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THE DIALECTICAL 'I':
INVENTION AND SELF IN ROBERT BURTON'S
ANATOMY OF MELANCHOLY

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"The Dialectical 'I':
Invention and Self in Robert Burton's
Anatomy of Melancholy

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Abstract:

This study explores Robert Burton's art of invention in the Anatomy of Melancholy and argues that the ethno-centric personality of the persona employs strategies of rhetorical invention in the Preface to the Anatomy in order to draw the reader into the labyrinth of the Anatomy proper. Burton constructs his discourse in the Preface according to the principles of the Aristotelian-Ciceronian formulae required to gain the reader's immediate attention, arouse his expectations, and initiate his interest in the treatise that follows. In the Anatomy proper, however, Burton uses principles of dialectical invention that closely resemble the Ramist theory of analysis and genesis in order to give the idea of melancholy its most extensive scope and depth of development.

A decidedly logocentric personality dominates the main design of the partitions and generates ideas in the Anatomy proper by using the Ramist modes of invention, which are clearly visible in the synoptic charts to each of the three partitions. The modes represent the operation of Ramist

analysis in which any idea can be explored in terms of cause, effect, definition, species, testimony, and so on until the exploration is finally exhausted. The digressions in the Anatomy proper appear to be the products of Ramist genesis or compositio, the means by which the generative personality of the persona breaks away from the order of analysis to create new compositions and new perspectives. Burton's art of dialectical invention illustrates the exploratory nature of the seventeenth-century mind as it ranges and wanders over all fields of human knowledge, popular and learned.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Much has been written about the Renaissance as an intellectual movement which not only introduced a rebirth of classical Greek and Roman philosophy but also brought forth an interest in the new cosmology made popular by Copernicus, Kepler, and Galileo. The age itself thus cultivated an uneasy climate for the battle between ancient authority and modern speculation. The new science put traditionally accepted first principles to the test of observation and experiment, and suddenly the world and the universe appeared to behave in ways that clearly ran counter to the ancient theories found in the works of Aristotle and Ptolemy. No wonder, then, that the Renaissance was also an age of much controversy, doubt, and uncertainty that ultimately lead to a general feeling of dis-ease known as Renaissance melancholy which, at least to Robert Burton in the seventeenth century, embraced all men and affected all of man's faculties including mind, body, and soul. Yet for Burton, melancholy represented much more than the sum of its parts; it became a convenient springboard for the exploration of knowledge leading to the discovery of ideas.

Burton's Anatomy of Melancholy represents a virtual labyrinth of information directly or indirectly related to the subject of melancholy with all of its medical, psychological, social, intellectual, and philosophical manifestations. His endless citation of sources indicates his concern with recording a variety of facts and opinions about melancholy, yet he shows a reluctance to air his own opinions and beliefs. As Joan Webber has observed, he prefers speculation to conclusion and thus deliberately avoids the absolute (86). He frequently gives us an inflated catalogue of authorities who are allowed to have their say, yet Burton rarely tells us which authorities he considers most reliable; according to Stanley Fish, "it doesn't matter which" (308). Burton's principal endeavor is to explore and investigate, taking the reader with him on his voyage of discovery. The Anatomy of Melancholy shows an extremely inventive mind capable of producing a wide and endless stream of ideas both ancient and modern, and we often wonder just how Burton manages to generate so much material. Lawrence Babb believes that the book took form as Burton "began shaping notes" and making lists that must have "grown very long" as his mind ranged over the social, physical, psychological, and intellectual world of man (Sanity in Bedlam 14). And yet we wonder if any conceptual

theory or theories for the invention of ideas lies at the heart of it all.

The purpose of this study is to examine Robert Burton's art of invention as he uses it in the Anatomy of Melancholy; and I will begin with the title of Burton's book, which provides the key not only to his art of discovering ideas but also to the intentions of his book. According to Rosalie Colie, the word "anatomy" finds its source in Vesalius's De corporis humani fabrica (1543) and operates much like a

metaphor for all sorts of examinations, or "discoveries," uncovering of areas of the globe or of knowledge analogous to the anatomical uncovering of the systems of the human body. . . . It is not the bones, though, that are the object of the investigation: the investigation is its own object. (431-32)

The anatomist's procedure follows a clearly defined method of stripping away the fabric of the human body in an effort to understand it. Devon L. Hodges argues that after the cutting has been completed, "an idealized body is destroyed, but a new field of knowledge is opened up for the creation of a scientific order of knowledge (5). Burton's procedure is much the same: he strips away the fabric of melancholy man in order to discover what lies beneath the surface. He continually cuts away layer after layer until nothing

remains of an old order, leaving a neatly cleared ground from which a new one can emerge to take its place. This procedure may possibly explain why Burton so busily writes of melancholy in order to rid himself of the disease.

The anatomist's method of producing "discoveries" has an interesting parallel with the art of dialectic introduced by Peter Ramus in his Dialecticae institutiones published in 1543, the same year of the publication of Vesalius's De corporis. According to Ramus, dialectic involves two operations called invention and judgment. Invention begins with a question about a doubtful matter and then proceeds to a topical place-logic of fourteen modes, or "seats," of invention: cause, effect, subject, adjunct, contraries, genus, species, name, notation, conjugation, testimony, comparatives, diversions, and definition. In the 1543 Dialecticae these modes appear in the form of bracketed tables which show the dichotomization of the parts of invention. According to Walter J. Ong, the art of invention "becomes thus a kind of commonplace yielding the various parts of itself (and of 'things'), which in turn yield more parts through a series of successive openings, like a Chinese puzzle" (Ramus, Method, and the Decay 200). Ramus's dialectic is presentational in its aspect, for its primary objective is to display ideas rather than to seek truth.

And like the method of anatomy, it, too, dissects, divides, and subdivides until the matter of investigation is completed. David Renaker has already called attention to the similarity between Burton's synoptic charts in the Anatomy of Melancholy and Ramus's dichotomies in his books on dialectic. Renaker lists several books by Ramus that Burton had in his possession, among them a 1577 edition of the Dialectic and a 1594 edition of the Lectures on Dialectic (211). However, Renaker interprets Burton's synoptic charts as "a map of the book" (212) rather than as diagrams representing the modes of invention. In other words, Renaker understands the charts to represent the product rather than the process of Burton's invention.

If Burton's central preoccupation in the Anatomy of Melancholy lies in investigation and discovery, then I think we can account for the wide discrepancy of opinion among scholars and critics over the genre, structure, substance, and persona of the work. To use Colie's word, scholarship has unfortunately focused its attention upon the "bones" of Burton's book rather than upon the method that he uses to lay them bare.

Genre studies of the Anatomy of Melancholy begin in the twentieth century with Sir William Osler's classification of the book as "a medical treatise" (252). Hardin Craig

believes the work represents a "critical encyclopedia" (244). William R. Mueller considers the work to be a study of England's social conditions (8). Northrop Frye, in an attempt to redefine genre altogether, classifies the Anatomy as "the greatest Menippean satire in English before Swift" (311). Lawrence Babb defines the nature of the book as "a collection of essays" (12). Ellen Louise Hurt labels the Anatomy as "a non-fiction prose treatise" (86). Rosalie Colie calls it "a major document in the genre of paradox" (454). Richard Leonard Nochimson, despite Hurt's classification of the Anatomy as non-fiction, asserts that the book is "a conscious fiction" ("Robert Burton: A Study of the Man, His Work, and His Critics" 128). Bridget Gellert Lyons places the Anatomy in the "expository-book tradition" (141). Devon L. Hodges classifies the work as "a scientific and theological treatise" (108). Ruth Fox, who has noticed the discrepancy over genre, explains that Burton's book "is all of these things joined in one Anatomy of Melancholy to create a kind of "compound character" (12).

In spite of all attempts to determine a genre for the Anatomy of Melancholy, I think Stanley Fish's classification applies most readily to the work. In his introduction to Self-Consuming Artifacts, he draws a distinction between two kinds of literary presentation: if the presentation

fulfills the reader's expectations, if it reflects the reader's values and beliefs, then the presentation, he argues, is rhetorical because "the experience of such a form will be flattering, for it tells the reader that what he has always known about the world is true and that the ways of his thinking are sufficient"; on the other hand, a presentation is dialectical if it "requires of its readers a searching and rigorous scrutiny of everything they believe in and live by it does not preach truth, but it asks that its readers discover the truth for themselves" (1). The Anatomy of Melancholy undoubtedly represents Fish's dialectical presentation since it forces the reader into a mist of paradox between the ancient world of traditionally accepted first principles handed down from classical texts and the new world of modern speculation that submits all traditionally accepted theories to the test of empiricism. The reader must wander through the book and decide for himself which of these two conflicting worlds of thought provides the best answers for him. And yet the reader also encounters the book's inclusion of myth, fable, superstition, proverb, and non-authoritative popular opinion, which undercut authority altogether. The reader must take his choice. Thus, Burton invites his reader to search for his own truth as Burton unfolds for him layer

after layer all human knowledge both learned and popular.

If we return to the discussion of invention, we remember that the Ramist dialectical invention is also presentational. Its principal aim seeks not truth but only an investigation of ideas preparatory to the discovery of truth. I plan to show that the process of invention that Burton uses in the Anatomy proper reflects that of the Ramist presentational dialectic, and it creates a form that Stanley Fish coincidentally classifies as a "dialectical presentation." Thus, the form mirrors the process which gave rise to that form.

Structurally, the Anatomy of Melancholy opens with a dedication to Burton's patron, George Berkley, signed by Democritus Junior. Following this dedication appears a poem entitled "Democritus Junior To His Book," which is then followed by "The Argument of the Frontispiece." Next, "The Author's Abstract of Melancholy" appears, followed by the Preface entitled "Democritus Junior To The Reader," which contains about one hundred pages of prefatory material. After the Preface appears the brief and comical threat, "To The Reader Who Employs His Leisure Ill." Finally, we arrive at the synoptic charts to the first partition. Synoptic charts also appear before the second and third partitions. The first edition of 1621 contains a title page, the

dedication, a seventy-two-page preface followed by the brief passage titled "To The Reader Who Employs His Leisure Ill." This first edition also contains the synoptic charts. The book closes with a six-page postscript signed "Robert Burton." The 1624 edition contains much the same material, except that the postscript signed by Burton is deleted entirely (including Burton's signature) with half of its material transferred to the Preface. The third edition of 1628 replaces the title page with the famous engraved one. The 1651 edition contains a preface more than twice the length of that contained in the 1621 first edition (Babb, Sanity in Bedlam 15-18).

The Anatomy proper contains three partitions: the first concentrates on the causes and symptoms of melancholy, the second dwells upon cures, and the third partition concerns love-melancholy. Yet it is important to notice that the third partition contains a preface, which may indicate that Burton might have considered this last partition as a separate book independent of the preceding two although connected thematically by the same subject matter in general. Each partition descends in a logical fashion from the largest structural unit to the smallest beginning with Section, followed by Member, which in turn is followed by Subsection. These sections, members,

and subsections represent the layers of Burton's subject matter, and he repeats this same layered effect in the second and third partitions. Embedded into these units are multiple digressions that always depart from and return to the greater design of the book.

The critical debates over the structure of the Anatomy of Melancholy focus primarily upon the question of whether or not (and to what extent) the work adheres to the logical organization presented to the reader in the synoptic charts preceding the partitions. Sir William Osler describes the structure in the Anatomy as "orderly in arrangement" (252). Yet the constant digressions, wanderings, and roving on the part of the author have caused much disagreement as to whether any order at all underlines the book. Lawrence Babb, for example, believes that the book is "not one work but several, the lesser discourses embedded in the text of the greater" (Sanity in Bedlam 8). The looseness of the book's construction probably explains Babb's reason for classifying the Anatomy as a collection of essays. James Roy King argues that Burton's fort^é lies in "smaller forms, which could be embedded in larger, unshaped masses of material" (75). The Anatomy, then, obviously defies our modern notion of organic unity, a concept that did not emerge until the early nineteenth century. Yet Daniel Henry Finlay reminds

us that seventeenth-century writers composed according to the encyclopedic tradition and thus created forms that to us appear irregular and loosely constructed in their overall design (11-12). David Renaker's discussion of Ramist influences upon the synoptic charts offers a justification for a logical order in the Anatomy, yet he asserts that Burton does not "adapt himself completely to the celebrated 'method'" of the Ramist order since Burton, he says, strays so often from his subject; and when Burton does apply his discourse to the logical order, he does so only in "the most perfunctory manner, with undisguised haste and weariness" (217). Once again, Renaker interprets Burton's Ramist design as a form or program to follow rather than as a heuristic for invention. The form, Renaker asserts, represents nothing more than a map for Burton to follow; and whenever Burton strays from that map, he ignores logic altogether (220).

Ruth Fox recognizes a two-sided design in the Anatomy of Melancholy:

[Burton] cannot finally rule that subject matter by logic, but he can and he does rule it by art, by imposing on it a structure which binds chaos into form. The structure is "artificial" in two senses: it orders and shapes the book's contents by art, and it serves as artifice to disguise the content's resistance to order, leaving the book's form a complicated pattern of logical organization modified by the tendency of the subject mat-

ter to defy logical control. (4)

Fox goes on to say that since the universe is chaotic in Burton's view, then "the book which would explore the matter of melancholy should tend to be chaotic as well. And so it is: chaos tries to rule the book" (18). As for Burton's digressions, Fox asserts that they appear only in partitions I and II (46), and that the third partition "is the last and major digression" (28). And as for the purpose of the digressions, Fox claims that digression is "necessary to the transmission of knowledge because it makes us question and see what knowledge is" (49).

Burton's sections, members, and subsections represent what Fox calls "rooms" that lie within the Anatomy's Gothic-like architectonic structure (27). Each partition expands as each room opens onto the next:

The partition grows; a new "room" is added within; but the exterior walls of the book do not have to be to torn down. The Anatomy, like a cathedral, is almost infinitely open to renovation. Addition or revision may modify the statement made by the construct, but it does not change the overall meaning either of the argument or of the building.
(28-29)

Fox declares that the overall structure in the Anatomy of Melancholy resembles that of a "tangled chain," which she believes to reflect "the statement of Burton's chief concern

in the book, the reassertion of order in the world through the assertion of order in art" (9).

As for the synoptic charts preceding each partition, Fox contends that they represent the "exoskeleton" of the Anatomy (29-30). Thus, Fox believes, as does David Renaker, that these charts represent Burton's underlying form of logical control and arrangement rather than the author's method of investigation and discovery of ideas; to Fox and Renaker they represent the "bones" of the book, not the modes of opening up the world of ideas.

A quick glance through the sections, members, and subsections of the Anatomy will inform even the most casual reader that Burton's interests are rather all-inclusive. Lawrence Babb calls attention to the fact that Burton's personal library contained approximately fifteen hundred books, of which Burton actually cites about thirteen hundred in the Anatomy of Melancholy (43). Burton's interests cover a wide range of ideas contained in such areas of knowledge as physiology, medicine, psychology, the supernatural, geography, theology, classical and contemporary literature, history, philosophy, and astronomy. And Babb draws the conclusion that Burton

has been influenced by too many [sources] to have been genuinely influenced by any. His mind is diversely curious, receptive, and retentive.

There is nothing really distinctive about his philosophical, religious, or social opinions. He is not Neo-Platonic, or Averroistic, or Thomistic. He is simply a Jacobean Englishman, an Anglican, who believes what most of his cultivated countrymen believe, although he is a little on the conservative side. (53)

Therefore, the actual subject matter alone cannot determine the entire nature of the Anatomy. That the book contains information about medicine, for example, hardly justifies the Anatomy as a serious medical treatise, as Osler would have it. Lawrence Babb reminds us that "less than a fourth of the Anatomy is devoted, in any strict sense, to medicine, physiology, psychology, and psychiatry" (9). According to Joan Webber, some of Burton's most interesting sources are proverbs, myths, fables, and superstitions (90). Apparently, then, Burton believes that the proper study of man cannot simply be restricted to the scientific; it must embrace a liberal study as well.

In addition to the critical attention given to genre, substance, and structure, many studies have focused upon the function of the persona, Democritus Junior, who dominates the preface to the Anatomy. In this Preface, Democritus Junior discloses information about his fifth-century prototype, Democritus of Abdera, a "pre-Socratic thinker, a cosmologist, and the proponent of an atomic theory of matter"; however, most seventeenth-century readers probably

considered this early philosopher as "the eccentric laugher, the scoffer, the perceptive and satiric critic of man and society" (Babb, Sanity in Bedlam 32). To most of Burton's contemporaries, Democritus was the famous laughing philosopher whose sole preoccupation was to expose all of man's various follies and absurdities as objects of laughter and ridicule. Babb believes, as do most critics, that "Burton plays his role of Democritus Junior in the preface, not in the body of the book" (Sanity 15), and that Burton employs the name of Democritus "to suggest a role, not to disguise himself" (Sanity 37). Before turning to the critical assessment of Burton's persona, it will be helpful to review the content of the satirical Preface.

The Preface begins with the persona's confession that he prefers to remain anonymous and that the reader can take him to be the man in the moon or anyone at all for that matter. He has borrowed his name from Democritus of Abdera since they have, he explains, so much in common. He then describes the fifth-century philosopher and explains the grounds for the similarities between them. He then relates the story of Hippocrates's visit with Democritus. Next, the persona refers to the book on melancholy which Democritus had written; but this book, he adds, was rather imperfect and was lost. The subject of the book concerned madness and

melancholy, and it grew out of his anatomies of animal carcasses in an effort to discover the "seat" of melancholy (the seat of atra bilis). The persona declares that he has now taken the responsibility of completing the work.

The persona's second reason for completing Democritus's book is largely personal: working on the project, he says, can help him overcome his own melancholy. He explains that, like other authors before him, he has taken ideas from other books; he then launches a full-scale attack upon writers who publish from purely selfish motives to achieve fame. Later he calls attention to the various faults of his book, and he confesses how difficult it is to please all readers. Therefore, he advises any reader who may object to the book to read another one instead.

The persona explains that he has chosen melancholy as his topic since so many people suffer from this disease and that many require the services of a complete physician. He then returns to his former object of focus, the meeting between Democritus and Hippocrates who, after having observed Democritus cutting up the bodies of several animals and laughing at the vanities of the human race, finally admitted to the people of Abdera that they were wrong to believe Democritus mad. Democritus, he assured them, was sane, honest, and wise. The persona declares that

there is now a need for a Democritus to laugh at Democritus.

The persona then criticizes the social, political, and religious abuses of the day which he believes would incur the laughter of the fifth-century Democritus. All the world's aberrations which lead to much sorrow, idleness, and despair not only affect society in general but the individual in particular. He then discusses the condition of men including princes, philosophers and scholars, lovers, women, and a host of others who suffer from the ways of the world.

The speaker brings his Preface to a close with an ironic conclusion: if his readers are offended by anything in the book, the persona will quickly deny all that he has written. With tongue-in-cheek irony, he announces that since he has now gained the reader's full confidence and trust, he will introduce the Anatomy of Melancholy.

The persona's attitude toward himself, toward his book, and toward his audience gives us no reason to take him very seriously nor to trust him to any extent. In the Preface he refers to himself as no one or nobody, his book as nothing, and his readers as people to whom he owes nothing. He constantly calls attention to the book's faults and shortcomings, apologizing for some and defending others regardless of what his audience may think. And yet he fears

that his audience may possibly object to the book's content; however, Nochimson reminds us that although

Burton said in the first edition that he expected his book to be censured, and even though he says in later editions that he has been "not so much approved by some as rejected by others" (p. 23), we have no evidence that the Anatomy was the subject of negative criticism during its author's lifetime. ("Burton's Anatomy" 283, n. 13)

James S. Tillman has explored the reasons for the persona's attitude toward self and argues that Burton adopts the traditional Horatian-Juvenalian "self-contradiction stance" for the purpose of "conciliating" the reader (91-92). The persona, in Tillman's estimation, imitates the Horatian persona who "falls into self-contradictions as a result of his comic vanity" (90). In other words, the persona's behavior in the Preface falls clearly in line with the traditional stance adopted by classical satirical speakers, not a mere coincidence of Burton's personal imagination.

