

KAIROS AND CHRONOTOPE: THE CONNECTED RHETORIC OF

MARGARET FULLER

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To the Dean of the Graduate School:

I am submitting herewith a dissertation written by Kristen Garrison entitled "Kairos and Chronotope: The Connected Rhetoric of Margaret Fuller." I have examined this dissertation for form and content and recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy with a major in Rhetoric.

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ABSTRACT

KRISTEN GARRISON

KAIROS AND CHRONOTOPE: THE CONNECTED RHETORIC OF MARGARET FULLER

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Margaret Fuller published two books and over 250 essays, and she worked as a journalist for the *New York Tribune* at a time when few women had such access to the public. Despite her prolific record of publication, however, the rhetorical dimensions of her writings are understudied to the detriment of our discipline. Not only do her texts reveal a rather consistent rhetorical practice, predicated on a dialogic relationship to the world, but her particular practice proves highly suggestive for all rhetorical efforts to assert counter-hegemonic views. Although women's studies values Fuller's role as a thinker who significantly impacted first-wave feminists, feminist rhetoric has not devoted enough attention to the rhetorical strategies Fuller employs; we need to recover Fuller as a key feminist rhetor, not only to fill a glaring gap in the historical record, but also to gain insights into the process of invention, especially those strategies that demonstrate *kairos*. *Kairos*, or opportunity, refers to the ways in which a rhetor makes creative use of available discursive means, a process at once immensely important to rhetorical theory and tremendously difficult to approximate, but Mikhail Bakhtin's discussion of literary chronotopes suggests an invaluable tool for illuminating the ways in which a rhetor

codifies *kairos* in her text. By rethinking chronotopes as the time-space representations of a writer's rhetorical opportunities, this research project suggests a method for approximating the *kairic* elements embedded within a text. Detailed textual analysis of the rhetorical chronotopes in Fuller's writings reveals that she used the dominant discourses of domesticity, transcendentalism, and nationalism to assert alternative ideals to guide the actions of women, men, and Americans. Not only, then, does chronotopic analysis illuminate Fuller's rhetorical strategy, but it demonstrates a productive method for inferring a constituent element of rhetorical invention. Thus, this project advances feminist rhetoric, by recovering Fuller as a key rhetorical figure of the nineteenth-century, and contributes to the discipline's efforts both to dialogue responsibly with Bakhtin's work and rework a classical terms for contemporary theory and criticism.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.....	iii
ABSTRACT	v
Chapter	Page
I. INTRODUCTION: FEMINIST RHETORIC AND THE PROBLEM OF MARGARET FULLER	1
II. IN SEARCH OF LIVED EXPERIENCE: DOMINANT SPATIAL AND TEMPORAL METAPHORS IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICAN LITERARY HISTORY	11
III. <i>KAIROS, CHRONOTYPE, AND RHETORIC AS INVENTIONAL ART</i> ..	45
IV. ROOF-TOPS, CATHEDRAL SPIRES, AND DUSTY HILLS: RHETORICAL CHRONOTOPES OF EXPANSION IN FULLER'S "THE GREAT LAWSUIT," <i>SUMMER ON THE LAKES, IN 1843</i> , AND <i>WOMAN IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY</i>	73
V. A VIEW FROM THE BALCONY: RHETORICAL CHRONOTOPES OF THE ROAD IN FULLER'S <i>DISPATCHES FROM EUROPE</i>	103
VI. MARGARET FULLER AND MIKHAIL BAKHTIN: TOWARD A THEORY OF CONNECTED RHETORIC	129
VII. CONCLUSION: DISSENT AND OPPORTUNITY	147
WORKS CITED	152

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION:

FEMINIST RHETORIC AND THE PROBLEM OF MARGARET FULLER

Margaret Fuller published two books and over 250 essays. She worked as a journalist for the *New York Tribune* at a time when few women had such access to the public, and “as a feminist, [she] played a key role in opening up space, both theoretical and literary, for women to contemplate and discuss issues of gender and of women’s social, cultural, and intellectual subordination” (Wayne 17). Despite her legacy and prolific record of publication, however, the rhetorical dimensions of her writings are understudied to the detriment of our discipline. Not only do her texts reveal a rather consistent rhetorical practice, predicated on a dialogic relationship to the world, but her particular approach proves highly suggestive for all rhetorical efforts to assert counter-hegemonic views. Joy Rouse claims that Fuller’s “value to us today can best be understood not in terms of her standing as an individual figure in rhetoric but in terms of the kinds of developments in the speaking and writing practices of marginalized citizens our histories have yet to account for” (111). To the contrary, her contributions to counter-hegemonic rhetoric are *testimony* to her value as a significant figure in American and feminist rhetoric. We need more attention to Fuller as a key feminist rhetor, not only to fill a glaring gap in the historical record, but also to gain insights into the process of invention, especially those strategies that demonstrate *kairos*. Through careful analysis of the rhetorical chronotopes, or the ways in which Fuller represents her unique time-space,

this study provides a more comprehensive account of Fuller as a rhetor and demonstrates a productive method for inferring a constituent element of rhetorical invention.

Admittedly, scholars of Fuller and feminist rhetoric alike have devoted considerable attention to the rhetorical qualities of her work—Jeffrey Steele has identified a rhetoric of transformation, Joy Rouse a rhetoric of citizenship, and Annette Kolodny a rhetoric of resistance. The focus of such scholarship has rested primarily on Fuller’s style, especially in *Woman in the Nineteenth Century*, or on the relationship between her writings and her life. In particular, scholarship attests to the dialogic or conversational quality of her prose, and myriad studies have emphasized the range of rhetorical strategies Fuller employs to achieve this quality; not only does she create various personae to represent different aspects of her consciousness (Stowe), but she employs conversational linguistic elements in her prose (Bean), and incorporates texts from others to achieve a textual version of a conversation on her choice of topic. As Fuller herself admits, conversation is her “natural element,” so attending to the dialogic elements of her rhetorical style enriches our appreciation for how she brought her social skills into her writing. But since the term “dialogic” necessarily invokes Bakhtin, we must be conscious of the ways in which our analyses neglect dimensions of his conceptualization; when we turn to him as a guide, we find that current scholarship has only scratched the surface of Fuller’s so-called conversational rhetoric. First, because Fuller criticism has focused primarily on voice, it consequently neglects an intrinsic component of all texts: the representation of time-space in, from, and *with* which the various voices—or subjectivities—speak. Second, rhetorical criticism has privileged her

explicitly feminist writings, and therefore devoted too little attention to her rhetorical strategies as a journalist. Finally, the scholarship has failed to recognize that her professed approach to literary and social criticism recommends a promising praxis of connected rhetoric, a dialogic rhetorical strategy for successfully entering—and altering—hegemonic discourses. Given feminist rhetoric's commitment to recovering lost voices, revising a reductive canon, and rethinking the very nature of rhetoric, the time has come to devote more attention to Fuller as a feminist rhetor.

A central concern of feminist rhetoric has been the power differential in language, and traditionally, feminist scholarship has organized this relationship spatially through the notion of separate spheres. The public/private paradigm dominating such work, however, has recently come under attack for reducing complex social relations to two “mutually exclusive, opposing and polarized terms,” resulting, ultimately, in “inadequate analyses” (Peterson 11-12). Current scholarship reveals dissensus regarding the appropriate solution to the conceptual crisis—whether to revise the ways in which we apply the model, as both Joan Landes and Mary Ryan argue, or reject it outright, following the lead of Cathy Davidson and Jessamyn Hatcher. Lest these differences seem utterly incompatible, the debate does find common ground in the insistence that feminist methodologies must better account for the historical moment and for difference; achieving such accountability requires, at the least, that “public” and “private” are unpacked and more carefully defined in any given analysis. As Linda Kerber observes, both terms have suffered from “sloppy use,” and Davidson and Hatcher argue for a more “expansive and appreciative way[s] to assess literary and cultural texts . . . [and] the

complex social reality that literature helps us to understand” (4). Likewise, scholars focused on the rhetorical practices of nineteenth-century women encourage more sustained attention to the “complex social realities” of women writers. Elizabeth Tasker and Frances B. Holt-Underwood recently published an overview of the past thirty years of feminist research methodologies, and Michaela Meyer reviews the past forty years of feminist contributions to rhetoric; neither study mentions the public/private as a paradigm or, by extension, the limitations of its power as an analytical tool, yet Meyer’s conclusion resonates with that of women’s studies in general: feminist rhetoric needs theories “that will enrich our definition of agency and provide a more accurate portrayal of the complexities of women’s daily lives” (13). Clearly, complicating received ideas of nineteenth-century women’s public speaking and writing abides as a central concern in feminist rhetoric.

Even the trope of the master’s tools, which has long held sway in feminist rhetoric, proves inadequate to the task of capturing the lived experience of an individual rhetor, because it too is predicated ultimately on a notion of separate spheres: the master’s and the subject’s. Karlyn Kohrs Campbell, for example, argues that “the principle of rhetorical invention is subversion, using the master’s tools to undermine, even sabotage, the master’s house” (112), while David Gold challenges the assumption that “the tools belonged to the master in the first place” (55). Regardless of the specific relationship different scholars have asserted between the two, the trope not only creates a false dichotomy but erases individual agency—despite its intention to recover it. The problem lies in the details of the analogy. First, the speakers and writers who capture our

attention cannot necessarily be cast as either Master or Subject; Margaret Fuller, for example, partakes of both subjectivities, as an intellectual elite and a woman subject to restrictive social mores, and the analogy collapses when we try to explain her rhetorical strategies. Further, if we label her as a “saboteur,” as a usurper of the master’s tools, we have limited her agency as an individual who has equal right to the dominant discourses of her day. Additionally, “tools” ultimately proves an inadequate symbol for language, as 20th century rhetoric has certainly upset the notion that words carry a one-to-one correspondence to reality. Unlike a hammer, which can only be a hammer and only be wielded at one particular moment by the one builder, language proves significantly more plastic, fluid, and responsive. The notion that feminist rhetoric is a subversion of dominant discourse obviously has its appeal and validity, for it helps us to understand better the relationship between dissenting and dominant voices, but the analogy does not adequately capture the nuances of a rhetor creating opportunity from a restrictive hegemonic script.

Meyer concludes that “feminist rhetoric should seek to discover how gendered concepts occur, how they are *communicated in daily interactions*, and how they transform the practices associated with the concept across cultures, *spaces, and time*” (emphasis added 9). Feminist rhetorical studies has been seeking a method that can account for a wide and loose definition of participation—that can include the individual woman speaking on feminist issues as well as the community of women engaged in social activism. Attention to chronotopic patterns expands critical focus beyond single aspects of a text—subject, setting, theme—and compels us to appreciate the rich ways in

which writers construct meaning. Therefore, in addition to advancing our understanding of the complex meanings that inhere in Fuller's writings, this study will also demonstrate how chronotopic analysis presents an analytic tool more sensitive to lived experience, in particular the social realities of feminist rhetors who create alternatives to the dominant discourses that organize them socially, culturally, and politically. In short, when we speak of "inventing women," we might consider more carefully the role of *kairos*. Assessing *kairos*, however, presents another problem, and again, Bakhtin's chrontope offers a solution.

In his essay "Forms of Time and Chronotope in the Novel," Mikhail Bakhtin describes chronotope as "the intrinsic connectedness of temporal and spatial relationships that are artistically expressed in literature" (84). Jay Ladin offers a useful elaboration of the chronotope; from Bakhtin's essay, he extrapolates "local" and "major" chronotopes as most significant to literary study, and defines the former as those that are "scattered throughout literary texts," and the latter as the patterns that ultimately suggest the "high-level, novel- and genre-defining chronotopes" that occupy most of Bakhtin's essay (215-16). Of considerable relevance to Fuller scholarship is Ladin's explanation of the close, dialogic relationship between the representation of a subject and the time-space in which she exists; he argues that chronotopes "define and limit the ways in which human character can exist in the narrative. In effect," he explains, "different constructions of identity, character, and . . . humanness . . . require different space-times for their representations" (223). The chronotope promises to advance scholarship on Fuller's conversational style by considering the relationship between her myriad personae and

their respective perspectives, yet it also resonates with current scholarship on *kairos*. Despite its importance as a constituent element of rhetorical invention, the *kairos* of a rhetorical artifact proves difficult to find; after all, it refers to the unique moment of rhetorical opportunity which presumably drives invention. As a cognitive process, it is ultimately inaccessible, but Philip Sipiora and James Baumlin's edited collection *Rhetoric and Kairos* attests to the value of designing methodologies that can approximate the *kairic* elements of a text. Because chronotopes refer to time-space representations, they have potential to uncover the unique perspective of a rhetor facing a *kairic* moment; yet the concept, as it lives in Bakhtin's corpus, proves a bit incompatible to rhetorical criticism. Bakhtin focuses on *literary* chronotopes, which mark "the place where the knots of *narrative* are tied and untied" ("Forms" emphasis added 250), a condition that necessitates some reworking of the concept to account for the knots of "opportunity." The discipline of rhetoric in general, and feminist projects in particular, desperately needs a methodological tool that will illuminate the inventional process. By asserting a working definition of *rhetorical* chronotope and analyzing the chronotopic patterns of Margaret Fuller writings, this study will not only contribute to an ongoing recovery project but also offer a new methodology for assessing counter-hegemonic rhetoric.

Before describing and justifying chronotope as a tool for identifying *kairos* and applying this critical lens to Fuller's writings, we must understand how scholarship has accounted for the temporal and spatial dimensions of nineteenth-century literature. Chapter one provides the necessary backdrop for considering time-space representations by reviewing time and space metaphors found in nineteenth-century American literature.

Due to the dearth of scholarly attention to these dimensions from a rhetorical perspective, the review turns to literary criticism in order to explore the temporal and spatial qualities of the three dominant discourses of antebellum America: domesticity, Romanticism (and Transcendentalism), and nation. Although the scholarship provides a strong representation of the temporal and spatial patterns in antebellum literature, no study considers the interrelationship of the domains, despite the fact that time and space are inextricably linked. Although analyses of the respective temporal and spatial qualities of a text certainly enlighten our readings, they fail to capture the ways in which lived time and space are represented in a text, and the scholarship indicates the need to pursue, among others', Bakhtin's work on the chronotope.

The next chapter, then, turns to this analytic tool, which has been underutilized in literary analysis and virtually neglected in rhetoric. Not only does chronotope present a productive lens for illuminating lived experience as it is codified in texts, but it proves to resonate strongly with the rhetorical concept of *kairos*. In order to explore the affinities between *kairos* and chronotope, this chapter builds upon Thomas Farrell's idea of "inventional rhetoric," which prompts our discipline to scrutinize more critically the conventional moment of a rhetorical artifact in order to build an eclectic repertoire of rhetorical strategies. Because chronotopes indicate the perspective of the persona, consistent patterns of time-space representations suggest the ways in which a rhetor makes creative use of dominant discourses. Additionally, chronotopes, in Bakhtin's work, represent a component of a dialogic approach to the world; thus, not only does this

chapter reveal the remarkable correspondence between chronotope and *kairos*, it also seeks to reconcile Bakhtin's work to the discipline of rhetoric.

Turning to Margaret Fuller's writings, chapters three and four demonstrate chronotopic analysis. The first analysis considers how Fuller used the dominant discourses of domesticity and Transcendentalism as opportunities to redefine the ideals espoused by each. Fuller's early publications—"The Great Lawsuit," *Summer on the Lakes, in 1843*, and *Woman in the Nineteenth Century*—reveal a consistent strategy of using chronotopes of expansion to meet her rhetorical objectives. By expanding her rhetorical perspective, the notion of a feminine ideal, and the scope of the women problem to include men, Fuller reinforces her central argument that women need to be free to pursue their own unique natures. The second analysis identifies the ways in which Fuller's four years of foreign correspondence utilize road chronotopes to comment on both the Italian Revolution and America's destiny as a great nation. Fuller's dispatches from Europe feature two consistent and interrelated time-space patterns: the space of the street, which represents the people, and the metaphoric road of time, which represents alternative views of humans' relationships to their future. Again, these chronotopes reinforce Fuller's rhetorical objective to shake American readers out of complacency in order to realize that her country's greatness depends on its adherence to democratic principles. Both chapters demonstrate that Fuller used dominant discourses of domesticity, Romanticism, and nationalism as opportunities to redefine them in terms of equality and spiritual growth; in other words, she created *karoi* from mainstream attitudes in an attempt to persuade her readers to realign themselves with more noble ideals.

Finally, the last chapter considers Fuller's rhetorical practice overall. Through her work as a literary and social critic, she articulated a critical method; despite the obvious relationship between her professed method and her ten years of rhetorical practice, no one has extrapolated a theory of rhetorical criticism from Fuller's writings. Extending Charles Capper's description of her criticism as "connected," this chapter argues that feminist rhetoric has demonstrated the utility and value of inferring theory from practice and concludes that Fuller's work not only recommends a consistent theory but one that coincides with Bakhtin's brief but provocative musings on a dialogic rhetoric.

In *Landscape and Ideology in American Renaissance Literature*, Robert Abrams asserts that literary scholarship of the "American Renaissance" has failed to "satisfactorily [explore]" literary and visual representations of "American landscape and space" (1). From an analysis that reduces American space to dialectically opposed representations of either "clean, unequivocal projections of *terra incognita*" or "a ubiquitous . . . abidingly negative geography" (2), he inevitably concludes that "in its Rorschach-inkblot fluidity [America] cannot ultimately be seen, encountered, and inhabited in any stable and comprehensive way" (131). The efforts of such writers as Margaret Fuller, however, suggest that, although incomplete and always in progress, something of America can, indeed, be seen, encountered, and inhabited. Therefore, this study argues for a dialogic approach to understanding the relationship between the living subject and the dynamic time-space she occupies, utilizing a conceptual tool complementary to Fuller's own professed commitment to dialogue.

CHAPTER II

IN SEARCH OF LIVED EXPERIENCE: DOMINANT SPATIAL AND TEMPORAL METAPHORS IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICAN LITERARY HISTORY

For quite some time, the lived experience has been paramount in the field of rhetoric, especially for those scholars seeking to recover lost voices and enrich the record of how various people have historically used language to mediate and shape their worlds. For example, David Gold's recent publication *Rhetoric at the Margins* adopts a microhistorical approach to historiography in order to recover the "local histories [that] often get erased in the process of history making" (ix); for Gold, careful examination of individuals' writings and the experiences they narrate will help us to "articulate a more nuanced interpretation of our past" (153). Likewise, Michaela Meyer advises closer attention to the ways in which daily life becomes codified in women's rhetorical texts and argues for methods that "provide a more accurate portrayal of the complexities of women's daily lives" (13). As Meyer's comment suggests, the various methodological favorites of rhetorical theory and criticism have reached the limits of what they can achieve, prompting us to think more creatively about how we might build a richer historical record of rhetoric as both discipline and practice. To speak in terms of "available means" is commonplace, yet the concept represents a still productive heuristic for interrogating the complex realities of various historical moments; if we include

dominant discourses as one of the resources available to rhetors, then rhetorical analysis should pay close attention to discursive trends of a given time period. More specifically, anyone attempting to understand antebellum America must confront the ways in which its writers, regardless of gender or agenda, grappled with the vast expanse of land and the vast unfolding of history, two complex problems that figured prominently in daily life, materially and metaphysically; if we are to understand the rhetorical environment, we must account for these discussions. Although rhetoric scholarship fails to address adequately the profound relevance of space and time (and the lived experiences they gesture toward) to nineteenth-century Americans, literary criticism of the time period proves instructive, so that an examination of the dominant spatial and temporal metaphors found in the literature presents a productive starting point. As we will find, however, existing scholarship on temporal and spatial representations reveals some telling patterns yet ultimately fails to consider the two domains in dialogue. If the field of rhetoric is to construct a more authentic record of rhetorical practices, it must reunite the two dimensions and examine closely how discursive representations of time-space codify lived experience.

Studies in American literary history reveal the significance of spatial and temporal inquiry. In *American Literary Geographies*, Martin Brückner and Hsuann Hsu assert geographical concerns as central to nineteenth-century Americans; authors of this time period relied upon the American landscape as an "interpretive grid" guiding their art (12). Consequently, it makes sense that scholars of American literary history devote considerable attention to the ways in which narratives codify "geographical themes,

trajectories, and values" (12). This so-called "spatial turn" engendered by the rise of cultural geography as an analytic paradigm prompted a reconsideration of previously homogenized national space, and nurtured methodologies that reveal "a multitude of qualitatively different spaces" (Brückner and Hsu 13). For scholars seeking to understand American literature and culture, then, space matters tremendously. As the most obvious example, the public/private binary has long served as one of the most popular and productive paradigms for interpreting antebellum America—a paradigm privileging the spatial. Due to the reductive nature of the binary, some scholars argue that the terms should be abandoned, yet the separate spheres ideology has proved resilient and responsive to criticism. The scholarship on spatial and temporal metaphors reveals three central tropes of domesticity, nature, and nation; even as these studies complicate the binary, we can see that the tropes map onto a private-public *continuum*, with the domestic (private) experience at one end and national (public) experience at the other, nature functioning as an ambivalent mediator of the two. Although examining the spatial and temporal metaphors, then, keeps the paradigm alive, it also expands it, demonstrating a more nuanced use of private and public—not only by replacing the slash with a hyphen, but also by expanding our focus to consider temporal dimensions. Despite claims that "history as god-term is dead" (Blair 544) and that interest in temporality has shifted to spatiality, a survey of recent scholarship indicates that however muffled its tread may have become in recent years, time abides as a central concern for literary historians because of its nagging refusal to rest in peace—however much space tries to steal the show, it cannot be apprehended without the temporal dimension. Furthermore, recent

attention to the temporal reveals “a desire to determine how the way we chart time delimits the kinds of relations we imagine across social space” (Luciano 17). Ideally, then, the two dimensions must be understood together; practically, however, critical attention to the spatial and temporal metaphors of nineteenth-century American literature isolates one dimension to the exclusion of the other, leaving us with no other choice but to bring individual analyses into dialogue with one another in order to approximate a more authentic sketch of nineteenth-century American life.

Recent studies have explored the temporal qualities associated with the home as both a literal and metaphoric space, but the literature predominantly understands domesticity spatially, from the literal space of the home to the interior space of True Woman’s identity. Any examination of domesticity must begin with Barbara Welter’s 1966 publication of “The Cult of True Womanhood: 1820-1860,” a seminal text for understanding antebellum women’s—at least white middle class women’s—experiences. Welter’s expansive review of antebellum texts identifies a complex of virtues constituting the True Woman: “piety, purity, submissiveness and domestic” (152). In Welter’s discussion, the term “domestic” regularly invokes the home and the qualities appropriate to that space; for example, she describes the antebellum publication *The Lady at Home* and observes that it “expressed its convictions in its very title and concluded that ‘even if we cannot reform the world in a moment we can begin the work by reforming ourselves and our households--It is woman's mission’” (162-3). From the various texts she examines, Welter establishes the significance of “domestic” for antebellum women writers: it marked women’s unique territory, a space for which her unique gifts were not

only suited but indispensable. Further, domesticity as a virtue of True Woman stood in righteous opposition to the immorality of the market, which had turned “this new land, this temple of the chosen people, into one vast countinghouse” (151). While the binary of the moral private and immoral (or amoral) public has become a commonplace in critical studies of nineteenth-century America, exploring the ways in which representations—and, thus, interpretations—of the domestic space have become more metaphoric disrupts the pesky binary by expanding our understanding of how some antebellum women writers subverted the concept in order to gain space and opportunity.

Not surprisingly, recent scholarship illuminates the ways in which domesticity “traveled” beyond the literal space of the house, taking up residence in the interior space of the True Woman and exterior spaces open to appropriation. For example, Lora Romero’s *Home Fronts: Domesticity and its Critics in the Antebellum United States* challenges idealized versions of the home to reveal a more complex story of what domesticity meant to antebellum women—and men. Driven by a Foucauldian engine, Romero’s study interrogates domesticity as a spatial metaphor in order to illuminate our understandings of the various ways in which “struggles for authority played themselves out in the antebellum period,” with the “middle-class home” representing one significant site of power negotiation (7). As Romero observes, scholarship has posited domesticity as a trope alternately conveying two, mutually exclusive meanings. On one side, as one of the “four cardinal virtues” of True Womanhood, domesticity signifies the home as a refuge and space of moral perfection, as a metaphor for “unthinking conformity” (2). Alternately, domesticity (especially as codified in domestic fiction) represents a

“countercultural” force, so that the space of the home represents a privileged site of sociocultural critique. Because these critical stances “proceed from the assumption that culture either frees or enslaves,” Romero rejects them and espouses instead a critical lens that illuminates the web of power struggles that include but do not absolutely define domestic spaces (4).

Specifically, Romero’s text understands domesticity as an “entrenched value system” rather than a specific locus; thus, rather than the literal space of the home as a site of absolute deferral or defiance, she imagines domesticity as a more complicated space, characterized not so much by its interior but by the “front” it establishes in relation to other forces vying for power. Because domesticity exists in relationship to other ideologies, it ultimately becomes interiorized, creating subjects who “could—and did—travel” (25). Romero’s elaboration of domesticity as a complicated metaphor for antebellum women’s negotiations of space helps us to understand how the home became more than the house; antebellum women’s recognition (or interpretation) of domesticity as a quality rather than a locale becomes especially recognizable in nineteenth-century social activism. Feminist rhetoric scholars have long focused their attention on the oral tradition of nineteenth-century female abolitionists and temperance advocates, with the understanding that many women speakers “found inventionary resources in True Womanhood itself,” and asserted their “piety” as proof of their “moral authority” (Campbell 120). Clearly, then, domesticity as a metaphor for mobile morality affirms what we already know of feminist rhetorical history: women who wished to speak publicly did so on moral grounds, a justification based on the very qualities that defined

the so-called private sphere. In short, in order to wield their unique powers of piety, nineteenth-century women had to expand what counted as domestic space.

In addition to the interior space of the True Woman, domesticity also satisfied its desire to colonize contested exterior space. Jessica Enoch's "A Woman's Place Is in the School: Rhetorics of Gendered Space in Nineteen-Century America" represents one of the few explicitly rhetorical analyses examining the spatial experience of nineteenth-century America. According to Enoch, education reformers realized that the current "physical environment of the school," likened to a "prison house," was inconsistent "with their new pedagogical goals" to nurture a core set of values in their students—values more consistent with the morality and chastity of the home (281). To achieve such a space, where domestic values could grow and be sustained, the reformers made significant changes to the material aspects of the school; for example, the schoolyard was to be fenced-in and landscaped with flowers and trees in order to separate it "from the profanity, bustle and dirt of the outside world" (282). The interior of the school was to be fashioned after the parlor; thus, like the home, the school was to be renovated "as a peaceful, comfortable, clean and decorative place—one separated and even fenced off from the outside world. . . . The school was no longer a prison; it was now a home" (284). Pedagogical reform may have inspired the renovations, but reconstructing the school as a domestic space proved consequential in other ways: it "opened up possibilities for the installation of the female teacher" (284). Enoch's study offers an important example of the general trend Romero identifies: domesticity did, indeed, travel.

