

RASSELAS: A STUDY OF VALUES

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MARTHA VIRGINIA RAWLINS, B.A., M.E.

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We hereby recommend that the thesis prepared under
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MASTER OF ARTS

Committee

Antry Nell Wiley
Chairman

Gladys Maddocks
Constance L. Beach

Accepted:

Frank Dyer
Dean, Graduate School

MAY 5 '58

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ACKNOWLEDGMENT

My thesis is part of my search to find some of the values -- the intangibles -- that every English teacher must lead her students to pursue. In literature, of course, values find enduring and moving expression, and it is in literary art, therefore, that I have sought the values which I now discuss. I am dealing with literature, the product of a creative process, and with instruction, a creative process involving student and teacher.

In my study of values as an aspect of literary history and criticism, I have chosen to analyze the ethical values of one author, Samuel Johnson, as he presents them in Rasselas, and in so doing I have emphasized those principles that have value for students in the twentieth century.

I wish to express my appreciation to Dr. Autrey Nell Wiley, who has given me inspiration and whose patient guidance and counsel have made this study possible, to Dr. Constance Beach and Dr. Gladys Maddoxs for their interest and encouragement, and to all teachers who have helped point the way to values.

June, 1957

Martha Virginia Rawlins

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CHAPTER I

AN APPROACH TO THE STUDY OF VALUES IN RASSELAS

To define the term value and to give a background for the following chapters of this thesis on Johnson's theory of values revealed in Rasselas it is necessary to consult dictionaries, including Johnson's, and to review significant philosophical and theological comments that formed English thought before and during Samuel Johnson's age. Definitions and discussions in philosophy and ethics tell us what was known and thought on our subject before and during the eighteenth century.

Recording definitions throughout the centuries, the New English Dictionary defines value as

amount of some commodity; medium of exchange; worth or worthiness (of persons) in respect of rank or personal qualities; worth or efficacy in combat, relative status of a thing, or the estimate in which it is held, according to its real or supposed worth, usefulness, or importance; in mathematics, a precise number or amount represented by a figure or quantity; in music, the length or duration of a tone; in chess and cards, the rank or importance; in painting, the importance of effect of tone of color.¹

Earliest of the examples are two quotations appearing in the fourteenth century. The first, in 1303, from R. Brunne's Handlung Synne, refers to a medium of exchange:

¹(Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1928), X, 29.

"But thou gyve hym ageyn, or the valeu. . . . Thou art falle than yn the vyce or coveytyse." The second, in 1330, from the Chronicle of Wace, refers to worth of persons in respect of rank of personal qualities: "Alle of valow, moste and leste, Suld com to London to his feste." We see that value, used as early as the fourteenth century, is a term fundamental to political economy. It has long had to do with the power of riches. It is related to natural resources, products, and the toil of mankind. We see also, that as early as 1330 value was understood in senses entirely different. Value was identified, for example, with the worth of human personality. It was identified with the ideal of chivalry, as illustrated by Spenser's words in the Faerie Queene: "Who his sword drew, and him with equal value counteruaged." Herein is a meaning the opposite of the economic. He who is of value possesses the power, not of buying and selling goods but of giving that which is neither, bought nor sold, namely himself.

Still other meanings of value appear. The theologian Wycliff, for example, said in 1380: "Our bileeve teaches us that God keepth things after her value, for if one thing be betere, God maketh it to be betere." The painter Sir Joshua Reynolds in 1778 wrote: "A certain quality of cold colors is necessary to give value and lustre to the warm colors".

Samuel Johnson, who wrote a dictionary himself, defined value as price, worth; high rate; price equal to worth of a thing bought. As an example of the latter meaning he used a quotation from Law: "Learn to live for your own sake, and the service of God; and let nothing in the world be of any value to you, but that which you can turn into a service to God, and a means of your future happiness."¹

The various attempts to specify the meaning of value which I have cited lead to a generalization. Value occurs in political economy, morality, religion, and art. It is confined to no one sphere. As a matter of fact, it is in everything. A cow or a color has value; a person or an action has value. But such a generalization reminds us that an ethical meaning is vaguely latent in early uses of the word.

According to the Britannica, however, the philosophical theory of values was not discovered until the nineteenth century, and only in the last decades of the twentieth century has it been universally recognized. As one of the great philosophical topics, the Britannica further defines values not as subjective incidents, more or less gratuitously super-added to fact," but as qualities

¹Dictionary of the English Language (London: Tenth Edition, 1810), II.

inherent in the structure of reality. The general proposition to which almost all theories of value would subscribe is that reality in its fullness contains and exhibits values.¹ We may infer that ultimate values are objective and are esteemed for their intrinsic worth. They are concerned with questions in aesthetics, religion, and ethics. It is with ethical values that the book Rasselas deals; therefore my study of this work involves questions about right and wrong, about duty, conscience, and moral laws. Ethics, as the science of conduct, the problem of the Good Life, is closely related to the theory of values because the question of objective or subjective values arises: Do ultimate values exist beyond the sphere of human action? Do we desire things because they are valuable, or are they valuable because we desire them?

Men of the past did not have in their usage the philosophical term value as it is now understood, but we may see that they had the idea that it represents and that they were aware of the problem of value. Thinkers who engaged in the study of the higher values of life inquired about the goodness of things and particularly about a certain class of things, namely human actions or morality. Evidences of this concern for the higher values of life can

¹(Edited 1955) XXII, 961-963.

be traced from the Greeks through the eighteenth century.

The Greeks spoke of value in terms of goodness, beauty, and truth. Plato, for example, "believed that man's highest good was a harmoniously developed personality, a condition in which every faculty functioned in a perfect way without infringing upon any other faculty."¹ His was the Greek principle of the 'Golden Mean.' A good man was one in whom appetite, reason, and courage worked in harmony, no one of them being in excess. According to Aristotle "well-being was a functional conception."² To him "man's highest activity was intellectual."³ Man was a thinker, and the exercise of thought was what Aristotle ranked high. God to him was "essentially a Thinker, the thought of thought -- pure thought."⁴ According to Patrick, "rational activity was Aristotle's notion of the highest good, expressed in scientific research, in philosophical thought, in quest for truth."⁵

Because of this belief in the rational activity in man, classical thought apprehended something of the

¹George White Patrick, Introduction to Philosophy (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1935), p. 435.

²Ibid.

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Ibid.

human self's height of spirit. The ancients conceived the rational faculty as a part of the mind of God. They believed man was born equipped with certain fundamental ideas. It was through this faculty of reason, according to Plato and Socrates, that man could be taught virtue; to them virtue was knowledge. They conceived of knowledge as eternal truths which existed beyond the world perceived by our senses. These truths were grasped through the intellect, and, therefore, objectivity of value was the key to all Platonic and Aristotelian thinking on the Good Life.

Subjectivity of value was the key to another theory, the ancient view of the good known as hedonism. Of it Patrick says, "Hedonism, in its simplest form, was the doctrine that pleasure is the highest good."¹ The Greek philosopher, Aristippus, first to propose this view, "had reference to the pleasure of the individual."² He was interested in physical or bodily pleasures, which he held in the highest regard. His theory was refined by Epicurus, who while "still making pleasure the highest good emphasized mental rather than physical pleasures and thought that in the end the greatest pleasure could be gained by freedom

¹Ibid.

²Ibid.

from fear and anxiety, and by studious avoidance of any cause of pain or worry."¹

The conception of the Good Life held during the Middle Ages and the Renaissance and from the Renaissance to the Age of Enlightenment was for rich and poor alike obedience to the laws of God. Both feudal lord and the peasant-serf were concerned with the salvation of their souls and the attainment of the Good Life in eternity. Theological law covered every phase of life. All men were enclosed within the same carefully defined circle of values laid down by the Church. By the beginning of the eighteenth century, however, the Church had lost much of its prestige.

The working unity of traditional Christianity was broken by the new science of the seventeenth century. Newton in the seventeenth century reduced the universe from chaos to order through his mathematical formulation of the relation of the planets and the laws of gravity to all natural phenomena. Locke, adopting the methods of clear simple reasoning and making them an extension of common sense, showed men how Newton's successes could be applied to the study of human affairs. Together, Newton and Locke set up Nature and Reason, which were to the

¹Ibid., p. 429.

eighteenth century what grace and salvation were to traditional Christianity.

Although the old system of theology had disappeared, the problem of evil still remained and was of vital importance. It pointed a question: Could morality survive with the removal of traditional theological sanctions? In the eighteenth century many answers were suggested, for men were not quite agreed upon how Reason was to solve the problem of morals. For the most part, however, the theories regarding morality may be grouped under three general classifications: the intellectual, the deistic, and the utilitarian.

The Intellectual

In English thought of the early eighteenth century the classical view of Plato and Aristotle was reflected in the work of such writers as Price and Samuel Clarke. Both advocated a morality based on theory instead of experience or experiment. Their principles, based on a priori philosophy, endeavored to solve the problem of morality through intellect alone. In other words, virtue was the fruit of purely intellectual discipline.

Price attempted to make morals a science wherein man through his intellectual faculties could gain an accurate knowledge of human behavior. He identified God

with nature; God was the first cause of all things. He assumed that the moral as well as the material universe was absolutely dependent upon God's laws. His theory of value was objective in that it based morality on the obligation to God. Actions sprang not from desires but from perception of truth. To Price the passions or emotions were subordinate to the intellect; they were actually unnecessary "in a higher state of existence."¹ Occasions for emotions arose entirely from our deficiencies and weaknesses. The intellect not only laid down moral laws but also enforced obedience without the assistance of the emotions.

Clarke advanced a theory that had much in common with that of Price. With him morality was much like the science of mathematics. He believed that morality was not subjective, was not dependent upon the character of the race with all of its imperfections. His ambition was to place morality in the sphere of absolute truth where "passions and the lessons of experience should be excluded."²

The abstract approach to the problem of morality, as illustrated in the thinking of Price and Clarke, never

¹ Leslie Stephen, History of English Thought (London: John Murray, 1876), p. 13.

² Ibid., p. 11.

got beyond the primary axioms, because it assumed "that men are fortified, consoled, and sustained by reason; it never became popular."¹ Englishmen of this age were not inclined to consider the ideal man as a mere calculating machine without passions and affections. Their sturdy common sense told them man was not all mind.

The Deistic

By the middle of the eighteenth century men began to hold that the nature of man lay not in his "reason" but in his "senses." Certain groups of thinkers recognized the impossibility of basing a moral code upon the intellect alone. These groups sought to explain morality in a particular moral sense as an innate source of knowledge of right and wrong. They spoke of conscience and duty as the highest good. The human mind knew intuitively what was right or wrong, and duty had to be done for duty's sake. There was in man a special "sense" or faculty or capacity by which moral distinctions were immediately known. There was an inner appreciation of the moral quality of actions, a kind of moral taste, which needed no explanation and did not come from experience. Now such appreciation involves feeling and ultimately

¹Cambridge History of English Literature (London: G. P. Putnam's, 1933), p. 489.

desires or tendencies underlying the feeling. Therefore it seems that ethical value begins to be associated with feeling; value and feeling of value are the same thing. Hence the inner appreciation for moral values felt by the deists seems to point to a recognition of the ultimate value of man's emotional life. Inherent in this theory was the belief that moral conduct was a kind of absolute value which nature was trying to realize. Such a view made morality subjective.

In the eighteenth century Lord Shaftesbury was probably the leading exponent of the intuitive theory. In the matter of religion Shaftesbury and his followers were, for the most part, deists. The deists' God was the person responsible for planning, building, and setting in motion the world machine. But once this God got the world-machine running, he ceased to do anything about it. Men were on their own. God had made them as part of the machine but had given them the special gift of getting to know by use of their reason just how they ran. So God ceased to be necessary. The deists, ceasing to worry about him, made a religion of reason, a system of morality without theology.

Deists believed that man's impulses were good and that human nature was itself divine. The moral sense, as a divine and natural instinct, directed man by its own authority. This was the optimistic belief that there could

be no real ill in the universe; apparent evil was only the effect of man's ignorance. Since the universe was pervaded by a supremely good and all-ruling mind, there could be nothing intrinsically bad.

Shaftesbury explained his moral theory in his terms 'harmony' and 'moral sense'. The universe was to Shaftesbury one of harmonies. Whatever seemed discordant in the general harmony could be resolved as man's intelligence widened. Shaftesbury meant by his term 'moral sense' that there was a natural tendency to virtue which was denied in the orthodox Christian dogma of human corruption. Moral sense directed men by its own authority and thus superseded the necessity of an appeal to their selfish instincts. It supplied the necessary sanctions and motives.

The first critic of Shaftesbury's philosophy was Mandeville, a thorough-going materialist, who fixed his eyes upon the facts around him. He preferred to recognize the important truth involved in the theological doctrine of human corruption. According to him, man was an animal moved by dark and base passions. As a matter of observation religion was the best restraint upon these impulses. To Mandeville virtue was a sham; it was nothing but selfishness. Man could not understand nature, which was a power beyond his intelligence. Man could only learn of

nature from facts, not from any a priori theory, harmony, on order.

Still another writer of this school was Butler. Shaftesbury's term 'moral sense' became with him the 'conscience'. Conscience was not a perception of the harmony of the universe, but rather the voice of God within men. It declared what was right and wrong. It was the faculty in man that made him a free moral agent. Butler believed that conscience was the will of God. It was the motivating force of man's actions in place of selfishness. Butler offered no easy optimism such as Shaftesbury's. His philosophy took into account the dark side of human nature which Shaftesbury preferred to overlook. Butler believed that conscience was a mystery which had not yet received sufficient explanation.

