b, p. 27).

A number of related points can now be considered, which will inform the question of congruence between mindscapes and culture. First, there is remarkable consistency throughout aspects of individual mindscape types. H-type thinking, for example, tends to apply its hierarchical, classificational worldview to all it encounters, things as well as people, which is consistent with universalism, competitiveness, and a zero-sum outlook, in which one’s gain is another’s loss. All categories, regardless of content, are perceived as closed systems. By the same token, G-type thinking tends to operate interactively, holistically, and innovatively, seeing mutually beneficial positive sum outcomes and continually evolving patterns in everything. It experiences the entire universe as a connected whole and does not conceive systems as isolated and discrete (1978b).

Second, what is self-evident in one type may be incomprehensible in another. And if the new and unfamiliar, to take just one area of variation, can be perceived as dangerous in one mindscape, irrelevant in another, interesting in a third, and indispensable in a fourth, there is abundant ground for incomprehension. Third, as a result of such incomprehension, persons of different mindscape types may consider one another illogical, immoral, and even, occasionally, insane. However, as a fourth point, puzzling behavior and thoughts may make sense in the framework of another mindscape, when understood as a different epistemology with a different set of fundamental values, beliefs, and assumptions. And finally, as discussed in Chapter 2, the inability to understand or

communicate with other types can be treated not as a moral or intellectual defect but as an “epistemological limitation” (Maruyama 2003a, p. 563).

Mindscapes and Cultural Differences

Furthermore, individual mindscape types have been found to be transcultural and transhistorical: “Any type that is found in a culture, even if the culture is ethnically pure, can be found in other cultures which have a sufficiently large population; and any type that is found in a historical period can be found in other historical periods” (Maruyama 2003a, p. 552). In any given society or culture or even organization there are individuals of all mindscape types, but it often happens that for historical or political reasons one of them may become powerful and official; the type in power may also change from period to period. One of the key questions to emerge from mindscape research is “if individual epistemological types are transcultural, then why are there cultural differences?” (Maruyama 1999, p. 56). It was found that cultural differences consist in the way some type becomes dominant and suppresses, influences, ignores, utilizes, or exploits other types, with “dominant” in this context meaning “powerful,” but not necessarily “majority.” Even though all individual types are present, they can be modified by cultural, social, corporate, and even intra-firm departmental influences in such a way that in each country, organization, or department, a predominant mainstream type may be established, making international, interfirm, interdepartmental, or interpersonal interactions difficult. Different cultures and professions exercise different pressures for or against some types for a variety of reasons, through the processes of acculturation,

socialization, ostracism, marginalization, indoctrination, etc. At the same time, individuals can also exercise “self-selection, internalization, sublimation, attrition, alienation, repression, identification, etc.” (Maruyama 2003b, p. 625; 2001, p. 65; 1999, p. 56; 1998; 1992, p. 2).

Even though in many cultures the heterogeneity of individual mindscape types is utilized, in those periods or cultures in which people with non-powerful mindscape types are ignored or suppressed and not given equal opportunities in education, employment, or other activities, a number of possible strategies can be employed. 1) Channeling: non-dominant types are channeled (or self-segregate) to various professional or occupational niches. 2) Masking: individuals with non-dominant types may disguise their types and practice them in a camouflaged form. 3) Subsedure: some persons become capable of functioning in two patterns, their own in a private life and in the mainstream pattern in public or official life. People in subsedure are “biscapal,” about which there is more in the next section. 4) Suppression: non-dominant types may become unconscious or latent in individuals, either by external pressures or by internal processes, but they can still be reactivated under favorable conditions. 5) Loss: if the suppression goes a step further, the individual may become incapable of reactivating his/her own pattern. 6) Withdrawal or alienation. 7) Rebellion. 8) Emigration. (Maruyama 2003a, pp. 556-557; 1994a, pp. 39-40). In summary,

it is posited here that in any large culture there are all types of individual mind patterns, but that cultural differences exist in the distribution of various individual types as well as in the social dynamics of the interaction among different types: some types are officially accepted or encouraged while others are relegated to the

social periphery, ignored, institutionally suppressed, individually repressed, latent or nonverbalized (Maruyama 1985, p. 126).

Nevertheless, all logical types do exist in each culture, even though some of them may be hidden, camouflaged or repressed. Maruyama cites instances of several dominant types in various societies and periods.

For example, H-type dominates in Sweden, while a mixture of S-type and I-type is dominant in Denmark. In Asia, Koreans show strong H-type characteristics, while Indonesia is strongly of S-type. In Japan, SH type is dominant, while in the United States, HI type is dominant. In this sense, Danes are closer to Indonesians than to Swedes, and Koreans are closer to Germans than to Indonesians. The popular notion of East/West contrast does not hold. . . .

Archaeological research in Japan has showed that the Jomon culture, which began 11,000 years ago, had G-type characteristics, and that the S-type was dominant in the Yayoi culture which arose 2,300 years ago. The H-type Yamato culture reached Japan via Korea 1,500 years ago, and this logic eventually became the official dominant logic of the ruling class, even though farmers still use S-type logic and the merchant class which emerged during the seventeenth century practiced G-type logic. In pre-colonial African cultures, G-type logics were practiced. Oral traditions explicitly stated that heterogeneity made co-operation possible while homogeneity bred wars (1996, p. 3).

Many professions also appear to have a dominant type, regardless of country.

Accountants tend to be of H-type, and painters tend to be of I, S or G-type. Newtonian astronomy was of H-type. Nineteenth-century thermodynamics, based on independent movements of molecules, was of I-type. Early cybernetics in the 1940s was based on the S-type, and the cybernetics of the 1960s on a combination of types G and S. Current educational and vocational systems are based on H-type logics. (1996, pp. 2-3).

According to Maruyama, in fact,

in the USA, one can find monopolistic domination of an academic department or even an entire discipline by one theory or one methodology. . . . Equal opportunity for all epistemological types has not been institutionalized in academic appointments (1994b, p. 381).

In business and organizations, mindscape types also influence everyday operations, including such matters as the choice of organizational structures, strategic rationales, planning procedures, management philosophy, principles for dealing with subcontractors, suppliers, distributors and competitors, and attitudes toward cultural and individual heterogeneity among managers and workers, to name but a few (1985, p. 127).

Cross-Mindscape Communication

Since different professions, disciplines, and cultures may have different epistemologies or paradigms, communication that is cross-professional, cross-disciplinary, or cross-cultural may also be cross-paradigmatic (Maruyama 1974b, p. 273). Unfortunately, cross-paradigmatic processing is very difficult for persons who are “monopolarized,” or dependent on *one* right way, *one* authority, *one* truth, etc.

The difficulty is that it does not occur to them that there are other paradigms. They are quite logical in not seeing other paradigms, because if they have “the” truth, all they have to do is to interpret everything in terms of that truth. They are sincerely *trapped* in their own paradigm. They are sincerely monopolarized (Maruyama 1974b, p. 275).

For people who are strongly monopolarized, it is a traumatic experience to be confronted with other ways of thinking. If they realize that there are other ways of thinking, their “truth” is put under question and they may feel as if the whole universe is collapsing. One way in which they may counteract this traumatic realization is to reinforce their belief in the “truth” and defend it as hard as they can, often disguising it in the form of an intellectual argument (Maruyama 1974b, p. 276).

Many of the discrepancies in cross-mindscape communication and understanding are the result of people's projecting their own modes of thinking onto others. They may sincerely mean what they say and may honestly believe that they comprehend the situation perfectly, but by converting what is said and done into their own paradigms or by applying their paradigms where they cannot appropriately be applied, they can do more harm than good (Maruyama 1974b, p. 273). In particular, researchers who seek data from the point of view of their own theory, logic, or epistemology can force their epistemological structure on the data, filtering and distorting it without realizing that they are doing so. Maruyama gives an illustration of this problem:

For example, a sociologist who believes in a hierarchy theory of social organization goes to a non-hierarchical culture, constructs a "measure" or "scale" of leadership (such as the frequency with which one person talks with other persons), collects "data," and writes a monograph on the hierarchical structure of the culture. . . . The universalist is convinced that everybody has the same thought structure and therefore her/his thought structure is universal. This provides non-universalists proof that the universalist is limited in her/his ethnocentric (non-universal) thinking and therefore even the universalist is non-universal" (1979b, pp. 383-384).

These difficulties and the frustrations they cause run much deeper than differences in relative values or priorities, arising as they do from the most fundamental epistemological assumptions. (Maruyama 1978b, p. 24).

Mutual understanding among people with different mindscapes is often illusory. Individuals may believe that they understand others when in fact they are reducing the others' thinking to their own mindscape. If the reduction produces an internally consistent interpretation, the person is likely to be convinced that it is an accurate comprehension. "In fact, the statement 'I understand you perfectly' is often a symptom

of dimension reduction” (Maruyama 1985, p. 145). Another form of illusory “understanding” goes like this:

It is only too easy to mistake self-consistency for absolute proof. There is also the danger of converting a counter-argument into a proof of theory [called] “autodox.” . . . For example, V advocates that there is only one correct logic, and that this logic is universally valid. He converts all counter-arguments into a “proof” that they are wrong. This usually amounts to saying that whatever does not fit his definition of “logic” is not a logic. On the other hand W is a mathematical logician, and can produce many types of logic. W can argue that V’s autodox is predictable in W’s theory, and that V’s logic is a *special* type of logic which is intellectually limited, *not* a universal logic which V believes it to be” (Maruyama 1985, p. 147).

Clearly, the self-evident in one epistemology can seem worthless in another, even if it contains wisdom that may be applicable and useful in any culture; those whose epistemology cannot accommodate it may fail to see its value and consider it exotic, or as something belonging to somebody else. People may also be unaware that others lack the concepts they consider basic and so it does not occur to them to explain their thinking. The “sub-understander” may be incapable of seeing the extra dimension, just as it is impossible to explain music to congenitally deaf persons or to explain color to congenitally blind. This impossibility is not a moral or intellectual defect, but is, as we have seen, an epistemological limitation (Maruyama 2003a, p. 563).

Any of these forms of sub-understanding can be damaging and infuriating, regardless of the social level at which they are found (Maruyama 2003a, p. 560; 1979b, p. 385). Today’s complex problems in international economics, business management, urban planning, governmental, and nongovernmental programs require not only contextual understanding and action, but more importantly, a general intellectual

reorientation and reorganization to cope with them. “All important and valued behavior, be it classified as economic, political, ‘scientific,’ social, educational or whatever, is pervasively affected by the assumptions, beliefs, values, meanings, and sanctions” embodied in the worldviews of the groups performing the behavior (Kraft 1978, p. 409). Thus, the difficulties in cross-disciplinary, cross-professional, and cross-cultural interaction, as discussed earlier, lie in the use of different structures of reasoning (Maruyama, 1974a, p. 136). These problems, in Maruyama’s assessment, are “ultimately epistemological rather than material and quantitative” (1992, p. 1).