Reinhard H. Freidrich argues that Burton "reinvented himself as Democritus Junior, thereby creating an authorial control over his subject matter" ("Training His Melancholy Spaniel," 195). And this particular pose as Democritus Junior allows the persona to explore the subject matter and discuss it with more freedom than he would have if he emerged as a real identity from behind the name. But more

importantly, the persona does not merely assume the name of Democritus; he also gives Democritus various multiple perspectives. Freidrich has also noticed these "multiple positionings" of the persona, whose activity in writing "grows into a multifaceted self-discovery in which the persona is at times stage, actor, and audience all in one ("Training His Melancholy Spaniel" 197-198). Furthermore, Freidrich argues that the persona's attitudes point to the various roles that he plays "as actor, as part of the audience, as solitary spectator, as reflection of the original Democritus ("Training His Melancholy Spaniel" 198). Thus, as the Ramist topical place-logic represents a spectrum for the display of ideas, so the persona represents a spectrum for various attitudes toward those ideas, which also lend to the discovery of still more ideas. Therefore, self (or selves) ties in very closely with the process of Burton's art of invention. I will elaborate more on the concept of self and multiple perspective as they contribute to invention later in Chapter Two of this study.

Although most critical studies dwell upon the speaker of the Preface, Joan Webber and Stanley Fish deal with persona as it operates not only in the Preface but as it functions in the three partitions of the Anatomy proper. Although both confine their discussion of persona to a single

chapter-length study, their analyses provide many useful insights.

Like Freidrich, Webber has noticed the multiple selves of the persona. She believes that one of the merits of the Anatomy lies in its tendency to assimilate "varied views" (86). She recognizes that several selves emerge in the Anatomy proper and explains that

Burton adopts the pseudonym of Democritus Junior, but he does not maintain that pseudonym consistently. The shifting back and forth among selves constitutes the most important and complex stylistic technique in the Anatomy. The "I" is not always the same "I," nor is it possible always to be sure who is supposed to be speaking at any one time. (81)

Webber goes on to classify the selves of the Anatomy, beginning with Robert Burton as the most limited "I," the biographical self writing from his study at Oxford University (81). She identifies the "I" of the Preface, Democritus Junior. She also refers to the "I" of Democritus of Abdera (82). She identifies a "cosmic personality," whom she believes to be mankind (93). Finally, there exists a "corporate personality" in which the book's readers are represented (99). Furthermore, Webber argues that Burton is "only one among innumerable characters and points of view represented in the book" and that

the book-mind is a universal one, including all sorts and conditions of men and arguments, and taking sides with no one. It becomes no one by being everyone. . . . His whole purpose is to include as many positions and possibilities as he can. (87)

Webber's description of the persona's many selves assimilating information from every conceivable source about every possible cause, effect, symptom, and cure of melancholy clearly indicates, I think, the activity of a dialectical personality whose sole preoccupation is to explore and investigate. To be dialectical, in a sense, is to assume multiple selves, each one offering its own perspective of reality, shifting back and forth between selves in order to give the impression of a kaleidoscopic view. I will elaborate on the definition of dialectical self and its implications for invention later in this chapter.

Webber explains that "one of Burton's principal efforts in his book has been to enable men to see through one another's eyes, and recognize themselves in others" (107). And, according to Webber, the persona "never leaves the reader alone" (100). He frequently addresses his reader "often in the imperative, either satirically or seriously ordering him to make personal application of the text" (100). The persona often engages in brief, confidential,

pseudo-conversations with the reader; and in doing so, the persona can generate "the kind of audience it wants, by building itself a dialogue with that audience" (98). And that the persona of the Preface orders any member of his audience to read another book if he objects to the one at hand indicates that Burton is not only inventing multiple selves to generate material, but he is also inventing an audience of readers rhetorically conditioned to receive that material and to participate in the activity of exploration and discovery. Burton's frequent use of "etc.," for example, to close out long-winded sentences almost invites the reader to mentally fill in those empty spaces with his own ideas and thus play the persona's role as inventor.

Like Joan Webber, Stanley Fish also calls attention to the sensitive interchange between persona and audience. Fish argues that the Preface's persona deliberately disorients the reader: after giving his reader some reasonable expectation of an "orderly defense of the name, title, and subject matter of the book" (305), the persona leads him through a "series of false promises" (304). After having been told that the book will be about melancholy, the reader is faced with not one but three subjects confusingly linked together: melancholy, Democritus Junior, and the reader (305). Even the method of the persona's scholarship,

Fish explains, bewilders the reader: "the speaker gives no indication of which authorities he considers most reliable [and] the reader is left with the unresolved contradictions and incongruities" (307-308). Fish believes that Burton's citations "confuse rather than clarify" (308); yet, he adds, the confusion as well as the hope of receiving clarification is just what sustains the reader's interest (309).

Fish goes on to say that once the reader turns to the Anatomy proper, he

is confronted immediately with a huge predigested synopsis in the form of a Ramist-like branching diagram, complete with sections, subsections, and members of subsections. The effect is to renew the promise--so many times made and so many times breached--of a comprehensible and sane universe, where the relationships between things can be grasped and anatomized and where the regularity of cause and effect suggests at least the possibility of managing one's life. (332)

The reader thus expects an orderly procession of ideas neatly sorted out, for that is what the synoptic charts promise; but Fish explains that in reading the actual text of the Anatomy proper

everything gets mixed up, and as a result the synopsis becomes the ever-present symbol of a promise--of order, sanity, the hope of making sense of things--that is never redeemed.

It is a promise, however, that Burton repeatedly renews (as he did in the preface) even after he has himself admitted that it could not possibly be kept. (334-35)

Burton's virtual Who's Who of classical and modern authorities enables the persona to transfer all responsibilities from himself to his sources in an effort to disappear while the authorities take the responsibility for what is said. And while Webber argues that Burton's "I" assimilates his citations (84), Fish maintains that the citations assimilate Burton (310). The difference between these two observations deserves notice: Webber apparently thinks that the persona's authorities construct his sense of self; Fish believes that they consume his sense of self. If Fish is correct, then the artifact itself, the Anatomy of Melancholy consumes self altogether, which may explain why the persona in the Preface refers to himself as no one or nobody. So who has written the Anatomy? asks Fish: "Everyone, the world, all, they, you, including the reader who is, in some sense, the author of what he is reading" (332). Fish has undoubtedly built a strong case for an unusual kind of collaborative authorship.

Although Ruth Fox confines most of her study of the Anatomy to structural considerations, she nevertheless includes a brief discussion of persona. She asserts that the personality who dominates the satirical Preface "is no single voice but a joining of historical voices in a place and time that are not one, but are merely the place and time

of the book"; furthermore, she interprets "no one" as another persona, or self: "Burton calls himself and his book nobody and nothing. . . . In Greek and Latin he explains that between Democritus and Burton . . . stands No one. No one has said it; it is nothing by nobody" (231). More importantly, Fox argues that this "no one" operates independently of both the reader and the other selves contained in the persona (232).

Obviously, the man behind the mask of Democritus Junior is playing some very entertaining games with logic. He declares that no one is exempt from melancholy. If we accept this premise as valid, then we must also accept the comic conclusion that no one becomes No One, alias Nicholas Nemo who, according to Fox, "annihilates the world of melancholy" altogether (233). Fox continues to say that Democritus Junior "can cure the world by making it nothing, a satiric view of reality, a poetical fiction" (234).

Devon L. Hodges agrees with Fox with respect to persona. He contends that the "I" of the narrator cannot be taken to refer to Robert Burton, nor can "Democritus Junior" give us any clue to the narrator's true identity. When the persona declares, "'Tis not I, but Democritus, Democritus dixit" (P, 121), Hodges wonders just who is speaking to us (119). Hodges argues, and quite correctly, that the "I"

is clearly different from Democritus, though Democritus is also a replacement for it. If the "I" is Robert Burton, it is Robert Burton as an "outside" created by anatomy: "I have . . . in this treatise . . . turned by inside outward" (P, 27). But the confusion caused by the process of turning an inside outward makes it difficult to separate outside mask and inside self. (119)

Furthermore, Hodges asserts that as "the anatomist gets to the truth, nothing is left. Nobody is fit to reside in Burton's utopia, the nowhere in which life is properly ordered" (120).

If we turn to Rosalie Colie's Paradoxia Epidemica for a moment, we find several reasons for the persona's tendency to make so much ado about nothing. Colie explains that during the Renaissance, investigations into the concept of nothing were undertaken in conjunction with speculations into the concept of infinity (222). The concept of infinity had filtered down to the Renaissance from Platonic and Aristotelian physics which introduced the idea of a plenist universe, an idea which Colie explains later became known as Lovejoy's "principle of plenitude" in the Great Chain of Being (252). The idea of the universe as infinite was one of the traditionally accepted theories handed down from the classical past; but as the new modern speculation emerged during the Renaissance, the concept of an infinite universe was put to serious question. The Galilean-

Copernican cosmology had in fact revealed to the world a vast universe, infinite though indeed, but full of empty spaces. Colie argues that the principle of plenitude was no longer sufficient and no longer to be trusted to "impose order within such limitlessness"; the concept of 'nothing' thus "became unmistakably 'something' to be reckoned with and counted on" (253). But more importantly, Colie explains that if man

cannot find a balance between these (rightly) terrifying extremes, then he becomes "nothing": for within him, as the Preacher everlastingly says, is vanity, emptiness. Pride, curiosity, presumption, all are vanity. (263)

And vanity, according to Colie, results "from undue preoccupation with 'nothings,'" and that the "'everything' that man's psychology affirms that he is . . . is an illusion" (264).

In Colie's chapter, "Solutions to the Problem About Nothing," we find yet another possible reason for the persona's preoccupation with "nothing" in the preface to the Anatomy of Melancholy. According to Colie, considerations for omnis can be interpreted as "pious imitations of God's plenist Creation"; nihil can be taken as "an operation at once imitative and blasphemous, at once sacred and profane, since the formal paradox, conventionally regarded as low,

parodie[s] at the same time as it imitate[s] the divine act of Creation" (223). And no one can really accuse anyone preoccupied with "nothing":

Since his subject is nothing, he cannot be said to be impious in taking the Creator's prerogative as his own--for nothing, as all men know, can come of of nothing. Nor indeed is he directing men to dangerous speculation, since at the very most he beguiles them into--nothing. And most important of all points in the paradoxist's defense, the paradoxical nihil imitates the truth of the Cretan's lie: if the paradoxist lies, he does not lie, since he lies about nothing. (224)

The persona in the satirical Preface of the Anatomy of Melancholy appears to be caught between extremes of "nothing" and infinity, and perhaps this explains the reason for his melancholy. His book contains virtually everything and yet we somehow get the impression that the Anatomy could continue forever. However, the persona calls his book "nothing," and we get just that same impression as we read through an almost inexhaustible list of authorities, citations, allusions, opinions, testimonies, and so on; they do not so much contribute to our understanding as they contribute to our confusion, leaving us with so many unresolved questions. The "I" of the Anatomy proper, as soon as he has given us a presentation of as many facts and opinions as he can about a particular cause of melancholy, for example, abruptly abandons the whole affair and quickly

moves on to the next cause without drawing any conclusions or establishing any connections from the preceding cause. The persona has thus presented to the reader the logical illusion of "everything" that really turns out to be "nothing." In fact, just as we expect the "I" of the Anatomy to make a conclusion or a connection, he often lapses into a self-directed digression after which he returns to the greater plan of the book.

The persona is very much a "nothing" standing between extremes of omnis and nihil. And, as Colie has shown, within this persona lies a comic vanity that has resulted from his endeavor to present these two extremes. In a very real sense, the persona becomes the object of his own satire, and so is the reader who feels compelled to follow the persona's course of direction through infinity and nothing and who tries to perform the impossible task of reconciling those two extremes.

But more important for the purpose of the present study, the persona appears to assume the role of the divine Creator, to assume the task of creating "something" from "nothing," and in that sense deliberately takes upon himself the operation of the plenist God. He is therefore an apt illustration of Colie's own argument that such an activity is both sacred and profane (223), since he both imitates and

parodies the activity of the original Creator. The persona in the Preface to the Anatomy, who prefers always to remain anonymous and distant from the whole situation, behaves very much in the tradition of the trickster god, imitating the divine act of creation and yet creating nothing at all. And if our playful persona has created nothing, then the effect upon the reader is even more comical since he apologizes for his work: he apologizes for nothing. The joke is, of course, upon the reader who may feel inclined to interpret the book as a serious medical, scientific, theological, social, political, or psychological treatise. It is everything--and nothing.

The preceding summary of scholarship pertaining to the Anatomy of Melancholy shows that many unresolved problems still remain to be explored. As for the subject matter of the book, Burton's interests are obviously too varied and too broad to pinpoint a single subject. His mind is unmistakably a multidisciplinary one.

Although many critics have dealt with the issue of the book's structure, none have adequately explained the book's simultaneous adherence to and defiance of order and logical control. David Renaker maintains that Burton introduces a logical plan in the synoptic charts, but that he refuses to adapt himself completely to that plan. Ruth Fox argues that

Burton's structure represents a "tangled" artifact which imitates a chaotic world that it also seeks to explain. According to Fox, the Anatomy would naturally tend toward disorder. And both Renaker and Fox regard the synoptic charts as maps or plans for Burton to follow in the discourses contained in the Anatomy proper. Nothing is mentioned about the structure having possibly taken its shape from a process of invention leading to a structure which reflects that process.

Of all the features contained in the Anatomy, the persona has attracted the most recent critical attention. Webber, with whose analysis I both agree and disagree, has presented an excellent case for the existence of several selves. While Webber has restricted much of her analysis of persona to the identification of these selves, I plan to focus my attention on their respective styles of invention in order to arrive at a suitable taxonomy for Burton's art of discovering ideas. Most critics focus upon the speaker in the satirical Preface without giving much attention to the persona who guides the reader through the Anatomy proper. I must agree with Lawrence Babb that the speaker in the Preface is not the speaker in the Anatomy proper, for their attitudes toward the reader and their styles of discourse are remarkably dissimilar.

Most attempts to establish a genre for the Anatomy of Melancholy are at best rather weak. I am inclined to agree, however, with Northrop Frye's classification of the work as a Menippean satire which he believes to depend "on the free play of intellectual fancy," creating a special kind of structure that very often "makes for violent dislocations in the customary logic of narrative" (310). Furthermore, Frye asserts that the "creative treatment of exhaustive erudition is the organizing principle" in the Anatomy of Melancholy where, he adds, "a symposium of books replaces dialogue" (311).

I also must agree with Stanley Fish's most excellent classification of the book as a "dialectical presentation" for the reasons explained earlier in this chapter. A Menippean satire and dialectical presentation have much in common in that they both play upon the world of ideas. In a sense, the dialectical presentation serves as an inventional means to a satirical end. If this is so, then I think Burton's intention, his direct aim in the Anatomy, is to satirize not society or politics or religion but to ridicule a world of scholarship which seeks to understand melancholy. In fact, Babb explains that in Burton's day, melancholy was often regarded as the scholar's disease (The Elizabethan Malady 74). And ironically, the Anatomy of Melancholy

belongs to this vast world of scholarship devoted to the study of the seat of atra bilis, the seat of melancholy, the seat of--nothing. The Anatomy of Melancholy becomes at once the instrument and the object of its satirical purpose.

I propose to analyze the Anatomy of Melancholy only with respect to Burton's art of invention. In particular, I will analyze each of those various "selves" contained in the Anatomy in order to uncover the specific means of invention that each self uses to generate ideas. Chapter II of this study will review the theories of invention from Aristotle to Peter Ramus, with particular emphasis given to the Ramist method, analysis, and genesis. Chapter III will deal with the speaker who addresses the reader in the Preface to the book and who employs the traditional ethnocentric Aristotelian-Ciceronian formulae for inventing ideas. In Chapter IV I will examine the persona of the Anatomy proper, the anonymous "I," who uses the objective, logocentric Ramist method of generating ideas. I will refer to this logocentric self as the Dialectical "I" of the Anatomy proper who performs important tasks central to Ramus's art of dialectic, analysis and genesis. The former operation merely analyzes ideas; the latter generates, or composes, new ideas which spring from the task of analysis. I hope to show that whenever Burton moves into digression,

he moves into the second Ramist operation, that is, genesis; and when he returns to the basic design of the book, he returns once again to analysis. Chapter V will draw conclusions from my study of Burton's art of invention and raise questions pertinent to further study.

And a brief note concerning citation: I have used the Holbrook Jackson 1977 Vintage one-volume edition of his original three-volume 1932 publication. This edition is based upon the 1651 sixth printing of the Anatomy, the last printing to show Burton's corrections. Citations taken from the preface of the Anatomy are indicated by P followed by the page number. Citations taken from any of the three partitions are marked by a roman numeral followed by the page number. I have also used citations containing translations of the Latin in brackets exactly as they appear in the text.

CHAPTER II

THIS SCRIBBLING AGE

About the actual art of invention Robert Burton has little to offer in his own opinion, yet he does mention the word on occasion in the Anatomy of Melancholy. The first occurrence of the word appears just after he has finished a severe criticism of his contemporaries whom he believes to have published purely from selfish desires to achieve fame. Burton leaves us with the impression that the published product of one author's invention does not differ greatly from the published product of another. And he laments that no one has written anything either new or noteworthy:

but we weave the same web still, twist the same rope again and again; or if it be a new invention, 'tis but some bauble or toy which idle fellows write, for as idle fellows to read; and who so cannot invent? (P. 24)

Such is Burton's opinion of the state of scholarship in his own time. Not only are the works rather unproductive, they also appear in his estimation regrettably lacking in substance.

Later, in his analysis of the powers of the rational soul, he again refers to invention. After listing the

several actions of the faculty of the understanding--apprehension, composition, division, discoursing, reasoning, memory, and judgment--he adds that some authorities ("they say") include memory with the art of invention (I. 165). The connection of memory with invention derives from the Platonic theory of the recollection of ideas, a concept that Aristotle later designates as reminiscentia, a term very different in meaning from that which we customarily assign to the word memory.

My discussion of the development of invention will begin with Plato's theory of ideas. In the Phaedo, Plato's topic of conversation centers upon the concept of the immortality of the human soul; but inextricably tied in with this concept is the notion of how man knows what he knows and by what particular means. The acquisition of knowledge depends upon the soul, and it is by means of reflection that the soul arrives at truth. The senses only become a hindrance to the soul's quest for truth, so it must endeavor to attain truth without the assistance of the senses (65a8-9). Plato argues that "what we call learning is really just recollection" and that "what we recollect now we must have learned at some time before, which is impossible unless our souls existed somewhere before they entered this human shape" (72e2-5). Learning is therefore

equated with recollection. And to "invent," according to Plato's definition, means to "recollect" ideas that the soul knew before it joined the body. Invention, as an art of discovering ideas unknown to the soul, is probably foreign to Plato's doctrine of ideas since all ideas, according to Plato's philosophy, pre-exist in the higher world of ultimate reality. It is the soul's task simply to tap into that known world to attain knowledge and truth. And in the Cratylus Plato explains that the task of recollection is a private activity for the mind, not a social activity in which man must discuss ideas with others in order to attain knowledge. Socrates tells his young friend toward the end of their conversation, "Reflect well. . . . And when you have found the truth, come and tell me" (440d2-4).

The question of the poet's source for ideas receives special treatment in the Ion, in which Plato argues that the Muse

makes men inspired, and then through these inspired ones others share in the enthusiasm, and a chain is formed, for the epic poets, all the good ones, have their excellence, not from art, but are inspired, possessed, and thus they utter all these admirable poems. (533c3-7)

Furthermore, Plato declares that poets cannot write their poems until they receive this inspiration; the powers of

the rational mind do not play an important role in the activity of composing poems (534b5). And we are never to make the mistake of crediting the poets themselves for their compositions:

it is in order that we listeners may know that it is not they who utter these precious revelations while their mind is not within them, but that it is the god himself who speaks, and through them becomes articulate to us. (534d1-5)

And Plato asserts further that

these lovely poems are not of man or human workmanship, but are divine and from the gods, and that the poets are nothing but interpreters of the gods, each one possessed by the divinity to whom he is in bondage. (534e2-5)

Therefore, according to the Platonic theory of ideas, the poet is not responsible for producing compositions; he merely passively receives ideas from some higher world of reality. Even the poet's craftsmanship does not enter into the activity of composition. No wonder, then, that Plato refuses to define poetry as an art or technique, for that would necessarily imply the poet's own workmanship rather than divine inspiration.