However, while Romero posits the travels as an outcome of women's developing sense of identity, so that interiorizing domesticity allowed them to leave the house but take the home with them, Enoch's study reveals a situation in which the ideal of domesticity guided the deliberate transformation of a material, exterior space, which *then* created the right conditions for women to travel beyond the house, however much they kept to the home. Interestingly, Enoch's study demonstrates how domesticity not only travels with the nineteenth-century True Woman, but how it exists as an abiding potential in various spaces; progressive male educators who were invested in a different pedagogy created a feminized space—before women were given access to it. In this case then, the sofa, the flowers, and the fence became spatial markers of domesticity, so that the female teacher's work was half done; the material domestic space accomplished, she faced the more challenging task of domesticating minds. Enoch's study reveals more fully the complex negotiation of interior and exterior, material and mental space we have come to read through the metaphor of domesticity, yet again, attention to the spatial aspects of domesticity tells only half the proverbial story.

Just as domesticity functions as a complex metaphor representing the private moral space of women's sphere—whether in the home, the head, or the schoolhouse—it also (and inevitably) represents women's relationship to time, in particular, a Romantic, natural time. Dana Luciano's *Arranging Grief: Sacred Time and the Body in Nineteenth-Century America* explores domesticity's relationship to the temporal experience of grief, as distinct from a modern sense of market and historical time(s). In the introduction, she writes:

The radical reorganization that we understand as the advent of modernity constructed a new vision of time as linear, ordered, progressive, and teleological. . . Yet exhilarating as this forward-moving vision of humanity's development might seem, it was nevertheless accompanied by no little anxiety about the way the new time-consciousness might situate the human as time's prey, the expiatory sacrifice of modernity. (2)

For Luciano, grieving rituals reveal attitudes toward the self and one's place in both the temporal realities of the day to day and history itself. Just as women devised means of appropriating domesticity to redefine spaces and thus enlarge their sphere—and, as Romero demonstrates, renegotiate spatial power relations—Luciano's study posits grief as an act of resistance against temporal frames rooted in the public, and thus masculine, sphere. Although Luciano does not explicitly acknowledge time as a function of (public) space, we can certainly read the implication: linear time is associated with progress and modernity; it is “objective,” “mechanical,” and “impersonal,” in comparison to “the slow time of deep feeling [which] could be experienced (and thus embraced) as personal, human, intimate” (2). Significantly, Luciano's exploration of grief as “a means of altering the shape and textures of [linear time's] flow” illuminates the link between a specific temporal experience and the body (female and male); the body becomes “an instrument of affective time-keeping,” distinct from the material objects measuring official time, and the grieving individual finds herself concomitantly confined to the real time of the present and focused on an idealized past (5). The sacred time of grieving becomes intimately tied to the private space of the home, and Luciano concludes that the

temporal experience of mourning reflects a desire “not to transform but to transcend history, using feeling to mimic the fulfillment promised by eternity” (19). Through her study, then, we recognize one way in which domesticity frames temporal experience, as something different from and better than, the linear time of the market—the event of death triggers the alternate temporality, affecting the individual’s orientation toward both the present and the past, on both immediate and historical planes. The grieving body represents this multitemporality; whether male or female, it is nonetheless situated unmistakably in the private, spiritual space of the domestic, and implicated in a Romantic view of nature.

Although the event of death represents one manifestation of domestic temporality, the stakes need not be so high; domestic time asserts itself in other ways that are still, nonetheless, connected with a more natural and moral sphere. For example, Thomas Allen’s *A Republic in Time* examines the ways in which symbols of domesticity—the kitchen clock and the cookbook—convey nineteenth-century women’s temporal experiences. Allen argues that clocks functioned as metaphors of multiple coexisting and intersecting experiences of temporalities; thus, the kitchen clock (as opposed to the factory clock, or the wristwatch) symbolized the temporal experience of domesticity, as a counter to the “chaos of the market” (114). According to Allen, the temporal experience of the nineteenth-century middle-class family “was structured around a tense dichotomy between the private, personal sphere of the home and the public, dangerous, and amoral world of market competition” (117). Women had to employ their own brand of time management, one in which domestic time was synchronized but not reducible to market

time. In this way, the temporal experiences of the home and work were “effectively, parallel and adjacent cultural spaces sharing the same organizing logic,” but as Allen notes, “the home became the place in which the market encountered and absorbed values not intrinsic to capitalist moneymaking”; in effect, domestic time sought to “transform the nature of the market” (120). Allen’s close reading of cookbooks reveals the dialogic relationship between the market and the home. Even as domestic manuals might feature the image of a kitchen with the clock centrally located, he observes that “none of the . . . recipes call for precision timekeeping,” but instead reflect “time intervals [that] are quite long and imprecise” (121). Allen interprets this temporal frame as traditional, grounded in knowledge “passed down from one generation of women to another” and informed by a more natural agrarian temporal frame (122); as he notes, many of the role models of domestic economy found in the literature are country women, who symbolize innocence, morality and, significantly, an alternate temporality. Thus, as a corollary to its travels beyond the space of the home, domesticity functioned as a metaphor for temporal frames deemed more private and more connected to a benevolent, Edenic, natural world, and just as True Woman was obligated to purify a space, Allen’s studies indicate she was likewise expected to redeem the amorality of market temporal experience. A more dialogic method of spatiotemporal analysis, however, would illuminate the specific temporal qualities of particular spaces; for example, Enoch’s study informs our historical appreciation for the feminization of the schoolroom, yet arguably, the parlor and classroom used significantly different clocks, and we need to account for such differences

if we want to achieve a richer record of lived experience. The spatial and temporal analyses of domesticity indicate rather unequivocally its dynamic nature, and in turn reveal the shifting borders of the private sphere as it encountered a Romanticized natural world.

As a metaphor for space and time in nineteenth-century America, nature represents an incredibly rich complex of competing spatial and temporal frames. In addition to its connection to the private, moral spatiotemporality of domesticity, the natural world is (paradoxically) invoked as the absolute antithesis to civilized society; recent scholarship examining nineteenth-century writers' various attitudes toward nature reveals the intense ambivalence many writers—including Emerson—felt toward the natural world and human beings' place in it. In their historical treatment of American literary history, Richard Ruland and Malcolm Bradbury gently revise the name by which F.O. Matthiessen christened the prolific literary period of the early nineteenth-century; arguing that the cultural activity of the time "was not a rebirth but a new beginning," they suggest American Naissance as a more accurate label (104-5). Such a seemingly trivial issue rather neatly captures one of the most important issues of the time period: identity. Whether born anew or born again, nineteenth-century Americans faced identity crises on multiple fronts, not the least of which sprang from their efforts to grapple with the tenets of English Romanticism, especially as it interpreted and practiced neo-Kantian thinking. Because nature, or "wilderness," figured prominently as "the quintessential locus of the American sense of otherness" in Romantic epistemology (Abrams *Landscape* 2), the

spatial and temporal dimensions of the natural world warrant close scrutiny for the ways they reveal nineteenth-century postures toward identity and knowledge.

William Roberson's *The Ironic Space* offers a cogent overview of the complexities behind the Romantic paradigm. In contrast to reductive accounts of romanticism as "a return to nature" (Woodring 193), Roberson describes the concept as "a shifting and dynamic system of relationships" which must be understood within a larger vision of "western cultural fabric" (3). Because Romanticism counsels an intimate relationship between Self and Other, interest in self-identity necessarily begins with a concomitant apprehension of the Other—and this is where the relationship becomes more complicated. First, as Roberson explains, Kant's "unity of consciousness," the transcendental "I," implies an unchanging essence of Self, without which there can be no imagination, and thus no thought—or identity. This unified Self, however, is composed of "two mutually necessary selves, the one unhampered by the constrictions of time and space, the other unable to escape determination by the same. . . . Given self-consciousness, the self confronts the dilemma of choosing conflicting interpretations of reality" (13). Such a dilemma prompts considerable anxiety when one is seeking Truth. The internal conflict inherent to a Romantic paradigm manifests rather uniquely in nineteenth-century American thought, as the Other of nature functions not solely and absolutely as a source of inspiration and self-discovery, but as a complex of competing spatiotemporal realities, an Other at once wildly dangerous and benevolently Edenic. As a result of such "conflicting interpretations," efforts to negotiate American identity

become implicated in navigating the spatial and temporal conflicts that inhere in the natural world.

For American writers, the Romantic impulse to understand the Self cannot, obviously, be reduced to the writings produced by the so-called Transcendentalists, but most of the literature that has drawn critics' attention for its spatial and temporal forms comes from this camp, or from seminal writers—Dickinson, Hawthorne, Melville—who appear to be responding to Transcendental tenets. Despite the title of Emerson's text, which has been conventionally understood as the textual birth of this metaphysical paradigm, or the central place of *Walden* as a supposed how-to manual, both Buell, and Ruland and Bradbury, suggest that the groups' attention to nature represented a means to a humanist end; as Buell observes, "at bottom they were more interested in man than nature, more interested in thought than observation" (146). Theoretically, intuiting the connectedness of the natural world would provide human beings with a model to guide their own efforts to achieve a "unity of consciousness"—presuming, of course, an undifferentiated and ultimately harmonious and unambiguous landscape. While such a vision of land may have represented the ideal, nineteenth century texts reveal a considerably ambivalent relationship to America's natural space, so that the disjunctions in the model proved unsettling for the psyche, a reality observed and aesthetically represented in the works of Poe, Hawthorne, and Melville, who revealed "the turned over, darkened face of transcendentalism" (Ruland and Bradbury 143). Careful examination of the myriad ways in which the natural world provided both spatial and temporal metaphors for metaphysical exploration demonstrates that both the Self and the

Other defied easy classification and unified apprehension. In short, the aesthetically represented struggles with natural elements symbolize metaphysical conflicts.

Despite Buell's claim that the Transcendentalists had overcome their Puritan ancestors' hostile relationship to nature, several studies find that many of their contemporaries still viewed nature as a "threat or obstacle to survival" (146). The critical scholarship on spatial metaphors employed in nineteenth-century American literature indicates that writers used natural space as a means of testing the relationship between the Self and Other; specifically, analyses of Whitman's and Melville's works describe how the authors complicated these perspectives in order to "subvert epistemological dualism" (Abrams "Space" 75). For Robert Abrams, Whitman's *Leaves of Grass* performs this work through language that emphasizes "the dynamic reciprocity between human awareness and the sensuous reality it both responds to and helps to shape" ("Space" 76). By cataloguing coexisting but discrete spaces, and situating the persona in various subject positions almost simultaneously, Whitman's poem challenges perceptions of American space as continuous and unified; additionally, Whitman's depiction of the profound intimacy between the perceiver and perceived varies significantly from Emerson's. In *Leaves of Grass*, both the individual *and* the collective are privileged, and the subjectivities presented throughout the poem encounter multiple spaces. In contrast, *Nature* implies a singular, monolithic, undifferentiated space—a representation that, according to Abrams, inspires terror: "an ontology of space that grants it being apart from a point of view threatens to turn on the subjective and to overwhelm it" ("Space" 78). Functioning as an epistemological metaphor, the "vast spatial expanses" of a

homogenized natural landscape represent the futility of a human quest for knowledge; in contrast, the representation of landscape as heterogeneous and fractured symbolizes the Other as a “humanly conditioned presence, [which] confirm[s], rather than nullifies], a human point of view” (“Space” 78). For Abrams, Whitman’s depiction of multiple, co-existing spaces indicates both the source of the persona’s anxiety and a solution.

Melville’s *White-Jacket* offers a similar critique of the Self/Other binary directing Romantic—and Transcendental—epistemologies; according to Bradley Johnson, Melville’s story explores the ways in which different versions of the Self compete for dominance. According to Johnson, “[f]or White-Jacket, the sailor, the body is . . . a complex system that, like the ship of which it is part, possesses contending elements of the elevated and the base” (244). As a result of this metaphysical conflict, Melville’s protagonist struggles to transcend, an ideal frustrated (rather than facilitated) by the natural world. Through the course of White-Jacket’s experience, he discovers that “attempts to transcend physicality [are] thwarted by natural force,” a lesson learned when he falls from the masthead into the ocean and nearly drowns (246). Further, attempts to transcend intellectually render him “unaware of subtle distinctions between individuals,” so that, in this way, the vast homogenous sea *does* function as a reflection of the individual—taking his lesson from the undifferentiated space around him, White-Jacket submerges the distinctions that mark other individuals, and in doing so falls into what we have come to understand as the solipsistic trap of Romanticism. Significantly, Melville exposes the dangers of Transcendentalist thought by taking its precepts to a logical conclusion; by using the ocean as a metaphor to represent a natural world of dangerous

and undifferentiated space, he not only challenges nineteenth-century trust in nature as a benevolent force, but more importantly indicates that the natural world does not necessarily offer a key to self-knowledge. Instead, renderings of the darker side of nature suggest that too much immersion in nature or transcendence of one's own body isolates and alienates the individual from the very world presumed to mediate self-awareness. As Abrams' and Johnson's studies indicate, nature as a generative Other became dangerously compromised in nineteenth-century American thought, and the natural world therefore offered a productive symbol to writers interested in interrogating Romanticism in general and Transcendentalism in particular. Just as natural space could be used to symbolize Nature's ultimate inaccessibility to human apprehension, and immunity to human control, temporal metaphors reveal the anxiety many thinkers felt regarding human history- and man's cosmic (in)significance.

The temporal aspect of Transcendentalism may be more subtle, but it is no less integral to nineteenth-century Americans' quest for knowledge and identity. In Roberson's review of Kant, he explains that "[t]he imagination allows the sequence of individual representations to be held together in a synthesis which makes possible the experience of sequential time" (12), yet a synthesizing imagination presupposes a unified consciousness able to record the changes in space that are necessary for time to be experienced; "individual representations" need only be synthesized when they capture difference. If, however, time moves too slowly—or appears to move not at all—differences cannot be apprehended, time cannot be experienced, and thus, consciousness itself, as the function of a synthesizing imagination, is compromised. Nineteenth-century

Americans invested in Romanticism faced a conundrum: Nature, that supposed conduit to heightened consciousness, appeared to be timeless, so that an individual seeking self-knowledge would face instead an erasure of consciousness, obviously not the desired effect; indeed, death consistently serves as a symbol of the temporal aspect of Nature. Transcendentalism suffered considerably from the seeming atemporality of nature; scholarship examining the natural world as a temporal metaphor indicates that transcendence proved not only undesirable but untenable, and nineteenth-century writers instead devised more complex systems that allowed for co-existing temporal dimensions.

For example, Edward Pitcher's analysis of time in "Masque of the Red Death," posits two intersecting temporal dimensions: the horological, or clock-time, and chronological, or life-time. For Pitcher, Poe's short story identifies horological time with a large clock and the main character, Prospero, whose mockery of time ultimately wins him no favors from the grim reaper; with his roots in capitalism and the market, the protagonist's preoccupation with and manipulation of horological time suggests the dire limits of a material temporal existence, while Red Death's association with chronological time, or the span of a lifetime, represents the futility, even arrogance, of attempting to control it. Death, arguably, represents the natural world, a "linear, consecutive, accumulative Time that implied decay and eventual dissolution of all physical life and matter" (72). Daily life, in contrast, is represented by the spinning hands of the clock, implying its ultimate insignificance when considered against the line of time which ends in death. Pitcher's interpretation of Prospero's arrogant and ultimately inconsequential attempts to manipulate time suggest the futility of attempting to transcend daily temporal

experience; indeed, his efforts appear rather silly within the context of the more natural—and powerful—temporal metaphor of death. For Poe, the temporality of the everyday might represent a repetitive circle, a mere spinning, but the temporality of the natural world—and its inevitable processes of death and decay—proceeds unrelentingly in a straight line and proves impossible to escape. As commentary on identity, Poe's story suggests that efforts to elude time are self-delusions that lead to a kind of depravity (rather than the desired enlightenment) relieved only by death, or the end of consciousness.

According to Thomas E. Hockersmith, Emily Dickinson's poetry also identifies transcendence with atemporality and death, but her writings suggest an alternative to Poe's rather bleak conclusion. Like Poe, Dickinson challenges the premise of transcendence; as Hockersmith explains, her poetry's "preoccupation with and emphasis on temporality" reveals the poet's struggles to accept the "limits of human reason . . . which frustrate the quest for knowledge" (277). Fundamentally, Dickinson "can conceive of no way to separate consciousness from time," so that the Transcendental (or Christian) trust in spiritual transcendence leads to two equally unattractive states: "an eternal isolation of consciousness in [undifferentiated] time or the end of all consciousness in oblivion" (287). Through close readings of several poems, Hockersmith interprets Dickinson's many renderings of death as commentary on efforts to transcend this world in order to gain spiritual insights; repeatedly, her poetry depicts a consciousness apprehending death and ultimately experiencing an unrelieved "state of monotonous isolation" (279). Rather than the key to spiritual growth, transcendence—a

state of “immortal consciousness”—leads to a paradoxical state in which the Self, situated within an “immense and indifferent universe” oblivious to the insignificant human, has only its own consciousness to register (287). In short, Dickinson recognizes that transcendence and death are two words for the same experience of atemporality, whether one exists in eternal monotony or disappears into oblivion. Like Poe, Dickinson understands nature to represent neither a source of self-knowledge, nor a means of accessing one’s divinity, but a constant reminder of one’s limitations, mortality, and inevitable death. Unlike Poe, however, she articulates hope; one can achieve a kind of “limited immortality” in art (289). Significantly, then, only art can transcend the time and space of its birth, and its creator must be content to live through it.

Ironically, the very writer credited with positing Nature as a metaphor for the divine—and thus an analogue for the divinely created human being—suffered his own anxieties when faced with the vast temporal dimension of the natural world. According to Allen, the nineteenth-century experienced a deeply unsettling paradigm shift in the temporal axis of world history; in the early part of the century, a 6000-year timeline of human history, based on careful readings of biblical documents, “was widely accepted in all strata of society” (147), but by mid-century, geologic theories of the age of the planet replaced the Christian system. Fully cognizant of this paradigm shift, Emerson reveals in his early writings reveal that “he was trying to imagine the geological timescale in domestic terms,” attempting to discursively contain the vast spatiotemporal frames of geologic theories within the familiar and unequivocally controlled space of the private home (190). His purpose in doing so, according to Allen, was to impose a humanist

agenda, to “interpret those vast stretches of time in a way that aggrandizes human beings” (190). In later writings, Emerson recasts the relationship between humans and nature, from one mediated by cosmic unity to one based on time; rather than contain God within each of us, “human beings contain time within themselves, redact time into a concise form” (Allen 196). Transcendence, thus, becomes a process of “extending . . . temporally from the moments of present time that constitute everyday experience into the vastness of natural time that lies before and behind them” (196). Clearly, Emerson recognized that the natural world represented an alternate, however “deep,” temporality, rather than the threshold to atemporal (non)existence; time became conceptualized as a “vast expanse,” yet we have only to recall the anxiety prompted by the immense horizons in Whitman and Melville to appreciate that revising Nature’s temporal quality from timelessness to “deep time” does little to minimize the sense of identity loss—or eclipse—prompted by this metaphysical paradigm.

While Nature theoretically offered a source of reflection, self-knowledge, and deep intuition for those pursuing a Romantic metaphysics, the specific experiments with Transcendentalism in America indicate that the natural world also invoked intense anxiety, uncertainty, and a sense of insignificance. The individual could become literally lost in the vast plains of American space, perhaps even encounter danger and death; the scholarship reveals a parallel metaphysical risk in contemplating the natural world. Geologic theories upset the longstanding primacy of the Christian time-line and further complicated efforts to assign nature a temporal frame conducive to Transcendental projects; despite nineteenth-century Americans’ technical knowledge of geologic time,

they certainly could not observe or *experience* it. The scholarship clearly identifies spatial and temporal concerns, but fails to reveal the ways in which they mutually influenced, perhaps even exacerbated, the other; the space of the natural world could only be experienced in time, yet analyses bracket the two dimensions. Abram's discussion of perceived space would benefit tremendously from a consideration of the multiple temporal frames such experience implies; after all, however fluid Whitman's persona, he can only experience one space at a given moment, so that a catalogue of spaces necessarily implies a passage of time—or a complex of co-existing, competing temporal frames. Similarly, Hockersmith's analysis of temporal despair in Dickinson's poetry ultimately manifests as a spatial problem: transcending *time* situates the individual in a spatial void. We cannot achieve a rich historical account of how Americans grappled with Romantic and Transcendental epistemologies if we falsely dissect the spatiotemporal reality that mediated their ontological experiments. Furthermore, in order to appreciate fully the metaphysical challenges Americans faced, we must expand our focus beyond the private world of individual identity to include the public sphere and national identity.

Nationalism, the third trope organizing the dominant temporal and spatial metaphors identified in nineteenth-century American writings, represents an extension of the concerns with nature, yet anxieties about national identity were born long before the Transcendentalists. As Ruland and Bradbury explain, "America existed" as an idea "before the actual continent was known" (4). Western culture had long speculated on a "land which was *terra incognita*, outside and beyond history" (4), so that the actual

discovery and colonization of the territory seemed the fulfillment of prophecy and a “divine plan” (5). Of course, the Puritans’ writings reveal the reality of the so-called New World; in addition to “the stuff of Eden[, t]here was also danger, death, disease, cruelty, and starvation,”—in short, an inhospitable natural world (5). Despite the Enlightenment’s privileging of man and his world, the burden of Eden continued to weigh upon nineteenth-century Americans who struggled to make the vast expanse of America their own, while simultaneously trying to assert their country’s role in human history. The ubiquitous image of America as Eden has both spatial and temporal implications; just as Romanticism required an accessible, benevolent natural world, prelapsarian potential could not be realized when one’s garden was overrun with weeds, snakes, and other human beings occupying what is supposed to be virgin space. As a geopolitical territory, then, America always and inevitably fell short of its Edenic promise, which not only dashed expectations but prompted unsettling questions about how, then, to define and interpret American space and time.

Nineteenth-century writers consistently used the natural world as a metaphor of American identity to interrogate dominant perceptions of their place in human history. Abrams defines the nineteenth-century as one “of intense national self-scrutiny and reassessment of prevailing assumptions” (*Landscape* 1). In contrast to their ancestors’ ability to demarcate rather neatly settled land from unsettled, nineteenth-century artists confronted “space in which the domesticated and the wild [grew] troubled and confused” (Abrams *Landscape* 10), which fueled anxiety about how to interpret America and construct a national identity. In his exploration of nineteenth-century landscape art—both

visual and written—Abrams discovers “a dynamic of incongruous perspectives and frames of reference in collision,” resulting in what he describes as a “ubiquitous dimension of obscurity” that infused all aspects of the natural world (*Landscape* 14). Because the wild natural space of America defied unambiguous classification, he understands it as “an abidingly *negative* geography,” and his study reveals the ways in which the works of Thoreau and Fuller demonstrate the ultimately unrelieved obscurity and ambivalence of the natural environments they encounter—and attempt to narrate—on their respective travels. For Abrams, the prevalence of this negative geography in antebellum literature functions as a counternarrative to “the doctrine of Manifest Destiny” and its drive to “[map] domesticated space” (*Landscape* 4-5); nature’s very obscurity positively served as a metaphor for the chaotic and unruly elements of American identity. However much such a representation of nature may have undermined efforts to secure an impregnable national identity, it paradoxically captured an indisputably American national spirit. For Abrams, then, the garden that may have once symbolized America’s destiny as the paradise on earth becomes a metaphor for the country’s characteristic troubled identity, the natural world representing “existentially open-ended space more permanent than the vanishing wilderness” (*Landscape* 14).

In another interrogation of the premises of Manifest Destiny, Whitman’s poem, “A Broadway Pageant,” suggests that urban, rather than rural, space best represents national identity. As a poem intended for a specific event—the visit of Japanese ambassadors to New York City—“A Broadway Pageant” presents Whitman with an atypical rhetorical situation, and Edward Whitley argues that the occasion “gave

Whitman this opportunity to explore the fracture lines in national identity . . . when the people he considered to be eminently representative of U.S. nationality were denied the status of national representatives" (455). Situating his persona within a large crowd of working-class, potentially unruly, Americans, Whitman not only conveys a sense of national space as urban, but also characterizes that space by a specific type of individual, and, as Whitley explains, "intervenes in a debate over what 'the crowd'" means in terms of American democracy (460). Significantly, by depicting the working class crowd as representative of American identity, Whitman articulates an alternate "image of representative nationality," one composed of the people rather than the leaders (464). Much as Abrams locates in antebellum writings a challenge to hegemonic narratives about controlled and homogenized space, Whitley finds in Whitman's masses a counterforce to limited accounts of national identity; for Whitman, the space of the city is by definition varied, chaotic, diverse, and dynamic, an interesting contrast to Abrams' account of the city as settled. Further, Whitley's analysis of the poem indicates that Whitman not only complicated urban space as a metaphor for national identity(ies), but characterized New York City in a manner similar to Abrams' account of the "ubiquitous and pervasive" expansion and extension of natural space. As a hub of cosmopolitan activity, the borders of New York City figuratively disappear, and Whitman's poem challenges the primacy of the frontier as a meaningful metaphor for national identity by positing the city as "a better model for defining the United State's place in the world" (474). From Whitman's perspective, then, the city offered a potentially revolutionary spatial metaphor for understanding the uniqueness and plurality of American national

identities. Thus, despite the tenacity of manifest destiny as a metaphor for Americans' relationship to untamed nature—and, therefore, as a source of national identity—close analysis of spatial representations reveals how nineteenth-century writers posited alternate conceptualizations.