Still another writer of this group was Francis Hutcheson, a disciple of Shaftesbury's and, like him, a confirmed optimist. Hutcheson believed the moral sense to be the approval of such impulses, feelings, and consequently of such courses of action as are most conducive to the public welfare. To Hutcheson, God was not the supreme judge who awarded and punished, but the God of nature, a beneficent Creator of a harmonious system. Man, a part of this harmony, naturally acted in the direction which was most beneficial to society. He assumed that this tendency

to promote the public happiness was not only the criterion of virtue but should be the sole motive to performing virtuous acts. Such an assumption placed Hutcheson but one step from the utilitarian theory of morals.

In France, Rousseau was another exponent of the deistic ideas. Inclined by nature to the emotional side of religion and undisciplined by education, he took refuge in the kind of natural religion which was fashionable and convenient in his age. His writings on the superiority of the savage state, unhampered by the restrictions of society and conventional morality, exerted influence on philosophical thought both in France and in England.

The deists' assumption that man is naturally good and that man can be depended upon to act virtuously when he cultivates this natural goodness particularly appealed to men of the eighteenth century. This idea of the perfectibility of man -- the idea of progress -- fired the imaginations of men in Johnson's Age. Progress spread by reason would enable men to control their environment and would lead men quickly to a state in which all would be happy, in which there would be no evil.

The Utilitarian

The utilitarian school based its system of morality on empiricism, a theory that sensory experience is the basis of all knowledge. Immediate experience was as the

only actual reality; and, for this reason, knowledge was essentially inductive in its procedure. As a result, its influence tended to remove the supernatural element in religion and leave man accountable only to himself for his actions. The utilitarian group traced its impulse to Locke, who destroyed for eighteenth-century thought the Platonic concept that at birth the mind is equipped with certain fundamental ideas. It was Locke's theory that the mind at birth is like a blank tablet on which experience writes. In the conditions of society itself were the causes for good and evil. A better society would make better men. Upon Locke's empirical philosophy eighteenth-century thinkers based their conviction that men could be changed and improved. Reason could show them how. Such a conviction asserted that man's moral sentiments had no mysterious character and that through scientific observation, the moral instincts could be studied and controlled.

David Hume, a disciple of Locke's, insisted that only by experience can man ever learn. He believed that reason was built up from experience. As J. H. Randall says, he believed that "man can explain nothing; he can only observe and depict."¹ His purpose was to show morality as a "normal faculty of human nature."² The one

¹Making of the Modern Mind (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1940), pp. 264-265.

²Stephen, op. cit., p. 91.

thing necessary was to get rid of the teleological view and to show that the tendency to produce happiness was not a case of preordained harmony by the Almighty but a case of cause and effect. Hume attempted to show that, in every instance, sanction follows the useful or agreeable qualities.

Such an assumption would not hold unless the supernatural sanction in morality was removed. This removal Hume proceeded to accomplish. Locke held that the law of God was the only permanent and invariable standard of morality. Hume, however, pointed out "that very little religious beliefs could be derived from observable facts. He held that there was no justification for believing that the present world is imperfect and for assuming a perfect Creator who will produce a perfect world. He did not believe there was an argument for the existence of an all-wise Creator."¹ Hume's appeal to experience broke down not only the rational defense of religious tradition, but the rational method in science as well. Human nature, he held, was largely habit and custom.

Adam Smith, another utilitarian, linked ethics with commerce. He believed that the God who made the universe could not fail to bring prosperity to men. He had optimistic

¹Randall, op. cit., p. 300.

faith in the divine natural order, in enlightened self-interest, free competition, and laissez-faire. Like Hume, he based his theory of morality upon public utility. The general welfare was always promoted by the generally useful. Man in seeking his own best interests promoted the general welfare, and one of his chief interests was prosperity. He assumed that man's respect for wealth was divinely implanted.

Hume's and Smith's utilitarian theories based upon empiricism analyzed human motives into complete self-interest and sought to make utility, individual and social, the sole criterion of the goodness of any act.

The principle of utility came out in another group of writers who, Stephen says, "may probably be regarded as the dominant school of the eighteenth century."¹ These were the theologians who insisted upon the will of God as the supreme moral sanction. Like the deists' God of nature, their God was aloof and impersonal, but he rewarded the righteous and punished the evil. Punishment for disobedience was fiercely exaggerated and sure. Hell was very real and terrible. Just how or why an impersonal God and a very real hell were reasonable, the orthodox chose to ignore. But the fate of his own soul became of utmost importance

¹Op. cit., p. 105.

to man. He was foolish to care for anything else. Unselfish concern for others would profit him very little. From such views, a form of morality arose which may be described as a "God-helps-those-who-help-themselves" type.

Waterland is probably the chief representative of the Christian system of morality as Christianity was then understood. He used the term 'Duty' and by it he meant obedience to a divine law. Man was not to question the reasons for the commands given by supreme authority. His was a utilitarian criterion of morality. Man tested the relative importance of divine commands by considering which was most conducive to the general good. Moral goodness was choosing and performing beneficial actions upon a principle of obedience and out of the love of God. If man was thus dutiful and virtuous, God would repay him.

Another exponent of the utilitarian theory was the theologian Abraham Tucker, who attempted to accommodate the mysterious dogmas of Christianity to a rational interpretation. He accepted the deists' God of the world-machine, but he believed that God did occasionally interfere, though only on rare and important occasions. His ethical theory, based on the deistic philosophical plan, showed that God made the machine and then allowed it to act by itself. From the beauty and harmony of the machine, man

CHAPTER II

JOHNSON'S USE OF PROSE ALLEGORY FOR THE PRESENTATION OF VALUES

Allegory offered Johnson an ideal literary genre in which to set forth his ethical philosophy, because its history and function had long been linked with the teaching of morality. During the Middle Ages and the Renaissance its function was purely didactic; its use could be either for reproof or instruction.¹ Sometimes because both appeared at once, personification was used to make real the abstractions, vice and virtue. Other conceptions came to be associated with allegory. During the eighteenth century, for example, exaltation was linked closely with it. A story was thought to be essential. This narrative quality, however, was more than the simple narrative style of the fable in colloquial prose. In contrast, allegory was more complex and elaborate. It was an art for a professional author to practice for its element of indirection made the handling of its form difficult.² It was a work of the imagination wherein a

¹Ellen Douglas Leyburn, Satiric Allegory: Mirror of Man (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1956), p. 3.

²J.A.K. Thomson, Classical Influences on English Prose (London: George Allen and Unwin), 1956), p. 17.

story moved on two levels, one on the surface and the other beneath the surface. Such indirection gave the genre its charm and intellectual appeal. It offered a pleasing medium for instruction in moral truths.

When with Rasselas in mind, we prepare to give a definition of allegory, we ask, of course, how Johnson defined the type in his Dictionary. It is in his words, "A figurative discourse, in which something other is intended, than is contained in the words literally taken."¹ Definitions since Johnson's have echoed his a current definition appearing in Miss Leyburn's Satiric Allegory (1956) calls allegory the particular method of saying one thing in terms of another, a method in which two levels of meaning are sustained and in which the two levels correspond in the pattern of the relationship of details.² Allegory presents two levels, then, the particular or surface level and the general or concealed level.

In presenting these two levels, the allegorist has available to him five schemes or frame works: allegories controlled by plot, allegories of mock heroes, animal stories, journeys, and future worlds.³ In some allegories

¹Johnson, Dictionary (London: Tenth Edition, 1810), II.

²Leyburn, op. cit., p. 6.

³The Classification given by Leyburn, op. cit.

two schemes are combined in order to give the author more freedom in handling the two levels. This technique Johnson seems to have used in Rasselas. He uses the mock hero to present his central character, Rasselas, a young man in search of a choice of life. He uses the journey to give the necessary action; as a matter of fact, Rasselas is little more than a set of essays about life with just enough story to hold it together.

Within the journey framework Johnson keeps the two levels of the surface story and the concealed story distinct by setting his story in Egypt and Abyssinia. If he had set his characters in the English world of the eighteenth century, the surface level would not have afforded enough difference to engage us imaginatively. In order to give himself some of the help that the creator of fantastic worlds usually finds in allegorical form, he set his story in Egypt, a real land to the eighteenth-century Englishman but one of remote charm quite removed from English life. As a result, the surface level is clear and interesting in its own right with enough resemblance to let us know what is signified as well as enough difference to keep the two levels distinct; thus Johnson maintains for us the pleasure of solving a riddle.

For his allegorical setting, Johnson accepted the Oriental vogue of the eighteenth century. He seems to have

made use of such accounts of Abyssinia as were available: Africa, Ogilby; Travels of the Jesuits in Ethiopia, Tellez; A Voyage to Abyssinia with Fifteen Dissertations by M. Le Grand, Le Grand; Narrative of the Portuguese Embassy to Abyssinia during the Years 1520-1527, Father Francisco Alvarez' an extract from Purchas' Hakluytus Posthumus; the Atlas Geographus. That Johnson knew these sources there can be little doubt. A study of Rasselas reveals he seems to have drawn much material from the Alvarez extract, of which more will be considered later. Certainly there seems to be little question that he drew material from Father Lobo's Voyage to Abyssinia, which he translated from the French in 1735. Lobo speaks of the difficulty of passing between the mountains and of the channels worn in the surface of rock. He mentions the Sultan's lieutenant general, Rassela Christos, from whom the name of Rasselas was derived. Another source that he drew from was Purchas' extract from Alvarez in which "a valley with strong gates is projected above a mountain itself as the real place of captivity for the princes."¹ He seems to have accepted this high mountain valley as the abode of his princes, for his description of the Happy Valley follows the details from Purchas' work rather closely.

¹J. B. Moore, "Rasselas and the Early Traveler in Abyssinia," Modern Language Quarterly, XV (1954), 36.

Johnson departs, however, from the known facts regarding Abyssinia and invests the Happy Valley with a charm derived from Urreta's fictional description in Historia Eclesiastica, Politica, Natural y Moral' de Ethiopia. Moore believes that he could hardly have known Urreta's Historia, because that book has never been translated into English.¹ But he could have known the frequent and contemptuous allusions to marvels mentioned in Urreta's book because they were dismissed by Tellez and Ogilby as absurdities. Urreta's account seems to have fitted Johnson's allegorical framework in that it set his characters in a mythical country. The Happy Valley is described as one of natural beauty where "all the diversities of the world were brought together, the blessings of nature were collected and its evils extracted and excluded."²

Still another source suggested by Professor Tillotson is the "Perisan Tales" translated by Ambrose Philips from the French in 1714.³ The philosophy from these tales finds its counterpart in Rasselas. The stories concern a search made by Bedreddin Lolo, King of Damascus, and his vizier, Atalmulc, for a happy man. Not finding such a man among the local townspeople, they continue their search by

¹Moore, op. cit., p. 40.

²Rasselas (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1927), p. 9.

³Translated from Petis de la Croix, "Mille et un Jours."

travelling. Professor Tillatson thinks that "there can be little doubt of Johnson's debt to the 'Persian Tales' for the subject and outline of Rasselas. He points out that the "role of Rasselas resembles that of Bedreddin. Both are attempting, incognito, to find happiness, though far different ends, since Rasselas is a young man trying to make the best 'choice of life.' The role of Imlac is that of Atalmule, the wiser man who foresees the end of the search and whose scepticism provides a chorus for each further step in it. The method of narration is similar, since both contain stories within the story. And there is a conclusion to both in which nothing is concluded. . . ."¹

Here, then, in the Happy Valley, known to readers of Oriental allegories Johnson begins his allegory of a young man in search of a choice of life. Imlac, Rasselas's guide, seems to present Johnson's own views. The story carries along a series of little discourses which offer Johnson the opportunity to present old truths or ethical values rooted in the past. He attacks the empiricism of Locke and Hume and their disciples, the utilitarians, in their emphasis upon the act of choice in moral affairs which seems to cut man off from everything except his own

¹Geoffrey Tillotson, Essays in Criticism and Research (Cambridge: The University Press, 1942), pp. 114-115.

interests. He reminds us that man in following tradition engages in race experience which is stable and secure. Let us hear his own words in the passage where Rasselas, Nekayah, and Imlac are discussing a visit to the pyramids:

"My curiosity," said Rasselas, "does not very strongly lead me to survey piles of stones, or mounds of earth; my business is with man. I came hither not to measure fragments of temples or trace choked aqueducts, but to look upon the various scenes of the present world."

"The things that are now before us," said the princess Nekayah "require attention and deserve it. What have I to do with the heroes or the monuments of ancient times? With times which never can return, and heroes, whose form of life was different from all that the present condition of mankind requires or allows."

"To know anything," returned Imlac, "we must know its effects; to see men we must see their works, that we may learn what reason has dictated, or passion has incited, and find what are the most powerful motives of action. To judge rightly of the present we must oppose it to the past; for all judgment is comparative, and of the future nothing can be known. The truth is, that no mind is much employed upon the present: recollection and anticipation fill up almost all our moments. Our passions are joy and grief, love and hatred, hope and fear. Of joy and grief the past is the object, and the future hope and fear; even love and hatred respect the past, for the cause must have been before the effect.