In two other dialogues, the Gorgias and the Phaedrus, Plato explains his ideas about rhetoric, but more importantly he asserts the superiority of dialectic as the

only acceptable method of investigating the nature of ideas. To Plato, inquiry becomes a means by which the intellect can attain understanding. Dialectic begins with a question leading to a testing out of hypotheses through a succession of answers that determine the definition and classification of terms and of establishing the similarities and dissimilarities between those terms and other terms which occupy the same class. Dialectic does not attempt to ascertain truth; it simply seeks to determine if there are any grounds for belief in any given statement. And here lies the central province of dialectic: dialectic operates within the realm of opinion, not with undisputable facts and universally accepted first principles. Thus, dialectic, in order to function effectively, must address probabilities since deliberation upon matters of opinion proceeds from the probable.

Aristotle understands invention to be very much an art or technique that can be learned, practiced, and applied to various forms of communication. Invention in the Aristotelian sense proceeds by means of proofs, either artificial or non-artificial, in order to produce an effective and persuasive argument designed to establish credibility in the mind of an audience rhetorically prepared to receive that argument. Much of the information relative to

invention for the effective means of persuasion is confined to the Rhetoric, but we find the principles of proof and the technique of using them for purposes of logical reasoning in the works of the Organon. The Categories provides a discussion of ten universal heads, or categories, the first of which is called substance; and the remaining nine heads (quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, state, activity, passivity) represent the attributes of that substance. Often referred to as distributions or properties of substance, these categories teach the form of an idea and its essence. Of Interpretation deals with the form of a logical proposition that expresses either the truth or falsehood of an idea. The Prior Analytics concerns the form of the logical syllogism by which inferences can be drawn from ideas. The Posterior Analytics deals with the application of the syllogism to scientific demonstration and with the determination of undisputed true first principles found in the nature of things. In addition, Aristotle affirms that there are four possible forms of inquiry, and "it is in the answers to these questions that our knowledge consists" (2.1.89b36). He then enumerates these forms of inquiry as follows:

- (1) whether the connexion of an attribute with a thing is a fact,
- (2) what is the reason of the connexion,
- (3) whether a thing exists,
- (4) what

is the nature of the thing. (2.1.89b21-25)

Finally, Aristotle argues that the determination of cause, the common denominator in these lines of inquiry, becomes the principal object of all investigation. The Topics concerns the adoption or rejection of principles as they relate to opinion only. Syllogisms applied to matters of opinion are classified as dialectical and therefore probable. And in the Topics we find the four sources of argument (propositions, meanings, differences, and similarities) as well as the four predicables (definition, property, genus, accident), the four predicates that propositions contain. Books II through VII introduce an almost exhaustive corpus of topics dealing with the four predicables. George A. Kennedy argues that "Aristotle probably borrowed the concept of the topic from the system of mnemonic devices being taught in his time," and that the Topics "deals with the finding or invention of arguments and with their evaluation, which comes to be called judgment" (Classical Rhetoric and Its Christian and Secular Tradition 83). Wilbur Samuel Howell provides the best explanation of these two operations:

Invention, or inventio as it was expressed in Latin, consisted of the methods by which debatable propositions could be analyzed to determine what could be said for or against them. Judgment or

disposition, termed iudicium in Latin, consisted in methods of arranging words into propositions, propositions into syllogisms or inductions, and syllogisms or inductions into whole discourses. Taken together, these two procedures constituted a machinery of analysis and synthesis on the level of language. . . . Actually these two procedures are the organizing principle of Aristotle's Topics, where seven books are devoted to the processes of analyzing dialectical propositions, and the eighth book, to the process of combining and using them. (Logic and Rhetoric in England 15)

Later in the Renaissance, Agricola will emphasize the idea that invention and judgment belong specifically to the province of logic; and Ramus's reforms in logic and rhetoric will reflect that same emphasis.

Aristotle retains many of the principles of dialectic established by Plato for like Plato, Aristotle believes dialectic to be a kind of investigation. And Aristotle, like Plato before him, agrees that dialectic requires the art of definition, classification, and division--along with the ability to determine similarity and difference--if the understanding of ideas can emerge. And for both Aristotle and Plato, the immediate object of dialectic is to know.

One of the main differences, though, between Plato and Aristotle lies in their theories of generating ideas. To Plato, "invention" is merely a recollection of ideas that the soul had previously known in its pre-existent state

before it joined the body. And the source for a poet's ideas lies in nothing more than divine inspiration rather than in self-conscious art or technique. In the Rhetoric Aristotle replaces much of the metaphysical dualism that runs throughout many of Plato's dialogues with a justification for a technique of invention which relies upon three forms of artificial proof: logos, ethos, pathos. Logos derives from principles of logical reasoning with emphasis on topics, or places, from which suitable enthymemes for arguments can be drawn. The Topics of the Organon contains the most extensive discussion of the sources for arguments relating to matters of opinion, and Aristotle often refers to this work in the explanation of topics in the Rhetoric. The word topos refers to a "place" where arguments can be found, and the topics therefore represent a collective body of known information. As Plato's theory for the origin of knowledge emphasizes "recollection," Aristotle's theory emphasizes "collection," a conscious act of retrieving known information. And the means of securing known information is no mystical process but a purely rational one without assistance from the gods.

Second, Aristotelian invention for the purpose of rhetorical discourse relies upon ethos (or the ethical appeal) derived from the speaker's character through which

his speech gains credibility in the mind of the audience. And third, invention relies upon pathos (or the pathetic appeal) derived from the speaker's understanding of how the character and emotions of the audience can be moved toward an acceptance of his speech.

Aristotle's theory of invention for rhetorical purposes depends just as much upon audience as it does upon proofs. He begins his discussion of the emotions in the first chapter of Book II of the Rhetoric with a brief remark concerning the relationship between speaker and audience:

The orator must not only try to make the argument of his speech demonstrative and worthy of belief; he must also make his own character look right and put his hearers, who are able to decide, into the right frame of mind. . . . it adds much to an orator's influence that his own character should look right and that he should be thought to entertain the right feelings toward his hearers; and also that his hearers themselves should be in just the right frame of mind.
(2.1.1377b23-28)

Aristotle then proceeds to define and illustrate several emotions common to all men. This analysis of audience is perhaps one of the most important contributions to the theory of rhetorical invention. And here again lies another point of difference between his theory of invention and Plato's: for Plato, ideas derive from private reflection; for Aristotle, they also emerge from social

interaction.

And finally, Aristotle, although he mentions nothing about the relationship between memory and rhetoric, does discuss the power of memory and recollection in a separate treatise. He defines memory as a state of perception or conception "conditioned by a lapse of time" (Memory and Reminiscence 1.449b25-26). All animals, including man, are endowed with this power. However, recollection is a particular power given to man alone; Aristotle contends that recollection represents

a mode of inference. For he who endeavors to recollect infers that he formerly saw, or heard, or had some such experience, and the process [by which he succeeds in recollecting] is, as it were, a sort of investigation. But to investigate in this way belongs naturally to those animals alone which are endowed with the faculty of deliberation . . . for deliberation is a form of inference. (2.453a10-15)

Thus, as dialectic represents a form of investigation, so does the process of recollection as a mode of inference. Recollection, not necessarily memory, perhaps operates as a tool by which information can be retrieved from a common pool of knowledge, that is, from topics and commonplaces. Recollection, then, becomes a rational power of the mind, not a mystical operation of the soul.

Aristotle's theory of rhetoric demands not only a

consideration for ethos and pathos as the means for producing persuasive discourse, but it also requires a reliance upon logos for sound reasoning in both the language and form of discourse. According to James Murphy, Aristotle emphasizes "an equal regard for the interconnection of rhetoric and logic, particularly in the area of invention" (Rhetoric in the Middle Ages 7). And Cicero's rhetorical theory reflects the same emphasis.

Cicero's early treatise on invention, written when he was but nineteen years old, refers to invention as involving two operations: discovering arguments for discourse and arranging them into discourse form. Apparently, Cicero considers arrangement as a part of the overall process of invention. In the first book of De inventione, he states that the discovery of arguments proceeds from an investigation of four issues: the issue of fact, definition, nature of an act, and competence of the court. He also mentions that the topics are instrumental in discovering arguments. Cicero then explains the seven-part form of arrangement. In the second book, he explains the nature of arguments as they relate to each of the four issues and as those arguments apply to forensic, deliberative, and ceremonial speeches. Thus, as Aristotle's theory of invention depends upon proofs,

Cicero's plan calls for the consideration of issues. Much later in De oratore, Cicero will favor Aristotle's forms of argument over the Roman preference for issues (Murphy, Rhetoric in the Middle Ages 18). Invention, as the young Cicero understands it, relates to a large extent to political matters with much emphasis upon the forensic.

Cicero's treatise, the Topica, represents, according to Kennedy, "a Latin version of the Aristotelian topics, though in fact most of the topics he discusses are not from [Aristotle's] topics, but from the list in Rhetoric 2.23 or from the stoic sources" (Classical Rhetoric and Its Christian and Secular Tradition 83). Originally intended as a commentary on Aristotle's Topics, Cicero's Topica actually represents "a treatise on rhetorical inventio rather than a book on logic" (Murphy, Rhetoric in the Middle Ages 15). In the Topica, Cicero announces that the art of argumentation requires two operations, the first dealing with the invention of arguments and the second concerning the judgment of their validity. And Cicero believes that Aristotle had originally intended the art of argumentation to follow these two procedures. Here Cicero is clearly subordinating invention and judgment (the two operations assigned to logic by the Stoics) to the province of rhetoric, a transplantation that caused a much heated

critical attack upon Cicero by Peter Ramus who, although he much admired Cicero for his oratory, deplored the Roman for his rhetorical theory (Murphy, Introduction, Arguments in Rhetoric Against Peter Ramus 19).

Cicero follows the Aristotelian doctrine of the places: in order to invent an argument, one must naturally go to the places (topoi), and from these places construct arguments which aim to resolve controversies over particular matters of opinion. Topics consist of two kinds, those inherent in the subject (intrinsic, artificial) and those external to the subject and marshalled in from outside the case at hand (extrinsic, inartificial). The extrinsic topics represent for the most part material drawn from authority and are therefore designated as testimonies. The intrinsic topics amount to a total of sixteen:

- definitions
- devisions
- etymologies
- conjugates
- genus
- species
- similarities
- differences
- contraries
- adjuncts
- antecedents
- consequents
- contradictions
- causes
- effects
- comparisons

It is important to bear in mind that Cicero's topics, designed to serve rhetorical purposes exclusively, become a means of providing content for arguments. In other words, Cicero's topics are generative only in the sense that they provide

stock arguments, snippets or oratorical material . . . thematic material, exempla, proverbs, sententia, quotations, and the like, which could be inserted into longer orations or which could be used as arguments in themselves. (D'Angelo, A Conceptual Theory of Rhetoric 39)

It may be helpful to draw some distinctions between the arts of logic (or dialectic) and rhetoric, since Ramist dialectic emerged from medieval developments and modifications of these two arts. We will find, for instance, a general loss of distinction between demonstration (certainty) and dialectic (probability), an increasing tendency in the schools to give rhetoric a dialectical cast, and a growing preference to regard topics not necessarily as a means of inventing ideas but as a method for managing ideas. Many of these developments will finally culminate in Ramism. And as Walter J. Ong asserts, any understanding of Ramism and its operations demands an understanding of its historical backgrounds and trends responsible for its rise.

Logic is analytical and investigative. Invention determines what can be said for or against a doubted

proposition; judgment decides the syllogistic form for the material gained from invention. And logic seeks to test the validity of both the matter and form of reasoning. Both operations, to repeat Howell's words, function "on the level of language" and they remain always on that level. The aim of rhetoric, however, is generative and persuasive.

Invention and arrangement deal largely with the discovery of arguments for persuasive communication and with the arrangement of those arguments into particular forms of communication. While logic operates at the language level for purposes of analysis and investigation, rhetoric functions at the discourse level for purposes of discourse production and persuasion. And unlike the art of logic, rhetoric requires a premium consideration for audience.

Equally important to keep in mind are the post-Ciceronian interpretations of the topics, the places for the discovery of arguments suitable for rhetorical discourse. According to D'Angelo, two schools of thought emerged: the first considered the topics "to be used as subject matter or as prefabricated arguments that could be directly inserted into discourse"; the second considered the topics "as abstract and analytical, to be used to probe any subject whatever" (A Conceptual Theory 38). In the late Middle Ages, the topics become more analytical than content-laden.

During the Scholastic period of the High Middle Ages (1000-1400), when dialectic (logic) gained supremacy over the arts of grammar and rhetoric, theories of rhetorical invention assumed a rationalistic quality to the extent that invention became more analytical and less generative than it had been during the classical period. In other words, rhetoric during the Scholastic period became dialectical in nature. The emphasis upon dialectic during these years provided the foundation for the Scholastic continuum in the Renaissance, particularly with respect to Ramus's reforms in dialectic and rhetoric. The reasons for the rise of dialectic over rhetoric lie in the works on logic and rhetoric by Boethius which became the staple university texts during the High Middle Ages.

Boethius (c. 480-524) made a substantial contribution to philosophy by translating Aristotle's logical works of the Organon into Latin; the translation quickly became the standard text for logic at the continental schools and universities. In addition, he wrote a treatise on the topics in four books called De differentiis topicis. The fourth book of this treatise became the standard text for instruction in rhetoric. Although Boethius was familiar enough with Cicero's Topica to write a commentary upon that work, there is no reason, according to James Murphy, "to

believe that Boethius was familiar with Aristotle's "Rhetorica" (Rhetoric in the Middle Ages 69, n. 93).

Boethius's De differentiis became one of the most influential and most widely known sources for the study of dialectic. A substantial portion of the work addresses the nature of logic, the operations of analysis, judgment, and the topics. Only in Book IV do we find any discussion of rhetoric. James Murphy's inventory of the material contained in this last book gives the impression that the art of rhetoric, as Boethius understands it, would depend almost exclusively upon invention and arrangement as its principal parts, invention taking the most important position of the two:

After stating that he does not intend to follow the ancient traditions of treatment, he declares it his plan to discuss rhetoric under ten categories: its genus, species, material, parts, instruments, parts of instruments, work and duty of authors, end, questions, and topics. (Rhetoric in the Middle Ages 68)

Using terms and methods of division more deserving of dialectic than rhetoric, Boethius is clearly setting up a program for a curiously dialectical brand of rhetoric. Murphy continues to say that the

bulk of what follows is devoted to the doctrine of constitutiones or status, with only brief definitions of the three genera, the

five parts of rhetoric, and the Ciceronian six parts of a speech (which Boethius calls "instruments"). There is no discussion of style, memory, or delivery. (Rhetoric in the Middle Ages 70)

Whatever the reason for Boethius's failure to provide any discussion of the last three departments of rhetoric, the point remains all too clear that invention and arrangement occupy the central positions in his theory of rhetoric. According to Murphy, "Boethius appears to be a logician seeking, almost uneasily, a place for rhetoric in a dialectically oriented world" (Rhetoric in the Middle Ages 69).

Michael C. Leff has pointed out that Book IV of the De differentiis created "a very narrow and severely rationalistic theory of rhetoric" ("Boethius and the History" 140). And Leff holds Boethius responsible for providing a foundation for the markedly dialectical cast of many late medieval studies in rhetoric ("Boethius' De differentiis," Medieval Eloquence 24). Furthermore, Leff argues that the Boethian subordination of rhetoric to dialectic divorced rhetoric from its audience ("Boethius' De differentiis," Medieval Eloquence 24). The same accusations will be levelled against Peter Ramus's reforms of dialectic and rhetoric later in the Renaissance. In fact, the Ramist reforms, which reassign invention and arrangement to logic

and confine rhetoric only to considerations of style and delivery, appear to repeat the same non-traditional approach to rhetoric found in the Boethian theory.

According to Murphy, Boethius's De differentiis appears on the university statutes all across Europe in the High Middle Ages as "one of the books to satisfy the reading requirement for rhetoric" (Rhetoric in the Middle Ages 68, n. 89). John Bliese provides an interesting discussion of the positions that dialectic and rhetoric held at the University of Paris beginning around the year 1215: the fourth book of Boethius' De differentiis is mentioned in the university statutes as being the standard text on rhetoric, yet the records also indicate that dialectic reigned supreme in the arts course curriculum; later in 1255 a university statute mentions nothing at all about the place of rhetoric, a development that indicates a decline of interest in that art ("Rhetoric in the Twelfth Century" 371). James Murphy adds that any study of rhetoric continued outside the regular schedule" and that it was "not specified as an ordinary part of the curriculum" (Rhetoric in the Middle Ages 94). In the 1267 Oxford and Cambridge statutes, the "fourth book of the Topicis is especially excluded; no other rhetorical works are mentioned" (Bliese, "Rhetoric in the Twelfth Century" 372). According to

Murphy, the fourth book of Boethius's De differentiis topicis is not mentioned as a reading requirement for rhetoric at Oxford until as late as 1431 (Rhetoric in the Middle Ages 68, n. 89).

Several reasons account for the decline of rhetoric in the arts course curriculum during the High Middle Ages and for the adoption of the fourth book of Boethius' De differentiis as a rhetoric text. In the first place, the years from 1000 to 1400 represent the Scholastic period, during which studies in the art of dialectic overshadowed studies in rhetoric. Second, Aristotle's Rhetoric remained relatively obscure during these years. Even though the Rhetoric went through two Latin translations during the thirteenth century, its influence in the schools was at best only slight. The first translation appeared shortly before 1250 but was never adopted in the arts course curriculum (Murphy, Rhetoric in the Middle Ages 93). The second translation was the version made popular by William of Moerbeke in 1270, sponsored by his teacher, Thomas Aquinas; however, even this translation is not mentioned in the statutes at the University of Paris as required reading (Murphy, Rhetoric in the Middle Ages 93; 94). James Murphy calls attention to the important fact that the Moerbeke translation is not mentioned in the Oxford University

statutes until 1431 (Rhetoric in the Middle Ages 95). Third, although Moerbeke's translation of the Rhetoric failed to play a significant role in the development of a decidedly medieval theory of dialectic or rhetoric, it became an important document in the study of ethics and political science (Murphy, Rhetoric in the Middle Ages 100). And finally, any large-scale consideration for classical rhetoric beyond Boethius's discussion of the art in De differentiis began sometime after 1416 when the manuscripts of Quintilian's Institutio Oratoria were discovered in the St. Gall monastery in Switzerland, and again after 1421 when a complete text of Cicero's De Oratore (along with the Rhetorica ad Herennium) was uncovered in Lodi, Italy. And any Ciceronian rhetoric available at the time was the De inventione; the Topica was made known chiefly through Boethius's commentary (Murphy, Rhetoric in the Middle Ages 109).

In addition, significant alterations occurred in the relationship between rhetoric and dialectic during the Scholastic period of the High Middle Ages that later resulted in a battle between those two arts for the possession of invention and arrangement. In the traditional Aristotelian view, logic can operate in any one of three disciplines: demonstration applies logic strictly to

scientific matters and works through undisputably true first principles in order to establish certainty; dialectic applies logic to matters of probability and works through analysis in order to establish grounds for belief; and rhetoric, the branch or offshoot of dialectic, applies logical reasoning to persuasive discourse in order to establish credibility in the mind of an audience. Apparently, then, the primary object of logic was its proper application to a discipline requiring a specific aim.

Yet during the Scholastic period in the High Middle Ages, the established lines of distinction between demonstration (certainty), dialectic (probability), and rhetoric (persuasion) gradually faded so that the term dialectic came to mean logic in the most all-embracing sense and thus assumed the characteristics of a kind of super-logic. And rhetoric, particularly in the Boethian view, took on a more rationalistic and dialectical quality than was originally intended. Such permutations created a profound effect upon the interpretation of the topics, the places for the invention of arguments. Later, the central questions in the schools concerned the structure and methods of the disciplines rather than the specific aims of those disciplines.