As a temporal analogue to Manifest Destiny's preoccupation with the material space that symbolized America's potential, the Edenic ideal referred to that unrealized potential and the fulfillment of prophecy, yet it too became more complicated: because America as New World represented a legacy from a European tradition, Americans bent on realizing their unique national identity could not commit to an idealized future without invoking the very history they wished to erase. In response to such temporal anxieties prompted by the burden of Eden, antebellum writers struggled to define their past in a way that preserved a distinction, however subtle, from Europe. Jane Donawerth Eberwein's analysis of Hawthorne's *Twice-Told Tales* addresses this issue, as she identifies varied temporal perspectives in four related tales. Of central interest to Eberwein is Hawthorne's "elongation of historical perspective" through which "[t]wo hundred years stretch somehow into an archaic tradition" (41). Eberwein draws attention to the manner in which the author describes portraits of ancestors, which had become far grimier and faded than reasonable, given the amount of time passed. Additionally, Hawthorne's representation of a masquerade not only depicts a "prolonged" temporal dimension but, by illustrating the past as obscure and hazy, "suggests as well the rapid loss of historical memory" (42). According to Eberwein, Hawthorne's consistent depiction of colonial America as the realm of obscure, ultimately lost, knowledge and his

use of a narrative frame that filters the tales through second-hand narrators evoke a sense of distance and a symbolic sense of “remote[ness] from all original sources,” a remoteness countered in later stories (43, 44). From Hawthorne’s experiments in temporal perspective, Eberwein concludes “an ironic sense of time[;] the present,” she posits, “can be understood by Hawthorne only in terms of the past, yet the past drains away its vitality. The past, for its part, can neither be evaded nor successfully used” (45). Certainly, nineteenth-century could not erase the two hundred years of experience and memory that preceded them, yet to evoke the past at once summoned the familiar and the foreign. Hawthorne’s series of tales reveals one aspect of the temporal anxieties prompted by an urgent nationalist project, and Eberwein’s analysis suggests that the author found no resolution or compromise. Thomas Allen’s exploration of the American-made clock’s rise to prominence suggests one creative solution to the problems of historical time; rather than persevere over the irresolvable problem of the past, or the contradictory drives to conquer space but resist imperialism, Americans asserted alternate temporal dimensions through which they might discover a heterogeneous complex of national identity.

Allen’s study brings together an eclectic collection of narratives; he includes not only the expected written accounts revealing various attitudes toward time but narrates the rise of the clock-making industry as a kind of back-story to the more conventional texts. Significantly, the clock offers a productive symbol for representing “the complex cultural history of temporal experience in America”; because “time could be, at once, both natural and artificial, both millennial and secular,” it could provide a productive

“medium for addressing the apparent contradictions of modern national identity not by eliminating them but rather by making it possible to imagine nationality as an ongoing negotiation, in narrative, of heterogeneous temporal modes” (4). As Allen explains, rather than a singular reliance on nature, religion, science, or the economy to determine a monolithic national identity, Americans organized their experiences according to an array of temporal schemes. Although space figures prominently in the search for an American identity, Allen argues that spatial language itself often “serves primarily as a metaphor for time,” representing the vast undiscovered territory of America’s (great) future (19). Making space a metaphor for America’s future was no accident. According to Allen, Americans struggled with “romantic theories of nationhood that prevailed in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries,” which understood “expansion [as] a necessary ingredient of national viability” (23). Expansion, however, smacked of imperialism; mediating American identity through the literal assimilation of the land thus proved troublesome and interfered with the nationalist project. In response, antebellum writers (notably, Thomas Jefferson) turned to temporal metaphors to represent “a utopian horizon in the future where the nation’s contradictions would resolve themselves into a coherent republic” (23). The horizon, therefore, became a temporal metaphor for America’s ultimate moment of self-fulfillment and national identity, so that whether individual Americans embraced a Protestant belief in a return to Eden, or a humanist trust in a utopian society, they all faced the same direction and sought their identity, as a nation, in the same place: the future. For Allen, clocks, as instruments at once marking the present

and implying the future, played a pivotal role in representing both the spatial dilemmas and temporal solutions characterizing antebellum depictions of national identity.

National identity clearly occupied the minds of antebellum Americans, who invoked a rich array of spatial and temporal terms to convey their concerns and hopes—yet the vast differences between, for example, Abrams' understanding of heterogeneous natural space and Whitman's assertion of heterogeneous city space, reveal a tension that Manifest Destiny, as a so-called master narrative, effaces. From the existing scholarship on nineteenth-century American nationalism, we can discern faintly the benefits of conjoining spatial and temporal analyses; even as many of the scholars emphasized one dimension, their discussions acknowledged, however briefly, the other. For example, Allen explains that space became a metaphor for time, an analysis that enriches our appreciation for the intimate relationship between the two dimensions and helps us to understand the very subtle rhetorical strategies writers used to resolve spatial dilemmas by transferring to the temporal domain. We need more studies that attempt to bring the two dimensions together, for the results advance our knowledge of our past. Why else conduct historical research?

Our exploration of the dominant spatial and temporal metaphors that scholars have interpreted and extrapolated from nineteenth-century literature reveals both the significance of time and space and the rather impressive complex of meanings the myriad metaphors convey. At bottom, ontological concerns persist; representations of domesticity reveal the ways in which women appropriated conventional ideals of womanhood in order to revise an entrenched value system from within; the problematic

of the natural world—as both garden and chaos—becomes an emblem for the anxieties wrought by a Transcendental conceptualization of self; the search for a unified national identity becomes refracted in symbols of human agency and control—the city, the clock. The studies reviewed certainly advance our appreciation for the competing ideals guiding nineteenth-century American life, and offer a solid foundation for pursuing further spatial and temporal analyses. However, much work is left; because time can only be measured by changes in environment—geological time indicated by fossils and strata, morning indicated by a change in the sun’s position—the individual temporal and spatial analyses of nineteenth-century nature provide incomplete accounts of what must have been incredibly unsettling metaphysical moments for antebellum writers, as they compared their own history to the world’s, and realized their profoundly ephemeral existence. Ultimately, a richer understanding of spatial and temporal metaphors—and the epistemological and ontological questions they represent—will advance scholarship seeking a more accurate account of and nuanced appreciation for the various rhetorical situations antebellum writers negotiated.

Winfried Fluck’s review of the theories and practices of American literary history finds promise in diversity studies, which he emphasizes as a productive method for understanding “what America is really all about” (11). In contrast to critical lenses that retain myopic focus on foundational, homogenized accounts of American literature, and by extension negate, unapologetically, the discoveries of a preceding generation, Fluck explores the potential of positing difference as the “unifying principle,” a methodological premise facilitating a “heterogeneous plurality of narratives” (14). In the preceding

review of temporal and spatial metaphors, diversity indeed seems to suggest a unifying principle. We found multiple competing visions of domesticity, of Romanticism and even Transcendentalism, and the pluralism manifested not only with regard to spatial renderings, but temporal ones as well. The scholarship on national identity likewise reveals the appeal of a pluralistic approach, as Abrams and Allen unpack homogenized accounts of American space and time to reveal co-existing and competing spatial and temporal frames. Less productive, however, is the practice of splitting lived experiences into two discrete dimensions, creating, in effect, an existential pluralism. Despite the general appeal of Fluck's recommendation, diversity can be taken too far when it proves antithetical to the very *raison d'être* of historical study: the approximation of past lived experience.

Although focusing one's glass on a particular aspect of a text in order to illuminate the whole is standard critical practice, we are all aware of the dangers of preserving the false dissection: we lose the living, breathing animal. Not only does severing temporal from spatial frames compromise our efforts to understand diverse *lived* experiences, but the field of cognitive linguistics indicates that it is not really possible to fully understand one without the other. Elisabeth Engbert-Pederson explains that "we cannot explain temporal expressions without reference to the perceiving human being in space" and therefore "time and space cannot be analyzed as separate domains" (143). In a more recent study, K.E. Moore offers this insight: "In analyzing space-to-time metaphors, we are not dealing with distinct and homogenous domains such as SPACE and TIME, but with a complex array of experience types" (234). Thus, not only are spatial and

temporal frames deeply complex, but ultimately they need to be reunited and interpreted in terms of experiential, rather than abstract temporal or spatial, language. For example, how might Johnson's insightful analysis of Melville's representation of the human body in natural space be enriched by an exploration of the various temporalities represented alternately by (man-made) ship and (nature-made) sea? Or, in Whitley's original discussion of Whitman's views of urban space, he observes that in one of Whitman's catalogues, the persona begins each line with the word, "When"; for Whitley, this repetition "suggests that these urban sights are preconditions that must be met before the bard will emerge and commemorate the occasion" (462), an interpretation that would benefit greatly from Abrams' insights regarding the ways in which the future held great significance for American national identity. Separately, spatial and temporal metaphors prove revealing and prompt important insights about American literary texts; how much more we will gain when we practice methods that reconnect the two and explore their dynamic interrelationship.

Harry Harootunian's critical analysis of the negative impact of the spatial turn is organized around a discussion of social science paradigms, but his concerns and ultimate conclusions are instructive for those of us seeking to always and again construct a usable past. Indeed, one of his central concerns rests on the "construction of national narrative" as a potentially oppressive act effacing difference; for Harootunian, attending only to the spatial runs the danger of ignoring the past and thus the significant differences that abide and impact the way in which individuals experience their present (42). Everyday lived experience of past cultures cannot be understood without an apprehension, however

incomplete, of the “unevenness” created by temporal disjunctions—for example, when “fragments of the past unexpectedly and suddenly rise up to impinge upon the present” (42) or, as the previous review suggests, when competing visions of the future variously influence present experience. In order to “restore this lost unity,” Harootunian explores the potential of Mikhail Bakhtin’s concept of the chronotope. The especial value of this concept lies in the way it connects “temporal and spatial into a specific but changing relationship artistically expressed in literature at certain moments in human development” (42). As Harootunian explains, chronotope is, by definition, a conceptual combination of spatiotemporal “specificity,” so that various chronotopes do not become rigidly ossified as universal forms, but change and evolve along with real space and time. Because the chronotope illuminates spatiotemporal experiences as they are aesthetically represented, it suggests a promising method for advancing scholars’ continued efforts to narrate American histories and understand the many narratives they both contain and create.

According to Alan Gilbert, the “essence of history” lies not in a general “overview” of “continuous time,” but in “the temporal horizons which operate on consciousness and behavior in particular human situations”—in other words, in unique, lived moments. (50-1). In her introduction to *Rhetoric Retold*, Cheryl Glenn asserts that “[t]he task of historiography is one of connecting the real and the discourse” (6). For historical rhetoric, achieving a more authentic record of the past can only be done through discourse; it is up to rhetoric scholars to interpret the real as best we can from the texts that remain. And the “real,” the lived experience of past writers, is conveyed through spatiotemporal metaphors. Literary criticism of nineteenth-century

America finds that these metaphors circulate around competing images of the natural world, and focuses its attention on the explicit symbols found in literary texts; attention to the metaphors deliberately invoked by authors tells us that we are on the right track: arguably, antebellum Americans faced no issue more important than the relationship between humans and nature. Consequently, we should dig deeper to uncover other manifestations of nineteenth-century American time-space, and scrutinize the various chronotopes that characterize a rhetorical text; here, at the core of the dominant discourses and the various texts through which they speak, we will find lived experience codified in its most fundamental form.

CHAPTER III

KAIROS, CHRONOTOPE, AND RHETORIC AS INVENTIONAL ART

In a posthumously published essay, Thomas B. Farrell reflects on the interrelationship between rhetoric and history, and seeks a theoretical framework that preserves the dynamics of a rhetorical text, regardless of its historic moment of inception. To this end, he posits rhetoric as an inventional art, as a practice grounded in the premise that “tributaries of action and agency are ongoing and nonfinalizable”; in order to achieve a richer understanding of the “dormant potentialities” of the past, we must understand rhetoric as a “succession of available *and unavailable* means of persuasion” (emphasis in original 329). Like Aristotle’s rhetor, then, the task of rhetorical history is one of discovery—of invention. What we are inventing is our past as it lives in our present—and we begin with an “image” that has abided as a significant historical event. However, rather than focus our critical energies solely on the formal elements of the text, or the outcomes of that text, Farrell directs the lens toward the moment of rhetorical invention, and attempts to identify the rich context of possibility and impossibility that shaped the rhetorical act. Farrell’s “meditation on some of the ways . . . rhetorical theory finds itself implicated with history” proves a provocative springboard for responding more systematically to his call “to find out why and how the spoken and transmitted version of past experience comes to us the way it does” (323, 330). Of special importance here is the “how”; specifically, *this* meditation seeks to sketch a method that will advance the

field's pursuit of the ways in which the so-called available and unavailable means become codified in rhetorical texts, as well as how we then interpret that text's place(s) in its historic moment(s). One conceptual tool holds great potential for serving these multiple ends: Mikhail Bakhtin's chronotope.

Despite the ubiquity of Bakhtin's concepts in rhetoric and composition, and despite various critics' tenacious efforts to organize his loose collection of interrelated concepts into an architectonics of dialogism, very little use has been made of the chronotope, arguably one of the most important constituent elements of the dialogic imagination. A handful of writers have appropriated the concept to interrogate the temporal and spatial complexes of specific literary works, but because of the demands of the chronotope as a methodology, it has not achieved the popularity of carnival and polyphony. Pursuing chronotopic analysis does, admittedly, require some work and attention to multiple time-space realities, but the effort reaps considerable insights regarding not only the historical realities of the author but her unique interpretation of and response to those realities. Specifically, chronotope offers tremendous promise for rhetorical criticism, as it advances recent efforts to theorize *kairos* as a formal element of a rhetorical text, yet chronotopic analysis also uncovers the greater historical context of available and unavailable means. By isolating a text's unique chronotopes—as variations of both cultural and generic chronotopes circulating during the historic moment of invention—we gain an opportunity to illuminate the rhetor's specific space and time. In short, we recover the *kairic* moments giving rise to the text itself.

The significance of *kairos*, and thus chronotope, to an invention rhetorical theory cannot be overstated. Farrell turns to Aristotle's formulation of "seeing" the available and the unavailable means as a major premise of his inquiry; arguably, the means represent the host of possibilities (and impossibilities) from which a rhetor may choose, and *kairos* directs the choosing. Although Farrell's sketch does not explicitly identify *kairos*, the term refers to a constituent part of a rhetorical act, as the unique moment of rhetorical invention. Traditionally, *kairos* refers to the convergence of two interrelated phenomena: right timing and proper measure, or decorum. Notwithstanding James Kinneavy's claim that the word *kairos* "does not occur in Homer," ("Kairos: A Neglected Concept" 80) related—and telling—concepts can be found in both the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*; in the former, "it denotes a vital or lethal place in the body, one that is particularly susceptible to injury" (Sipiora 116), while in the latter, Homer refers to Odysseus as *polutropos*, a term that, according to Antisthenes, signifies the epic hero's ability to "speak with men in many ways" (Rostagni 26). Both meanings prove to be influential on those thinkers who follow; Hippocrates, Pythagoras, and Gorgias reveal a sensitivity to the importance of timing and measure in treating the body—whether the diagnosis calls for medicine or discourse. Treating "the body" necessarily implies attention to the individual, and as Catherine Eskin notes in her analysis of Hippocratic *kairos*, "timing is as important to physicians as it is to men who deal in the art of words. What is key to both is the ability of the speaker to recognize the 'right' moment, and knowing that right moment, to take decisive action" (107). If we can approximate this

crucial moment of recognition and response, we at once advance our historical record of effective rhetorical artifacts and enrich our understanding of successful rhetorical invention.

The history of rhetoric testifies to the central place of *kairos*, and although our discipline has expanded considerably since its classical days, the notion of right timing and opportunity transcends historical moment or epistemological bias. Indebted to those who preceded him, Gorgias made *kairos* the “cornerstone of his entire epistemology, ethics, aesthetics, and rhetoric,” and despite Plato’s sharp criticism of the sophists, *Phaedrus* reveals *kairic* sensitivity in Socrates’ description of the ideal rhetor, who must acquaint himself with the various kinds of men’s souls and adjust his speech accordingly. In apparent response to Socrates’ recommendation, Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* is suffused with attention to *kairos*; in particular, Kinneavy argues that Aristotle’s designation of forensic, epideictic, and deliberative rhetoric implies *kairic* elements, as does his formulation of rhetoric as the discovery of available means *for a specific situation* (“Kairos in Classical” 59-60). Isocrates sought to educate men to be, above all, “pragmatic thinkers and speakers,” and consequently, he placed “special emphasis on what is practical and expedient under any given set of circumstance”—in other words, Isocrates valued *kairos* as an integral component of *phronesis* (Sipiora 9). Clearly, despite philosophic differences, Greek thinkers shared the premise that a speaker should be sensitive and responsive to his rhetorical situation, a sensitivity that did not escape the notice of the Romans, especially Cicero.

Gary Remer argues that Cicero's interpretation of *kairos* as decorum significantly influenced his thinking on the interrelationship between the "honorable" and the "useful"; although some scholars have asserted that the orator subordinated the former to the latter, Remer counters that Cicero "[was] committed to balancing the honorable and the useful . . . [T]he upshot is that the absolute categories become more liquid, with the rhetor having to decide contextually" (8). Decorum, from a Ciceronian perspective, demanded attention to the "language, tone, organization, time, [and] place" of an utterance, not merely as a practical consideration, but as an "ethical ideal"; according to Remer, "Cicero links decorum to morality by arguing that decorum (propriety) agrees with nature—and nature is inherently moral" (19). James Baumlin explores the influence of Cicero on Renaissance ideals of decorum, which had been "apparently either forgotten or ignored during the Middle Ages" (140). His analysis of Renaissance visual rhetoric reveals a Humanist concern for competing temporalities, which are rooted in a "Ciceronian theory [that] combines *to prepon* and *to kairos*, 'the fitting' and 'the timely,' in a complex synthesis, at once observing both the formal and the temporal or situational aspects of discourse" (143). After a long history of influence on rhetorical practices, *kairos* suffered diminished status during the Enlightenment and nineteenth-century, the inevitable result of rhetoric's loss of invention to the domain of logic; Augusto Rostagni's reclamation of *kairos* in 1922 played a major role in engendering what we've come to appreciate as a "new" rhetoric, which attempts to bring classical and 20th century rhetorics into a

productive dialogue. Thus, *kairos* abides as a central concern to rhetorical theory, but as recent scholarship attests, complications arise when we try to bring *kairos* into rhetorical criticism.

As James Baumlin and Philip Sipiora's edited collection *Rhetoric and Kairos* indicates, recent attention to the historical and contemporary relevance of *kairos* has prompted deeper reflection on its theoretical implications yet struggles to articulate critical methods for identifying the *kairic* elements in a rhetorical artifact. For example John Smith distinguishes the "uniform time" of *chronos* from the "qualitative character" of *kairos*, and argues that "*kairos* is peculiarly relevant to the interpretation of historical events, because it points to their significance and purpose and to the idea that there are constellations of events pregnant with a possibility (or possibilities) not to be met with at other times and under different circumstances" (47). In other words, history represents a series of *kairic* moments—consequently, rhetorical analysis seeking to construct a rich past must explore how opportunities (both taken and lost) find expression in texts. Richard Enos cautions, however, that we must be wary of the methods we bring to rhetorical analysis: if we "treat the artifacts of rhetoric as we once treated literary texts, placing them in a timeless vacuum removed from the context within which they occurred . . . we will limit our understanding of *kairos*, and by default, classical rhetoric itself" (79). Certainly his concerns prove relevant to the entire rhetorical tradition and speak to the central place of *kairos* in the invention of a rhetorical past. As Kinneavy aptly observes, "rhetoric desperately needs the notion of *kairos*," not only because of the intimate interrelationship between opportunity and rhetorical action, but also because

kairos resonates so harmoniously with the “concept of situational context” (“*Kairos*: A Neglected Concept” 83). Indeed, post-modern suspicions (and post-post-modern celebrations) that knowledge and experience are ultimately situated attests to the epistemic significance of *kairos* and extends its domain beyond rhetoric, yet Gregory Mason claims that modern prejudice against the “time-bound” diminishes our ability to fully appreciate the value of all texts, including literature. Consequently, “reclaiming” *kairos* as a conceptual tool will not only contribute to the study of rhetoric as inventional art but significantly enrich “our understanding of art (and of life)” (199). Despite tendencies, then, to discriminate between rhetorical and literary texts, and to prescribe methodologies accordingly, *kairos* profoundly influences the production of all texts, and by extension reveals the historical conditions that make such texts possible. Its relevance far exceeds classical rhetoric and conventional renderings of its scope. Although *kairos* certainly marks a moment of rhetorical opportunity, and as such carries practical significance, it also conveys an ethic and epistemology, both of which enhance *kairos’* value as a theoretical concept and a critical tool of analysis.

Significantly, *kairos* indicates a relationship between the individual speaker and her world. The concept is symbolized by the Greek god of Opportunity, a young, winged man whose most telling feature is his head; significantly, he is depicted as bald, with the exception of a forelock, which indicates “the importance of looking out for *kairos*, as the propitious moment, and grabbing his forelock before he passes by to avoid being left to swipe at a bald head” (Hawhee 20). Such a representation suggests that the individual has only one chance to recognize a fleeting opportunity, yet it also indicates a temporal

metaphor for individual existence. Kevin Moore has identified three general time-to-space metaphors in language: the first two posit an ego, a perspective-specific metaphor, where time is perceived alternately as approaching, then passing, a stationary individual or as a pre-existing road upon which the individual travels (presumably always forward). Additionally, Moore identifies a third metaphor, where time is understood to pass without the observation of a perceiver, a temporal version of the tree falling in the forest. Such metaphors carry great significance for an understanding of rhetoric and *kairos*, for they reveal attitudes toward human agency. The figure of Opportunity obviously resonates with the metaphor of the stationary individual, who must almost passively but vigilantly await the right opening, but contemporary notions of *kairos* are not satisfied by such a reductive representation, which not only limits the agency of the perceiver but erases the complexities of time as individuals experience it. We need a more sensitive analytic tool if we are to advance our appreciation for how rhetors recognize, exploit, and create opportunity.

Recent theoretical treatments of *kairos* suggest that we understand it as a convergence of temporal frames that are distinct in the unique relationships they each posit between the individual and time. Like Moore, Baumlin discerns three such temporal schemes, yet he finds them to be mutually coexisting rather than exclusive; in his analysis of Renaissance emblem books, Baumlin identifies a pattern of juxtaposed symbols of different temporalities: he characterizes *kairos* as the moment of opportunity, *chronos* as the line of time, and *aion* as the circle of eternity. Within this general framework, *kairos* symbolizes “the quintessentially human experience of time as an

aspect of individual consciousness, deliberation, and action”; time becomes *individualized* as a unique experience of each perceiver, so that “rather than the constant linear passage of time . . . *kairos* marks that single fleeting moment when an individual chooses from among all competing alternatives and eventualities, thereby changing one’s world-as-lived” (155). Time, then, becomes complicated, multiple, its monolithic character fragmented into a plurality of co-existing frames. Without multiple temporal frames, individuals would have no choices, no alternatives, and thus no *kairos*. Although *kairos* does “depend on temporal frames that are independent of human action,” frames that bring the perceiver into a particular kind of relationship with the world and present opportunities that are always partially determined yet open, it is by *our response* to the opportunity that we assert an ethical stance (Benedikt 227, 229). Debra Hawhee describes this experience as a call to produce discourse by inventing in the middle, between what is given—the situation and universal rhetorical forms—and what is conceived—the rhetor’s unique response. The response, however, is not merely mechanical, but creative and obligatory; “[i]nvolving heightened awareness, [*kairos*] requires an act of perception . . . and a sometimes uncomfortable act of choice” by an individual who is compelled “to participate in the making of meaning” (Mason 208). In short, *kairos* is more than right timing or proper measure; it is no less than an ethic which situates a subject within a world at once chaotic and ordered, and demands that she make “right” choices. Thus, *kairos* is inextricably tied to notions of an ethical rhetorical practice.

Because rhetoric is understood “as an expression of *kairos*” (Sipiora 15), our discipline must continue the work begun by Sipiora and Baumlin’s edited collection—we need conceptual lenses that discern the *kairic* qualities of a text. However, because *kairos* foregrounds *individual* recognition and response, the task of analyzing the *kairic* moments that produced a rhetorical text proves challenging. John Poulakos identifies a fundamental problem inhibiting rhetorical analysis of *kairos*—without access to the lived moments of invention and delivery, “how can we begin to understand *kairos* as a notion that can be observed in the composition of an oration? To what extent can *kairos* be said to operate as a formal strategy within a rhetorical text?” (90). These rhetorical questions provide their own opportunity for Poulakos to assert that *kairos* can be observed both “intuitively” and “technically” by close attention to the markers within the text, indicators the writer provides regarding both the rhetorical situation and decisions. In his analysis, Poulakos assumes generic conventions of forensic and epideictic rhetoric, and reveals the ways in which Gorgias manipulates audience expectations in order “to create an impression of timeliness” (90). One method, then, of criticism posits generic forms and looks for textual clues of the unique application of the form. Similarly, Baumlin and Baumlin examine lexical references to temporal frames in *Hamlet*, and argue that, through specific temporal markers, texts reveal cultural and historical attitudes toward time, a position Roger Thompson reiterates in his close reading of *kairic* elements in Ralph Waldo Emerson’s writings. His analysis, as prototypical, warrants more attention, as it at once illuminates the significance of *kairos* to the meaning of a rhetorical text and

exposes the insufficiency of current methods to reveal the ways in which *kairic* elements infuse a text.

In “Ralph Waldo Emerson and the American *Kairos*,” Thompson argues that Emerson’s works reflect a general “feeling of right time and moral entitlement” to enact social change, an attitude he identifies as the American *kairos*. Drawing upon the ideas of Kinneavy and Tillich, his analysis posits two overlapping but distinct *kairic* elements: the historic moment represents a Tillichian event, where the “eternal break[s] into the temporal,” the latter then understood in Kinneavy’s terms as a “specific time and place” (188-9). Thompson locates a transcendental American *kairos*, which “involves the invocation of the eternal during a specific moment in history in order to enact change”; additionally, he asserts that nineteenth-century Americans viewed their new nation as a *kairos*, “a nation uniquely positioned in the history of the world to fulfill the destiny of God” (187). Resonating with the dominant discourse identifying America as a new Eden, Thompson’s American *kairos* certainly helps us to understand better, in rhetorical terms, how antebellum writers’ attitudes toward their historic moment invested their writings. His analysis focuses on key texts representing the various social projects occupying Emerson: literature, education, and rhetoric. In his reading of “The American Scholar,” Thompson emphasizes the message of timing, explaining that Emerson’s essay pronounces an end to “America’s time as imitators” and urges Americans to recognize the ripe moment for literary independence (190). Significantly, the moment is one of divine importance, as America is to lead the world in more than just letters; similarly, Emerson’s demand for educational reform rested upon the belief in America’s

transcendental *kairos*, which presented a unique opportunity for achieving a “spiritualized literacy and educational system” (191). Rhetorical theory, according to Thompson, played a significant role in both projects, as the right kind of rhetoric would inspire the necessary social change.