"The present state of things is the consequence of the farmer, and it is natural to inquire what were the sources of the good that we enjoy, or to the evil that we suffer. If we act only for ourselves, to neglect the study of history is not prudent; if we are entrusted with the care of others, it is not just Ignorance, when it is voluntary, is criminal; and he may properly be charged with evil who refused to learn how he might prevent it." (pp. 136-37)

Johnson is saying here that the empirical philosophy of his age has failed to recognize and come to terms

with the factor of continuity in human experience. He believes that ethical values show obstinate continuity. The fundamentals of good conduct were discovered long ago, and it is needless impoverishment of human resources to lose sight of this fact. He believes that there is an abiding pattern of the good life in its larger outlines, for as Imlac says in his discourse on poetry,

". . . the knowledge of nature is only half the task of the poet; he must be acquainted likewise with all the modes of life. His character requires that he estimate the happiness and misery of every condition; observe the powers of all the passions in all their combinations, and trace the changes of the human mind as they are modified by various institutions and accidental influences of climate or custom, from the spiritlessness of infancy to the despondence of decrepitude. He must divest himself on the prejudices of his age or country; he must consider right and wrong in their abstracted and invariable state; he must regard present laws and opinions, and rise to general and transcendental truths, which will always be the same." (pp. 50-51)

What, we ask, are these "general and transcendental truths, which will always be the same?" According to the discourses in the allegory, Johnson believes those virtues which make life good are restraint, industry, stability, fortitude, duty, and compassion. We must hold fast to these rules of life and to faith all of which have served our ancestors as the best guides through life.

In Rasselas he is addressing the middle class, the industrial and commercial class, during a time of rapidly increasing national wealth. He seeks to extol simple

honesty in conduct and the steadyng power of the intellect over impulses and materialistic allurements. The middle class through the influences of increasing prosperity and utilitarian ethics had grafted on to Puritan virtues those of economics, so that the middle class virtues were personal responsibility, diligence, moderation, sobriety, and thrift. These qualities made virtue a matter of good business. The effect of such a fusion made man practice an individual morality so that he became morally self-sufficient and isolated from the social group.

Although Johnson, for the most part, extols these middle-class virtues, I believe his emphasis shifts from the individual to the general or the universal. To pursue this thesis further, let us consider these virtues as he presents them in the allegory. Concerning industry, for example, the utilitarian and protestant insisted that a tradesman's duty was to bend every effort and talent as best he could to prosper financially for the glory of God. Energy and prosperity were dedicated to the Almighty who blessed a man possessing them. In contrast to this materialistic view, Imlac says: "My father was a wealthy merchant. . . . He was honest, frugal and diligent, but of mean sentiments, and narrow comprehension: he desired only to be rich, and to conceal his riches, lest he should be spoiled by the governors of the provinces." (pp. 36-37)

In another passage on wealth, showing how the love of money corrupts the heart and emotions, Johnson describes Rasselas and his companions' sojourn in the palace of the wealthy master, who points out the dangers of prosperity:

"My condition has indeed the appearance of happiness, but appearances are delusive. My prosperity puts my life in danger; the Bassa of Egypt is my enemy, incensed only by my wealth and popularity. I have been hitherto protected against him by the princes of the country; but, as the favor of the great is uncertain, I know not how soon my defenders may be persuaded to share the plunder with the Bassa. I have sent my treasures into a distant country, and, upon the first alarm, am prepared to follow them. Then will my enemies riot in my mansion, and enjoy the gardens which I have planted!" (p. 91)

Still another character symbolizing avarice is the Arab bandit, who ranges the country merely to get riches. He tells his captive, Pekuah, that he will fix a ransom, give a passport to her messenger, and perform his agreement with punctuality. The days pass and he finds her such a delightful companion, intelligent and educated, that he delays to send for her ransom, but an agent of Nekayah's finds the camp, and only then does the bandit prepare for her return when the "gold, which he would not fetch, he could not reject when it was offered."¹

I do not mean to imply by these examples that Johnson scorned honest effort on labor; he struck out

¹Rasselas, p. 178.

against all forms of indolence. But these passages suggest that neither the effort to acquire nor the effort to possess material objects contributed much to character. Instead of fixing the mind and desires on physical objects, man should develop inner resources that link him to his fellow man and his God. He should deny himself for the larger interest.

Self-denial necessitates restraint and discipline, virtues esteemed in an orderly society far removed from the primitive one idealized by Rousseau. For this reason Johnson opposed the cult of primitivism led by Rousseau in pre-revolutionary France. We see his displeasure with it reflected in Nekayah's distaste for pastoral life and in Rasselas's displeasure with the natural philosopher who advises him:

"This, said a philosopher, who had heard him with tokens of great impatience, is the present condition of a wise man. The time is already come, when none are wretched but by their own fault. Nothing is more idle, than to inquire after happiness, which nature has kindly placed within our reach. The way to be happy is to live according to nature, in obedience to that universal and unalterable law with which every heart is originally impressed; which is not written on it by precept, but engraven by destiny, not instilled by education, but infused at our nativity. He that lives according to nature will suffer nothing from the delusions of hope, or importunities of desire: he will receive and reject with equability of temper; and act or suffer as the reason of things shall alternately prescribe. Other men may amuse themselves with subtle definitions, or intricate raciocination. Let them learn to be wise by easier means: let them observe the hind of the

forest, and the linnet of the grove: let them consider the life of animals, whose motions are regulated by instinct; they obey their guide and are happy. Let us therefore, at length, cease to dispute, and learn to live; throw away the incumbrance of precepts, which they who utter them with so much pride and pomp do not understand, and carry with us this simple and intelligible maxim, That deviation from nature is deviation from happiness."

When he had spoken, he looked around him with a placid air, and enjoyed the consciousness of his own beneficence. "Sir," said the prince, with great modesty, as I, like all the rest of mankind, am desirous of felicity, my closest attention has been fixed upon your discourse: I doubt not the truth of a position which a man so learned has so confidently advanced. Let me only know what it is to live according to nature." (pp. 98-99)

Then follows Johnson's view of this philosophy:

"The prince soon found that this was one of the sages whom he could understand less as he heard him longer." In his opinion such a philosophy was inimical to individual morals and general progress because it glorified the individual and led away from that reality which is universal. Mistaken in his understanding of Rousseau, as Brownell, for example, shows in his analysis of naturalism, Johnson did not distinguish between the natural and the normal. He did not see that even the disciples of Rousseau -- eighteenth century or twentieth century progressives -- admitted the normal to be the laudable aim of our lives, the duty of man to order his nature with a view to seeming natural by being normal.¹

¹William Crary Brownell, The Genius of Style (New York: Scribners and Son, 1924), p. 157.

Lack of discipline, which in his mind characterized primitivism -- merely self-interest and self-expression -- were for Johnson a form of mental laxity, of obsession with selfish desires, whereas following an objective ideal meant lifting a person out of himself. In contrast to Rousseau, Johnson believed every kind of mental laxity -- indolence, instability, idle speculation, vain wishing, and sins originating from self-love -- should be subjected to constant vigilance and discipline. His penetration into these mental states shows a remarkable psychological astuteness suggestive of our own century.¹ The mind if it is to grow and be healthy must establish active links of sympathy and understanding with what is outside itself. It must be disciplined; Johnson's own words persuade us, as Imlac speaks about the "dangerous prevalence of the imagination":

"Disorders of intellect, answered Imlac, happen much more often than superficial observers will easily believe. Perhaps, if we speak with rigorous exactness, no human mind is in its right state. There is no man whose imagination does not sometimes predominate over his reason, who can regulate his attention wholly by his will, and whose ideas will come and go at his command. No man will be found in whose mind airy notions do not sometimes tyrannise, and force him to hope or fear beyond the limits of sober probability. All power of fancy over reason is a degree of insanity; but while this power is such as we can control and repress, it is not visible to others, no considered as any depravation of the mental facilities: it is not pronounced madness but when it comes ungovernable, and apparently influences speech or action.

¹Richard B. Hovey, "Dr. Samuel Johnson, Psychiatrist," Modern Language Quarterly, XV (1954), p. 326.

"To indulge the power of fiction, and send imagination out upon the wing, is often the sport of those who delight too much in silent speculation. When we are alone we are not always busy; the labour of excogitation is too violent to last long; the ardour of enquiry will sometimes give way to idleness or satiety. He who has nothing external that can divert him, must find pleasure in his own thoughts, and must conceive himself what he is not; for who is pleased with what he is? He then expatiates in boundless futurity, and culls from all imaginable conditions that which for the present moment he should most desire, amuses the desires with impossible enjoyments, and confers upon his pride unattainable domination. The mind dances from scene to scene, unites all pleasures in all combinations, and riots in delights which nature and fortune, with all their bounty, cannot bestow." (pp. 189-191)

Johnson is saying that since the mind is a restless, energetic force, the trouble with naive naturalism is that it leads us to interpret or at least label instincts or desires in terms merely of the particular objects on which they happen to fix. He penetrates to the actual process of desiring itself, as an activity inherent in mankind. We see it in the restless discontent of Rasselas in the Happy Valley. Johnson does not deny that man is selfish; he takes selfishness for granted.

He believes, therefore, that the optimism of Shaftesbury and Rousseau as to the natural goodness of man in a harmonious universe is flimsy, for it does not take into account man's basic human nature. As a result, Rousseau and Shaftesbury mistake the objects to which the desire happens to turn to for ends that are somehow able to

serve as permanent sources of satisfaction once we get them. Man thinks the objects of desires will give happiness; therefore he limits his mind to wishing for those objects, and he is unable to think of anything else.¹

To fix desires on ourselves, on objects, or on other people is, says Johnson, unwise, for the good life is not found in one's own private world. Moreover, according to Johnson, lack of restraint in pursuit of one's desires often results in madness like the mental state portrayed in his astronomer deranged by his vagaries. Even the hermit in his allegory was ready to return to society. Languid desires to withdraw from human society, even in pursuit of favorite studies, should be subjected to constant discipline. Neither the manner of pursuit nor the object of pursuit -- sought, for example, within marriage and family life -- will bring happiness, for Rasselas and Nekayah's discourses on marriage reveal that man finds only limited happiness therein. Concerning love and marriage, Johnson displays a hard common sense that almost approaches disillusionment. From love and marriage he suggests that one should not expect more from life than life will afford. Some of his most realistic views on this subject he voices through Nekayah:

¹Walter Jackson Bate, The Achievement of Samuel Johnson (New York: Oxford University, 1955), p. 69.

"I know not whether marriage be more than one of the more innumerable modes of human misery. When I see and reckon the various forms of connubial infelicity, the unexpected causes of lasting discord, the diversities of temper, the oppositions of opinion, the rude collisions of contrary desire where both are urged by violent impluses, the obstinate contests of disagreeing virtues, where both are supported by consciousness of good intention, I am sometimes disposed to think with the severer casuists of most nations, that marriage is rather permitted than approved, and that none, but by the instigation of a passion too much indulged, entangle themselves with indisoluble compacts." (p. 126)

Throughout the allegory Johnson shows that we should not fix our hopes and desires on objects and on persons. Life is uncertain; nothing which has life can boast stability; therefore man must look elsewhere for value.

One of the deeper values is a disciplined intellect which unifies and steadies emotions, the blind, dark forces in man. The disciplined mind provides man with the power to get outside his selfish nature; it reaches for contacts with others; it yearns to exercise sympathy and compassion, two virtues which Johnson believes help to give us a glimpse of the invisible, hovering over the gross world of the senses and touching it with a gleam of a divine yet familiar beauty. Speaking of this gleam as "light," Imlac says to Nekayah: "Open your heart to the influence of the light, which, from time to time breaks in upon you."

Sympathy and compassion are the Christian virtues which demand from man the exercise of another virtue, duty -- a sense of duty to people, to the community, to the world. In utilitarian ethics performing good works for the blessing of God was a good business arrangement, but performing them as a duty in the classical and Christian theory of values is a virtue because it is the right form of conduct as old as the race itself.

Johnson presents duty as that virtue which requires participation in life. Rasselas's discontent in his prison of pleasure in the Happy Valley urges him to seek life more fully. When the allegory ends, he rules a little kingdom where he "administers justice in his own person." Other characters illustrate this social conception of duty. Feeling the sense of duty to mankind, Pekuah becomes a prioress in a convent. Nekayah "founds a college of learned women" in which she presides. "By conversing with the old, and educating the young," she divides her time "between the acquisition and communication of wisdom" and educates "for the next age models of prudence and patterns of piety." Here Johnson is proposing the cultivation of women's minds. This proposal has appeared from the very beginning of the allegory when Nekayah seeks to accompany Rasselas and Imlac in their escape from the Happy Valley, which symbolizes intellectual immaturity. Johnson is

saying that women should have equal intellectual opportunities with men. He stresses this point more forcefully in Pekuah's description of conditions in the bandit's seraglio:

"The diversions of the women were only childish play, by which the mind accustomed to stronger operations could not be kept busy. I could do all which they delighted in doing by powers merely sensitive, while my intellectual faculties were flown to Cairo. They ran from room to room as a bird hops from wire to wire in his cage. They danced for the sake of motion, as lambs frisk in a meadow. One sometimes pretended to be hurt that the rest might be alarmed, or hid herself that another might seek her. Part of their time passed in watching the progress of light bodies that floated on the river, and part in marking the various forms into which clouds broke in the sky. . . .

"Nor was much satisfaction to be hoped from their conversation: for of what could they be expected to talk? They had seen nothing; for they had lived from early youth in that narrow spot: of what they had not seen they could have no knowledge, for they could not read. They had no ideas but the few things that were within their view, and had hardly names for any thing but their clothes and their food." (pp. 173-74)

The poignancy of this scene serves to deepen her sense of duty toward society.