With the rediscovery of Quintilian's Institutio


oratoria and Cicero's De oratore came a widespread demand for a reassertion of traditional rhetoric; and, according to George A. Kennedy in his Classical Rhetoric in Its Christian and Secular Tradition, a corresponding demand "in restating the relationship of dialectic and rhetoric" quickly emerged "on the part of those whose primary interest was in rhetoric" (207).

The Dutch humanist and scholar, Rudolph Agricola (1444-1485), attempted to redefine the relationship between dialectic and rhetoric in De inventione dialectica libri tres, which he completed in 1479. This work deserves attention since it occupies an important position in a humanist world increasingly concerned with the status of rhetoric in the arts course curriculum as well as in the practical affairs of public service. The title indicates that the treatise explains the art of dialectical invention, and so it does. Yet Agricola fuses into his discussion of dialectic several elements traditionally assigned to rhetoric so that, as J. R. McNally explains, his dialectic assumes a certain rhetorical flavor ("An Analysis of Rudolph Agricola's De Inventione dialectica" 242). Borrowing material from Aristotle, Cicero, Quintilian, and Boethius, Agricola follows tradition by dividing dialectic into invention and judgment though much of his discussion focuses

upon invention. And he also agrees with tradition that dialectic "attempts to produce belief" in matters of opinion (McNally, "Rudolph Agricola's De inventione" 395). He defines dialectic as the art of "speaking convincingly about any subject proposed, since . . . it is established for one thing only, which is to teach something to him who hears" (McNally, "Rudolph Agricola's De inventione" 408). Walter J. Ong argues that Agricola's theory of dialectic as the art of discoursing upon any subject whatsoever without regard to any considerations of certainty or probability clearly indicates the extent to which the distinctions between dialectic and demonstration had become blurred (Ramus, Method 101).

The first non-traditional feature in Agricola's theory of dialectic is his assertion that the places for invention belong to the province of dialectic solely and exclusively. Apparently, Agricola refuses to consider that Aristotle believed rhetoric to have its own places for the purpose of invention. Therefore, Agricola, like any dialectician, considers invention as a department of dialectic rather than rhetoric. Peter Ramus's reforms in the sixteenth century will echo these same doctrines. According to McNally, Agricola renamed, redefined, and rearranged the topics of Aristotle, Cicero, and Boethius "so as to render the places

more easily taught and remembered" ("Prima pars dialecticae" 168). And McNally illustrates Agricola's places as follows in the chart below:



These places can be used to analyze discourse, to produce discourse, or to run a subject through the entire range of the places in order to produce an exhaustive topical description of the subject (McNally, "Prima pars dialecticae" 169-70). Invention begins, according to

Agricola, with a question which is broken down into still more questions, from which are chosen only those that deserve the most attention. The terms of these questions are then run "through all the places; then by reason of their correspondencies and discrepancies with the question as we stated it, we must gather arguments on one side or the other" (McNally, "Rudolph Agricola's De inventione" 414). This process of taking the terms through all the places is properly called ekphrasis, a strategy for discovering arguments that bears some resemblance to tagmemics, our own twentieth-century heuristic for gathering material for discourse.

Second, according to Agricola's theory of dialectical invention, the discovery of the middle term for the syllogism becomes the "middle of the argument" in discourse since it connects the two propositions (McNally, "Rudolph Agricola's De inventione" 397). The topics offer various places to find the middle term for the argument. Ong provides a convenient explanation for this procedure:

if one wants to answer the question, Is man dialectically inclined? one searches the loci and finds a middle term or "argument" such as "rational." This, one recognizes, is similar to, or "accords" with "dialectically inclined," whereupon one can argue: Man is rational. But rational beings are dialectically inclined. Therefore man is dialectically inclined. (Ramus Method 112)

Ramus's theory of dialectical invention will agree with Agricola's with respect to finding the middle term for the argument, but Ramus will argue consistently that cause represents the basis for all logical reasoning.

And third, Agricola's dialectic assumes a premium consideration for audience, a feature customarily reserved for rhetoric since the aim of rhetoric is persuasion. Agricola asserts that the second operation of dialectic, that of judgment, "hands down some sort of form for the argument which was discovered" which leads to "achieving conviction in the hearer" (McNally, "Rudolph Agricola's De inventione" 403). Furthermore, all discourse must, in Agricola's estimation, consider the speaker, the audience, and the subject of the speech" (McNally, "Rudolph Agricola's De inventione" 407). These considerations bring to mind, of course, Aristotle's three artificial proofs--ethos, pathos, logos--used in rhetorical invention, which Agricola marshalls into his theory of dialectical invention. Agricola mentions almost nothing about style, memory, or delivery; he apparently considers these three operations as belonging to the art of rhetoric.

Agricola's new dialectic, which marked the shift from the older scholastic logic with its emphasis upon disputation, gained immediate and widespread popularity in

the schools throughout the continent and in England. The German humanists, especially Melanchthon and Sturm, held the work in high regard; and at Paris his dialectic received much favor. And significantly by the year 1535 at Cambridge, Agricola's dialectic had replaced the works of the medieval scholastics as the recommended reading material in the arts course curriculum (Ong, Ramus, Method 94).

Agricola's statement that invention properly belongs to dialectic alone, his simplification of the topics (renamed, redefined, and rearranged), and his insistence that invention begins with a question leading to the discovery of the "middle of the argument" certainly prefigure the Ramist method of invention which emphasizes these same considerations. Yet despite their apparent similarities, Agricolan dialectic differs significantly from Ramist dialectic in one important way: Agricola's dialectic calls for a strong consideration for audience, thus taking on an ethnocentric quality. Therefore, Agricolan dialectic is "voiced" since it incorporates several properties usually associated with rhetoric. Ramist dialectic, on the other hand, confines its attention strictly to matters of logic and has little regard for audience considerations. For this reason, Ramist dialectic is "silent," due to its heavy handed emphasis upon the logocentric and to its

reliance upon the diagrammatic.

Agricola's insistence that teaching is the proper objective of dialectic is rather symptomatic of a general trend toward reform in education during the Renaissance. The issues of what to teach and how received the most attention in the universities throughout Europe as the humanists departed from medieval pedagogy. Reacting in large measure against the scholastic passion for using logic only for what they called endless and even useless disputation, the Renaissance humanists began to reassess the teaching curriculum in order to make it satisfy the practical demands of their age. Neal W. Gilbert points out that the

two chief medieval forms of teaching, the lecture, or reading and exposition of a written text, and the disputation, were reflected in the written commentaries and quaestiones. It was upon these forms of educational discourse that the Humanists directed their attack: the technical jargon used in them, especially the syllogistic form of argumentation, displeased these lovers of style immensely. (Renaissance Concepts of Method 68)

Furthermore, Gilbert explains that the humanists began to insist more and more upon a quick and efficient means of teaching the arts (Renaissance Concepts of Method 71-72). More importantly, the humanists, who lost fascination in scholastic argumentation with its heavy emphasis upon disputation, turned instead to invention or the method-

ical way of discovering arguments for most any subject (Gilbert, Renaissance Concepts of Method 119). This stress upon invention was especially crucial in an age that demanded fluency of thought and expression not only in the schools but in the civic and ecclesiastical communities as well.

The call for simplification and efficiency in the arts course curriculum ultimately led to a renewed interest in method, a term which occupies a central position in the Ramist program of dialectic. Before turning to Ramism, though, it is necessary to review briefly the history of method.

In the classical Greek sense, method refers to a "way through" or a "following after" and regulates the process of investigation. Plato uses the term in the Phaedrus purely in the technical sense that any man who understands the procedures and applications of method can obtain knowledge of an art and subsequently teach that art to others: such a man, he asserts, is called the dialectitian (266b3-8). Aristotle equates method with a directed logical procedure used to conduct an investigation when one is not aware of the end in view (Ong, Ramus, Method 227). A logical procedure calls for an analysis of a subject into its parts and an examination of those parts; this method is

the most informing organizational principle in Aristotle's works on logic, and he seldom departs from that method in his other works. Thus, in Aristotle's view, method does not mean any "way through," but rather the way of conducting an investigation (Gilbert, Renaissance Concepts of Method 40).

Just as influential as Plato and Aristotle is the second-century Greek scientific writer, Galen (c. 120-200), who applies the Aristotelian logical method to the study of human anatomy and physiology. Ong explains that the method of teaching as introduced in the preface to Galen's Medical Art includes analysis, synthesis, and division; and for this reason Ong contends that method has its origin in the medical arts:

Medicine . . . emerged as a rationalized technique not only by curing its patients but also because of some ability to explain cures. When the patient did get well, it was up to the physician to prove to his students that his method of treatment, not merely nature, had turned the trick. (Ramus, Method 226)

Although Cicero never uses the term methodus in his works, he does use the phrase via et ratio; according to Gilbert, the first Latin writer to use the word methodus is Boethius who employs the term in his translation of Aristotle's Topics (Renaissance Concepts of Method 49; 50).

The medieval schoolmen, according to Ong, saw in method a principal means of structuring the arts:

Medieval interest in method grew principally on the common grounds of curriculum organization and pedagogical procedure rather than that of scientific investigation. Methodus, which medieval writers encountered in Boethuis' translation of Aristotle's Topics, came to mean . . . a curriculum subject, because it signified, as in John of Salisbury, Lambert of Auxerre, or St. Albert the Great, a short cut to knowledge. It was also called an ars . . . or if it was short enough, a compendium. (Ramus, Method 227-28).

The Renaissance humanists believed that method could provide a "curriculum-efficient" means of acquiring and transmitting knowledge in the classroom; yet, as Gilbert explains, this new development "tended to degenerate into empty formalism and pedantry" (Gilbert 73). However, most of the humanists approved of the trend toward simplification in the arts. Gilbert calls attention, for example, to the fact that Erasmus (1467-1536) favored method enough even to recommend its practice to students of theology; he hoped that his comments would prove beneficial "to candidates in divinity, serving not only to keep them from losing their way but also to expedite the passage to knowledge, so that they might arrive more quickly and with less labor at their goal" (Renaissance Concepts of Method 108).

Johann Sturm (1507-1589), a contemporary of Ramus,

gives method a place in dialectic and bases his justification for doing so in Plato and Aristotle (Gilbert, Renaissance Concepts of Method 123). Yet, as Ong has observed, Sturm's ideas on method actually derive from Galen's three-fold method of teaching illustrated by medical examples:

Analysis, we are told, proceeds according to an order established by the end one has in view. Thus, the end of medicine is health or the healing of the human body, and from this end the means are determined by the reasoning process which considers successively: actions, bodily powers (virtutes), the members of the body which are the seats of these powers, the (four) bodily humors, and the (four) elements. This is the order of nature, and, Sturm goes on, synthesis proceeds simply by reversing it, working from a consideration of the elements back to the actions. Analysis is used in discovering the arts, synthesis in teaching them. (Ramus, Method 234)

As we shall see later, Ramus adopts the doctrine of analysis and synthesis for his program of dialectic.

Philip Melanchthon (1497-1560) conceives of method as a means of investigation proceeding from a series of ten questions, all of which appear to operate as an unusually dynamic combination of Aristotle's categories, four forms of inquiry, and topics. He asserts that any subject matter to be investigated (analysis) or taught (synthesis) must first be submitted to the following set of questions:

- 1) What does the word signify?
- 2) Does the thing signified exist?
- 3) What is the thing?
- 4) What are its parts?
- 5) What are its species?
- 6) What are its causes?
- 7) What are its effects?
- 8) What things are adjacent to it?
- 9) What things are cognate to it?
- 10) What things are repugnant to it?

Gilbert explains that Melanchthon understood method "as a way of teaching. . . . Yet he had the greatest respect for the Aristotelian theory of science . . . and regarded Aristotle as the master of method" (Renaissance Concepts of Method 127). But the Renaissance humanists failed to realize that neither Plato nor Aristotle considered method particularly as a short cut to knowledge--indeed, far from it. The humanists interpreted method strictly in accordance with the curriculum demands for simplicity and efficiency. Thus it appears that the foremost concern for the humanists was not necessarily method as a means of investigation in the traditional Aristotelian sense, but rather method as a means of managing knowledge. The most significant feature, though, in Melanchthon's theory concerns the proper placement of method in dialectic. Most humanists considered method as belonging to the first part of dialectic, that is, invention, where it served as a guide for investigation leading to the discovery of arguments out of the topics and

commonplaces. Melanchthon, however, made a bold step by declaring that method represents what is done with arguments once they are gleaned from the topics and commonplaces; therefore, in Melanchthon's scheme of things method operates under the second part of dialectic, or judgment, the disposition and arrangement of material gained from invention (Ong, Ramus, Method 237). This curious transference of method from invention to judgment provided a convenient precedent for Ramus who will likewise consider method as a part of judgment. According to Ong,

Ramus' second half of dialectic is, on the whole, an attempt to deal with judgment or statement in terms of the topics or places which were the concern of the first half of dialectic, invention. In this scheme, dialectic itself, its second as well as its first half, becomes a kind of superplace or supercommonplace which yields up its own parts as arguments. (Ramus, Method 238)

Ramus apparently considers method to operate in both invention and judgment.

The most radical departure from traditional logic in the Ramist program of dialectic is the complete elimination of the categories and predicates, the ten universal classes and the statements that can be said about them. A category refers to an abstract universal attribute belonging to all things. Everything, for example, is said to have the

attributes of quality, quantity, place, relation, and so on; predication refers to any utterance which can be made about an attribute. In other words, predication occurs when the subject is joined with a predicate. The categories and predicates are thus instrumental in the formation of logical propositions in a syllogism. A place differs from a category in that a place refers to the concrete representation of a category. Ong calls attention to this essential difference: he explains that relation represents a category, related things a place. The places, not the categories, become the sources for arguments. In Ramus's program of dialectic, all concern for universals and predication is abandoned entirely in favor of topics; but instead of representing the "seats" of arguments, Ramus's places represent arguments in and of themselves (Ong, Ramus, Method 183). With predication (that is, utterance with its emphasis upon "voiced" statement) completely eliminated from dialectic, Ramus's "place-arguments" become "silent," diagrammatic, and merely presentational as a result of the reform. But for Ramus, logic remains purely analytical in its aim, methodical in its procedure, presentational in its aspect.

The avenue toward the places (or arguments) in Ramus's program of dialectic is, of course, a question designed to

provide a starting point in the search for the middle term. One starts with the question "Is man dialectical?," scans the places in order to find the connecting link between "man" and "dialectical," and comes across "species." Since reason is species-specific to man alone, man is rational and thus dialectical (Ong Ramus, Method 183). The following charts in Figures 1 and 2 present the bracketed dichotomies of the places for the invention of arguments as set forth in the 1543 first edition of the Dialecticae institutiones. By 1576 the places for invention will expand to fulfill what Ramus will call "greater simplification."

Ramus declares that judgment involves three sub-operations: the first deals with the syllogistic arrangement of whatever invention has found; the second links together in a chain-like manner all the material by means of definition and division, and Ramus asserts that nothing exists beyond definition and division; the third sub-operation Ramus refers to as an ascent to God, a method leading to the divine truth of God. Ong explains that this last step represents a peculiar Platonic cast of Ramist dialectic but that Ramus finally deleted this step altogether in later revisions of his theory (Ramus, Method 190). It is the second method of definition and division that best represents the Ramist method.




Fig. 2. The 1576 Outline of Dialectic. Taken from Frank Pierrepont Graves, Peter Ramus and the Reformation, 155.

In the Ramist program of dialectic, method not only applies to the disposition of the material gained from invention but to the teaching of the arts as well. And here Ramus includes the already well-known analysis/synthesis procedure used in the arts course curriculum. Analysis simply refers to the breaking down of discourse in terms of its questions leading to the places from which the arguments are drawn, an investigation of the propositions, the syllogistic form, and the arrangement of definitions, divisions, and examples--all of which descend from universals to particulars; synthesis (or what Ramus prefers to call genesis or compositio) is the reverse of analysis and is used in the production or building up of new discourse (Ong, Ramus, Method 264). Simply put, analysis represents an exploratory investigation, taking discourse apart component by component in an effort to explain how the discourse works. In this sense, it shares this operation with anatomy, which cuts into the human body layer after layer to explain the parts and function of man's internal structures. Furthermore, analysis, like anatomy, has much in common with Ramus's dichotomies in that they both divide and subdivide so that everything seems to finally reach a vanishing point. In other words, nothing is left. And here we arrive at the unsteady yet most informing principle of

Ramist dialectic by Ramus's own admission: nothing remains beyond definition and division. A glance at Ramus's dichotomies would tend to substantiate the notion that the the Ramist dialectic is everything--and yet nothing. It appears that division and dichotomization could continue indefinitely; however, as Ong explains all too well, dichotomization culminates not in conclusion but only in diagrams (Ramus, Method 195). Thus, dialectic has descended from dialogue to diagram, all art from technique to technology, method to matrix, places for invention to paradigms for management. The entire focus of Ramist dialectic falls upon presentation rather than upon argumentation.

Once analysis has been performed, genesis or composito begins and operates in the reverse of analysis by building up or producing new discourse. Yet, as Ong observes, Ramist genesis results not in the production of anything really new but becomes only a reverse mirror image of analysis, or what Ong describes as "an assembly-line performance, to which the term synthesis, a 'placing together,' better applies" (Ramus, Method 264). Therefore, genesis never really breaks free from the order of analysis but merely provides an occasion to imitate that order. Nothing comes of nothing.

The Ramist dialectical invention introduces for the

first time a logical system of places, all of which operate within a spatial paradigm where the entire range of invention can be seen at a glance. Ramus's dialectic, then, becomes simply a logic of places, or what Ong prefers to call a "place-logic" (Ramus, Method 183). The most obvious feature of the place-logic is the spatial arrangement of terms designed to display the relationship of one term to another in such a way as to allow all the places as full a range of perspective as possible. And the bracketed dichotomies proceeding from the general to the most particular reveal a peculiar tendency to fill space, a tendency that is by no means a sheer coincidental side effect of Ramus's peculiarity of thought: Ramus's place-logic reflects the increasing concern in Renaissance science over the notion of quantification and expansion of thought made popular by the Copernican concepts of space and system (Ong, "System, Space and Intellect" 227).

As mentioned earlier in Chapter One of this study, two important documents were published in 1543: Vesalius's De corporis humani fabrica, which advanced the notion of physical man as a structural system, and Ramus's Dialecticae institutiones, which introduced the concept of invention as a system of logical thinking. Another work appeared in the same year that challenged traditional theories of the

universe: Copernicus's De revolutionibus orbitium caelestium presented the idea of the universe as an interplanetary system controlled and directed by the laws of physical motion. In all three of these areas of knowledge--anatomy, dialectic, and astronomy--the emphasis falls upon quantity and expansion of thought, an emphasis resulting from the Copernican sensitivity to space and the corresponding drive to manage it (Ong, "System, Space and Intellect" 227). Anatomy became a system of investigating structural space in the human body, astronomy a system of exploring cosmic space in the universe, and Ramist dialectic a system of exploring intellectual space in the human mind. This preoccupation with space ultimately led to spatial presentations and diagrams designed to make the comprehension of any given subject a remarkably visual activity. The diagrams helped to bring quantification and expansion of thought under manageable control. According to Ong, these diagrams reflect the shift from the classical discourse as the way to knowledge to observation as the way to knowledge (Ramus, Method 151). Platonic dialectic as a primarily voiced dialogue is replaced by the silent Ramist diagram.