Through his reading of both “Eloquence” essays, Thompson discerns a constant reliance on a rather Platonic notion of the divinely inspired rhetor, as the inevitable hero of a “transcendental *kairos*” (192). Near the end of his discussion, he expands his scope to consider briefly other seminal texts, such as Lincoln’s “Emancipation Proclamation,” and makes a persuasive argument for the pervasiveness of a transcendental, spiritualized sense of *kairos* in antebellum American texts. Based on his readings, Thompson concludes that “[t]he American *kairos* is a moment not just when the eternal breaks into the temporal, then, but when the temporal individual invokes the eternal in order to transcend his realm” (195). The American *kairos*, then, imagines a great dialogue between the individual and the divine, creating an image that moves us beyond a reductive history positing a one-way relationship, with the individual as the lone Romantic seeking communion with the natural world.

Thompson’s analysis of *kairos* in Emerson’s writings both demonstrates the potential of the concept to illuminate rhetorical strategy and exposes the need for a more sensitive methodological tool. His essay does reveal the ways in which one seminal writer’s works wield rhetorical power; Emerson’s essays are without doubt grounded in one of the most influential ideologies of the time period, and Thompson’s invocation of *kairos* as an illuminating concept reveals how this ideology worked on a textual level.

However, although his analysis allows an exchange between individual and eternal, thereby enriching our understanding of Emerson's available means, it reduces all of Emerson to one universal trope. Furthermore, he reduces a complex time period to a single universal *kairos*, and despite his argument that the moment in time represents a historic opportunity, he has universalized and generalized *kairos*—it is no longer the unique rhetorical opportunity facing a single rhetor, but *the* shared, collective opportunity facing an entire nation for an extended, or at least undefined, period of time. We do need his insights regarding a transcendental, universal sense of *kairos*—to explain antebellum America in such a way helps us understand the urgency and the sense of mission facing some of America's most interesting writers. But as a critical tool, *kairos* invites—demands—that we individualize the time and space of a rhetor's moment; 30 years separate “American Scholar” from “Eloquence,” yet Thompson's analysis seems to consider them constituent moments of a single *kairos*, and in doing so, erases the distinctions, however subtle, between the vastly different rhetorical moments facing Emerson throughout his lifetime.

Indeed, what current methods of *kairic* rhetorical criticism fail to preserve is the interrelated but irreducible components of the rhetorical situation: the given situation and available means, and the rhetor's unique response to it. Much analysis of *kairos* collapses the distinction; critics establish generic or universal temporal frames and then search out those themes or theories in individual texts. Such an approach may certainly be warranted, for there's no denying that rhetorical texts can and do read with the proverbial grains of their time period. Yet to assume agreement or close identification—

or even stark opposition—between the individual and the collective reduces the complex relationship between a text and the world in which it was conceived. We should be wary of any claims that a time period can be captured in one, tidy, *kairic* swoop, and recall Baumlin’s findings that any historical moment can have multiple temporal frames at work, each manifesting different opportunities. Complicating the available means of a time period necessarily complicates the decision-making process of an individual rhetor, whose text may not, after all, be reducible to the dominant discourses of her day. Analyses of *kairos* therefore, must be more sensitive to the elements of the text that might challenge, interrogate, or dialogue with hegemonic notions of temporality, and must consider the very likely possibility that a single utterance can establish multiple relationships with its time period as it addresses dominant discourses and ideologies.

Consequently, in order to pursue a deeper level of analysis, we must explore more than historical themes, dominant discourses, and lexical frequencies. As Baumlin advises, “the most telling application of *kairos* may be charted in the internal temporalities of discourse itself; for arguments necessarily unfold in time, subtly changing as one line of reasoning extends, completes, or overthrows another, continually adjusting in accordance with an audience’s complex response” (156). Because each text can represent its own *kairos*, and because a single text can represent multiple, co-existing *kairoi*, Baumlin concludes that “the internal temporalities of discourse remain a subject for further investigation” (157). Furthermore, despite the earliest renderings of *kairos* as a spatial concept, referring to the most vulnerable part of the warrior’s body, it has been reduced to include only temporal considerations; a rhetorical act, however, occurs in a

particular space and time, so in addition to more finely-tuned methods of discourse analysis, critics interested in identifying the unique moment of rhetorical opportunity must conceive of a time-space, and look for spatial qualities of temporal, or *kairic*, markers. As a conceptual tool presupposing “the intrinsic connectedness of temporal and spatial relationships that are artistically expressed in literature,” Bakhtin’s chronotope meets our methodological needs for pursuing the *kairic* qualities of a text and thus sketching the inventionary moment (“Forms of Time” 84).

Anyone familiar with Bakhtin’s work knows that he had a rather ambivalent relationship with our discipline; as John Murphy explains, “he had little good to say of rhetoric,” (259) which forces those of us who value him as a thinker to proceed very carefully before appropriating him recklessly or irresponsibly. Although Murphy asserts that Bakhtin’s “rhetorical status may well depend on our ability to talk away his antipathy toward rhetoric,” he suggests that modifying the term to indicate less force and more civility would make it a “respectable, intellectual, even literary endeavor. From this perspective,” he explains, “rhetoricians explore languages that make worlds, not words that sell cars” (260). The shift he describes more accurately represents the expansive scope of contemporary rhetorical study, and arguably makes our field more palatable to Bakhtin. A rhetoric devoted to manipulation of the masses and compulsion, a rhetoric directed monologically at persuasion—certainly, Bakhtin would have no part of such a misuse of language and abuse of dialogic possibility. But twentieth-century rhetoric has long challenged this traditional, mainstream definition, and efforts to move beyond rhetoric as discursive oppression absolutely need Bakhtin’s insights about “a dialogic

rhetoric rooted in [the] idea of love,” as an act that nurtures a positive relationship with the Other (Sapienza 138). Indeed, if we wish to bring Bakhtin’s work into a genuine and answerable dialogue with rhetorical theory, we must establish a particular kind of relationship between the Self and Other, and build a rhetorical practice from that foundation.

In *Toward a Philosophy of the Act*, Bakhtin explores “the relation between the world as experienced in actions and the world as presented in discourse” (Holquist Foreword ix); of central concern is the difference that inevitably abides between the actual event and the act of representing it. The record of the deed, detached from the deed, incorrectly comes to stand in for the unique lived moment of a unique individual, a false assumption perpetuated by the world of theory. What Bakhtin seeks is a way to approximate the “unitary and once-occurrent being of life” from the “actually performed act—not from the aspect of its content, but in its very performance,” and he claims that, to do so, we must first perceive the act, for example, of speaking or writing, as an “actualization of a decision” (28). Central to this relationship between life and art is the concept of answerability, which he describes as the “taking-into-account . . . of all the factors” relevant to the act’s content, truth-value, “historicity and individuality” (28). An answerable act “concentrates, correlates, and resolves within a unitary and unique and . . . *final context* both the sense and the fact, the universal and the individual, the real and the ideal” (29). Consequently, answerability not only posits an “I” who assumes responsibility for her “unique participation in being,” but, by extension, grants other

individuals, whom she experiences as Other, their right to unique, once-occurrent being (43).

This respectful relationship between Self and Other forms the basis of Bakhtin's dialogism; as Michael Holquist explains, "dialogism argues that all meaning is relative in the sense that it comes about only as a result of the relation between two bodies occupying simultaneous but different space" (*Dialogism* 21). Meaning, in other words, cannot be achieved by an isolated Self—the Other is a necessary condition of existence, and our actions represent a response to an Other. However, this response reflects a unique position, as well as a unique perspective of a shared time and space, so that the "I" functions as a "central point needed to calibrate all further time and space discriminations" (Holquist *Dialogism* 23). This subtle distinction between the simultaneous time-space of a Self and Other is not merely academic; once we accept the notion that two witnesses to the same event interpret that event differently, we must consider the impact on rhetorical theory and criticism. One rhetorical text represents one individual's unique response to an event, and if we are to preserve the unique quality of her perspective, we must pursue analyses that seek not to reduce the single act to a universal, homogenized account but to reveal the unique perspective encoded in the act. Representing a "further development of Bakhtin's early concern with the act," the chronotope essay sketches a method rich in potential "for understanding the nature of events and actions," which are "necessarily performed in a specific context," or time-space (Morson and Emerson 367).

In his essay, “Forms of Time and Chronotope in the Novel,” Bakhtin describes literary chronotopes as “spatial and temporal indicators [that] are fused into one carefully thought-out, concrete whole. Time, as it were, thickens, takes on flesh . . . likewise, space becomes charged and responsive to the movements of time” (84). As such, chronotopes determine both plot lines and “the image of man in literature, and, therefore, they “define genre and generic distinctions” (85). As this definition implies, Bakhtin focuses his discussion on the ways in which time-space is aesthetically expressed in literary works, although he does include references to biographical genres. Such literary chronotopes necessarily arise from a real-time chronotope: “Out of the actual chronotopes of our world (which serve as the source of representation) emerge the reflected and *created* chronotopes of the world represented in the work (in the text)” (emphasis in original 253). In order to demonstrate the function and significance of literary chronotopes, Bakhtin identifies major literary genres and illustrates the ways in which time-space configurations determine generic conventions; for example, he devotes considerable attention to the temporal and spatial characteristics of Greek Romance, then traces the life of this generic base, as well as the time-space of folkloric chronotopes, into the nineteenth century. In his concluding remarks, he asserts that chronotopes are significant because they indicate “the place[s] where the knots of narrative are tied and untied,” and therefore “all the novel’s abstract elements . . . gravitate toward the chronotope and through it take on flesh and blood” (250). Despite Bakhtin’s preference for literature, especially the novel, as an “allegory for representing existence as the condition of authoring” (Holquist, *Dialogism* 30), his historical survey of chronotopes

has tremendous relevance to the discipline of rhetoric, which ultimately seeks to understand how the knots of *opportunity* become tied and consequently organize the various elements of a rhetorical text. Bakhtin's final comment in particular provides an opening for extending his historical poetics beyond the literary novel. He writes, "without such temporal-spatial expression, even abstract thought is impossible. Consequently, every entry into the sphere of meaning is accomplished only through the gates of the chronotope" (258). Although Bakhtin's interests remain on the meanings chronotopes convey in literature, other scholars have sought to generalize his discussion, and their contributions advance our effort to craft a productive method for analyzing rhetorical chronotopes, which in turn indicate the *kairic* qualities of a text.

Morson and Emerson, for example, assess chronotope as an expression of the theory of relativity, and conclude that chronotopes maintain the interconnectedness of experience as a spatiotemporal phenomenon; any effort to sever the spatial from the temporal in the process of conducting "abstract analysis . . . runs the risk of distorting" the very experience we seek to understand. Additionally, Einstein's theory reminds us of the multiple nature of time and space, prompting us to account for the "variety of senses of time and space available" to a writer, who is also granted the creative license of "discovering new ones" rather than limiting her choices to those available. Finally, chronotopes are not only multiple and co-existing, but mutable, changing historically as the conditions they represent change (367-9). Fundamentally, then, rhetorical chronotopes refer to the complex of co-existing time-space(s) that characterize an event as it is represented in a text; they can be given or conceived, traditional or novel, general

or unique. Even more significantly, they exist in dialogic relation to one another: “chronotopes are mutually inclusive, they co-exist, they may be interwoven with, replace or oppose one another, contradict one another or find themselves in ever more complex interrelationships” (Bakhtin “Forms of Time” 252). If we are to understand a text’s meaning, and access the historical moment it mediates, we must access the chronotopes.

Although Jay Ladin follows Bakhtin’s lead in focusing his lens on literary texts, his systematic elaboration of the chronotope proves useful for a variety of texts. From Bakhtin’s essay, he extrapolates distinct levels of chronotope, and identifies the “major” and “local” ones as most significant to literary study. He describes major chronotopes as the patterns that ultimately suggest the “high-level, novel- and genre-defining chronotopes” that occupy most of Bakhtin’s essay former, and distinguishes them from local chronotopes, those that are “scattered throughout literary texts,” and presumably unique to the author (215-16). Furthermore, Ladin emphasizes the close, dialogic relationship between the representation of a subject and the time-space in which she exists; he argues that chronotopes “define and limit the ways in which human character can exist in the narrative. In effect,” he explains, “different constructions of identity, character, and . . . humanness . . . require different space-times for their representations” (223). His designation of major chronotopes explains several applications of the concept in a variety of disciplines; for example, in literary analysis, Elissa Heil explores the chronotopic significance of the drawing room in Trollope’s *Barchester Towers*; in composition studies, Deborah Mutnick considers the relevance of chronotope to collapsing a binary of personal versus academic prose (both of which function as major

chronotopes); and in cultural geography, Amanda Lagerkvist analyzes the impact that “chronotopes of nostalgic dwelling” have on the renovation of Shanghai. Because any given text presents multiple chronotopes, Ladin delineates nine different relationships, creating a flexible taxonomy that can aid scholars’ efforts to identify various chronotopes within a text and discern the ways in which they influence one another. For rhetorical criticism, chronotopic analysis proves especially suited for revealing the complex relationship between the time-space representations of dominant discourses and the rhetor’s unique perspective; thus, not only does this method expose the internal workings of any given text, it helps us see what no other method reveals: the invention process.

Ladin emphasizes the crucial relationship between the “hero” and the chronotopes; a text’s hero, whether the aestheticized author (in autobiographical or other non-fiction writing) or a distinct protagonist, represents a unique time-space, a unique perception of a shared event, and therefore the chronotopes she chooses necessarily offer the proverbial window to an individual consciousness. For rhetorical chronotopes, we must consider too that the author is not merely aestheticizing life but is responding to a specific and unique rhetorical situation; therefore, the chronotopes will also indicate the available means, imply the unavailable ones, and illuminate the unique, unrepeatable choice(s) the rhetor made in response to her opportunity. Let’s return to Thompson’s analysis of Emerson’s writings to consider how chronotopic analysis productively complicates the idea of a “transcendental American *kairos*” and Emerson’s response to it. Although a thorough and careful treatment of his work exceeds the scope of this chapter, we can certainly gain an appreciation for the value of chronotope to *kairic* analysis.

Thompson has taken the first step in a chronotopic analysis by identifying one major chronotope at work: the time-space represented by the American *kairos*, a divinely sanctioned country on the cusp of historical significance. His analysis demonstrates where this chronotope finds expression in Emerson's writings; for example, Emerson begins his "The American Scholar" with the announcement that "the time is already come when [America] ought to be, and will be, something else" (qtd in Thompson 190), and he concludes by referring (again using future tense) to the "nation of men [that] will for the first time exist because each believes himself inspired" (qtd in Thompson 191). Thompson's analysis identifies the American Scholar as no less than the corporeal "manifestation of the Spirit" as it enters the world; thus the scholar functions much as Christ does, a special and single man charged with a divine mission. Emerson's essay, however, suggests a more complicated discussion of the relationship between the past, the present, and the future, and the role of men in bringing about change and creating a unique American community of equals. Although his title does indicate a platonic ideal in *the American Scholar*, much of his essay indicates that all men have the potential that inheres in an American *kairos*; consequently, we discern a tension between Emerson's thoughts on genius and democracy, and the possibilities for nurturing American hero(es). Furthermore, the presence of a chronotope of historical, natural, and spiritual cycles creates a tension with the linear time-space of the American *kairos* chronotope.

For example, Emerson notes immediately the nature of the speaking event as a "re-commencement," an "anniversary," (53) both terms referring to a cycle, a present moment that is at once grounded in the past and verging on the future of America, given

and yet to be conceived, and we will see this cyclical chronotope recur in various manifestations throughout the essay. A historical cycle arises in his account of the origin of man; he identifies the “old fable [that] covers a doctrine ever new and sublime,”—in one phrase, Emerson invokes the past (fable), the present (covers) and the future (new), and the meaning of the phrase indicates the cyclical nature of the relationship between the three temporal frames. Additionally, his reference to fable implies a particular kind of space—the great text of human knowledge—which dominates his discussion of the American scholar. Later Emerson elaborates the complex relationship between the time-space of historical knowledge; although his prescription for truth-catching requires Man Thinking to abandon his books and seek knowledge in the sun and stars, Emerson first asserts that “books are the best type of the influence of the past” and each generation is obligated to “write its own books,” which will one day provide for the next generation of thinkers (56). The past, again, informs the present, which in turn must meet its obligation to the future, a formula that circulates all three temporalities into the present time-space; furthermore, the implication is that each succeeding generation will find itself engaged in a similar process of recycling the old to create the new. In addition, then, to the sense of a divine mission, Emerson’s essay clearly characterizes the time-space of the American present as a confluence of past and future, which are not at the utter mercy of cosmic influence but the work of individual men committed to progress.

Emerson’s discussion of the role of nature in nurturing Man Thinking is also more complicated than first appears. Conventionally, the natural world functions as an analogue to man’s soul, so that studying the one elucidates the other. Yet Emerson’s

characterization of this relationship reveals a tension. For the scholar, nature itself seems to exist beyond the time-space of the present, even as it appears materially before him; “there is never a beginning, there is never an end, to the inexplicable continuity of this web of God, but always circular power returning to itself” (55). The natural world, here, represents the kind of eternal Thompson identifies as the *kairos*, yet this world is not suddenly breaking into the everyday; it is always and already implicated in the everyday time-space of the natural world we experience. The human impulse, according to Emerson, is to reduce this eternity, to lasso it into the present time-space; in other words, faced with the enormity of Nature, “classification begins.” Although he advises man to “study nature” in order to achieve self knowledge, Emerson also cautions against the impulse to impose order too zealously: “*tyrannized* over by its own unifying instinct, [the young mind] goes on tying things together, diminishing anomalies, discovering roots running under ground, whereby contrary and remote things cohere and flower out from one stem” (emphasis added 55). Studying nature, then, reveals two competing chronotopes: the immediate, present time-space of the natural world and the eternal, divine cosmos of Nature, both of which share the time-space that the ideal scholar must negotiate. The path, therefore, to becoming the ideal scholar is much more complicated than gazing at the heavens, and despite Emerson’s optimistic claim that the “time is already come,” he has articulated some rather formidable conditions that must be met in order for the time and space of the American *kairos* to materialize.

To identify an American *kairos* in Emerson’s essay helps us to understand a major preoccupation of 1837: the thinker, early in his career, used his opportunity to

speak to a group of young men about their potential, and by situating them on the cusp of a great historical possibility, he certainly impressed them with a sense of hope they might otherwise have lost. The chronotopes of this one text, however, reveal Emerson's own concerns and uncertainties regarding how exactly the men of his time were to take advantage of the opportunity to write a new chapter in human history. His text reveals a sensitivity to the pervasiveness and value of the past, especially with regard to intellectual history, so that, at times, the cycle of the past has a positive influence. However, the past also intrudes, limits, and "tyrannizes," so that intellectual space comes to resemble the colonized geographical territory of America's immediate past. The chronotope of the historical cycle, then, situates the individual in concomitantly familiar and oppressive space, and if the American scholar is to work toward a future, he must solve the problem of the past. Likewise, the American scholar, as divine champion (in Thompson's formulation), first must know himself; for Emerson, self knowledge comes through the contemplation of nature, but Emerson's representations of nature complicate that relationship. The cycles of the natural world indicate both its transcendental and material qualities; it is at once immediate to man as sense experience and profoundly inaccessible to man as "the web of God" (Emerson 55). Nature, then, represents another problem, another contingency that our ideal Scholar must negotiate. As we can see from this extremely brief survey of rhetorical chronotopes, Emerson may have indeed been inspired by the idea of an American *kairos*, but his essay reveals that he recognized the sheer difficulty in bringing about the change he imagined.

The chronotopes Emerson invokes tell us something about the *kairic* qualities of the text; we know the details of the rhetorical situation—a lecture delivered to the Phi Beta Kappa society at Harvard. Emerson took advantage of this opportunity to impress his audience with his unique perspective of American space and history. His references to specific writers and thinkers (Cicero, Locke, Bacon, Shakespeare), to the scientific method of classification, to a Platonic ideal of Man: these would have resonated with his listeners and represent his available means. His metaphysical musings were clearly intended for an intellectual audience, yet he interweaves the intellectual with the spiritual through the nature and history chronotopes, indicating that he saw in this rather conventional rhetorical practice a unique chance to create a different vision of the American intellectual. Additionally, despite the theme—and audience—of his address, he concludes his lecture with a deliberate turn to the *prosaic*: in stark contrast to his repeated allusions to high culture, he presents the young minds before him with a detailed description of “the near, the low, the common,” and asserts that “the literature of the poor, the feelings of the child, the philosophy of the street, the meaning of household life, are the topics of the time” (68). Given the ways in which he cautions against unrestrained book learning and bookish intellect, and given his presentation of the everyday as the raw materials for the American scholar, we must consider that rather than (or in addition to) a transcendental American *kairos*, Emerson perceived an opportunity to posit a democratic American *kairos*.

The prosaic time-space of the American scholar represents Emerson’s interpretation of the rhetorical opportunity to speak before the future leaders of our

country—they represent what he perceived as a *kairos*. Yet they also suggest the limitations he faced within his historical moment, and a quick survey of some (as Farrell terms them) *silences* further illuminates Emerson’s unique, lived time-space. For example, although he consistently creates chronotopes that invoke the past, he does not mention America’s past—the founding fathers, for example, are not mentioned. Additionally, although Margaret Fuller was a close friend of Emerson’s, women are noticeably absent from his discussion; granted, he addressed an exclusively male crowd, but he had no qualms about challenging them on other fronts, such as the usefulness of education. Evidently, scorning the overly bookish paled in comparison to suggesting a Woman Thinking. Most significantly, while the American scholar found inspiration in the common and the everyday, he was always oriented toward the future, specifically, a *better* future. Emerson’s chronotopes reveal that, while he may have respected the complex, conditional nature of the journey, he never doubted the mission itself: “A nation of men *will for the first time exist*, because each believes himself inspired by the Divine Soul which also inspires all men” (71). Twenty-first century readers no doubt struggle to appreciate the perspective of someone living during the early years of the so-called first “nation of men,” to feel the burden and promise of such a responsibility and opportunity. Significantly, despite all the obstacles to achieving this modest utopia, Emerson’s optimism never fails; arguably, skepticism regarding the progressive future of America represents one of Emerson’s most telling *unavailable* means.

The preceding analysis of rhetorical chronotopes in Emerson’s essay is admittedly brief—its purpose was not to provide a comprehensive treatment but to present a

suggestive sketch of how chronotopic analysis reveals aspects of a text we cannot otherwise see. Examining rhetorical chronotopes in a text not only indicates the rhetorical options and choices a rhetor makes, but it suggests the limits of that individual's time and space, the writer's own real-life chronotopes; in short, chronotopes reveal *kairos*. Unlike other critical tools, which identify general patterns and focus on the text, the times, or the audience, chronotopes offer a unique insight into the *inventional process of the rhetor*—they preserve the individual and breathe life into the past to a degree that has been underexplored in our discipline. Furthermore, the chronotope offers a conceptual tool that will advance recent scholarship on *kairos* beyond its historical import to its theoretical and critical potential. Farrell prompts us to “look to the past not as a grave of dead certainties but as a cauldron of live possibilities” so that we can recover and discover “normative potentialities for a rhetoric of emancipation and recovery” (335). Rhetoric as anventional art, ultimately, understands that individuals face rhetorical opportunities as well as create them; discovery of our own available means demands that we look to our past as rich source of material for inventing our present.

CHAPTER IV

ROOF-TOPS, CATHEDRAL SPIRES, AND DUSTY HILLS: RHETORICAL CHRONOTOPES OF EXPANSION IN FULLER'S "THE GREAT LAWSUIT," *SUMMER ON THE LAKES, IN 1843*, AND *WOMAN IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY*

"I say, that what is limitless is alone divine"

(Margaret Fuller *Summer on the Lakes, in 1843*).

"For human beings are not so constituted that they can live without expansion. If they do not get it one way, they must another, or perish"

(Margaret Fuller *Woman in the Nineteenth Century*).

In *Woman Thinking: Feminism and Transcendentalism in Nineteenth-Century America*, Tiffany K. Wayne traces the intellectual history of feminism which extends from the works of Margaret Fuller. In particular, her detailed account of Caroline Healy Dall reveals that several rhetorical tropes of late-nineteenth century feminism can be found in "The Great Lawsuit" and *Woman in the Nineteenth Century*. Wayne's intellectual history of this moment in feminism makes a significant contribution to the rhetorical tradition by illuminating Fuller's legacy, and Wayne is certainly right to challenge, and correct, a historical record that identifies "Fuller as the only woman of

ideas associated with the movement” (6). Despite admitted leanings of scholarship toward Fuller, at the expense of other, equally committed and vocal nineteenth-century feminists, the historical record is still incomplete, especially regarding Fuller’s rhetorical strategies. Studies of Fuller have certainly advanced our appreciation for feminist rhetoric by examining her conversational style and her calls for social reform, but the field has not adequately explored how Fuller’s work helps us to consider a key question driving the discipline: How do dissenting voices successfully enter, and ultimately alter, hegemonic discourse?

Rhetorical analysis of Fuller’s writings generally understand her work according to her style or her objective; the former body of scholarship seeks to explain what others have denigrated as “interminable prattle” or criticized for its excessive allusions and indirect argument (Brownson 21). Given her self-avowed love of conversation, several studies recognize—indeed value—the conversational style of her prose. According to Capper, Fuller employed the literary dialogue frequently “because it kept open questions about which she felt ambivalent” (56); unlike the conventional essay, the dialogue resisted “round[ing] the piece into a whole by filling up the gaps” (Fuller qtd in Capper 56). We can see this commitment to open intellectual exchange throughout much of her writings. For William Stowe, Fuller was likewise drawn to the travel genre because it “allowed her to express in a single context the disparate aspects of her consciousness” (250), and Judith Bean’s linguistic analysis of the conversational elements in *Woman in the Nineteenth Century* reveals the rhetorical effects of Fuller’s style. Not only did her many discursive voices provide an apt vehicle for articulating alternate perspectives, but

they also “serve the purposes of her feminist work”: as Bean argues, “[h]er style creates involvement . . . establishes bonds of trust, initiates interaction with the reader and emphasizes immediacy” (29). In effect, Fuller’s style challenges discursive conventions and, therefore, challenges “the principles behind the organization of life” (29).