Still other characters discourse at length upon duty as a virtue to be exercised among one's fellowmen. The hermit feeling the need of becoming a part of mankind says:

"I am sometimes ashamed to think that I could not secure myself from vice, but by retiring from the exercise of virtue, and begin to suspect that I was rather impelled by resentment, than led by devotion, into solitude. . . . In solitude, if

I escape the example of bad men, I want likewise the counsel and conversation of the good. I have been long comparing the evils with the advantages of society, and resolve to return into the world tomorrow. The life of a solitary man will be certainly miserable, but not certainly devout. . . ." (p. 95)

The astronomer regaining his sanity after finding his place in a group of sympathetic friends, speaks of how futile is man's efforts to cut himself off from society:

"I have passed my time in study without experience; in the attainment of sciences which can, for the most part, be but remotely useful to mankind. I have purchased knowledge at the expense of all the common comforts of life; I have missed the endearing elegance of female friendship, and the happy commerce of domestick tenderness. If I have obtained any prerogatives above other students, they have been accompanied with fear, disquiet, and scrupulosity; but even of these prerogatives, whatever they were, I have, since my thoughts have been more diversified by more intercourse with the world, begun to question the reality." (pp. 203-204)

Imlac speaks a summary to all these examples when he comments, "He that lives well in the world is better than he that lives well in a monastery."

According to Johnson, "to live well in the world" also requires fortitude. His shrewd common sense reminds him that the world, is at best, full of sadness, misery, foolishness, and disappointment. As Imlac reminds Rasselas, "Human life is every where a state in which much is to be endured, and little to be enjoyed." This truth

Rasselas and Nekayah discover in their observations of the different ranks in society. From the humblest to the greatest there are pettiness, sadness, complaint. Their study of mankind ends with Nekayah's conclusion, "Of the blessings set before you make your choice, and be content. No man can taste the fruits of autumn while he is delighting his scent with the flowers of spring: No man can, at the same time, fill his cup from the source and from the mouth of the Nile."¹ Johnson would have us accept life and be serene.

Throughout Rasselas we have seen Dr. Johnson answer the theories of the thinkers of his age. In the form of allegory he has presented the middle-class virtues of eighteenth-century England and interpreted them in the light of the classical and Christian values. Stout Anglican churchman that he was, he saw society as a mystical body; he reverenced the decent order whereby the past was knit to the present, man to man, and man to God through fellowship in works of charity, in festival in the prayers and ceremonies of the Church. Fine classical scholar that he was, he saw the value of the classical belief in the nobility of the intellect; he knew its power to unify and to give form. Hard realist that he was, he

¹Johnson, Rasselas, p. 134.

was, he knew the value of experience as expounded by the empiricist Locke. Thus because he was the man that he was, an intellectual, a devout Christian, a middle-class Englishman used to vicissitude, he took the best of the past and of his age and gave to eternity the best of the human spirit.

CHAPTER III

JOHNSON'S USE OF IMAGERY TO PRESENT VALUES

In Chapter I, I have dealt with the philosophies of values current during the eighteenth century and, in Chapter II, with the use Johnson made of allegory to present ethical values that he considered important not only for men of his own age but for all time. In Chapter III my purpose is to analyze the manner in which he presents these values in order to engage us emotionally and intellectually so that old truths may take on life and meaning for us. Such an analysis as I propose converges on style, which Brownell defines as "that order and movement with which a writer endues his thoughts, or the manner which is the man."¹ All the stylistic qualities of Johnson's prose may be traced to his ethical values; behind his values -- words or substance -- stands the man.

In studying the prose style of Rasselas, one is concerned with certain classical influences: the Platonic dialogue, the aphoristic expression, the periodic and balanced sentence, the Latin influence on his vocabulary. Dialogue, for example, came readily to Johnson's hand when he wished to present such abstractions as ethical values.

¹Brownell, op. cit., p. 40.

He employed the classical device of dialogue, which was probably first used by Plato, for reasons similar to those mentioned by Professor Thomson when he said that in his Symposium, Plato used dialogue for a discussion of love because, "truth was more like to be won from the earnest converse of mind with mind than by the solitary enquirer."¹ In the hands of Johnson the discourses aim at conversation that seeks to persuade and to instruct and to engage us imaginatively. The question and answer technique, which Johnson uses, for example, to project the discontent of Rasselas in the Happy Valley, evokes a response in us, for the whole discourse has an immediacy that engages our sympathies as well as our minds. Rasselas's words beget familiar stirrings of discontent within us:

"What," said he, "makes the difference between man and all the rest of the animal creation? Every beast that strays beside me has the same corporal necessities with myself; he is hungry and crops the grass, he is thirsty and drinks the stream, his thirst and hunger are appeased, he is satisfied and sleeps; he rises again and is hungry, he is again fed and is at rest. I am hungry and thirsty like him, but when thirst and hunger cease I am not at rest; I am, like him, pained with want, but am not like him, satisfied with fullness. The intermediate hours are tedious and gloomy; I long again to be hungry that I may again quicken my attention. The birds peck the berries or the corn, and fly away to the groves where they sit in seeming happiness on the branches, and waste their lives in turning

¹Op. cit., p. 147.

one unvaried series of sounds. I likewise can call the lutanist and the singer, but the sounds that pleased me yesterday weary me today, and will grow yet more wearisome tomorrow. I can discover within me no power of perception which is not glutted with its proper pleasure, yet I do not feel myself delighted. Man has surely some latent sense for which this place affords no gratification, or he has some desires distinct from sense which must be satisfied before he can be happy.'

After this he lifted up his head, and seeing the moon rising, walked towards the palace. As he passed through the fields, and saw the animals around him, 'Ye, said he, are happy, and need not envy me that walk thus among you, burthened with myself; nor do I, yet gentle beings, envy your felicity; for it is not the felicity of man. I have many distresses from which ye are free; I fear pain when I do not feel it; I sometimes shrink at evils recollect, and sometimes start at evils anticipated. . . ."

Or, for example, we are affected by the somber resignation in Imlac's pronouncement concerning happiness:

"Every man may, by examining his own mind, guess what passes in the minds of others: when you feel that your own gaiety is counterfeit, it may justly suspect that of your companions not to be sincere. Envy is commonly reciprocal. We are long before we are convinced that happiness is never to be found, and each believes it possessed by others, to keep alive the hope of obtaining it for himself. In the assembly, where you passed the last night there appeared such spriteliness of air, and volatility of fancy, as might have suited beings of a higher order, formed to inhabit serener regions inaccessible to care or sorrow: Yet, believe me, there was not one who did not dread the moment when solitude should deliver him to the tyranny of reflection." (pp. 78-79)

Some of the most beautiful of the discourses appear in Chapter XXXIV and portray Nekayah's grief over the loss of her favorite, Pekuah. Perhaps it is significant to remark

here that the theme of grief was close to Johnson's own experience. Although the report is sometimes challenged, many scholars still point out that Rasselas was written, as Johnson told Sir Joshua Reynolds, in seven nights to provide for the funeral expenses and some small debts of the author's mother.¹ It may be that some of Johnson's grief over her death is reflected in the following discourse of Imlac as he comforts Nekayah, who in her anguish has just remarked that she has resolved to hide herself in solitude because, without Pekuah, she has no pleasure to "reject or retain." Imlac says:

"The state of mind appressed with a sudden calamity is like that of the fabulous inhabitants of the new created earth, who, when the first night came upon them, supposed that day would never return. When the clouds of sorrow gather over us, we see nothing beyond them, nor can imagine how they will be dispelled: yet a new day succeeded to the night, and sorrow is never long without a dawn of ease. But they who restrain themselves from a receiving comfort, do as the savages would have done, had they put out their eyes when it was dark. Our minds, like our bodies, are in continual flux; something is hourly lost, and something acquired. To lose much at once is inconvenient to either, but while the vital powers remain uninjured, nature will find the

¹A recent report is made by Albert C. Baugh, who says that Rasselas was written in January 1759 and published in April of the same year to defray funeral expenses of his mother. A Literary History of England, edited by Albert C. Baugh (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1948), p. 994. R. W. Chapman (ed. Rasselas, 1927) gives these facts: Mrs. Johnson died on January 25, 1759, and Rasselas was published in April of the same year. From a letter by Johnson to his publisher, William Strahan, it is learned that the story was being written before January 20, (pp. x-xi.)

means of reparation. Distance has the same effect on the mind as on the eye, and while we glide along the stream of time, whatever we leave behind us is always lessening, and that which we approach increasing in magnitude. Do not suffer life to stagnate; it will grow muddy for want of motion: commit yourself again to the current of the world; Pekuah will vanish by degrees; you will meet in your way some other favorite, or learn to diffuse yourself in general conversation." (pp. 156-57)

The aphorism employed in the service of sincerity like the ancient Greek apophthegm, the aphoristic statement dependent "upon the truth or justice of what is said and not on any surprising or challenging way of saying it"¹ likewise served Johnson. In the hands of the Romans the apophthegm became the epigram, a favorite literary device which depended more on form than substance, more on striking satiric statement than truth; and although Johnson was greatly influenced by Latin prose and even used the epigramic or platitudinous statement in the Rambler, I believe that in Rasselas there is more of the aphoristic quality in his prose. This I believe true for two reasons. First, Johnson does not strive to make a point but is willing to let the words depend on the truth. In fact, he almost seems to be afraid of any hint of affectation or any profusion of colorful imagery that might evoke sensual feeling. Second, his sentences lack the satiric quality necessary for the successful epigram; instead they have

¹Thomson, op. cit., p. 135.

the aphoristic quality of sincerity, and of economy and effectiveness of diction. In Imlac's speeches they become excellent teaching devices:

"He whose real wants are supplied must admit those of fancy." (p. 39)

"Human life is every where a state in which much is to be endured, and little to be enjoyed." (p. 57)

"Few things are impossible to diligence and skill." (p. 65)

"Envy is commonly reciprocal." (p. 78)

Johnson's preference for classical technique is shown also in his sentences, particularly the periodics, which, according to Professor Thomson may be noted in the ornate style of Isocrates for it was he who invented "the wonderful structure that could be mastered through observing its rules. It consisted of several parts or clauses all carefully balanced one against the other and yet all building up to a conclusion which gave them unity."¹ This sentence in classical prose, the period, even today, by virtue of its form and precision, holds the reader's attention as no other sentence does because if it is correctly framed, it does "not give up its meaning until it has come to an end."² It demands for its full effect

¹Op. cit., p. 121.

²Ibid., p. 109.

the response of readers with some education; they can appreciate its beauty and meaning. So Johnson's prose demands unceasing attention on the part of the reader because of its abstract and intellectual vocabulary and balanced parts. The piling up of phrase on phrase gives this sentence a certain rhythmic pattern, which in his hands, becomes a unit of precision, rhythm, and dignity.

The words swell harmoniously across his page in a cadence so measured that each sentence is like the sonorous swells of a cathedral organ. The following types of sentences, because of their balance and rhythm are excellent for presenting ethical ideas and for securing emotional tone:

"To talk in public, to think in solitude, to read and to hear, to inquire, and answer inquiries is the business of the scholar." (p. 36)

"Ignorance is mere privation, by which nothing is produced; it is a vacuity in which the soul sits motionless and torpid for want of attraction." (p. 56)

"He shewed with great strength of sentiment, and variety of illustration that human nature is degraded and debased, when the lower faculties predominate over the higher, that when fancy, the parent of passion, usurps the dominion of the mind nothing evolves but the natural effect of unlawful government, perturbation and confusion, that she betrays the fortresses of the intellect to rebels, and excites her children to sedition against reason their lawful sovereign." (p. 83)

Such measured rhythm suits the dignity and seriousness of the ideas. As a result, we are made to feel these truths,

realize them in imagination, and have emotions that they are fitted to produce. And this is the artistry of Johnson. His words have the power to enhance our sense of life. C. T. Winchester says:

Our deepest moral emotions, as justice, veneration, religious aspiration, bear witness to our unconquerable feeling of a life superior to physical relations, that impose laws upon all actions but will not itself be limited or confined. And these vague indefinable emotions, which are often more intense, any of those states of feeling which seem to be made up largely of dim undeterminate desires after something higher, purer, sweeter; states of feeling which have always some tinge of sadness in them yet are not painful, -- these would seem to be deep stirrings within us of that restless, unsatisfied spiritual life. It is in such moments that we become most thrillingly aware how real and intense is our life, how keen its ardors and its longings.¹

In order to bring such abstractions as motives, mental states, or passions vividly to our minds, however, he sometimes uses personification often linked with metaphor. In showing the restless energy of the mind, for example, these passages appear in the discourses:

"How could a mind hungry for knowledge be willing in an intellectual famine to lose such a banquet as Pekuah's conversation?" (p. 176)

or:

"The mind in weariness or leisure recurs constantly to the favorite conception and feasts on the luscious falsehood whenever she is offended with the bitterness of truth." (p. 191)

¹C. T. Winchester, Some Principles of Literary Criticism (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1908), p. 76.

Some of the most vivid images are kinesthetic:

"The mind dances from scene to scene, unites all pleasures in all combinations, and riots in delights which nature and fortune with all their bounty, cannot bestow." (p. 191)

In many examples when he speaks of the mind, he uses language that suggests motion: "everything floated in their minds," "fastened upon his mind," "sent imagination out upon the wing," "beam of hope darted into his mind."

Throughout the discourses Johnson is presenting ideas. His purpose calls for an intellectual style rather than sharp imagery, yet an analysis of the words in Rasselas reveals deft handling of sensory imagery which serves his ethical purpose. Imagery, in Professor Millett's words is, "the result of the evocation, with varying degrees of clarity, of mental reproductions, representations, or imitations of sense perceptions."¹ It must be noted with allowance for variable responses, because a study of sense-imagery has only a provisional reliability. Professor Fogle thinks that in the first place, it is improbable that any two persons can obtain identical results from examining the same passage.² To one the predominant sensory response from an image will be visual; to another kinesthetic or

¹Fred B. Millett, Reading Poetry (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950), p. 47.