The foregoing discussion of the art of invention from Plato to Ramus reveals some interesting alterations, shifts

of purpose, and modifications in logical and rhetorical terminology that I believe made the rise of Ramist dialectic possible if not wholly inevitable. The supremacy of dialectic during the High Middle Ages, the loss of distinction between logic, dialectic, and rhetoric, and the Renaissance drives to make the arts curriculum-efficient helped to provide a foundation for Ramism. The Ramist reforms in dialectic and rhetoric were widely influential in the arts course curriculum in many schools across Europe and Great Britain. And several attempts have been made to determine the impact of Ramism upon literary works of the Renaissance and of the seventeenth century. Rosamond Tuve's well-known Elizabethan and Metaphysical Imagery (1947), for example, explores the Ramist influences upon the construction of images in English metaphysical poetry. However, Ong argues that Ramists "did not write metaphysical poetry, or indeed, much poetry at all" ("Ramist Rhetoric," The Province of Rhetoric 248). One work which does show Ramist influence is, of course, Robert Burton's Anatomy of Melancholy where the synoptic charts bear a close resemblance to the bracketed dichotomies in Ramus's art of dialectic. Yet the Ramist influence is not confined to the charts alone; the progression of thought in the Anatomy proper also reflects the Ramist method of analysis and

genesis as well. Burton appears to use analysis as a means of explaining a cause, symptom, or cure of melancholy; and he uses genesis to produce compositions of his own. I believe that these compositions represent what scholars and critics have customarily called "digressions." The Anatomy proper best represents in my own opinion a fairly good demonstration of Ramist dialectical invention for reasons that will be explored in Chapter IV of this study.

However, Burton's strategy for invention in the preface differs from the Ramist method used in the Anatomy proper. In the preface, Burton's system of invention reflects the Aristotelian-Ciceronian formulae. His aim in the preface is strictly rhetorical and designed to make a deliberate satirical impact upon its readers. And, as will be explained in the next chapter, the structure of the preface assumes the Ciceronian seven-part arrangement which also suggests its rhetorical nature and purpose. Only when we enter the Anatomy proper do we notice a change in the nature, aim, and method of the discourses there. The nature of the Anatomy proper is analytical, exploratory, investigative; its aim, as opposed to that in the preface, is dialectical, using many of the terms of Ramus's place-logic to generate ideas; its method reflects the analysis/genesis theory of Ramist dialectic. The emphasis in the Anatomy

proper falls upon the presentation of ideas rather than upon rhetorical argumentation. And even in some places, particularly in the digressions, we find Burton using Melanchthon's ten questions as an additional means of generating ideas. We shall find the Melanchthon questions operating extensively in the Digression of Air.

The difference between the respective strategies of invention also determine the persona's sense of self. In the preface where the aim is rhetorical and satirical, the persona is an ethnocentric personality whose sense of self is largely determined by his audience's conception of him and of the content of his address to them. As we enter the Anatomy proper, however, the persona's sense of self is determined by the information that he records in his analyses and by the authorities whom he cites. Here we notice a dialectical personality who behaves very different from the ethnocentric persona who addresses the audience in the preface. In a very real sense, the dialectical personality in the Anatomy proper is a No One who simply presents information about melancholy. Actually, his authorities represent the "speakers," who give the Anatomy proper its strange illusion of "voice." Northrup Frye may very well be correct when he asserts that the Anatomy of Melancholy is a Menippean satire where "a

symposium of books replaces dialogue" (The Anatomy of Criticism 311). And in this particular sense, the Anatomy represents a curious sort of interpretive community for collaborative thinking. Yet the dialectical personality who guides the reader through the Anatomy proper is no real authority himself on the subject of melancholy; he merely recedes into the background behind fact, authoritative statement, and popular opinion.

CHAPTER III

PROOF BY EXPERIENCE: "ALL THE WORLD IS MAD"

The Preface to the Anatomy of Melancholy may be said to assume a variety of purposes. First, it introduces the subject, the name of the persona, and the title of the book to follow. Second, the Preface serves to defend both author and book from any possible accusations from readers who may object to the method, style, and subject matter. In this sense, the Preface may be regarded as the author's apology. Third, the Preface introduces the idea of melancholy, as the persona proves by examples drawn from experience that all the world is mad, that it suffers from melancholy, that melancholy penetrates all civilization, all societies, the commonwealth, every profession both public and private. The Preface begins with the universe of melancholy and its global ramifications. Thus, the Preface focuses upon the external manifestations of melancholy, that is, its manifestations in culture and society as a whole. It gives a telescopic and panoramic view of the whole. Only in the Anatomy proper, where dissection becomes the prevailing instrument of analysis, do we find a microscopic view of internal man and his physical, psychological, and spiritual

faculties. Fourth, the Preface, according to R. Steve Wilkerson's excellent study of its formal structure, not only operates as an entire exordium to the Anatomy proper but it also adopts the form of a judicial oration containing the classical divisions of the exordium, partitio, narratio, refutatio, confirmatio, digressio, and peroratio in an effort to "sway a presumptively hostile audience" (86). Fifth, the Preface is a satire designed to ridicule man, society, and civilization and to illustrate the overall disorder and lack of common sense and reason in the world. The Preface reveals a world gone wrong, a sort of anti-norm; and by reading of the vast chaos and confusion of a melancholy world, we make a conscious effort to recall certain conditions which constitute a reasonable and healthy one. In other words, a complete view of an anti-norm produces a conscious recollection of certain conditions required to produce the norm. And I believe that most satires have this feature in common. They do not so much aim to correct the follies and abuses of man and society as they seek to raise consciousness, to remind the reader of what the norm is by constantly showing him its direct anti-thesis. Satire appeals to that innate knowledge of reason and order that exists in the reader's mind; but any conscious expectation that the reader may have of reason and order is

deliberately inverted by the satirist's portrait of a world gone wrong. The satire creates a conscious desire in the reader's mind for the norm by presenting to the reader a complete view of its opposite. In the Preface to the Anatomy our expectations of the norm are deliberately reversed as we become increasingly aware of man's unreason, which accounts for much of the world's melancholy. Satire therefore presents a deliberate inversion of the reader's expectations of the norm, an inversion which ultimately creates in the reader's mind a conscious desire for it.

Yet in a sense we find in the Preface several reasons to suppose that Burton is possibly writing a satire of melancholy itself, melancholy man, and of a world that makes much ado about melancholy. And we will find examples of the persona's self-mocking, self-satirizing poses as he stands upon a stage as the "personate actor" before the wide "common theater" of his readers. But before turning directly to the Preface, it will be helpful to come to terms with melancholy, the melancholy man, and the Jacobean cult of melancholy.

Lawrence Babb explains that

melancholy originates in Renaissance scientific theory. Since Renaissance thinkers recognize the interreaction of body and mind, melancholy is

both a psychological and a medical term. . . . In Burton's title, the word refers to a mental disease , or genus of diseases, which is copiously discussed in Renaissance, medieval, and classical works on medicine and psychiatry along with such other maladies as madness, frenzy, hydrophobia, and epilepsy. (Sanity in Bedlam 2)

More importantly, though, Babb reminds us that despite the usual physical and psychological characteristics of melancholy, it provided some attractions for the Elizabethan intellectuals:

In the Renaissance mind it is accompanied by and modified by another concept of the melancholy character, a concept of greater dignity. The source of this is the Aristotelian Problemata (XXX, i). According to the Aristotelian idea of melancholy, black bile engenders unusual intellectual and artistic powers. (Sanity in Bedlam 3)

Melancholy could be said to cause idle despair and brainsickness, a breakdown of creative power, or it could provide a well-spring for active imagination (genius) leading to constructive ideas. Babb also offers an amusing portrait of the rapidly rising Elizabethan cult of melancholy which became quite the fashion in Europe and in England:

The association of melancholy with genius made the malady attractive. In the sixteenth century English travelers found it very much in vogue among the Italian intellectuals and brought it

home with them. An epidemic broke out in England, apparently about 1580, and continued for several decades. For some time melancholy men were so numerous in London that they constituted a social type, often called the malcontent. (Sanity in Bedlam 3)

In all respects, the readers, the "common theater," of the Preface to the Anatomy of Melancholy probably recognized at once the melancholic affectation of the "personate actor" before them who will introduce them to the causes, symptoms, effects, prognostics, and cures of melancholy. They recognized, perhaps, the affected intellectual behind the mask of Democritus Junior who tells them to "Seek not after that which is hid" (P. 15). And he constantly worries that his audience of readers will reject him or object to him as well as his book. However, there is no apparent reason to suppose that Burton's readers actually objected to the Anatomy. That the work went through five editions during Burton's lifetime indicates the book's unusual popularity.

It may very well be that Burton invented the idea of the hostile audience as a means of seducing the reader into the book. It is clear to us that the Preface to the Anatomy of Melancholy is dominated by the relationship between the persona's self and the audience, between the subject of melancholy and what the audience knows (or does not know) about it. And Democritus Junior stands upon a stage as a

reflection of a melancholy age. Furthermore, as Richard L. Nochimson tells us, "Burton's sense of self is determined by the way in which he thinks others see him" ("Burton's Anatomy: The Author's Purposes" 281). And as we shall learn later in this chapter, the persona's sense of self, his ethos, is also determined to a large measure by his audience's beliefs, values, attitudes, and prejudices. Thus, we have in the Preface to the Anatomy of Melancholy a rhetorical presentation, to borrow Stanley Fish's term, since it reveals a sensitive interchange between the persona's attitudes and those of his readers.

Burton's strategy of invention in the Preface relies upon rhetorical rather than dialectical methods. As mentioned previously in Chapter Two of this study, rhetorical invention requires a premium consideration for the audience in terms of its needs and expectations. Rhetorical invention is therefore essentially ethnocentric in its aspect since it depends upon an overriding concern for the opinions, values, and reactions of others. And, as we shall learn later in this chapter, Burton's use of rhetorical invention in the preface to the Anatomy sustains that ethnocentric exchange between persona and audience, which is necessary to seduce the reader into the Anatomy proper. The persona deliberately baits his reader and strings him along

a wide channel of expectations; by the end of the Preface, the reader's expectations are inverted by conventions of satire. And I believe that the deliberate reversal of the reader's expectations finally seduces the reader into the Anatomy of Melancholy. The reader may expect in the Preface an introduction to the Anatomy, yet the Preface does not behave rhetorically in the manner of an introduction. The reader desires to know the identity of the persona, but the persona deliberately conceals his true self. The persona tells the reader that his book is about melancholy, but he announces to the reader later that "thou thyself art the subject of my discourse" (P, 16). And as far as just who has written the book, the persona confesses, "'Tis not I, but Democritus, Democritus dixit" (P, 121). Yet the reader learns later that it is not Democritus but "they that say it" (P, 121). And still later the reader discovers that "it is neminis nihil [nothing by nobody]" (P, 122).

The "personate actor" of Democritus Junior deliberately and methodically dodges the reader's expectations almost at every turn, creating a profound illusion of "something" that appears to be "everything," which the persona asserts to be "nothing" at all. The reader then resorts to the Anatomy proper to find answers to his questions and dilemmas, but he soon finds himself hopelessly lost in a labyrinth of still

more questions, a virtual flood tide of answers to choose from, and a most uncomfortable shortage of absolutes.

In this chapter I will explain how the audience, Burton's immediate community of readers, determines the nature of the persona's sense of self, his ethos, in the Preface to the Anatomy of Melancholy. And I will also explain how the sensitive interchange between reader and persona operates in a rhetorical presentation designed to seduce the reader into the dialectical presentation offered in the Anatomy proper.

In the first place, the Preface to the Anatomy is neither a preface nor an introduction to the book in any sense, and the title of the preface certainly indicates this important point. The "preface" is simply called "Democritus Junior to the Reader." And the further we read into it, the more we become aware that Burton's purpose is not to introduce the Anatomy of Melancholy but to gather together into one place all the parts and materials of man's experience with a melancholy world with its lack of order, reason, and common sense.

Democritus Junior begins his address to the reader by declaring that he is a "free man born" (P. 15) and that he alone can choose to disclose his true identity as well as the nature of his book. He asks,

who can compel me? if I be urged, I will as readily reply as that Egyptian in Plutarch, when a curious fellow would needs know what he had in his basket, Quum vides velatam, quid inquiris in rem absconditam? It was therefore covered, because he should not know what was in it. (P. 15)

The covered basket remains concealed as does the identity of the persona who confesses that he "would not willingly be known" (P. 15). But the basket serves as an image for a literal place into which things are gathered. It may also serve as an image for the author's concealed identity or for the book which he has written that he believes his readers should not read. The covered basket might also point to the classical image of Pandora's Box, which contains all the world's troubles, confusions, and despair. The basket is therefore a curious and at the same time ominous image. The persona refers to the contents contained in the basket as something that his readers should not know about.

If we turn to the Greek word, *ethos*, we learn that it means "a habitual gathering place" which thus brings to mind the idea of "people coming together" (Halloran 60). Burton's community of readers come together through the *ethos* of a persona who calls himself Democritus Junior. He represents the immediate cultural matrix, or what Karen Burke LeFevre refers to as "the point of intersection between speaker or writer and listener or reader";

furthermore, LeFevre argues that rhetorical invention "presupposes the existence of others and is oriented to take into account their knowledge, attitudes, and values" (46). In a very real sense, Democritus Junior is a reflection of his readers just as much as they are a reflection of him. In that case, then, the true identity of the man behind the mask of Democritus Junior is immaterial to his purpose. Actually, he represents Every Melancholy Man who shares a common bond with other fellow melancholics. The argument of his address to the reader clearly illustrates that both he and his readers are all in the same "basket," as it were, that no one is exempt from madness and melancholy. He declares that he has written about melancholy in order to avoid it (P. 20) and to "make an antidote out of that which was the prime cause" of his melancholy" (P. 21).

He announces, too, that he "would help others out of a fellow-feeling" and that this occupation will benefit "the common good of all" (P. 22). Democritus Junior never really admits that his "playing labour" (P. 20) of writing the book has indeed cured him of his own melancholy, but he implies that the project has at least helped him to avoid it, so much so that he considers himself experienced enough to help others to avoid it, too. At the end of the Preface, after he has proved to the reader by examples drawn from

experience that melancholy afflicts all men, he asks, "Whom shall I then except?," to which he answers,

Ulricus Huttenus' Nemo; nam, nemo omnibus horis sapit, Nemo nascitur sine vitiis, Crimine Nemo caret, Nemo sorte sua vivit contentus, Nemo in amore sapit, Nemo bonus, Nemo sapiens, Nemo est ex omni parti beatus [Nobody; for Nobody is sensible at all times; Nobody is born without fault; Nobody is free from blame; Nobody lives content with his own lot; Nobody is sane in love; Nobody is good, Nobody wise; Nobody is completely happy]; etc., and therefore Nicholas Nemo, or Monsieur Nobody, shall go free. (P. 117)

There may be some connection between this Nobody who "shall go free" and the identity of the persona who describes himself as a "free man born" early on in the Preface. The true identity of the man behind the mask of Democritus Junior may in fact be No One. And Democritus Junior refers to himself several times throughout the Preface as nobody or no one. His identity as No One gives him a peculiar advantage as an anonymous, ethical "authority" over his readers who, at least in his own opinion, perceive him from the start to be an outsider.

R. Steve Wilkerson has determined that the structure of the Preface follows the rhetorical order of the seven-part, Ciceronian judicial oration, which he believes to represent the persona's "apology" for writing satire (8). The exordium begins with the persona's direct address to his

"Gentle Reader":

I presume thou wilt be very inquisitive to know what antic or personate actor this is, that so insolently intrudes upon this common theatre to the world's view, arrogating another man's name; whence he is, and what he hath to say. Although, as he said, imū si nolvero, non respondebo, quis coacturus est? I am a free man born, and may choose whether I will tell; who can compel me? if I be urged, I will as readily reply as that Egyptian in Plutarch, when a curious fellow would needs know what he had in his basket, quum vides velatam, quid inquiris in rem absconditam? It was therefore covered, because he should not know what was in it. Seek not after that which is hid; if the contents please thee, "and be for thy use, suppose the Man in the Moon, or whom thou wilt, to be the author"; I would not willingly be known. (P. 15)

The exordium is designed to attract the reader's immediate attention, and the covered basket represents the bait or trap for the reader who is told to seek not for that which is hid.

The persona then moves into the partitio, which contains a statement in one sentence of the major divisions of the discourse to follow (Wilkerson 91):

Yet in some sort to give thee satisfaction, which is more than I need, I will show a reason, both of this usurped name, title, and subject. (P. 15)

Wilkerson explains that the "promise to give 'satisfaction'" is a constant taunt to the reader to penetrate the mask of

the persona" (91); however, I believe that the promise is more a taunt to the reader to continue reading the Preface, for the Preface is the basket which will ultimately hook the reader's interest. And the statement "to give thee satisfaction" brings to mind, of course, an invitation to a duel, a match in which both persona and reader participate.

After he has introduced the main divisions of his argument, the persona then moves into the narratio in which he explains a brief history of Democritus of Abdera and the book that he left unfinished.

Up to this point, the persona has identified himself as a "personate actor"; in the narratio he declares another role: he is now a

mere spectator of other men's fortunes and adventures, and how they act their parts, which methinks are diversely presented unto me, as from a common theatre or scene. (P. 18)

The persona is now a part of his audience of readers. This new role as member of his own audience enables him to make others see the chaotic world that he sees, to share the common experience of the human condition in a world gone wrong. As member of the audience, he gathers ideas from the experiences that the members of his community have had and thus changes his status from being the outsider to one who enters the community of his fellow spectators.

Thinking that his audience will accuse him of having stolen another man's name, the persona replies,

I confess, indeed, that to compare myself unto him for aught I have yet said, were both impudency and arrogancy. I do not presume to make and parallel, antistat mihi millibus trecentis [he is immeasurably ahead of me], parvus sum, nullus sum, altum nec spiro, nec spero [I am insignificant, a nobody, with little ambition and small prospects]. Yet thus much I will say of myself, and that I hope without all suspicion of pride, or self-conceit, I have lived a silent, sedentary, solitary, private life, mihi et musis [for myself and my studies] in the university. (P. 17)

Furthermore, he confesses that he desired "to have some smattering in all, to be aliquis in omnibus, nullus in singulis [a somebody in general knowledge, a nobody in any one subject]," yet he admits with mocking self-contradiction, "qui ubique est, nusquam est [he who is everywhere is nowhere], which Gesner did in modesty" (P. 17). The persona manages to put the reader at ease with him by revealing himself as a harmless, modest, unambitious university student, a simple "nobody" who merely desires to read into every corner of human knowledge. Nochimson explains the persona's rhetorical reasons for presenting himself in such a manner:

He seems to have introduced the humility and the joke in an attempt to prevent the reader from regarding the author as one who puts on airs.

And while being playful, Burton is working to strengthen his position with respect to that of the reader. (Burton's Anatomy: The Author's Purposes" 280)

The persona behaves much like the playful, "ranging spaniel" (P. 17) that is man's best friend. And it is just this sort of personality that Nochimson believes "draws the reader into the book" ("Burton's Anatomy: The Author's Purposes" 281). But more than that, the persona's personality quite effectively reaches the audience on its own familiar grounds. Zoja Pavlovskis explains that this comic, self-satirizing, self-deprecating manner of the persona is necessary to the "teaching process" in that the audience is more disposed to accept advice from "a humanly fallible man" than from the "aloof teacher of majestic grandeur" (25).

From the beginning of the exordium to the end of the narratio, the persona maintains a comfortably distant yet workable I-YOU relationship with his audience of readers, and he sustains this relationship well into the refutatio in which he defends both the title and the subject of his book from any possible accusations from the audience.

The persona presumes that his immediate community of readers may hold certain objections to him. First, he thinks that since many other authors before him have written books on the subject of melancholy that they probably

believe his book to be an "unnecessary work" (P. 22). He also suspects that they consider him a thief because he has taken ideas from other authors (P. 25). He believes, too, that they will accuse him of meddling in matters that do not concern him; after all, he is merely a divine and should not involve himself with questions concerning medicine (P. 35). Perhaps these readers, already aware that the speaker addressing them represents only one of many malcontents who belong to the popular cult of melancholy, see him as the "personate actor" or one who merely plays the role of the affected intellectual to whose sense of superiority they will object. Yet as the persona, who calls himself Democritus Junior, removes any suspicions and prejudices held against him by the hostile audience, he effectively establishes grounds for his own credibility and for his book. And in this way he gains the reader's attention but in a most self-mocking, self-contradicting manner.