Mindscales as Culture

In his article “Logic, Cultures, and Individuals” Maruyama writes that “when we compare cultures, we do so in terms of the dominant type” (1996, p. 3). From there it is but a short step to equating dominant types with cultures, as Sitaram and Haapanen (1979) assert in *Handbook of Intercultural Communication*: “When members of different value systems interact, such communication becomes intercultural” (p. 159). Similarly, Kraft, as mentioned in Chapter 2, points out that “commitment to a worldview or basic value system appears to be a cultural universal” (1978, p. 407), and the influence of such fundamental concepts is of high importance in the process of interpersonal, intergroup, and intercultural communication. Cultural studies scholar Richard A. Peterson (1990) supports this usage, citing two distinct perspectives on the term culture: 1) culture as codes of conduct “embedded in or constitutive of social life,” and 2) culture in the symbolic products of group activity, “be they those of artists, religionists, scientists,

lawyers, taste makers, the folk, the mass media, and the like,” which encode and convey various forms of information (p. 498). Such symbolic elements also identify individuals and groups of similar kinds and mark their distinctions from others, everything including “classes and collectivities ranging in size from nations to scientific research laboratories” (p. 498). Both of these perspectives fit within the definition of mindscape.

Culture, then, is not merely a property of racial, ethnic, religious, or national groups, which are considered the usual cultural “containers.” Organizations, institutions, professions and occupations are also “containers for culture and sites of cultural difference,” according to Kevin Avruch (2004, p. 398). His article in *Harvard Negotiation Law Review* illustrates the point with a tragic tale, familiar to Texas readers:

Finally, as in the case of interest-based negotiation, deep cultural differences complicate the situation and potentially compromise the instrumental/expressive model. Jayne Docherty’s analysis of the failed negotiations between U.S. federal law enforcement and the Branch Davidian religious community in Waco, Texas, in 1993, which ended with the deployment of overwhelming force and much death and destruction, demonstrates the limitations of the standard instrumental/expressive distinction when the parties attempt to communicate across the deepest cultural divides of ontology and worldview (p. 404).

Avruch defines culture as:

the socially transmitted values, beliefs and symbols that are more or less shared by members of a social group. These constitute a framework through which members interpret and attribute meaning to both their own and others’ experience and behavior (p. 393).

This definition includes a number of assumptions. First, individuals belong to multiple groups and therefore carry multiple cultures. “The implication is that an encounter between two individuals is likely to be a *multicultural* encounter since each participant

can draw on more than one culture to make sense of the situation” (Avruch, in Docherty 2004, p. 716). Therefore, second, it is important to understand the institutions and mechanisms that transmit culture. Third, culture is almost never perfectly shared by all members of a community or group. “Individuals have the capacity to selectively adopt and adapt their multiple cultures, so you cannot assume that a person from culture X will do Y” (Avruch, in Docherty 2004, p. 716).

Jayne Docherty also believes that the most complete and sophisticated way of thinking about culture requires a greatly enriched definition (2004, p. 715), which she develops in the following passage.

A useful way to think about and get hold of a worldview (our own or someone else’s) is to think of people as answering the following five questions at an unconscious level as they move through their daily lives: What is real? How is the real organized? What is valuable about those things (or people or institutions or traditions, etc.) that are real? How do we know about what is real? How should I (or we) act (or not act)? People are not able to answer these questions directly, but their answers “leak out” in their language, in their actions, and in their institutions – in their *culture* [italics added for emphasis] (2004, pp. 718-719)

She uses the term “local cultures” to indicate “those complex systems of meanings created, shared, and transmitted (socially inherited) by individuals in particular social groups” (p. 713). We begin to see mindscapes as culture when we are forced to recognize that not everyone experiences and lives in the world the same way we do; they may not even live in the same “world” we do (p. 715).

“Local culture” is also employed by Gubrium and Holstein (1997) to identify those limited frameworks for organizing meaning whose domains are relatively bounded and distinct. They are made up of recognizable categories, familiar vocabularies,

particular interpretations, organizational mandates, personal and professional orientations, group perspectives, etc., and are found in small groups, formal organizations, and other relatively circumscribed social collectivities (p. 172). Further, Gubrium and Holstein specify that their use of the word “local” is intended “as an *experiential* designation rather than a purely geographic label” (p. 172). For example, multiple local cultures may simultaneously inhabit the same geographic area, or the relative prominence of local cultures may vary from time to time within the same setting (p. 172). Local culture may also have specific organizational moorings, reflecting the distinct perspectives, meanings, and priorities of formally organized settings, disciplines, or groupings. In fact, they argue, everyday life is more and more conducted within formally organized settings, and the articulation of meaning increasingly accords with organizationally promoted ways of making sense of experience (p. 173). And they too espouse a greatly expanded conceptualization of culture.

The idea of a general culture, as some anthropologists conceive of it for example, is too broad to represent diversely meaningful and applicable wholes. Culture writ large may indeed provide grounds for interpretation, but not in the imperious, dogmatic fashion that traditional formulations often imply. . . . Contingencies intersect to confront interpretive practitioners with a vast array of complex options and constraints. Race, gender, professional affiliation, physical location, biographical particulars, and myriad other factors come together at the nexus of interpretive domains and demands, to be sorted and used. Given these complexities, it is virtually impossible for interpretation to be dictated by any single source, in any totalized fashion (p. 173).

The concept of mindscape as culture could certainly be contained within these erudite parameters.

The new cultural orientation proposed by intercultural communication theorist Tulsi B. Saral (1979) is very different from the one to which people who have grown up in print-dominated linear culture are accustomed.

The culture to which most of us raised and educated in Western traditions subscribe is one that emphasizes individual rational thinking and linear reasoning for achieving dissociative, contrasting categorization conducted with an air of detachment and personally uninvolved objectivity – a culture that encourages competition and views accumulation of material goods as reward for achievement (pp. 78-79).

Saral suggests instead a way of viewing the world that is

neither dissociative nor a linear work of syllogistic reasoning, but one of unitive thinking, of intuitively appreciating the commonality of events and objects by subjectively experiencing, with the whole body, oneself as necessarily connected with an environment and the universe. The followers of this world view approach the environment not to control or manipulate it, but simply to flow with it (p. 79).

In such a phenomenological orientation, there is no place for either an elaborate designation of bipolar “cultural value clusters” or for comparing and contrasting objects and characteristics with other objects and characteristics. One simply “experiences” the continuous flow of events and objects and the unity of all, even of so-called opposites. The focus of study within such a framework is not on developing catalogues of the habit patterns of various cultures, but on facilitating a process of “in-culture self-knowledge,” which is a necessary prerequisite to any effective communication or interaction (p. 79). The Western-style cultural orientation described above has much in common with Maruyama’s H-type mindscape, whereas the proposed alternative is more like his G- or S-types. Saral suggests that we view intercultural communication as analogous to communication among various states of consciousness, both acknowledging “the

uniqueness of these distinctive dimensions,” and freeing ourselves from “our deep rooted addiction to sensing and coding reality in rigid and narrow patterns (p. 83).

A similar line of thought is behind Bernard Phillips’ (2001) proposal of an alternative to sociology’s present interpretation of the scientific method, or what he calls the “bureaucratic worldview,” which emphasizes social stratification, bureaucracy, and conformity (p. 2). “Within a bureaucratic worldview with its seesaw metaphor, power is a zero-sum game, a fixed pie of rewards, where the gain by some is at the expense of others” (p. 138). He suggests instead the possibilities offered by an “interactive worldview,” which conceives of the development of power based on influence more than on force, “where influence rests on legitimation through making visible shared values, which previously had remained largely invisible, and embodying those values” (p. 138). Such a conceptualization would open up possibilities for utilizing the range of human universals as a basis for effective policies in international relations (p. 138). First, though, it is necessary to build bridges across the “subcultures” or fields of sociology, “changing our tower of Babel into a discipline where we can all gain from learning to follow the scientific ideal of communicating with one another” (p. 1). He cites Alvin Gouldner’s (1970) call for a reflexive sociology as an important step in moving toward the kind of interactive, intercultural communication which will achieve those aims (p. 163). It appears that an enriched conceptualization of culture is developing of necessity and by consensus.

Several scholars have written about research traditions as cultures, further expanding the basis for appreciating the cultural in the epistemological. Cognitive

researchers Herrmann and Raybeck (1997) identify differences between basic and applied research “that demonstrate that these research fields function as two separate cultures” (p. 28). They also contend that cultural forces have contributed to this situation, because both approaches subscribe to different beliefs and values.

Indeed, in many cases, two populations can be seen to define themselves in contrast to each other, as in the case of the Northern Irish versus the English or, for that matter, psychoanalysts versus humanists (p. 28).

Cultures are often distinguished from one another on the basis of differing languages, patterns of behavior, and belief structures, all of which tend to reflect and reinforce their own assumptions and conventions (p. 32). The same conditions hold, as we saw previously, for mindscapes.

Mahoney and Goertz (2006) too consider quantitative and qualitative research traditions as alternative cultures, given that

each has its own values, beliefs, and norms. Each is sometimes privately suspicious or skeptical of the other though usually more publicly polite. Communication across traditions tends to be difficult and marked by misunderstanding. When members of one tradition offer their insights to members of the other community, the advice is likely to be viewed (rightly or wrongly) as unhelpful and even belittling (pp. 227-228).

Scholars pursue different specific research goals, observing different norms about research practices (p. 228), and much misunderstanding between the two traditions seems to derive from different approaches to explanation, indeed different assumptions about what constitutes explanation and even what does or does not need explaining (pp. 231-243). Reichardt and Cook (1979) go so far as to call it a “fundamental clash” between methodological paradigms. “According to this view, each method-type is associated with

a separate and unique paradigmatic perspective and it is these two perspectives which are in conflict” (p. 9). Here again, the idea of perceptual/cognitive/cogitative/behavioral types as cultures is upheld.

Egon Guba’s *The Paradigm Dialog* (1990) extends this thinking to the research traditions of positivism, postpositivism, critical theory, and constructivism, paradigms which can be characterized by the way their proponents respond to three basic questions, the ontological, the epistemological, and the methodological.

The questions are these: 1) Ontological: What is the nature of the “knowable”? Or, what is the nature of “reality”? 2) *Epistemological*: What is the nature of the relationship between the knower (the inquirer) and the known (or knowable)? 3) *Methodological*: How should the inquirer go about finding out knowledge? (p. 18).

The answers that are given to these questions constitute basic belief systems or paradigms, “subject to all the errors and foibles that inevitably accompany human endeavors” (p. 19).