Other scholars have also recognized such sociopolitical dimensions and emphasize the ways in which her prose calls for social reform. Jeffrey Steele, for example, understands *Woman* as a call for women to “achieve self-reliance by transforming themselves” (282); for Steele, the site of transformation coincides with women’s grief over a lost sense of self-identity at the hands of an oppressive patriarchal culture. Steele’s essay recognizes that Fuller’s “numerous portraits” of “great women and powerful female types” presented to her readers “a gallery of ‘representative women’ who served as ontological templates mapping different images of female being” (286). Therefore, not only did her myriad voices recreate the appealing qualities of intellectual conversation, but her *choice* of voices reveals her objective to establish high standards of womanhood and promote women’s self-culture; her legacy as a central influence on first-wave feminism testifies to her effectiveness. Wayne asserts that “as a feminist, Fuller played a key role in opening up space, both theoretical and literal, for women to contemplate and discuss issues of gender and women’s social, cultural, and intellectual subordination” (17). Later she writes that *Woman in the Nineteenth Century* “provided a rhetorical and philosophical alternative to arguments promoting women’s education” which were based on the ideals of Republican Motherhood; Fuller found “a rhetorical way out of justifying education and increased opportunities in relational terms” and

asserted the relevance of self-culture to women's education (45). Joy Rouse also emphasizes the relevance of these two ideals to Fuller scholarship, and argues that Republican Motherhood, surprisingly, proved subversive, for it "challenged the public/private dichotomy of the separate spheres ideology . . . by politicizing motherhood" (113). The ideal of the patriotic maternal, then, was already available to Fuller as a means of advocating for women's rights, yet ultimately, it maintained separate spheres, however much it worked to expand the territory of women's private domain to consider public affairs. For Rouse, Fuller appropriated this dominant discourse for her own subversive agenda, specifically to argue "for a philosophy of women's education that would lead to their social and political involvement" (114). Regardless of perspective, the scholarship seems to agree that any account of Fuller's rhetoric must consider her writings within the context of dominant gender ideologies and the texts that articulate them. We will find that such discourses represented both a limitation and an opportunity for Fuller to establish different principles for establishing domestic ideals.

Additionally, scholars agree that Fuller's writings must be read against the backdrop of Transcendentalism in general and Emerson's brand of it in particular. David Robinson finds that *Woman in the Nineteenth Century* argues from the Transcendental platform of self culture, "or the continued spiritual growth of the soul" (84). He explains further that the Transcendentalists held that "character needed development not for its own sake but for the sake of a divine core of identity within the individual"; self-culture, therefore, did not imply a materialist, self-interested philosophy but one that, paradoxically, ultimately denied the self in order to "become absorbed into the larger will

of God" (85). Thus, Transcendentalists relied profoundly on the image of the "ideal man" both to represent that potential immanent in every human being and to motivate individuals to maintain their commitment to self-discovery. As Robinson explains, although Transcendental thought resisted social activism, viewing it as a distraction from individual development and reform, Fuller confronted a Transcendental dilemma when society and culture erected barriers preventing women's self-culture. Transcendentalism, then, provided a rationale and an ultimate end for Fuller, but she recognized that the material existence of the individual could not be ignored. According to Susan Belasco Smith, this time period in Fuller's life marked her "departure from Emersonian idealism" as she became more committed to a "life of action" as the necessary counterpart to the life of the mind (xviii). Despite its emphasis on self-growth and inward reflection, which Fuller certainly espoused, the Transcendental ideal proved insufficient because it failed to account for reality. Yet in its shortcomings, Fuller saw an opportunity to create an alternative ideal of selfhood.

Annette Kolodny, among others, recognizes the tremendous impact Fuller's work had on first-wave feminists especially, and characterizes her "conversational strategies" as "revolutionary and enduring" (377). We take for granted (and profoundly appreciate) that Fuller successfully challenged the deeply entrenched ideologies of separate spheres and Transcendental self-reliance, yet we should be taking greater pains to understand *how* she did so. Attention to style and argument reveals the end product, yet the canon also invites us to consider the process of invention and to consider not only a rhetor's available means but her *kairos*. The nature of such inquiry proves difficult, since we are

fundamentally attempting to understand an ultimately inaccessible event. While we cannot access her mind at the moment of creation, we can make reasonably confident assumptions about her discursive available means, and we can examine her rhetorical products for the chronotopes (time-space representations) that reveal how Fuller invented opportunities, or *kairos*, in order to present alternatives to hegemonic scripts. As Rouse observes, “many women used ideals of womanhood to position themselves as agents of the polis” (116) and Fuller, to a degree, is no exception. Her use of these ideals as a *kairos*, however, suggests that she sought outcomes far beyond civic participation. When applied to her early writings—“The Great Lawsuit,” *Summer on the Lakes, in 1843*, and *Woman in the Nineteenth Century*—chronotopic analysis reveals that Fuller regularly used chronotopes of expansion to reinterpret ideals of woman and Transcendental thought; even her choice of chronotopic theme reveals a creative use of dominant discourse, for the idea of westward expansion represented the “dominant political mood” of the 1840s (Belasco 79). Chronotopic analysis of her writings indicates that Fuller did not so much appropriate dominant discourses as use them as opportunities to advance a different kind of ideological base for all human beings.

Not only does chronotopic analysis make an important contribution to the discipline’s efforts to understand the unique qualities of the invention process, but this analytical method advances our appreciation for the relationship between “The Great Lawsuit” and *Woman in the Nineteenth Century*, and further explains the rhetorical purpose of *Summer on the Lakes, in 1843*. The 7th (and most recent) edition of the Norton Anthology of American Literature features this footnote to Fuller’s “The Great Lawsuit”:

“In 1844 Fuller published the revised, expanded version of this work under the title *Woman in the Nineteenth Century*, but the additions were *hardly more than padding*“ (emphasis added 1620). This claim is regrettable, for the revisions Fuller makes prove extremely revealing and significant. Despite the fact that nearly all of the original text of the *Dial* essay appears in *Woman*, the later publication adds over 50 pages, nearly doubling the original essay. Although much of the scholarship on the two documents stops short of dismissing the additions, there seems to be a general oversight of the nature of Fuller’s revisions; most scholars (with Capper as a notable exception) conflate the two and analyze them as one text, or they focus their critical attention on *Woman* without pointing out the ways in which it reflects a development of Fuller’s earlier thinking on the problem of women’s thwarted pursuit of self-culture. In short, *Woman* scholarship often ignores “The Great Lawsuit.” Given Fuller scholars’ apparent interest in plotting her development as a thinker, continued comparison of these two texts is essential. Chronotopic analysis demonstrates that Fuller’s revisions to the original essay are tremendously significant, and we must evaluate them as not only a more developed articulation of her argument but as an indication of the impact her travels during the summer of 1843 had on her understanding of women’s search for self-culture.

Her report of her summer travels also deserves further scrutiny. *Summer on the Lakes, in 1843* has often been analyzed in terms of the travel genre, an approach driven by the assumption that her primary objective was, in fact, to publish travel literature. Consequently, scholarship on *Summer on the Lakes* focuses on the ways in which it complies with conventions of travel literature, and, in some instances, how it takes

creative liberties. For example, William Stowe explores the ways in which Fuller takes advantage of the “genre’s broad adaptability” in order “to express in a single context the disparate aspects of her consciousness” as a thinker and social critic (242, 250). Sounding as different “voices” throughout the text, these myriad perceptions are “held together . . . by the simple fact that they coexist in the same text” (251). Another body of scholarship values the social criticism of Fuller’s travel piece and attends to the ways in which she captures the not dissimilar plights of Native Americans, women, and slaves. Finally, many recognize the importance of *Summer on the Lakes* as a reflection of Fuller’s inward exploration, especially as she finds herself “in conflict with an Emersonian view of the world” (Smith xviii). Such studies certainly address significant dimensions of this text, but the rhetorical aspects of *Summer on the Lakes* are underexamined, as is the relationship of the travel piece to the philosophic tracts which bookend it. When considered rhetorically, and in terms of her preoccupation with expansion, *Summer on the Lakes* proves more than a book of Fuller’s travels, both outward and inward; likewise, it is more than a purposeful rendering of “the discourses, the hum and buzz, of culture” (Schriber 129). The genre of travel literature presents a *kairos*, an opportunity for Fuller to interrogate actively the principles she outlines in “The Great Lawsuit” and clarifies in *Woman in the Nineteenth Century*. If we do not illuminate the important relationship between these three utterances, we miss a significant dimension of Fuller’s rhetorical method and objective.

Analysis of the ways in which Fuller represents time and space in these writings reveals a clear pattern: Fuller sought to expand, not only the literal space of the present

moment for women, but the entire woman question and approved discourses that had so encased the issue as to stifle alternative views and possibilities. Throughout her letters and published works, she uses various expansion chronotopes to characterize the problem and offer a solution; further, she not only relies on such time-space representations in the content, but she practices an expansive rhetorical method: in a rather significant sense, her medium is profoundly reflective of her message. Letters written to various individuals from 1842-1844, when she was working on her feminist tracts and travel book, provide valuable insights into this method and her deep desire to correspond more intimately with nature, especially those elements that suggest great depth or height. In an 1842 letter written to her brother Richard, she reveals a strong connection with the “bolder lines in the manuscript of nature,” and expresses her desire that her “lot had been cast amid the sources of the streams, where the voice of the hidden torrent is heard by night, where the eagle soars, and the thunder resounds in long peals. . . [O]nly in some scenes, and with some people, can I expand and feel myself at home” (Hudspeth 3.81). That same month, she refers to “the fathomless lake of my existence” and in November of the same year characterizes friendship as an opportunity to “permit the soul to flow, beneath the open sky” (3.90, 3.99). Clearly, nature represents a vast expanse with which Fuller identifies spiritually, yet her letters also indicate situations in which she feels disconnected from this world and her fellow humans. She expresses a wish to “bring before [Elizabeth Hoar] the varied world-scene,” a wish “never permitted even where I wished it most” (3.48). A letter to Mary Rotch reveals the distance Fuller feels between herself and productive thinking, a relationship she describes in terms of “great subjects

lying mountainous and distant as ever in the horizon” (3.62), and a letter to Emerson invokes a revealing tension between the “affectionate expansions of my heart” and the “pallid and narrow” quality of her “daily life” (3.96).

Given Transcendental privileging of the natural world, Fuller’s consistent use of such metaphors is neither surprising nor revolutionary; however, the ways in which she balances such idealized representations of sublime nature with the constrictions, barriers, and obstacles she encounters on her way to spiritual growth are tremendously revealing and noteworthy. More importantly, the Transcendental premise of nature as a metaphor for the soul becomes decidedly more complicated in Fuller’s writings, which capture her frustrated efforts to pursue an ideal that gradually but undeniably proves untenable—or, at the least, insufficient. Fuller’s lived experiences reveal to her the limitations of Transcendental philosophy, yet she uses these same tenets to expand the ideal in order to bring it closer to reality. “The Great Lawsuit: Man versus Men. Woman versus Women” represents her first major effort to forge a more productive relationship between the two dimensions—as well as the two sexes.

Few scholars have attended specifically to this text, choosing instead to focus on the “final draft” of *Woman in the Nineteenth Century*, but Charles Capper’s biography aids our efforts to appreciate “The Great Lawsuit” on its own merits and from its own unique time and space of creation. Published in the July 1843 issue of the *Dial*, “The Great Lawsuit” registers Fuller’s response to a rather rich debate ensuing about women’s experience. Directly relevant to her essay, separate spheres ideology seemed at its most intense, with 1841 witnessing the publication of Catherine Beecher’s *Treatise of*

Domestic Economy, a text promoting women's sphere as necessary to a democratic and Christian life. In the spirit of protecting national interests, Beecher demands that "certain relations be sustained, which involve the duties of subordination," and she justifies such deference by claiming that women enjoy the privilege of choosing their respective masters: "No woman is forced to obey any husband but the one she chooses for herself; nor is she obliged to take a husband if she prefers to remain single" (26). She quotes de Tocqueville at length, beginning with his comparison of America's democracy with other countries' apparent experiments in equality, which he derides: "It may readily be conceived that, by *thus* attempting to make one sex equal to the other, both are degraded; and from so preposterous a medley of the works of Nature, nothing could ever result, but weak men and disorderly women" (qtd in Beecher 28). Beecher's *Treatise* endorses separate spheres as a necessary condition of national greatness, and she recommends that woman not only accept her place but value the paradox of her submissive sociopolitical role and superior moral status. In his account of domesticity as one of Fuller's key discursive influences, Capper claims that "Fuller was not so far from Beecher: both sought to advance the intellectual autonomy of women without *either calling for their political activity or challenging their social subordination*" (emphasis added 108). He later notes that Fuller's essay is both "a wide-ranging discussion . . . of the modern debate over women's nature and status" and a "philosophical text founded on a particular liberal Romantic ideology of inward and outward freedom" (111), again suggesting that "The Great Lawsuit" makes no suggestion of collective action.

Analysis of the rhetorical chronotopes in “The Great Lawsuit” (as well as several rhetorical analyses of *Woman*), however, suggests that Fuller *did* recognize the relevance of civic participation to advancing women’s freedom to pursue self-culture, even if she privileged the individual over the collective. However much her essay emphasizes the importance of the individual, Fuller clearly recognizes that women’s spiritual freedom can only be achieved by removing the sociopolitical and cultural barriers that inhibit intellectual and spiritual exploration. Further, as her title explicitly indicates, Fuller does not limit the scope of her essay to women but includes men as well—and her argument, significantly, directly opposes de Tocqueville’s; rather than “degrade” both, removing barriers to women’s self-culture ensures the full humanity of both sexes. The limitations of separate spheres ideology, then, provides Fuller with an opportunity to reinterpret not so much the literal domain of the sphere but the metaphysical scope of the domestic ideal which that “sphere” is meant to delimit.

In order to offer an alternate interpretation of women’s sphere, Fuller expands the time and space conventionally associated with it. When we compare, for example, Beecher’s first lines with those of Fuller’s, we find that the former begins with specifically American time and space; her book is dedicated “To American Women,” and her first line reads, “[t]here are some reasons why American women should feel an interest in the support of the democratic institutions of their country, which it is important that they should consider” (25). She establishes a chronotope of the American present, and much of the text is oriented toward an ideal American future. Beecher’s introductory section presents de Tocqueville as witness to the sound practice of “applying to the sexes

the great principle of political economy” (28), a rhetorical move again based on an immediate chronotope of the present. Fuller, in contrast, begins “The Great Lawsuit” with a subtitle that establishes a drastically more expansive scope, and a first line that reads “[t]his great suit has been carried on for many ages, with various results” (1620). The difference is instructive; Fuller introduces her treatment of the debate over women’s role not within the immediate present of America, but within the “ages” of human history. The first several paragraphs make use of expanded time and space—the speaker is concerned not with American prosperity, but with bringing the *planet* “into conscious harmony with the law of [the universe] spirit”; she does not narrow her focus to applaud America’s greatness but *man’s*, in the historic forms of “heroes,” “sages and lawgivers,” “poets and priests.” Only after establishing an expansive tapestry of human history as the context for considering women’s experience, does she shift to a chronotope of the present: in the eighth paragraph, she writes: “And now, no mere glimmering consciousness but a certainty is felt and spoken, that the highest ideal man can form of his own capabilities is that which he is destined to attain” (1622). Her rhetoric here resonates rather harmoniously with Beecher’s, but she has situated the present as a moment within a grand history, as a part of a whole. Additionally, some of her early references to America carry the sting of criticism: she describes a “national independence . . . blurred by the servility of individuality,” and characterizes the “free American [who] so often feels himself free . . . only to pamper his appetites” (1625). Despite these obvious failings, “still,” she admits, “it is not in vain, that the verbal statement has been made, ‘All men are born free and equal’. There it stands, a golden certainty” (1625). By

placing America's potential within this historical context, Fuller creates a different perspective of the debate over women's place. At once, we can see she has expanded the context, and she will continue to punch through the constructed walls of women's sphere in order to demonstrate that the significance of the question far exceeds the needs and opinions of nineteenth-century America.

Indeed, after situating the time-space of nineteenth-century America within the vast expanse of human history and cultures, she establishes two meaningful chronotopes to characterize and challenge the narrowness of current thinking. After referring negatively to those individuals whose opinions are so rigidly entrenched that they cannot "admit of any new light," and mocking the efforts of those who "mark out with due precision the limits of women's sphere and women's mission," Fuller adopts a position of supposed neutrality. In doing so, she adopts a domestic chronotope: "Let us look upon the subject from that point of view which to-day offers. No better, it is to be feared, than a high house-top. A high hill-top, or at least a cathedral spire, would be desirable" (1627). These few lines, if understood as shifting chronotopes, or perspectives, prove incredibly telling. The only position a woman can take in order to consider her own position is...the very sphere she wishes to interrogate. A perspective derived from nature or religion might prove more productive, but these are unavailable to her. Ironically, Fuller finds a way to achieve the most expansive perspective possible from her domestic cell: through books. Human history, as codified in literature, is at once within and without the domestic space, so that it is in the library where Fuller finds *kairos* within the domestic ideal to challenge it.

In addition to human thought as recorded in books, Fuller draws upon personal experience and common knowledge of her time period to catalogue the two sides of the debate; she compares women's experience to that of slaves, and references "innumerable instances" of lazy men preying on their wives. Yet she contextualizes these present details within historical attitudes that designate women as inferior in order to reassert the historical context of the contemporary debate, and after a brief speculation on the conditions that would make a better future for women—a passage in which she refers to "elevated thought and feeling," opportunities to "grow" and "live freely and unimpeded," to "unfold powers" and "allowed the free and full employment" of them (1629)—Fuller returns her gaze to the past. Again, she surveys the historical field and expands the discursive space to include the voice of her alter-ego Miranda, the poetry of Ben Jonson and Schiller, Christian Scripture, and Greek Mythology. Her purpose in doing so is two-fold: she at once reveals "obstructions [which] impede this good era" she desires, yet her myriad references demonstrate that "the Idea of woman has not failed to be often and forcibly represented" (1629, 1635). Her catalog of examples is significant: unlike Beecher's account of women's duties, as they define and circumscribe her present sphere, Fuller invokes several images of feminine *ideals* and in doing so performs another rhetorical expansion: unlike many feminists, who sought to expand the domain of the domestic to allow women more opportunities, Fuller virtually dismisses the sphere as a legitimate organizing scheme and seeks instead to revise and expand the notion of Woman itself. Furthermore, this ideal is closely tied to reality; significantly, she refers to real historical women such as Emily Plater, Queen Isabella, Mrs. Jameson, as evidence of

women who represent the hopes she has for spiritual freedom for all women. Only after taking her roof-top perspective and surveying history for precedent does she assert her argument: women do not want to be adored by men, powerful over men, or richer than men—any advocates for women’s rights who make such claims “have not searched deeply into the need.” Instead, she claims: [i]t is for that which at once includes all these and precludes them. . . . It is for that which is the birthright of every being capable to receive it,—the freedom, the religious, the intelligent freedom of the universe, to use its means, to learn its secrets as far as nature has enabled them, with God alone for their guide and judge” (1636). If there is a sphere to be admitted in Fuller’s view, it is the cosmos, not the American household. Better to abandon the idea of a prescriptive sphere altogether and seek in nature the catalyst for achieving one’s better—even best—self.

Given that Fuller wrapped up her final edits of “The Great Lawsuit” while planning a summer exploration of the Great Lakes, it seems impossible not to hear, within these lines, a sense of anticipation and hope for her own quest for divine freedom. Although *Summer on the Lakes, in 1843* has “always defied easy classification,” (Smith vii), it is conventionally and conveniently understood to follow the travelogue genre; it represents Fuller’s reaction to her exploration of the Great Lakes, beginning with Niagara Falls, eventually winding through some Illinois prairie, up Lake Michigan and returning to Buffalo. William Stowe remarks that the genre’s “loose conventions provided an excellent framework for her own eclectic style,” a style which also, whenever possible, invited myriad voices into a so-called conversation (242-3). The genre invites dialogue and tolerates loose ends, so that Fuller’s text, which is as much (if not more) an

intellectual exploration as a geographical one, does not register as unconventional. Other scholars, however, such as Michaela Brucker Cooper and Joan Burbeck import more significance to the specific content of the various texts Fuller interweaves; though they examine *Summer on the Lakes* from different perspectives, they share a feminist lens, recognizing how the experience of travel could “unsettle” a woman (Burbeck 67), provoking anxiety “about her own tenuous position” (Cooper 173). Thus, her travelogue reveals great insights regarding woman’s experience in mid-nineteenth century America.

However, Fuller’s text reveals even more; in addition to its value as a rich account of a region of America, a social commentary on the sad plight of the Native Americans, and a critical analysis of women’s frontier experience, *Summer on the Lakes* also offers a broader perspective: by virtue of revealing Fuller’s internal struggle with Transcendentalism, the travel book presents an opportunity to test the argument of the “The Great Lawsuit.” When we discern the ways in which she utilizes expansive and constrictive chronotopes, we not only better understand *why* she became frustrated with Emersonian Transcendentalism, but we see the rationale for the revisions she makes to her own philosophy, which becomes codified in the revisions that constitute *Woman in the Nineteenth Century*.

For Fuller, the litmus test regarding a woman’s spiritual growth was the degree to which she was in harmony with nature, whether human, mineral, organic, or divine. The problem with separate spheres, as with all false constructs, was the obstructions such ideologies erected that prevented women from pursuing their true callings—whatever they may be, and wherever they may lead. Just as “The Great Lawsuit” revealed that she

held “ideal” to be a relative, and ultimately very personal concept, *Summer on the Lakes* complicates the space of the natural world, especially the American West, and the clusters of expansion/constriction chronotopes in her travel book indicate that Fuller’s sense of a monolithic and transcendent Nature were challenged by her travels. In the very first chapter, “Niagara, June 10, 1843,” Fuller describes altered positions from which to view the Niagara Falls, even though her title suggests a single experience. The central problem seems to be one of distance. She describes Niagara as the “original” of which she had seen copies (an experiential distance) and as a “picture” seen from afar (a physical distance). She also describes different psychic distances from this natural object: she backs away in fear; she moves so close that “all power of observing details, all separate consciousness was quite lost” (5); she shares the space with objects (a man spitting, buildings) that obtrude on her efforts to experience Niagara. Each space represents a different chronotope, and significantly, these immediate Niagara chronotopes dialogue to suggest a complex time-space representation of Nature. Given her purpose “to woo the mighty meaning of the scene” (18), her aesthetic representations of Niagara reveal the difficulties she encountered in trying to commune with Nature in order to interpret her unique relationship to it. Paradoxically, the more she approached the physical space occupied by the object of her contemplation, the more diminished her ability to contemplate it. Niagara Falls is not the only site that provokes a pause; in her excursion to the prairies as well, Fuller finds that her first impression is “of the very desolation of dullness,” an effect only to be corrected once she has ”learn[ed] to look at it by its own standard” (22). In other words, every reality has its unique ideal.

This principle becomes especially relevant when we consider Fuller's accounts of the various homes she encounters in her travels; the chronotope of the prairie house reveals her preoccupation with expansion at the same time that it tempers it. She devotes considerable attention to describing the degree to which the home exists in harmony with Nature: in Illinois, "this habitation of man seemed like a nest in the grass, so thoroughly were the buildings and all the objects of human care harmonized with what was natural" (24) in comparison to "dwellings of the new settlers which showed plainly that they had no thought beyond satisfying the grosses material wants" (29). A log cabin at Rock River seemed "the model of a Western villa. Nature had laid out before it grounds which could not be improved" and the interior featured a "female taste [that] had veiled every rudeness" (36). Consistently, Fuller commends those manifestations of Western expansion that create or sustain a harmony with Nature, and criticizes those individuals who seem oblivious to the beauty around them. The frontier home becomes an even more complex symbol for harmonious existence when Fuller begins to share her observations about the uniquely unpleasant existence of frontier wives; her discussion of their plight has gained a fair voicing in the scholarship, but it's important to recognize its place in a larger discussion. In chapter three especially, Fuller discusses "the unfitness of women" as a disharmony that results from misguided socialization—from a faulty ideal; presumably, the same advice found in the domestic manuals prevalent during this time is culpable for putting frontier women at a disadvantage. Significantly, the solution is education, but an education "planned by persons of sufficient thought to meet the wants of the place and time" (39) and designed to allow humans to "carry out [their] own plans

without obliterating those of nature” (38). The experience of witnessing humans living both in and out of harmony with nature made quite an impression on Fuller, and we can see evidence that she expanded its relevance to human relations throughout the book.

Arguably, the sections of *Summer* depicting her actual travels occurred “first,” with the additional discursive layers either coinciding with or following the actual experience of her tour of the Great Lakes. She admits on occasion that “circumstances made it necessary for me to . . . read all the books I could find about the region,” during her travels, while she refers another time to reading books in Harvard library after she had returned in order “to go over the ground with them” (Hudspeth 3.160). Chapters six and seven reflect her research, but more importantly, the specific works and details she catalogs have a function similar to her multiple renderings of the natural sites: including the stories of the Native Americans presents the reader with the necessary collection of perspectives in order to judge them “by their own standards” (*Summer* 144), with the optimistic intent to promote better harmony between the two peoples. Her various accounts of misguided marriages serve a similar purpose: to show the dire consequences of ignoring the unique qualities and lived experiences of each individual, who must have the freedom and preparation to explore and live according to her own nature. Although she draws upon a variety of sources and encounters, Fuller’s repeatedly represents exemplars of both harmony and disharmony, and the lesson drawn seems to be one about the *limits* of expansion; building one’s house as a nest, or educating one’s child to play guitar and milk cows, or learning about Native American culture all demonstrate a conscientious, a *connected* expansion of one’s own time and space that is ever mindful of

the Other. Even more, her reflections on the summer of 1843 seem to indicate a new understanding of Romantic self-culture: the Self cannot grow if it attempts to negate, disregard, or dream away the Other.

In *Woman in the Nineteenth Century*, published less than a year after *Summer on the Lakes*, Fuller shares her formula for helping women make ethical use of freedom: “thought urg[es] action, and action lead[s] to the evolution of still better thought” (95). This description aptly characterizes the relationship between “The Great Lawsuit,” *Summer on the Lakes*, and *Woman in the Nineteenth Century*, and suggests that the revised and extended version of her *Dial* essay presents an opportunity for Fuller to articulate some improved thoughts on women’s situation. Although the general argument promoting women’s right to intellectual and spiritual freedom abides, the additional material reveals her travels and other experiences that have grounded her in nineteenth-century realities. Capper, one of the few Fuller scholar who explicitly addresses the differences between “The Great Lawsuit” and *Woman*, attributes much of the new content to “her year and a half of rising outrage over racial and gender bigotry” (177), and in his detailed analysis, he plots the many personal experiences that influenced Fuller’s understanding of the debate. He observes that the first half of *Woman* preserves with minimal alteration the content of the essay, and argues that when Fuller does elaborate or revise a passage, she does so in order to “[darken] her portrayal of male prejudice” (177). According to Capper, the material unique to *Woman* contributes “new illustrations of complex portrayals of women in the Western canon” and attends more

directly to gender practices. Clearly, the new content reveals Fuller's growing appreciation for the intimate relationship between the ideal and the real.