He promises his readers that although other writers have written books about melancholy, he will produce "something different in its new setting" (P. 25). He assures them that if his discourse "be over-medicinal, or savour too much of humanity," then he will make amends to them by writing what they would normally expect a divine to write--"some treatise of divinity" (P. 35). He argues, too,

that even though he considers divinity "to be the queen of professions, and to which all the rest are as handmaidens," he sees "no such great need for it" (P. 35). Besides, he asks, "why may not a melancholy divine, that can get nothing but by simony, profess physic?" (P. 36). The persona justifies his reasons for assuming the responsibility of a medical man by drawing a parallel between the two occupations:

It is a disease of the soul on which I am to treat, and as much appertaining to a divine as to a physician, and who knows what an agreement there is betwixt these two professions? A good divine either is or ought to be a good physician, a spiritual physician at least, as our Saviour calls Himself, and was indeed (Matt. iv, 23; Luke v, 18; Luke vii, 21).
(P. 37)

With tongue-in-cheek humor, the persona, even though he believes that there is "no such great need" for a treatise on divinity, nevertheless gives his readers what they expect from a divine: testimony from the Holy Scripture to prove his point, complete with citation of chapter and verse for quick reference. Yet he informs his readers that the two professions combined constitute the much needed "whole physician":

A divine in this compound mixed malady can do little alone, a physician in some kinds of melancholy much less, both make an absolute

cure.

Alterius sic altera poscit opem.

[When in friendship joined,
A mutual succour in each other find.]

And 'tis proper to them both, and I hope not
unbecoming me, who am by my profession a divine,
and by mine inclination a physician. I had
Jupiter in my sixth house. (P. 37)

The persona's rationale for combining the duties of the physician and the divine stems from his own belief that together they can provide remedies that each one alone cannot. The persona realizes that not Holy-ness, but Wholeness is required to remedy man's malady.

He also encourages them to believe that he can provide an "absolute cure" for melancholy by applying remedies both divine and medicinal. He knows that his audience desires cures for its melancholy and thus makes a subtle promise to provide them. He explains that the reason for his interest in physic is largely due to astronomy, the position of Jupiter in his sixth house, making it clear to the reader that his "inclination" was not of his own choice but caused by the influence of the stars beyond his own control.

In response to the reader's possible accusation that the persona has illegally stolen ideas from other authors, he exclaims, "I cite and quote mine authors . . . sumpsi,

non surripui [I have taken, not filched]" (P. 25). And should his audience object to the style and other such matters, he confesses that

for those other faults of barbarism, Doric dialect, extemporanean style, tautologies, apish imitation, a rhapsody of rags gathered together from several dung-hills, excrements of authors, toys and fopperies confusedly tumbled out, without art, invention, judgment, wit, learning, harsh, raw, rude, phantastical, absurd, insolent, indiscreet, ill-composed, indigested, vain, scurrile, idle, dull, and dry; I confess all ('tis partly affected), thou canst not think worse of me than I do of myself. 'Tis not worth the reading, I yield it, I desire thee not to lose time in perusing so vain a subject, I should be per-adventure loath myself to read him or thee so writing; 'tis not operae pretium [worth while]. (P. 26)

The passage cited above clearly illustrates the persona's self-mocking pose as he quickly and comically charges himself of these "crimes" before the audience has a chance to. At the same time, such a disclosure of faults taunts the reader, making him want to see for himself whether the book is as worthless as its own author claims it is. Then, almost as an afterthought, the persona admits that "We have all our faults" (P. 26), reminding his readers, of course, that his faults are no worse than their own. Again, the idea that we are all in the same basket is repeated.

The persona brings the refutatio to a comical close

when he offers in an aside to the reader the following advice:

Yet one caution let me give by the way to my present or future reader, who is actually melancholy, that he read not the symptoms or prognostics in this following tract, lest by applying that which he reads to himself, aggravating, appropriating things generally spoken to his own person (as melancholy men for the most part do), he trouble or hurt himself, and get in conclusion more harm than good. I advise them therefore warily to peruse that tract; lapides loquitur (so said Agrippa, de occ. Phil.), et caveant lectores ne cerebrum iis excutiat [he discourses stones, and the readers must beware lest he break their heads]. (P. 38)

Apparently, his reference to certain members of his audience who are actually melancholy implies the existence of those in his audience who are not. Yet the persona has reiterated constantly that all the world is mad and therefore melancholy (with the exception of Nobody); now he creates what Stanley Fish calls the "empty category" of non-melancholics through which he believes Burton "makes certain that we will read the interdicted sections, if only to prove to ourselves that his warning was meant for others" (318). However, the persona's empty category may be intended for those "personate actors" like himself who only play the role of the affected melancholic intellectual. Indeed, we are all melancholics, real or imaginary, actual or otherwise.

When the persona moves into the confirmatio, he shifts from the I-YOU relationship with his readers to the much more dominant, ethnocentric, all-inclusive WE; for he must prove by examples drawn from experience that all the world is mad and that "we" all suffer from the chaos and confusion caused by the world's madness. And here again, the persona becomes a member of his own audience of spectators who must agree with his arguments. They cannot deny what experience confirms:

In a word, every man for his own ends. Our summum bonum is commodity, and the goddess we adore Dea Moneta, Queen Money, to whom we daily offer sacrifice, which steers our hearts, hands, affections, all: that most powerful goddess, by whom we are reared, depressed, elevated, esteemed to sole commandress of our actions, for which we pray, run, ride, go, come, labour, and contend as fishes do for a crumb that falleth into the water. (P. 65)

The persona generates ideas from the experience which the members of his audience share in common. He then calls up a vast catalogue of incidents which he had seen himself and which he knows his audience has likewise noticed:

To see so much difference between words and
deeds . . .

To see a servant able to buy out his master . . .

To see men buy smoke for wares, castles, built
with fool's heads . . .

To see men wholly led by affectation . . .

To see a man wear his brains in his belly . . .

To see a man roll himself up like a snowball, from
base beggary to right worshipful and right
honorable titles . . .

(P. 66-67)

And finally, the persona reveals the upside-down conditions that prevail in a world that has lost sight of reason and order, a world in which traditional roles are reversed:

To see wise men degraded, fools preferred; one govern towns and cities, and yet a silly woman overrules him at home; command a province, and yet his own servants or children prescribe laws to him. . . . To see horses ride in a coach, men draw it; dogs devour their masters; towers build masons; children rule; old men go to school; women wear the breeches; sheep demolish towns, devour men, etc.; and in a word, the world turned upside downward! (P. 68)

The portrait of an upside-down world ultimately causes the reader to consider the conditions which constitute a reasonable one. The persona argues, by quoting an anonymous source, that the state is "like a sick body which had lately taken physic, whose humours are not yet well settled, and weakened so much by purging, that nothing was left but melancholy" (P. 81). Furthermore, he declares that the sick state must be reformed (P. 80). And after he describes how idleness has caused the general lack of production and industry in his country, he breaks free from his audience

and his immediate argument to enter his own world, albeit a Utopia, a No Place that Nobody builds for himself.

His Utopia, his New Atlantis, is "a poetical commonwealth" of his own making (P. 97). And the word "poetical" should remind us that this Utopia is after all only fiction. The most noticeable difference between the digression and the other divisions of the persona's address is the complete rejection of the ethnocentric WE, which binds persona and reader in close community, in favor of the egocentric I, which indicates a deliberate exclusion of "others":

I will yet, to satisfy and please myself, make an Utopia of mine own, a New Atlantis, a poetical commonwealth of mine own, in which I will freely domineer, build cities, make laws, statutes, as I list myself. (P. 97)

The persona now engages freely in creating or inventing his own world and thus assumes the responsibility of the Creator by generating his own world in which he will "freely domineer." Yet this New Atlantis, this Utopia of his own creation, bears some uneasy resemblances to the chaotic world from which he has just departed. Orphans, prisoners, and madmen inhabit his Utopia, hardly the sort of people we would expect to find in this ideal place. However, the persona's New Atlantis at least makes some provisions for

these unfortunates. And we discover, too, that even war is a potential reality in his Utopia. He admits to us that he hates war, especially "offensive war, except the cause be very just" (P. 106), and he will not tolerate it. If such offensive wars occur in his New Atlantis, he "will have them proceed with all moderation" (P. 107). For "defensive wars," he will have necessary funds set aside for the military defense of the country in order to avoid charging "heavy taxes and impositions" upon the people. The persona's Utopia is in some ways only an imitation of the chaotic world of madness and melancholy. His digression, his creation, is not really anything new but only a mirror image of the world that requires reform. Fish has also noticed the similarities between the world of madness and the world of the persona's self-styled Utopia. He argues that we are once again "back at the same old stand, nothing has changed" (328). Furthermore, Fish maintains that Utopia really does not exist,

at least not one sustained enough to allow it to stand out. Nor should this be surprising. Nothing stands out in Burton's universe, because nothing--no person, place, object, idea--can maintain its integrity in the context of an all-embracing madness. . . . The Utopia is just one more barrel, one more false promise, one more substanceless hope of sanity and order, and, like the others, it surfaces for brief moments before the advancing tides of melancholy rise to overwhelm and obliterate it. (329)

Apparently, there is no escape from melancholy's basket, by either the realities of experience or by the fictions of the imagination.

The persona finally returns to finish the confirmatio. He begins by describing the general discontent among families and then moves on to a discussion of how philosophers and scholars, women and lovers, along with a host of various other people who suffer from madness. He ends the confirmatio with the statement that Nobody, Nicholas Nemo, is free from melancholy and madness (P. 117). Nobody is his first exception; he lists a catalogue of "wise" men in addition to Nobody who are exempt from melancholy:

- 1) those who are silent, "no better way to avoid folly and madness than by taciturnity";
- 2) senators and magistrates, hic licet impune pessimos esse [they are privileged to be as bad as they like (some say), we must not speak of them, neither is it fit];
- 3) Stoics, "ad summum sapiens nisi quum pituita molesta [unfailingly wise save when troubled with the phlegm]";
- 4) Cynics, who are "all 'betrothed to wisdom,' if we may believe their disciples and followers";
- 5) Lipsius, who "brags how he sowed wisdom in the Low Countries";
- 6) finally the Pope, who is "more than a man, as his parasites often make him, a demi-god, and besides His Holiness cannot err, in Cathedra belike: and yet some of

them have been magicians, heretics, atheists, children" (P. 118-19). The persona is obviously agreeing with what he thinks his audience considers to be the appropriate exceptions. However, to each exception he adds a note of doubt about these alleged exceptions: senators, magistrates, stoics, cynics, and the Pope are exceptions only by virtue of their reported reputations and by what their disciples and followers have testified. Thus, in spite of information, whether recorded in books as fact or passed along by popular gossip, we and the persona's audience encounter a certain amount of uncertainty as to whether these exceptions really are exceptions. But the satirical message remains all too clear that Nobody is free, exempt, from madness and melancholy.

In the peroration the persona briefly summarizes his main points and repeats his objective:

To anatomize this humour of melancholy, through all his parts and species, as it is an habit, or an ordinary disease, and that philosophically, medicinally, to show the causes, symptoms, and several cures of it, that it may be the better avoided. (P. 120)

He announces, too, that if his readers object to the book, he will deny all that he has said, to place all responsibility on Democritus for what he has written. And yet he also places the responsibility upon his authorities, the

"others" whose ideas he has cited. He hopes that the book will cause no such offence; but if so, "aliquid recognoscat, nos mentimur omnia [let no one take these things to himself, they are all but fiction]" (P. 123). The effect of this declaration is disarming to the reader, since the persona has taken great pains to defend his name as well as the title and subject of his book only to reduce everything at the final stage to nothing. So we end just where we began--with nothing and nobody. The reader is left with the paradox that melancholy is all and nothing.

Thus far we have investigated Burton's art of rhetorical invention in terms of how form and audience determine the content of his address to the readers. The Ciceronian, seven-part oration becomes the basic engine for rhetorical persuasion aimed at engaging the reader's attention, removing any possible prejudices that the audience may have about the speaker, his character, and his subject, and at establishing credible arguments in support of the speaker's case. All this the persona has accomplished, at least at a surface level. But Burton's art of invention lies much deeper than mere consideration for form and audience.

We have seen how the persona shifts his perspective from actor to member of the audience to the isolated,

egocentric speaker in the digression of Utopia. These are Burton's inventive "selves" referred to earlier in this study, and each one provides a springboard for the production of ideas embedded into the prescribed form of the Ciceronian oration.

The persona invents ideas from at least three perspectives or points of view. First, from the ethnocentric perspective of the Rhetorical "I" (which defines the content generated in the Preface), the persona invents ideas common to all who share the same world conditions. This "self" is determined largely by how others see him and by what they think of him. He appeals to their concern with melancholy and to their experiences in the melancholy world. He is "like" them only because he shares their experiences.

Second, in the Anatomy proper the persona, although he retains the I-YOU relationship with the reader, generates ideas from the Ramist place-logic construct which enables him to "fill" the slots or empty spaces in the spatial paradigm, which represents the outer frame of ideas generated by logic: cause, effect, definition, division, species, comparisons, differences. This perspective determines the persona's "method" and creates the impression of a methodical personality who in turn gives the impression

of a methodical and orderly mind in control of the "sober discourse." In addition, the persona collects and embeds into the outer frame, or diagram, the testimony drawn from a host of authorities and books. In this way, his sense of self is determined by what "they" say. He becomes a mere reflection of the scholastic tradition and the new modern speculation, the point of intersection between knowledge past and knowledge present. He allows his books to participate in a symposium, as Northrop Frye has explained (317). Collection, in fact, becomes one of the principal means of invention. He admits early in the Preface that he has

read many books, but to little purpose, for want of good method; I have confusedly tumbled over divers authors in our libraries, with small profit for want of art, order, memory, judgment. . . . all my treasure is in Minerva's tower. Greater preferment as I could never get, so I am not in debt for it, I have a competency (laus Deo) from my noble and munificent patrons, though I live a collegiate student, as Democritus in his Garden, and lead a monastic life, ipse mihi theatrum [sufficient entertainment to myself], sequestered from those troubles of the world, et tanquam in specula positus (as he said), in some high place above you all. (P. 17-18)

Though he admits that he has remained sequestered from the main traffic of life, his method of invention bears some resemblance to the Platonic system of invention which requires reflection and isolation. Yet the persona taps

into the great resources of ideas found in the scholastic book tradition; and upon the scholastic tradition he superimposes the new ideas contained in the books of his own modern age. He combines "voices" of the present which echo "voices" of the past, building a resulting dialogical exchange of ideas across time and space.

The scholastic collective of the Ramist diagram and the dialogical symposium of books work together in order to make the Anatomy presentational, that is, dialectical. And the persona's personality in the Anatomy is also dialectical as he presents ideas generated from the spatial paradigm, and allowing his authorities to have a sort of open forum for discussion of those ideas. The persona, the anonymous Nobody in comparison with the giants upon whose shoulders he stands, recedes into the background while his authorities assume responsibility for what is said. It is always "they" that say it; the Dialectical "I" is actually a Nobody among those whose works he cites and quotes. The persona's sources continually "give way to other sources"; and almost in competition with an "infinity of sources, the new compiler must remain anonymous or become obsessed with defining a role" (Wong 111). He merely presents information; he cares not to become involved with controversy over the truth or falsehood of the testimony.

The presentational aspect of the Anatomy proper in particular perhaps confirms Ruth Fox's assertion that the Anatomy of Melancholy "is not argumentative prose" (53).

And yet his sense of self is always constructed by the testimony of his authorities. He confesses that the

matter is theirs most part, and yet mine, apparet unde sumptum sit [it is plain whence it was taken] (which Seneca approves), aliud tamen quam unde sumptum sit apparet, [yet is becomes something different in its new setting]; which nature doth with the aliment of our bodies incorporate, digest, assimilate, I do concoquere quod hause [assimilate what I have swallowed], dispose of what I take. (P. 26)

This "incorporating" self represents the Dialectical "I," the logocentric personality who, as Joan Webber explains, offers "as many different positions and possibilities as he can" (87). His ethos is determined by his sources to the extent that what he writes "shows as scholar" (P. 25). And the image of eating books and digesting them brings to mind the familiar adage that "you are what you eat." The Dialectical "I" reveals himself as a reflection of the collective scholastic, gathering into one place the remnants of all knowledge across the continuum of space and time; and he invites the reader to play the role of the collective scholastic. These invitations are often prefaced with the tag phrase, "I refer you to . . .". In this way the

dialectical personality arouses curiosity in the reader and likewise encourages him to "eavesdrop," to listen to additional discussion among other books.

Finally, the third inventing self, the Generative "I," emerges in the digressions that always depart from and return to the greater design of the discourse. We have already seen the persona's digression of Utopia in the Preface, and he continues to embed digressions into the text of the Anatomy proper. This personality is extremely egocentric as he breaks away from the spatial paradigm in order to create or compose new discourses of his own where he can "freely expatiate and exercise" himself for his own "recreation," as he tells us in his Digression of Air (II. 34). This self may perhaps represent the "free man born" of which the persona speaks early on in the Preface. Very often this self behaves much like the "I" of infinite worlds that we experience in the Digression of Air in which the persona becomes the long-winged hawk that soars far above man's melancholy world to survey the geography of earth from a distance (II. 34). From this vantage point, he is free to generate questions as well as answers to matters of human knowledge and to pit the book tradition against personal observation.

Ruth Fox has called attention to the fact that the

Digression of Anatomy "not only gives the known facts, but it raises the right questions, for to Burton it is pertinent that his audience should be wondering how man is man" (54); in this way, Burton invites the reader to play yet another role, that is, to "participate in his inquiries" (54). Many of the digressions allow the persona the freedom to raise questions and answers, to move beyond the restrictions of the known world and to explore possibilities in the unknown beyond whatever books contain. The Digression of Anatomy, which appears very early in Partition I, illustrates the persona's interest in exploration. Here he declares that his digression may induce men "to examine more accurately, search farther into this most excellent subject" (I. 146). The notion of searching farther defines the exploratory nature of digression. And further search is intended for the reader whom he invites to participate in the exploration. In the Digression of Air, the persona explores for his own "recreation," which suggests perhaps that exploration enables him to assume a new role, a new identity which allows him to generate ideas from a new perspective.

These three perspectives operate in the Anatomy proper in order to invent ideas and to sustain invention. We have already explored the nature of the Rhetorical "I" of the Preface which relies upon the Aristotelian-Ciceronian means

of invention to generate ideas. In the next chapter, I will explore the nature of the Dialectical "I" of the Anatomy proper and explain the similarities between that inventive self and the Ramist theory of analysis. Burton appears to imitate Ramist analysis in the synoptic charts that precede each partition; and he uses the diagram as a principal means of inventing ideas according to the dialectical modes of Ramist invention. The Ramist diagram, as will be discussed in the next chapter, represents the culmination of medieval scholastic logic. Into the diagram he embeds information that he has collected from the book tradition and from the opinions held by his own culture. This activity of diagramming and collecting information makes Burton's Anatomy proper presentational in the best tradition of dialectical invention and constitutes the logocentric nature of the persona involved in such activity. The persona's activity of combining the Ramist diagram with testimony collected from authorities constitutes what I will refer to as the scholastic collective, which represents Burton's primary method of dialectical invention. In addition to the diagrammatic and collective system of invention, Burton includes citations from his sources and creates an illusion of voice as he allows the books to talk and thus to keep the act of generating ideas continually spinning. The

books collaborate, work together as a community of knowledge, and they create a kind of dialogue, which I will refer to as the dialogical collaborative. This combination of the scholastic-collective and the dialogical-collaborative makes Burton's system of invention particularly dynamic and self-perpetuating.

I will also examine Burton's use of Ramist genesis, which I believe to operate extensively in the digressions in which he creates compositions of his own making, new discourses that spring from Ramist analysis.