The basic belief system/paradigm of conventional positivist inquiry can be summarized as follows: reality exists “out there” and is driven by immutable natural laws, knowledge of which takes the form of time- and context-free generalizations; inquirers are expected and assumed to be noninteractive and value-free; questions and/or hypotheses are stated in advance and subjected to empirical tests (falsification) under carefully controlled conditions. Postpositivism is best characterized as a modified version of positivism (p. 20). Reality, driven by natural laws, exists but can never be fully apprehended or understood; objectivity remains the ideal, but it can only be approximated; inquiry is done in more natural settings, “using more qualitative methods,

depending more on grounded theory, and reintroducing discovery into the inquiry process” (pp. 20-23). Critical theory, or “ideologically oriented inquiry,” rejects the claim of value freedom and aims to eliminate false consciousness and to energize and facilitate transformation (p. 25). Both postpositivists and critical theorists feel that there can be an accommodation between their positions and, indeed, with conventional positivism. Constructivists, on the other hand, feel that the positivist/postpositivist paradigms are badly flawed and must be entirely replaced (p. 25). Their paradigm depicts knowledge as a human construction, “never certifiable as ultimately true but problematic and ever changing” (p. 26). Realities exist “in the form of multiple mental constructions, socially and experientially based, local and specific, dependent for their form and content on the persons who hold them”; findings are the creation of the process of interaction between researcher and researched; “individual constructions are elicited and refined hermeneutically, and compared and contrasted dialectically, with the aim of generating one (or a few) constructions on which there is substantial consensus” (p. 27).

Guba’s summary of the dialog like this:

As a constructivist I can confidently assert that *none* of these four is *the* paradigm of choice. Each is an alternative that deserves, on its merits . . . to be considered. The dialog is not to determine which paradigm is, finally, to win out. Rather, it is to take us to another level at which *all* of these paradigms will be replaced by yet another paradigm whose outlines we can see now but dimly if at all. That new paradigm will not be a closer approximation to truth; it will simply be more informed and sophisticated than those we are now entertaining (p. 27).

Maruyama argues vehemently for the same level of sophistication in understanding mindscape types.

Ontological and epistemological assumptions also concern qualitative communication researchers Lindlof and Taylor (2002).

Research methods form the practical technologies of larger systems of belief about the nature of reality (*ontology*) and about how that reality may be known (*epistemology*). Although these beliefs are often only implicit in specific projects, they form an important code by which communication researchers assert their work – and recognize the work of others – as the product of a particular tradition (p. 7).

This statement acknowledges both paradigmatic differences and the codes by which they can be recognized, important elements in mindscape theory as well. Lindlof and Taylor also include extensive lists of the implicit assumptions of positivist and interpretivist paradigms, but they then go on to refer explicitly to the “intercultural communication” between them (p. 23). Research focuses on “reciprocal and emergent relationships between culture and communication” (p. 23), emphasizing the social construction of cultural knowledge and identities, and reinforcing the congruity of mindscape and culture.

Lincoln and Cannella (2004) speak to the epistemology/culture question from their positions as critical theorists, referring to the dominance of any particular paradigm.

There are further ways to consider the shapes, forms, and impositions of methodological conservatism. One might consider the *disciplinary* functions of such discourse – that is, the ability to *discipline* (and punish) members of the social science research community who choose to exercise alternative methodological (e.g., qualitative), framework (e.g., critical theorist positions), or design (e.g., emergent, or pattern theory) choices for their studies. In disciplining contemporary “scientific culture,” conservatism assumes first and foremost a *monoculture* – a single discursive and methodological community that speaks the same language and more important, takes as its concerns the same issues from the same perspectives. To do otherwise in a strict disciplinary “regime of truth” is to endanger one’s professional standing, if not entire career. As the “regime of

truth” enlarges, it eventually forms a “web of power” in which all who wish to participate (in this instance, in social science research) are ensnared (p.8).

They argue that the construction and acceptance of this power can be unconsciously accepted as legitimate and even necessary, resulting in the exclusion of persons of non-dominant paradigms (pp. 9-12).

Scholars who accept the content are cautioned about colluding in their own oppression and are reminded that quality research and scholarship is always free to question in any direction and to generate unthought-of possibilities and perspectives (p. 12).

In much the same way, Maruyama describes the suppression and loss of non-dominant mindscape types and advocates for the broad utilization of all mindscape potentials.

For Denzin and Lincoln (2005), the researcher is “bound within a net of epistemological and ontological premises which – regardless of ultimate truth or falsity – become partially self-validating” (p. 22). The net that contains the researcher’s epistemological, ontological, and methodological premises may be considered a paradigm, an interpretive framework, or a basic set of beliefs that guide action. All research is interpretive, as it is guided by the researcher’s set of beliefs and feelings about the world and how it should be understood and studied.

The gendered, multiculturally situated researcher approaches the world with a set of ideas, a framework (theory, ontology) that specifies a set of questions (epistemology) that he or she then examines in specific ways (methodology, analysis). . . . Every researcher speaks from within a distinct interpretive community that configures, in its special way, the multicultural, gendered components of the research act (p. 21).

This community has its own historical research traditions, which constitute a particular perspective and which convey particular views of the “Other” who is studied (p. 21).

These are the same mechanisms which are at work in producing cultural distinctions.

Perhaps the most explicit connection of mindscape and culture is Robert K.

Merton’s (1972) allusion to the “balkanization of social science, with separate baronies kept exclusively in the hands of Insiders bearing their credentials in the shape of one or another ascribed status” (p. 13).

As the society becomes polarized, so do the contending claims to truth. At the extreme, an active and reciprocal distrust between groups finds expression in intellectual perspectives that are no longer located within the same universe of discourse. The more deep-seated the mutual distrust, the more does the argument of the other appear so palpably implausible or absurd that one no longer inquires into its substance or logical structure to assess its truth claims (p. 9).

This description conforms to Maruyama’s idea of epistemological limitations, with the suspicion, separatism, and ethnocentrism that ensue (see Merton 1972, p. 17). Merton’s reminder that individuals have multiple “variously interrelated statuses” which affect their behavior as well as their perspectives (1972, p. 22) also parallels Maruyama’s analysis of the various coping and adaptive strategies pursued by people with non-dominant mindscape types.

Obviously, there are many ways of saying the same thing about the difficulties and potentialities inherent in the recognition of epistemological differences. While the comparisons just presented may lack precision and present some problems in other respects, they are nevertheless helpful as illustrations of elusive abstractions. To borrow an idea from phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty, “the [written] word is pregnant

with meaning,” yet it never quite contains the inner thought. Every attempt to “close our hand on the thought [leaves] only a bit of verbal material in our fingers” (1974, p. 86). Or to put it another way, “communicative action is a limited means of conveying ideas, attitudes, and impressions from one self to another” (Churchill 2005, p. 22). Translation between “internal languages” is imprecise and misses meanings. A demonstration of this can be found in the ways in which the title to Marcel Proust’s (1981 [1913-1927]) great series of novels is variously translated. “One version gives it the romantic title *Remembrance of Things Past*. Another offers the more practical title *In Search of Lost Time*. Both may be correct; it depends on how you read them” (Churchill 2005, p. 11).

In conclusion, this section looked at different structures of reasoning and developed the idea of mindscapes. The effects of mindspace differences at every societal level were discussed, as well as communication difficulties among them. An enriched understanding of culture as epistemology emerged, demonstrating the congruence of shared mindscapes and culture.

RESEARCH QUESTION 3

This question, “In what ways can the concept of mindscapes as cultures be integrated with the principles of intercultural communication?” explores the possibility of improved communication at all social levels when misunderstandings and conflict are handled as cases of cross-cultural contact. To that end, the principles of intercultural competence will be examined and applied to the idea of mindscapes as cultures.

Intercultural Competence

Broadly speaking, cross-cultural competence consists of the ability to “interact effectively and appropriately with people who have multilevel cultural identities” (Deardorff 2004, p. 14). Interestingly, there is fairly general agreement on the basic characteristics required to develop this ability, as summarized in Deardorff’s study on the prospective “internationalization” of U.S. undergraduate students.

When presented with various definitions of intercultural competence, administrators who participated in this study selected the following summarized definition as the one that is most applicable to their institutions’ internationalization strategies: Knowledge of others; knowledge of self; skills to discover and/or to interact; valuing others’ values, beliefs, and behaviors; and relativizing one’s self. Linguistic competence also plays a key role. . . . Intercultural competence also involves the development of one’s skills and attitudes in successfully interacting with persons of diverse backgrounds (2004, pp. 14-15).

Although consensus has not been reached on defining and measuring intercultural communication competence – nor, perhaps, should it be expected – the concept has been broadly investigated in different disciplines. One widely used definition, developed within Organization Studies in the 1970s, identifies seven behavioral elements that allow individuals to function effectively in intercultural settings: display of respect, interaction posture, orientation to knowledge, empathy, role behaviors, interaction management, and tolerance of ambiguity (Chen 1992, p. 24). “Display of respect” in this context means the ability to express respect and positive regard for another person and includes behavioral cues such as eye contact (as appropriate to the culture), body posture, voice tone and pitch, and general displays of interest in the interaction. “Interaction posture” involves the ability to respond to others in a descriptive, nonevaluating, and nonjudgmental way.

“Orientation to knowledge” refers to the ability to recognize the extent to which knowledge is individual in nature. “Empathy” is the ability to “put oneself in another’s shoes.” A highly empathetic individual usually responds accurately to “apparent and less apparent expressions of feeling and thought by others,” usually projects interest, and “provides verbal and nonverbal cues that he or she understands the state of affairs of others.” “Role behaviors” include the ability to be functionally flexible in different group situations. “Interaction management” means the ability to take turns in a discussion as well as initiating and terminating interaction based on a reasonably accurate assessment of the needs and desires of others. And finally, “tolerance of ambiguity” incorporates the ability to react to new and ambiguous situations with little visible discomfort (Chen 1992, pp. 24-25).

Lustig and Koester’s text *Intercultural Competence: Interpersonal Communication Across Cultures* (2003) makes use of this same seven-point definition, but with a few modifications. They split the element of “role behaviors” into a) “task role behavior” and b) “relational role behavior,” which are defined, respectively, as: a) behaviors that involve the initiation of ideas related to group problem-solving activities, and b) behaviors associated with interpersonal harmony and mediation (p. 72). They also amplify some definitions, explaining that “orientation to knowledge” includes the terms people use to explain themselves and the world around them, and “interaction management” implies skill in regulating conversations, in contrast to dominating a conversation or being nonresponsive to the needs of others in the interaction (pp. 72-74).

In addition to these capabilities, a number of other elements essential to communication competence have been specified by scholars from different disciplines. These include self-disclosure, self-consciousness, social relaxation, behavioral flexibility, interaction involvement, and the capacity to deal with social difficulties in the host culture (Chen 1992, p. 26). "Self-disclosure" here refers to the process of appropriately revealing personal information to one's partners who are not likely to know it from other sources. "Self-consciousness" is the ability to know or to monitor oneself; "social relaxation" involves low levels of communication anxiety; and "behavioral flexibility" includes the ability to behave appropriately in different situations. "Interaction involvement" means being attentive, responsive, and perceptive in interaction, and "capacity to deal with social difficulties caused by the host culture" implies psychological adaptability to situations of frustration, stress, alienation, and ambiguity (pp. 26-27). It is further pointed out that beyond communication skills, various personal attributes as well as psychological acclimation and cultural awareness are also indispensable for competence in different cultures. "In other words, in order to be competent in intercultural settings, individuals must possess the conceptual 'why' [as well as the] behavioral 'how' elements regarding the host culture" (p. 34).