Just as the title of the *Dial* essay established a governing chronotope, specifically of the grand expanse of history, so too does *Woman* reflect an overarching temporal-spatial quality; yet this title addresses the historical *reality* of women's current situation. As Capper explains, in *Woman* Fuller attends more explicitly to gender practices, which she represents with newspaper clippings, references to feminist tracts, and an extended polemic against cultural double standards that enable prostitution (180-83). Here, her "feet step firmly on the ground," as she employs more focused rhetorical chronotopes of the present (*Summer* 64). For example, in the original essay, Fuller presents the literary dialogue between her persona and the "sorrowful trader" who laments the changes that would take his wife away from "her own sphere" (1627). After correcting his erroneous claim regarding his right to control his wife, Fuller writes, "Many women are considering within themselves, what they need that they have not, and what they can have, if they find they need it. Many men are considering whether women are capable of being and having more than they are and have, *and*, whether , if so, it will be best to consent to improvement in their condition" (1627). In the next paragraph, she moves immediately to more generalizations about "the numerous party . . . [who] strive . . . to mark out with precision the limits of woman's sphere and woman's mission" (1627). In the original essay, Fuller unmistakably refers to the present situation, yet her rhetorical chronotopes establish a generalized sense of contemporary time and space; here, the pervasive cultural milieu is *kairic*, and prompts Fuller to raise a central question about who should decide

what women need. In *Woman*, we see different rhetorical chronotopes reinforce, even alter the context of the question.

The trader is no longer sorrowful; he is “irritated.” So, it seems, is Fuller. Following her passage addressing women’s consideration of what they might need, and men’s concerns about whether or not they should consent, Fuller narrows from the generalized present to “this morning.” In the new passages, she shares detailed excerpts of items not only in an American newspaper, but in a German one as well. The items reveal women’s issues as “newsworthy.” From the close-up chronotope of the morning—which immediately establishes not only a sense of immediacy but of the reality of women’s lived experience (it is *her* morning, her newspaper, her experience)—she expands to “[t]he past year” and describes “action in the “Rhode-Island [sic] legislature, to secure married women rights over their own property” (12). Before picking up the original thread regarding those generalized others who attempt to “mark out... women’s sphere,” she remarks, “These symptoms of the times have come under my view quite accidentally: one who seeks, may, each month or week, collect more” (12). Here, again, the rhetorical chronotope is significant. Fuller situates herself as someone who is *not* seeking such items; she is stationary, presumably at home (where she belongs) reading her mail and the newspaper. The situation regarding women’s experiences has become so ubiquitous that it proves impossible to ignore; further, despite her own efforts to live the solitary life, to practice Transcendental ideals, this added material demonstrates a new *kairos*: political reality intrudes on efforts to achieve one’s ideal (whether intellectual, domestic, or otherwise). Although Fuller personally prefers to live according to

standards different from those espoused by Beecher, she obviously recognizes that the current situation imposes unacceptable restrictions on *all* women, even those who accept the ideology of separate spheres. With this one passage, Fuller crafts a richer representation of the present era, and in doing so, demonstrates her own commitment to advocating for all women, regardless of the ideals they pursue.

This same passage also hints at another rhetorical expansion, one that appears to have garnered little attention in the scholarship. Although Fuller's title suggests that she has narrowed her attention to Woman only, some of the added content indicates that she seeks to articulate more explicitly an ideal man, one whose presence is necessary if woman is to experience her own freedom. Late in *Summer on the Lakes*, Fuller makes brief reference to the kind of man who would "revere" the "rare nature" of a woman who resisted her "appointed lot," and asks, "When will this country have such a man? It is what she needs; no thin Idealist, no coarse Realist, but a man whose eye reads the heavens while his feet step firmly on the ground" (64). Here, she admits that, "as such men come not so often as once an age, their presence should not be absolutely needed to sustain life," but her Preface to *Woman* indicates that women's efforts to pursue life more fully not only require a particular kind of man but will help to bring him forth: "the development of one cannot be effected with that of the other" (1). The passage examined above, in which Fuller enumerates evidence that Woman is newsworthy, hints at her growing awareness of man's relevance to nineteenth-century woman's self-culture. Although Fuller doesn't fully develop this thread until later, she expresses her approval (undoubtedly with a male readership in mind) of the Rhode-Island legislature who

“showed that a very little examination of the subject could teach them much” (12).

Presumably, her very text can prove instructive for those men who are likewise committed to careful examination of the issue under discussion.

As Capper notes, the first half of *Woman* intensifies negative images of men, providing her readers with rather unequivocal cautions about the kinds of behaviors that warrant criticism and reform. But just as she presents images of strong women, *real* women, who, whatever their human foibles, represent the good that comes of women’s freedom to pursue their unique divine callings, she also recognizes specific men who, in valuing strong women, recommend themselves as models for other men to follow. For example, her reference to Emily Plater certainly attests to the character of the woman, but Fuller curiously inserts another perspective—that of Plater’s biographer, whom she counts as an example of “the nobler sort [of men who] viewed [Plater] with a tender enthusiasm worthy of her. ‘Her name’ said her biographer, ‘is known throughout Europe. I paint her character that she may be as widely loved’” (20). In this passage, Fuller does not quote the direct words of Plater herself, only the male biographer, and only when we discern chronotopes can we understand that Fuller, by including him, creates an additional time-space, an alternate perspective from which to view her real, ideal woman. Some might interpret this move as evidence of Fuller’s ultimate complicity with the status quo—Plater should not “need” a man to approve her. But because Fuller has established clearly her philosophical commitment to promoting the interrelationship between woman and man, her inclusion of the male biographer advances her cause: they exist in a kind of dialogic relationship, with her excellence a motivation for his love and

admiration. In the next passage, Fuller grants that “No! man is not willingly ungenerous. He wants faith and love, because he is not yet himself an elevated being” (21); again, we see Fuller expand the scope of the problem to include the shortcomings of real men, while she concomitantly offers suggestions for how he might improve himself.

Fuller’s rhetorical expansion can be found throughout her text, codified in her references to a host of cultures and various thinkers; although she grants a distinction between literary representations of woman and the potentially less romantic “facts of daily life,” her examples reveal the historical persistence of ideals that bear on the specific experiences of nineteenth-century women and men. She asserts that “Germany did not need to *learn* a high view of woman; it was inborn in that race,” and she reviews three ballads that demonstrate a “high view of woman, of marriage” (28-9). Despite the realities Greek women experienced, Xenophon “caught glimpses of the ideal woman” even as he was “aiming at the ideal man” (30), and after relating in detail his account of Cyrus, Abradatus, and Panthea, she writes, “there is no way that men sin more against refinement, as well as discretion, than in their conduct towards their wives. Let them look at the men of Xenophon” (49). In a lengthy description of thinkers whom she identifies as “prophets of the coming age,” she first describes the work of Swedenborg; she admits that he has some old-fashioned notions but concludes that “his idea of woman is sufficiently large and noble to interpose no obstacle to her progress” (66). Likewise, Fourier “places woman on an entire equality with man,” and Fuller recommends his writings for their insights into woman’s economic needs and options, so that “she might dignify and unfold her life for her own happiness and that of society” (66). Finally,

Goethe, “by continual efforts at self-culture, takes as good care of women as of men,” and Fuller applauds these men in particular for “educating the age to a clearer consciousness of what man needs, what man can be, and better life must ensue” (67). Thus, Fuller offers models of hopeful men to complement her more emphatic portrayal of liberated women. Each of these references—and myriad others—exists within its own rhetorical time-space, and while some readers balk at the tremendous deluge of perspectives Fuller gathers within the covers of *Woman*, her rhetorical expansion of the topic complements her message.

In “The Great Lawsuit,” we found that Fuller assumed a roof-top perspective, but in *Woman*, we find that she has gained the other vantage points she desired: “a high hill-top” and a “cathedral spire” (12). In the new material that marks the second half of *Woman*, Fuller explicitly shifts rhetorical chronotopes from the domestic to the sermonic, and her stated purpose for doing so is to make her meaning “sufficiently clear” (92). Fuller informs her reader of the pending change in authorial chronotope: “As I am anxious to leave no room for doubt, I shall venture to retrace, once more, the scope of my design in points, as was done in old-fashioned sermons” (92). The prose that follows is, indeed, more direct, more conventional, and for those of her readers who suffered through her looser, conversational, expansive style for the previous 91 pages, the last six likely prove more familiar and appropriate. The rhetorical chronotope of the cathedral spire symbolizes another *kairos*: women such as Maria Stewart and Angelina Grimké had used the sermonic form to challenge dogma and justify public speaking on moral grounds. Gesturing toward the cathedral, then, invokes this subversive rhetorical

strategy, but it also maintains the expansive effect she has created, as it raises her perspective from the pulpit to a higher vantage point from which she can better survey the land. Additionally, because she demonstrates the rhetorical ability to employ a more direct—and more masculine—organizational scheme for laying out her argument, those who interpreted her deliberate conversational style as a sign of Fuller’s inferior writing skills stand corrected: the preceding conversational discussion was obviously deliberate and intentional, despite critics’ “implausible conjectures” to the contrary (Kolodny 359). Clearly, she perceived the contemporary debate regarding women’s place as a conversation engaging every age of human history, and she identified in the ideals of domesticity and transcendentalism an opportunity to interject. Her rhetorical method reinforced her message that both ideals needed not only to be re(de)fined but profoundly expanded to include the realities of everyday women *and* men.

Finally, in her last few paragraphs, Fuller writes “I stand in the sunny noon of life. . . Every spot is seen, every chasm revealed. Climbing the dusty hill, some fair effigies that once stood for symbols of human destiny have been broken. . . Yet enough is left . . . to point distinctly to the glories of that destiny; faint, but not to be mistaken streaks of the future day” (97-8). In this powerful closing image, Fuller situates herself in a present that marks the “middle” of the day of human history; from this natural vantage point, she surveys the remains of the past and glimpses the promises of the future. It is a fitting image for a rhetorical piece that attempts to capture, within the binding of a slim book, an account of humankind’s efforts to achieve the “era of a truly human life” (5). This chronotope also situates her in a transcendental pose, yet her attention is on the course of

human affairs, not directed inward to reflect solely on her own destiny—she has assumed a perspective that has transcended the immediate concerns of the present day to consider the grander scheme of human destiny. She has moved from her rooftop, from a separate spheres construct, to adopt a position that privileges her life as she experiences it, and she has expanded her transcendental gaze to include the dusty ground, the spots, the chasms.

Fuller scholarship has established a solid foundation for attempting more nuanced understandings of her rhetorical methods and process of invention. The two dominant trends that attend to her conversational style and reform objectives remain discrete until we use a critical lens that magnifies the rhetorical chronotopes codifying the *kairos* giving rise to her writings; with chronotopes, we are able to recognize the interrelationship between the conversational style and reform project—the overarching time-space of expansion includes both. Her particular formula for reform required an expansion not of women's domestic sphere, but of the very notion of a feminine ideal; first, and foremost, Fuller sought to expand a monolithic and transcendent feminine ideal to promote a more pluralistic, individualized, and immediate notion of ideals that were intimately tied to the realities of a woman's lived experience. She might have articulated this directly, but her natural approach to self-culture was to bring many voices into dialogue, a rhetorical version of showing rather than telling, so she not only expands the ideal, she expands discursive space to include multiple perspectives weighing in.

As Kolodny observes, Fuller invented a “discourse appropriate to feminism,” predicated on “a collaborative process of assertion and response in which multiple voices could—and did—find a place” (375). The scholarship leaves no doubt that her

conversational style was neither accidental nor undirected: she chose a style and pursued objectives that complemented her epistemological and ontological views. Filtering her writings through chronotopic analysis adds another layer to the scholarship by advancing our understanding of *how* her style and objectives mutually inform each other and her rhetorical strategies. Fuller employed a conversational style because she wanted women to participate in day's important conversations, yet she also wanted to impress upon her readers the necessity of open exchange over authoritarianism, not out of a sense of propriety but because Fuller understood the dialogic relationship between Self and Other. However, not all voices sounded equally, and a final observation further elucidates Fuller's method. Fuller clearly critiques the separate spheres ideology as espoused, for example, by Catherine Beecher, yet nowhere in "The Great Lawsuit" or *Woman* does she specifically refer to Beecher or quote her text. Similarly, Fuller challenges the myopic preoccupation of Self recommended by Emerson's self-reliance, yet nowhere does she quote him. Instead, she draws upon their writings to *create* representative voices, no doubt recognized as suggestive of a separate spheres or transcendental view, but not connected with a specific individual. That Fuller deliberately chose to quote some individuals, such as J.Q. Adams, and not Beecher or Emerson, might also be understood within the master chronotope of expansion. If she had focused on the individuals, she might have missed the opportunity to address a way of thinking; again, we find evidence that her concern is not with individuals, but with restrictive ideals that constrain women and "obstruct the holy work that is to make the earth a part of heaven" (*Woman* 1).

CHAPTER V

A VIEW FROM THE BALCONY: RHETORICAL CHRONOTOPES OF THE ROAD IN FULLER'S *DISPATCHES FROM EUROPE*

“We have waited her long in the dust; we are tired and hungry, but the triumphal procession must appear at last” (Margaret Fuller, *Woman in the Nineteenth Century*).

“Meanwhile, let us proceed as we can, picking our steps along the slippery road. If we keep in the right direction, what matters it that we must pass through so much mud?” (Margaret Fuller, “New Year’s Day”).

In her earlier writings, Margaret Fuller seeks an elevated position, a strategic perspective, in order to consider “the subject from the best point of view which to-day offers” (*Woman* 12), a rhetorical strategy we find she continues to follow throughout her career as a journalist. Given her commitment to Romanticism and its careful consideration of the Other, her consistent practice of deferring judgment until she “knows the scene” makes sense; she acts in accord with her principles. As a critic, whether social or literary, Fuller proceeds from the assumption that “we must learn to look at [a new form of life] by its own standard,” so that her first task is to find the best perspective (*Summer* 22). In her explicitly feminist writings, she situates herself on a roof-top, and later on cathedral spires and hilltops, in order to survey human history from particular

ideological stances; her various perches symbolized her rhetorical strategy to create novel perspectives from familiar spaces. In the social criticism she writes from Europe, especially during the Italian Revolution, we discern a similar penchant for the proverbial birds-eye view, as she consistently describes the action or events from a balcony, a loggia, or window. Her objective, however, is significantly different. In the texts that constitute *These Sad but Glorious Days: Dispatches from Europe, 1845-50*, she pursues not so much a historical survey as an advantageous view of the present as it is represented by the people. Here, we have her attention focused on the masses, rather than the exemplars of human history; as with her earlier writings, she seeks entrance into mainstream discourses in order to articulate unconventional views, but in her journalism, it is the Romantic project of nationalism that presents an opportunity for a woman journalist to privilege her perspective on public events and their relevance to the immediate future.

Fuller began writing for the *New York Tribune* during the fall of 1844, and although she considers that she might instead “produce something excellent,” she recognizes the opportunity “to aid in the great work of mutual education” through journalism (Hudspeth 6.359). As Judith Bean and Joel Myerson explain, her writings during this time clearly indicate a transformation from her earlier days as editor of the *Dial*; while in Boston, Fuller had resisted “direct association with ‘radical’ groups such as the abolitionist societies,” but her writings for the *Tribune* reveal “an increased understanding of the opportunities for political action” (xv). When Marcus and Rebecca Spring offered her the chance to travel with them in Europe as a nanny for their son,

Fuller took advantage of the opportunity that had long eluded her, and Horace Greeley, *Tribune* editor, arranged for Fuller to work as a foreign correspondent. She traveled with the Spring family for one year, then separated from them to immerse herself in Italian culture; she lived in Naples, Rome, and Florence for extended periods of time, witnessed the fall of Rome during the revolution, fell in love and gave birth to a son. Throughout these intense personal events, she wrote 37 “letters” to Horace Greeley for publication in the *Tribune*; although these dispatches often relate eyewitness accounts of events overseas, they should not be understood strictly as news stories, for her intent is not to *report* but to *interpret* the events she observes. As Reynolds and Smith explain, “[t]hough other reporters often witnessed events that fuller missed, her classical education, her comprehensive study of Jefferson’s writings, and her acute historical consciousness gave her coverage exceptional richness and depth” (2). Because of the dispatches’ obvious aesthetic qualities, they describe the collection as Fuller’s “finest literary achievement” and consider it “far above the level of ordinary journalism” (2). As they note, her dispatches reveal a Romantic predilection for the heroic and for literary forms, so that in her writing she often “conflate[ed] art and life” (12). The timeless aesthetic quality of these letters is undeniable, but they also have great significance for feminist rhetorical projects that want to pay tribute to the efforts of women who have played a role in the construction of human history.

Despite the novelty of a woman journalist, and the obvious rhetorical qualities of both journalistic prose and the epistolary genre, rhetorical analysis of Fuller’s dispatches is meager. When Fuller scholars do attend to the rhetorical qualities of these

later writings, they generally analyze her style, especially as it complements the travel writing genre. As with her earlier texts, studies of *These Sad but Glorious Days* devotes considerable attention to recognizing the conversational style of her journalism; for Heidi Kolk, who understands the dispatches as examples of travel writing, Fuller's "tropes of suffering" characterize the most noteworthy conversational tone. Kolk's analysis focuses on the tension that arises between Fuller's "angry attacks on her fellow-travelers and readers" and her obvious "capitulat[ions] to the most well-worn clichés of the genre"; according to Kolk, Fuller ambivalently appropriated the persona of the "irreverent and ill-humored traveler type" (377, 381). Others cast a wider net, considering the myriad personae that Fuller employs in the dispatches; Stowe for example, argues that many of the dispatches give "testimony to the variety of her experience and to her belief in the ultimate unity of that variety, of the compatibility, indeed of the necessary coexistence of the personal, the emotion, the aesthetic, and the political" (256). The conversational quality of her dispatches, then, resides in the various aspects of her consciousness as she filters them through the letters from Rome, and for Stowe, these shifts serve a rhetorical purpose. He observes instances of Fuller shifting from the persona of "bold political" advocate to that of "conventional tour guide" and argues that the significance of her life lies in the example she sets as a complex thinker who never "abandon[s] her identity as a woman" (Stowe 261). Although Stowe's analysis appreciates the heterogeneity of Fuller's personae and emphasizes the most interesting aspect of Fuller's style, any analysis that pigeonholes

the dispatches as strictly travel writing pieces cannot fully account for the rhetorical aspects of these rather eclectic texts.

Although travel to Europe does provide Fuller with the opportunity to continue writing for the *Tribune*, these texts cannot be reduced to the travel genre; Reynolds and Smith argue that, because Fuller's dispatches often prove tremendously personal while employing a wide range of rhetorical modes, they "wander far outside the boundaries of conventional travel qualities" (9). Additionally, Elsden observes that, unlike other travelling women writers of her time period, Fuller alone worked as a journalist; her dispatches were not published in one unit after she returned from her travels, but as individual pieces representing distinct and more immediate responses to the events she experienced from 1846-50. Eliding these differences undermines our efforts to understand her unique rhetorical strategies for crafting a unique kind of text. Leslie Eckel attempts to account for both the conversational and journalistic qualities of Fuller's work and therefore emphasizes the texts themselves rather than the consciousness creating them. For Eckel, Fuller's conversational journalism "modeled . . . the kind of creative transnational exchange that she believed could strengthen American democracy" (27). Indeed, the nationalist bent of the letters from Europe figures prominently in the scholarship, but criticism often foregrounds the psychological perspective of Fuller's growing sense of nationalism and examines the rhetorical aspects of her dispatches merely as manifestations of a metaphysical revolution.

Bell Gale Chevigny's study of Fuller's dispatches as acts of "mutual interpretation" presents an insightful analysis of the intimate relationship between Fuller's internal and external travels; read through Fuller's professed critical lens, the internal and external mutually interpret each other, or, in other words, relate dialogically. For Chevigny, Fuller's social criticism prompted her to "explore the living conditions" of various marginalized groups and to "[protest] failures of democratic policy" (103), social and political acts that ultimately turned inward and altered Fuller's views of the people. Thus, as Chevigny argues, Fuller not only interpreted the Italian revolution as a commentary on American complacency, but also internalized a lesson regarding the urgency of acting on one's principles. Although limited, Chevigny's analysis of the rhetorical aspects of Fuller's dispatches prove highly suggestive; she asserts, for example, that "[Fuller's] vantage point had shifted, quite literally, from lofty alienation to engagement on the ground" (106). This insightful observation certainly contributes to Stowe's and others commentary on Fuller's multiple personae, but Chevigny neither pursues the rhetorical import of such a shift nor identifies evidence of this shift in her dispatches. Significantly, Chevigny's textual evidence for this shift comes from Fuller's *letters*. Granted, most Fuller scholars seem to agree that "[i]n Fuller, writing and living were intertwined to an unusual degree," so that any analysis of Fuller should attend to the insights culled from her personal letters (Chevigny "To the Edges" 174). But the preponderance of Fuller scholarship fails to give fair attention to her public writings as rhetorical artifacts, a surprising oversight given her publication record. In addition, then,

to reading the dispatches as testimony to Fuller's growing radicalism, we should also appreciate how she used the dominant discourses of Romanticism and Nationalism to urge American readers to change their thinking and behavior.

Fuller, of course, was not the only American woman writing from Europe. As Elsden explains, the nineteenth-century witnessed a trend of American women writers exploring Europe in order to find America, "to participate in the construction" of nationhood (xv); in contrast to the strict "domestic boundaries" that contained them in America, travel abroad "freed them to expand their discursive territory beyond hearth and romance and to examine issues of a public nature in relation to their private experiences as women" (xiv). Her analysis of nineteenth-century women's writings supports the notion of a gendered notion of nationalism at work in these texts. According to Elsden, "American women recognized and manipulated traditional structures that promoted nationalism; their texts utilize the rhetorical strategies and symbolism that male writers often invoke" (xvii). The potential for creative appropriation of these structures proved especially rich for Fuller, who became, "for virtually the first time in America, a female editorial staff member of a major metropolitan daily newspaper" (*Capper Margaret Fuller* 167). Because her musings on public events were published in mainstream media, she had access to a broader audience and thus had even more opportunity and obligation to provide her American readers with information pertinent to "our affairs and our future" (Hudspeth 3.256). Consequently, although much of the scholarship privileges the *personal* relevance of the dispatches, as manifestations of Fuller's spiritual and political growth, we must also continue to explore the ways in which she "utilize[s] the Italian

Risorgimento as a lens through which to assess American democracy” (Elsden 26). Elsden draws attention to Fuller’s use of body imagery to draw symbolic parallels between women’s experience and the creation of national identity: “Fuller writes of the ‘body’ politic in terms that speak for the various bodies that contribute to the nations. . . . This mapping of human sentience onto geographic space links body politic to body personal” (26-27). Furthermore, Elsden recognizes that “as a journalist. . . Fuller had a distinctive relationship to her audience” (27). Clearly, both Elsden and Chevigny perceive the rhetorical import of Fuller’s work for the *Tribune*, but neither makes rhetorical analysis the dominant lens. This is surprising, given the highly rhetorical nature of journalism. Further, with nationalism as a dominant discourse innately tied to the public sphere, Fuller’s dispatches must be filtered through a rhetorical lens if we are to fully appreciate her discursive objectives.

Additionally, given the obvious importance of the intimate relationship between Self and Other, between private and public, in Romantic thought in general, attention to the psychological aspects of her life in Italy provides fertile soil for growing an equally revealing line of inquiry: her rhetorical persona. An extension of her spiritual and intellectual development, her conscious representation of everyday experiences for public dissemination at once confirms the value of existing scholarship for feminist rhetoric even as it exposes the opportunities for further analysis; both her intellectual development and her job as a foreign correspondent situate her in various configurations of time and space. The ways in which she represents these chronotopes in her dispatches not only confirms her self-development but reveals how she used personal events and epiphanies

as inventional strategies. Elsden writes, “Her tactic for catalyzing social activism is to target the individual reader. Fuller utilizes her front-page platform to make large-scale political pronouncements about her nation and its people, harsh assessments designed to promote the reader’s self-scrutiny” (29). We perhaps take for granted the outcome of Fuller’s journalism, yet if we consider that insulting her fellow Americans might have cost her a job, we must wonder what rhetorical strategies she enacted in order to use mainstream media to unsettle the mainstream. Chronotopic analysis of her dispatches suggests that the key to her success lies in her careful construction of a complex ethos.

Bakhtin’s essay on the chronotope generally maintains focus on the generic types of time-space representations found in literature, yet he makes some provocative claims about the relationship between the hero’s consciousness and the time-space in which she acts; the chronotope not only “defines genre and generic distinctions,” but it also “determines to a significant degree the image of man.” In short, claims Bakhtin, “the image of man is always intrinsically chronotopic” (“Forms of Time” 85). As Ladin explains, “the interdependence of chronotope and character probably grows out of the fact that although we think of time and space as objective ontological facts, we experience them phenomenologically, personally, as intimate expressions of our physical and psychic situations” (223). The “consciousness” of the journalist, no less than the consciousness of a hero or author, manifests in the unique perspective—the unique time-space—represented in the text; conversely, “any representation of time and space implies a synthesizing consciousness” (Ladin 224). When we apprehend a pattern in the chronotopes a writer uses throughout four years of producing 37 discrete (however

interrelated) texts, we must recognize a deliberate and purposeful representation that carries rhetorical meaning. Read through a chronotopic lens, Fuller's journalism illuminates our understanding of how a rhetor takes and makes opportunities to assert an ethos in order to challenge the status quo. Not only does Fuller attempt to engage a presumably complacent and apathetic American audience in the social and political events of Europe, but she unsettles national pride in America's destiny as the new Eden. Her success lies in using variations of road chronotopes to situate herself within public space and establish a sense of urgency regarding America's future. Significantly, Fuller relies on rhetorical chronotopes that emphasize the individual within a democratic collective in order to urge her country to redeem itself before the opportunity is lost.