CHAPTER IV

PROOF BY LOGIC: "I WILL SHOW A REASON"

We have already seen how the Rhetorical "I" in the Preface to the Anatomy of Melancholy operates only in terms of its ethnocentric relationship to the "others" who listen to or read his preliminary remarks about the universe of melancholy. We have seen how the persona in the Preface generates ideas by means of rhetorical invention (which relies heavily upon considerations for audience in relation to its expectation, values, attitudes, and prejudices) and arranges his discourse according to the principles of the classical oration. As we enter the labyrinth of the Anatomy proper, we notice a sudden shift in tone, attitude, style, and method that differs significantly from that of the Preface. The self-satirizing, self-contradicting tone of the speaker all but vanishes as a more sober voice in the Anatomy proper takes control of the discourse. The speaker in the Anatomy proper appears intensely dedicated to the production of a logical presentation of melancholy by analyzing and classifying all of its features according to the principles of logic; and, of course, he continues to cite his authorities both ancient and modern, learned and

popular, in order to lend further dignity and authenticity to his "sober" discourse. The attitude and tone of the speaker in the Anatomy proper thus appears more authoritative and scholarly than the playful persona of the Preface.

Yet the most noticeable difference between the discourse found in the Preface and that contained in the Anatomy proper lies in their respective methods of generating ideas. The persona in the Preface relies upon rhetorical invention and form in order to generate ideas and to arrange them into a pattern of development designed to seduce the reader into the Anatomy of Melancholy. His ethos operates like a basket representing a kind of temptation for the reader to uncover whatever is contained there. His ethos performs the same function as the basket, gathering into one place all the members of his generation who share the same experiences in a melancholy world. After he has hooked his audience's attention--its "assured hope and confidence" (P. 123)--he then pulls the audience directly into the labyrinth of the "sober" discourse contained in the Anatomy proper.

The basket also serves as an appropriate image for the entire Preface. Inside the basket are all the fragments of a melancholy world with its problems and confusions that the


persona has gathered there for our review. All through the Preface he gives us the impression that he has turned that basket upside-down as he discusses each social, political, and religious manifestation of melancholy, allowing all of the parts and pieces of human existence to tumble out so that indeed nothing is left. Thus, the satirist-rhetorician of the Preface has created in the reader's mind a conscious desire for a new order to replace an essentially defective one. As we shall soon discover in the Anatomy proper, it is the dialectician who must deconstruct and anatomize all the fragments of that old order in an effort to understand the causes for its defects. This act of deconstructing the world is much like the business of the anatomist who cuts into an organism layer by layer until nothing is left. The anatomist paradoxically has learned something about his subject but only after he has taken it apart, killed it. All that remains to be done is to rebuild a new order to replace an essentially defective one. And deconstruction prepares the way for re-construction, the building up of a new order for human existence. Signs of that new order lie in the third partition of the Anatomy in which the persona confesses that this last book shall "take like gilded pills" and that his lines "shall not only recreate but rectify the mind" (III, 7). The whole

progression from the first and second partitions to the last represents an ascent from the unreason and confusion that is man's to the reason and order that is God's. The progression thus moves from despair to hope, the ultimate cure for melancholy.

It is important to notice, too, that "Democritus Junior" is conspicuously absent from the Anatomy proper. Lawrence Babb has found one reference to the name but only in the 1638 fifth edition. We have as our guide a nameless persona who exists only in relation to the production of ideas and information, which overrides his concern for audience. Yet in spite of all the information that he records about melancholy, certain discrepancies and differences of opinion exist among the authorities whom he cites. If the reader indeed expects answers or absolute cures for melancholy, he soon finds himself wandering through a virtual maze of answers, opinions, and theories. These discrepancies and conflicting opinions reflect "the conjunction of the idea of melancholy with the intellectual uncertainties and philosophical skepticism of the period" (Lyons 120). Burton appears to suggest that everything in relation to melancholy remains doubtful yet he continues to offer as complete a range of opinions as possible about the causes, symptoms, and cures of melancholy. The Anatomy of

Melancholy therefore represents a mirror image of the age of doubt. It "attracts conflicting analyses, diagnoses, and theories; it defeats learning and so illustrates learning's limitations" (Korkowski 83).

Yet the persona takes the discrepancies and differences of opinion and submits them to the control of logic, making the reader think that uncertainty and doubt can be regulated by principles of logical reasoning. The following diagram of Section 1, Member 1, taken from the synoptic chart to the first partition, well illustrates the range of choices for the reader to make, which are signalled by the repetition of the conjunction "or" that connects each subsection to the next.



Habits as
Subs. 4.

The reader is cast into an either/or situation and must therefore decide for himself which category best applies to his own situation. The fourth subsection for "Habits" is further broken down into nine subclasses until we finally arrive at melancholy, the most particular of diseases which will occupy our attention for the remainder of the Anatomy proper:

Habits as Subs. 4.	Dotage. Frenzy. Madness. Ecstasy. Lycanthropia. Chorus Sancti Viti. Hypophobia. Possession or obsession of devils. Melancholy. See Y
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The charts show that his dichotomies are like "anatomies," the parts of melancholy which in turn open into more parts--all according to the principles of dialectic. We find, for example, that Section 1, Member 1 contains five subsections. The first begins with an explanation of the most general cause of man's melancholy, his fall from grace with God. Subsection 2 presents the definition, number, and division (distributions, in dialectic) of diseases. Subsection 3 deals with the divisions of the diseases of the mind.

Subsection 4 develops the division further by presenting the several species or kinds of diseases associated with the disturbed mind. The dialectical movement is always conductive: it operates like a spectrum, breaking ideas down to their smallest clusters. And such a movement indicates an ever-present direction for dialectical invention. The entire process of generating ideas progresses by linear dialectical conduction: an idea passes through a spectrum ("In diseases, consider") where it can be broken down or anatomized according to the places or topoi for dialectical invention. And in the above diagram we recognize the familiar Ramist place-logic for dialectical invention proceeding from general to particular according to cause, definition, species, and distribution. These dialectical places represent the resources for the exploration of an idea preparatory to the construction of discourses about that idea.

If we turn to the features of Ramist dialectic, we recognize the similarities between Burton's synoptic charts and Ramus's bracketed dichotomies of the art of dialectic. We notice, too, that both Ramus and Burton tend to visualize ideas in terms of classes and in relation to their bipartite division. In the 1576 outline of dialectic shown in Fig. 2. of Chapter II of this study, the topics for arguments are

either artificial or non-artificial; artificial topics are either primary or secondary; inartificial topics are either divine or human, and so on until the divisions are exhausted. In Burton's synoptic chart of diseases in general, their causes are either impulsive or instrumental; diseases of the body are either epidemical (capable of affecting the general community) or particular (capable of affecting the individual only), of which gout and dropsy are examples; diseases of the mind are manifested in disposition or in habit. And melancholy belongs to the class of habits, which in turn belongs to the still larger class of diseases of the mind. And it is important to notice here that Burton's discussion of melancholy begins with the mind, and in the third partition its cure also begins with the mind, a cure which will not only "recreate but rectify" it (III, 7). Burton appears to suggest that the human intellect requires a change, perhaps a new direction of thinking, before it can be cured of melancholy. And, at least for the Dialectical "I" of the partitions, sections, members, and subsections, scholastic logic is the instrument for the re-edification of the intellect. Drawing out branching dichotomies becomes his method of avoiding melancholy by keeping the mind active by continually descending into particulars. The Dialectical "I" manages to

generate ideas for discourse by playing the role of the diagnostician who presents to the reader, his patient, as many causes of melancholy as he can. His repetition of "etc." invites the patient to participate in dialectical diagnostics, to generate more ideas related to the causes of melancholy, and thus to participate in his own cure by actively engaging his mind in intellectual operations.

Walter Ong explains that Ramus's dichotomies have their sources in Rudolph Agricola's De inventione dialectica, but particularly in medieval class logic

which approaches logical structure by considering primarily the way in which certain classes include other classes, each of those latter still further classes, and so on indefinitely. In other words, it is a logic built on the extension of terms, and as such invites quantification and encourages thinking which specializes in quantified analogies, overt or disguised. The great medieval developments in quantification had been in great part class logics, and while it was not new to Ramus the cult of dichotomies, which reaches its peak with him and his followers, could hardly have taken place independently of this medieval heritage. (Ramus, Method 201)

The branching dichotomies represent a spatial presentation of an idea showing all of its characteristics and features. More importantly, the dichotomies represent a spatial paradigm of a complete investigation of any idea, a system for a logically directed exploration. In other words, the

spatial paradigm becomes a heuristic for invention that proceeds according to the principles of the place-logic. The paradigm also appears to represent a form of arrangement. Wilbur Samuel Howell explains that Ramus "expressly notes the presence of invention in an act of arrangement, and the presence of arrangement in an act of invention" (162-63). However, if we look carefully at Ramus's dichotomies, we notice that it is not arrangement but direction that defines and governs the progression of the divisions. In Ramus's dichotomies the direction always moves progressively from general to particular until no further division is possible.

According to Howell, the divisions

separate a logical class into subclasses opposed to each other by contradiction, and to separate the subclasses and the sub-classes in the same way, until the entire structure of any science resembled a severely geometrical pattern of bifurcations. (162)


Ong describes Ramus's dichotomies as a process of breaking down an idea into units, clusters, and corpuscles:

Ramus tends to view all intellectual operations as a spatial grouping of a number of these corpuscles into a kind of cluster, or as a breaking down of clusters into their corpuscular units. These clusters, once formed, can be regarded also as corpuscles which in themselves admit of further combination and which form still further clusters. (Ramus, Method 203)


And we notice the same tendency in the Dialectical "I," whose personality dominates the synoptic charts in each of the three partitions of the Anatomy of Melancholy. He appears to understand melancholy as a science or an arts-course curriculum subject which can be explained scientifically and presented logically to the reader. The branching diagram for melancholy is shown in Fig. 3 where we notice Burton's place-logic for the invention of "arguments." Here the entire range of melancholy reveals itself at a glance, complete with references to the second partition in which the cures of melancholy are discussed and to the third partition in which love-melancholy is explained. And we can see several of the Ramist topics for generating ideas: genus (diseases in general above), species, definition, cause, effect (symptom), name, difference, comparison, subjects (parts), and adjuncts or the characteristics of the parts explained in the discourses developing place-adjunct. The synoptic chart in Fig. 3 represents Ramist analysis of a melancholy, breaking down or anatomizing it layer by layer until the analysis is completed. Sister Miriam Joseph explains that topics for invention allow for the "systematic and exhaustive" investigation of an idea (308). Yet the topics are in and of themselves conducive to the production of ideas. Ramus's place-logical spatial paradigm and

Burton's equally topical synoptic charts allow for the analysis or investigation of a subject under consideration as well as for the production of ideas about that subject. Burton's synoptic charts become the "dialectical scheme," as Ruth Fox describes them (24), for the invention and presentation of ideas.

Returning once again to Burton's synoptic chart for melancholy shown in Fig. 3, we notice many of Ramus's topics for dialectical invention. Place-cause becomes a subject for investigation which requires its own spatial paradigm in two parts, one for general and the other for particular. Symptoms of melancholy can be taken to mean effects or signs, and place-effect requires its own paradigm having three main divisions of general symptoms, particular symptoms, and prognostics or predictions of future symptoms tending toward the good or the bad. Prognostics is another form of testimony, a non-artificial proof indicating events for the future (Joseph 311). Thus we have in the synoptic chart of melancholy several topics which require further dichotomizations. The topics, in other words, provide spring boards for further division and therefore additional information. The charts generate more charts of bracketed dichotomies lending further development of information and ideas.



Memb. 3.
 Its definition, name, difference, Subs. 1.
 The part and parties affected, affection, etc. Subs. 2.
 The matter of melancholy, natural, unnatural, etc. Subs. 4.



Its causes in general. Sect. 2, A.
 Its symptoms or signs. Sect. 3, B.
 Its prognostics or indications. Sect. 4, C.
 Its cures; the subject of the second Partition.

Fig. 3. Burton's Chart of Melancholy, (I, 126).

The chart for the particular symptoms of melancholy, shown in Fig. 4, reveals further dichotomization into three species: head melancholy, hypochondriacal melancholy, and melancholy that afflicts the entire body. Here the topics for invention have given way to continual diaresis, a method of dividing the general into its kinds or species (Joseph 315).

In the second partition Burton develops the subject of cures for melancholy as he had promised in his chart of melancholy shown in Fig. 3. Cures are either general or particular; of the general there are unlawful cures, of which the instruments of the devil and magicians are examples. Of the lawful cures he includes those derived from God and the saints, although he questions whether the saints and their relics do in fact produce cures and whether it is lawful to enlist their assistance in the cure of melancholy. The last lawful cures are those prescribed by the physician, those applied by the patient, and finally those derived from physic of which he lists three kinds: dietetical, pharmaceutical, and chirurgial. The pharmaceutical cures, shown in Fig. 5, are arranged according to the method of diaresis, the division of place-genus into place-species. The constant division confirms the logocentric personality of the Dialectical "I" who continually

Head melancholy. Subs. 1.	In Body	Headache, binding, heaviness, vertigo, lightness, ringing of the ears, much waking, fixed eyes, high colour, red eyes, hard belly, dry body; no great sign of melancholy in the other parts.
	Or	
	In Mind	Continual fear, sorrow, suspicion, discontent, superfluous cares, solicitude, anxiety, perpetual cogitation of such toys they are possessed with, thought like dreams, etc.
Hypochondriacal, or windy melancholy Subs. 2.	In Body	Wind, rumbling in the guts, belly-ache, heat in the bowels, convulsions, crudities, short wind, sour and sharp belchings, cold sweat, pain in the left side, suffocation, palpitation, heaviness of the heart, ringing in the ears, much spittle, and moist, etc.
	Or	
	In Mind	Fearful, sad, suspicious, discontent, anxiety, etc. lascivious by reason of much wind, troublesome dreams, affected by fits, etc.
Over all the body	In Body	Black, most part lean, broad veins, gross, thick blood, their hemroids commonly stopped, etc.
	Or	
	In Mind	Fearful, sad, solitary, hate light, averse from company, fearful dreams, etc.

Fig. 4. Burton's Chart of Particular Symptoms to the Three Distinct Species. (I, 129).




Fig. 5. Burton's Chart of Pharmaceutics: General, Alternative. (II, 2.)

descends to particulars by means of Ramist-like analysis, cutting into the subject like the anatomist layer by layer in order to investigate it and to generate ideas about it at the same time. The logic of places represents his tool for anatomy as they determine the locations for generating ideas.

In the third partition, in which the persona takes up the discussion of love-melancholy, we notice that he returns once again to the places for dialectical invention. The chart for heroical or love-melancholy shown in Fig. 6 reveals that the persona combines the places used in the charts to the first and second partitions. We notice that cause, effect (sign), and cure, along with prognostics, operate together in one spatial presentation of love-melancholy. In this sense, the third partition brings together the methods of dialectical invention used in Partitions I and II, indicating that Burton may have intended the last partition not to be a continuation of the first two but a culmination of the dialectical method used in the first two partitions.

Another topic for invention not indicated on the chart is testimony, or inartificial proofs necessary for the complete investigation of an idea. Testimony enables the writer to explore an idea in terms of what others have said




Fig. 6. Burton's Chart of Heroical, or Love-Melancholy (III, 1.).

about it, and Burton uses this particular topic extensively throughout the three partitions of the Anatomy of Melancholy. Place-testimony becomes the most informing principle of Burton's art of dialectical invention, and it derives from a variety of sources. Testimony taken from the "wisdom of one" is properly called apothegm (maxim); testimony taken from "one's own experience" is termed "martyria" (Joseph 97; 98). Apodixis is testimony used to base an argument "on the experience of many"; proverbs "represent the testimony of many men" (Joseph 98). Sources for these testimonies are popular, grounded in the non-authoritative opinions of the individual or of the community at large. Testimony cited from the learned world of scholarly authority is called apomnemynesis, "which quotes testimony of approved authors" (Joseph 102). Epicrisis "adds to the authority cited the opinion of the speaker, who may agree or disagree, or make exceptions" (Joseph 103). Finally, the frequent and detailed citation of sources for reasons of deliberate amplification of discourse is called systrophe, often used for rhetorical rather than dialectical purposes. Burton appears to employ systrophe for dialectical reasons since his discourses are a-rhetorical in nature and since his aim appears to be exploratory and investigative. In exploiting

place-testimony to its fullest extent, Burton creates the illusion of voice and dialogue and thus partially recovers the traditional concept of dialectic as an art of discourse that was lost as a result of the Ramist reforms in logic and rhetoric.

Joan Webber has already called attention to Burton's extensive use of citations and argues that the Anatomy of Melancholy "grows, most notably, by absorbing quotations" (84). Furthermore, she asserts that Burton's citations remind us that we are "dealing with a person whose life is books" and that his mind "is the storehouse and assimilation of learning" (85). Assimilation, not only of testimony but also of places for generating ideas, explains Burton's art of dialectical invention intended not to persuade but to present or display ideas and to offer as many opinions and theories as possible. Webber explains, too, that Burton "is more interested in the speculation than in the conclusion" and that he is "most skeptical about absolute, generalizing statements on any subject" for the simple reason that "he sees that not all authorities are relevant to the needs of all" (86). The spatial diagram of the place-logic and the citation of testimony drawn from learned and popular sources create a scholastic-collective mind that assimilates information generated by the dialectical places for

invention.

Lawrence Babb has enumerated and described Burton's sources for citation and concludes that his "abundant display of his learning shows that he is proud of it. His assiduity in study shows that he has enjoyed the acquiring of it" (Sanity in Bedlam 55). Burton's inclusion of testimony also leaves us the impression that "everyone" has written the Anatomy and that the Dialectical "I" of the partitions, sections, members, and subsections is merely a "no one" among the vast authorities who have contributed to the world of scholarship. Indeed, the ethos of the Dialectical "I" is determined by "everyone" who contributes to the great bulk of knowledge; and once again his ethos operates as a gathering place, this time for all of those who belong to the community of scholarly authority and popular opinion. Karen Burke LeFevre argues that the art of invention "builds on a foundation of knowledge accumulated from previous generations, knowledge that constitutes a social legacy of ideas, forms, and ways of thinking" (34). Yet it is "difficult to tell where Burton's "I" leaves off and where the source begins, or vice versa" (Webber 84). The real purpose of the citation of sources is to allow the voices of knowledge to be heard over the confusion caused by melancholy. Stanley Fish asserts that the "end of a

dialectical experience is (or should be) nothing less than a conversion, not only a changing, but an exchanging of minds" (2). This voiced exchange of ideas constitutes the dialogical-collaborative community of minds that together build a body of information. In order to achieve this effect, Burton turns testimony into dialogue as he allows each authority to speak. In a sense, then, Burton's authorities play the role of actors, each one standing upon a stage speaking his lines to the reader-spectators of his "common theatre." And Burton introduces his citations with stage-like directions for speech, giving the impression that the dialogical exchange is much like a heated debate or even idle chit-chat among the books. Webber explains that Burton

acknowledges his sources by calling attention to them in an unequalled stream of varied synonyms for 'as so and so says': 'approves,' 'declared,' 'hath commented,' 'gives an instance,' 'relates,' 'observes,' 'holds,' 'repeats,' 'supposed,' 'confirms,' 'condemns,' 'cries out on,' 'prescribes,' 'rings,' 'explodes,' 'laughs to scorn,' 'cracks,' 'scoffs,' 'witnesseth,' 'denounced,' 'subscribes,' 'mutters.' (85)

In the first partition, the persona uses systrophe extensively as a means of elaborating further upon the definition, name, and difference of melancholy. We learn that the name

is imposed from the matter, and disease

denominated from the material cause . . . from black choler. And whether it be a cause or an effect, as disease or a symptom, let Donatus Altomarus and Salvianus decide; I will not contend about it. (I, 169)

Right from the start, the persona makes it clear that he will take no part in the discrepancies and conflicts of opinion among his authorities. Instead, he lists a catalogue of sources for the reader to choose from:

It hath several descriptions, notations, and definitions. Fracastorius, in his second book of Intellect, calls those melancholy "whom abundance of that same depraved humour of black choler hath so misaffected, that they become mad thence, and dote in most things, or in all, belonging to election, will, or other manifest operations of the understanding." Melanelius out of Galen, Ruffus, Aetius, describe it to be "a bad and peevish disease, which make men degenerate into beasts"; Galen "a privation or infection of the middle cell of the head," etc., defining it from the part affected, which Hercules de Saxonia approves . . . calling it "a depravation of the principal function." (I, 169)

And as to the actual part affected by melancholy, we again run into difference of opinion among experts and authorities:

Most are of the opinion that it is the brain: for being a kind of dotage, it cannot otherwise be but that the brain must be affected, as a similar part, be it by consent or essence . . . as Laurentius well observes. . . . Marcus de Oddis (in a consultation of his, quoted by Hildesheim) and five others there cited are on the contrary part; because fear and sorrow, which are passions,

be seated in the heart. But this objection is sufficiently answered by Montaltus, who doth not deny that the heart is affected (as Melanelius proves out of Galen) by reason of his vicinity, and so is the midriff and many other parts. (I, 170-71)

As we have become accustomed to the medical technicalities involved in locating the part affected by melancholy, the persona wraps up the dispute by quoting Lodovicus Vives's Fable of Man in which man's body is compared to a clock: "if one wheel be amiss, all the rest are disordered" (I, 171). Science has thus turned to fable as the persona cites liberally from all sources, scientific or fictitious. The reader quickly finds himself between two extremes of fact and fiction concerning melancholy. And there the persona ends his discussion of the part affected and moves directly to the next subject, the affection and "whether it be imagination or reason alone, or both" (I, 171).