²Richard Harter Fogle, The Imagery of Keats and Shelley (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1949), p. 26.

tactual. Readers are likely "to be predisposed toward certain types of imagery." As Professor Millett says, we meet with the difficulties in classifying images according to their sensory appeal. Psychologists, for example, have made use of a classification of persons as predominantly visual-minded or predominantly auditory-minded; if they had pushed their observations further, it is possible that they would have discovered that there are not only these two types of image-making persons but also persons who find it easier to evoke one of the other four basic types of images.¹ In the second place, the sensory content of images is often not simple but complex. In many instances a single image contains two or more sensory suggestions. When Johnson describes animals as "frisking on the lawns," the image 'frisking' is to me predominantly kinesthetic but it is visual as well. Nevertheless, as a method of analyzing style or the treatment of substance, the advantages of such a study outweigh the disadvantages which I have listed.

In order to establish the sensuous characteristics of Rasselas as accurately as possible, I have analyzed the nouns and verbs found in the story, classifying all effective sense-images as visual, auditory, tactual, olfactory,

¹Millett, op. cit., p. 48.

gustatory, and kinesthetic.¹ My purpose in this analysis is to examine the language Johnson uses in presenting ethical values and to discover certain characteristics of style which are Johnson's expression of universal principles. His nouns and verbs are mainly abstract and Latinized. His nouns are accompanied by few adjectives, and when modifiers do appear, they are generalized. Verbs suggest the most concrete imagery; yet even these are many times generalized because of their Latin origin. Of the verbs suggesting sensory impressions the greatest number are kinesthetic. The next in frequency are visual and auditory. Only a few suggest gustatory, tactful, and olfactory sensations.

Other significant characteristics appear in the verbs. One is the frequent use of passive voice which occurs 507 times. Another is the extensive use of copulas which appear 555 times. These two verb forms appear on nearly every page. Still another factor is the repetition of favorite verbs.² For example, find is used 75 times; know, 50; see, 57; begin, 33; come, 32 times. Such verb forms, because they are general, serve in expressing

¹These are classifications used by Fogle, op. cit.

²See Appendix A.

principles rather than concrete action. They explain and define and thus serve the purpose of allegory.

Perhaps the most effective visual-imagery appears in Chapter I, in which a description of the Happy Valley is given. Here Johnson, working on a panoramic scale, generalizes and reduces, in order that the details of his scene may fit within a unity of the whole. He looks out before him in a broad sweep and paints upon a large canvas the scene

. . . in whose dominions the Father of waters begins his course; whose bounty pours down the streams of plenty, and scatters over half the world the harvests of Egypt; (p. 7)

Then he paints in the following objects:

The place . . . was a spacious valley in the Kingdom of Amhara, surrounded on every side by mountains of which the summits overhang the middle part. (p. 8)

Johnson's visual imagery seems to be focused on distance and height. It shows him generalizing objects near at hand in order to harmonize them with his background.

From the mountains on every side, rivulets descended that filled all the valley with verdure and fertility, and formed a lake in the middle inhabited by fish of every species, and frequented by every fowl whom nature has taught to dip the wing in water. This lake discharged its superfluities by a stream which entered a dark cleft of the mountain on the northern side, and fell with dreadful noise from precipice to precipice till it was heard no more. (p. 9)

Throughout the description of the Happy Valley Johnson's use

of such nouns as animals, beats, trees, fish, blessings suggests objects that are to be thought of as a class rather than as individuals.

Nouns of Latin origin, such as artificers, superfluities, precipice, extensive circuit, diversities, eminence, habitations, verdure, fertility, and exigencies give an abstract quality and have a scientific or philosophic flavor. Professor Wimsatt suggests that when they appear on every page, Johnson's meaning is apparent; Johnson is interested in generality in the classes to which things belong, in the aspects which unify groups and objects. Thus, he explains Johnson's use of Latin words:

Latin words in the eighteenth century took the place not of a single English word but of a group of words, they were more manageable. Such words were more stylistically convenient. This easy expression of the Latin diction was a kind of irreducibility, a suggestion of radical meaning, and also of a substantive dignity which all the more recommended the diction to use in the scientific content. Plainer English words, (soapy, belching, oily) smell and feel too much of the impressionistic and undiscriminating talk of every day; in a scientific treatise they would have been irrelevant, too specific in solidity of meaning. The Latin words both in their stymology and their ductility suggest something remote from the usual, some more precisely controlled and subtilized experience or more accurate observation. By their very removal from the ordinary, the Latin words suggest the principles of things -- a reason or an explanation.¹

¹Wimsatt, Philosophic Words (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948), p. 12.

Thus Professor Wimsatt explained in more detail the observation of Stephen, who says that Johnson had a love for big words and a love for putting the abstract for the concrete and that his Latinized abstractions in the style of a scholar of the old type "acquired something of the old elaboration."

It is true that Johnson delighted to express familiar thoughts in philosophical language; he wanted big words for big meanings. He himself had this to say concerning diction:

Language is the dress of thought; and as the noblest men, or most graceful action, would be degraded and obscured by a garb appropriated to the gross employments of rusticks and mechanics, so the most heroic sentiments will lose their efficacy, and the most splendid ideas drop their magnificence, if they are conveyed by words used commonly upon low and trivial occasions, debased by vulgar mouths, and contaminated by inelegant applications.²

Johnson did not use common words; he thought they were colloquial, too colored by the rub of life. In this belief he was a true classicist, for Longinus before him had written that the "use of trivial words had a terrible debasing effect on a grand passage. . . . One ought not in elevated passages to have recourse to what is sordid and contemptible, except under pressure of extreme

¹ Leslie Stephen, Samuel Johnson (New York: Harper and Bros., 1878), p. 166.

² Samuel Johnson, Lives of the English Poets, ed. Arthur Waugh (Oxford: University Press, 1926), p. 49.

necessity, but the proper course is to suit the words to the dignity of the subject and thus imitate nature, the artist that created man."¹

This use of abstract language together with the spaciousness of the scene gives a tone of grandeur and elevation that are linked with allegory. So compelling is the dignity of the passage that the reader feels lifted out of himself, many times unwillingly, but the pull upward is there in the words and in the rhythm of the phrases. Both reach down inside and lift him up into space where he experiences keen exhilaration and pride.

Into this broad landscape Johnson next paints in a few physical details that give a sensory impression of harmony and order.²

The sides of the mountains were covered with trees, the banks of the brooks were diversified with flowers; every blast shook spices from the rocks, and every mouth dropped fruits upon the ground. All animals that bite or brouse the shrub, whether wild or tame, wandered in this extensive circuit, secured from beasts of prey by the mountains which confined them. On one part were flocks and herds feeding in the pastures, on another all the beasts of chase frisking in the lawns; the sprightly kid was bounding on the rocks, the subtle monkey frolicking in the trees, and the solemn elephant reposing in the shade. (p. 7)

Although the underscored words give sight-images, they tend to the general partly because of the lack of

¹Cassius Longinuo, On the Sublime, translated by A.O. Prickard, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1906), p. 243.

²I have underscored words to which I wish to call attention.

adjectives. Johnson employs the adjective clause and phrase rather than the adjective, because these constructions not only afford opportunity for parallelism and antithesis, both of which are excellent for the alignment of reasoning and for generalization, but set a rhythmic movement which gives intensity and living emotion. This rhythmical piling up of phrase on phrase casts a spell over the reader and turns his thoughts toward the sublime.¹

Another stylistic value is the significant use of color. Long an artistic medium of meaning, it is used to define space with the nouns verdure, valley, ground, trees, fruits, kid, monkey, and elephant, words which suggest color rather than actually giving it. Only one word of any color concreteness appears in this passage or, as a matter of fact, in the entire story. It is the Latin noun verdure which Johnson defines in his Dictionary as "green color." Because of the neutrality of grays, whites, and blues suggested by these nouns and the passivity of the Latin verdure, these colored areas move out of the surface of the landscape. The reader sees at a distance the "banks of the brooks diversified with flowers and flocks and herds feeding in the pastures". Even "the sprightly kid bounding on the rocks" or "the subtle monkey frolicking in the trees"

¹Longinus, op. cit., p. 235.

appears through a midst. Moreover, a sense of orderliness and restraint is suggested in the scene: . . . "on one part were flocks and herds feeding in the pastures, on another all the beasts of chase frisking in the lawns; all animals -- whether wild or tame, wandered in this extensive circuit."

Such restraint in use of color while reducing the details and making them flow into the scene, also I believe, serves Johnson's moral purpose. Through his subtle use of color he points to the griefs, desires, and fears that "corrode the heart with longings and regrets, all the treachery of the human heart." My assumption is based upon what is said to be the main function of color -- the definition of mood. Although no generally accepted psychology of color exists, the painter and poet have always used it to express an emotional climate.¹ Brilliant colors move into space, filling it with details and particulars which cause a certain emotional response in the reader. According to Ernest Mundt, who writes about color in relation to painting, tentative results of some limited experiments with color suggest that pure yellow induces an association with sheer energy; pure blue, with inert existence; pure red

¹Ernest Mundt, Art, Form and Civilization (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1952), p. 191.

with latent potency. He writes:

None of these three qualities can enter by itself into the reality of action; it requires the medium of mixture. Admixing the impulsion of yellow with the potency of red produces the aggressive vehemence of orange. Adding active yellow to passive blue results in the quiet activity of green. The addition of red to blue -- potency to passivity -- results in purple, a color suggestive of introverted recollection.

The ring of intense colors thus circumscribes symbolically the orbit of man's emotional attitudes, and also corresponds in its oppositions with the polarities of emotional states. Extrovert yellow opposes contemplative violet; inert blue opposes aggressive orange; active green opposes the latent potency of red. (p. 17)

In terms of color thus interpreted, Johnson's description of nature appears to be all the more significant. His method is to paint not in intense color but in hues. Perhaps these hues suggest the motives, the tensions, and the frustrations of mankind. Mundt suggests that at "the still center of the color system lies median gray, symbolizing absolute neutrality. Around it there are hues of more complex mixture that do not seem as 'unnatural' as the purer ones. They are partly neutralized by contradictory values and are thus more immediately reflective of the tensions and frustrations of human existence."¹ Through his deft use of hues in describing the Happy Valley, Johnson seems to hint at these tensions and frustrations which he later personifies in the discourses. In fact,

¹Mundt, op. cit., p. 192.

where other writers employ color to secure mood, Johnson uses the power of the discourse and rhythmical prose to achieve emotion.

Here in the visual imagery of the Happy Valley Johnson gives hints of his allegorical purpose. In the very beginning, he engages the reader through imagery of spacious grandeur that points to something beyond the senses. There is the pull of the sublime reaching down to man. Then there are faint hues which recede into space, symbolizing man torn by tensions and frustrations -- the restlessness of the human heart that reaches out to meet the sublime.

Another effective descriptive passage is that of the hermit's cave. Here auditory images strengthen visual images. The sounds are gentle and soothing; the visual images are restful. A scene as this "composes the mind to pensive meditation."

. . . It was a cavern in the side of the mountain, over-shadowed with palm-trees; at such a distance from the cataract, that nothing more was heard than a gentle uniform murmur, such as composed the mind to pensive meditation, especially when it was assisted by the wind whistling among the branches. (p. 92)

In other scenes Johnson employs very little visual imagery. Appearances seem to be of little importance. The imagery is deliberately vague; it evokes rather than pictures. This treatment is particularly true also of his

presentation of characters. He rarely presents details of physical appearance, yet he evokes a certain image of the character through accounts of physical actions and causes the reader to identify himself with the character. He achieves this effect through kinesthetic impressions.

The sharpest kinesthetic sensations are suggested by verbs. In the very beginning, we discover union of the kinesthetic with the visual in the first chapter in . . . "whose bounty pours down the streams of plenty, and scatters over the world the harvest of Egypt," (p.5) and again in the beautiful phrase "every fowl whom nature has taught to dip the wing in water." (p. 9)

The use that Johnson makes of kinesthetic impulses is most effective in presenting character. To him appearances are not important. It is human behavior that he is interested in; it is emotions and mental processes that he wishes the reader to understand. And in this imaginative process employing imagery he begins with the actions and culminates in the psychological. In order to establish an impression of Rasselas, Johnson gives his actions but not before his discontent is hinted at in a sentence: "Thus they, the sons and daughters of Abyssinia, rose in the morning and lay down at night pleased with each other and with themselves, all but Rasselas, who, in the twenty-sixth year of his age, began to withdraw himself from their pastimes

and assemblies and to delight in solitary walks or silent meditation." (p. 12) Immediately there follow images of physical actions which reveal the preoccupation of a young man who "withdraws himself from pastimes and delights in solitary walks and silent meditation." He sits before tables covered with luxury, forgetting to taste the dainties placed before him." (p. 12) We have the feeling of actually seeing him as he "rises abruptly in the midst of a song and hastily leaves." (p. 12) We recognize his discontent as he "repulses invitations, spends day after day on the banks of rivulets sheltered with trees, where he listens to the birds in the branches, sometimes observes the fish playing in the stream, and casts his eyes upon the pastures and mountains filled with animals." (p. 12) In spite of the fact that these verbs suggest motion, they invite deductions leading to generalities.