Among negotiation and conflict resolution experts, sensitivity to and appreciation for cultural nuance "is less a matter of knowing specific, substantive things about another culture and more a matter of knowing some of the ways that culture may affect individuals' basic orientations toward such matters as time, power, 'face,' or risk" (Avruch 2004, p. 404). Other influential cultural orientations or values which must be

taken into account have been researched and arranged by Shalom Schwartz (1997, in Lustig and Koester 2003) into ten categories, as presented below.

Power:	social status and prestige, control or dominance over people and resources
Achievement:	personal success, through demonstrating competence according to social standards
Hedonism:	pleasure or sensuous gratification for oneself
Stimulation:	excitement, novelty, and challenge in life
Self-direction:	independence in thought and action – choosing, creating, and exploring
Universalism:	understanding, appreciation, tolerance, and protection for the welfare of all people and for nature
Security:	safety, harmony, and stability of society, of relationships, and of the self
Benevolence:	preservation and enhancement of the welfare of people with whom one is in frequent personal contact
Tradition:	respect, commitment, and acceptance of the customs and ideas that one's culture and religion impose on the self
Conformity:	restraint of actions, inclinations, and impulses likely to upset or harm others and violate social expectations or norms

(Lustig and Koester 2003, p. 89).

People's relative positions on Schwartz's ten orientations to: power, achievement, hedonism, stimulation, self-direction, universalism, security, benevolence, tradition, and conformity are now recognizable as outward manifestations of the assumptions of their underlying epistemologies, as comparison with the characteristics of Maruyama's four main types will show. The characteristics of Maruyama's four main epistemological types are presented again on the next page for comparison, along with definitions of the underlined terms.

**Table 2. A Reiteration of Table 1:
Characteristics of Maruyama's Four Main Epistemological Types**

H-type	I-type	S-type	G-type
<u>homogenistic</u> hierarchical classificational <u>universalist</u> <u>sequential</u> competitive zero-sum opposition extrapolation	<u>heterogenistic</u> independent random individualist no order unique negative-sum isolation caprice	<u>heterogenistic</u> interactive <u>homeostatic</u> <u>mutualist</u> <u>simultaneous</u> cooperative positive-sum <u>absorption</u> stability	<u>heterogenistic</u> interactive <u>morphogenetic</u> <u>mutualizing</u> <u>simultaneous</u> cogenerative positive-sum <u>unfolding</u> evolution

Homogenistic means having or believing in only one logic; heterogenistic means several logics occur. Homeostatic indicates the maintenance of a certain pattern among heterogeneous elements, whereas morphogenetic interactions create new and developing patterns among increasingly heterogeneous elements. Universalist is belief in universal or general principles that apply to all; mutualist refers to stable group relationships, while mutualizing is creating mutually beneficial new patterns. Sequential is step by step linear processing; simultaneous means multiple processes occur simultaneously and can interact. Absorption is the result of deviation-counteracting forces such as socialization or institutionalization, and unfolding means emergent or evolving new forms and patterns (Maruyama 1979a, p. 14).

Misinterpretations

An essential element of intercultural competence is understanding cultural value orientations. But it is equally necessary to avoid attributing puzzling or disturbing

behavior to individual personality or character, rather than to external factors of the environment or situation, a problem that social psychologists call the “fundamental attribution error” (Ross 1977, in Brislin et al. 1986, p. 320). This error is more likely to occur in cultures where values favoring individualism are stressed over those favoring collectivism. Other such frequently noted basic cultural contrasts are “egalitarianism and hierarchy (sometimes measured as something called ‘power distance’); low context and high context communication styles (sometimes simplified as ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’); and monochronic and polychronic orientations” toward time (Avruch 2004, p. 405). An example of these time orientations is provided by Gregorc (1984, 1982), who writes that “learners who viewed time as discrete units expected classes to start on time and end on time, whereas learners who viewed time as eternal were not concerned with deadlines or strict punctuality” (1984, p. 52).

The extent to which individuals achieve a “cultivated sensitivity for thinking about culture” with its inherent discrepancies, such as those just listed above, depends to a large degree on personal qualities, including:

an appreciation for conceptual complexity (i.e., thinking in terms of shades of gray, rather than black and white); a critical stance toward stereotyping others; an ability to establish new social relationships fairly easily; a capacity for empathy; and an interest in the other culture. Also essential are a critical awareness of one’s own ethnocentrism; a tolerance for difference plus a capacity to suspend judgment; a sense of humor (though humor is often notoriously culture-bound); and skills in collaborative problem solving (Avruch 2004, p. 406).

Training for intercultural competence should therefore emphasize the existence of both cultural differences at the surface level and cultural similarities at a deep level. If only one level is recognized there will be errors in mutual understanding. Denying the reality

of cultural differences, with such beliefs as “we are all the same,” “they are just like us,” etc., ignores the long history and substantial knowledge base of culture studies in cultural anthropology and other disciplines (Berry 2004, p. 180).

One of the major problems in studying international and intercultural communication is the unexamined belief that “existing systems, structures, theories, or choices in one (usually our own) culture will produce very similar communicative frameworks or systems in another culture,” on the assumption, that “after all, human beings, underneath it all, are really all the same” (Casmir 1978, p. 254). This perspective is embodied in the “universalist” aspect of Maruyama’s H-type mindscape, as was discussed under Research Question 2. The person with universalist thinking is convinced that everybody has the same thought structure he/she does and therefore believes that her/his thought structure is universal, resulting in unwitting distortions (Maruyama 1979b, p. 384). Instead of being comfortable with individuality or variety as a basis for interhuman communication, people may so desire to discover commonality or universality, that they have the effect of enforcing submission by one or more of the communicating parties rather than facilitating meaningful participation or mutuality and equality for all (Casmir 1978, p. 255).

Cultural (or mindscape) groups do vary in attributes, as is obvious from such things as language, technology, social structures, traditions, values, and norms, among many others. Glossing over these real differences is offensive to the “others” because it denies their cultural reality. But even more importantly, it undermines the necessity of coming to know others on their own terms. “Thus, convincing people that social and

cultural differences and similarities do exist is a basic first step in training for intercultural competence” (Berry 2004, p. 181). The culture-specific content of the processes of perception/cognition can interfere with making valid observations of one’s own and other cultures and individuals, and it is therefore a requirement of intercultural competence that those processes and their particular use be made explicit.

Distortions

Knowledge of the pervasiveness of illusory perception, stereotypical thinking, categorization, and attribution also helps to increase appreciation for the extent of one’s susceptibility to distorted thinking. As Schutz explains,

“rational action” on the common-sense level is always action within an unquestioned and undetermined frame of constructs of typicalities of the setting, the motives, the means and ends, the courses of action and personalities involved and taken for granted (Schutz 1973a, p. 18).

And they are not merely taken for granted by the actor but are also assumed to be taken for granted by everyone else as well, in the belief that:

If I were to change places with my fellow-man I would experience the same sector of the world in substantially the same perspective as he does, our particular biographical circumstances becoming for all practical purposes at hand irrelevant (Schutz 1973a, p. 19).

This presumed “reciprocity of perspectives” (p. 19) can lead to powerful expectations, projections, and other distortions. For example, in a study entitled “Interpersonal Expectations as the Building Blocks of Social Cognition,” people whose test results identified them as having a competitive personality were found to conceive of social life as involving “a dog-eat-dog world where it was necessary to be vigilant for any situations

where others would have the opportunity to take advantage of them” (Holmes 2002, p. 2). The competitive participants showed little variance in estimating what motivations others would have, believing that “they would be self-interested at best, exploitative at worst” (p. 2). In effect, they transformed the experimental situation so that any reasonable person would respond to their actions in a defensive or competitive way to protect their own appropriate interests. Interpersonal expectations were shown thereby to be a critical but underestimated aspect of much interaction (p. 2). One is reminded here of the often overlooked relevance of the Thomas Theorem, which states that “If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences” (Thomas and Thomas 1928, p. 572).

Projection is a perceptual distortion that adds “extra dimensions which do not exist in the phenomena to be interpreted. Usually the dimensions projected are traits that the decoder himself possesses” or that were believed to exist in other people in previous unrelated experiences (Maruyama 1961a, p. 59).

Among the traits most frequently projected are fear, suspiciousness, aggressiveness, connotativity of communication, i.e. communication by hint and insinuation, etc. A suspicious person believes that other persons are also suspicious. An aggressive person expects everyone else to be aggressive. A person who uses indirect insinuations reads non-existent meanings between the lines of another person’s statement (Maruyama 1961a, p. 60).

These unwitting assumptions and patterns of thinking, being so basic that their existence is not noticed, are more harmful than simple ignorance. “Wrong background information interferes with communication and contributes to misunderstandings,” in Maruyama’s findings (1963, p. 92). Discrepancies and attributions produce misunderstandings not only of content, but also of the intent and sincerity of other people (p. 107). People are

continuously attempting, within the framework of their own internal logic, to make sense of the behavior of others and to orient their behavior in terms of their interpretations. Thus, a person whose thought system is closed to new information cannot understand anything beyond that system by using only the elements and operations within it. "Only by accepting elements or operations from outside his system can he go beyond this closed boundary" (Maruyama 1961b, p. 119). On the other hand, people with open thought systems may generate new understandings by manipulating the elements and operations already existing within their thinking system (p. 119).

Insufficiency of Information Alone

A major goal, then, of cross-cultural training is to make people aware of these interpretation differences. However, evidence indicates that mere cognitive learning is not sufficient to bring about changes (Bochner 1982, p. 37). Simply providing general information about what is otherwise thought to be an "exotic society" does not constitute culture learning because such material does not generalize to everyday life situations and, if anything, only exacerbates the "us" and "them" differentiation through categorization and stereotyping (p. 37). As Brislin, Cushner, Cherrie, and Yong (1986) discuss in their article "The Bases of Cultural Differences," it often happens that

certain categories about groups of people are so central to an individual's thinking that they will be resistant to change and will be used again and again. Since [many] people behave according to the categories they have organized and not the individual factors, these categories often become stereotypes that do not allow for variation (p. 307).

If people fail to recognize that the problem is due to their lack of understanding about the distinctions within conceptual categories, there is nothing to break the cycle of assumption, behavior according to the assumption, and reinforcement of the assumption. On the other hand, people with broader and more sensitive perspectives can make many differentiations within a certain subject area; they are said to be “cognitively complex” rather than “cognitively simple” (Brislin et al. 1986, p. 308).

A cognitively simple person has only a single framework within which to assess the observed behavior of others. Thus when there is something he or she does not understand it is likely to be evaluated ethnocentrically (Davidson 1975, p. 80), as shown in the following example.

Blind belief in one’s own values forces one to look down at others who do not accept the same values. When a person believes in individuality and another in the individual’s responsibility, the chances are that the two cannot communicate very well. When a person strongly believes in his right to say what he wants to say and know what he wants to know, he might think the others who do not share the same belief are stupid (Sitaram and Haapanen 1979, p. 157).