Our persona refuses to draw conclusions from the controversy at hand. Ruth Fox argues that he refuses to make any conclusions, that he

cannot achieve concordantia--he will not "contend"--and instead of trying to reconcile contradiction he accepts it and then goes ahead and orders, defines, makes categories in spite of it, letting others decide about causes, effects, or symptoms, and proceeding himself to draw out "descriptions, notations, and definitions. (38)

Webber has noticed that Burton's sentences are like multiple-choice questions: "check one, or if none is applicable, explain under 'other' (etc.)" (101-102). And this device creates a peculiar impact upon the reader:

This kind of variety makes the sentence as inclusive as possible, offering the reader every opportunity to find it in his own experience, and to broaden his own experience by taking all this into himself, just as Burton has done. Both the references to other writers and the use of "etc." permit an openness of meaning that does not limit the subject to what can be fitted onto the page.
(102)

The persona has promised to clarify the causes, symptoms, and cures of melancholy, but his citation of authorities, who many times disagree with each other, often makes any clarification "melt into cloudiness," as Fox has observed.

In the second partition, we encounter the same promise of clarification--that we will discover the cures for melancholy--yet we discover that here, too, differences of opinion exist. Melancholy, as the persona has explained in the first partition, has many causes, among them improper diet. In the second partition he devotes a subsection to the cures of improper diet. He then discusses the kinds of meat, water, fish, and fruits that will rectify the diet:

Crato, consil, 21, lib. 2, admits roast meat, if the burned and scorched superficies, the brown we call it, be pared off. Salvianus,

lib. 2, cap. I, cries out on cold and dry meats. . . . Galen takes exception at mutton, but without question he means that rammy mutton which is in Turkey and Asia Minor. . . . Arabians commend brains, but Laurentius, cap. 8, excepts against them, so do many others. (II, 22-23)

Again, we are in the same muddle. The cures for melancholy, as are the causes, are relative to the needs of the individual at hand and not of all mankind in general. And thus the reader must consider and choose for himself which cause or which cure best applies to his own case. At the same time, the reader is called upon to participate actively in dialectical diagnostics as he continues to read, hoping to find the remedy for whatever ails him. It appears that Burton deliberately uses place-testimony as a means of circumventing the absolute at every turn, for to arrive at the absolute would necessarily terminate the search and stop the investigation of more possibility.

Another non-artificial form of place-testimony is the citation of beliefs and opinions from the cultural collective. Proverbs and maxims operate extensively throughout the partitions, and Burton seems to employ them for the edification of readers who find themselves hopelessly lost in the discrepancy of opinion among medical and scholarly authority. These readers (perhaps those who are actually melancholy) can take immediate refuge from the

storm of skepticism by escaping to the wisdom of one, the maxim, or of the many, the proverb. All through the Anatomy Burton juxtaposes knowledge (ever-changing and temporal as it is) against wisdom (apparently universal and therefore eternal) in order to create yet another atmosphere of extremes.

For those readers who experience confusion among scholarly authorities, Burton offers them solace in the authority of the maxim: "narrow in soul, narrow in spirit" (I, 353); "of evils choose the least"; "as Tully holds, 'better be a temperate old man than a lascivious youth'" (II, 29). And if the wisdom of one is insufficient, the reader can take hold of the wisdom of the many: "riches gather many friends" (I, 347), and so on. Yet the proverbs and maxims reflect the wisdom that is man's just as the scholarly authorities reflect the knowledge that is man's. Both have their limitations, for the causes and cures of melancholy are relative to the individual. According to Fish, Burton preoccupies himself "with the disparity between a prescriptive moralism and the intractable reality of everyday life, and to some extent his Anatomy . . . impresses upon us the unavailability of easy answers" (349-350). Thus, we find in the Anatomy everything known about melancholy, yet we find nothing in terms of how to deal with

it. Burton appears to suggest that we either engulf ourselves in the study of it (in which we become hopelessly lost in the labyrinth of its causes, symptoms, cures, and prognostics), or we escape confusion altogether by clinging to preachy proverbs and maxims that at least ease the pain and provide some sense of security.

The digressions in the first two partitions reveal yet another personality behind the Anatomy who delights in breaking away from the tedium of topics and testimony, a personality who creates his own world of thought as he ponders new questions, new consideration, new possibilities. This personality is the Generative "I" who creates new compositions of his own that spring from the task of analysis. We have already reviewed in Chapter II of this study the Ramist method of analysis/genesis. Analysis is the logical deconstruction of discourse into its component parts, or the "descent from the most general through the less general to the particular (Ong, Ramus, Method 258). And analysis can produce several results, one of which is the "dichotomized Ramist tables in bracketed form, in which the items may be single words or entire sentences and paragraphs" (Ong, Ramus, Method 265). Genesis is the creation of a new work considered, according to Ong, "as starting with imitation but as moving out from there to

greater freedom of expression" (Ramus, Method 264).

Burton's digressions appear to operate in the manner of Ramist genesis, or compositio, in which the persona strikes out on his own to produce a composition of his own free of the restrictions of the spatial paradigm.

The first digression appears early in the first partition and is entitled "Digression of Anatomy." Here he announces that he will explain those "hard words" that will occur throughout the entire book. He will explain the anatomy of the body and the faculties of the soul "for the better understanding of that which is to follow" (I, 146). In other words, he will explain man in terms of structure.

Most notable is the almost complete absence of multiple citations in the "Digression of Anatomy." The Generative "I" simply examines, anatomizes body and soul without the constant chatter of authorities in the background. And as we move progressively into man through body, humour, soul and her faculties, the inward sense, the understanding, and the will, we enter the world of inner man, a world worth exploring. The Generative "I" takes us into this inner world in order that we may know "how man is man" (Fox 54). It answers the initial starting question, "What is man?"

In the second partition, which explores the cures for melancholy, the Generative "I" emerges once again, this time

to move outward far beyond the confines of earth in order to explore the ample regions of air. The "Digression of Air" allows the Generative "I" to wander at random as freely as a long-winged hawk

souring higher and higher till he be come to his full pitch, and in the end when the game is sprung, comes down amain, and stoops upon a sudden: so will I, having now come at last into the ample fields of air, wherein I may freely expiate and exercise myself for my recreation, awhile rove, wander about the world, mount aloft to those ethereal orbs and celestial spheres, and so descend to my former elements again.
(II, 34-35)

This opening passage to the "Digression of Air" reflects the Generative "I's" fascination with roving, wandering, exploring; he is able to break free of the spatial place-logical paradigm in order to exercise, for his own recreation his imagination and thought. From this point forward, the persona spins his discourse around question after question, "moving back and forth from hypothesis to hypothesis, commenting on all the world systems, but not committing himself to any particular one" (Barlow 291). The questions that the Generative "I" uses recalls the set of ten questions designed by Melanchthon for investigating a subject. Some of the persona's questions begin with such phrases as "I would find out" and "I would examine"; others use interrogative tag words, such as how, what, where, and

in many cases, why. The following passage indicates the Generative "I's" unusual flair for inquiry:

Whence proceed that variety of manners, and a distinct character (as it were) to several nations? some are wise, subtile, witty; others dull, sad, and heavy; some big, some little . . . some soft and some hardy, barbarous, civil, black, dun, white; is it from the air, from the soil, influence of stars, or some other secret cause? Why doth Africa breed so many venomous beasts, Ireland none? Why hath Daulis and Thebes no swallows . . . as well as the rest of Greece, Ithica no hares, Pontus asses, Scythia swine? Whence comes this variety of complexions colours, plants, birds, beasts, metals, peculiar almost to every place? Why so many thousand strange birds and beasts proper to America. . . . Were they created in the six days, or ever in Noah's ark? if there, why are they not dispersed and found in other countries? (II, 43)

In this "Digression of Air," we find the persona wandering as a long-winged hawk in those wide open fields of air; yet we discover, too, he generates even more ideas for fruitless speculation by dreaming up questions for which there are no easy answers. If man indeed pursues a study of his own melancholy by poring through facts and opinions contained in books and cultural belief, he will find confusion there; on the other hand, if he chooses to escape the restrictions of documented knowledge by wandering into the vast unknown, he will encounter the same uncertainties and unresolved questions. There is no escape from melancholy either by analysis or by genesis. We always

return to melancholy, just as genesis and digression return to the analysis that dominates the greater logical design of the book. Yet in a peculiar sense, the digressions in Partitions I and II appear, at least in my estimation, to be rehearsals for Partition III, which Ruth Fox believes is the "great, final digression from scholastic order, which, like the digressions of I and II, nonetheless make use--sometimes startling, almost perverse, use--of the forms scholastic order gave to the Anatomy at the outset" (123).

The Generative "I" of the third partition has arrived at the subject of Love, for he admits in his Preface to Partition III that "love is a species of melancholy" (III, 4). Thus, the Generative "I" has taken place-species and gives it a central position as the topic for an entire partition. He also confesses that he has written this book at the request "of many who begged" him to "dwell at greater length on this topic" (III, 9). Lest we make the mistake of thinking that love can cure melancholy, the persona shows us that love, as a species of melancholy, is just as diseased and sick as everything else in the world. And although the form of the third partition imitates the place-logical pattern of the preceding two (for that form is the persona's ever-present method), the third partition is a digression, as the persona's own words imply as he cites Valleriola:

there lies open a vast and philosophical field to my discourse, by which many lovers become mad; let me leave my more serious meditation, wander in these philosophical fields, and look into those pleasant groves of the Muses, where with unspeakable variety of flowers we may make garlands to ourselves, not to adorn us only, but with their pleasant smell and juice to nourish our souls, and fill our minds desirous of knowledge. (III, 6)

Again, the persona is up to his old tricks: he baits the readers once again with the notion that his treatise on love will provide the readers with the answers that they have been expecting all along, that the treatise will comfort and give solace to their melancholy. They expect some little "gilded pills" to appease their malady. And, of course, the persona had implied that philosophy can remedy the mind, yet philosophy is somehow bound up with the Muses, which Fox believes to make Partition III "a new and 'metaphorical' view of [love-melancholy] by attesting to melancholy as a literary phenomenon, a poetic invention" and which enables the Anatomy to change "from a medical treatise to a kind of poetry" (138).

In Section 1, Member 1, Subsection 1, we learn that love is desire, specifically a desire for that which is good (III, 11). The persona then cites Augustine's division of love: "Two cities make two loves, Jerusalem and Babylon, the love of God the one, the love of the world the other"

(III, 14). Man corrupts love when he begins to desire the things of the world more than God, when he desires after the objects of God's creation rather than God the Creator. And from this point forward, the persona makes his explications of love to the reader, pointing out all along the way that love becomes corrupt when man chases after wealth, ambition, commodities--all the objects of perverted desire.

The persona divides the species of Love-melancholy into its three kinds: heroical or love-melancholy, jealousy, and religious melancholy. All three deal with Love's deterioration into lust in courtship, jealousy leading to hatred in marriage, and finally folly in excess or defect leading to madness in religion. Love and its three kinds turn out to be just as diseased as everything else in a melancholy world. Genuine love is that which inclines toward God and fellow man. Instead, love becomes perverted since man desires only that which will satisfy his appetite, his lust, and his need to believe in superstition. Lust, jealousy, and superstition are all "bastard branches" of genuine love (Fox 174). And we get the uneasy impression that there is no escape from the misery of love's condition.

The persona declares in Section 4, Member 1, Subsection 5 that man needs a cure for superstition and that his cure to

purge the world of idolatry and superstition will require some monster-taming Hercules, a divine Aesculapius, or Christ Himself to come in His own person, to reign a thousand years on earth before the end, as the Millenaries will have him. They are generally so refractory, self-conceited, obstinate, so firmly addicted to that religion in which they have been bred and brought up, that no persuasion, no terror, no persecution can divert them. (III, 375)

We find that the causes of religious melancholy stem from the devil by means of miracles, apparition, and oracles. The agents of religious melancholy are politicians, priests, imposters, and blind guides, who all reveal their mindless simplicity, excess of zeal, ignorance, and pride (III, 325). And it would take a man of Herculean strength to remove man's religious follies, according to the persona. Thus, as Stanley Fish asserts, "there is no remedy" (339). The persona quietly "concludes" at the end of Partition III:

Only take this for a corollary and conclusion, as thou tenderest thine own welfare in this and all other melancholy, thy good health of body and mind, observe this short precept, give not way to solitariness and idleness. "Be not solitary, be not idle." (III, 432)

To avoid melancholy means to devote oneself to work and duty:

avertat cogitationem a re scrupulosa [let him avert his thoughts from the painful subject], by all opposite means, art, and industry, let him laxare animum, by all honest recreations and

recreate his distressed soul. (III, 431)

And above all, man can avoid despair by focusing on hope.

If we come back to Democritus Junior's address to the reader in the satirical Preface, we run across the persona's conclusion that he can only offer his readers his sincere wishes for a better world and a better existence:

To conclude, this being granted, that all the world is melancholy, or mad, dotes, and every member of it, I have ended my task, and sufficiently illustrated that which I took upon me to demonstrate at first. At this present I have no more to say. His sanam mentum Democritus [Democritus wishes them sanity], I can but wish myself and them a good physician, and all of us a better mind. (I, 126)

Cures and remedies for melancholy are at best only products of man's wishful thinking. He cannot escape it except by refusing to dwell on it and keeping perpetually busy. Paradoxically, though, dwelling upon melancholy and keeping busy about it has become the persona's method of avoiding the personal sting of the malady. And he has exhausted, anatomized, dichotomized, and therefore killed the malady by his method of cutting into it layer by layer until nothing is left but--hope, perchance the vanity of wishful thinking, that can provide the foundation for a new order that may replace the defective one.

We discover, too, that the digressions, although they

attempt to move beyond method and analysis, simply imitate the world that analysis uncovered; that is, instead of wandering away from melancholy's chaos and confusion, they generate more of the same confusion and hopelessness. The digression, the genesis, has not invented anything new; on the contrary, it serves only to reinforce the idea that melancholy is inescapable even in those ample, philosophical fields of air.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

Robert Burton leaves the impression that in spite of all the reader knows about melancholy from books or from beliefs embedded in the popular culture, the disease still remains an equivocal phenomenon. His anatomies, his "discoveries," of melancholy reveal that this phenomenon is something incapable of measurement or definition. And the persona, the Rhetorical "I" of the Preface alerts us to this very fact:

And I doubt but that in the end you will say with me, that to anatomize this humour aright, through all the members of this our microcosmos, is as great a task as to reconcile those chronological errors in the Assyrian monarchy, find out the quadrature of a circle, the creeks and sounds of the north-east or north-west passages, and all out as good a discovery as that hungry Spaniard's of Terra Australis Incognita, as great a trouble as to perfect the motion of Mars and Mercury, which so crucifies our astronomers, or to recify the Georgian calendar. (P. 38)

Thus, the task of anatomizing melancholy is impossible since it is full of its own boundless equivocations. Man cannot finally come to understand melancholy any more than he can arrive at a proper understanding of himself, for melancholy is man and all mankind. But at least the persona, the

Dialectical "I" of analysis, has attempted the work of examining, exploring, and investigating the causes, symptoms, cures, and prognostics of the malady. And the method that he has used in his exploration of this phenomenon known as melancholy is that of dialectical invention by a Ramist-like place-logic which provides the modes of invention, by analysis which collects and gathers information in the form of testimony, and by genesis which provides a means of further exploration and investigation beyond the fixed boundaries of analysis.

Burton's art of invention in the Anatomy proper makes use of the scholastic-collective mind that generates ideas from the topics required for dialectical invention and assimilates citations from sources and authorities that come together in the body of one book and become a part of the dialogical-collaborative community of thought where the exchange of ideas can take place across the continuum of time and place. In this way, Burton's sources play a significant role in generating ideas, for the text-to-text dialogue (what the books "say" and how they "reply" to one another) creates the illusion of voice and conversation that keeps invention an on-going activity. Burton appears to take hold of the silent Ramist diagrammatic place-logic and make it talk by means of the dialogical-collaborative

exchange of texts as they assume the role of an interpretive community for a discussion of melancholy. The texts, as each one piles one comment upon another, construct the uneasy reality that melancholy is a confused heap of opinions, differences of opinion, uncertainties, and doubts. The Anatomy of Melancholy, to repeat Stanley Fish's observation, offers to the members of a melancholy generation a "searching and rigorous scrutiny of everything they believe in and live by," and this rigorous scrutiny is the very means by which the Anatomy becomes a dialectical presentation.

We have seen how the persona in the satirical Preface employs the devices for rhetorical invention in order to generate ideas and thus create a rhetorical presentation designed to seduce the reader into the Anatomy proper. Rhetorical invention requires a premium consideration for the audience's expectations, beliefs, attitudes, and prejudices; and we have learned how the Rhetorical "I" of the Preface satisfies this criterion by constructing his discourse by the principles of Cicero's seven-part judicial oration designed to defend himself and his book from any possible accusations from potentially hostile readers. Therefore, the persona builds an ethnocentric person-to-person relationship with his readers. The persona of the

Anatomy proper, on the other hand, concerns himself more with the world of ideas rather than with his relationship with his readers. He exists only in relation to the logical presentation of ideas and for this reason his ethos is strictly logocentric. This personality reveals itself in the Ramist-like branching dichotomies of topics and in the dialogue that emerges among the books which contribute to the building up of these ideas generated by the place-logic.

Burton's art of invention relies upon a directed system of logical thinking that proceeds by generating ideas from cause, effect, definition, division, genus, species, and so on in order to give human thought as complete a range as possible. Burton's logical system certainly substantiates the notion that since

the subconscious part of the mind is not accessible, the writer must aid the subconscious as much as possible by a deliberate and conscious effort, by defining the problem, by filling in the details, by carefully working out the design. . . . The old truism that invention favors the well prepared mind seems to be an accurate one. (D'Angelo 53)

Second, Burton generates still more ideas by drawing from books and popular opinion and in this way makes use of collaboration as a means of fleshing out ideas. And here we can understand the extent to which one mind depends upon other minds for the production of new insights, new ideas,

and new perspectives. Burton appears to make use of what Karen Burke LeFevre calls "resonance" which emerges

when someone acts as a facilitator to assist or extend what is regarded as primarily another's invention, or when people are mutual collaborators at work on a task. . . . People who act as resonators help an inventor to locate himself or herself in a tradition and a community and to live in a way that is conducive to further invention. (65)

Burton, as well as his Dialectical "I" of the Anatomy proper, enters the scholarly tradition of others who have written about melancholy or at least some aspect of it, identifies himself as a member of that great tradition and draws upon its vast accumulation of thought in order to build his ideas upon that tradition. And in this sense, he becomes the dwarf, as his readers become dwarves, standing upon the shoulders of a great foundation of knowledge.

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