In a later passage Rasselas meditates upon his escape from the Happy Valley. Here the sensation of motion and of tension is exemplified. Kinesthetic images are filled with sharper sensations of binding, of holding down; and strengthened by such words as broken rocks, narrow passages, despaired, and discouraged, they give the effect of restlessness and frustration. Yet we do not experience these feelings ourselves. We feel, however, that we have seen Rasselas; we recognize his discontent, understand it

as part of our own, and sympathize with him. We are involved intellectually and emotionally but not physically because Johnson has not really given his character a body and because these verbs are rather generalized. This treatment, of course serves the purpose of allegory, for the characters are symbols of mankind, and Johnson does not want his reader to become empathetically involved with the people in the story.

When he looked around him, he saw himself confined by the bars of nature which had never yet been broken, and by the gate, through which none that had passed it were ever able to return. He was now as impatient as an eagle. He passed week after week in clambering the mountains to see if there was any aperture which the bushes might conceal, but found all the summits inaccessible by their prominence. The iron gate he despaired to open.

He then examined the cavern through which the waters of the lake were discharged, and looking down at a time when the sun shone strongly upon its mouth, he discovered it to be full of broken rocks, which, though they permitted the stream to flow through many narrow passages, would stop anybody of solid bulk. He returned discouraged and dejected. . . . (p. 25-26)

Behind the character of Rasselas is the shadow of Johnson the man himself who knew discontent and frustration and, recognizing them for what they were, is saying through his imagery that in youth the life of sensation, such as was experienced in the Happy Valley, temporarily satisfies, but as the mind with the approach of maturity grows in comprehension discontent sets in.

The allegory contains another example of the same treatment of characters in the description of the women in the Arab's seraglio. This passage occurs in Pekuah's account of her adventure. The woman's physical actions come as expressions of mental states we recognize as universal, notwithstanding the fact that they are the mental states of the women of a harem. We first note their responses in the phrase "looked on me with malignity."

Then follow these sentences:

They ran from room to room as a bird hops from wire to wire in his cage. They danced for the sake of motion as lambs frisk in a meadow. One sometimes pretended to be hurt that the rest might be alarmed, or hid herslef that another might seek her. Part of their time passed in watching the progress of light bodies that floated in the river, and part in marking the various forms into which clouds broke in the sky.
(pp. 173-174)¹

It is impossible to see these human beings revealing human follies without understanding that Johnson's motive in presenting these characters is to show the mental vacuity that has always been one of the ills of human existence. In doing so, he satirizes the opposition of his age to the cultivation of women's minds.

In my analysis of other sensory images I have found that taste, tactful, and auditory images are rather slight. Taste and tactful images, when they do occur, are metaphorical.

¹The underscoring is mine.

Such suggestions as are conveyed by "drinking at the fountain of knowledge to quench the thirst of curiosity" (p. 41) or "the consciousness of his own folly pierced him deeply," (p. 23) and "man is no more emaciated by envy; is no more emasculated by tenderness." (p. 84) make no appeal to human sensations.

Auditory images are thin and often muted, for example, the gentle murmur of water in the description of the hermit's cave. The greater number of sounds are unindividualized, as in "He . . . heard the song of joy or the laugh of carelessness" (p. 77) and "every tongue muttering censure." (p. 103)

This analysis of sensory imagery shows that the spirit of Johnson's style in Rasselas is away from the individual; it does not present sharp images. This bent for generality Professor Wimsatt explains as an influence of his age, the Lockean epistemology that supported a distinct way of imagining and using words. It was one of mechanical operations and mechanical laws; it was a very abstract world, and thus it harmonized with certain neo-classic esthetic principles. Things were expressed only in the most general terms.¹ Professor Wimsatt believes that Johnson, who by temperament and religious conviction resisted the

¹Op. cit., p. 99.

"regularizing of the human soul," participated in the spirit of his age by utilizing the stylistic way of mechanical diction and metaphor.

Concerning Johnson's tendency toward the general, Miss Zilpha Chandler agrees with Mr. Wimsatt. In her study of his prose style, she points out that his imagery is imagery only in the most diluted sense, for his terms tend to be non-sensory, his meaning tends to be general and abstract because of his diction. It is her thesis that if his writings contain imagery, the term imagery means simply non-literal expression. She says:

Johnson's prose does not have strong imaginatives appeal. Almost all abstract language is metaphor, dead, half dead. The great part of language shades into the proper use of the word; the word most relevant in the context. This is the merit of good diction in its most unspecified sense. It is only in this sense that imagery may be attributed to him. His imagery has no need for sensory value. He uses words in their primary meanings, their denotations; not their connotations.¹

His prose style, is for the most part, exact in choice of words; his diction does not primarily express color and emotion. His sentences, showing classical influence, are ornate, carefully constructed and harmonious in sound. All these qualities of his prose may be traced

¹Zilpha Chandler, An Analysis of the Stylistic Techniques of Johnson (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 1928), p. 65.

to his ideals. His belief is in the universal which leads away from the individual; this was hinted at in the description of the Happy Valley. Throughout the discourses his plea is for understanding that demands range of mind and depth of feeling, for the reality that lies outside. Thus he wrote as he defended the broad general truths and struck at the leading faults of the common mass of humanity. His solemn, compassionate outlook gives the allegory its unity of mood. Such artistic blending of emotion with ideas as he achieved makes the allegory so effective in teaching virtues rooted in the past. To a man of the eighteenth century who was encouraged by naturalistic and utilitarian philosophy to follow his own individual desires rather than precedent, the ancient virtues of discipline and fortitude as they appeared in Rasselas must have made good sense; they gave stability to life. At the same time, they let him experience an increased awareness of social responsibility, and the Christian virtues, sympathy, compassion, and duty presented in the allegory must have quickened his heart.

CHAPTER IV

VALUES IN RASSELAS FOR TODAY'S ENGLISH TEACHERS

From an analysis of the ethical values presented in Rasselas, we see that Johnson was concerned with the ultimate of value, good and evil, and that he believed in the importance of preserving the moral law as the best guidance in life. He believed that the good man possessed the ancient virtues of honesty, industry, fortitude, restraint, self-denial, and compassion; and he held without reservation, that literature offered one of the best means of showing man what he should be and how he should live. That he had great faith in the power of books to teach these virtues is shown in a conversation with Boswell when he spoke of the advantages of reading: "The foundation of knowledge must be laid by reading. General principles must be had from books, which, however must be brought to the test of real life."¹ In a letter to his servant, Francis Barber, he wrote, "Let me know what books you are reading. You can never be wise unless you love reading."²

Like Plato, he believed that truth and virtue were to be found beyond the physical world; wisdom was to be

¹Boswell, The Life of Dr. Johnson, ed. George Birkbeck Hill (New York: Bigelow Brown Co.), p. 533.

²Ibid., p. 327.

found in the world of ideas. He complained of Milton because in his plan of studies offered for the education of youths he put writers in scientific subjects above poets, authors, and historians.

But the truth is, that the knowledge of external nature and the sciences which that knowledge requires or includes, are not the great or the frequent business of the human mind. Whether we provide for action or conversation, whether we wish to be useful or pleasing, the first requisite is the religious and moral knowledge of right and wrong. . . . Prudence and justice are virtues and excellencies of all times and all places; we are perpetually moralists, but we are geometricians only by chance.

Let me not be censored and pedantic or paradoxical, for if I have Milton against me, I have Socrates on my side. It was his labor to turn philosophy from the study of nature to speculations upon life; but the innovators whom I oppose are turning off attention from life and nature. They seem to think that we are placed here to watch the growth of plants or the motion of the stars. Socrates was rather of the opinion that what we had to learn was how to do good and avoid evil.¹

Thus Johnson approached the philosophy of value as a man of letters, not as an impersonal scientist. He showed an attitude called for in 1956 in "The Tragic Attitude toward Value":

The philosophy of value, if it is to rise above the level of an academic problem, must bridge the gap

¹Samuel Johnson, "Milton," Lives of the English Poets, ed. Arthur Waugh (London: Oxford University Press, 1926), pp. 73-74.

which now separates it from its chief source of reliable material, the arts which represent feeling. A union between philosophical method and the arts of personal feeling is clearly needed inasmuch as the philosophy of value is itself a revolt against the philosophical tradition which was content to follow only the needs and problems of the impersonal sciences and which, consequently, found in the uniformity of nature and experience only causal sequence, mechanical determination, and logical or mathematical necessity. Blind to all other forms and patterns of experience, this tradition left values, like opinions, in the philosophical limbo ruled by chance, fortune, or caprice. At best, it taught us, as Spinoza said, to love the cold scientific necessity which rules the world and to repress human values, which have their source in illusion.¹

As an instrument for educating youth in our own country, therefore, the literature course is a treasury of aspiration and values, and because it speaks to both the mind and the heart, it causes the student to feel the value of truth and virtue. Because of social upheavals in the last two decades, literature is often for many students the only source from which values may be learned. The postwar migrations, during which more than a third of our people changed their residences in search of work made the whole problem of community life and of decent orderly living just as acute as it was during the war. During sudden shifting of great masses of people who have had no

¹Henry Alonzo Myers, Tragedy: A View of Life (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1956), pp. 3-4.

time or opportunity to become acclimated in their new environment, making for deep social and emotional unrest throughout our nation, youth bears the worst of the discontent, for young people are caught in a chaotic situation between unsettled homes and overcrowded schools. It is no wonder that we have ever rising figures for crime and delinquency and that even the strongest youths are in danger of serious moral deterioration. Charles Nichols describes a student common in most classrooms throughout the nation at the present:

The student was born during the depression and grew up in a nation at war; the world, of which he often seems to have the vaguest awareness, is a world in constant crisis, its back up, its future uncertain. His education has often been on double sessions throughout his grade school experience. He has been "socially promoted." If he is from the South he has often been taught by teachers who are barely literate themselves. His median reading score is often ninth grade (or lower). Very likely his background is one where books, records, and magazines of quality were lacking. He has rarely heard two people engaged in a conversation involving any but the most rudimentary ideas. Mass media in his community has provided only "western" hill-billy music or gospel preachers. He may be one of the thousands of Americans, who has never had access to a decently stocked public library. If any addition to these conspicuous disadvantages, the young person has suffered economic deprivation, an unstable family life, or discrimination, the problems involved are considerably augmented. For the most serious obstacle the learning (except lack of intelligence) is a badly damaged self-esteem. Indeed who can preserve his self-esteem intact in a society as hostile and mechanized as our own?

Hence the individual's capacity for concentration on his stories is vitiated by his necessarily

scattered attention. Often his adaptation to the painful experiences he has had creates a flattening of the emotions, a dulling of personality, a lack of curiosity, which must lessen his interest in literature. Even where the student has had advantages of family background, the factors mentioned may give him feelings of inferiority, or may have created a cynical outlook.¹

What values, then, must literature teach this student in order for him to understand the customs, laws, rules, and patterns of the society in which he must grow up? In other words, what are the values of our democratic society that he must discover? According to a recent poll of teachers these are moral values which the teachers in our schools believe to be important in a democratic society: worth of the individual, basic freedoms, integrity, responsibility for the welfare of mankind, faith in God and man, importance of inner resources, intelligence and freedom to think democratic methods, and right attitudes toward marriage and sex.²

Our world must answer such moral questions as these: How are armaments to be reduced? How can nations create abundance and use it for greater good? How can nations

¹Charles N. Nichols, "There's No Discharge in This War," College English, XVII (May, 1956), 479-481.

²Review of Fay L. Corey's Values of Future Teachers (New York: Teachers College, Columbia University, 1955), Journal of Educational Research Vol. 6 (1956), p. 79.

eliminate and control situations that lead to war? The spirit in which these questions are considered and advocated is "no less essential than the plan itself."¹ Perhaps the solutions for such problems depend ultimately upon the virtues which condition the existence and welfare of society itself, such as discipline, self-restraint, self-control, respect for law, obedience to law, limitation of desires, temperance, co-operation, education.²

In view of the needs of our own culture and of the problems and complexities of the world itself, what surviving worth do the virtues presented in Rasselas hold for students in the twentieth century? It is my belief that in spite of his weaknesses often pointed out by critics--his narrow and inflexible interpretation of mankind's tastes and aspirations; his failure to take sufficiently into account the complexity of human nature; his limited conception of the way to truth--Johnson has much to say of ethical value.³ Students need his sanities of discipline and restraint, his wholesome and courageous

¹Editorial, "Think of a Man," Saturday Review of Literature, August 4, 1956, p. 13.

²Values suggested by Patrick, op. cit., p. 440.

³Joseph E. Brown, The Critical Opinions of Samuel Johnson (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1926), pp. xxi-xxxvii.

fortitude, his sense of social duty, his high regard for the nobility of the mind engaged in patient and thorough study, and his compassionate outlook on mankind.

For a student who has been educated under the influence of a dogmatic and naturalistic philosophy that has emphasized the act of choice in moral affairs, that has emphasized problem solving to the point where no aspect of experience is stable and secure, and that has drawn so far away from "indoctrination" that there remains nothing to be passed on or handed down, Samuel Johnson's words on discipline, restraint, and self-denial meet a particular need.