The opposite of such ethnocentrism is cultural relativism, by which the values of others are understood within the framework of that culture rather than in comparison with one’s own (Davidson 1975, p. 80). “Instead of doing ‘comparative studies’ of others, we should study others as they are. Then, we need not, for instance, look at other ways of speaking as ‘accent’ and our way as standard speech” (Sitaram and Haapanen 1979, p. 158). A cognitively complex person has several frameworks for the perception of the same behavior. “He might, for example, suspend judgment and obtain more information before evaluating the behavior” (Davidson 1975, p. 80). Indeed, one of the most

significant results of cultural competence training is believed to be an increase in cognitive complexity, allowing for greater intercultural effectiveness (pp. 80-81).

Studies have also suggested a connection between culture learning and personal growth, meaning that persons who are comfortably at home in more than one culture lead intellectually and emotionally more satisfying lives than monocultural individuals (Bochner 1982, p. 36). Specifically,

many experiments show that children brought up in rich, complex and variegated environments subsequently perform better on a whole range of intellectual and cognitive tasks, than children brought up in dull and limited nursery surroundings. [What is more,] studies of bilingual children have shown that they perform significantly better than unilingual children on various cognitive measures (Bochner 1982, p. 36).

From an adaptive, social psychological point of view, the more skills people have, the greater will be the range of contingencies with which they can cope (p. 36). It follows, therefore, that multicultural people will be more effective than monocultural individuals in dealing with the number of cross-cultural encounters human beings will increasingly face in the future.

Conflict

Every intercultural encounter is a “complex improvisational experience,” according to negotiator and scholar Jayne Docherty (2004), whose work in conflict and negotiation was included in the previous section on Research Question 2. “It is critically important to remember that our own cultures are largely invisible to us; they are simply our ‘common sense’ understandings of the world” (p. 715). Even a shared language can actually cover profound differences in the participants’ sense of reality (p. 716). Hence,

conflict is, at essence, the construction of a special type of reality, containing the potential for revealing and illuminating divergent perspectives. Instead of focusing on what is “wrong” with other cultures, we can subject our own cultures to the same scrutiny we apply to the cultures of others, which of course requires becoming critically aware of our underlying assumptions (p. 717). “Our own worldviewing (and our own worldviews) are largely invisible to us unless we bump up against a worldview other than our own or we confront a new experience for which we do not have easy answers” (p. 718). Schutz gives a vivid description of the phenomenon in this excerpt:

And with respect to the paramount reality of everyday life we, within the natural attitude, are induced to [bestow upon it the accent of reality] because our practical experiences prove the unity and congruity of the world of working as valid and the hypothesis of its reality as irrefutable. Even more, this reality seems to us to be the natural one, and we are not ready to abandon our attitude toward it without having experienced a specific *shock* which compels us to break through the limits of this “finite” province of meaning and to shift the accent of reality to another one (Schutz 1973b, pp. 228-229).

Simmel’s (1971) depiction of “The Stranger” also fits this description.

He is fixed within a certain spatial circle – or within a group whose boundaries are analogous to spatial boundaries – but his position within it is fundamentally affected by the fact that he does not belong in it initially and that he brings qualities into it that are not, and cannot be, indigenous to it. . . . In the case of the stranger, the union of closeness and remoteness involved in every human relationship is patterned in a way that may be succinctly formulated as follows: the distance within the relation indicates that one who is close by is remote, but his strangeness indicates that one who is remote is near (p.143).

Ichheiser (1949) opened the door to the recognition of our own realities, pointing out that as long as our interpretative mechanisms operate to allow us to understand and anticipate other people’s behavior accurately, we remain, as a rule, entirely unaware of their presence.

Their functioning reveals itself only in their results, that is, in our preconceptions and conceptions about other people. The mechanisms themselves remain hidden. It requires the shock of having been deceived, or having committed a striking error of interpretation, to arouse reflection and pave the way to a possible discovery of these hidden mechanisms which are responsible for our illusions (Ichheiser 1949, p. 9).

But Ichheiser realizes that misattributions are not merely misperceptions and errors of inference. "They are socially shaped and socially functional interpretive processes and, therefore, encompass more than individual cognitive processes" (Rudmin, Trimpop, Kryl and Boski 1987, p. 174). Disagreements and conflicts persist exactly because of the different ways in which people see relevant social facts, believing that they themselves see things "as they are," while others are either unable or unwilling to do so (Ichheiser 1966, p. 560).

Cross-cultural research has revealed that there is actually a tendency to seek conflict rather than complementarity. "Seek conflict and you will find it. Seeking complementarity is conceptually more reasoned, more ambiguous, and consequently more difficult than finding conflict" (Raybeck 2005, p. 242). Not only that, but efforts at promoting complementarity are often viewed as threats to people's fundamental assumptions (p. 242).

Members of opposing camps tend not to acknowledge each other's positions. When they do, they employ . . . an adversarial or confrontational style of argumentation. In this form of academic exchange, assertions of the opposite school are targeted and criticized with the aim of demolishing them. The views of members of opposing academic tribes are shown to be false, incoherent or insignificant. Those engaged in this form of debate do not attempt to learn from other viewpoints, nor do they use the opportunity of academic exchange to reflect upon and question some of their own presuppositions (Baert 2005, p. 195).

Such a response often creates fragmentation and antagonism. In academic cultures this can show up as splits into methodological and theoretical schools, “which often denigrate each other as part of their competition for hegemony,” according to Randall Collins (1989, p. 135). Conflict is especially intense when there are political overtones, or when it is argued that only practical or politically supportive (or supported) knowledge is worthwhile (p. 135).

This factionalism is debilitating because we need multiple approaches in order to cross-validate our findings. For sociology to make progress, we need some spirit of generosity, instead of a spirit of factional antagonism. This is not the same as a policy of “go your own way,” tolerating each other but having nothing to do with one another intellectually. . . . As in other human activities, conflict is inherent within the organization of the intellectual world. This is not bad, since conflict is a main source of intellectual dynamics The personal aspect of that intellectual structure is generosity and good will, a positive feeling towards each other’s best contributions as we grope our way forward together (Collins 1989, p. 137).

Insiders and Outsiders

Obviously, cross-cultural contact can be either a threatening or an enhancing experience. It will be threatening “if the other person is regarded as a deindividuated outsider intruding on the group’s established territory, undermining the values and diluting the cultural identity of its members” (Bochner 1982, p. 37). Conversely, the contact can be enhancing if the other person is regarded as a different but interesting individual, whose presence does not constitute a territorial infringement but instead an opportunity to learn something about the world at large. Baert (2005), in fact, suggests a dialogue in which “people do not wish to score points by exploiting the weaknesses of

others [but instead] they try to listen to them by understanding them in the strongest way” so as to learn from them (p. 195).

For Maruyama, the “insider/outsider” question concerns cultural wisdom, of which he differentiates two types. The first is the wisdom which exists in specific cultures or specific disciplines. Since little or no explanation or theorization is needed for members, they may be unaware that others lack the concepts they themselves consider basic and which it does not occur to them to explain. The wisdom contained within each specific culture is often taken for granted within that culture because insiders consider it trivial, while outsiders may consider it irrelevant and inapplicable to themselves. Much wisdom is therefore reduced to trivialities if either insiders or outsiders try to explain it (1979b, p. 387). The other type of wisdom is gained through “transepistemological understanding.” It concerns the limits of applicability of theories, logics, epistemologies, and culture-specific wisdom. “It is a metawisdom, so to speak” (p. 387).

Robert K. Merton has more to say about this idea with his classic discussion of *Insiders and Outsiders* (1972). “According to the doctrine of the Insider, the Outsider, no matter how careful and talented, is excluded in principle from gaining access to the social and cultural truth” (p. 15). Not only do Outsiders not understand, they cannot even know what is most *worth* understanding (p. 17). But this doctrine ignores the fact that individuals occupy not a single status but rather a status set, “a complement of variously interrelated statuses which interact to affect both their behavior and perspectives” (p. 22). It also neglects the range of variability in perspective and behavior among members of the same group or status. Beyond that, it fails to allow for the special insights that are

available to Outsiders who have been systematically frustrated by the “Insider” social system. Their experience in trying to cope with problems of exclusion and suppression can serve to sensitize them to the hidden inner workings of the culture, which are either invisible to or taken for granted by Insiders (pp. 27-29). If, on the other hand, the perspectives of each group are taken seriously enough to be carefully examined rather than rejected out of hand, “there can develop trade offs between the distinctive strengths and weaknesses of Insider and Outsider perspectives that enlarge the chances for a sound and relevant understanding of social life” (p. 40).

The Role of Interpersonal Expectations

Far more usual, however, is the tendency for perspectives to become self-confirming as people shut themselves off from ideas and information at odds with their own conceptions. “They come to see in the other primarily what their hostile dispositions alert them to see and then promptly mistake the part for the whole” (Merton 1972, p. 40). These perspectives – often unexplored – lie deep within human subjectivity. Gregorc (1979) refers to them as “properties of the self, or soul,” that are used for self-actualization (p. 234). Social psychologist Daniel Gilbert (1998) believes that to a certain degree people see what they expect to see, regardless of how wrong or irrelevant their expectations (p. 122). He has categorized the mistakes people make when they attempt to understand others into four general phenomena: “idealism,” or seeing things as we expect them to be; “egotism,” seeing things as we want them to be; “circumstantialism,”

thinking about only the things we see without also considering unseen factors; and “realism,” thinking that we see things as they really are (p. 121).

Under the influence of “idealism,” what the other person actually did is perceived not only on the basis of local cues given by the person’s movements, but also according to what we think we know about the situation or what we expect. “To some extent people see what they expect to see, and because such expectations can be wrong or irrelevant, the assimilative tendency they produce can be a source of error” (p. 122). Within limits, people tend to see what they are prepared to see (p. 132).

“Egotism,” or seeing things as we want them to be, allows people to find dispositional inferences to be more informative, useful, and comforting than situational inferences, sometimes justifying inherently unjust social systems by “perpetrating the illusion that people’s outcomes are ultimately of their own making” (p. 131). People’s needs, wants, wishes, and desires have been found to be a potent and frequent source of errors in judgment (p. 124).

“Circumstantialism” refers to the failure to use information that is absent but obtainable, or considering “that which happens to be here” rather than “that which happens to be.” With this kind of mistake, people fail to recognize that what they see is not necessarily everything that is seeable (p. 126). It also includes “the failure to use information that the observer has, but for some reason, does not have in mind.” This tendency to rely exclusively or heavily on whatever information is easily available is one of the fundamental sources of error (p. 127). It is more difficult to overcome

circumstantialism than to surrender to it, especially when people are unable or unwilling to do what is difficult (p. 132).