Manifest Destiny represented a dominant discourse that Fuller at once invoked and challenged. Coined by John L. O'Sullivan in 1839, the concept attempts to "solve the problem of how a republic could grow without becoming tyrannical . . . by making time the medium for an effusive nationalism, in which the future itself would become American territory" (Allen 23). Converging with the mythology of America as a new Eden, Manifest Destiny not only privileged a utopian future but erased an ultimately useless past: Sullivan posited a "disconnected position as regards any other nation," and claimed that

we have, in reality, but little connection with the past history of any of them, and still less with all antiquity, its glories, or its crimes. On the contrary, our national birth was the beginning of a new history, the formation and progress of an untried political system, which separates us

from the past and connects us with the future only; and so far as regards the entire development of the natural rights of man, in moral, political, and national life, we may confidently assume that our country is destined to be the great nation of futurity. (426)

Fuller, however, embraced classical learning, valued the lessons of “antiquity,” and articulated what she clearly deemed a reasonable compromise: in deference to the expectations of her audience, she would “illustrate from the past, and European life, but [would] not dwell upon them” (Hudspeth 3.256). Although she may have been able to honor this compromise in New York, her travels to Europe brought into sharp relief the pitfalls in America’s stubborn celebration of its unique destiny and concomitant complacency in working to achieve it. While her dispatches from London and Paris carry sting enough in their harsh criticism of America’s failure to enact the principles it espouses, they maintain an attitude of hope and a reveal a trust that there is time enough for America to redeem itself. As she becomes more involved with Italy’s fight for independence from foreign and papal rule, however, her message becomes more urgent and suggests that the time has come for America to act before the moment passes. Thus, Fuller invokes the essential premise of America’s greatness, but she announces that the utopian horizon approaches and that the people of her country must act, so that she at once appropriates and revises the dominant discourse of manifest destiny; as Chevigny observes, Fuller challenged the mainstream notion that America’s destiny was unique and “urged instead an egalitarian cosmopolitanism, which would reposition America morally as *one nation among many*” (“Mutual Interpretation” 110). Such a message would

certainly unsettle those readers invested in America's sense of divine calling as the new Eden and must have created a rhetorical burden for Fuller. Because she focuses her message on the people, rather than the government, of the United States, she must establish her ethos as a democrat rather than as an intellectual—she must take to the streets.

An analysis of road chronotopes, however, includes more than a catalogue of the instances she literally enters or observes this public space. Bakhtin's study devotes considerable attention to the literary chronotope of the road as literary metaphor. A constituent element in what he identifies as the "adventure-time" novel, the road chronotope "fuses the course of an individual's life . . . with his actual spatial course"; as a result, "space becomes more concrete and saturated with a time that is substantial: space is filled with real, living meaning, and forms a crucial relationship with the hero and his fate" ("Forms of Time" 120). Given the abundance of scholarship pointing to the intimate interrelationship between Fuller's life and letters, the road chronotope at once complements established ground and exposes new territory. In more rhetorical texts, such as Fuller's dispatches, the road chronotope invests particular spaces with special significance, and the rhetor employs the chronotope in order to convey a particular relationship with that space. Throughout her dispatches from Europe, Fuller obviously reports on key events she deems of interest to her American readers, yet as she becomes more invested in the social and political problems she encounters, the events that count as "key" shift. Her earlier reports focus on European culture and celebrities—her reference to the "people" is negligible. Additionally, although she admonishes her readers to take

more seriously America's own social ills, she conveys no sense of urgency in doing so. However, once she arrives in Italy, she consistently reports on the events that take place on the streets, among the people; whether she observes from a window or within the crowd, she reveals her commitment to the public space of the masses, as well as prompts her readers to act more decisively to correct their country's wrongs. Rhetorical chronotopes of the road follow two general patterns; in one, the spatial dimension dominates, and the literal space of the city street organizes Fuller's account of public life, variously represented by processions, crowds, festivals, or protests. Thus, one brand of road chronotope symbolizes the public. Alternately, Fuller also employs road chronotopes to represent temporal concerns, and the image of the "road" works as a metaphor for registering her alternating views on the future and its link to both the past and present. Finally, attention to chronotopes accomplishes a unique analytic task: it preserves the different times and spaces from which Fuller writes, countering the critical tendency to erase important phases of Fuller's rhetorical gestures in pursuit of a grand narrative of her life.

In her first 11 dispatches, marking approximately six months of travel, Fuller pays little attention to life on the streets. Instead, she relates her encounters with various European celebrities, such as William Wordsworth and Thomas Carlyle. In her first dispatch, Fuller incorporates a "working-man's" speech, but it is a tribute to a nobleman, and she afterwards comments on "how great, how imperious the need" of the well-intentioned politicians, who must contend with such overwhelming social problems (47).

In her one clear reference to street life, she expresses that she felt "compelled to turn a

deaf ear to the squalid and shameless beggars of Liverpool” as she talked with “the girls from the Mills, who were strolling bare-headed with coarse, rude and reckless air through the streets” (47). The “homes of England,” she concludes, are losing their “sweetness” because “Woman, the warder, is driven into the street, and has let fall the keys in her sad plight” (47). This commentary represents Fuller’s sole, notable reference to public space, to the life of the city street, during the first 11 dispatches. She does make several visits to various social institutions, such as a child-care and a washing house, but she constructs these experiences in terms of the leaders, rather than those led. For example, in her account of Joseph Mazzini’s “school for poor Italian boys,” her interest clearly lies with the founder, not the students; of the latter, she relates merely that “these poor boys, picked up from the streets, are redeemed from bondage and gross ignorance” (99). To Mazzini, she devotes over two pages. Chronotopes of the road—detailed representations of public life—therefore, are notably absent from her initial reports from Europe. Similarly, her rhetoric depicts the road of human history as ground suitable for a sunny Sunday drive, rather than the desperate race in the dark she later perceives.

In dispatch one, for example, after reporting on the “shameless beggars” and “bare-headed” girls, Fuller interprets these social ills as evidence of “the darkest hour of night” before the proverbial dawn, and she expresses faith that (quoting Sir Walter Scott) “[t]here’s a good time coming” (47). Invoking a chronotope that represents time approaching, Fuller implies a rather passive humanity awaiting the promised “good time.” Although she applauds the efforts of “those who aid,” in no way does she suggest that the social ills she has witnessed demand an urgent response from everyone capable.

By dispatch eight, written in Paris but still covering her London experience, we witness a subtle but suggestive change in her perceptions; she writes that she cannot think about what she saw in London “without a prayer, *daily more fervent*, that the needful changes in the condition of this people may be effected by peaceful revolution which shall destroy nothing except the shocking inhumanity of exclusiveness . . . May their present possessors *look to it in time!*” (emphasis added 88). Here we can discern a budding sense of urgency in her characterization of “more fervent” prayer, even though she ultimately, again, depicts a rather passive and complacent spectator to the so-called “inhumanity.” When compared to the rest of her dispatches, these earlier writings are notable for what they lack: Fuller’s perception of the significance of the masses to the realization of a (more) utopian human existence.

Her first reference to a “crowd” happens on her last day in Paris. In dispatch 12, we witness a rhetorical pairing that pervades her foreign correspondence. After commending the French for drawing a crowd that “is always gay,” Fuller describes “the immense crowd [that] thronged the streets this year” for Mardi Gras, an event sobered by the knowledge that “the poorer classes have suffered from hunger this Winter . . . [and] the people in the Provinces have suffered most terribly amid the vaunted prosperity of France” (119). Immediately following this account of the masses, Fuller argues that “the need of some radical measures of reform is not less strongly felt in France than elsewhere, and the *time will come* before long when such will be *imperatively demanded*” (emphasis added 119). In this dispatch, Fuller also makes the first of many pointed and cutting criticisms of American complacency: “The more I see of the terrible ills which

infests the body politic of Europe, the more indignation I feel at the selfishness or stupidity of those in my own country who oppose an examination of these subjects” (119). Yes, the time will come when humanity is ripe for change, but for Fuller, the time might not come soon enough, and we can see that, as she immerses herself more in the everyday life of the street, she begins to articulate her concerns for the future in more explicit and more frequent road chronotopes.

Dispatch 16, for example, seems emblematic of the gradual shift in Fuller’s attention from high culture and celebrity to the spirit of the people; she begins the letter in a conventional manner—with a focus on a leading literary figure, this time, Italy’s Alessandro Manzoni. She quickly, however, advances the perspective of “Young Italy [which] prizes his works, but feels that the doctrine of ‘Pray and wait’ is not for her at this moment, that she needs a more fervent hope, a more active faith. She is right” (147). In this dispatch, we sense Fuller’s growing awareness of the people—and a growing sensitivity to them as human beings, rather than an undifferentiated lump of forgotten humanity—and of the passivity inherent to dominant discourses about time and human progress. Not only does Fuller applaud Italy’s growing impatience with waiting for her *time to come*, she follows its lead by chastising her own country for its complacency; after a harsh appraisal of Austrian’s oppression of the Italian people, she laments, “Alas! I have the more reason to be ashamed of my countrymen . . . those who are rich . . . [who] have no heart for the idea, for the destiny of our own great nation” (154). More specifically, she opposes conventional attitudes, such as that promoted by Manifest Destiny, that recommend a passive reception of a great future. Fuller recommends

instead the Italians as an example for Americans to follow; the formation of a National Guard is described as “the earnest of Progress, the *first step* toward truly national institutions and a representation of the people” (emphasis added 158), and although she expresses doubt that “the present road will suffice to lead Italy to her goal,” she characterizes their efforts as progress along “an onward, upward road” paved by the efforts of the people (160). In like spirit, she extorts her readers to “take a good chance and do something” and observes that “the Soul of our Nation need not wait for its Government; these things are better done by the efforts of individuals” (161). Clearly, the more time she spends observing the Italians’ efforts to evolve into a republican form of government, the greater her awareness of the active role that individuals must take to ensure a more humane future, and it is through a subtle but steadily more frequent employment of road chronotopes that she signifies the interrelationship between the space of the street and the path to a better future and employs rhetoric that would move her intended audience.

Throughout the events that promised Italy would achieve its goals, Fuller regularly and richly describes processions and festivals celebrating various moments of success; she notes that

festivals in Italy have been of great importance, since for a century or two back, the thought, the feeling, the genius of the people have had more chance to expand, to express themselves, there than anywhere else. Now, if the March of Reform goes forward, this will not be so; there will also be speeches, made freely on public occasions. (180)

Accordingly, her dispatches during this eventful period include translations of such speeches and pamphlets distributed in the street, as discursive testimony to the forward march the Italians have begun. Significantly, the path to the future not only requires that the people both follow and forge it, rather than wait for the future to arrive, but it also must move upward; soon, Fuller's road chronotopes begin to reflect the difficulties the Italians face in their revolutionary efforts. For example, she characterizes the competing forces at work in Pope Pius IX as a "collision between the Priest and the Reformer," between the weight of the past and the promise of the future, and expresses concerns that the Pope's lack of commitment to the people will block their progress. Additionally, she incorporates a document representing the will of the "Italians of the Unions," in order to convey the voice of the people; the letter warns, "should you [King of the Two Sicilies] refuse . . . to follow the fortune and virtue of Italy, then, Sire, her destinies would indeed by disturbed in the magnificent path where they are now advancing, but not averted therefrom" (191-2); a letter to Pius IX from Mazzini follows, in which the revolutionary leader expresses his faith that papal leadership "would much abridge the road and diminish the dangers, the injury, the blood" (198). Significantly, Fuller admits that she offers the "noble document" not only for the practical purpose of keeping her readers updated on events in Italy, but she characterizes Manzini's letter as "one of the milestones in the march of Thought," in effect adding yet another layer of signification to the image of the road; not only does the street represent the people, but their active investment in the progress of their national history, as well as human history. Further, the march of progress requires both thought and action, again, not of a select few, but of

everyone; as this dispatch foreshadows, however, those who have great power can ease or intensify the burden of the journey.

In the next few dispatches, Fuller's road chronotopes reveal the unfortunate consequences of the so-called collision between Priest and Reformer; not only did the inevitable conflict arise, but the Priest triumphed. Ironically, Fuller describes the Pope's renewed commitment to his vows as "the descent to ill," and explains that, in "proclaim[ing] himself the foe of . . . reform measures," he "had taken the first stride on the downward road" (231). Her immediate concern is to express the grief of the people who "had lost their father" but who refused to "submit to the inaction he urged" (231), and after a succinct report of the political maneuvers resulting from the Pope's defection, she returns again to the perspective of the people and expresses her desire to write of them in more detail in a later, fuller form more reflective of the "glorious new births" of the revolutionary effort. "Italy," she concludes, "is being educated for the Future: her leaders are learning that the time is past for trust in Princes and precedents—that there is no hope except in Truth and God; her lower people are learning to shout less and think more" (237). They seem to have no choice but to rely upon themselves; the Pope follows the downward slope, and America, "spoiled by prosperity, stupid with the lust of gain, [and] soiled by crime in its willing of perpetuation of Slavery," has lost the spirit which fuels the march and chooses instead to "sleep" (230). The spirit of the Italian people, in stark contrast, seems fully awakened, and they begin to assert a more aggressive right to their city streets.

Arguably the most detailed dispatch throughout the 37 she wrote, dispatch 26 recounts Fuller's return to Rome after a few months "rest" in a smaller town; in this dispatch, she recreates life on the streets of Rome on the very day that the revolution begins. She remarks, "the 15th was a beautiful day and I had gone out for a walk. Returning at night," she learns of the assassination of a traitorous minister of the people; walking through a crowd of people, he was stabbed in the back (239-40). We can appreciate Fuller's rhetorical burden; how to justify such base behavior to an American readership? How to defend her beloved Roman people, whom she had recently credited with a less reactive and more thoughtful mind? Although in previous dispatches, Fuller had situated herself among a crowd, here she not only intensifies the effect but emphasizes her physical entrance into the streets, among the very people who had carried out the plan to assassinate the minister. She emphasizes that the crowd behaved "as if all [had been] previously acquainted with the plan" and mentions that even the soldiers, charged to protect Rossi, "stood at their posts and said not a word" (240). Fuller describes her activities following the day of the assassination; she went to one church and another; she looked at a monument and entered a chapel; she walked along a main street and followed the sound of beating drums to join a crowd gathered to observe the Civic Guard, observing that "nothing could be gentler than the disposition of the crowd" (242). Clearly, she recognized the opportunity to validate the desire of the Italian people to take decisive action to achieve their goals; Rome, she asserts, "must either advance with decision and force, or fall—since to stand still is impossible" (245). Yet she also tempers her sympathetic hope with the realistic admission that the march of Progress covers

treacherous ground, and seems to prophecy that if Rome “falls this time . . . the way is paving for final triumph” (245). In the next discursive breath, she acknowledges that her own country, in electing a new President who “seems to be honest,” makes its own “step upward after having sunk last time to choosing a mere tool of party” (245). Fuller achieves a sympathetic rendering of the Italian crowd, as committed revolutionaries rather than cold-blooded assassins, by joining them on the streets and in their procession to mark the start of the revolution, and her consistent pairing of street scenes with images of the future as a path to be paved reveals how she created rhetorical opportunities from the events she witnessed and the dominant discourses of her own country. For the remainder of her dispatches, which plot the ultimate battle in and fall of Rome, Fuller’s representation of the literal events that unfold on the city streets concomitantly symbolizes the Italians’ desperate efforts to construct the path of the future in the direction of democratic ideals; just as Priest and Reformer collided within, and ultimately brought down, the Pope, so does the crushing weight of the past, in the form of monarchical tradition, attempt to halt the march of Progress and obliterate the path.

As the Italian republic faces resistance and attempts to protect its fledgling government, Fuller’s perspective shifts; although she continues to recount the various processions marking various stages of the *Risorgimento* as well as the horrifying details of battle in the streets of Rome, she maintains a strategic distance. Significantly, at the climax of the historic moment she has seen develop, she regularly reports from an elevated vantage point, which grants her a perspective appropriate to a historian. For example, in dispatch 28, she reports on the formation of Rome’s Constitutional

Assembly, an event that “gave occasion for a fine procession.” Notably, Fuller is not in the streets with the people; instead she describes her position “in a balcony in the Piazza Di Venizia” (255). Although she returns to the streets in the days following this momentous occasion, Fuller will regularly write from a space that affords her a broader view of events. Her elevated position, however, should not be interpreted as a gesture of superiority; indeed, her commentary in dispatch 28 indicates that her view from the balcony facilitates a better understanding of the Italian people than most Americans demonstrate. She recounts a conversation with an American tourist who criticizes “the people, [who] seem only to be looking on; they take no part” (258). As Fuller explains, the man failed to recognize that the members of the National Guard represented “the people,” specifically “all the decent men in Rome” (258). His misunderstanding results from his failure to observe and know the Italian people.

Her vantage point also affords her the opportunity to perceive and articulate the affinities between the Italians and her American readers; in contrast to earlier dispatches referring to the stupidity and selfishness of America, this text seems to extend her elevated attitude toward her own country: “How I wish my country would show some noble sympathy, when an experience so like her own is going on. . . . It would make me proud to have my country show a religious faith in the progress of ideas” (259). Fuller has taken the higher ground and invites her readers to do the same—to reveal their noble, religious aspect out of sympathy for a “sister cause” (259). Although the balcony view removes her from the street, her connection with the people is in no way weakened; instead, it is enhanced by her recognition that the Italians’ struggle is an extension of her

country's own efforts to realize a great future. When France becomes involved and enters Rome, Fuller reports from her window, the balcony, the loggia, out of obvious necessity, but she provides moving details of life—and death—in the streets below. Her observations influence her view of the march of progress; unlike the first years of the revolution, when Fuller's road chronotopes represented the present and future as one road that, presumably, proceeded from the past, her view from the balcony eventually convinces her that “no transition is possible between the old and the new. *The work is done*” (278). Additionally, her elevated positions reveal a rhetorical objective to record the history of this people rather than merely understand them, so that her sympathetic accounts of visiting hospitals and walking the streets at night are balanced by the more objective reports from the loggia; the focus remains the same but the altered perspectives provide her readers with a sense of Italians as individual people *and* as a struggling nation.

In her final dispatches, Fuller reflects on the experience of witnessing the harried travels of a nation on the road to democracy. In dispatch 35, she begins with her obligation to “contradict the falsehoods promulgated by a now enslaved and hireling press” (312), obviously an important task made all the more significant by its allusion to the First Amendment rights her readers may take for granted. The falsehoods concern the role that France and other countries played—or failed to play—in the fall of Rome; as she had prophesied in an earlier dispatch, “should [Rome] fall from its present position, it will not be from internal dissent but from foreign oppression” (282), and three months later she exposes the ways in which France directly undermined the efforts of a country

pursuing the same rights she enjoyed. Fuller describes France's actions as "steps tracked in blood," but she claims that they are in fact blessings in disguise for they confirm absolutely that "there is no possible compromise" between the past and a future based on democratic ideals (313). Her first act of reporting truthful events, then, invokes the space and time of the road to the future; her second duty takes her to the city streets in order to counter claims that they are made dangerous by anarchy and rampant crime. Fuller writes

I reiterate what I have before said, and it ought to be enough—I, a woman, walked alone at all hours, in all quarters of Rome; I stood alone amid the throng of soldiers and of citizens; I took with me little girls to help me at the hospitals, and their parents thought my protection sufficient; I was at the gates, at the post-office, in the nearer quarters of Trastevere, in the Vatican gardens—I never saw an act of violence, was never even jostled in the excitement of the crowd; I do not believe ever people or soldiery showed a finer spirit. (315)

Her testimony to the Italian *Risorgimento* focuses on the two spatiotemporal concerns she has developed and woven throughout her four years of reporting from Europe: the path of human history and progress, and the streets of the people. That she brings them together in her concluding remarks on the events of 1848 evinces their rhetorical significance.

Chronotopes of the road not only represent the people and their future in meaningful ways, but they also reveal Fuller's perspective and subjectivity as a female foreign correspondent writing for an American audience. Her book publications indicate

a penchant for elevated perspectives; she regularly recounts the scenes around her and the thoughts they elicit from a literal or metaphoric roof-top. When she began her career as a journalist, she signed her *Tribune* articles with a “star,” which Capper interprets as “a gritty version of her old symbol for lonely femininity” (198), but given the spatiotemporal quality of a star—as, arguably, the penultimate elevated position—we can understand as well its relevance to the various rhetorical personae she crafts throughout her writings, and especially in her star-signed dispatches. Fuller certainly does not hide or diminish her gender, and scholars (such as Stowe and Elsden) have rightly noted the gendered rhetoric in the dispatches. But these studies seem to suggest that Fuller writes from a single, coherent subjectivity as a woman, when the dispatches show that she employs a more complicated repertoire of subjectivities to establish ethos with her American readers. Capper explains that Greeley hired Fuller to help move the *Tribune* in a particular direction; in order to appeal to “an emergent urban middle class,” many of whom resisted sensational journalism and “yearned for some modicum of rational argument, refinement, and uplift in their daily news,” Greeley strategically nurtured the cultural flavor of the newspaper. Knowing Fuller’s like commitment to promoting high culture, the fit seems obvious. If we read the dispatches as testimony to Fuller’s spiritual development and turn toward social activism, we can ignore questions about how her readership responded to certain content, especially the consistent commentary on American complacency. But chronotopic analysis brings to the fore the ways in which Fuller seeks to unsettle her readers, and if we brush such rhetorical treasures aside, we not only lose a significant aspect of Fuller’s meaning, we miss an opportunity to

scrutinize how a rhetor makes creative use of dominant discourses to assert counter-hegemonic ideas.

Chronotopic analysis of Fuller's dispatches from Europe reveals her ongoing preoccupation with Romantic ideals; yet as much as she found and celebrated her heroes of the Italian revolution, her committed attention to the people suggests a creative rethinking of heroism. Admittedly, her relationship with a member of the Civic Guard certainly had some influence on her perception of the people as hero, but she speaks highly of other groups of people, such as those who took care of the wounded, or those who celebrated in the streets. Romanticism gave her an opportunity to consider an ideal vision of the masses, and she conveys this perspective through her consistent reports from and of life on the streets. In the mainstream belief in manifest destiny, she finds even greater opportunity to celebrate the people; as Bean and Myerson explain, Fuller felt deep "antipathy for the imperialistic impulses of the Manifest Destiny ideology," which she found antithetical to America's professed commitment to democratic ideals of equality (xviii). That same ideology, however, implied America's greatness, and she used her country's national pride as an opportunity to assert an alternative path to achieving it—rather than oppress other peoples to advance mainstream, anglo-American interests, individual Americans should work together for social reform and revolution in order to realize their divine potential. Because Fuller used democratic ideals to critique America's democratic practice, she established her own nationalist ethos in order to challenge her country to realign themselves with noble values, as well as keep her readers aware of the heroic battle being waged in the name of those same ideals.

CHAPTER VI

MARGARET FULLER AND MIKHAIL BAKHTIN: TOWARD A THEORY OF CONNECTED RHETORIC

“Conversation is my natural element. I need to be called out and never think alone
without imagining some companion”

(Margaret Fuller, letter to James Clarke).

“The word in living conversation is directly, blatantly, oriented toward a future answer-word: it provokes an answer, anticipates it and structures itself in the answer’s direction”

(Mikhail Bakhtin “Discourse in the Novel”).

Margaret Fuller and Mikhail Bakhtin do not, at first thought, seem a natural—or even a reasonably forced—fit. Fuller was a Transcendentalist and therefore subscribed to a system organized by Romantic idealism, while Bakhtin professed unequivocal distaste of any “-ism,” and this fundamental incompatibility seems reason enough to keep them at opposite ends of the dining room table. Admittedly, Fuller’s thinking and writing ultimately “answered” to a higher ideal, a concept Bakhtin resisted for its threat of finalization, but Fuller conceptualized “ideal” as a very personal, unique concept; each individual carried within herself a divine potential, and the work of the individual was to draw out her unique divinity. In more Bakhtinian terms, she theorized a unique “ought”

to direct the actions of the unique, once-occurrent Being, and she believed that the individual moved toward her potential and grew spiritually through open and sustained interaction with the Other. Although Fuller often found such inspiration in the natural world and valued her solitude, she was known as a conversationalist not only because she loved to talk but because she gained so much from listening. Given her emphasis on the Other as integral, and her respect for each Self as a unique being, she seems not as far from Bakhtin as we first suppose. As Caryl Emerson observes, “[Bakhtin] begins with two people who sit facing one another in a room, permanently outside each other but obliged to fulfill each other. There is no greater challenge in the world” (232). For Fuller, there was also no greater opportunity.

Bakhtin and Fuller need to be brought into dialogue because they complement each other. Writing 100 years apart, each makes a significant contribution to a project that has occupied our discipline since Corax and Tisias: how can we practice an ethical rhetoric? Classical rhetoric focused on the ethos of the rhetor, as we see in Plato’s insistence on a rhetor who concerns himself with truth and men’s souls and Quintilian’s emphasis on the speaker’s character, but twentieth-century rhetoric expands our notions of classical concepts to complement more inclusive theories of rhetorical practice. Bakhtin has influenced such efforts from myriad angles, but the central theme of dialogism represents his ethics of communication; as he asserts in *Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics*, “[t]o be means to communicate dialogically. When dialogue ends, everything ends” (252). For Bakhtin, then, dialogue is more than just talk; is an ethical imperative, a way of living in the world that makes our own self-actualization dependent

upon our willingness to respond to others, however different they might be. Although he would have resisted any label, but especially that of “rhetorician,” Bakhtin illuminates the complex act of human communication and brings us closer to understanding how we can practice an ethical rhetoric.

In contrast to his unifying principle of dialogism, Bakhtin characterizes rhetoric as monologic, which means it attempts to shut down dialogue, to silence or finalize the Other. Despite his ambivalent views of rhetoric, unsurprising given his experiences with Stalinist Russia, “Discourse in the Novel” admits a ray of hope when he distinguishes between the composition and orientation of rhetorical forms and explores, however briefly, the nature of a responsive rhetoric. He admits that “all rhetorical forms [are] monologic in their compositional structures,” but he chastises linguists for their failure to move beyond attention to these structures:

Linguists have taken into consideration only those aspects of style determined by demands for comprehensibility and clarity—that is, precisely those aspects that are deprived of any internal dialogism, that take the listener for a person who passively understands but not for one who actively answers and reacts. (“Discourse in the Novel” 280)

As this comment suggests, a more dialogic understanding of rhetoric recognizes the active, living presence of a listener who is free to agree, challenge, contribute, or resist. He continues, “In the actual life of speech, every concrete act of understanding is active” as the listener or reader “assimilates the word to be understood” into an existing set of beliefs, experience, and knowledge. A speaker—a rhetor—“counts on” active

understanding and directs her message “to the specific world of the listener” (“Discourse in the Novel” 282). Although the speaker has her agenda, and thus does not engage in a purely dialogic relationship with her audience, Bakhtin indicates that a rhetor can “enter into dialogical relationships with *certain aspects* of this [ideological] system” (emphasis added *ibid*). Thus, Bakhtin’s later work suggests an ethical rhetorical stance, from which the speaker engages in conditional dialogue that not only asserts her view and serves her agenda but that connects with the listener and looks for a response. In such a scheme, both Self and Other preserve their respective integrities.