In Rasselas Johnson guides youth in the art of self-management by pointing to the young men of "spirit and gaiety whose only business was to gratify their desires, and whose time was spent in a succession of enjoyments." He shows that their "pleasures were gross and sensual in which the mind had no part" and that they "laughed at order and law."¹ Youth needs to discipline his appetites to the best interests of his entire personality. This same idea Johnson discussed in essay form in the Rambler, written in 1750 before Rasselas. Of self-denial he says, "No man whose appetites are his masters, can perform the duties of his nature with strictness and regularity; he that would

¹Rasselas, p. 81.

be superior to external influences must first become superior to his own passions."¹

Among the normal functions in personality is sex, which is fundamentally related to the entire process of the individual's growth, maturity, and decline. Misdirection and misuse of the function of sex are among the major forces of personal unhappiness and moral collapse, while the proper manifestations of sex life are important aids in the development of happy, serene, and integrated personality. Sound, wholesome, teaching about sex and about the responsibilities of marriage is among the moral needs of the student.

Both in Rasselas and in the Rambler Johnson treats with shrewd common sense such subjects as the unhappiness caused in marriage by wrong motives in the choice of partners, causes for misunderstandings, disagreements in marriage, and a marriage of prudence without affection. For the girls, especially, many of whom are tempted to make early marriages rather than complete school, he warns that the unhappiness of women whether single or married is the common lot: "Women are placed, according to the old proverb, between Scylla and Charybdis, with no other choice

¹ Samuel Johnson, The Rambler, No. 52, Works of Samuel Johnson (New York: George Dearborn, 1932), p. 112.

choice than of dangers equally formidable; and whether they embrace marriage, or determine upon a single life, are exposed, in consequence of their choice, to sickness, misery, and death."¹

Fortitude, that ancient virtue which permits one to endure patiently misfortune and pain, is a character value that youth needs in order to accept life in a world that is not always friendly. Students need to understand that life cannot always flow in pleasant channels, and that happiness is neither a realistic nor particularly noble aim. He needs to understand that evil is a reality not to be ignored and that it must be faced courageously. Johnson explores the nature of evil in Rasselas and shows that its causes are so various and uncertain, so complex, and so much subject to chance that he would pursue the goal of happiness is certain to meet disillusionment. The experience of the two young people is enlarged by misfortune. Because of it they proceed with disciplined courage to various occupations that will serve mankind. This example of handling misfortune helps a student to understand that man can work in a co-operative search for ways to eliminate evil. Yet when all that man can do has been done, the fact remains that human life carries its

¹The Rambler, No. 39.

load of tragedy, loss, and sorrow. With the attitude of patient resignation he bows before his fate and accepts it. His experience of sorrow is that of countless millions before him. Again, this theme of the unhappy condition of man Johnson had treated in the Rambler: "There is, indeed, no topic on which it is more superfluous to accumulate authorities, nor any assertion of which our own eyes will more easily discover, or our sensations more frequently impress the truth, than, that misery is the lot of man, that our present state is a state of danger."¹

Another aspect of life the student needs to learn to accept with fortitude is what Johnson terms the pettiness of life:

The main of life is, indeed, composed of small incidents and petty occurrences; of wishes for objects not remote, and grief for disappointments of not fatal consequence; of insect vexations which stings us and fly away, impertinences which buzz a while about us, and are heard no more; of meterous pleasures, which dance before us and are dissipated; of compliments which glide off the soul like other music, and are forgotten by him that gave and him that received them.

Such is the general heap out of which every man is to cull his own conditions; for us the chemists tell us that all bodies are resoluble into the same elements, and that the boundless variety of things arises from the different proportion of very few ingredients; so a few

¹The Rambler, No. 120, p. 346.

ingredients; so a few pains and a few pleasures are all the materials of human life, and of these the proportions are partly allotted by Providence, and partly left to the arrangement of reason and of choice.¹

In learning to accept evil and to come to terms with it courageously, youth begins to understand his significance in the universe, for it is through a sense of the tragic in life and the pettiness of life that men unite in a co-operative struggle for a better world. A student experiences a sense of belonging and of active partnership. What he does is worth something because it is a part of a great undertaking. His contribution of work and of loyalty is positively appraised, and thereby his life is saved from aimlessness and futility. This sense of the continuity of mankind, the continuity of goodness, of a glimpse of the one in the many which Johnson reveals both in substance and in style--intellectually and emotionally--is one of the greatest values we English teachers can give our students because Johnson comes to realize that individuals do not exist by themselves but form a part of human society and need to participate in it. His sympathy reaches out to grasp the unity of mankind and to engage in the struggles going on the world over for greater welfare and justice. More

¹The Rambler, No. 68, p. 127.

specifically he feels a part of his own community and puts himself into his family, government, and church.

The duty of co-operation, of useful participation in life, is a virtue Johnson treats most forcefully.

Though he does not use the term co-operation, he makes it plainly a duty by showing that the good man works for his fellowman. In Rasselas, for example, he reminds the student that both the hermit and the astronomer returned to society in an effort to make their lives more meaningful. In one of the selections from the Rambler this theme is discussed:

There is nothing more fatal to a man whose business is to think, than to have learned the art of regaling his mind with airy gratifications. Other vices or follies are restrained by fear, reformed by admonition, or rejected by the conviction which the comparison of our conduct with that of others may in time produce. But this invisible riot of the mind, this secret prodigality of being, is secure from detection, and fearless of reproach. The dreamer retires to his apartments, shuts out the cares and interruptions of mankind, and abandons himself to his own fancy; new worlds rise up before him, one image is followed by another, and a long succession of delights dances round him. He is at last called back to life by nature, or by custom, and enters peevish into society, because he cannot model it to his own will. He returns from his idle excursions with the asperity, though not with the knowledge, of a student, and hastens again to the same felicity with the eagerness of a man bent upon the advancement of some favorite science. The infatuation strengthens by degrees, and like the poison of opiates, weakens his powers, without any external symptom of malignity.¹

¹The Rambler, No. 89, p. 142.

The sense of social consciousness revealed in this passage and expressed in the eighteenth century through practical benevolence and humanitarian reforms gained impetus in the nineteenth century and found expression in, for example, Tennyson's "The Palace of Art," a work which a student in the twentieth century can read with profit, for Tennyson is saying in poetry what Johnson has said in prose: man cannot live to himself and keep his sanity. When man walls himself up in selfish isolation to pursue the good things in life, forgets that he is a part of mankind, and looks disdainfully on his brothers, he fills his soul with "deep dread and loathing of solitude."¹ Tennyson says the sin of a life lived selfishly is a sin against God, and he ends his poem on this note:

"Make me a cottage in the vale," she said,
 "Where I may mourn and pray.
 Yet pull not down my palace towers that are,
 So lightly beautifully built:
 Perchance I may return with others there
 When I have purged my guilt."²

Tennyson is saying here as Johnson has said in Rasselas that the real test of a man is not what he knows, but what he is in himself and in his relation to others.

¹ Alfred Tennyson, "The Palace of Art," Poetical Works of Alfred Lord Tennyson (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1900), p. 52.

² Ibid., p. 53.

The duty of co-operation as Tennyson and Johnson present it in these words has real value, it seems to me, for our students. To accept one's place in the human drama is a pattern for living which is consistent with the best scientific, philosophical, and religious methods of our generation. It is a pattern in which many educated and ethically sensitive individuals in our day actually find themselves looking out upon life and reality. No less a person than Einstein held this value important in the training of youth:

It is not enough to teach man a specialty. Through it he may become a kind of useful machine, but not a harmoniously developed personality. It is essential that the student acquire an understanding of and a lively feeling for values. He must acquire a vivid sense of the beautiful and the morally good. He must learn to understand the motives of human beings, their illusions and their sufferings and in order to acquire a proper relationship to individual fellow men and to the community.¹

This pattern of co-operation already has acceptance exemplified in the enthusiasm of individuals for human betterment without reference to intellectual formulas, religious sanctions, or ulterior rewards. It involves continuity with the long past and projection into the distant future. It is the process of enriching human experience with forms of beauty and sentiment.

¹Albert Einstein, "Importance of the Humanities," College English, XIV (1952), p. 105.

This brings to mind another value inherent in Rasselas, one which I have not treated specifically. It is the all-embracing atmosphere of grandeur which lifts the reader out of himself toward a quality of perfection that is the ultimate value of Rasselas. This sense of a goal lying outside man and his world requires both mind and heart to seek the really first rate; such integrity of a student's mental and emotional life is real education and real religion. I make no apology for the latter term, for, as Sir Richard Livingstone says, "Whatever people may think of religion, it is a sign of superficiality to think nothing about it. To miss the spiritual is to miss life itself."¹ It seems to me, that whatever else a student might gain from reading Rasselas, he cannot fail to feel the pull of the sublime "to which we all aspire, and where," says Imlac, "there will be pleasure without danger, and security without restraint."

¹Sir Richard Livingstone, "Adult Education in England," Modern Education and Human Values, Pitcairn Crable Foundation Lecture Series (Pittsburg: University of Pittsburg Press, 1948), p. 121.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

During the writing of the last part of my thesis a new book, The Language of Value edited by Ray Lepley, was published.¹ Had it been available to me at the onset, my research would have been guided by it, for in it I have found clarification that I wished for during my study. It is a collection of philosophical essays, which describe and analyze particular problems in value, consider more general problems within total human adjustments, or deal with the peculiarities of the language of value. It shows the importance of and the interest in the nature and status of value in our scientific world. For my study of values in Rasselas I found the following essays significant: "The Language of Values," by Willis Moore; "Some Puzzles for Attitude Theories of Value," by Richard B. Brandt; "The Meaning of 'Intrinsic Values,'" by Harold N. Lee.

In dealing with the language of value Willis Moore points out that the actuality of the value situation was prior to and independent of the use of language of any kind and penetrated to the very nature of language itself. This premise implies that value was inherent in the primitive

¹The Language of Value, ed. Ray Lepley (New York: Columbia University Press, 1957).

communications of gestures, overt acts, and such an expression as "u-m-m-m." On the brute level the language of value was the imperative overt action which served as a means of keeping "the individual in contact with the herd and within limits of behavioral patterns of survival value for the species concerned."¹ From this primitive level the language of value moved to the imperative sentence or a directive in regard to behavior, and became a problem in semantics, but such commands were not "scientific sentences," because they were not a picturing but a "pushing or a pulling; and we do not test pushings or pullings for degree of resemblance to something."²

When the language of value moved to the descriptive sentence of gentle persuasion, it became a more effective instrument for inducing agreement in value because the language took the form of discourse which sought to modify behavior or value in an indirect way, and it has become the only type of imperative, according to Moore, that we may expect to be effective in the modification of value. This premise, I believe, points up the importance of Rasselas as an effective instrument of moral teaching because Johnson has employed the form of discourse which as

¹Ray Lepley, op. cit., p. 18.

²Ibid.

allegory intends to modify behavior as well as values.

Moore has found discourse to be "descriptive in its basic-level functioning and consequently amenable to scientific treatment."¹ He explains "scientific treatment" by observing that descriptions of what men do can be considered normative because of the continuity of racial behavior. He cites the fact that human beings are similar in nature and that widespread and long-term agreements in human society are at least fair approximations to satisfactory choices; an individual may even expect to be able to direct his own behavior fairly successfully in terms of such generalizations.² This thesis serves to add significance to my analysis of materials showing Johnson's belief in the universality of human experience and to my conviction that his descriptive psychology of the passions and motives in human behavior is probably just as "scientific" as similar observations made by psychologists.

The other essays which I have cited deal with the empirical nature of value. Richard Brandt observes that values are confirmable by observation in the manner of empirical science. On the other hand, he reminds us that

¹Lepley, op. cit., p. 25.

²Ibid.

there is an emotional element in value for the reason that value language is "essentially imperative language, a language of recommendation, expressive of attitudes, and weighted with emotive meaning."¹ But he believes that values do not always correspond with attitudes, and, as we have seen in Rasselas, Johnson believed that to pursue the good according to our own desires and emotions was to invite disillusionment and even disaster.

Finally, in the essay "The Meaning of 'Intrinsic Value'," Harold N. Lee believes that "moral values are formed in the light of values to be realized in circumstances other than those which obtained."² He holds that there are "unrealized values which are sometimes judged to be greater than those realized."³ This concept is one of potentiality. Value in the broadest sense is a potentiality which means a fulfillment of the intellectual and emotional sensibilities of man. Intrinsic value implies the aspirations, the yearnings of man. It is the reach that exceeds the grasp, or a sense of perfection. This intrinsic value inherent in the pervading tone of grandeur in Rasselas makes the book one of real value.

¹Ibid., p. 155.

²Lepley, op. cit., p. 192.

³Ibid.

In conclusion, it seems evident in view of these recent philosophical studies of the language of values that literary works such as Rasselas will more nearly serve the student as guides to the good life than the more practical or useful sciences, for in the last analysis our student is a man who needs the longer view, backward and forward, in order to express himself through service within his community. He must seek the universal; in the twentieth century rugged individualism is the sign of the uncouth. As he reaches upward, literature can help him, because

It is the writer's privilege to help man endure by lifting up his heart, by reminding him of the courage and honor and pride and compassion and pity and sacrifice which have been the glory of his past. The poet's voice need not merely be the record of man, it can be one of the props, the pillars to help him endure and prevail.¹

¹The words of William Faulkner upon receiving the Nobel Prize Award for Literature in 1950.