Under the “realism” error, observers believe that they are having the experience of “seeing” rather than “inferring” what others are feeling or thinking, disregarding the psychological processes that translate realities into appearances, and acting instead “as though the two were one, just as they disregard the physiological processes that translate light into visual images” (pp. 133-134). Observers equate the actor’s perception of the situation with their own, failing to recognize that they themselves are interpreting the situation. “It is the failure to recognize the inherent mutability – and hence the fallibility – of one’s own perceptions and judgments” (p. 125). This failure to acknowledge that one’s beliefs and desires can color one’s perceptions of the world is not at all uncommon

Research suggests that misperceptions arise in the presence of all four of these phenomena, occurring when observers fail to notice or consider the actor’s situation (circumstantialism), misconstrue the actor’s situation or behavior (idealism and realism), or feel a special need to predict the actor’s behavior (egotism) (p. 134). In John Steinbeck’s poignant novel *East of Eden* (1952), one of the characters delivers a trenchant summary of the situation:

That’s why I’m talking to you. You are one of the rare people who can separate your observation from your preconception. You see what is, where most people see what they expect (Steinbeck, 1952, p. 163).

Open and Closed Systems

Thus, any approach to human communication will be strongly, perhaps entirely, influenced by the underlying philosophy its practitioners bring to it (Casmir 1978, p. 249). If they use a closed framework of “repetitive-mechanical, law-governed concepts,” they are likely to develop different insights than if using “an open, biological, metabolic, fluid, process-oriented approach.” This is a parallel to Maruyama’s open and closed thinking systems, referred to above; when two people, one having a closed and the other an open thinking system, try to start from their common ground of understanding, “the chances are that the person with the open system will go beyond the common ground and get into the other person’s thinking outside the common ground, while the person with the closed system will remain within his or her system” (Maruyama 1961b, p. 119).

Casmir presents another, more chillingly prophetic aspect of the closed-open dichotomy:

[It] is a significant problem that closed mechanical systems tend to *occupy or take over* territory, because by definition they do not interact with their environment or adapt to it in the same way as an open system, resulting in eventual imbalance or disintegration. In other words, mechanical systems tend not to fit in, they do not *discover* their places, rather they occupy any given space. On the other hand, open, metabolic systems make use of their survival-function or -ability to adapt, through import and export of factors in their environment. Thus they can more readily *fit-in*, become *ecological partners*, *discover their place*, with a minimum of disruptive or destructive conquest and confrontation (Casmir 1978, pp. 248-249).

Structures, institutions, organizations, and even cultures in the Western orientation have tended to be mechanical, closed, institutionally-oriented, and frequently control- or dominance-pyramid-shaped models. Casmir warns that the use of these models “based

on closed, mechanical systems may create significant problems for human survival because they can stifle the innate, creative, generative mechanism in human beings as open systems” (p. 249).

Cross-Cultural Translation

One prerequisite, then, for successful intercultural contact is sensitivity to the impact people have on each other. The most direct way to accomplish this, in the view of cross-cultural social psychologist Stephen Bochner (1982), is for each group to learn the other group’s culture, admittedly a difficult if impractical prescription, particularly when awareness of cultural discrepancy is lacking in the first place. At least there should be developed “a critical mass of bicultural persons who can mediate between the two groups” (p. 38). This is exactly what Maruyama recommends for cross-mindscape communication, except that he calls the bicultural mediators “biscapal translators,” as previously discussed in Chapter 2. “Understanding across different mindscape types is impossible or very limited without biscapal translators. Even within a culture, interpersonal communication is often difficult for this reason” (Maruyama 1994a, p. 41). And to worsen the situation, existing theories tend to assume that communication problems can be solved by giving more information, putting the emphasis on methods of information transmission.

When the existence of the heterogeneity of mindscape types was not known, it was believed that understanding would be achieved by communication. In the 1950s, “communication” was the keyword and the magic concept which would solve all types of social problems as well as psychological problems. Its corollary was that if you were not understood, it was because you did not communicate

enough, and therefore it was your own fault. This view of understanding still persists and prevails even today (Maruyama 2003a, p. 560).

Deetz (1982) finds this assumption in the neopositivist position that the problem of intersubjectivity is a problem of “other minds” and that the possibility of understanding is generated out of the held-in-common knowledge of the empirical world and the equivalence of the sensory equipment of all human beings (p. 6). In this reasoning,

intersubjectivity is, in effect, reduced to objectivity. If people could learn to avoid prejudices, get rid of distortions, and see through to the real world, there would be little problem of understanding. The principle goal in studying communication would be to remove the prejudices which prohibit people from seeing the world as it is. With this position language is seen as the major prejudice. . . . If people would all use operational definitions and be clearer and more precise, there would be fewer communication problems (p. 6).

But this approach is outdated in cross-cultural and cross-scopal communication, and is specific to particular mindscapes, as we have seen.

The existence of predominant mainstream types in groups, organizations, and professions can make those whose logical types are non-dominant feel uncomfortable, unhappy, or frustrated without being aware of the reason, so transmission of information is beside the point. Thus, international, interfirm, or even interdepartmental interactions are rendered unnecessarily difficult (Maruyama 1996, pp. 3-4; 1992, p. 2). The solution lies in realizing that epistemologically different mindscape types exist, learning to understand the other types, and utilizing individually different mindscape types that have been obscured by the mainstream type. “This last point is particularly important in discovering the scarce human resources that can serve as a bridge in multicultural, cross-

cultural, interfirm, and interdepartmental management and planning” (Maruyama 1992, p. 2). Hence, there is a need to “discover, identify, and mobilize biscapal persons” (1994a, p. 40). It is also important to note that translation between mindscape types, which Maruyama calls “transcapation,” is different from language translation and does not necessarily involve different languages. Transcapation may be needed, for example, between two mindscape types within the same country using the same language (p. 41).

The translation solution he advocates involves a two-part process of a) identifying the paradigm on which the thinking of the other party is built, and into which they convert your statements; and b) making them realize that your paradigm is different from theirs, then getting them to understand your paradigm (Maruyama 1974b, p. 275). In other words, cross-paradigmatic communication can be improved by making people realize that others are using paradigms which are different from their own, and by developing the ability to think in other paradigms (1974b, p. 276). Neither of these steps is by any means easy, but the process is especially difficult for people who are monopolized and dependent on *one* authority, one right, one truth, as discussed under Research Question 2. Their defense against the trauma of demonopolization can often be disguised in the form of an intellectual argument, but “painful as it may be to some persons, the process of demonopolization is the first step of the cross-paradigmatic process” (1974b, p. 276).

The next step consists of “trans-spection,” or “getting into the *head* (not shoes) of another person” (1974b, p. 276). One erases or compartmentalizes as much of his or her own paradigm as possible, and takes on and thinks in the paradigm of another person.

Instead of disagreeing or trying to convince, one tries to think exactly like the other person. This process takes a long time for those who have never done it before, but according to Maruyama, it becomes easier as one acquires experience and ability in practicing it (1974b, p. 276). The final stage is to let the other person trans-spect into your own paradigm, but this is often the most difficult part.

If you have never trans-spected into other paradigms, you would not even know how your paradigm is different from other paradigms. You are not aware of something which is very natural to you, like the air you breathe. This is why the third step should not begin until the second step is reasonably completed. (Maruyama 1974b, p. 276).

It may not even be possible to do the second and third steps completely. Those individuals who can, at the very least, appreciate and accommodate both “local” and “foreign” cultures are a valuable asset. And therefore, communication training should not require or encourage the acceptance of any one culture as being “right” or “universal” (Maruyama 1985, p. 126).

Unfortunately, many current instructional systems are based on H-type logics, and individuals of other logical types are disadvantaged or excluded, whether knowingly or unintentionally (Maruyama 1996, pp. 3-4), since people “display their cognitions through their communication behavior” (Gioia, Donnellon, and Sims 1989, p. 503).

It is not merely the words or sentences uttered that are important, but rather the production of the underlying meaning. . . . The process of language comprehension or interpretation is often more subtle than word choice or syntax, frequently requiring the listener or reader to peruse the immediate linguistic and situational context for cues as to the intended meaning of a communication (Gioia, et al. 1989, p. 506).

It is therefore essential to recognize that communication is necessarily dependent on shared linguistic and sociocultural knowledge. Meaning is thereby jointly produced, based on “cognitively held structures of expectations regarding the world of experience” (Gioia et al. 1989, pp. 506-507). Thus, any communication situation consists of parts of all participating cultures, each contributing to the generation of a new or different system (Casmir 1978, p. 250). However, as Gioia and co-authors note, there are relatively few requests for clarifications of the attributions made in conversation.

This may represent the phenomenon described by sociolinguists in which a participant in a conversation selects a particular interpretation strategy, then resolves all subsequent ambiguities through application of that strategy (i.e., by “fitting” information to his or her interpretive scheme). . . . The implications here are subtle, but significant [leading a person to] ignore relevant information that is inconsistent with an existing script. Or, alternatively, [filling] in unknown information with “default” information contained in the script . . . rather than using “objective” behavioral information [or paying attention] to the specifics of the individual case at hand (Gioia et al. 1989, pp. 520-522).

New Solutions

However, in recent years, new types of individual and social processes have emerged, and are proving to be healthier than the old principles of sociocultural adaptation and homogeneous social identity (Maruyama 2003b, p. 625). “Self heterogenization,” for example, is the designing of individually unique ego identity by combining cultural elements – including foreign elements – into a coherent composition which is more compatible with one’s own mindscape type. Another adaptive process, called “cultural milieu selection,” is voluntary geographic displacement to an environment compatible with one’s own mindscape type. Maruyama believes that

cultural milieu selection is migration of a new kind (p. 625). Processes like these are currently of great interest in the young field of cultural futuristics to those “who see the obsolescence of our traditional social paradigms and are concerned with generating new social paradigms” (Maruyama 1978b, p. 27).

Mannheim was clearly ahead of his time in 1936 when he held out a similar hope, citing the process in which ancient Athenian democracy “called forth the first great surge of skepticism in the history of Occidental thought” by the Sophists of the Greek Enlightenment.

They simply had the courage to express what every person who was really characteristic of the epoch felt, namely, that the previous unambiguity of norms and interpretations had been shattered, and that a satisfactory solution was to be found only in a thoroughgoing questioning and thinking through of the contradictions. This general uncertainty was by no means a symptom of a world doomed to general decay but it was rather the beginning of a wholesome process which marked a crisis leading to recovery (Mannheim 1936, p. 9).

In Casmir’s thinking, “it is impossible to find the answers we seek on the basis of any one, culturally-based, systems-theory” (1978, p. 253). Therefore, any “recovery” from a wholesome crisis of uncertainty depends on having optimum, positive international and intercultural interaction as a result of communication which has become “a *mutually* beneficial, not a subversive, destructive, or overpowering situation” (p. 251).

Sitaram and Haapanen (1979) have a more specific prescription, as the following excerpt explains.

Perhaps even cultural relativism is not the ultimate answer. Because each culture has something to offer to the world, it is necessary to locate that something in each culture. Effective communication is needed about what each culture can contribute to the rest of the world (p. 159).