Given his commitment to dialogue and distrust of system, Bakhtin’s work has attracted feminists—and with good reason. He has been especially productive in suggesting viable alternatives to the traditional agonistic model of persuasion. Foss and Griffin, for example, posit invitational rhetoric as a way to practice a more feminist (and therefore more ethical) rhetoric; they define invitational rhetoric as language that functions as “an invitation to the audience to enter the rhetor’s world,” with the purpose of creating an opportunity for both parties to achieve not only a “greater understanding of the issue” but to pursue productive self-reflection and potentially transformation (5). Accordingly, then, this kind of rhetorical practice encourages a greater respect for the audience—the rhetor, in seeking to share a perspective rather than impose a position, spends less time trying to anticipate audience resistance in order to adapt her message. “Instead,” as the authors explain, “[rhetors] identify possible impediments to the creation of understanding and seek to minimize or neutralize them” in order to create space for dialogue (6). Although changing opinions is not the purpose of invitational rhetoric, if it

does occur, it is the result of a dialectic engagement between rhetor and audience, the ultimate goal being to achieve “new understanding and insights gained in the exchange of ideas (6). Foss and Griffin’s conceptualization of a dialogic rhetoric is representative; it downplays agonism and minimizes traditional rhetoric’s emphasis on the speaker’s role in asserting her particular view of the world. Clearly, this is one of many attempts to conceptualize a dialogic rhetoric, but theories need practice. What does invitational—or any brand of dialogic—rhetoric *look like*? How do we enact it? How successful is it? We need theories to help us enlarge the repertoire of rhetorical strategies, but we also must have solid examples of dialogic rhetoric in action. Fuller’s writings provide just such an example of a dialogic approach to interpretation and communication which she describes as “mutual interpretation.”

Mutual interpretation represents Fuller’s commitment to the Other as a means of understanding the world better and nurturing self-growth, or self-culture; in her early days at the *Tribune*, literary texts especially represented a rather productive Other, both for herself and her readers. In a letter to James Clarke, she explains that she “never regarded literature merely as a collection of exquisite products, but as a means of mutual interpretation” (Hudspeth 6.359). For Bell Gale Chevigny, Fuller’s critical approach reveals a deep appreciation for and “understanding of the social origins of consciousness” (“Mutual” 99). Based on the assumption that knowledge is situated and that “human capacities are malleable,” mutual interpretation “welcome[s] other perspectives and engages them dialectically, letting them clash and mingle with our own” (“Mutual” 100). Often, in fact, Fuller seems unconcerned with synthesizing or resolving contradictions or

incompatibilities, so that her writings provide ample evidence of a *dialogic* engagement with the Other. As Chevigny observes, “alternative perspectives can illuminate, check, and complicate our initial sense of things,” and she rightly notes that “Fuller’s psychology is rooted in its appreciation of mutuality. She knew herself best relationally” (“Mutual” 100). Significantly, then, Fuller’s critical approach represents an ethical stance, so that no matter her rhetorical task, her writings reveal both the practice and outcome of engaging the world dialogically. However, her brand of dialogue does not require that she soften her message out of deference to her readers; furthermore, despite her invocation of the term “mutual” to describe her criticism, her actual writings contradict the suggestion that she engaged in the kind of friendly interaction that “mutual interpretation” implies. Thus, the label has its limits and does not adequately describe Fuller’s rhetorical practice; analyzing her writings should recommend a more accurate theory to reflect her practice, as well as offer insights regarding how an individual might *really* practice dialogic rhetoric.

Feminist rhetoric has often made productive use of such a method; by reading texts for signs of invention and other rhetorical strategies, several scholars have derived representative theories of key women writers who may not have explicitly delineated a critical theory but practiced one nonetheless. For example, Krista Ratcliffe makes a convincing argument for a rhetorical theory of “troubled materialism” to describe Virginia Woolf’s textual practices; in order to “extrapolate Woolf’s feminist theory of rhetoric,” Ratcliffe reads her writings for an articulation and consistent demonstrations of a theory of language (260). She finds such materials in a variety of texts and concludes

that “Woolf’s strategies,” as well as her musings on women’s relationship to language, “imply that women can use the language of men to find ways of expressing” their own “material conditions” (261). Although Woolf herself does not articulate a rhetorical theory as such, she enacts one, and careful reading of several texts allows Ratcliffe to posit a productive theory that fairly represents Woolf’s textual strategies. Similarly, Foss, Foss and Griffin successfully excavate feminist rhetorical theories from the works of several women writers; they produce a collection that not only expands our notion of “rhetoric” but complicates what counts as “theory.” They posit rhetoric as the study of “how people construct the world in which they live” and emphasize the central place of individual agency in rhetorical acts (7). In stark opposition to a traditional notion of theory, which limits such intellectual work to a select few and follows a strict protocol of hypothesis-building and testing, the editors of this collection understand theory as a product of “the most simple and basic of human experience [that] can be tested and verified through everyday practices and observations” (8). To demonstrate the various ways in which individual experience and knowledge inform rhetorical practices, they present the texts of nine feminist writers; although two of the featured writers describe their work “in specifically rhetorical terms,” the others do not (10). As Foss, Foss, and Griffin find, however, “a rhetorical perspective and theory clearly are evident in the works of all nine theorists,” and their analysis of these elements rests on a method that infers a rhetorical theory from rhetorical artifacts (10-11). As these studies illustrate, extrapolating a theory from practice has proved insightful for feminist rhetoric. Additionally, despite different approaches, this methodological maneuver demonstrates

feminist rhetoric's commitment to illuminating the context and experience that shape each rhetorical act, in effect drawing our attention to the ways in which rhetorical practices are connected not only to a rhetor, but to an audience and the world under discussion. Margaret Fuller's professed commitment to mutual interpretation must be expanded to represent her philosophy of language, one that engenders both a poetics and a literary criticism and establishes the premises of a theory of connected rhetoric.

Drawing from various essays she published in the *Tribune*, Capper attends to commentary in which Fuller explicitly references her understanding of literary excellence. Especially in her harsh assessments of literary giants (such as Longfellow) of her time period, she cannot help but compare their works to her ideal; in a "virtual précis of her poetics," Fuller asserts that the materials of poetry were available to everyone, but a truly "poetic vision" must "originat[e] in actual observation" and poetic expression must "be rooted in that vision" (Capper 250). The literary critic must follow suit; through patient observation and "long acquaintance through varied moods" only does a reader arrive at "the best judgment" (Capper 249). Theoretically, America, in both its democratic government and its inspirational landscapes, was primed to nurture a "literary democrat," someone who would "[encourage] avant-garde literary tastes and practices that she hoped would vitalize a potentially popular literature" (Capper 251). Fuller believed that "if individuals would become . . . authentic observers of life within and without, they would collectively create a 'fresh atmosphere' conducive to the birth of an original American literature" (Capper 252). Thus, not only poet and critic, but all individuals, had the responsibility and opportunity to contribute to culture, provided they

opened themselves to a fair and sustained engagement with the Other. For the critic in particular, authentic observation led to a fair and insightful judgment because it prepared the observer to understand the observed on its own terms—and to assess the degree to which it practiced its own potential. Because her criticism often implicated American cultural and social values, she demonstrated her own sustained study of her country in order to critique effectively the ways in which it fell short of its potential, whether in the literature it produced or the institutions it supported. Capper argues that “such ‘connected’ criticism—invoking society’s shared values to critique its practice—characterized much of her best criticism” (255); although his analysis focuses on her critical performances, it proves highly suggestive for understanding her rhetorical practices and inferring a working theory of connected rhetoric.

Capper’s assessment rests primarily on a survey of Fuller’s criticism written for the *Tribune*, but all of her writings express her approach to interpreting and responding to her immediate world and experiences. In other words, what he understands as her preferred approach to a specific act of producing criticism has far greater implications—she seeks and creates dialogic connections with the world she surveys and the readers she addresses. Thus, she does more than connect her critique to a value; her critique itself derives from the connection she forges with the Other. In practicing connected rhetoric, then, Fuller’s first act is one of empathizing with the Other. Some of her personal writings suggest that she at times wishes to lose herself in Nature, unsurprising given her Transcendental leanings. In her published writings, however, she does not, significantly, lose herself in contemplating her environment, whether her object be the natural world or

the people around her; because she preserves a sense of her own identity, she is able to connect with others. In Bakhtinian terms, “[i]t is not the object that unexpectedly takes possession of [her] as the passive one” but, instead, she “empathize[s] actively” and in doing so not only preserves her “own unique place” but also “brings forth something new” (*Toward* 15). Indeed, she herself comments that with the loss of “separate consciousness” goes “all power of observing details” (*Summer* 5). The ability to observe—to do the kind of work she considers indispensable for self-growth—demands the preservation of the Self. Certainly, “The Great Lawsuit” proceeds from her recognition that women are not afforded the same freedom to engage in sustained, authentic observation of the world around them; that they are either discouraged from study or limited in access. When Fuller argues for “the freedom, the religious, the intelligent freedom of the universe, to use its means, to learn its secret as far as nature has enabled them,” she reveals her belief in the ethical and spiritual necessity of unfettered observation to the development of the Self (31). Her dispatches from Europe likewise reveal her conceptualization of the Self engaged in active observation; she repeatedly comments on her desire to “live there for a year obscure in some corner, from which I could issue forth day by day to watch unobserved the vast stream of life” (88); later she criticizes a companion for his lack of “modest scrutiny, patient study, and observation,” which interferes with his ability “to form any accurate impressions” (258). A connected rhetorical practice, then, first assumes a unique individual engaged in active empathy with the world around her, yet it also assumes that this individual, this *rhetor*, seeks to assert a view of her world for others to consider.

In addition to respecting the Self, connected rhetoric also demands a particular attitude toward the integrity of the Other. Certainly, her conversational style can be understood as a gesture toward this attitude; whether by literally incorporating other writers' texts, recreating alternative perspectives in a literary dialogue, or establishing a conversational tone, Fuller's dialogic style enacts an ethical stance toward the Other. Her writings also reveal this stance through her commentary and reflection on her surroundings. The first chapter of *Summer on the Lakes, in 1843* relates her efforts to perceive Niagara Falls from many angles in order to "know" it, and she theorizes, "all great expressions which, on a superficial survey, seems [sic] so easy as well as so simple, furnishes [sic], after a while, to the faithful observer, its own standard by which to appreciate it" (4). Later, Fuller writes that "nature refuses to be seen by being stared at," and she speaks again to the value of "learning" the Other before judging it. Likewise in chapter six, she not only reiterates her interpretive scheme but demonstrates it; after reporting several accounts by other writers describing Native American culture from myriad perspectives, she asserts "[l]ooked at by his own standard, he is virtuous when he most injures his enemy, and the white, if he be really the superior in enlargement of thought, out to cast aside his inherited prejudices enough to see this" (144). Here we can see that she extends her principle of authentic observation beyond the inanimate natural world to include human nature as well; in doing so, she demonstrates the universal relevance of appreciating the divine integrity of the Other, regardless of its form. In "The Great Lawsuit," Fuller observes that "[n]ature seems to delight in varying the arrangements, as if to show that she will be fettered by no rule, and we must admit the

same varieties she admits” (42). Superficial observation not only endangers the growth of the individual attempting to make sense of the world, but insults the integrity of the Other and, consequently, undermines the kinds of connections that foster dialogue. More importantly, in respecting the integrity of the Other, connected rhetoric makes careful distinctions between the ideal, or potential, and the real; specifically, Fuller’s writings often demonstrate an effective strategy of criticizing literature, individuals, or a nation, on the grounds that it is not living up to a collective sense of its own professed ideals. Fuller finds *kairos* in the difference she discerns between the Other’s desires and its actions, and in doing so forges a connection with that Other.

Finally, connected rhetoric establishes a particular kind of relationship to the reader, who might be implicated by the Other under consideration in the text, but also exists as her own unique Self, capable of responding to textual representations. For Bakhtin, rhetoric generally fails to respect this relationship, as the writer takes a monologic position and shuts down dialogue—refuses to listen or consider alternative perspectives. Yet “Discourse in the Novel” especially encourages us to consider how rhetoric can be practiced more ethically by exploring the nature of the word and the agency of the reader. Most appropriations of dialogism seem to assume a friendly relationship, yet he makes clear that words do not—nor should they—always play well together: “The word, directed toward its object, enters a dialogically agitated and tension-filled environment of alien words, value judgments and accents, weaves in and out of complex interrelationships, merges with some, recoils from others, intersects with yet a third group” (276). Because language is inherently dialogic, always situated “on the

border between oneself and the other,” it resists monologism, even if the speaker tries to impose a final word (293); monologism, then, refers to a particular attitude of a speaker or writer toward her audience. Like the word itself, the audience lies beyond the scope of the speaker and can choose how to respond to the rhetorical gesture. An ethical rhetoric, however, will actively seek to establish connections with the audience in order to advance the knowledge and experience of both parties; Fuller’s *Tribune* writings represent the most interesting examples of how Fuller establishes rather complicated relationships with her readers. Capper’s appreciation for the ways in which Fuller invokes shared values in order to critique them doesn’t fully unpack the complex, potentially ambivalent response of an audience to counter-hegemonic arguments. Indeed, for her criticism to be effective, she must establish a particular kind of connection, especially when we consider that Fuller wished to provoke people into changing their behaviors. Connected rhetoric not only identifies common social values but creates rhetorical opportunities from dominant discourses; Fuller recognizes the *kairic* value of her day’s conventional attitudes for voicing her dissent.

In her essay “Thanksgiving,” Fuller enters dominant discourse concerning the origin of the holiday in order to advance a higher purpose, a more meaningful way to give thanks. An unabashed rhetorical piece, she unequivocally asserts her cultural critique of American practice as a corruption of its ideals, and in doing so certainly privileges her position; in other words, she asserts her perspective and hopes to persuade her readers to agree with it. Her piece also preserves the integrity of the Other—in this

case, Americans celebrating a uniquely national holiday. She begins by establishing the connection between Thanksgiving, New England, and their Puritan ancestors, and asserts that “the old spirit which hallowed the day still lingers and forbids that it should be entirely devoted to play and plum-pudding” (8). Immediately, she invokes two chronotopes—that of the past, the suffering first settlers of what would become their nation—and that of a superficial present, in which Americans have forgotten the true meaning of giving thanks and focus instead on food and fun. Presumably, most of her readers can relate to both perspectives, and as she presents her criticism of a deprecated national holiday devoted to “the enjoyment of sensual players” (10), her readers can take some comfort in the alternate perspective and rightly claim it as theirs as well—Fuller leaves room for them to quickly align themselves with the more enlightened version of Thanksgiving Day. In presenting them with two perspectives, Fuller concomitantly scolds Americans for their neglect of a higher calling and reminds her specific readers to heed it. Her essay makes consistent comparison between the wisdom of past ages—represented by the Puritans as well as the figure of Nestor—and the “want of moral discrimination on important subjects” characterizing the present, and alludes on several occasions to Scripture (11); not only do these references establish her ethos, they speak to her readers’ values and forge a connection between them. This is not just a matter of identifying with her audience; certainly, she does so, but rhetorical analysis must distinguish between identification that sacrifices either the Self to popular sentiment or the Other to self-interested manipulations, and identification that seeks to connect in some authentic way with an audience respected as individuals who share a set of values.

Fuller sacrifices neither her own integrity nor that of her reader, even as she delivers some rather scathing judgments about a base and unworthy practice which many of her readers are surely guilty of following.

Her essay “New Years Day,” published three weeks later, provides another example of Fuller’s criticism of her country’s failure to realize its potential. She begins by referencing a Native American tradition to mark the end of a year and “propitiate the Great Spirit for the coming year” (14) then turns her focus to American culture and begins a rhetorical search for the “sparks of a new fire” that will guide the new year. In a discursive move she makes frequently, Fuller embraces her readers in mutual exploration: “Let us look at the signs of the times, to see in what spot this fire shall be sought . . . Let us look about to see with what rites, what acts of devotion, this modern Christian nation greets the approach of the New Year; by what signs she denotes the clear morning of a better day, such as may be expected when the eagle has entered into covenant with the dove!” (14-15). Not only do the times suggest some unchristian acts but some decidedly unchristian men, who generally “live from and for themselves, acknowledging no obligation and no duty to God or to man” (15). From this observation she draws a devastating conclusion: Americans, the supposed superior race, are found “not fitted to emulate the savages” who “knew how to reverence the old and the wise” (15). Again, she establishes two major chronotopes of worthy past and debased present, and because her readers identify with both, they can distance their baser selves from their better halves. Additionally, her consistent use of first person plural not only includes her readers, but also includes her—when America falls short, everyone is culpable.

Immediately, Fuller catalogues specific examples from current events that testify to her harsh indictment and builds to a rhetorical crescendo in which she establishes a different relationship to those who fail to uphold democratic and Christian ideals: “Ye stars! Whose image she has placed upon her banner, answer us! Are not your Unions of a different sort? Do they not work to other results?” Here, we see her invoke the symbols of their democratic nation, a rhetorical move that grants some relief to the guilt-burdened reader—after all, they can align themselves with those stars that represent America’s destiny, and she reinforces this connection in her following assertion of hope: “Yet we cannot lightly be discouraged or alarmed as to the destiny of our Country. The whole history of its discovery and early progress indicates too clearly the purposes of Heaven with regard to it” (16). Not only does this optimistic comment shift the entire tenor of the essay from critique to cautious celebration, it articulates the shared vision of America and, therefore, reminds her readers of a greater, nobler potential and duty.

In both of the essays, as well as myriad others, Fuller delivers some incredibly caustic judgments of American society. Some rhetors might choose to soften the proverbial blow with euphemism or, conversely, to launch a full-scale attack; we can certainly find examples of both rhetorical strategies in the historical record. Fuller adopts a smart and effective strategy that produces an ethical rhetorical practice: she makes careful observation, she pursues truth, and she respects her relationship with her audience. Her approach, consistent across ten years of writing for public dissemination, demonstrates a dialogic rhetorical practice. Such a practice does not, despite certain

interpretations of Bakhtin's work, deny the speaker her own right and agency; indeed, the claim that any kind of rhetoric should or could be "polyphonic," seems misguided, since this term refers to a particular kind of relationship between an author and her characters. Arguably, rhetorical texts' very function lies in asserting a dominant view, whereas polyphony grants the characters a significantly greater role—they arise as separate, distinct consciousnesses (Morson and Emerson 232-7). Polyphony, however, is not the only form a dialogic utterance can take, though it certainly represents the purest manifestation; when we consider the criticisms of Fuller's writing—that it lacked unity and coherence due to its excessive inclusion of others' texts, words, *voices*, we cannot help but recognize its dialogic qualities. These voices represent her epistemological stance—contrary to Transcendental emphasis on truth as the product of divine inspiration and inward reflection, Fuller reveals her need for others in order to better herself. We see this begin to develop in her days as editor of the *Dial*, when she finds that solitary inquiry can take her only so far: "O these tedious tedious attempts to learn the universe by thought alone. Love, Love, my father, thou hast given me.—I thank thee for its pains" (qtd in Capper 33). Her understanding of dialogue as an act of love resonates profoundly with Bakhtin's views and informs her writings; Fuller crafts rhetorical compositions that pursue a dialogic sense of truth and establish dialogic orientations toward the world and her readers.

Given both Fuller's and Bakhtin's commitment to the ethical and spiritual necessity of engaging in dialogue, we would be remiss to deny them the chance to chat. Not only do they have much in common, but their respective works interilluminate the

other's. Both are attempting to make sense of Platonic and Kantian idealism, and both count Goethe as a significant influence. Bakhtin articulates a conceptual framework for considering the relationship between language, humans, and truth, and Fuller's writings present one manifestation of a dialogic imagination.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION: DISSENT AND OPPORTUNITY

As Foss, Foss and Griffin explain, feminist rhetoric should not be limited to women writers who articulate an explicit theory of language or communication; as they note, feminism has expanded “to include eliminating the oppression of all people who are marginalized by the dominant culture” (2). In a similar vein, Bean and Myerson define feminist criticism as “more ethically than aesthetically oriented” due to its emphasis on “human change and genuine social improvement” (xxii). Clearly, Fuller’s efforts to draw attention to the myriad ways America fell short of its potential establish her as a significant figure in feminist rhetoric.

Existing scholarship on Fuller establishes the conversational style of her writing, and is in the early stages of exploring the ways in which her texts consistently challenge conventional genres; certainly her inclusion of other perspectives, through literary dialogue and other texts, plays a major role in stretching, perhaps puncturing, generic boundaries. Scholarship has also established the especially intimate relationship between Fuller’s lived experience and her discursive representations—her art reflects her life to an intense degree. Although rhetorical analysis has adequately accounted for her style, and even offered some compelling accounts of her rhetorical objectives, the discipline seeks to understand better how rhetors create opportunities to voice dissent, and Fuller’s role as an outspoken advocate for all humans’ rights, during a time period when women were

granted limited access to the public sphere, demands that we pay more attention to her rhetorical strategies. *Woman in the Nineteenth Century* is a powerful text and certainly worth its place in the feminist rhetoric anthology *Available Means*, but this text does not fully represent Fuller's value as a key rhetorical figure. She may not have elucidated a theory that can be readily anthologized, but she *practiced* one; moreover, her particular practice grew organically from a commitment to genuinely engaging the Other in order to nurture the Self. Feminist rhetoric seeks a more inclusive and expansive account of how real people use language to advocate for others and assert an ethical relationship to the world; in Fuller's writing we find exemplary demonstrations of such rhetorical efforts. This study, then, not only contributes to our knowledge of Fuller's rhetorical strategies, consequently enriching our understanding of a significant American women writer, but it also reveals a rhetorical practice that can be generalized to the benefit of feminist rhetorical theories. Fuller's writing recommends a theory of connected rhetoric, one which preserves the integrity of both the Self and the Other, employs dialogic style, and recognizes the counter-hegemonic opportunities inherent in mainstream discourse. Future studies should explore how other feminists have employed connected rhetoric in order to challenge the status quo and compare the success of this approach to others.

The contributions of this study, however, exceed feminist rhetoric. First, a method of chronotopic analysis has great potential for advancing the field's recent attention to *kairos* as a constituent element of a rhetorical act. Arguably, nothing is more important to our understanding of *successful* rhetoric; the texts we privilege in the historical record draw our attention because they are exemplary and therefore represent

the final product of a savvy rhetor. *Kairos*, then, reveals the inventional process of a good rhetor. However, as Sipiora and Baumlin's invaluable edited collection makes clear, *kairos* also demands scrutiny because it represents a creative act and therefore has epistemological import. Because chronotopes represent the lived experience of the rhetor at the moment of invention and creation, they offer the best lens for advancing our knowledge of *kairos*, in both senses of the word. Chronotopes first reveal the rhetor's orientation toward dominant discourses—not merely her opinion of them, but the ways in which she aesthetically represents her unique time and space and her relationship to the status quo. Chronotopes also indicate the manner in which the rhetor creates opportunities within dominant discourses to articulate an alternative perspective; as we found in Fuller's writings, her representations of literal time and space—whether the prairie or the city streets—not only established her unique perspective but carried within them rhetorical significance, as she used her positions to advance an alternative interpretation of the world she perceived. Because American time and space occupied nineteenth-century thinkers and writers, the chronotope seems an especially suitable tool for illuminating antebellum rhetorical strategies; because all communication proceeds from the specific time-space of a writer, chronotopes prove relevant to rhetoric in general, and this study presents a methodology that will contribute to our understanding of rhetorical invention.

By utilizing Bakhtin's notion of the chronotope, this study has also demonstrated a stubborn refusal to abandon all hopes of reconciling Bakhtin to rhetoric. Granted, his work has become so ubiquitous in rhetorical studies that his key terms are often invoked

without attribution, but this study sought to practice its own connected rhetoric by listening carefully to Bakhtin's words in order to discern the ways in which he might be brought into dialogue with rhetoric in a way that preserves his integrity. Bakhtin sought to maintain the integrity of Self and Other, and he rejected overarching theories because they neglected the living, breathing, growing individual whose experiences they were supposed to help explain. Theories, in other words, deny agency, and rhetoric has obviously been used as a tool for asserting stifling theories—such as communism. It also has the potential to express agency and stimulate dialogue in the pursuit of truth; ultimately, Bakhtin himself did not assert dialogism as a theory, but embraced dialogue as an ethical stance, a life principle. If we deny his voice and influence in our efforts to articulate more ethical rhetorical practices, we not only violate Bakhtin's life principle, we reduce his living principle to a theory—we finalize dialogue itself. Anyone who embraces Bakhtinian thought thus understands that any communicative act can—and *should*—be orientated toward a dialogic relationship with the world. To advance our efforts to identify dialogic rhetorical practices, this study illuminates a method for discerning the dialogic dimensions of a text and posits a conceptual framework for understanding connected rhetoric as a dialogic gesture. Bakhtin's work, however, is rich and complex, and rhetoric as a discipline should continue such inquiry into the ways he can be brought to the discussion on his own terms.

By bringing together Margaret Fuller, as feminist rhetor, and Mikhail Bakhtin, this study has uncovered the potential of a theory of connected rhetoric, which presents a powerful practice for all rhetors seeking to find successful entrance into mainstream

discussions and, more importantly, to impact its path and its flow. Any rhetorical practice seeking social progress must, it seems, face an ugly reality: to be heard in the public sphere, we must assert our vision clearly and unequivocally. Despite feminist rhetoric's desire to avoid the oppressive act of persuasion, some of our most celebrated feminists—Margery of Kempe, Sor Juana, Mary Wollstonecraft, Margaret Fuller, Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Virginia Woolf, Betty Friedan, and most of the women who publish in feminist rhetoric—assert themselves. Even a cursory survey of the rhetorical strategies employed by successful reformers and revolutionaries suggests that these rhetors did not take an invitational approach to rhetoric, however fruitful such an approach may be in other, less urgent, rhetorical situations. Instead, these individuals offered careful and *persuasive* articulations of their respective visions and understood their rhetorical acts to be an integral part of making the world a better place. Future research should test the driving assumption of this study: a rhetorical practice that preserves the integrity of both the Self and the Other represents our most promising strategy for challenging dominant discourses. It is through connected rhetoric that we create opportunities for successfully proclaiming our dissent.

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