APPENDIX

APPENDIX A
SENSORY VERBS APPEARING IN RASSELAS

Auditory Verbs - - - 61

address	direct	pronounce
admonish	discourse	propose
answer	entreat	prattle
applaud	enumerate	protest
ask	exhort	recite
bewail	expatiate	refer
bleat	explain	relate
call	hear	remark
command	inform	reproach
communicate	impart	say
complain	importune	shatter
conclude	inquire	solicite
confer	interpose	speak
consult	interrupt	talk
converse	lament	tell
cry	laugh	upbraid
declare	listen	urge
demand	mutter	utter
deny	order	warm
dictate	proclaim	welcome
		whistle

Kinetic Verbs - - - 195

act	climb	dress	float
advance	collect	drink	flow
arise	cover	drive	fly
arrive	clung	drop	frisk
approach	compell	dig (dug)	frolic
avoid	confine	divert	gather
balance	continue	elude	glide
bar	convulse	enlarge	hang
boil	crawl	ensue	hasten
bow	crush	entangle	haunt
break	cull	enter	hew
bring	dance	erect	hide
bound	dart	escape	hinder
build	decline	exhaust	hop
burst	demolish	extinguish	hover
calm	deliver	fall	imitate
carry	depart	fasten	invade
cast	descend	fetch	issue (out)
catch	destroy	fill	join
cease	detain	fix	kill
charge	discharge	fly	labor
chase	disentangle	foan	leap
chill	dip	follow	leave
clamber	divide	force	lessen
		forge	lie

lift	pursue	shake	swim
measure	quicken	shift	tear
melt	quit	shrink	threaten
mingle	guiver	shut	throw
mount	raise	sink	trace
murder	recede	slacken	travel
obstruct	release	sleep	traverse
open	remove	snatch	tremble
overbalance	repose	soothe	turn
overflor	rest	squander	unbend
overhang	retreat	station	unconnected
overleap	rise	start	unite
overpower	retire	straggle	upborne
pant	return	stray	usurp
pass	roll	stop	vanish
pause	rove	stream	vanquish
peck	run	strike	venture
pierce	rush	struggle	vie
plant	sail	stun	walk
play	salute	succor	wait
ply	scatter	surmount	wander
pluck	seek	surround	wanton
pour	send	suspend	waved
press	seize	swarm	weaken
prostrate	sequester	swell	wear (away)

withdraw

wrought

Tactual Verbs - - - 10

bite	hurt
chill	incense
dry	pain
exhaust	peck
fire	suffer
feel	torture

Gustatory Verbs - - - 5

Canker
eat
feast
feed
taste

Olfactory Verbs - - - 0

Visual Verbs - - - 82

adorn	conceal	float	mingle
advance	corrode	flourish	mount
animate	crawl	fly	overbalance
appear	crowd	foam	overhang
approach	dance	hang	overflow
attract	darken	gather	overshadow
behold	dart	gaze	paint
bite	dawn	interwoven	pitch
boil	draw	join	play
bow	display	kiss	pours
browse	embrace	land	prey
canker	entangle	light	rekindle
chain	enter	illuminate	repose
cloud	entertain	infest	riot
collect	fade	melt	ruin

sail	shrink	stand	suspend
salute	sit	stare	tremble
search	sleep	station	wanton
shelter	smile	surround	watch
shine	snatch	survey	wither
shower	sparkle		

Frequency of verbs appearing in Rasselas

abashed	1	allow	9	ate	1
act	13	allure	2	attain	2
accompany	2	amuse	8	attempts	7
acquit	1	animate	1	attend	5
add	5	anticipate	1	attract	2
address	2	appear	10	avoid	1
administer	2	applaud	2	balance	1
admire	1	apply	2	bar	1
admit	9	appoint	1	bear	6
admonish	1	approach	7	be, is are, etc.	555
adorn	1	arrive	7		
advancing	10	arise	1	begin	33
advantage	1	arm	1	beguile	1
afford	15	assemble	2	beheld	4
afflict	1	asked	7	believe	14
agree	8	aspire	1	belong	1
agitate	1	assist	4	bent	1
alarm	1	astonish	1	bequeath	1

bestow	3	carry	6	compelled	4
betray	4	cost	4	complained	1
bewail	1	catch	3	complicated	1
bid	1	cease	10	compose	3
bite	2	celebrate	1	comprehend	1
bleat	1	censure	1	conceive	7
boils	1	chaines	1	congratulate	2
bound	2	change	1	conclude	4
born	1	charm	1	concur	3
borrowed	1	charge	2	condemn	1
bow	3	chase	1	conduce	2
break	7	chill	1	confess	5
bring	13	choose	8	confe	2
brouse	2	clamber	3	confide	1
build	2	cling	1	confine	4
burst	3	climb	1	confirms	1
burthened	2	close	6	conform	1
busy	1	cloud	2	confound	1
buy	1	collect	2	conjecture	4
canker	1	combine	1	conquer	1
call	7	command	7	consider	29
calm	1	commits	5	console	2
come	32	communicated	3	consent	2
care	1	compare	6	consult	1

contain	1	dance	4	determine	8
contemn	1	dare	3	descend	7
content	1	darken	1	describe	3
continue	15	dart	2	deserve	3
contribute	3	dash	1	desire	11
control	1	down	1	despair	2
converse	4	debar	1	depart	2
convince	3	debase	1	depreciate	1
convulse	1	deceive	2	despise	2
collect	2	decide	2	destroy	1
co-operate	2	declare	3	destine	1
copy	1	decline	2	deversified	1
corrode	1	defy	1	devote	2
corrupt	1	deject	2	disappoint	1
counsel	1	delayed	4	discern	1
count	1	deliberated	1	discourage	1
court	1	deliver	2	discover	14
cover	1	delight	12	discharge	3
crawl	1	demand	1	discontent	1
credit	2	demolish	1	discourse	3
cry	2	deny	5	disengage	1
crowd	1	depend	1	disgusted	1
crush	1	derive	1	dismissed	6
cull	1	detain	2	display	2
cure	1	detect	1	dispose	1

dispute	3	dug	1	erect	1
disregard	1	effect	1	escape	8
dissipate	1	elude	2	estimate	1
distinguish	1	embalm	1	exalted	1
disturb	5	embark	1	examine	4
dictate	4	embitter	1	excel	1
die	5	embrace	3	exchange	3
direct	4	employ	2	excite	5
differ	3	enable	8	exclude	2
diffuse	1	enamoured	1	exempt	1
dip	1	encourage	1	exert	2
disentangle	1	encounter	1	exhaust	2
divert	4	end	6	exhort	1
divest	1	endeavor	15	expatiates	1
divide	4	endure	2	expect	17
do	18	enforce	3	explaine	2
doubt	2	enjoy	12	expose	4
draw	3	enlarge	2	extend	5
dread	2	ensue	1	fade	1
dream		entangle	3	fail	1
dress	1	enter	17	fall	9
drink	1	entreated	6	familiarize	2
drop	2	entertained	2	fancy	2
drive	4	enumerate	1	fasten	3
dry	1	envy	5	favor	3

fear	4	forsake	1	hate	2
feast	2	free	1	haunt	1
feed	2	frequent	1	hear	25
feel	13	frighten	1	heed	1
fetch	1	frisk	2	help	1
figure	2	frolic	1	hesitate	1
fill	8	frustrate	1	hew	1
find	75	furnish	1	hide	5
fire	2	gain	7	hinder	2
fits	1	gather	2	hired	3
fix	8	gaze	3	hope	11
flatter	4	give	23	hop	1
float	3	gladden	1	hover	2
flourish	1	glide	2	hurt	1
flow	2	go	21	imagine	11
fly	6	govern	1	impart	5
foam	1	gratify	4	impell	2
follow	9	grant	1	implore	1
fondle	1	grieve	4	importune	3
forbear	8	grow	4	impute	3
force	6	guess	1	incensed	1
forfeit	1	hang	2	incite	2
forge	1	happen	12	increase	5
forget	11	harrass	2	induce	1
form	6	hasten	5	indulge	3

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infest	3	kiss	1	marry	3
informed	1	know	50	mean	1
influence	1	labor	5	measure	1
inhabit	1	lament	3	meditate	2
injure	4	land	1	meet	8
illuminate	1	languish	1	melt	1
inquire	2	laugh	1	mingle	5
insinuate	1	lay	7	miscarry	1
instill	1	lead	5	mislead	1
intend	4	leap	1	miss	2
intercept	2	learn	11	mistaken	1
interpose	1	leave	20	mitigate	1
interrupt	1	lessen	2	modify	1
interweave	1	lie	8	mount	2
intrude	1	lift	1	muse	1
intrust	1	lighten	1	mutter	1
invade	3	light	1	name	1
invite	4	limit	2	need	3
issue	3	listen	8	neglect	6
join	5	live	24	negotiate	2
judge	1	look	22	note	1
justify	2	long	4	number	1
keep	6	lose	11	obey	1
kill	1	love	4	oblige	2
kindle	1	mark	2	observe	17

obtain	4	partake	2	posses	7
obstruct	2	pass	30	pour	4
obviate	1	pay	4	practice	2
occupy	1	pause	1	prattle	1
offend	4	peek	1	preclude	1
offer	3	perceive	7	predominate	3
omit	3	perform	7	prefer	1
opened	6	perish	4	prepare	7
oppose	1	permit	6	prescribe	2
operate	1	people	1	present	3
order	1	perplex	1	preside	1
ought	1	persist	2	preserve	2
outlive	1	persuade	1	press	4
overbalance	1	persue	6	presume	1
overflow	3	pierce	2	pretend	3
overhang	1	picture	1	prevail	7
overleap	1	pine	1	prevent	1
overlook	1	pitch	2	prey	3
overpower	2	pity	2	proceed	5
overshadow	1	place	7	proclaim	1
overwhelm	1	plant	3	procure	6
owe	1	play	6	produce	8
own	1	please	8	profess	1
pain	1	ply	1	prolong	1
paint	3	pluck	1	promise	5

pronounce	2	recollect	4	remind	2
propose	3	recommend	2	remove	2
prostrate	1	record	1	renew	4
protest	1	recover	4	require	7
prove	6	recreate	1	repay	2
provide	1	recur	2	repent	3
punish	2	redress	1	repine	2
purchase	2	re-enter	1	repose	3
purpose	3	reflex	1	reposite	1
put	7	reform	1	repress	1
qualify	1	refuse	6	represent	2
quicken	2	regard	1	reproach	4
quiet	1	regret	2	repulse	1
quit	2	regulate	2	reside	3
quiver	2	rehearse	1	resign	2
raise	7	reject	4	resolve	19
rage	1	rejoice	8	resort	1
range	4	rekindle	2	respect	1
read	2	relate	5	rest	3
reason	2	relax	1	retain	1
recall	3	release	2	retire	1
recede	2	relieve	1	restore	3
receive	13	remark	3	restrain	3
recite	1	remain	5	retreat	3
reciprocate	1	remember	7	retire	7

return	21	set	11	sported	1
reverence	2	settle	1	sprend	4
review	1	shake	1	squander	1
revolve	1	share	1	subjugate	1
reward	1	shatter	1	subside	1
riot	3	shelter	1	subside	1
rise	12	shift	1	subsist	1
rob	2	shine	1	succeed	3
roll	4	show	9	succor	1
rove	1	shower	1	suffer	19
run	3	shrink	2	suggest	2
rush	2	shut	1	suited	1
ruin	1	sink	3	supply	7
sail	3	sit	19	support	2
salute	2	slacken	1	suppose	11
scatter	1	sleep	4	surround	4
search	1	smile	4	surprise	3
second	1	snatch	1	survey	5
secure	6	solaced	1	survive	1
see	57	soliciting	4	suspect	5
seek	6	soothe	3	suspend	1
send	6	sparkle	1	sustain	1
sequester	1	spare	2	stand	6
seize	5	speak	7	stare	1
serve	1	spend	8	start	4

stay	3	thank	1	wander	9
station	1	think	30	want	8
stray	1	throw	5	wish	8
straggle	1	torture	1		
stream	1	trace	3		
strike	2	trade	1		
stop	78	travel	10		
store	1	threaten	2		
struggle	1	treasure	1		
stun	1	tremble	2		
study	1	trick	1		
stupify	1	trust	4		
swarm	1	try	4		
swell	1	turned	1		
swim	4	tyrannise	1		
take	19	unacquaint	2		
talk	3	unbend	1		
taste	2	understand	5		
teach	10	undertake	3		
tear	1	unknown	1		
tell	18	unite	3		
tend	1	vanish	1		
tempt	1	vary	5		
terminate	1	visit	6		
terrified	1	walk	10		

APPENDIX B

NOUNS APPEARING IN CHAPTERS I, XX, XXXVII, XXXVIII

General Class	Sensory Class
Chapter I Happy Valley	Chapter I
animals	arches of stone
beast of prey	cavern
delights	cleft
eminence	elephant
engines	kid
fertility	monkey
fish	mountains
fowl	precipice
flocks	rivulet
flowers	valley
fruit	verdue
herds	
lake	
necessities	
passage	
rock	
stream	
superfluities	
trees	

Chapter II Master's palace

accommodations	boughs
appearances	path
art	rivulet
basin	shrub
habitations	
palace	
possessions	
spaces	
stone	
stream	
table	
wood	

Chapter xxi Hermit's cave

apartments	bench
door	book
instruments	cataract
neatness	palm trees
place	paper
regularity	pens

Chapters xxxvii - xxxviii Bandit's home

carpets	couch
house	crocodiles
inner apartments	river-horses
meat	turrets
supper	
tent	

APPENDIX C

ADJECTIVES APPEARING IN CHAPTER I, RASSELAS

Description of Happy Valley - p. 8

Five adjectives

1. spacious valley
2. human industry
3. thick wood
4. ancient days
5. massy

Two participles

1. surrounded on every side by mountains
2. forged by artificers

Six adjective clauses

1. which wisdom - - - - - princes
2. of which - - - - - middle part
3. by which - - - - - entered
4. that - - - - - rock
5. of that which it had been disputed - - - - - industry
6. that no man - - - - - them

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