Gioia and colleagues (1989) point out that culture is constructed through its members' cognitions and displayed in language used to communicate ideals, values, goals, and so forth. Therefore, "any attempt to initiate a change begins by changing the language used to communicate new values, goals, and models of action" (p. 523).

The overarching observation that applies to the comparison of the differing paradigmatic perspectives, however, is this: *When one adopts different "lenses" with which to view ostensibly the same organizational phenomena, one simply "sees" different things* [italics original] (Gioia et al. 1989, p. 524).

Or as Cronbach puts it, "There are more things in heaven and earth than are dreamt of in our hypotheses, and our observations should be open to them" (1975, p. 127).

Encountering new social settings can allow people to re-define and re-conceptualize, seeing "themselves, their own culture and their own presuppositions from a different perspective" (Baert 2005, p. 196).

Particularly in the social sciences, this encounter with difference can affect self-knowledge in three ways. First is the "conceptualizing effect," which may allow people to articulate and conceptualize their own culture. "Research into different forms of life allows individuals to verbalize their unconscious presuppositions and articulate the interpretative procedures by which they have hitherto made sense of their surroundings" (Baert 2005, p. 196). Second is the "emancipating effect," in that people may come to question some of their deep-seated beliefs about their own culture in general or particular aspects of it. "Whereas people generally tend to experience their taken-for-granted cultural surroundings as universal, the awareness that things are done differently may question this experience or undermine it altogether" (p. 197). Third is the "imaginative

component,” in that facing differences may allow people to envisage alternative futures. “People’s expectations and imaginative faculties tend to be shaped and constrained by the taken-for-granted world that they inhabit, and encountering a different setting may enable people to distance themselves from their own culture so as to explore new worlds” (p. 197). They may then be empowered to develop their imaginative abilities and become able to conceptualize what is not present (p. 197).

This is precisely what Agar (2004; 1999) proposes as a “theory of noticing” (1999, p. 687), based on “rich points,” by which he means the problems in translation that surface when the perspectives of researcher and group of interest make contact. “A rich point, then, is some expression of the source group, verbal or nonverbal or both, that the researcher cannot make sense of. A rich point signals a disjunction between perspectives” (p. 687). Agar suggests several sources for these moments of opportunity.

One kind of rich point, the classic moment of traditional anthropology, is simple *incomprehension*. Something occurs . . . that just does not make any sense. A second kind is *contradiction*. A researcher thought he or she understood the source perspective, but then something happens that is the opposite. A third is *departures from expectations*. One thinks that a concept is now understood, but then another example comes up that fits but not quite. A fourth kind of rich point occurs through *repetition*. Source people do or say something over and over again, and the researcher cannot figure out why. Another type involves *packaging information*. We know from linguistics that people package information into *old* and *new* when they communicate. Source folks might package things we know but in ways that jolt us because they package as new something that is old to us or something old that is new. A sixth type of rich point involves *arousal* on the part of the researcher – something that happens arouses anger or anxiety in a researcher that is not presents among the source group (p. 687).

All of these disjunctions are familiar – by feeling if not by name – to anyone who has tried to communicate with possessors of mindscapes different from their own.

Another proposal calls for the development of a “flexible mind” to counteract both “mental rigidity” and “fuzzy-mindedness” (Zerubavel 1995, pp. 1095-1099).

To the “rigid mind,” the world is basically made up of discrete, insular entities separated from one another by wide mental gulfs. Distinctively characterized by its unyielding commitment to the mutual exclusivity of those “islands of meaning” the rigid mind allows no “contact” whatsoever between them and eschews any effort to build “bridges” across those divides. As one would expect, it cherishes sharp, clear-cut distinctions between mental entities and leads a vigorous campaign against the vague, the in-between, and the ambiguous Mixtures, composites, and other mental mongrels, of course, inevitably threaten the cognitive tranquility of anyone committed to such a rigidly compartmentalized view of the world. (p. 1095).

This kind of inflexibility may be grounded in an overly defensive stance toward the world, resulting from a reluctance to acknowledge the rather arbitrary basis of conventional boundaries along with a deeply hidden yet uneasy “awareness that the wide divides we envision separating mental entities from one another are actually figments of our own minds” (p. 1097). Such thinking induces a “kind of intellectual tunnel vision” and inhibits creativity, given that “transgressing boundaries is a hallmark of being creative which almost by definition presupposes not accepting any rigid structure as a given” (pp. 1096-1097).

Yet a diametrically opposed, “fuzzy-minded” view is no better, since any notion of order inevitably presupposes some boundaries. Without at least some “mental horizons” that would help scholars channel their curiosity and organize their intellectual attention, “it would be absolutely impossible to establish any coherent scholarly agenda” (p. 1098). Between these two extremes lies Zerubavel’s proposed ideal.

Indeed it is quite possible to foster an intellectual environment that would allow for both order and creativity, structure and open-mindedness, focus and change.

In order to create such an environment, however, we must cognitively commit ourselves to an altogether different mindset that revolves around . . . “the flexible mind.” . . . Essentially rejecting the “either/or” logic of the rigid mind yet without resorting at the same time to the extreme fuzzy-minded opposite stance of abandoning any social, group basis of identification altogether, the flexible mind sculpts complex, intricate identities that are based on a “both/and” logic” (pp. 1099-1100).

This kind of cognitive orientation offers the intellectual advantages of a more open-minded and less provincial or tribal outlook, while at the same time providing “a much more honest reflection of the highly ambiguous as well as fluid manner in which the world is actually organized” (p. 1102).

The middle ground is also called for in a piece titled “Critical Thinking: What Is It Good For? (In Fact, What Is It?),” and published, appropriately, in *Skeptical Inquirer Magazine* (Gabennesch 2006). Citing Peter Berger’s classic statement, “It can be said that the first wisdom of sociology is this – things are not what they seem” (1963, p. 23), Gabennesch puts forth a slightly altered version as the first wisdom of critical thinking: things are not always entirely what they seem (2006, p. 2 online).

In short, since it is so easy to misperceive reality, a critical thinker is disinclined to take things at face value, suspicious of certainties, not easily swayed by conventional (or unconventional) wisdom, and distrustful of the facades and ideologies that serve as the ubiquitous cosmetics of social life. In other words, critical thinkers are necessarily skeptics (p. 3 online).

Developing a skeptic’s worldview, however, means that one’s foundational assumptions – as well as those of others – will be disturbed. “Toes will be stepped on, tempers could flare, mortified members of the audience may stagger from the room” (p. 4 online).

Requirements for full-fledged critical thinking are even more daunting:

- Being unwilling to subordinate one's thinking to orthodoxies that demand to be swallowed whole – at the risk of being charged with heresy.
- Refusing to dismiss possible merits in ideas that otherwise may be deeply repugnant – at the risk of appearing immoral.
- Being capable of saying “I don't know” – at the risk of appearing unintelligent.
- Being willing to judge the truth value of ideas sponsored by demographic and cultural groups to which one does not belong – at the risk of being accused of prejudice.
- Being willing to change one's mind – at the risk of appearing capricious.
- Being open to the arguments of adversaries – at the risk of appearing disloyal.
- Having an acute awareness of the limits and fallibility of one's knowledge – at the risk of seeming to suffer from that dreaded malady, low self-esteem (Gabennesch 2006, p. 3 online).

Subjecting ideas to such intellectual due process can require more integrity, humility, tolerance of uncertainty, and courage than most people find easy to summon. Yet, as Gabennesch argues, the societal benefits are great and responsibility for raising the level of multidimensional critical thinking in society should be borne by social scientists. “Social scientists, by virtue of their way of looking at the world and the habits of mind that they promote, are in the best position to educate others about the importance of questioning our assumptions and challenging what we think we know” (p. 4 online).

One other suggested solution to the difficulties of cross-cultural contact advocates intercultural training programs which incorporate goals including: increased self-awareness, reframed cognitions, management of emotional reactions and challenges, enhanced behavioral skills, and increased understanding of cultural differences and similarities resulting in improved other-awareness. Intercultural training is “an interactive facilitative process in transforming the mind-sets, affective habits, and behaviors of the learners so that they can communicate competently across cultures”

(Ting-Toomey 2004, p. 217). In her negotiation work, Ting-Toomey distinguishes between the habits of “mindless listening” and “mindful listening.” With mindless listening, conflicting parties tend to engage in selective hearing, monologue responses, and defensive postures. Mindful listening, on the other hand, “is a powerful face-validation skill” (p. 235). Ting-Toomey’s recommendations are summarized in Table 3, below. Entries can be read horizontally to provide contrasting descriptions of the two approaches or vertically as a graphic summary of each.

Table 3. Two Approaches to Intercultural Communication	
MINDFUL	UNTHINKING
Attentive listening Supportive posture Struggle <i>with</i> Ethnorelative lens Mindful reframing New scripts Mindful inquiry Sustained dialogue Vulnerability shared Shared power Common interests Creative options Win-win synergy	Selective hearing Defensive posture Struggle <i>against</i> Ethnocentric lens Judgmental attitude Habitual scripts Mindless face-threats Fight-or-flight spirals Emotional outbursts Coercive power Positional difference Fixed objectives Win-lose or lose-lose outcome
(Adapted from Ting-Toomey 2004, pp. 217-235.)	

In this method, disputants are taught to try to listen with focused attentiveness to the cultural and personal assumptions that are being expressed in the interaction.

We can also practice mindful listening by engaging in paraphrasing and perception-checking skills. Paraphrasing skills involve both verbally

summarizing the content meaning of the disputant's message in our own words and nonverbally echoing our interpretation of the emotional meaning of the disputant's message. The verbal summary, or restatement, should reflect our tentative understanding of the conflict party's content meaning. . . . We can also try to paraphrase the emotional meaning of the disputant's message by echoing our understanding of the affective tone that underlies the message (Ting-Toomey 2004, p. 235).

All of the foregoing suggestions assume an adequate level of awareness, courage, and good will, which as we have seen, is not often available, at least not without training.

Perhaps the most feasible solution is one inspired by a Carl Sandburg poem:

Elephants Are Different to Different People

Wilson and Pilcer and Snack stood before the zoo elephant.

Wilson said, "What is its name? Is it from Asia or Africa? Who feeds it? Is it a he or a she? How old is it? Do they have twins? How much does it weigh? If it dies, how much will another one cost? If it dies, what will they use the bones, the fat, and the hide for? What use is it besides to look at?"

Pilcer didn't have any questions; he was murmuring to himself, "It's a house by itself, walls and windows, the ears came from tall cornfields, by God; the architect of those legs was a workman, by God; he stands like a bridge out across deep water; the face is sad and the eyes are kind; I know elephants are good to babies."

Snack looked up and down and at last said to himself, "He's a tough son-of-a-gun outside and I'll bet he's got a strong heart, I'll bet he's strong as a copper-riveted boiler inside."

They didn't put up any arguments.

They didn't throw anything in each other's faces.

Three men saw the elephant three ways

And let it go at that.

They didn't spoil a sunny Sunday afternoon;

"Sunday comes only once a week," they told each other

(Sandburg 1969, in Strauss 1995, p. 8).

The men took a "live and let live" stance; three different perspectives resulted in three types of description of the same phenomenon. More often, however, researchers – and people in general – resemble the proverbial blind men "feeling different parts of the

elephant and not [even] recognizing someone else's elephant as being related to their own" (Strauss 1995, p. 14). Mannheim, however, believed that

ideologizing influences, while they could not be eradicated completely, could be mitigated by the systematic analysis of as many as possible of the varying socially grounded positions. In other words, the object of thought becomes progressively clearer with this accumulation of different perspectives on it (Berger and Luckmann 1966, p. 10).

So while Sandburg's three men did not argue or throw things at each other, they also missed a golden opportunity to move from individual isolation to intercultural connection and better access to the larger world of humanity.

In summary, then, this section examined intercultural competence and things that get in its way, including the misperceptions and attributions that arise from underlying basic assumptions, showing the applicability of the principles of intercultural communication to cross-mindscape communication. Sources of conflict were presented, along with possibilities for transcending and transforming conflict, thereby developing new solutions to communication problems.

CHAPTER V

SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS

Sociology is storytelling. . . . It resonates with suspense, mystery, irony, and paradox. It relates the tragedy of boundless aspirations coming up against human limits. In other words and above all, good sociology promotes self-recognition. The reader and listener see themselves in a tale well told. They “re-know” themselves, and in so doing come to possess consciously what they already were, but were not fully aware of (Aho 1998, p.2).

Having come to the end of this particular story, one of its aims will have been achieved if readers have not only seen themselves but also recognized someone else they might have wondered about, seeing him or her in a suddenly different light. It is, after all, the purpose of research to expand knowledge and generate new ways of thinking. In pursuit of that goal, then, this chapter will bring together central conclusions of the study, outlining their significance and implications, and closing with final thoughts on future directions for development and discovery.

SUMMARY

This project has taken the form of a metatheoretical exploration striving for internal coherence and suggestive of future research programs and means of substantiation. Its focus is on synthesizing theories of culture and communication and approaching problems differently to arrive at different solutions.

In response to Research Question 1, it was seen that culture has been conceptualized in a great variety of ways, ranging from “the best and most glorious

achievements of a people or civilization” (Alasuutari 1995, p.25) to a “quality” of groups and organizations (Avruch 2004, p.393). Attempts to define it have been rank-ordered, categorized, and dichotomized in terms of concrete or abstract, and generally filtered through the needs and perspectives of the originating discipline. More contemporary efforts, however, have expanded the conceptual envelope, giving due consideration to questions of meaning, power, multiple identities, and the social construction of reality.

Question 2 examined the concept of mindscapes, the “perceptual/cognitive/cogitative/behavioral types” named by Maruyama (2003a, p.549; 1980, p.591), and found common ground with the enhanced understanding of culture. Mindscapes may be partially genetically transmitted and/or partially learned; they produce both concrete and abstract manifestations of underlying assumptions; communication between different ones can be fraught with problems and result in “clashes”; and the particular wisdom of one is often lost to others in the absence of self-knowledge and reflexivity. Culture as epistemology and epistemology as culture are ideas whose time has come.

The third question investigated the applicability of principles of intercultural competence to cross-mindscapes interaction and communication, going beyond such staples as respect, knowledge, empathy, and tolerance of ambiguity to include cultural value orientations, expectations and attributions, and cross-cultural/cross-scapes “translation.” It was suggested that cognitive complexity, in place of a cognitively simple outlook, could alleviate the tendencies of ethnocentric evaluations and judgments, proposing that conflict at all social levels holds potential for illumination if treated mindfully.

SIGNIFICANCE

Theoretical Implications

An enriched definition of culture has been emerging in the work of contemporary social scientists, including Clifford Geertz (1973), Robert K. Merton (1972), Egon Guba (1990), Bernard Phillips (2001), and Jayne Docherty (2004), and particularly among those who are engaged in cultural studies and developing critical theories, like Pertti Alasuutari (1995), Kevin Avruch (2004), Patricia Hill Collins (1986), and feminist theorist Marcia Westcott (1979). As sensitivity to the subtleties of power and domination grows, and recognition of the pervasiveness of multiple realities dawns, the need for a broader conceptualization of culture is obvious. Theoretical work that includes mindscapes as culture may contribute useful insights while increasing sociological reflexivity. This dissertation develops elements which might profitably be incorporated, among them the epistemological-cultural connection, the assumptions underlying much interpersonal, intercultural, and international conflict, and the recognition of interculturalism in everyday life.

Theories of attribution and communication could also benefit by expanding to focus on the probable *roots* of what is attributed and communicated. Before delineating what factors of the situation or person may give rise to errors in interpretation, attention must be given to the cognitive/perceptual processes which underlie them, such tendencies as categorization, polarization, fear of or ignoring the unfamiliar, or the denial of differences in persons and cultures.

Finally, a new paradigm for research and the general understanding of human needs and potentials could emerge from the thoughtful examination of existing paradigms of research, theory, cognition, etc. Each deserves consideration of its particular merits, but all are limited and could be combined and/or replaced by another more informed and sophisticated paradigm than any we presently use. For example, positivism, post-positivism, constructivism, and critical theory all have appropriate and inappropriate applications, and none serves equally well in every situation. Identifying their inherent characteristic assumptions and values could illuminate the fundamental beliefs about the world which are associated with each paradigm, allowing for dialog of a much more conscious and enlightened nature about human differences and similarities.

Methodological Implications

The use of “thought experiments” (Maxwell 1996, p.45) or imaginative hypothesizing – asking “what if” questions – deserves much wider recognition as a valuable and valid method of study. Such intuitively-based research could move knowledge past the point of “proving the indubitable” (Geertz 1978, p.88) and into the realm of unveiling the unthought-of and the not-yet-recognized as reality. Studies investigating human behavior such as deviance, conformity, ethics, religious beliefs, political inclinations, etc. would be particularly suited for such a method, in which researchers would be encouraged to take advantage of their familiarity with their subject matter to pursue “hunches” or “gut feelings” about what might be going on.

In the same vein, literary works such as “biographies, autobiographies, memoirs, novels, plays, and movies” (Strauss 1995, p.14) can fruitfully be mined for much more than counts or patterns of recurring themes, words, or concepts. “Investigators examine words, sentences, paragraphs, pages, documents, ideas, meanings, paralinguistic features, and even what is missing from the text” (Ryan and Bernard 2003, p.290), using techniques of interpretive analysis for exploratory and confirmatory purposes.

Subjectivity and originality need not be denigrated; many things currently held as proven were once branded iconoclastic. Or as Howard Becker reminds, “it is not that scientists agree when the facts require them to, but rather that when they agree, what they agree on become the facts” (1993, p.224). The products of creative imagination can inspire fresh theoretical speculation and suggest appropriate supporting data. Even before the birth of science people were reading and writing great literature as social commentary or to try to make sense of the human condition. Such creative works might prove rich ground especially for researchers pursuing interests in such areas as ethnography, family violence and dysfunction, historical or political sociology, social psychology, or critical theory.

Practical Implications

“Convincing people that social and cultural differences and similarities do exist is a basic first step in training for intercultural competence” (Berry 2004, p.181).

Therefore, one of the practical applications of this study might be to raise awareness of the existence of multiple realities based on different logic structures, allowing people to envisage other ways of being.

Schools, starting with the very youngest children, could recognize that while linear, hierarchical thinking has its place, other types are functional in other ways that may be more conducive to optimal human development. Of course, teacher training would have to be similarly revised to incorporate means of allowing people to recognize and articulate their unconscious and taken-for-granted beliefs. None of this would happen quickly or efficiently, but that should not preclude making a start somewhere.

Professionals engaged in communication training, mediation, conflict resolution, legal practice, and interpersonal counseling would benefit greatly from a thorough grounding in the idea of mindscapes as culture. A more nuanced understanding of their clients' ways of thinking could lead to more satisfactory and lasting outcomes, as well as improved self-knowledge for all parties.

FURTHER RESEARCH

We stop when time, personal interest, and other resources run out. Then the baton passes to others to qualify, fill in the holes, and generally test a general theory's applicability to particular substantive areas (Strauss 1995, p.16).

So for those who would take up the baton and play with the possibilities presented herein, some suggestions follow.

According to Maruyama, some aspects of mindscape types are inborn while others are learned, but we do not yet know which is which (2003b, p.607; 1996; 1992, p.2; 1979a, p.14). While it would be helpful to develop some means of distinguishing, such a determination has yet to become possible. It might be more useful to develop a reliable indicator of which aspects are actually present, possibly along the lines of Janoff-

Bulman's (1989) assessment of people's "assumptive worlds" or Rubin and Peplau's (1973) use of the "Just World" scale to measure people's fundamental beliefs, or Boje's (2004) online mindscape surveys and evaluation tools. A corollary would be to find out whether certain characteristics of particular mindscapes are necessarily tied to other characteristics, for instance the H-type's hierarchical thinking and belief in one best way for all, or the I-type's indifference to the unfamiliar and adherence to a personal value system. Could these traits be found in different combinations? Are there traits not mentioned in Maruyama's coverage? The development of means of assessment and evaluation would go a long way toward substantiating the existence of mindscape differences and their accommodation in human interaction. If the implementation of such evaluative strategies illuminates the existence of additional traits or combinations, this can only broaden and enrich the substance of his theory and strengthen the foundation he has developed.

There is also a great need to mobilize "biscapal translators" (Maruyama 1994a, p.40). Research should be conducted to identify such persons and discover the origins of their abilities, particularly through organizational and educational research. Employee and student characteristics, attitudes, and aptitudes are already routinely assessed; adding a component to reveal biscapal abilities could prove extremely useful. Pierre Cossette's (1998) ingenious "Study of Language in Organizations" provides a symbolic interactionist model that could serve as a foundation. Studies could also ascertain how people with non-dominant types cope with their various environments, again through organizational or higher-education research, or ethnographic or interview-based studies

of people in non-traditional and unconventional settings or occupations. These findings could then lend themselves to various training and awareness-raising programs, with the aim of developing more biscalpal capability.

And as we saw earlier, social scientists, “are in the best position to educate others about the importance of questioning our assumptions and challenging what we think we know” (Gabennesch 2006, p.4 online). A final suggestion, therefore, might be to welcome and encourage social research that does more questioning and challenging than is currently supported either academically or financially. Projects that critique privileged epistemologies or dominant orders – in the style of Lincoln and Cannella’s assessment of “Methodological Conservatism and Governmental Regimes of Truth” (2004), for example, or Kurt Richardson’s analysis of “The Hegemony of the Physical Sciences: an Exploration in Complexity Thinking (2005), or Douglas Raybeck’s look at complementarities in cross-cultural research (2005), or even C. Wright Mills’ (1959; 1951) once shocking insistence on exposing the backsides of socially approved facades – all can provide valuable and salutary insights. The sociological imagination should settle for nothing less.

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